JC(FR)-3.4.9

Joint concept

Contribution of the Armed Forces to STABilisation (STAB)

Joint Concept (JC[FR]) 3.4.9, which is called *Concept on the Contribution of the Armed Forces to STABilisation (STAB)*, is in compliance with the graphic charter defined in French Joint Manual (PIA[1]) 0.5.5.1 (no. 161/DEF/CICDE/NP – 18 June, 2010). Said graphic charter is in compliance with the requirements laid out in *Allied Administrative Publication (AAP) 47* (called *"Allied Joint Doctrine Development"*). It also applies the rules laid down in the *Lexique des règles typographiques en usage à l'Imprimerie nationale* (ISBN 978-2-7433-0482-9), the main sections of which are available on the website www.imprimerienationale.fr, as well as the standards of the *Académie française*. The front cover of this document was created by the Defence Institute for Communication and Audiovisual Production (*ECPAD – Établissement de communication et de production audiovisuelle de la Défense*). This document was printed by the Paris Central Administration Service (*SPAC – Service parisien d'administration centrale*), a branch of the *École Militaire*, Graphics Pole of Paris (*PGP – Pôle graphique de Paris*). Please note: the reference version of this document is the electronic copy published on the Intradef[2] and official websites of the *Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d'expérimentations* (Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrine and Experimentation) at http://www.cicde. defense.gouv.fr, under the heading *"Corpus conceptuel et doctrinal interarmées"* (Joint Concepts and Doctrine Hierarchy).

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[1] French Joint Manuals or *"Publications interarmées"* (PIA) are part of the Joint Concepts and Doctrine Hierarchy (*CCDIA-FR, Corpus conceptual et doctrinal interarmées français*), along with Joint Concepts and Joint Doctrines.
[2] Intradef is the internal French Ministry of defence website.

JC(FR)-3.4.9

CONTRIBUTION OF THE ARMED FORCES TO STABILISATION
(STAB)

Letter of promulgation

Admiral Pierrick BLAIRON
Vice Chief of theDefence Staff
(VCDS)

1. Stabilisation takes place within the continuum of crisis management in theatres of operations abroad. It lays the groundwork to enable the political conditions for crisis resolution, as well as for sustainable peace and development in a given country.

2. This crucial process is often a multidimensional one, with civilian and military aspects, to which armed forces usually contribute in a decisive way.

3. This concept first clarifies the aims and stakes associated with stabilisation, then characterises the nature of the military contribution to stabilisation, as well as its approach. It also establishes concrete principles of action for the armed forces in this type of commitment.

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1. This table constitutes the collection of all the amendments proposed by readers, regardless of their origin or rank, as submitted to the Assistant Director for Doctrinal Synergy (AD-DS) of the CICDE. It is based on the table featured in Annex B (see page 39).

2. The amendments validated by the director of the CICDE appear in this table in chronological order of review.

3. The amendments incorporated are shown in different colours in the new version according their chronology and following a specific code described in another reference document.

4. The front cover and second cover page of this document shall be corrected to indicate the existence of a new version. The official registration number shall include the following note: *"Xth edition of Day / Month / Year"*.

5. The amended version of the text to be used as a joint reference document shall replace the previous version in all electronic databases.

No.	Amendment	Origin	Effective date
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References

a. **JC(FR)-01,** *Capstone Concept on the Employment of Armed Forces (CCEAF),*
    no. 004/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 11 January, 2010.

b. **JC(FR)-3.4,** *Comprehensive Approach (CA) in CRO (military contribution),*
    no. 024/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 24 January, 2011.

c. **JC(FR)-3.4.5,** *Crisis Management (CM),*
    no. 033/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 10 January, 2008.

Foreword

1. The armed forces are generally engaged in crisis resolution as part of a comprehensive approach aimed at re-establishing the security conditions needed for a return to normalcy in a crisis area.

2. As demonstrated by the engagements in the Former Yugoslavia, or more recently in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti or Afghanistan, stabilisation covers highly varied situations which should be regarded in a comprehensive manner.

3. Stabilisation is central to crisis management; it usually is international and multidimensional in nature, with civilian and military[3] aspects, and must be envisaged in the long term. Successful stabilisation lays the political conditions for crisis resolution which are most appropriate for the country (or region) in question.

4. The hierarchy of concepts notably includes Joint Concept (JC[FR]) 3.4, called *Comprehensive Approach (CA) in CRO (military contribution)*[4], which sets out the principles governing military action during these missions. Moreover, the French White Paper on Defence and National Security (*LBDSN – Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale*) sets standards in the field of stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction[5].

5. It appeared necessary to write a conceptual document to provide operational commands with details concerning the involvement and contribution of armed forces to stabilisation, so as to clarify the notions and vocabulary relating to this theme and bring consistency to the body of doctrines on related subjects, such as Operational Military Assistance (OMA), Security Sector Reform (SSR), Disarmament – Demobilisation – Reintegration (DDR) processes and CIvil- MIlitary Co-operation (CIMIC)[6].

6. In addition to the interministerial discussions on the theme of crisis management, the position of the French armed forces with respect to our international partners must also be explained, and consistency with documents of a similar nature published by NATO or the EU must be ensured.

7. This document, which is first and foremost written in an operational perspective, is mainly intended for the strategic and operational levels and is applicable the entire armed

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[3] Exclusively civilian stabilisation operations may also exist; they are not covered by this concept.
[4] See reference b.
[5] See the LBDSN, pages 58, 73, 114, 129, 204, 211, 217 and 224.
[6] See the Glossary, p. 42, for a full definition of these terms.

forces, to include the National *Gendarmerie* within the framework of its "*defence*"[7] missions under the authority of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)[8]. It is pragmatic and provides operational staff with useful guidance regarding the practice of stabilisation in operational theatres abroad.

8. Lastly, it aims to clarify the place and role of the armed forces with respect to the other actors involved, i.e. what they must, can, cannot and must not do in this specific engagement framework.

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[7] Missions concerning the *prévôté* or military provost (army criminal police, intelligence, protection [see http://www.defense.gouv.fr/gendarmerie/presence-dans-le-monde/prevote/la-prevote for more information]), public security (crowd control, law and order, protection of property and individuals, intelligence), special operations (intervention, observation, security, protection).]

[8] This participation of the National Gendarmerie in operations abroad is the subject of operational contracts set out in Joint Manual (JM[FR])-03, Section 1.

The place of JC(FR)-3.4.9 in the JCDH*

NATO Strategic Concept 2010

White Paper on Defence and National Security (LBDSN)

European Security Strategy 2003

Highest reference

Capstone Concepts

MC-4000

JC(FR)-01 CCEAF

English version available

Capstone Concept on the Employment of Armed Forces

Joint Concepts

JC(FR)-3.4 Comp. Appro. in CRO

17168/09 Use of Force in EU led OPs

JC(FR)-3.4.3 Intervention in CRO

JC(FR)-3.4.4 OPs vs IRreg. ADver.

