



**(FRA) Joint Centre  
for Concepts,  
Doctrine and  
Experimentation**



# **Operational Military Assistance to a Foreign Force**

**Joint Doctrine  
(FRA) JD-3.4.5.1\_OMA(2011)**

**No. 009/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 04 January 2011**



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(FRA) JD-3.4.5.1\_OMA(2011)<sup>1</sup>

**OPERATIONAL  
MILITARY ASSISTANCE (OMA)  
TO A FOREIGN ARMED FORCE**

No. 009/DEF/CICDE/DR as of 04 January 2011

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<sup>1</sup> Before the restructuration of the national doctrinal corpus, this document was formerly known as (FRA) JEC-3.21\_AMO.

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# Letter of Promulgation

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Paris, 04 January 2011  
No. 009/DEF/CICDE/NP

1. Current operations show the importance and need for an effective contribution to training, education, preparation and/or reorganization of foreign armed forces.
2. Indeed, technical and operational military assistance complement conventional courses of action conducted in current operations.
3. Military assistance contributes to serving France's strategic or power interests in the fields of prevention or intervention, and to the reinforcement of a partnership within a framework that does not directly engage its security or its vital interests. Military assistance is integrated to the overall military strategy and to the strategic anticipation process. It aims at establishing a French military influence on supported foreign armed forces in the long term while limiting the direct engagement of our forces in the event of a conflict, thereby contributing to their preservation.
4. *Operational Military Assistance (AMO) to a Foreign Armed Force* meets the specific needs corresponding to the context of an intervention. Indeed, the nature of the operations' mandates positions our contingents in support to local forces more and more often, aiming to a progressive transfer of responsibility to the sovereign authorities. This requires the implementation of an adapted assistance. As a matter of fact, operational military assistance can take many forms depending on its implementation framework, situation, necessary expertises and assigned objectives.
5. Within the general framework of military assistance, the multiple answers to this need require the elaboration of a joint doctrine giving a coherent framework to operational military assistance in terms of missions, selection, education and training of the personnel, legal limitations and logistic support.

General Pierre de VILLIERS  
Vice-Chief of Defence Staff  
(MGA<sup>2</sup>)



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<sup>2</sup> Major général des armées.

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## Table of Amendments

1. This table lists the collection of all the amendments proposed by readers, regardless of their origin or rank, as submitted to the Assistant Director of the Doctrine Department of the *CICDE* and detailed in Annex B (see p. 35).
2. The amendments validated by the director of the *CICDE* are written in **red** in the table below in chronological order.
3. The amendments are shown in **purple** in the body of the text of the new version.
4. The front cover of this document and the first page will be annotated to show the existence of a new version. The official registration number must thus be amended in **red** with the following mention: "**amended Day/Month/Year**".
5. The amended version of the text to be used as a joint reference document replaces the previous version in all electronic databases.

No.	Amendment	Source	Effective date
1	Declassification from RESTRICTED to UNCLASSIFIED	CICDE	30 January 2012
2	Conversion from (FRA) JEC-3.21 to (FRA) JD-3.4.5.1	CICDE	30 January 2012
3	Addition of a legal notice	CICDE	30 January 2012
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### References

- a. **(FRA) JC-01\_CCEAF(2010) Capstone Concept on the Employment of Armed Forces**, no. 004/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 11 January 2010.
- b. **(FRA) JC-3.4\_CA(2011) Comprehensive Approach (CA) to External Crisis Management (CM) (Military Contribution)**, no. 024/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 24 January 2011.
- c. **(FRA) JD-3.4.4\_COIN(2010) Counter-Insurgency**, no. 253/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 5 November 2010.
- d. **(FRA) JC-3.4.9\_STAB(2010) Contribution of the Armed Forces to Stabilisation**, no. 022/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 2 February 2010.

### Foreword

1. Operational Military Assistance (OMA) to a foreign armed force<sup>3</sup> is a traditional mission of the French Armed Forces. A French Military Mission helped Poland from 1919 to 1921 in its conflict with Russia. The Mixed Airborne Commando Groups (GCMA<sup>4</sup>) acted against Viet-Minh in Indochina. In the 60s, during decolonization, France has trained the armed forces of the new states. Most recently, Operational Assistance Detachments (DAO<sup>5</sup>) were often committed into action along with French-speaking African armed forces. Now, France deploys Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs), Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (POMLTs) or instruction detachments in support to Afghan armed forces.
2. Through military assistance, France can act in the field of prevention, intervention and reinforcement of a partnership within a framework that does not directly engage its security or its vital interests. Instead, it benefits its strategic or power interests.
3. Indeed, through the commitment to support local armed forces, and with an educated and trained mentoring staff, the armed forces can reduce the political, human and financial costs of a limited—if not discrete—intervention while contributing to the national security strategy.
4. This joint doctrine *Operational Military Assistance (OMA) to a Foreign Armed Force* defines the possible contribution of the French Armed Forces to make it operational or to train it in particular fields. OMA can be extended by a future military cooperation to be developed in support of the national security strategy and thus of the overall military strategy.
5. This doctrine leads to several recommendations:
  - a. **Integrate OMA to the overall military strategy<sup>6</sup> and strategic anticipation process** with a view to determining the French military influence to obtain after its implementation.
  - b. **Maintain a current vision of the results achieved to the benefit of the host country as well as to our own national security strategy** by a follow-up centralized at the level of the OMA armies.
  - c. **Be ready to carry out an audit within an interministerial framework in order to:**

<sup>3</sup> A foreign armed force is a force that is legally established to the service of a state recognized by France, and with which it has signed either a state-to-state agreement or an agreement via an international organization.

