

Government response to IOB evaluation no. 379:

'Investing in Stability: Dutch Policy on Fragile States Reviewed'

14 October 2013

Introduction

In April 2013 the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs completed its evaluation of Dutch efforts in fragile states and the integrated approach to security, stability and sustainable development. The IOB report, entitled 'Investing in Stability: Dutch Policy on Fragile States Reviewed', is attached, along with the government's response.

The IOB's report examines policymaking and implementation in the period 2005-2011, with a particular focus on Afghanistan, Burundi, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Somalia and South Sudan. In 2005 the Dutch government published a Memorandum on Post-Conflict Reconstruction that laid the foundations for its integrated approach to the issue. This was followed in 2008 by a strategy document on 'Security and Development in Fragile States', which set out the policy underlying Dutch efforts in conflict areas and fragile states. The IOB's evaluation seeks to provide insights into the efficiency and effectiveness of Dutch policies aimed at reducing conflict and promoting peacebuilding in various fragile states and regions around the world. A key feature of these policies is that they aim to strengthen local socioeconomic development and stability as well as regional and international stability and security. In 2012 a letter to parliament (Parliamentary Papers 32 605, no. 94) updated Dutch policy on security and the rule of law in fragile states, based on lessons from the past. The Dutch approach focuses on the following five themes:

1. human security;
2. a functioning legal order;
3. inclusive political processes;
4. a legitimate and competent government;
5. a peace dividend in the form of jobs and basic services.

Context-specific and conflict-sensitive analyses have been used in consultation with partners in the international community to set priorities and identify the appropriate combination of these themes for each country. Our efforts focus on the underlying causes of conflicts, with a special emphasis on combating instability and exclusion and supporting beneficial forces in

society. We also focus specifically on the political and economic role of women, as part of the Netherlands' wider efforts to ensure the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. In multilateral forums, the Netherlands has played a leading role in formulating crisis response policy.

In recent years, there has been an increase in the attention devoted to the themes of security and the rule of law at global level. Fragile states have achieved the poorest results in pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals and are in danger of falling even further behind in political, social and economic terms. Without peace, security and a functioning government based on the rule of law, progress will remain elusive in these states. The Netherlands is therefore strongly in favour of incorporating security and the rule of law into the post-2015 development agenda and promotes this approach at bilateral and multilateral level. In addition, in the framework of the Security and Rule of Law Knowledge Platform, we are cooperating with civil society partners and knowledge institutions to consolidate the theories of change on which Dutch policy is based. This further strengthens Dutch efforts in fragile states.

Along the same lines, IOB's report concludes that, as a relatively small player on the global stage, the Netherlands has always operated selectively and on the basis of its own policy priorities, while coordinating its efforts with other international players at all times. Within the parameters of these priorities, we have worked in a flexible and sometimes experimental manner, taking account of the context in the country or region concerned. Policy implementation has often been built on best practices and characterised by common sense and pragmatism. IOB concludes that the Netherlands has achieved mixed results but that its overall score has been positive and that it has been an active and visible player. In the following sections, the government addresses the report's main findings and issues for consideration.

Findings

1. A high degree of policy continuity

IOB observes that there was continuity in the policy priorities in the field of peace and security during the 2005-2011 period. The main Dutch priorities were peace, human security, the rule of law, strengthening legitimate governments and measures aimed at improving socioeconomic programmes, including job creation. The government concurs with this observation and would emphasise that support for these goals is also growing internationally.

The Netherlands has actively contributed to this trend by advocating a broad, integrated approach to security and the rule of law in international organisations such as the United Nations, the European Union and NATO. A good example of this is the Netherlands' role as co-chair of the group of countries that concluded the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States in Busan in 2011.

2. Increasing integration of policy implementation and closer cooperation between ministries

An integrated approach and improved cooperation between ministries have increasingly characterised policy implementation, with an emphasis on the interplay of political, governmental, socioeconomic, military and regional issues. IOB rightly notes that the Netherlands benefits from the fact that it treats development cooperation both as an independent policy area and – simultaneously – as an integral part of Dutch foreign policy. According to IOB, the Fragile States and Peacebuilding Unit (EFV) played a key role in knowledge development at the Ministry, at Dutch embassies and in international policymaking. The government welcomes this finding and foresees a similar role for the Stabilisation and Humanitarian Aid Department (DSH) in combination with the Security and Rule of Law Knowledge Platform. The government also shares IOB's view that the interministerial coordination of Dutch efforts in fragile states has gradually improved. The key players behind this ongoing trend are the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security & Justice.