JC(FR)-3.4.5 Prevention/ Ant. of crises

JC(FR)-3.4.9 Contrib. of AF to STAB

English version available

Joint Doctrines

Capstone Doctrine on the Employment of Armed Forces

AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine

JD(FR)-01 CDEAF

AJP-3 Operations

JD(FR)-3 C2 of ops engagem.

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AJP-3.4 Non ART 5 CRO

AJP-3.4.1 Peace Support Operations

AJP-3.4.2 Non-Comb. EVAC OPs

JD(FR)-3.4.2 Non Comb. EVAC OPS

AJP-3.4.3 Spt to Civil Authorities

AJP-3.4.4 COIN

JD(FR)-3.4.4 COIN

English version available

French Joint Manuals

Army Doctrine

Army Manual-13 C. Rebellion

Caption

* Joint Concepts & Docrine Hierarchy

NATO Document

French Document

EU Document

Classified Document (triangle on lower right-hand side)

Promulgated document

Promulgated document / New version under ratification

Promulgated document / New Version in progress/Revision

Document under ratification

Document under development/study

Document to be deleted after incorporation into a higher-level document or after being replaced by another document

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Table of contents

Section I – The definition of stabilisation

101. The word "*stabilisation*" has several accepted definitions[9], all of which express the will to manage the troubled post-crisis stage in territories marked by a profoundly disorganised running of the state and often torn apart by intra-state conflicts. In this concept, it is defined as follows:

102. **Stabilisation is one of the crisis management processes aimed at restoring the minimum conditions required to ensure the viability of a state (or region), by putting an end to the use of violence as a means of protest and by laying the groundwork for a return to normal life through the initiation of a civilian reconstruction process.**

103. **The stabilisation phase corresponds to the crisis management period during which this process prevails.**

104. Stabilisation is primarily a political objective, which in France is managed and coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (*Ministère des affaires étrangères et européennes/MAEE*)[10] for the benefit of a host nation. The local authorities and population are the main beneficiaries and the real focus of stabilisation. They should **take ownership of** the entire crisis resolution process and truly **make it their own**[11].

105. The aim of stabilisation is thus dominated by civilian concerns. Consequently, it always includes a civilian aspect and, very often, a military aspect, both of these being closely related[12].

The beginning and end of stabilisation

106. As laid out in the joint concept on crisis management (JC[FR]-3.4), **stabilisation takes place within the continuum of crisis management** (anticipation – initial response – stabilisation – normalisation – strategic watch). It is inextricably interlinked with the **initial response** preceding it and the **normalisation** phase which follows. This is why it is difficult to delineate in time.

107. While stabilisation actions should begin as soon as possible, the actual stabilisation phase starts in concrete terms when one or several of the following conditions are met in the theatre of operations:

   a. "*Major combat*" against conventional opposing forces is over.

   b. A ceasefire agreement can be enforced (interposition force in place), at least in specific areas.

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[9] Depending on the documents referring to it, whether they be produced by France or allies, it can be a phase of the engagement, a process or even a type of mission or operation (see Annex C).

[10] See the LBDSN, page 259 and the White Paper on France's Foreign and European Policy (*Livre blanc sur la politique étrangère et européenne de la France*), 2008 – 2020, pages 68 and 69.

[11] For that matter, this is what fundamentally differentiates stabilisation from the pacification operations of the past.

[12] Sometimes, when there is no military threat or for political reasons, stabilisation interventions are performed using only civilian means (e.g. Georgia in 2008). However, this concept, while highlighting the multidimensional nature of stabilisation, only covers operations in which armed forces are engaged..

c. The intervening force has sufficient freedom of action in its area of responsibility (including control of the airspace and coasts).

108. Similarly, **the transition from the stabilisation phase to the normalisation phase** may be envisaged when[13]:

a. The threat is no longer a military one or is now very limited and civilian players are able to carry out their activities freely in the entire area concerned.

b. Local security forces assume most security responsibilities.

109. However, the stabilisation phase seldom follows a linear path. It can be marked by discontinuities, and even breaks:

a. In **time**: peaks of violence, or even the resurgence of a military threat.

b. In **space**: stabilised areas can be next to areas that are still in conflict or, on the contrary, to normalised areas. Moreover, border zones generally prove to be the most difficult to control.

The pillars of stability

110. "*Stabilising*" a system consists in restoring its balance, steadiness and permanence.

111. The stability of a state mostly relies on three pillars, which are strongly interdependent:

a. **Security**.

b. The durability of **governance** and **sovereignty** (at political and institutional level).

c. **Economic and social development**.

112. During a crisis, the weakening of one of the stability criteria generally undermines the other pillars, based on a "*vicious circle*" logic. Conversely, in an improving society, a "*virtuous spiral*" takes hold in which the stability criteria mutually strengthen one another.

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[13] These conditions may be cumulative.

Figure 1 – *Stability criteria and the virtuous spiral.*

113.   Stabilisation is thus aimed at restoring the foundations of these three pillars, that is to say the **"*social link*"** in the broad sense between the political power, social and economic players, as well as the population of the state in question, while fulfilling the fundamental aspirations of individuals. The involvement of local authorities and the adherence of the local population are essential to achieve this objective. This is why, to international forces, it appears essential to cooperate with local security forces and to take the human environment into account. Conversely, the players opposed to this process, who often use irregular courses of action, usually try and turn this population into a target, a shield, or even an instrument to achieve their ends.

Section II – Key stabilisation processes

114.   Two important processes are implemented in concrete terms by civilian and military players during stabilisation:

   a.   The **restoration of security** or **"*securing*"**.

   b.   The **restoration of normal living conditions in the area** or **"*reconstruction*"**.

115.   These processes cover various lines of operation (for example, governance and consolidation of political legitimacy, security, economic development, etc.).

116.   **During stabilisation, the restoration of security (mostly military) generates conditions which are favourable to reconstruction (mostly civilian).**

117.   These two processes are generally initiated before, and continue after the stabilisation phase: establishing a safe and secure environment ("*securing*") shifts from the fight against armed violence to the upholding of public security and "*reconstruction*" evolves from emergency humanitarian assistance (which can lay the foundations of reconstruction) to long-term development aid.

Figure 2 – *The restoration of security and reconstruction during the stabilisation phase.*

The restoration of security (or securing)

118. The **restoration of security** constitutes, at least initially, the main process implemented by the armed forces during stabilisation. In this concept, security is understood as respect for the integrity of the territory, institutions and interests of the state in question and for the physical integrity of individuals and property[14].

119. Its restoration can thus be broken down into the following actions:

   a. The restoration of **external security**, in particular by ensuring border control, including along coastlines.

   b. The restoration of **national domestic security**, which can also be divided into:

   (1) Interposition between belligerent forces.