<sup>4</sup> *Groupement des commandos mixtes aéroportés.*

<sup>5</sup> *Détachements d'assistance opérationnelle.*


<sup>6</sup> Elaboration, set-up, organization and implementation of military means in order to reach the objectives defined by the national or multinational political project within the framework of a general strategy. Note: this level is particularly focused on the preparation and conduct of war (PIA-7.2.6-3\_GIAT-O[2012] *Glossaire interarmées de terminologie opérationnelle [French glossary for operational terminology]*).

- (1) first, determine the necessary human and financial means depending on the accepted objectives following the expressed request for assistance of a foreign armed force;
  - (2) estimate the duration of the deployment;
  - (3) determine the possible equipment and services requirements;
  - (4) assess the results obtained during and after the mission.
- d. **Assess the status of the available capacities** which are likely to contribute to an operational military assistance for the short, intermediate and long term. For this purpose, it is necessary to:
- (1) identify the available and non-available capabilities within the armed forces, directorates or services likely to contribute to an operational military assistance;
  - (2) determine the limits of the operational military assistance within an international context in favour of a coalition or within the framework of collaboration with another state;
  - (3) elaborate a joint education policy of the personnel—including the reserve—that is likely to serve in states or territories that are distant from our traditional zones of influence and which require a long-term vision in terms of future possible commitments. This policy could specify the necessary place and type of education, list the particular and rare capabilities of the armed forces, especially in terms of linguistics, but also identify certain interesting professional careers.



# Domain 3.4

# Prevention and Crisis Management



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### Section I – Introduction

101. Military assistance to a third country is a way for France to satisfy its interests and contribute to the international stability by preventing risks and threats or by consolidating the stability of a state. The authority and sovereignty of the latter depend on the security it can ensure to its own population.
102. The French approach aims to help the supported state in acquiring its autonomy after assistance. The implementation of military assistance answers a strategic requirement. Indeed, the destabilization of a state can be regarded as detrimental or contrary to the interests of France.
103. Military assistance answers the Generic situation 10 “*Assisting a third country*” defined in (FRA) JD-01\_CCEAF(2010) *Capstone Concept of the Employment of Armed Forces*. It is part of an influence strategy and promotion of selected topics (French Armed Forces, France, Europe, a coalition, an international organization, French-speaking communities, etc.). OMA can be carried out alone or in parallel with an intervention/stabilization military activity.
104. Military assistance can cover two pillars: Technical Military Assistance (TMA) and Operational Military Assistance (OMA). OMA contributes to the concepts of Comprehensive Approach (CA)<sup>7</sup>, STABILization (STAB), military influence in support to operations, and COUNTER-INSurgency (COIN) doctrines.

### Section II – Military Assistance Objectives

105. In its structural dimension (Technical Military Assistance) and in its support to operations (Operational Military Assistance), military assistance aims to:
  - a. contribute to the security of the supported state within the framework of the “*prevention*” strategic function in order to decrease the risk of destabilization and of a direct intervention of our Armed Forces—with its load of consequences in terms of human and financial costs;
  - b. contribute to the education of the armed forces in particular fields (fight against trafficking, border monitoring, fight against terrorism, action of the state at sea, etc.);
  - c. support the re-establishment of domestic security during the stabilization phase following the intervention of our forces, either by fighting against IRregular ADversaries (IRADs)<sup>8</sup> within the framework of a COIN, or by restoring or enforcing domestic security (or peacekeeping);
  - d. reinforce the participation capabilities in peace support operations;
  - e. restore external security.
106. Within the organizational and operational areas, it can imply:
  - a. the creation, training and support of an armed force (recruitment, organization, training, equipment, coaching, infrastructures) according to the selected capabilities and missions;

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<sup>7</sup> (FRA) JC-3.4\_CA(2010) *Comprehensive Approach (CA) to External Crisis Management (CM) and Military Contribution*, no. 550/DEF/EMA/EMP1/NP as of 9 June 2010.

<sup>8</sup> (FRA) JC-3.4.4\_IRAD(2008) *Operations against an Irregular Adversary*, no. 131/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 22 May 2008.

- b. the improvement of an armed force by developing its operational functions or by creating them (command, intelligence, fires, campaign, support, education—including of the leaders, counter-insurgency training) with a view to its possible employment;
  - c. collaboration and cooperation in order to elaborate a defence policy in the long term by defining its implementation, strategic planning and assessment of the situations, reaction ability, costs management, forecasting and budgeting, interoperability with either our forces or local forces.
107. Military assistance can be conducted within an international (NATO, EU, UN) or bilateral framework, particularly in compliance with the defence agreements or request of a third state. The course of action consists of transmitting our knowledge and know-how to the supported state.
108. It is implemented either:
- a. locally, by assistance detachments or embedded personnel within military or civil organizations, or within the forces;
  - b. in another country or on the host nation's territory to benefit from the better conditions of assistance in terms of infrastructures or security.

### Section III – Complementarity of Technical Military Assistance and Operational Military Assistance

109. As part of the defence diplomacy of the French Ministry of Defence<sup>9</sup>, military assistance is defined by two aspects complementing each other:
- a. Technical Military Assistance (TMA) is usually conducted in a non-hostile environment. It can be defined as a structural cooperation which nowadays comes under the French Directorate for Defence and Security Cooperation (DCSD<sup>10</sup>)/Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (MAEE<sup>11</sup>) through its financing, but which calls upon the armed forces' competences.
  - b. Operational Military Assistance (OMA) is conducted in a hostile or semi-hostile environment. Indeed, in such a situation, the supported state can not completely ensure the whole of its sovereign duties. However, OMA aims at reducing the volume of foreign forces which could have been deployed for an intervention.
110. Activities conducted as part of TMA are usually not emergencies. They facilitate a progressive and planned positioning, namely in terms of human competences.
111. OMA requires an excellent reactivity to provide the expected competences and know-how at the right moment in the organizational and operational fields.
112. Activities may be conducted over the long term.

