

Joint Publication 3-07



Stability



03 August 2016



PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides doctrine for stability mission, activities, and tasks as part of stabilization efforts across the range of military operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of objectives.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the US, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



KEVIN D. SCOTT
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Force Development

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**SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-07
29 SEPTEMBER 2011**

- **Retitles “Stability Operations” to “Stability.”**
- **Changes the terminology from “stability operation” to “stability actions” (short for stability missions, activities, and tasks) or at the strategic level to “stabilization effort.”**
- **Adds the concept of combining defeat mechanisms with stability mechanisms (compel, control, influence, and support) to conduct operations.**
- **Expands the discussion on stability across the conflict continuum, to clarify the place of stability actions in all types of joint operations and the phasing construct.**
- **Expands and updates the discussion in the introductory chapter on understanding stability actions.**
- **Adds a section on the fundamentals of stabilization: conflict transformation, host nation (HN) ownership, unity of effort, and building HN capacity.**
- **Creates a new chapter on an integrated approach to stability action in joint operations.**
- **Adds a section on joint force component stability actions.**
- **Adds a section on the relationship between protection of civilians and stability.**
- **Includes a new section on operation assessments and stability actions.**
- **Creates a new chapter on stability actions in joint operations.**
- **Expands the appendix on transitional authority to both military transitional authority and military support to transitional civil authority.**
- **Modifies, adds, and removes multiple terms and definitions from JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Describes Stability Actions**
- **Discusses an Integrated Approach to Stabilization**
- **Covers Joint Stability Functions**
- **Explains Stabilization Planning**
- **Discusses Stability Actions in Other Joint Operations**

Stability Actions

Stabilization is the process by which military and nonmilitary actors collectively apply various instruments of national power to address drivers of conflict, foster host-nation resiliencies, and create conditions that enable sustainable peace and security.

Stability can be described as the overarching characterization of the effects created by activities of the United States Government (USG) outside the US using one or more of the instruments of national power to minimize, if not eliminate, economic and political instability and other drivers of violent conflict across one or more of the five USG stability sectors (i.e., security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, governance and participation, and economic stabilization and infrastructure).

Stability Operations Within the Range of Military Operations

Stabilization efforts can be conducted across the conflict continuum. Military support to stabilization efforts during peacetime generally takes the form of routine contact, military presence, and security cooperation (SC) activities (e.g., security force assistance, State Partnership Program, and security assistance). During crisis response and limited contingency operations, the balance of stability and combat operations varies widely. Many crisis response and limited contingency operations, such as foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), may not require combat. Others, such as strikes and raids, may not require stability actions, but incorporate stability considerations into planning. Still others, such as counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, which can be very protracted, will require a delicate balance

of offense, defense, and stability actions throughout the operation.

Understanding Stability

Stability is needed when a state is under stress and cannot cope. In general, stabilization is usually the responsibility of the host nation (HN), Department of State, and the United States Agency for International Development with support by the Department of Defense (DOD) conducting stability actions as necessary. Stability operations during a joint operation typically require the expertise of civil affairs in civil-military operations. Stability actions are often conducted in support of other USG departments or agencies to support an HN government and security forces, or an international organization. However, where there is no alternative competent lead organization or as national objectives dictate, the military force must be prepared to plan and execute USG stabilization efforts until it becomes feasible to transition that responsibility to another organization noted above. Instability is the symptom of a political crisis rooted in how political power is distributed and wielded, and by whom. To help resolve the situation, stabilization efforts seek to reshape the relationships within the indigenous populations and institutions, the different communities that make up the HN populace, and elites competing for power.

Understanding the Root Causes and Immediate Drivers of Instability

To understand the operational environment (OE), the joint force must understand both the root causes and immediate drivers of instability. The root causes refer to the deep structural features of the HN that contribute to its vulnerability or resiliency in the face of internal and external stresses. These often include a mix of cultural, demographic, sociological, economic, geographic, and/or political factors. The root causes give rise to the more immediate drivers of instability: the opportunity, motive, and means for violence.