   (2) The fight against irregular adversaries[15].

   (3) The restoration and maintenance of public security (or public peace):

   (a) A policing mission (protecting individuals and property, judiciary and administrative police).

   (b) A mission to dispense justice (trials, incarcerating offenders, etc.).

   (c) Public order (including riot control).

   (4) The fight against transnational criminality (illegal trafficking, Mafia-like organised crime, etc.).

120. Various types of threats often overlap in current theatres of operations, when the same players pose a threat of a military nature and are also responsible for unrest jeopardising

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[14] For reasons of clarity, this deliberately restrictive definition does not cover the contemporary notion of "*human security*", which includes meeting the essential needs of the population. These needs have been included in the mainstay "*economic and social development*".

[15] JC(FR)-3.4.4, *Operations against IRregular ADversaries (ADversaires IRréguliers or ADIR)*, no. 131/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 22 May, 2008.

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public security, falling within the remit of the police. This is why the legal framework of the action deserves special attention, and must namely specify the rules to be applied to captured persons, and also the legal rules applicable to terrorist threats, hostile crowd movements, etc.

Reconstruction

121. The other important process initiated progressively during stabilisation is aimed at **laying the groundwork for a return to normal life** for the local population. This "*reconstruction*", understood here in a very large sense, is a mostly civilian process aimed at rebuilding the two other pillars of stability: governance and economic and social development.

122. This "*reconstruction*" can be divided into the following fields:

    a.   **Political** (e.g. elections, DDR process[16], etc.) **and institutional reconstruction**, including:

        (1)   Supporting the creation (or restoration) of national and local institutions.

        (2)   Possibly implementing Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Operational Military Assistance (OMA)[17].

    b.   **Economic and social reconstruction**, including:

        (1)   Meeting the vital needs of the population (water, food, housing, health, energy, freedom of movement, education).

        (2)   Building (or rebuilding) key infrastructures.

The link between securing and reconstruction

123. The heart of the issue of stabilisation is to reconcile security imperatives with the reconstruction objective. Indeed, these two logics are often **in competition**, but they **complement** each other and are always **interlinked**.

124. There can be some competition between these two processes. For example, the implementation of overly restrictive security measures can hinder reconstruction by limiting freedom of movement. However, reconstruction cannot take place in the absence of minimum security conditions. Conversely, the misery and despair of the population feed insecurity. Therefore, progress concerning security and reconstruction usually go hand in hand. In all cases, the two logics are truly interwoven: in parallel to the securing of reconstruction, for instance through the military protection provided to IOs and NGOs, there can also be a reconstruction of security, namely through SSR and DDR processes.

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[16]   Disarmament – Demobilisation – Reintegration (see Annex D).
[17]   See the definitions in Annex D.

Figure 3 – *The interweaving of securing and reconstruction.*

125.	*The relative balancing between the securing and reconstruction processes depends on how the situation evolves in the considered area. The success of stabilisation is based on their coordination, so as to set the virtuous spiral of security – development – good governance in motion. To achieve synergy between the two processes, as underlined by the LBDSN[18], a civil-military "comprehensive approach" should be promoted (see Annex A).*

Section III – Issues and challenges related to stabilisation

126. The implementation of stabilisation in theatres of operations is usually a long-term process that is particularly complex and delicate to achieve.

The primary importance of the context

127	*The key factors that are specific to each situation must be closely analysed for each operation. Due to their specificity, any dogmatic approach to stabilisation would be inappropriate: no "ready-made recipe" or any kind of "political engineering" can guarantee success in all cases. The primary importance of the context calls for* **pragmatic and flexible solutions that fit the specific environment of the operation.** *It requires a real* **understanding** *of the situation. A* **shared understanding** *of the theatre (which can notably be gained through* **intelligence**) *making it possible to* **comprehend** *these complex situations is essential to stabilisation. However, due to the number and complexity of the factors to be taken into account, the results obtained using predictive computer tools are highly uncertain.*

128. The key factors are the following:

    a.   The **situation at the beginning** of stabilisation: particularly the conditions under which the intervening forces are initially engaged.

    b.   The level and type of **violence** present in the theatre, as well as the nature, motives, capabilities, means of support and courses of action of possible **adversaries** of the crisis resolution process.

    c.   The **local human environment** (politics, sociology, history, culture, economy, etc.), on which the implementation of a viable reconstruction process that is appropriate to the context and culture specifically depends.

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[18]   See the LBDSN, page 58.

d.   The **number, nature** and **motives** of other **players**: multinational coalition, international organisations (IOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), private companies including Private security companies (PSCs), the media, etc.

e.   The **legal framework**, which is often complex (due to the simultaneous applicability of international, national and local laws[19]) and liable to change over time.

f.   The **geographical** and, most importantly, **regional dimensions** of the theatre, as well as the **nature of its access points**, which have an impact on the courses of action and means which can be envisaged.

The discontinuity of stabilisation

129.   *The players intervening in the crisis must take into account the discontinuity of stabilisation (in space and time) when choosing their courses of action and the way they are deployed. In accordance with the precautionary principle, they must remain* **prudent** *and maintain the* **capability to react**. *But they must also show their* **determination** *to preserve the gains achieved despite the uncertainties of the situation.*

Ownership of the process by the local authorities and population

130.   The process by which the local authorities[20] and population take ownership of the crisis resolution is fundamental but difficult to control. The assumption of more responsibility by the authorities and the adherence of the population are major challenges and require that the primacy of **perceptions** be taken into account. Yet public opinion is often fickle and increasingly influenced by multiple sources of information[21].

131.   A foreign presence, and especially that of intervening forces, has a direct impact on the opinion of the host country's population. Even though this presence is meant to be unobtrusive, it is never neutral due to the visibility of foreign forces. There is always a risk that this presence might be perceived as an "***occupation***", especially if this sentiment is cleverly exploited by the opponents of the stabilisation process. It is therefore essential that soldiers' behaviour be beyond reproach in order for the population to have a positive perception of them.

132.   *The primary importance of perceptions for the acceptance and local ownership of the stabilisation process emphasises that the* **behaviours**, *the* **image** *given off and the* **messages** *relayed by foreign players are of crucial importance, as is their ability to* **counter the propaganda disseminated** *by adversaries. In particular, this implies that tangible positive* **results** *should be actively and regularly communicated.*

The exploitation of time

133.   During the stabilisation process, improving the situation requires time, particularly with regard to the political, economic and social pillars. This need for time can sometimes be challenged by the possibility of instant access to information, which can exacerbate public opinions' calls for quick, tangible results.

134.   From a military standpoint, long interventions limit the possibility of maintaining adequate levels of standby response forces for other contingencies.