### Section IV – Military Assistance Stakeholders

#### Various Stakeholders in France

113. Military assistance is internationally identified, observed and accepted. However, as it falls under the national security strategy and therefore is a major element of the influence strategy<sup>12</sup>, it is not neutral. Military assistance provides support to a state in order to enable it to have the

<sup>9</sup> Former PIA-00.204, INS 1100 *Prévention des crises et diplomatie de défense* (French instruction doctrine on crisis prevention and defence diplomacy, document no more available while under revision), no. 000556/DEF/EMA/EMP.1/NP and no. 000014/DEF/EMA/SCRI/NP of 3 July 2002 which stipulates that “defence diplomacy can be defined as the armed forces’ participation to the actions of the French diplomacy, which one seeks to prevent any risk of crisis and to contribute to the achievement of France’s objectives abroad. Should there be a crisis in the concerned country; the defence diplomacy already includes the assistance, even recourse, to military means”.

<sup>10</sup> *Direction de la coopération de sécurité et de défense.*

<sup>11</sup> *Ministère des affaires étrangères et européennes.*

<sup>12</sup> The **influence strategy** is the art of organizing and using diplomacy, economy, information, as well as military and socio-cultural capabilities so as to support the interests of a state, group of states or international community through activities in the psychological and cognitive fields.



security forces necessary to the exercise or restoration of its sovereignty within a comprehensive approach framework.

114. The personnel employed can either belong to the Ministry of Defence, to the military or be under specific contract.
115. The legal framework is clearly defined according to the assistance mission.
116. The authority of employment can either be the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs within the framework of TMA, the Ministry of Defence within the framework of OMA, or an international organization.

### Supported Armed Forces

117. In addition to the political support from OMA or TMA, the host country's armed forces can seek the acquisition of technical skills, know-how, equipment, combat training, etc.

### Military Assistance and International Organizations

118. NATO, the EU or international organizations can request the Ministry of Defence's competences.
119. If OMA is considered within a multinational framework, the support brought to the various nations should be coherent, and possible complementarities should be identified as well as the favoured type of assistance depending on the national interests.

### Military Assistance and Arms or Services Exports

120. TMA and OMA are courses of action enhancing the display of our armaments and know-how in services—namely through their exportation, which is another factor of influence of the overall military strategy. As such, they must prepare the ground within the framework of the mission.

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## Chapter 2

# Operational Military Assistance

### Section I – Definition

201. Operational Military Assistance contributes to the development of operational capabilities of the host country's armed forces by our military forces (education, organization, training, coaching, equipment supplies, etc.). It can also be integrated within the broader framework of a support to institutions, namely through the Security Sector Reform (SSR) and possibly through a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process.

202. It can be defined as follow:

203. Operational Military Assistance is the contribution of French Armed Forces to the various components of a foreign armed force in terms of competences, knowledge, know-how and experience in the field of defence and in the ability to act in operations. Within a bilateral, interministerial and possibly multinational framework, OMA consists of educating, organizing, advising, training, equipping, even militarily mentoring, a third country.

204. It aims at:

- a. reducing risks and preventing threats likely to destabilize the supported state;
- b. and/or contributing to restore its sovereignty.

205. It is exerted for a given situation for the duration necessary to its effectiveness or to the accomplishment of the mission under the terms of the signed agreements.

### Section II – Purpose

206. In compliance with the *French White Paper on Defence and National Security* (2008) and within the framework of bilateral or international agreements, or under the mandate of an international organization, OMA contributes to the process of anticipation (collect of data and monitoring of a potential zone of crisis), prevention (development and management of local capabilities in order to ensure security in peacetime or stabilization phase), protection (helping the supported country reply to a threat), or intervention (advising, education, mentoring, or support to local armed forces).

207. The purpose of OMA is to reinforce the structures of defence of the host country:

- a. in terms of prevention in order to:
  - (1) contribute to the strategic monitoring through the risks assessment of a spreading destabilization from zones of crisis;
  - (2) prevent a crisis through the support to the local defence and security forces of the supported state, while taking part in the reinforcement of its security system in all its dimensions.
- b. in terms of intervention, stabilization and reconstruction in order to:
  - (1) create, reinforce or support the build-up of a foreign armed force during an intervention or for an exit of the crisis, within a national or international framework;
  - (2) participate in a transitory way to the reinforcement of institutions.
- c. within the framework of its missions and in compliance with the signed agreements, in order to provide a permanent contribution to the protection of a state, if necessary, in

all the fields of defence and security, as well as to the diffusion of the French foreign policy through a highly visible activity.

208. A mission of OMA can thus have various objectives:
- a. Help the supported country in ensuring its stability and sovereignty through: direct operational activities (protection from land, sea and air approaches), training activities for the executives or instruction activities for the personnel, the donation or sale of equipments, advising activities for units in operation, the temporary deployment of specific personnel or military equipment, etc. In the latter cases, if French military considers the use of force, it must be under agreements with the host country.
  - b. Contribute to a comprehensive approach (Ministry of Defence [*MINDEF*<sup>13</sup>], Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs [*MAEE*] and Ministry of the Interior, Overseas Territories, Territorial Collectivities and Integration [*MIOMCTI*<sup>14</sup>]).
  - c. Help the supported country in committing under good conditions in a peacekeeping operation abroad within the framework of the UN or of an international organization (such as the African Union [UA]).
  - d. Contribute to the military influence strategy<sup>15</sup> such as defined by the French Defence Staff (*EMA*<sup>16</sup>).

### Section III – Implementation Criteria for OMA

209. Operational military assistance must answer the following criteria:
- a. Contribute to the strategic and power interests of the French foreign policy in its military dimension.
  - b. Have available and qualified human resources that it can employ without being at the expense of the armed forces' operational capability.
  - c. Obtain a return on the investment. Benefits are identifiable in terms of the armed forces' influence, interests in the overall military strategy—namely through privileged relations in the long term with the armed forces of the supported country—and economic relations, particularly in equipment and services.
  - d. Reduce the effort during an operation by progressively making local forces support the military commitment; or by preventing a direct intervention of our forces.

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<sup>13</sup> *Ministère de la Défense.*

<sup>14</sup> *Ministère de l'intérieur, de l'outre-mer, des collectivités territoriales et de l'immigration.*

<sup>15</sup> The military influence strategy is permanently exerted by the armed forces in order to obtain effects in the psychological and cognitive fields, and to lead an individual or a group—favourable, neutral or hostile—to act in the direction of the national interests, and/or objectives of a coalition or of the international community.

<sup>16</sup> *Etat-major des armées.*

## Section I – Generic Missions

### Recruitment

- 301. Recruitment and selection of the local personnel.

### Education

- 302. General or specific education of the personnel (leaders, instructors, technicians, personnel in units).
- 303. Basic military formation during the stabilization phase, including to the various categories of uniformed personnel in charge of public security (law enforcement force, customs, coastguards, paramilitary, etc.).
- 304. Education on operational functions taking into account the various levels of responsibility and expected competences.

### Training

- 305. Technical or operational training of the personnel at various levels (basic training, units supervision, high military hierarchy), of the staffs or units inside or outside the host country.

### Organization

- 306. Proposition of the set-up or adaptation of the local armed forces' structures, functioning and working methods.

### Preparation

- 307. Engendering favourable conditions to the integration of a national force to a multinational force or to a peace support operation.

### Mentoring

- 308. Contribution to the set-up of a capability.
- 309. Reinforcement of the capabilities in a given function (intelligence, logistics, etc.).
- 310. Within the framework of an operation, mentoring can cover tactical advising, the connection with the host-nation's deployed forces, possibly the periodical commitment of the Operational Assistance Detachment (*DAO*) depending on the circumstances if the particular directive (see chapter 4, section III) allows it or if the situation requires it.

### Advising

- 311. Contribution to the SSR or DDR process.
- 312. Advising at the various levels of the decision-making process in the various fields relative to the defence of the host state (choice of capabilities, armed force model, budgeting, etc.).

## Audit

313. The audit is an advantageous form of assistance: it is inexpensive and facilitates the development of relations with a partner country. By establishing an initial situation, it gives the necessary elements to provide and conduct suitable military assistance (personnel, equipment, financing, duration).
314. The audit is ensured by a military organization associated with other ministries involved. It intervenes:
- a. before the launching of an OMA mission;
  - b. during an OMA mission, in order to establish possible margins of progress;
  - c. at the end of the mission, in order to assess the results. In this last case, it is recommended that the audit organization be different.

## Contribution to the Equipment or Services Export

315. The sale of equipment, including arms, or services is not a form of OMA to a foreign armed force. However, through its action of education, it must be taken into account as it contributes to the development of the French Armed Forces' influence before and after providing assistance. It also facilitates a future interoperability and can include technical support (material maintenance and/or maintenance training).

## Section II – Operational Assistance Detachments and Embedded Individuals

316. Operational Assistance Detachments (*DAOs*) are *ad hoc* structures that are established according to the theatre of operations and mission. They can be joint or from one component only depending on the missions (**Cf. annex A: “OMA in the Armed Force”**).
317. National regulations relative to health, logistics, counter-insurgency and security, and CIS<sup>17</sup> are systematically respected by deploying at the national level the necessary resources that are not available in theatre or in the host country.
318. Depending on the mission and theatre of operation, the structure of a *DAO* is adapted in the fields of organization, personnel and equipment. A *DAO* chief is systematically appointed. A link with the French command must be maintained. The training is collective.
319. Isolated personnel may be embedded within the staffs or local armed forces.
320. Efforts must be made on individual and collective protection, namely in hostile or semi-hostile situations. The *DAO's* morale must be constant (trust in the capabilities of the Force's action for its benefits) and requires the possibility of an extraction capability.

## Section III – Assistance Missions to Institutions

321. Within a comprehensive approach framework, two processes are concretely implemented by civil and military actors during stabilization<sup>18</sup>:
- a. the restoration of security or “*securing*”;
  - b. the return to a normal life for the local population or “*reconstruction*”.
322. During stabilization, the restoration of security by the armed forces creates favourable conditions for reconstruction. This type of mission is subjected to a framework agreement with France.

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<sup>17</sup> Communication and Information System.

<sup>18</sup> (FRA) JD-3.4.5\_STAB(2010) *Contribution of the Armed Forces to Stabilisation*, no. 022 DEF/CICDE/NP as of 2 February 2010, former (FRA) JC-3.4.9\_STAB(2010).

## Operational Military Assistance (OMA), Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR)

323. The Armed Forces usually contribute to the institutional reconstruction of a host country through military assistance to its forces which can be integrated to the military pillar of a possible SSR process. Therefore, they contribute to the "prevention" strategic function.
324. If a SSR process is adopted by the international community, the Armed Forces may provide support, namely through weapons salvage and storage from the disarmed combatants.

### Specific Vocation of the Organization

325. Within the framework of its Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) missions, and in addition to the missions under the DDR process, the French Verification Unit (*UFV*<sup>19</sup>) of Creil provides its expertise in the field of weapons security and ammunitions storages. This expertise can lead to the definition of useful stocks, making it part of the SSR.

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<sup>19</sup> *Unité française de vérification.*

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#### Section I – Principles

##### Host State's Agreement

401. OMA is subject to the agreements signed with the host country.

##### Security of Forces during OMA

402. The level of hostility of the theatre of operations and the risk incurred must moderate the degree of involvement in operational military assistance. It determines Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) or other documents (Status of Forces Agreement [SOFA]), and the Rules Of Engagements (ROE).
403. The personnel's security is a priority. In addition to the medical follow-up, including psychological, it must consider their extraction if needed and their evacuation, especially in case of combat wounds.

##### Visible and Controlled Effectiveness

404. OMA must produce visible and, if possible, quick and credible results.
405. It must contribute to the disengagement of the national forces if they have been deployed.
406. It must facilitate the partnership between local armed forces and foreign forces intervening on the theatre while creating a cultural bridge between them.
407. In addition to the positive perception of the French contribution in competences, the creation of privileged links with the local authorities or elites, the future equipment of the armed forces, the export of the planning method, doctrines, even French language, etc., can constitute as many returns on investment from OMA.
408. It requires the implementation of indicators of effectiveness, including the success of the French influence strategy.

##### A Clearly Identified Chain of Command

409. OMA is under the responsibility of the defence attaché to the host country or of the designated French representative. It must be centralized and coordinated for results to be achieved after several mandates. It must work in close cooperation with the intervention/stabilization forces deployed on the theatre and the national command and control chain.

##### Local Ownership

410. OMA must prepare the supported local forces in adopting social skills and know-how. OMA's disengagement can start once the local forces have fully owned them.

##### Distancing the Personnel

411. To avoid a too great personal implication, which can be prejudicial in the long term, the embedded personnel must preserve careful neutrality with respect to the local armed forces. Therefore, the mission must be limited in time. However, the duration of the mandate must be sufficient for the establishment of a real link of trust between the *DAO* and the host country's forces.

## Section II – The OMA Process

### Request for OMA

412. The generic process is as follow:
- a. Initial audit: OMA is preceded, if possible, by an initial audit conducted by the French Defence Staff so as to assess the relevance of the request, initial state and needs; identify the capabilities of the French Armed Forces to answer this request; determine the advantages and disadvantages; assess the human and financial costs, as well as the duration.
  - b. Official request by the host country.
  - c. Adequacy with the national interests.
  - d. Political acceptance.
  - e. Identification of the assets (human resources, budgets, equipment for the host nation).
413. OMA is requested:
- a. in the case of a bilateral operation, by the Force Commander (FCdr) *via* the ambassador;
  - b. within a bilateral framework, by the French embassy of the concerned country if there is one;
  - c. in the case of a multinational operation, by the mandating organization to the diplomatic branch (NATO, EU, UN [mine clearance], OSCE, UA, etc.).

### Identification of Partnerships

414. OMA must seek partnerships to answer to a national influence strategy and because of limited resources, namely financial resources.
415. It may fall under an interministerial and possibly international prospect.
416. To this end, external or internal complementarities must be sought with a view to obtaining the expected results and influence, particularly in the military field.

### Financing

417. The possible financing sources are to be determined according to the services provided and following situations:
- a. Bilateral OMA.
  - b. TMA in the case of an action complementary to OMA conducted out of the theatre of operation (education and training within French military academies, etc.).
  - c. OMA within the framework of a coalition<sup>20</sup> in compliance with the signed agreements.
418. Therefore, European funds cannot be used for military missions. The financing of the SSR and DDR processes are primarily civil, which can limit the implementation of OMA.

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<sup>20</sup> From 2002 to 2007, the G8 invested 10 billion dollars in the education and equipment of the Afghan National Army (ANA).

## Legal Dimension

419. The concept must be in compliance with the legal structures defined by the defence agreements, MoU or SOFA.

## Use of Private Security Companies (PSCs) and Semi-Public French Organizations

420. The Armed Forces cannot use PSCs considering the current legislation. On the other hand, semi-public organizations can intervene, namely in mentoring, educating and auditing. In this case, the request for military assistance can be complex and must associate the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the process.

## Section III – OMA General Modalities

421. A particular directive describes each mission given within the OMA framework. It specifies its context and limits, the tasks to be achieved, the links and subordination, the command and support, the duration and assessment methods.

## Complementarity of OMA and TMA

422. OMA and TMA should be coordinated. Indeed, it is more effective to educate and train the personnel of a foreign armed force in France or in a neighbour country.

## Education and Training

423. Depending on the missions, theatres and local cultures, OMA personnel should be specifically trained bearing in mind the levels of the personnel to train in the host country (troops, leadership, headquarters staff). The personnel's ability—especially to adapt to the local culture—contributes to the development of trust relations with the supported forces, which is essential for the success of the mission.

## Mental Preparation of the Personnel

424. Since the personnel are isolated within a foreign force in a semi-hostile or hostile operational context, they must be carefully selected: volunteering, personality, open-mindedness, moral and psychological strength, motivation in the mission and its objectives, which will have to be explained to the supported forces.

## Knowledge of the Local Culture and Linguistic Expertise

425. The personnel must be sensitized to the Human Environment of the Operations (HEO), i.e. the interactions between individual or collective actors made up in systems which can have an impact on the employment of forces in a given zone.
426. HEO analysis aims to bring knowledge and comprehension of the supported forces and their human environment, and to help in the preparation and conduct of operations, orientation of the courses of action, adaptation of the *DAO*'s social skills and know-how to the local forces. The learning of their language may be considered.
427. This knowledge must be based on an individual appropriation resulting from the experience of former missions of long duration in the given countries in order to comprehend its culture. Although not a priority, the occasional use of Foreign Legion personnel of the same origins as the host country can be useful in some situations.