Fundamentals of Stabilization

Joint forces supporting USG stabilization efforts should consider the use of fundamentals of stabilization and the principles of joint operations to plan and execute military activities to facilitate long-

term stability. The fundamentals are conflict transformation, HN ownership, unity of effort, and building HN capacity.

The Stabilization Framework

The framework helps to organize stabilization efforts and scopes the stability actions to achieve their objective whether, supporting theater campaign plans and integrated country strategies, or in major contingency operations.

The stabilization framework is a construct to help the joint force commander (JFC) conceptualize part of the OE of a nation-state that requires stabilization in support of US national strategy and interests. The framework characterizes an OE, identifies distinct stages of activities, assists in defining the types and ranges of tasks performed in that environment, and provides the basis for tools with which to measure progress toward the desired end state. The tasks and activities that make up these stability operations fall into three broad categories: initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability. The **initial response** stage generally reflects actions executed to stabilize an OE in a crisis state. During this stage, military forces perform stability actions, in concert with other agencies, during or directly after a conflict or disaster when ongoing violence poses a threat. The **transformation** stage represents the broad range of post-conflict reconstruction, stabilization, and capacity-building tasks. Military forces perform these tasks in a relatively secure environment, free from most wide-scale violence, often to support broader civilian efforts. The **fostering sustainability** stage encompasses long-term efforts that capitalize on capacity-building and reconstruction activities to establish conditions that enable sustainable development. This stage also represents those stability actions undertaken to prevent instability and conflict.

An Integrated Approach to Stabilization

Linking Military and Civilian Activities

Leaders link military and civilian activities to achieve true unity of effort. Within the USG, the National Security Strategy guides the development, integration, and coordination of all the instruments of national power to achieve national objectives.

***Stabilization and Reconstruction
Essential Tasks Matrix***

The matrix serves as a means to leverage functional knowledge and systemic thinking into planning, preparation, execution, and assessment.

The stability essential tasks matrix (ETM) assists planners to identify specific requirements supporting HNs in transition in order to prevent armed conflict, prevent civil strife, or restore stability in a post-conflict environment. The stability ETM divides the tasks conducted during operations and their relative time frame for execution across five broad technical areas and three timeframes (initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability). Detailed planning enables staffs to integrate and synchronize activities in time and space, identify complementary and reinforcing actions, and prioritize efforts within and across the stability sectors. The stability sectors represent the five key focus areas for civil-military efforts. The stability sectors are: security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, governance and participation, and economic stabilization and infrastructure.

***Joint Force Components and
Stability Actions***

Military forces provide support to facilitate the execution of tasks for which the HN is normally responsible. These actions generally fall into one of three categories, representing the collective effort associated with stabilization:

- Tasks for which military forces retain primary responsibility.
- Tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations retain responsibility, but military forces execute or are prepared to execute.
- Tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations retain primary responsibility.

Joint Stability Functions

The joint stability functions described here are security, FHA, economic stabilization and infrastructure, rule of law, and governance and participation. These functions are based upon the sectors developed in the stability ETM as interagency guidance on stability and reconstruction activities across the USG.

Security

Security activities seek to protect and control civil populations, territory, and national assets such as infrastructure or natural resources. Such activities

may be performed as part of a military occupation during or after combat; as a component of a COIN or peacekeeping operation; or in response to a natural disaster. They seek to reassure rather than compel the civil population, while communicating a clear, credible threat of force to opportunists or potential adversaries.

Humanitarian Assistance

The humanitarian assistance function includes programs conducted to meet basic human needs to ensure the well-being of the population. Well-being is characterized by access to and delivery of basic needs and services (i.e., water, food, shelter, sanitation, and health services), the provision of primary and secondary education, the return or voluntary resettlement of those displaced by violent conflict, and the restoration of a social fabric and community life.

Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure

The economic stabilization and infrastructure function includes programs conducted to ensure an economy in which people can pursue opportunities for livelihoods within a predictable system of economic governance bound by law. A sustainable economy is characterized by market-based macroeconomic stability, control over the illicit economy and economic-based threats to the peace, development of a market economy, and employment generation.