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[19] International law (in particular, the law of armed conflicts), national law of the host country, national law of the various players.
[20] Official political authorities, but also eminent personalities from civil society, religious leaders, customary leaders, etc.
[21] Press organisations, Internet, etc.

135.   As for irregular adversaries, they are aware that time is often ultimately on their side if they are able to hold out.

136.   *During the stabilisation phase,* **the transfer of responsibility** *to local authorities must be pursued as soon as possible. The short period during which the international community is viewed more favourably in the aftermath of the psychological shock caused by the intervention[22] should especially be put to the best possible use. Similarly, the intervention plan should remain* **flexible** *so as to enable a reduction of the end strength of the deployed forces as soon as possible but also quick reinforcements if needed.*

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[22]   Which, according to most analysts of modern conflicts, lasts around a hundred days.

The nature and approach to the military contribution to stabilisation

Section I – The general role of the armed forces in stabilisation

201.   In the general context described above, the general contribution of the armed forces can be summarised as follows.

202.   ***The contribution of the armed forces to stabilisation mainly consists in restoring and consolidating the security conditions under which the political objectives will be achieved essentially through non-military ways and means.***

203.   ***Its primary focus is the restoration of security*** in the face of a military threat (including by irregular adversaries). However, the forces may be led to **take part in some reconstruction actions**, either because the insecurity level is still too high for specialised civilian agencies to be able to deploy, or because they are the only ones with the expertise required in a specific field (e.g. rebuilding the local armed forces within the framework of an SSR programme).

204.   This contribution begins in effect when the military forces have deployed and have sufficient freedom of action in their area of responsibility. It ends when responsibility for security has been transferred to other players (international civilian forces, local security forces).

205.   Due to the importance of knowing the theatre, **intelligence of military interest**[23] is essential to the contribution of the armed forces during this phase. In particular, it provides them with:

   a.   An analysis of military threats (regular and irregular threats).

   b.   An analysis of the general framework in which the intervention takes place.

   c.   An assessment of the results achieved during this intervention.

206.   In the context of developing a comprehensive approach, intelligence of military interest must also contribute to the elaboration of a shared assessment of the situation with the other players.

The main role of the armed forces: the restoration of security

207.   During the stabilisation phase, **the main role of the armed forces consists in restoring the level of security required to implement the reconstruction process**. This is the **main reason behind** their engagement and a possible failure in the field of security compromises the entire crisis resolution process. This role can be broken down into:

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[23]   Intelligence of military interest (in French *Renseignement d'intérêt militaire [RIM]*): intelligence that includes data and assessments necessary for evaluating the situation and making a decision, at all levels of command (JC, JD and JP 2).

The restoration of domestic security in the face of a military threat

208. Acting for the benefit of a fragile or failed state, intervening armed forces generally play a **key role in the restoration of domestic security** in the host country, notably if it is plagued by the **hostile actions of irregular adversaries**. They thus implement the courses of action that are specific to counterinsurgency. **Counterinsurgency** therefore constitutes a particular form of securing whose stakes have a decisive influence on the success of stabilisation as a whole. In this case, **controlling** the physical and human aspects of the **environment** proves to be essential and requires sufficient means, specifically in relation to the number of inhabitants in the area of responsibility.

The consolidation of external security

209. During the stabilisation phase, as long as the local security forces are not fully operational, the international armed forces also ensure the main part of the **external security** of the host country (or region), by deterring and preventing any threat coming from abroad[24]. Generally, they must also take part in the **surveillance** of land and sea **borders** as well as in **airspace control**[25], as these conditions are often necessary to establish a safe and secure environment on the territory of the host country.

The participation in the restoration and maintenance of public security

210. In some cases, intervening forces can take on responsibilities concerning the **restoration and maintenance of public security**, by enforcing law and order (e.g. through crowd and riot control). In exceptional cases, they may also have to carry out police missions (protecting individuals and property, fighting trafficking, etc.). In all cases, they should only take part in the maintenance of public security inasmuch as civilian security forces (local or intervening forces) are nonexistent, insufficient, unavailable or unsuitable. **This type of mission should be handed over as soon as possible** because the competence of the armed forces is limited and they quickly lose their legitimacy to exercise such responsibilities over time.

The contribution of the armed forces to reconstruction

211. **Armed forces are not intended to take part in civilian reconstruction directly**, but they can **contribute** when the civilian means required are nonexistent, insufficient, unavailable or unsuitable. Thanks to its favourable impact on perceptions, this contribution proves helpful to get the population to accept the force and to establish a safe and secure environment. This contribution generally evolves as the level of violence subsides (see Annex A) and it can take the following forms:

Actions to support the integration of the forces

212. During the stabilisation phase, the armed forces support their own intervention via **CIvil-MIlitary Co-operation actions (CIMIC)**[26]. These CIMIC actions are first and foremost aimed at favouring the adherence of the population, through projects that are often limited in scope but are concrete and can be implemented quickly (QIP)[27]. It is within this framework that Medical Assistance to the Population (MAP)[28] also lies. Although their aims are different, CIMIC actions and civilian reconstruction should still be coordinated in space and time so as to avoid overlaps or, on the contrary, the overlooking of important points, and more importantly to ensure the overall consistency of the actions

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[24] See the case of Kosovo.
[25] When such authority is given by their mandate.
[26] See the definition in Annex 1.
[27] Quick Impact Projects.
[28] See JD(FR)-3.29, *Medical Assistance to the Population (MAP)*, no. 907/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 15 May, 2009.

taken as part of the general crisis resolution process. In this way, CIMIC can make it possible to initiate civilian reconstruction actions.

Assistance to the population

213.   In an emergency where an immediate civilian intervention is not possible, or in situations covered by international law[29], armed forces may be called upon to provide **humanitarian assistance** to the local population, even if only by conducting needs assessments. This type of mission, which must remain limited in time, requires important preparatory work and calls for the support of expert advisers. The civilian reconstruction process can later rely on the actions carried out by the military to provide assistance to the population.

Operational military assistance

214.   Armed forces usually contribute to institutional reconstruction through **military assistance** to the host country's forces, notably by taking part in the **military aspect** of any possible **SSR** process. They often also **support** DDR processes when they are initiated by the international community, notably by recovering and storing disarmed combatants' weapons.

Support of civilian reconstruction actions

215.   In some cases, and particularly during the short period where they are viewed with leniency, in the absence of any local civilian administration and before any specialised civilian players become involved, there is a possibility that the military force and its supporting elements will be the only actors able to fulfil certain essential civilian duties in order to avoid a complete disorganisation of society. Moreover, the forces can provide **support for civilian reconstruction actions of an economic nature** (repairing infrastructures, etc.). For example, they can ensure their safety, provide specific expertise, perform mine-clearing and clean-up operations in an area or on a route, provide logistical support, or even means of transport, etc. Such direct contributions to reconstruction must remain rare. In all cases, their implementation must be evaluated precisely and closely coordinated with the civilian means used. Lastly, **special financing for this support must be set up as soon as possible by those who request it**.