## Particular Situations

### *Principles of Subordination*

428. Any DAO or embedded personnel must be able to rapidly refer to the French representative designated in a personal directive or to the defence attaché, particularly in case of the education and training of armed forces in a third country. In the event of the absence of a national authority in the zone of deployment, the chain of command must be specified in the personal directive.
429. French legal terms always apply.
430. Within the framework of its mission, personnel can be allotted to an authority of the host state. Personnel are subject to specific instructions; they must carry out the orders of their employing authority.

### *Information Assurance*

431. Personnel must also be careful of:
  - a. not compromising the mission;
  - b. not compromising the information.
432. It is important to respect the concepts of secrecy and discretion. Indeed, any detachment or embedded individual is considered by the local armed forces as a French representative. As such, any information, attitude or comment could make the object of an analysis or interpretation which, in certain cases, could call into question the OMA and security staff. Therefore, personnel must be informed before their departure of the sensible topics and of the attitude to adopt with regards to some questions.

### *Relationships to the Forces and Other Functions*

433. In order to support the legitimacy of the OMA mission in progress, the selected personnel must know the following functions in their various components (Psychological Operations [PSYOP], Key Leader Engagement [KLE], information assurance, etc.): *“Public Affairs”*, *“Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)”* and *“Information Operations”*.

## Criteria for a Successful OMA

434. The competence suggested at the adapted level must be identified based on the request from the supported armed forces and their ability to acquire the competence.
435. The transmission of a competence must facilitate a significant progression on the legitimacy of our action and on the effectiveness of the supported armed forces.
436. Since cultural and linguistic knowledge are necessary to the know-how and social skills (rules of commitment and of behaviours), they are an important criterion of success. However, the OMA personnel should be predisposed to the field of HEO.
437. Personnel must be prepared so as to adapt to the local conditions and a relative isolation, including in a hostile operational situation.
438. A regular control should be made to check that the objectives to be reached are in course of acquisition.
439. “Footprint” is another criterion. The durability of the activities and the survivability of the systems or organizations that have been set up must be sufficient to demonstrate the seriousness of France’s commitment and to ensure the durability of results.

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## Annex A

# OMA in the Armed Forces

- A01. Organizational and operational aspects may be requested for assistance by the different components.

### French Army

- A02. A DAO advises, educates, trains but does not command, except in exceptional situations. It can be deployed by combat arms (infantry, armoured tanks), supports (artillery), logistics, Special Forces, etc.
- A03. The structure depends on the theatre of operation and of the mission. The education and training is collective. An effort is made on individual and collective protection. The morale of the DAO—an isolated troop in semi-permissive or hostile environment—must be constant (trust in the capabilities of the Force's action for its benefits). National medical support must be ensured (MEDEVAC). The psychological follow-up must be permanent and continue after the return from a mission. Logistics has to be provided at all times and in any place: ammunition, fuels, etc.

### French Navy

- A04. A DAO can be deployed for all the operational components of the marine: naval aviation, surface, submarines, diving, logistics, Special Forces, etc.
- A05. Its intervention is not exclusive to strictly military missions: it can participate to navy missions of state action at sea (such as law enforcement at sea, control of illicit traffics, etc.).

### French Air Force

- A06. The Air Force can set up DAOs with full capabilities, such as air policing, and choose from a wide range of action, including the insertion of advisers within the structures of the host country. Operational assistance intervenes more particularly in the fields of excellence of the French Air Force, and only on the assumption that the set-up of a DAO does not overburden the national capabilities required for operational contracts.

### Gendarmerie

- A07. Within the framework of the operational contract<sup>21</sup>, the *Gendarmerie* is able to deploy capabilities of some interest to operational military assistance. It is particularly the case for the following pillars:
- a. Public security, with the deployment of mobile *Gendarmerie* squadrons.
  - b. Expertise and education, with the deployment of teams dedicated to the education and coaching of local security forces, ongoing relations with the local law enforcement and judicial institutions, depending on the mandate given to the Force.
- A08. Within the framework of civil operations, the *Gendarmerie* is also present depending on the type of assigned missions:
- a. Executive missions: substitution to local security forces.
  - b. Mentoring and control missions: providing an expertise.
  - c. Observation missions: within the framework of international agreements.

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<sup>21</sup> PIA-0.3\_CONTRATS OPS(2011) *Contrat opérationnel des forces armées* (French joint publication on the operational contract of the armed forces), Booklet 1.

## Directorate of Military Intelligence (*DRM*<sup>22</sup>)

A09. RESTRICTED

## Special Operations Command (SOC)

A10. RESTRICTED

A11. RESTRICTED

A12. RESTRICTED

A13. RESTRICTED

A14. RESTRICTED

A15. RESTRICTED

A16. RESTRICTED

## Military Health Service (*SSA*<sup>23</sup>)

- A17. Aside from its medical support mission to the deployed *DAO*, the *SSA* can man or participate in a *DAO* to:
- a. educate and train (combat rescue, emergency medicine and vital surgery);
  - b. advise, particularly for the organization of medical support to a force;
  - c. audit, prior, during and after the deployment of a *DAO*;
  - d. reinforce the medical capabilities of a foreign armed force.