Rule of Law

The rule of law function refers to programs conducted to ensure all individuals and institutions, public and private, and the state itself are held accountable to the law, which is supreme. The rule of law in a country is characterized by just legal frameworks, public order, accountability to the law, access to justice, and a culture of lawfulness. Rule of law requires laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and that are consistent with international human rights principles. It also requires measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in applying the law, separation

of powers, participation in decision making, and legal certainty.

Governance and Participation

Governance is the state's ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society. Participation is a process by which authority is conferred on rulers, by which they make rules and by which those rules are enforced and modified, and refers to programs conducted to help the people to share, access, or compete for power through nonviolent political processes and to enjoy the collective benefits and services of the nation. These rules and processes must be seen as predictable and tolerable in the eyes of the population to be deemed legitimate. They are manifested in three core functions: representation, security, and welfare.

Stabilization Planning

General

The development of operation plans that integrate offense, defense, and stability actions and integrate the military's stabilization efforts with the activities of interorganizational partners is the responsibility of JFCs and their staffs. JFCs must also ensure that subordinate commanders executing stability actions understand the overall planning of the operation, including, in particular, how various military and civilian stability efforts interrelate and, when possible, integrate with each other and with combat missions, tasks, and activities, if any.

Understanding the Operational Environment

An understanding of the OE in stabilization enables the development of an approach that includes realistic, achievable objectives, and properly aligns ends, ways, and means. Understanding of the OE is accomplished through joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) and the collective staff assessment. The most important component of the OE to understand is the relevant actors. These include the population, friendly elements of the joint force, and adversaries. Other relevant actors may include supporting state actors and non-state

actors (e.g., transnational terrorist or criminal organizations) and/or the nongovernmental organization community. The JIPOE process yields important information that informs the JFC's ability to identify relevant actors, and understand, anticipate, and/or influence relevant actor decision making and associated behavior with respect to the JFC's stabilization objectives.

Planning Stabilization Efforts

To attain the desired end state, stability actions capitalize on coordination, cooperation, integration, and synchronization among military and nonmilitary organizations.

The goal of operation planning is to develop a comprehensive approach that integrates the capabilities and contributions of many diverse participants toward a common purpose of overcoming the destructive effects of instability and violent conflict and serves as a centerpiece for unity of effort in stabilization efforts. Commanders use stability mechanisms to visualize how to employ the force to conduct stability tasks. The four stability mechanisms are compel, control, influence, and support. Commanders perform all stability tasks within the framework of conflict transformation, intended either to address a source of instability or to promote a mitigator of violence. During planning, commanders make all efforts to view stability tasks through a culturally focused lens and examine them beyond the first order of effects.

Integrated Planning

Building unity of effort is an inherent part of the joint planning process, especially when more than one United States Government department or agency is involved.

Established policy and procedures are designed to support the military chain of command while engendering comprehensive, cooperative planning between military and civilian departments and agencies of the USG to implement stability policy and direction. Interagency operation planning takes place over three general phases: initial interagency planning; reassessment and revision of plans; and transition planning, which includes planning for ongoing operations and for when authorities are passed from one entity to another. Considerations for building unity of effort begin early in the planning process by increasing shared understanding and participation in a collaborative planning process.

Special Considerations

Special considerations include civil-military operations, command and control, protection, sustainment, and women in conflict resolution.

Assessment of Stabilization Efforts

Operation assessment for stabilization efforts uses subjective and objective analysis to determine the status of relevant factors within the OE. By developing a clear understanding of the current state of these relevant factors, a determination can be made about progress (or regression) toward the desired end state.

Planning Transitions and Transferring Authorities

Successful transition planning creates the conditions for the successful transfer of authority to non-DOD agencies, non-USG entities, or the HN to preserve the gains made through more traditional military activities. The joint force focuses primarily on the transition of security functions from US and multinational forces to non-DOD agencies and the HN, but in a large footprint operation, especially following major combat operations, the joint force may have to plan for the transition of non-security functions as well. Planners should be aware of the authorities under which they plan and fund the transition. These will differ from the authorities used to execute the intervention.

Stability Actions in Other Joint Operations

General

Maintaining or reestablishing stability in other nations is often integral to how other joint operations achieve or contribute to US political objectives. Integrating stability activities into the planning and execution of other joint operations helps avoid unintended consequences, translates short term gains into lasting progress, and provides a bridge linking operational objectives with broader strategic goals.

Stability Activities in Conflict Prevention

Joint forces performing prevention activities focus on support to diplomatic/political and developmental efforts to lessen the causes of tension and unrest. Military actions to prevent conflict, promote both HN and regional stability, generally take the form of security cooperation and military engagement, and presence activities.

Stability Considerations in Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

FHA consists of DOD activities conducted outside the US and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. FHA activities conducted by US Armed Forces range from military engagement activities supporting geographic combatant commanders' SC and related programs to conducting limited contingency operations in support of another USG department or agency.

Stability Considerations in Peace Operations

The majority of peace operations aim at maintaining or reestablishing HN stability; although peace enforcement operations often involve major combat operations, branch and sequel efforts often involve stabilization to secure US objectives.

Stability Actions in Major Operations

Stability, while not the focus of the operations, may be a critical element to success. When executed, stability operations will likely take the form of tasks to be executed concurrently with and may influence the planning and execution of combat operations. In some cases, stability activities may rise to the level of being a subordinate operation, such as follow-on operations while combat operations are still occurring.

Stability in Foreign Internal Defense

Foreign internal defense (FID) refers to the US activities that support an HN internal defense and development (IDAD) strategy designed to protect against subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security, consistent with US national security objectives and policies. Stability considerations are inherent to the multidimensional, interagency, and multinational approach of US FID activities. FID focuses on helping the HN to address the root causes of instability, and emphasizes that joint force efforts are intended to support IDAD programs in a manner that is acceptable to the HN's cultural and political realities.

Stability in Counterinsurgency

The stabilization considerations of COIN are rooted in the political nature of the conflict and the primary focus should be on the population,

rather than just the insurgents. Stabilization efforts are typically required to reinforce the legitimacy of the affected government while reducing insurgent influence.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides doctrine for stability mission, activities, and tasks as part of stabilization efforts across the range of military operations.

CHAPTER I STABILITY ACTIONS

1. General

a. Stability is achieved through the process of stabilization through the balanced application of the instruments of national power in partnership with the host nation (HN) and local communities. Stabilization is the process by which military and nonmilitary actors collectively apply various instruments of national power to address drivers of conflict, foster HN resiliencies, and create conditions that enable sustainable peace and security. Stability can be described as the overarching characterization of the effects created by activities of the United States Government (USG) outside the US using one or more of the instruments of national power to minimize, if not eliminate, economic and political instability and other drivers of violent conflict across one or more of the five USG stability sectors discussed in Chapter II, “An Integrated Approach to Stabilization” (i.e., security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, governance and participation, and economic stabilization and infrastructure).

b. Joint operations are a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability actions. Joint force commanders (JFCs) integrate and synchronize these operations and activities to accomplish assigned missions, especially those requiring combat operations. Depending on a variety of factors, stability actions may be the predominate focus during some phases of an operation/campaign.

c. An **operation** is a military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. **Military contributions to stabilization consist of those various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the US in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.** Stabilization actions are conducted across the conflict continuum from peace to war and can be conducted by military forces before, during and after conflict. These actions may be conducted in support of other USG departments and agencies as part of an integrated country strategy. Commanders appropriately combine stability actions with offensive actions and defensive actions to achieve objectives. Commanders might employ stability capabilities as part of a theater campaign plan (TCP).

d. Stability actions are conducted in each joint phase, including a shaping phase. Stabilization efforts should not be confused with joint phase IV (stabilize).

e. Stability actions are particularly important in phase 0 (shape) and phase 1 (deter), as part of building partnerships as a result of military engagement, security cooperation (SC), and deterrence actions by conventional forces and special operations forces (SOF) units outside of a joint operation. Generally, these activities or tasks directly support a chief of mission (COM) and country team for stabilization through a geographic combatant commander’s (GCC’s) TCP. The mission sets, tasks, and activities used may be the same

as those used during a joint operation during a limited contingency or major operation/campaign.

f. Stability actions are often an integral part of TCPs, integrated country strategies, and every phase in operations that support the comprehensive stabilization process. This process assists states or regions entering, enduring, or recovering from crisis to transform the state from actual or potential violent conflict toward a sustainable political settlement. It involves identifying and reducing the sources of instability at all levels while strengthening mitigating factors across political, security, rule of law, economic, and social spheres in collaboration with legitimate actors in the HN and region.

g. Stabilization efforts are a critical component of a broader strategic/operational approach to prevent, resolve, or help states experiencing internal conflict caused by instability. Where US national security objectives depend upon maintaining or reestablishing stability, stabilization links the application of joint force combat power and/or SC capabilities with the achievement of strategic and policy objectives. Stabilization does this by assisting the HN reach a sustainable political environment that allows societal conflicts to be resolved peacefully. This approach involves addressing drivers of instability across political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) systems in collaboration with legitimate actors in the HN. Appendix F, “Key Stability Documents,” provides general summaries of some key documents.

h. The stability framework, discussed in paragraph 7, “The Stabilization Framework,” demonstrates the relevance of stability and provides a more complete description of the connectivity of stability actions before, during, and after conflict.

i. Sustainable security and stability requires the transfer of responsibilities and authorities from the military to another interagency partner (e.g., Department of State [DOS] and a COM) and/or the HN, often occurring during the transitions from phases III to IV and V of a joint operation/campaign. The size and complexity of the operation will determine the number and difficulties in the transfers of authorities and responsibilities. Transfer of responsibilities from the military to another interagency partner and/or the HN normally is a significant activity signaling progress toward the end state of an operation/campaign.

j. Additionally, USG stability efforts supported by the joint force must be sustainable by the HN over the long-term. This sustainability should be cultivated to ensure viability of long-term USG investments in the affected HN through foreign assistance, which includes development, humanitarian, and security assistance.

2. Stability Operations Within the Range of Military Operations

a. Stabilization efforts can be conducted across the conflict continuum. Military operations vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity within a range that extends from military engagement, SC, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations, and, if necessary, major operations and campaigns. The nature of

the operational environment (OE) may require US military forces conduct several types of joint operations simultaneously while also supporting routine USG stabilization efforts. Whether the prevailing context for the joint operation is one of traditional warfare or irregular warfare (IW), or if the operation takes place outside of conflict, combat and stability actions are never sequential or alternative actions; the JFC should integrate and synchronize stability actions with offensive and defensive actions within each phase of any joint operation.

b. During military engagement, SC, and deterrence activities, stability actions support the GCCs' TCP military objectives and objectives of the integrated country strategy. Military support to stabilization efforts during peacetime generally takes the form of routine contact, military presence, and SC activities (e.g., security force assistance [SFA], State Partnership Program, and security assistance).

c. During crisis response and limited contingency operations, the balance of stability and combat operations varies widely. Many crisis response and limited contingency operations, such as foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), may not require combat. Others, such as strikes and raids, may not require stability actions, but incorporate stability considerations into planning. Still others, such as counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, which can be very protracted, will require a delicate balance of offense, defense, and stability actions throughout the operation.

3. Understanding Stability

Stability is needed when a state is under stress and cannot cope. In general, stabilization is usually the responsibility of the HN, DOS, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) with support by the Department of Defense (DOD) conducting stability actions as necessary. Stability operations during a joint operation typically require the expertise of civil affairs (CA) in civil-military operations (CMO).

See Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, for additional detail regarding CA and CMO support for stability actions.

a. An unstable nation-state requires a tailored response that integrates tools of HN statecraft with support of a comprehensive approach by the USG and/or multinational partners, or international organizations. In this comprehensive approach, military forces play two critical roles. First, they establish conditions that facilitate the efforts of the other instruments of national power—providing the requisite security and control to stabilize an operational area. Second, they work in conjunction with those other instruments of national power to help foster and sustain the political environment that is the foundation of long-term stability. Military forces support stabilization by leveraging the coercive and constructive capabilities of the force to establish a safe and secure environment; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; help create conditions that enable HN actors to establish locally appropriate political, legal, social, and economic institutions; and help transition responsibility to a legitimate civil authority operating under the rule of law. This transition is fundamental to a shift in focus to long-term development. Success

typically requires a long-term commitment by external actors and is ultimately contingent on the support of the HN populace.

b. There is no universal template for stabilization: each effort must be tailored to account for the strengths and weaknesses of the HN, and the nature of the instability. Stability actions executed in a relatively benign OE as elements of a GCC's TCP share similar broad goals as those activities conducted in the aftermath of conflict or disaster. They aim to influence the HN to build legitimate partner capacity, strengthen legitimate governance, maintain rule of law, foster economic growth, and help to forge a strong sense of national unity. However, their design, sequence, and implementation must be carefully aligned to address the political, social, and economic realities of each context. Ideally, effective stabilization is undertaken before, rather than after, conflict. Conducted within the context of peacetime military engagement, stabilization provides a foundation for multinational cooperation that helps to achieve US national objectives.

c. **Military Contribution to Stabilization.** Stability actions are often conducted in support of other USG departments or agencies to support an HN government and security forces, or an international organization. However, where there is no alternative competent lead organization or as national objectives dictate, the military force must be prepared to plan and execute USG stabilization efforts until it becomes feasible to transition that responsibility to another organization noted above. Consequently, the joint force must be capable of understanding the root causes and immediate drivers of instability, and, if necessary, plan and implement an integrated political-military plan to address them. This will typically involve a mix of offensive, defensive, and stability actions to establish civil security and civil control, restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian assistance until such time as it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other USG departments and agencies, a foreign government and security forces, or an international organization. The joint force will operate in support of another interagency partner, usually DOS, and, as appropriate international organization or multinational force structures for managing CMO, and will seek to enable the deployment and utilization of the appropriate civilian capabilities. Dependent upon the concept of operations (CONOPS) and available forces, DOD CA capabilities may be required for CA operations and CMO that support operations through each phase of joint operations, and especially during the transitions through phases IV (stabilize) and V (enable civil authorities).

d. **Political Settlement**

(1) Instability is the symptom of a political crisis rooted in how political power is distributed and wielded, and by whom. In this respect, political power is not confined to what may be considered legitimate spheres of influence, but includes all types of activity that aim to increase influence and share of resources, while constraining that of another. Such disagreements over political power are often driven by dynamics at both the elite and grassroots levels of its indigenous society. Such political elite or elites are persons or groups with power from wealth, status, and institutional power from influential positions within prominent private or public organizations (e.g., bureaucratic, corporate, economic, intellectual, media, religious academic, social). Political elites include not only politicians

but also ethnic/tribal leaders, community organizers, religious leaders, business leaders, and criminal actors.

(2) The root cause(s) and/or immediate drivers of instability may or may not be political; regardless of the cause, the solution may require political action, i.e. policy change, reprioritization/refocus of specific HN government programs, an urgency to develop or increase a specific HN government capability and capacity, or negotiations with other influencers. As a result, effective USG stabilization efforts require coordinated top-down and bottom-up approaches.

(3) To help resolve the situation, stabilization efforts seek to reshape the relationships within the indigenous populations and institutions, the different communities that make up the HN populace, and elites competing for power. The relationships between these three elements of the HN society are interdependent and are the key to a sustainable political settlement. Personnel who plan stabilization efforts should understand the relationships between these internal elements and recognize external influences from third-party actors that may affect stabilization efforts beyond the capabilities of any of the internal components.

