Within a legion of the U.S. aid recipients, there is a narrow group of the most privileged partners which has included the Arab Republic of Egypt since the signing of the Camp David Agreements. However, the end of the 30-year rule of Hosni Mubarak during the Arab Spring in 2011 induced the United States to reconsider its support to Cairo. Reacting to a series of subsequent governmental changesthe U.S. executive and the Congress sought to use suspending military and economic aid and modifying political, financial and technical conditions of its provision to influence domestic and foreign policies of Egypt. Logic and dynamics of these efforts, as well as the constraints that hindered their implementation under the Barack Obama and Donald Trump presidencies have not been examined yet in detail and with proper attention to the role of various domestic actors’ interests and external developments, namely, the Egypt’s actions and changes in its international environment. The paper draws several key conclusions. Indeed, the United States has demonstrated its willingness to experiment with a truly unique range and combination of methods of using conditional aid as leverage but thisexperimentationprocess was distorted by a mixture of powerful internal and external factors. The domestic political economy of the U.S. military assistance to Egypt, determined by its ‘tied’ status and distinctive financial privileges, and a permanent pressure from defense and pro-Israeli lobbies (and lobbyists occasionally hired by Egypt) had as strong an impact as the U.S. authorities’ intent to obtain perceived benefits from continuing strategic cooperation with Egypt or to avoid risks of ‘losing’ it to competitors, especially Russia. Egyptian governments understood clearly thelogic of the U.S. aid provision and the ways to mitigate the threat of aid suspension, which - notwithstanding a parallel generous support from the Gulf countries to Cairo - may help explain the U.S. failure to accelerate Egypt’s transition to democracy after 2011.

Affiliation: The Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS