The last decade in the Western development studies has been marked by a quest for an optimal model of revising reporting requirements for various development flows. One of the most visible changes was a significant broadening of a spectrum of peace and security-related expenditures eligible for reporting as official development assistance (ODA). Starting with 2016, this spectrum will include, inter alia, expenditures related to countering violent extremism. Neither these revisions, nor their political and economic substance has been duly studied by the international relations scholars. This paper fills a gaping niche by implementing novel conceptual approaches and applying them to an examination of both qualitative and quantitative data. Conceptually, the paper draws on the results of previous research on the security-development nexus, as well as the works of the London School of Economics professors J. Lind and J. Howell. The revisions of reporting requirements are being conceptualized as one of the under-researched manifestations of ‘securitization of development’ (understood as an encapsulation of global and national security interests in the framing, justification, structuring and implementation of development and aid policies) at the meso-level of changes in volumes and direction of the development aid flows. This helps to posit a hypothesis that the revisions of reporting requirements serve the interests of the largest established donors. This hypothesis is verified in two steps. First, the author tracks the process of revising reporting requirements by comparing consecutive reporting directives issued by the ‘club of donor’ — the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development throughout 2000s. Second, using quantitative data from the OECD database, this paper examines absolute and relative volumes of ODA-eligible peace and security-related expenditures by various groups of donors and studies the distribution of these flows among key DAC members. It helps to confirm the main hypothesis and identify complex political-economic nature of the revisions of reporting requirements. These revisions may equally be explained by a trend towards merging security and development imperatives, as well as by some influential donors’ willingness to boost their contribution to international development against the background of not very favorable economic conditions and budgetary constraints. The paper concludes with an examination of potential opportunities and risks related to the aforementioned revisions for strategic interests of the Russian Federation.