Section II – The evolution of military contribution and transitions

The general evolution of the role of intervening military forces

216.   The contribution of the armed forces to stabilisation evolves over time, in terms of both its importance and nature[30].

217.   The role of intervening military forces generally becomes less important over time. Their contribution is **decisive** during the initial response phase and remains significant at the beginning of the stabilisation phase, when important residual pockets of violence remain. It remains **essential** so long as there is a risk that armed violence might resume. Finally, it becomes of **secondary importance** when the conditions of normalisation are about to be met, i.e. usually when local forces progressively take on the responsibility of ensuring security. International forces then **reduce the visibility of their presence**, which should

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[29]   See the Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August, 1949.
[30]   The model described is a theoretical one: this evolution may vary from one theatre of operations to the next, and also from one region to another within a same theatre.

remain a deterrent[31], until local forces are able to assume full responsibility for security autonomously[32].

218.   During the stabilisation phase, the **duties** of the armed forces evolve as follows:

Figure 4 – Theoretical evolution of the duties of the armed forces during the stabilisation phase.

Transfers of responsibility

219.   The stabilisation phase is a transition period between the priority given to military action and the predominance of civilian action. It includes several **intermediate transitions**, i.e. **transfers of responsibility**.

220.   The intervening armed forces should generally perform these transitions according to the following order of priority:

a.   Transferring any possible **police** responsibilities to specialised forces and services (ideally to local services if they are able to take them on, otherwise to an ad hoc international police force which should ideally have a military status similar to that of the *Gendarmerie*)[33].

b.   Transferring any possible responsibility for **humanitarian assistance** to the population to civilian humanitarian agencies (IOs and NGOs).

c.   Transferring all **reconstruction** duties (except for military aspects[34]) which may have been entrusted to the armed forces to civilian agencies.

d.   Transferring all **security** responsibilities (domestic and external security) to the local forces[35].

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31   For example, as a reserve for intervention on the territory or nearby.
32   Which marks the transition to normalisation.
33   However, the naval and air forces may continue to fulfil such responsibilities in order to enforce the sovereignty of the host country.
34   CIMIC, military aspect of the SSR or DDR processes.

221.   These various transitions, which can take place simultaneously, must be prioritised, anticipated, planned for and managed in close coordination with the other players involved. It is indeed imperative that they succeed, for any step backwards could be interpreted as a failure of the crisis resolution process as a whole.

222.   To anticipate and plan for these transitions, defining indicators and monitoring them regularly can prove to be particularly relevant, especially if they are elaborated in coordination with all players. These indicators must reflect the level of achievement of each objective to be reached in order to ensure the stabilisation of the host country, and notably:

   a.   Progress in terms of **security**.

   b.   The increased capacity of **local security forces**.

   c.   The actual deployment and capabilities of **international civilian players**.

   d.   Progress regarding the **host country's authorities' ability to govern**.

223.   Implementing the transitions which directly involve the intervening forces mainly comes under the first three factors in accordance with the theoretical diagram below.

Figure 5 – Military contribution to stabilisation.

224.   Due to the specific context of the theatre and crisis[36], any theoretical transition model is uncertain. In particular, transitions are the subject of political decisions which take more than local conditions into account. Consequently, this concept can neither describe transitions during the stabilisation phase in detail, nor the criteria to be taken into account to plan for them, as this work must be performed for each operation individually.

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[35]   In some cases, there can be an intermediate transition between international forces with different statuses, for example between an ad hoc coalition and a UN peacekeeping force.

[36]   The notion of security, for instance, is highly subjective and varies according to each player depending on whether they are part of a company, an NGO or the armed forces. It also varies according to the nature of the threats and risks in the theatre under consideration. A precise and common definition of insecurity levels (or thresholds) can only be achieved for a given theatre of operations, but this work makes transfers of responsibility from the military to civilians easier.

Section III – General approaches and limits of the military contribution to stabilisation

The specificity of military action regarding stabilisation

225. The **specificity of military action**, i.e. the ability to fight, must be recalled and preserved regardless of the context of the engagement. Therefore, during the stabilisation phase, the armed forces first and foremost have the role to **restore security in the face of a military threat** (regular and irregular threats), **while military intelligence analyses such a threat**. Similarly, **no French military unit is specifically dedicated to stabilisation**, unlike in some allied armies.

The adaptation of the armed forces to stabilisation

226. In order to efficiently contribute to stabilisation, the armed forces adapt their organisation, means and courses of action to each theatre. This adaptation, which relies on the versatility, modularity and flexibility of the French armed forces, especially applies to the following fields:

    a.   The **command and control of operations**, through:

        (1)   **Decentralisation** and the promotion of the **initiative** down to the local tactical level.

        (2)   The strengthening or adaptation of certain **functions** (intelligence, CIMIC, information operations, public affairs, sub-tasks of logistical support, political, legal, cultural or even economic advising, etc.).

        (3)   The implementation of **appropriate procedures**, etc.

    b.   The **conduct of operations**:

        (1)   By capitalising on our **air and information superiority** so as to achieve the appropriate military effect at the right place at the right time.

        (2)   By adapting our **courses of action** (decentralisation, adapting postures, evolution of the rules of engagement according to the legal framework, etc.).

        (3)   By seeking where possible **dual equipment sets for deployed units** (for example, both armoured and light tactical vehicles).

        (4)   By using some **dual capabilities** (military and civilian) of the means engaged[37], etc.

    c.   The **strengthening of specific capabilities**: intelligence, and especially human intelligence (HUMINT), deployment assistance, CIMIC, mobility, etc.

    d.   The **development of influence capabilities**, particularly in the field of Information Operations (IOs), including Military Influence Operations (MIOs).

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[37] For example, deployment assistance capabilities.

The preservation of the capability to react

227.   In all cases, the adaptation of the forces to stabilisation must preserve their **capability to react**, especially when facing a sudden deterioration of the security situation. This capability relies on the **deterrent nature**, the **responsiveness** and the **flexibility** of the deployment, the equipment and the personnel which make up the intervening force.

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Chapter 3
The foundations and principles of military action for stabilisation

Section I – The foundations of military action for stabilisation

301.　The foundations of military action for stabilisation are the main imperatives that the armed forces must uphold, according to a logic shared with the other players. They must be appropriate to the specificity of the particular context of the intervention.

Upholding the legitimacy of the action

302.　The legitimacy of military action is based on legality, which is usually ensured by a mandate given by the United Nations Organisation, and military ethics. It notably rests on controlling the use of force, and thus on its adequacy to the objectives pursued, while maintaining its reversibility, observing proportionality in counterattacks and favouring precision over force. Legitimacy is acquired slowly and quickly lost.