3. Policy is not based on a specific theory of change

IOB believes that Dutch fragile states policy is implicitly based on a neoliberal paradigm (democratisation, good governance and economic development through market forces) adhered to by many donor countries. According to this paradigm, the development of fragile states may in many ways be analogous to the path followed by Western states. The government partly agrees with this finding. It is true that, in practice, certain aspects of the international effort in countries such as Afghanistan are implicitly based on such assumptions. Unilateral Dutch action would serve little purpose in such cases. On the other hand, Dutch policy on fragile states and security and the rule of law attaches great importance to specific contexts, local traditions and flexibility, as opposed to predetermined policy prescriptions. It is also worth noting that there is no single, accepted theory of change that can be applied to fragile states and that assumptions about stabilising factors are constantly subject to review. It is not clear whether it is even possible to develop a single, useful theory of change that can be applied effectively in a wide range of conflict situations

and fragile states. Dutch policy is based on a country-specific approach. This is reflected in the Dutch missions' Multi-Annual Strategic Plans (MASPs), which are based on a thorough analysis of the local situation. The search for evidence-based solutions is continuing in consultation with the missions, various partners and the Security and Rule of Law Knowledge Platform.

4. A flexible and experimental approach, provided there is sufficient political support

IOB states that policy implementation is generally in line with the objectives set. The sectoral allocation of resources is also in keeping with these objectives. Implementation at country level is dependent on the national context and opportunities identified by the Netherlands within certain themes and sectors. The government agrees with this finding. Flexibility is a key priority in this context. One of the advantages of the fact that the Netherlands delegates a high proportion of its resources to its foreign missions is that this facilitates a swift response to changing conditions.

5. A selective focus on various elements of the integrated approach

The Netherlands has not always focused on all elements of the integrated approach to peace and security. According to IOB, this is due to the complexity of the issues, limited resources and the Netherlands' own interests and added value, which varied from case to case. However, Dutch efforts have always been coordinated with international players. The 3D approach (defence, diplomacy and development) has served as a holistic framework rather than a blueprint. The government welcomes this finding. The Netherlands does not need to work on every element of the integrated approach at all times. Even as a relatively small player on the global stage, we can coordinate such action at international level with other countries and organisations. However, we can make a difference by judiciously deploying our resources, expertise and networks in areas where we have added value. IOB observes that, in cases involving a substantial deployment of military personnel and resources, the defence component often takes on a dynamic of its own that is strongly influenced by national politics. The government agrees with this observation and emphasises the importance of a long-term, balanced involvement in fragile situations. IOB notes that the diplomatic component was the least apparent one during the period under review, despite the fact that it can make a major contribution behind the scenes. In contrast, the development component featured prominently in many cases, although it mainly targeted basic services and capacity building rather than private sector development. The government shares IOB's conclusion that diplomatic efforts were sometimes less visible. IOB rightly notes that these efforts were

nevertheless very important, for example in the case of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan, the peace talks in Burundi and the political initiatives in the Afghan province of Uruzgan. Incidentally, many of these diplomatic efforts were developed in the framework of the government's strategic priority on security and the rule of law. Besides direct Dutch action, these efforts also included cooperation and coordination with the UN, regional actors and other donor countries.

6. Increased attention to understanding local context, but varying quality of analysis

IOB notes that the need for a thorough understanding of the local, national and regional context became an established part of policy but that the depth of this understanding and the degree to which it found its way into policy varied. In Somalia and Chad, for example, this approach was applied too superficially. The Netherlands' efforts were governed by pragmatic considerations based on conflict analyses that also considered the regional dimension. The government confirms that the Dutch integrated approach presupposes an analysis of individual countries, but that regional contexts and dynamics are crucial both to analysis and to the gist of solutions. Context analyses are a standard part of the MASPs developed in 2011 by embassies in priority regions and countries. These analyses not only map the dynamics of conflicts but also devote attention to the available resources and instruments. The MASPs will be updated in 2013 to ensure a closer alignment with current government policy. The establishment of the new international security budget (BIV), which will continue to rely just as heavily on context and conflict analyses, opens up a new dimension in this regard. The government further notes that, given the limited nature of Dutch involvement in Chad, the country should not be regarded as a benchmark for Dutch efforts in fragile states.

7. Long-term support, though standard policy, was not always provided

IOB notes that several partner countries, such as Afghanistan, Burundi and South Sudan, received long-term support. However, the Netherlands withdrew early from Uruzgan, and the DRC ceased to be a partner country in 2012. Moreover, the slimming down of the Dutch presence in Khartoum may result in the Netherlands no longer being regarded as a credible mediator in Sudan's conflict with South Sudan. The Dutch contribution in Chad was a one-off affair.

The government recognises the importance of long-term involvement and a steady course in fragile situations. This is also one of the conclusions of the World Bank's *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development*, which states that it can take 20 to 30 years

to achieve lasting stability. The government's international security strategy 'A Secure Netherlands in a Secure World' also refers to the need for perseverance in crisis management and long-term efforts to build a state founded on the rule of law. In the case of Uruzgan, for example, it is worth noting that the Netherlands continued to provide development assistance after we withdrew our troops and that we made an effort to ensure that our activities were handed over to and continued by our development partners. With regard to the DRC, it is worth noting that many Dutch programmes continued under the umbrella of the regional programme for the Great Lakes as well as through multilateral and civilateral (NGO) channels. In the case of Sudan, finally, the focus shifted to South Sudan, where the Netherlands continues to work for a lasting peace in various ways.

8. The international community, including the Netherlands, achieved positive results

IOB believes that despite the persistent instability in various regions some significant results have been achieved, including the peaceful establishment of the independent state of South Sudan, the absence of large-scale armed conflict in the DRC, a decrease in the number of attacks and hijackings by Somali pirates, progress on security sector reform and improvements in human rights and public administration in Burundi, improved access to land and microcredit, and cross-border projects in the fields of energy and natural resources. There has also been tangible progress in Afghanistan in providing services and ensuring livelihoods. The results of the Netherlands' activities in Uruzgan were mixed; the ink-stain strategy was relatively successful in specific zones (urban areas), but not elsewhere. Afghan partners had serious capacity problems, reconstruction projects had a limited impact and demobilisation and reintegration programmes largely foundered. The government shares IOB's view of the results, which is confirmed by its own evaluation of the Uruzgan mission. It is clear that progress was achieved in Uruzgan in the areas of infrastructure, health care, agriculture and education, including girls' education.

9. The international community reached the limits of policy-led change and sustainability

IOB concludes that the international community is relatively powerless in the face of local rulers and communities that are unable or unwilling to contribute to security, stability and reconstruction in their countries. Success can be achieved when there is broad-based support for the path agreed between national governments and international partners. In particular, IOB concludes that support for fragile states is largely dependent on local political, social and governmental processes. The government considers this a key conclusion and notes that it already forms a mainstay of policy on security and the rule of law. Outside

support can only strengthen national processes, never create them. Local ownership and the efforts of local and national authorities are crucial in this context. This is consistent with trends in policymaking over the past ten years, the World Bank's *World Development Report 2011* and the Dutch government's International Security Strategy. Alongside the 'traditional' task of building institutional capacity, which remains of the utmost importance in fragile states, there is now a stronger emphasis on legitimacy, countervailing powers and the political role of civil society organisations. There is also a need for greater realism in setting policy objectives, while long-term domestic political commitment is a prerequisite for achieving lasting results.

Issues for consideration

1. Theoretical foundations of fragile states policy

IOB observes that more explicit attention could be devoted to scholarly insights about statebuilding, fragile states policy and conflict sensitivity. This could lead to a stronger emphasis on supporting and building on local structures and relationships and – potentially – to alternative forms of conflict reduction, peacebuilding and statebuilding. The government shares this view, although it is of the opinion that reliance on local actors and solutions is already largely an axiom of current policy. The planning and design of the programme to strengthen the rule of law in Kunduz is a good example of this. Dutch policy is sufficiently flexible to find pragmatic solutions based on the specific context of a given country. It would be useful to explore possible alternative forms of conflict reduction, peacebuilding and statebuilding and to develop specific policy proposals in consultation with Dutch development partners, for example through the Security and Rule of Law Knowledge Platform. Research proposals to this effect are currently being prepared. IOB also concludes that the positive impact of the peace dividend on stability is sometimes overestimated, citing South Sudan as an example. The Knowledge Platform Security and Rule of Law plans to initiate a study examining the correlation between the promotion of employment and stability.

2. Contextual analyses

IOB advises the relevant ministries to pursue and step up the measures needed to enable them to perform analyses and to increase their analytical capacity, and to involve various external partners in this process. The government is happy to adopt this recommendation. In a letter concerning the international security budget (BIV), it recently informed the House of Representatives that, wherever possible, contextual analyses would be incorporated into its

preparations for and decisions on the use of the BIV (Parliamentary Papers 33 400, no. 149). Contextual analyses examine political, economic, social and security-related developments and are used to identify the causes of conflicts, obstacles to development, the balance of forces and the Netherlands' added value. Our analysis will make use of existing knowledge and expertise, from outside as well as inside government. This will also create new opportunities for early warning and preventive activities in countries with smouldering conflicts. On the basis of these contextual analyses, a strategy will be subsequently formulated identifying clear interim and final objectives and the instruments needed to achieve them.

3. Integrated approach

IOB recommends the development of a less ambiguous, theoretically solid definition of the 'integrated approach'. Because Dutch fragile states policy encompasses not only defence, diplomacy and development cooperation but also the criminal justice system, police and economic cooperation, IOB considers the term 3D somewhat outmoded. It makes more sense to talk about an integrated or coherent approach. Furthermore, it is important to recognise that this approach is highly dependent on national and international political developments, which are sometimes perilous and often urgently require a response.

Since its first application in Uruzgan, the Netherlands' integrated approach has developed significantly. As noted in the recently published International Security Strategy (Parliamentary Papers 33 694, no. 1), an effective approach to fragility and crises requires the simultaneous and coordinated deployment of instruments in the fields of defence, diplomacy, development cooperation, the police, the criminal justice system and trade. Effective action in fragile states is a prolonged process that, in addition to crisis management, focuses specifically on prevention, reconstruction and long-term stabilisation. The government strives to employ the best possible mix of these instruments. Besides synchronising Dutch efforts, this requires cooperation and coordination with international and local partners. Furthermore, as well as selecting the appropriate instruments and partners, the policy priority on security and the rule of law involves pursuing a cautious approach that emphasises inclusiveness and prevents backsliding into conflict. The Netherlands also always seeks to add value and complement others' efforts. The integrated approach is more than just a mixture of instruments and partners; efforts in fragile states should also be based on a joint and thorough analysis of the situation and environment.

4. Realism and risk management

IOB warns of a gap between predominantly optimistic and ambitiously formulated policy and the complexity, difficulties and risks involved in operating in real-world fragile states. The government has taken this warning to heart. Objectives will be tested to determine how realistic and attainable they are. It is important to recognise that operating in fragile states inevitably entails risks. Situations can change rapidly, and established objectives may at a certain point appear outdated. Both the government and parliament need to accept that operating in unstable environments involves greater risks. What is important is that these risks are expertly explored and only taken after careful consideration. The embassies' new MASPs will also take account of this approach.

Countries and regions

1. Afghanistan

IOB's policy review is based to a large extent on the Dutch mission in Uruzgan and the final evaluation that was prepared after its conclusion. Some of its observations and conclusions have therefore already been articulated in the letter to parliament of 28 September 2011 (Parliamentary Papers 27 925, no. 436).

With regard to the analysis presented by IOB in support of its arguments, the government wishes to refer to the lessons that the Netherlands learned in Uruzgan and built on in Kunduz. Experiences in Uruzgan had a profound impact on the highly integrated planning and implementation of the police training mission in Kunduz. More attention was also devoted during this mission to formulating specific result indicators to facilitate the comprehensive guidance, monitoring and evaluation of the mission's results.

IOB is positive on the subject of policy coherence but asserts that Dutch efforts in Uruzgan were carried out in relative isolation from our International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) partners in Afghanistan. The government does not fully concur with this statement. The international community worked with a regional division of labour in Afghanistan. The Netherlands and its coalition partners frequently consulted on their approach both at Regional Command South and in donor meetings. The Netherlands constantly insisted in these consultations that the Afghan government should play a leading role and that the UN should play a coordinating role in civil matters in Uruzgan, but this approach was not sufficiently put into practice.

At the same time, our views evolved, so that we focused increasingly on the long-term effects of the Dutch presence. Examples of this include our decision to bring Afghan national programmes, civil partners and the UN to Uruzgan. Most of these civil partners are still active in the province. Dutch funding for development programmes is being phased out in 2013.

IOB rightly devotes considerable attention to environmental factors, such as the level of security (or insecurity), the Afghan government's inadequate capacity, the sometimes poor cooperation between donors and the country's lack of absorption capacity. This is an ongoing issue in fragile states – especially in Afghanistan – that once again highlights the importance of the local context and the need for a long-term approach to work in such countries.

IOB is relatively pessimistic about Afghanistan's future and has doubts regarding the sustainability of the international community's efforts. The government has always stressed that progress is not irreversible but believes that certain achievements will have a lasting impact. There has been progress in development and enhanced access to education and health care on a national scale. In Uruzgan, efforts in the fields of education, health care, agriculture and infrastructure are expected to have a long-term impact.

2. The Great Lakes

IOB takes a positive view of the achievements of the regional programme for the Great Lakes, which were due to effective cooperation between the missions and the Ministry in The Hague, the presence of sufficient analytical and management capacity and a willingness to cooperate with other actors and take firm diplomatic or political action where necessary. Another key factor was that the regional dimension was taken into account in the national programmes for each individual country. Incidentally, this did not mean however that all activities under these programmes had to be on a regional scale. IOB observes that certain interventions, such as support for national security and the rule of law, are better suited to implementation at national level. The government concurs with this observation. Cross-border activities in the fields of economic development, the environment, biodiversity and food security, which are less controversial and politically sensitive, are better suited to a regional approach. Incorporating these activities into the Regional Programme was a good idea and helped promote cooperation between the countries in the region. These regional activities complemented the national programmes, which more often focused directly on

security and the rule of law. Given the nature of the underlying issues, IOB believes that a long-term approach is required to both regional and national efforts.

The government welcomes IOB's endorsement of its chosen approach to the region. As it continues to develop this approach, it will be guided by IOB's observation that controversial and politically sensitive activities in such fields as national security and the rule of law do not lend themselves to a regional approach. Nevertheless, the regional perspective will be given due weight in national programmes on such issues.

3. DRC

The Netherlands' policy towards the DRC developed along the general lines of Dutch fragile states policy. IOB observes that a broad approach to fragility and peacebuilding was facilitated by the DRC's becoming a development cooperation partner country in 2007. As a result, the Netherlands was able to make a certain, significant contribution to the stabilisation of the DRC through our involvement in developing international strategies and operational frameworks and our support in specific areas, including the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, security sector development, the stabilisation of eastern DRC and the fight against sexual violence. The Netherlands pressed with some success for donor coordination and contributed diplomatically, politically and financially to strengthening the rule of law and good governance.

However, IOB also observes that the situation in the DRC was so intractable and the risks so great that the Netherlands was gradually forced to scale down its policy objectives. In practice, there were limited opportunities for constructive cooperation with the government and effective donor coordination. The Netherlands nevertheless continues to push for greater stability in eastern DRC, which remains one of the region's main sources of instability. We will also continue to provide funding from central budgets and through multilateral and civilateral (NGO) channels. Support provided under the DRC MASP is also continuing. The Dutch embassy in Kinshasa continues to interact with other donors and the national authorities, albeit at a lower pitch than in 2007-2011. IOB concludes that Dutch and other international support has helped reduce the destabilising influence of the DRC's neighbours and promote peace. A recent report by RAND's National Security Research Division has also demonstrated that this support has spared the country and its people further disintegration.

IOB further notes that efforts in the DRC will take a long time to bear fruit. A flexible response to the changing situation is therefore essential. Compared to other donors, the Netherlands

has performed particularly well in this regard. One example of this is our use of the Stability Fund, for example to finance a certification system for tin that is meant to address one of the causes of conflict in the country. According to IOB, the Netherlands, which is regarded by the parties in the region as an unbiased and reliable partner, has played a significant policy role. The government sees these findings as a vindication of its policies.

4. Burundi

IOB observes that, due in part to the small number of donors and its neutral position, the Netherlands was able to provide substantial added value in Burundi, through both its bilateral programme and its support for multi-donor initiatives such as the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP). IOB concludes that the security sector development programme has achieved good results, including the development of trust within just a few years that enables the Netherlands to raise issues like human rights violations and integrity. The Netherlands' general budget support proved instrumental in stabilising the country and served as leverage in holding the Burundian government to its promises of reform.

A key lesson from the experience in Burundi is the need to deepen the dialogue and partnership with actors at various levels of government and society. This will therefore continue to be a priority in the coming years. Our integrated approach gradually took shape as we increasingly adopted programme-based methods linking diplomacy to economic, financial, humanitarian and military-administrative instruments. The Netherlands' efforts were consistent with Burundi's national priorities and the limitations arising from the situation there. The experiences gained from the programme in Burundi confirm the importance of and need for long-term support for political, governmental and social transformation in fragile states.

5. Somalia

IOB observes that during the period under review, Somalia was not a partner country, it did not fit any of our country profiles, and no Dutch business-related development instruments were available there. Dutch efforts focused on a regionally-oriented multilateral approach. IOB further notes that Dutch policy emphasised the need for an integrated approach, including the necessity of tackling root causes. The main elements of Dutch policy were alleviating humanitarian emergencies, combating piracy, asylum issues and security/terrorism. Although causal links were made between these elements, IOB observes, policymaking and implementation ran on separate tracks.

The government feels that IOB's observation is partly justified but notes that policymaking and implementation have gradually become more integrated. Furthermore, the combination of the international community's new, stronger focus on Somalia and the launch of the Netherlands' international security budget (BIV) offers new opportunities for the future. The government concurs with IOB's observation that Dutch efforts in Somalia have focused heavily on the multilateral approach, in part with a view to donor coordination and the Paris agenda. As also noted by IOB, this choice was partly based on local conditions, including (until recently) the lack of a legitimate central government. The resulting high levels of insecurity resulted in a limitation of Dutch aims to humanitarian aid, anti-piracy measures and the training of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops. The recent establishment of a new central government has created an opportunity to shift the focus of anti-piracy efforts from treating the symptoms at sea to capacity building on land, making it possible to tackle the root causes of piracy and terrorism over the long term. Since the installation of the new Somali government, the Netherlands has invested in building the capacity of the Somali security forces, the criminal justice system and, with a view to encouraging repatriation, the migration services. It now seems fairly likely that the international community will support the building of a security apparatus and a state based on the rule of law, allowing a viable economy to take root.

6. South Sudan

IOB concludes that the Netherlands was initially able to make a limited contribution to peacebuilding and development in South Sudan. It suggests that the focus on unity inspired by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the emphasis on creating a peace dividend diverted attention from the promotion of internal security (e.g. strengthening the police, the rule of law and good governance). However, IOB does refer to – and emphasise the importance of – an increasingly integrated Dutch approach. Challenges identified by IOB include: stability and security, ethnic violence, oil dependence, food security, strengthening democratic and inclusive governance and fighting corruption. The government recognises the accuracy of the IOB's picture and is aware of the importance of a holistic approach. However, it would point out that the situation on the ground in South Sudan is still highly intractable. The challenges remain great, but through its policies the Netherlands is making a serious attempt to pursue an integrated approach in South Sudan. We are using various instruments for this purpose: our own strategic priorities on security and the rule of law, food security, private sector development and water, as well as our contribution to the United Nations Mission in Southern Sudan (UNMISS) and a reconstruction tender funding civil

society organisations that are active in South Sudan. The use of pooled funds will also continue, but their selection will increasingly be based on effectiveness and efficiency.

Our integrated approach in South Sudan is based on diplomacy (through our embassy there and the work of the Dutch Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York), defence (through our contribution to UNMISS) and development (through our development cooperation programme). In this way we are working from several angles to meet South Sudan's great need for stability and security. A central priority is supporting the development of the South Sudanese police, both by contributing to UNMISS/UNPOL and through our bilateral development cooperation programme. We are also currently working on a programme to support the entire South Sudanese criminal justice system, including its prison system.

7. Chad

IOB concludes that owing to limited resources there was little scope for long-term Dutch activities in Chad. For example, the Dutch contribution to EUFOR was always meant to be short-lived, and few resources were available for ambitious projects. The government believes that our efforts in Chad should not be regarded as representative of Dutch efforts in general. Such a limited deployment in a country without a Dutch diplomatic mission or a bilateral development relationship could hardly serve as a sound basis for integrated policy and lasting results. Looking beyond the Chadian case, the government would observe that, following the establishment of the BIV, Dutch attention will in future focus primarily on countries that hold out the prospect of a more effective and integrated deployment of resources.

Conclusion

On the whole, the government is pleased with this evaluation, which supports the main features of Dutch fragile states policy. It intends to continue ambitiously along its chosen path, for example with the establishment of the international security budget (BIV) and the recently presented International Security Strategy. Insofar as it is not already doing so, the government will take the lessons that have emerged from this evaluation into account when developing and implementing policy in the field of peace and security. It will also exchange ideas on the potential implications of the evaluation with universities, knowledge institutions, NGOs, international organisations and government bodies in the Security and Rule of Law Knowledge Platform.