## General Secretariat for the Administration (*SGA*<sup>24</sup>) and Defence Historical Service (*SHD*<sup>25</sup>)

- A18. The Defence Historical Service can be requested to cover many fields (implementation, expertise, advice) related to *OMA*.
- A19. It can provide its competence in:
- a. the management of operational documents (paper and/or electronic archiving);
  - b. the set-up of documentation centres for educating organizations such as war colleges, or to the benefit of the staffs;
  - c. the management of Lessons Learned (LL): analysis of the administrative, juridical, operational and historical value of the documentary production, the already existent funds and collections; development of a policy of oral testimonies collection and of a communication policy to the public, including through microfilming and digitalization;
  - d. the expertise in the condition of preservation of the funds and collections.

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<sup>22</sup> *Direction du renseignement militaire.*

<sup>23</sup> *Service de santé des armées.*

<sup>24</sup> *Secrétariat général pour l'administration.*

<sup>25</sup> *Service historique de la Défense.*

## Other Organizations or Structures

- A20. Other types of operational military assistance can be considered depending on needs and circumstances: Defence Procurement Agency (*DGA*<sup>26</sup>), Central Directorate of the Joint Petroleum Service (*DCSEA*<sup>27</sup>), the Joint Supply and Secretariat Department (*SCA*<sup>28</sup>), Joint Directorate for Defence Infrastructure Networks and Information Systems (*DIRISI*<sup>29</sup>), Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)<sup>30</sup>.

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<sup>26</sup> *Direction générale de l'armement.*

<sup>27</sup> *Direction centrale du service des essences des armées.*

<sup>28</sup> *Service central du commissariat.*

<sup>29</sup> *Direction interarmées des réseaux d'infrastructure et des systèmes d'information.*

<sup>30</sup> Autonomous civil-military structures contributing to improve the good local governance. Under the orders of a military authority, they must coordinate their action with the deployed forces and local authorities.

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## Annex B Request for Amendments

1. Readers of this document are invited to report any errors, misprints or mistakes, as well as any remark or suggestion for improvement. Those should be listed in the table below and sent to the *CICDE* at the following address:

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or directly on the *CICDE*'s Intradef and/or Internet website: <http://www.cicde.defense.gouv.fr>.

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2. Amendments validated by the director of the *CICDE* will be highlighted in **red** in the “*Summary of Amendments*” featured on **page 7 of the electronic version of this document.**

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### Part I – Initialisms and Acronyms

#### Initialisms

C01. Each letter of an initialism is pronounced separately as though separated by periods.

#### Acronyms

C02. Acronyms are made up of several syllables which can be pronounced as a single word.

#### Graphic Charter of the Lexicon

C03. In this lexicon, the characters which constitute an initialism or acronym are written in capitals so that the reader can memorize their meaning.

C04. French initialisms and acronyms are written in **bold, italic, Arial font, size 9, in red Roman characters**. Anglo-Saxon initialisms and acronyms are written in **bold Arial font, size 9, in blue Roman characters**.

#### List of Initialisms and Acronyms used in this Document

<b>AAP</b>	Allied Administrative Publication
<b>AJP</b>	Allied Joint Publication
<b>ANA</b>	Afghan National Army
<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>CA</b>	Comprehensive Approach
<b>CCEAF</b>	Capstone Concept on the Employment of Armed Forces
<b>CEF</b>	<i>Concept d'Emploi des Forces</i>
<b>CIMIC</b>	Civil-Military Cooperation
<b>CIS</b>	Communication and Information System
<b>COIN</b>	COunter-INSurgency
<b>CIA</b>	<i>Concept InterArmées</i>
<b>JC</b>	Joint Concept
<b>CICDE</b>	<i>Centre Interarmées de Concepts, Doctrines et d'Expérimentation</i> Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrine and Experimentation
<b>DAO</b>	<i>Détachement d'Assistance Opérationnelle</i> Operational Assistance Detachment
<b>DCSD</b>	<i>Direction de la Coopération de Sécurité et de Défense</i> Directorate for Defence and Security Cooperation
<b>DCSEA</b>	<i>Service Central des Essences des Armées</i> Central Directorate of the Joint Petroleum Service
<b>DDR</b>	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
<b>DEF</b>	<i>DEFense</i> Defence
<b>DGA</b>	<i>Direction Générale pour l'Armement</i> Defence Procurement Agency

<b>DIA</b>	<i>Doctrines InterArmées</i>
<b>JD</b>	Joint Doctrine
<b>DIRISI</b>	<i>Direction Interarmées des Réseaux d'Infrastructure et des Systèmes d'Information</i> Joint Directorate for Defence Infrastructure Networks and Information Systems
<b>DR</b>	<b>DIFFUSION RESTREINTE</b> <b>RESTRICTED</b>
<b>DRM</b>	<i>Direction du Renseignement Militaire</i> Directorate for Military Intelligence
<b>EJC</b>	Exploratory Joint Concept
<b>CEIA</b>	<i>Concept Exploratoire InterArmées</i>
<b>EMA</b>	<i>État-Major des Armées</i> French Defence Staff
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FCdr</b>	Force Commander
<b>FRA</b>	FRAnce (NATO country code)
<b>GCMA</b>	<i>Groupement des Commandos Mixtes Aéroportés</i> Mixed Airborne Commando Group
<b>HEO</b>	Human Environment of the Operations
<b>IRAD</b>	IRregular ADversary
<b>JP</b>	Joint Publication
<b>PIA</b>	<i>Publication InterArmées</i>
<b>KLE</b>	Key Leaders Engagement
<b>LL</b>	Lessons Learned
<b>MAEE</b>	<i>Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et Européennes</i> Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs
<b>MEDEVAC</b>	MEDical EVACuation
<b>MGA</b>	<i>Major Général des Armées</i> Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff
<b>MINDEF</b>	<i>MINistère de la DEFense</i> Ministry of Defence
<b>MIOMCT</b>	<i>Ministère de l'Intérieur, de l'Outre-Mer et des Collectivités Territoriales</i> Ministry of the Interior, Overseas Territories and Territorial Collectivities
<b>MIOMCTI</b>	<i>Ministère de l'Intérieur, de l'Outre-Mer, des Collectivités Territoriales et de l'Immigration</i> Ministry of the Interior, Overseas Territories, Territorial Collectivities and Integration
<b>MoU</b>	Memorandum of Understanding
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NP</b>	<b>Non Protégé</b> <b>Unclassified</b>
<b>OMA</b>	Operational Military Assistance
<b>OMLT</b>	Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team
<b>OSCE</b>	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
<b>POMLT</b>	Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team
<b>PRT</b>	Provincial Reconstruction Team (Afghanistan)
<b>PSC</b>	Private Security Company
<b>PSYOP</b>	PSYchological OPeration
<b>SALW</b>	Small Arms and Light Weapons