303.　To maintain the legitimacy of the intervention within the **host nation**, the armed forces must be especially careful to foster a positive perception of their role and not to be viewed as occupation troops. While respecting the populations, they must also show professionalism and behave impeccably. They must also put themselves in a supporting position relative to the local security forces as soon as possible. In the eyes of **national (French) public opinion**, the legitimacy of the intervention can be quickly eroded by the losses suffered. Force protection, here again, is especially important. At the **political level**, this legitimacy is strengthened by the multinational nature of the intervening force. Lastly, it is a matter of winning the "*information battle*" on a strategic level, thanks to an appropriate defensive and offensive information strategy.

Maintaining credibility

304.　During the stabilisation phase, the credibility of the forces essentially relies on their **freedom of action** in their area of responsibility, in order to maintain their ascendancy over possible adversaries.

A shared understanding of the engagement context

305.　**Understanding the context**, which is always specific, is essential. It requires anticipation and a refined and multidisciplinary analysis, well before the intervention begins, so as to elaborate an assessment shared by all players. Within this context, intelligence of military interest provides a major – though not exclusive – contribution.

Striving for unity of effort

306.　As part of this **comprehensive approach** aimed at meeting the political objective set, the armed forces strive to maintain, throughout the stabilisation phase, the coherence of their action in relation to the other players and, as much as possible, to promote coordination and cooperation among the players involved in order to improve synergy.

The adherence of the local authorities and population

307. In the theatre, the armed forces not only preserve the legitimacy of the intervention, but they also contribute to the **ownership** of the crisis resolution process by the local authorities and population. The force must therefore strive to keep, or sometimes gain, the support of the large majority of this population regarding the action of the international community and, more specifically, the action of the intervening forces.

Section II – The principles of military action for stabilisation

308. The foundations of the contribution of the armed forces to stabilisation can be broken down into pragmatic principles according to a specifically military logic. These principles must obviously be carefully adapted to the specific context of the intervention.

Understanding and adapting to the environment

309. Given the primary importance of the context, understanding it, so as to carefully and continually adapt military action, is of major importance. This involves:

    a. Performing an **analysis of the situation** in all areas (geography, history, sociology, economy, politics, culture, etc.) and backing it up, as often as possible, with an **initial reconnaissance** of the theatre.

    b. **Widely circulating this analysis** by organising a specific training module intended for all servicemen to be deployed in the theatre.

    c. Increasing **intelligence resources** in the theatre, notably concerning human intelligence (HUMINT), and strengthening the units specialising in media analysis.

    d. As soon as possible, identifying the **real power relationships**[38] in the theatre.

    e. Identifying the **information environment** (and its players) within which perceptions are built according to themes and messages.

    f. Analysing the **legal framework** of the intervention as soon as possible.

    g. Laying down clear and simple **operational Rules of Engagement** (RoE), as well as **rules of behaviour** which fit the local human context and are known to all.

Anticipating stabilisation from the outset of the initial response planning

310. Stabilisation issues are so complex and interwoven that they must be anticipated as soon as possible at the operational level, particularly via the following measures:

    a. Apprehending the impact of the courses of action selected for the **initial action** on stabilisation, especially if it is a coercive action: in such a case, **controlling the use of force** (namely by limiting the destruction of civilian infrastructures).

    b. **Planning the evolution** of the force structure and its deployment plans of action, with a view to the specific missions of stabilisation (see § 226).

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[38] Pressure groups, key leaders who may be official political authorities, but also religious leaders, customary leaders, etc.

c. Preserving **existing institutions** to the extent possible, including those responsible for the maintenance of law and order, or providing for their replacement as soon as possible.

d. Identifying and supporting the social groups contributing to the resolution of the crisis and fighting the others, without however **demonising** or **entirely discrediting** a specific group.

e. Having the resources and means required to address the **pressing humanitarian needs** of the population, if necessary.

Seeking synergy with the other players while preserving the specificity of military action

311. Within a comprehensive approach, the armed forces must, in concrete terms, strive for greater complementarity between their action and that of the other players, without compromising their specific military nature. This principle particularly involves:

a. First, sharing unclassified information with the other players so as to develop a **common understanding of the situation and objectives pursued** on a political, military and strategic level.

b. Applying this approach in the theatre of operations, by facilitating the **coordination of military action** with that of the other players involved, especially concerning the preparation and management of transitions.

c. While ensuring that **actions of a specifically military nature remain under military command in all cases**.

Acting in contact with the population

312. Due to the major role played by local actors in the success of stabilisation, the intervening armed forces must:

a. Seek and maintain ongoing relationships with the **local authorities** and other **key leaders** that have been identified.

b. **Favour contact with the population** when choosing postures and courses of action and, at least at the beginning of the stabilisation period, have enough troops in contact with the population to ensure a **significant presence**.

c. **Protect the population**: in particular, ensure public security if no other service is able to do so during the short period where the military is viewed favourably after the initial response.

d. **Strive to rally** the factions which can be won over, but show unfailing determination with respect to the others.

e. **Meet the vital needs of the population**, i.e. ensure emergency humanitarian relief if no other organisation is able to do so.

f. **Endeavour to respect local customs**, notably by avoiding courses of action or behaviours which might offend local sensibilities.

g.   **Reduce the risk of collateral damage** by controlling the effects of weapons (especially by using precision weapons and low-lethality weapons within the context of crowd control).

Influencing perceptions

313.   Given the crucial importance of public opinion in this type of engagement, the forces must develop their ability to influence perceptions:

a.   By implementing an **information strategy** in order to win the "*information battle*" in the local and international media, as well as on the Internet;

b.   Thanks to **information operations** in the theatre, fighting disinformation and rumours, and showing the authorities and population the determination of the force as well as the positive results achieved in comparison with the former situation;

c.   By leading **CIMIC actions** consistent with the general manoeuvre of the force, with the support of decentralised budgets;

d.   While taking into account the importance of the local **cultural and social perspectives** for interpreting the messages and actions of the population.

Acting quickly and managing efforts over time

314.   To make the most of deadlines, which usually work against foreign players during the stabilisation phase, the armed forces must both maintain their ability to act (or respond) in an emergency and work towards long-term effects. This is why they must:

a.   Be able to make the best of the short period *(**"état de grace"**)* during which they are viewed favourably following the initial response by having as many capabilities as possible straightaway in order to face the requirements of the theatre.

b.   Gain long-term **control** of physical and human aspects in key areas[39], by decentralising the operation, while being able to **carry out emergency interventions** to respond to unexpected threats or make the most of an opportunity.

c.   Be able to quickly and continuously adapt to the way in which the threat and its courses of action evolve, thanks to an effective **lessons learned** process.

d.   Have the necessary **logistical support** to make long-term interventions possible[40]. However, the footprint of the logistical system can be minimised by **outsourcing certain services locally**. Moreover, outsourcing has the advantage of favouring acceptance of the forces, as it contributes to stimulating the local economy.