<b>SCA</b>	<i>Service du Commissariat des Armées</i> Joint Supply and Secretariat Department
<b>SGA</b>	<i>Secrétariat Général pour l'Administration</i> General Secretariat for the Administration
<b>SHD</b>	<i>Service Historique de la Défense</i> Defence Historical Service
<b>SOC</b>	Special Operations Command
<b>SOFA</b>	Status Of Forces Agreement
<b>SSA</b>	<i>Service de Santé des Armées</i> Military Health Service
<b>SSR</b>	Security Sector Reform
<b>TMA</b>	Technical Military Assistance
<b>UFV</b>	<i>Unité Française de Vérification</i> French Verification Unit
<b>STAB</b>	STABilization
<b>UN</b>	United Nations

## Part II – Terms and Definitions

<b>Operational Military Assistance</b>	Operational Military Assistance (OMA) is the contribution of the French Armed Forces to a foreign armed force in its various components of competences, knowledge, know-how and experience in the field of defence, and in the ability to act in an operation. Within a bilateral, interministerial and possibly multinational framework, OMA consists of educating, organizing, advising, training, equipping even militarily mentoring a third country. It aims at: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. reducing risks and preventing threats likely to destabilize the supported state;</li> <li>b. and/or contributing to restore its sovereignty.</li> </ul> It is exerted for a given situation for the duration necessary to its effectiveness or to the accomplishment of the mission under the terms of the signed agreements.
<b>Key Leader Engagement</b>	The planned and coordinated employment of the various levels of command to engage with civil and military key leaders within the operations area in order to establish durable and thorough relations in support to the objectives of the Force's military influence strategy.
<b>Defence Diplomacy</b>	Participation of the Armed Forces to the actions of the French diplomacy aims at preventing any risk of crisis and contributes to the achievement of France's objectives abroad. Even outside any declared crisis in a given state, it already includes the use of military means.
<b>Human Environment of an operation (HEO)</b>	Range of interactions between actors and systems able to have an influence on the employment of armed forces in a given area. The analysis of the HEO aims at acquiring knowledge and understanding of the human environment so as to contribute to the politico-military decision-making process, the preparation and conduct of operations, the definition of courses of action, and the adaptation of the behaviours and skills of the deployed armed forces in order to select the process that is best adapted by the conjunction of physical and non-physical actions so as to reach the desired end state. The HEO analysis contributes to the identification and assessment of the effects of a strategy on the human environment of a current or future theatre of operation.
<b>Mentoring</b>	In the absence of an official definition, mentoring covers all generic missions to be carried out by a DAO or embedded personnel for a given operation.
<b>Influence Strategy</b>	The influence strategy is the art of organizing and using diplomatic, economical, information, military and socio-cultural capabilities so as to support the interests of a state, group of states or international community through activities in the psychological and cognitive fields.
<b>Military Influence Strategy</b>	The military influence strategy consists in the continuous conduct of activities by the armed forces to obtain effects in the psychological and cognitive fields, and to drive a favourable, hostile or neutral individual or group to act for the benefit of our national interests, those of a coalition or of the international community.

# Summary

## (FRA) JD-3.4.5.1\_OMA(2011)

1. Operations in Afghanistan have shown that embedding national military staff within local forces is a complementary course of action to conventional operations. This Operational Military Assistance (OMA) can also be provided within the framework of a coalition with implied constraints and limits.
2. The deployment of teams to missions and structures which are very different but have the same objective on a theatre, and among local forces which have different traditions, lifestyle or style of combat, requires to identify the necessary principles and conditions to successfully achieve this type of course of action.
3. This joint doctrine (FRA) JD-3.4.5.1\_OMA(2011) *Operational Military Assistance to a Foreign Force* has the following objectives:
  - a. To provide the precise definition of the different forms of military assistance provided by the French Armed Forces to a foreign armed force.
  - b. To align this joint doctrine with the documents on Comprehensive Approach (CA), Stabilization (STAB), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and Counter-Insurgency (COIN) within the framework of a comprehensive manoeuvre.
  - c. To specify the principles and nature of the contribution of the Armed Forces, directions and services to OMA.
  - d. To highlight the studies on the possible forms of integration of French military staff within local forces, interministerial coordination, command chains, relations with the forces or structures deployed on a theatre of operation to establish, the perimeter of their different actions in terms of mission, command, rules of behaviour and rules of engagements, constraints, limits, and duration.
  - e. To specify the status as well as the conditions for the staff's protection and rescue.
  - f. To establish principles to guide the selection, training and operational preparation of the military personnel before their deployment.
  - g. To integrate the issues on support and combat support to accomplish the missions.



This document has been developed by the (FRA) Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrine and Experimentation (CICDE), a joint agency working on behalf of the French Defence Staff (EMA). For any information, please contact the CICDE at:

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