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[39] See paragraph 312.
[40] Especially in matters of personnel support.

Finding the balance between maintaining credible military presence and progressively stepping aside in favour of the local forces

315. Due to the constant possibility of a new outbreak of armed violence[41], intervening forces must always maintain their military credibility, that is to say they must remain a deterrent and responsive force. However, their presence and courses of action must gradually become less visible and enable the local forces to regain their rightful place. To reconcile these two imperatives, the forces must:

   a. Have **means that are numerous and powerful enough** to indisputably outclass a possible adversary in the event of an armed confrontation.

   b. Always remain **in control of the airspace and entry points of the theatre**, including sea entry points.

   c. Be able to quickly update the **information** concerning a particular area, so as to be able to **intervene** under short notice.

   d. To this effect, have a mobile, powerful and responsive **reserve** (especially thanks to an airmobile capability) and be able to deliver precise and long range **fires**.

   e. **Be able to adapt the deployment and postures of the force** according to the evolution of the context, by adopting courses of action and attitudes that are more or less visible and aggressive.

   f. As soon as possible, transfer all possible **responsibilities which are not within the specific remit of the military** to other organisations, starting with police missions.

   g. Contribute to strengthening, or even rebuilding, the **local security forces** and **promote** these forces in order to reinforce their legitimacy, by actively cooperating with them.

   h. Be able to act as soon as possible to **support the local forces**, which specially implies that specific tactical expertise should be acquired and developed.

   i. However, avoid leading anyone to believe in an **early disengagement**, as this could be exploited by the propaganda of adversaries.

Favouring the concentration of effects

316. The concentration of effects must be pursued, so as to maximise the effectiveness of the means implemented for stabilisation, in particular:

   a. By maximising the **synergy between military functions** (notably: intelligence, fires, CIMIC, information operations, public affairs, etc.), which must all integrate into a single manoeuvre focused on precise objectives.

   b. By concentrating efforts in the **most critical areas**[42], i.e. the most important areas from a security, geographical, demographic, economic, symbolic or other standpoint[43].

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[41] See paragraph 129.

[42] These key areas obviously depend on the context of the theatre and their determination is one of the major command responsibilities. One must be sure that a continuous and long-lasting intervention will be possible. These areas are often inhabited and urbanised, calling for appropriate action capabilities.

c. By gradually extending stabilised areas and handing them over to the local security forces as soon as possible, so that the intervening forces may focus their efforts elsewhere.

d. By never deserting stabilised areas lest insecurity should return, for this would compromise the credibility of the intervening forces and local forces in the eyes of the relevant population for a long time.

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[43] Within the framework of a multinational operation, the allocation of a particular area to a contingent can depend on other criteria but, in all cases, it makes it possible to enhance the visibility of national action.

The evolution of the military contribution to reconstruction

A01.   During the stabilisation phase, the military contribution to the civilian reconstruction process of the host country usually evolves according to the level of residual insecurity.

A02.   As long as the insecurity level remains very high, no reconstruction is possible (civilian agencies are still absent from the theatre or cannot be deployed). The forces concentrate on restoring security and can only possibly provide **humanitarian assistance** to the neediest part of the population (refugees, displaced persons, etc.).

A03.   When the insecurity level is still high and civilian agencies still do not have sufficient freedom of action to perform actions on the entire theatre, the forces can dedicate some of their capabilities (dual capabilities) to **restoring essential services** (water distribution system, energy, health care, etc.) in the most critical areas.

A04.   When there is residual insecurity, they can contribute to **protecting** the civilian agencies taking part in reconstruction and possibly provide them with **logistical support**.

A05.   When security is restored, the forces only take a very limited part in reconstruction, by providing **specific support** to civilian agencies on an individual basis.

A06.   However, if the intervening forces have been entrusted with a **military assistance** mission to train the local military forces[44], this contribution usually remains **constant** (or even **increases**), at least until the end of the stabilisation phase. Likewise, **CIMIC actions** remain **necessary**, at least until security is restored. The projects launched within this framework are then transferred if possible to the civilian players taking part in reconstruction in order to be continued.


Figure 6 – *The evolution of the involvement of the armed forces in reconstruction.*

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44   Possibly within the framework of an SSR process.

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1.   The readers of this Joint Concept document are invited to highlight any errors, misprints or mistakes and to make any comments or suggestions for improvement. These should be sent to the CICDE (according to the table model below) at the following address:

Sous-directeur Synergie doctrinale
CICDE
École militaire
21, Place JOFFRE
75700 PARIS SP 07

Or by telephone (**01 44 42 83 38**) for information on the latest e-mail address.

No.	Origin	Paragraph (no.)	Sub-paragraph	Line	Comment
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2.   The amendments validated by the Director of the CICDE will be highlighted in red in the "*Summary of the amendments*" featured on page 7 of the electronic version of the document.

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Part I – Initialisms, acronyms and other abbreviations

C01.   In this section, characters which constitute an initialism, acronym or abbreviation are written in capital letters, so that the reader may memorise their meaning.

C02.   French initialisms, acronyms and abbreviations are written in **_Garamond bold font, size 11, in red italic type_**. Anglo-Saxon initialisms, acronyms and abbreviations are written in **Garamond bold font, size 11, in blue roman type**.

Initialisms

C03.   In initialisms, each letter is pronounced separately as though separated by periods.

AAP	Allied Administrative Publication / _Publication administrative interalliée_
AD-DS	Assistant Director for Doctrinal Synergy (CICDE)
AJP	Allied Joint Publication / _Publication interarmées interalliée_
CA	Comprehensive Approach
CCDIA(FR)	Joint Concepts and Doctrine Hierarchy (JCDH)
CCEAF	Capstone Concept on the Employment of Armed Forces
CEF	_Concept d'Emploi des Forces_ / Capstone Concept on the Employment of Armed Forces
CICDE	_Centre Interarmées de Concepts, de Doctrines et d'Expérimentations_ / Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrine and Experimentation
CM	Crisis Management
CRO	Crisis Response Operation
DDR	Disarmament-Demobilisation-Reintegration
ECPAD	_Établissement de Communication et de Production Audiovisuelle de la Défense_ / Defence Institute for Communication and Audiovisual Production
EU	European Union
FJP	French Joint Publication
JC(FR)	French Joint Concept
JD(FR)	French Joint Doctrine
IO	Information Operations
ISBN	International Standard Book Number
LBDSN	_Livre Blanc sur la Défense et la Sécurité Nationale_ / White Paper on Defence and National Security
LF	Land Forces
MAEE	_Ministère des Affaires Étrangères et Européennes_ / Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs
MAP	Medical Assistance to the Population
MIO	Military Influence Operations
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
_NP_	_Non protégé_ / Unclassified
OMA	Operational Military Assistance
PA	Postal Area
PGP	_Pôle Graphique de Paris_ / Graphics Pole of Paris

PIA	*Publication InterArmées* (see FJP)
PSC	Private Security Company
RIM	*Renseignement d'intérêt militaire*/Military Intelligence
RoE	Rules of Engagement
UN	United Nations
SSR	Security Sector Reform
VCDS	Vice Chief of the Defence Staff

Acronyms

C04. Acronyms are made up of several syllables which can be pronounced as a single word.

CIMIC	CIvil-MIlitary Co-operation
DEF	DEFence
HUMINT	HUMan INTelligence
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
SPAC	Service Parisien d'Administration Centrale / *Paris Central Administration Service*
STAB	STABilisation

Other abbreviations

C05. Abbreviations of convenience must be distinguished from conventional abbreviations:

a. Abbreviations of convenience are intended to simplify specific works (archives, catalogues, codes, dictionaries, monographs, etc.). An expression must be sufficiently long and appear frequently in order for such an abbreviation to be used. As they are only used in a specific work, readers will find a list very helpful.

b. Conventional abbreviations are: numbers, symbols (laid down in legislation) and abbreviations determined through common use, which cannot be modified without creating confusion.

(1) Abbreviations should be avoided in the text of literary works and non-specialised works.

(2) However, they are used systematically in tables, notes, references, parts of the text in parentheses and, more generally, any time simplification does not compromise the quality of presentation or complicate the understanding of the text.

Cf.	*Confer*, see, refer to, etc.
no.	Number(s))
p.	Page(s)
Ref.	Reference(s)

Part II – Terms and definitions

Operational Military Assistance (OMA)

Operational Military Assistance (OMA) refers to the support, in all its forms, provided by military forces in order to develop the operational capabilities of the armed forces of the host country (training, mentoring and advising, supply of equipment, etc.). It can be part of the more extensive framework of a Security Sector Reform (SSR).

CIvil-MIlitary Co-operation (CIMIC)

CIvil-MIlitary Co-operation (CIMIC) refers to the operational function intended to improve the integration of the force into its human environment, so as to make it easier to fulfil its mission, restore normal law and order and facilitate crisis management by local authorities (administration, humanitarian action, economic recovery, etc.)[45].

Stabilisation operations

"Stabilisation operations" **at strategic level**: this term, which is mentioned on page 204 of the French White Paper on Defence and National Security[46], covers all operations currently being carried out by the international community, i.e. operations of a predominantly military nature whose "*objective is usually related to the cessation or control of hostilities*", international civilian operations, humanitarian operations and peacekeeping operations[47].

"Stabilisation operations" **at tactical level**: in this case, it refers to tactical **actions** to establish a safe and secure environment, which may be performed simultaneously with combat actions, or even humanitarian actions[48].

Disarmament – Demobilisation – Reintegration (DDR) process

The aim of **Disarmament – Demobilisation – Reintegration (DDR) processes**, which are initiated following a decision of the international community, is to contribute to restoring the stability of a state or region by encouraging combatants or parties to the conflict to renounce the possession of arms **(disarmament)**, to sever their ties with the armed group **(demobilisation)** and to reintegrate into society for good as civilians or, sometimes, as part of the newly formed governmental forces **(reintegration)**[49]. These processes therefore contribute to national reconciliation and to consolidating the sovereignty of the local government.

Security Sector Reform (SSR)

Most of the time, **Security Sector Reform (SSR)** is initiated by the international community and managed within a multinational framework. It is a comprehensive process aimed at reinforcing or restoring the political stability and economic development of a country or region, through actions directed at all the institutions involved in the security sector (army, police, customs, forest rangers, etc.), legal institutions (courts, correctional administration, etc.), but also the institutional opposition forces associated with them (Parliament, independent authorities) and news and public relations organisations (media, etc.)[50].

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[45] See JC(FR)-9, *CIvil-MIlitary CO-operation (CIMIC)*, 262/DEF/EMA/EMP.1/NP as of 3 March, 2005, p. 6.

[46] The *Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale* (pages 58 and 129) and the White Paper on France's Foreign and European Policy (*Livre blanc sur la politique étrangère et européenne de la France*, page 67) refer to stabilisation as a *"process"*, a *"phase"* or a *"key component"* of crisis management.

[47] This phrase expresses the fact that all these operations are aimed at stabilising the host country, but it refers to *"stabilisation"* and *"crisis management"* in similar terms. Such a definition is thus difficult to implement and would be redundant with the crisis management concept (JC[FR]-3.4.4) approved in 2008.

[48] Cf. the *Three Block War* concept of American General Charles C. Krulak (*Marines Magazine*, January 1999).

[49] Cf. Note of the Ministry of Defence on DDR processes no. 3091/DEF/DAS/POLDEF/SDL of 10 June, 2009.

[50] See the French approach to SSR published by the *MAEE* in August 2008.

Summary

1. The word *"stabilisation"* has several accepted definitions, all of which express the will to manage the troubled post-crisis stage in territories marked by a profoundly disorganized running of the state and often torn apart by intra-state conflicts.

2. In this document, stabilisation is defined as one of the crisis management processes aimed at restoring the minimum conditions required to ensure the viability of a state (or region), by putting an end to the use of violence as a means of protest and by laying the groundwork for a return to normal life through the initiation of a civilian reconstruction process.

3. The stabilisation phase thus corresponds to the crisis management period during which this process prevails.

4. Stabilisation is primarily a political objective, which in France is managed and coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (*Ministère des affaires étrangères et européennes – MAEE*) for the benefit of a Host Nation. The local authorities and population are the main beneficiaries and the real focus of stabilisation. They should take ownership of the entire crisis resolution process and truly make it their own.

5. The aim of stabilisation is thus dominated by civilian concerns. Consequently, it always includes a civilian aspect and, very often, a military aspect, both of these being closely related.

6. The French Joint Concept (CJ[FR]) 3.4.9, which is called *Contribution of the Armed Forces to STABilisation (STAB)*, clarifies the notions and vocabulary relating to this theme and ensures the consistency of the Joint Concepts and Doctrine Hierarchy (*CCDIA-FR: Corpus conceptuel et doctrinal interarmées français*) on related subjects, such as Operational Military Assistance (OMA), Security Sector Reform (SSR), Disarmament – Demobilisation – Reintegration (DDR) processes and Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC).

7. This document, which is first and foremost written in an operational perspective, is mainly intended for the strategic and operational levels and is applicable to the entire armed forces, to include the National *Gendarmerie* within the framework of its *"defence"* missions under the authority of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). It is pragmatic and provides operational staff with useful guidance regarding the practice of stabilisation in foreign theatres of operation.

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