(4) The political settlement should entail simultaneously negotiating a compromise with other elites and addressing the demands of the communities they have mobilized. The degree to which elite agendas reflect those of the populations they claim to represent varies widely—some elites are entirely concerned with personal power or enrichment, while others are deeply committed leaders. A political settlement that delivers lasting stability must work at multiple levels at the same time—negotiating with elites while reaching past them to shape the perceptions of the communities and networks they rely on for power. This is accomplished through civil, military, and diplomatic activities that are carefully synchronized to reinforce each other and support a stabilization narrative. Political settlements that are not perceived by the population as delivering grassroots change are unlikely to either constrain opportunistic elites or prevent the emergence of new leaders demanding change, often through renewed violence.

4. Understanding the Root Causes and Immediate Drivers of Instability

a. To understand the OE, the joint force must understand both the root causes and immediate drivers of instability. The root causes refer to the deep structural features of the HN that contribute to its vulnerability or resiliency in the face of internal and external stresses. These often include a mix of cultural, demographic, sociological, economic, geographic, and/or political factors. Root causes can produce grievances that on their own do not result in instability, but can be exploited to mobilize portions of the population to violence. The root causes give rise to the more immediate drivers of instability: the opportunity, motive, and means for violence. Root causes typically require long-term efforts to resolve and often can only be tackled once some level of stability has been restored. The joint force may play a role in helping address root causes, particularly during peacetime military engagement with HNs to prevent conflict before it breaks out. However, in the face of growing or severe instability, stability activities concentrate on the

immediate drivers in order to resolve the political crisis, and create an opportunity for longer-term processes to deal with the root causes.

b. Different analytical frameworks are used to identify the root causes and immediate drivers of instability, respectively. The fragile states framework provides a basis for analyzing the root causes of instability and a broad perspective on the condition of the HN. The opportunity, motive, and means framework helps the joint force understand how the root causes have shaped the political dynamics of the HN and been exploited to mobilize segments of the population towards violent conflict. Analysis of the opportunity, motive, and means factors helps the joint force prioritize, sequence, and plan their efforts to maximize the impact of stability activities over the short to medium term.

c. The Root Causes of Instability

(1) The Fragile States Framework

(a) A fragile state is a country that suffers from institutional weaknesses serious enough to threaten the stability of its central government. Whether that fragility is caused by the removal of state institutions in military actions, ongoing systemic issues of economics or governance, a sudden onset disaster, or any other circumstances that may upset the balance of the elements of a stable state, the JFC must understand the context in which stability actions are executed. The fragile states framework can help the JFC and military planners develop a foundational understanding of the OE (see Figure I-1). The framework describes different levels of fragility and the direction and speed of movement along the framework. States can move within the fragile states framework based on the relationships among the elements of a stable state.

(b) The term “fragile states” describes a broad range of failing, failed, and recovering states in which legitimate and representative governance institutions struggle or fail to manage social, security, economic, and political pressures. Fragile states fall along a spectrum from weakness to collapse, in which conflict may or may not be a salient factor. The entity that tracks international data for signs of state failure is an NGO called Fund for Peace. The fragile states index, produced by the Fund for Peace, is a critical tool in highlighting not only the normal pressures that all states experience, but also in identifying when those pressures are pushing a state towards the brink of failure. Ideally, conflict and state failure might be preempted by effective development assistance strategically targeted to critical vulnerabilities. To date, this has been more the exception than the rule, in large part because analysis has been imprecise, the ability to marshal resources for countries not yet in crisis is limited, and some situations are simply not amenable to development assistance solutions—at least in the short run. Military forces may be tasked to support development assistance with stabilizing activities such as security.

(c) Whatever the operational situation, when joint forces commence operations in an area, the HN may be at any point along the fragile states framework from a failed state to a recovering state. From that point, the joint or multinational forces and civilian agencies will attempt to move the state toward stability, even as the presence of destabilizing factors (e.g., insurgents, ongoing natural disasters) may contribute to




Figure I-1. Fragile States Framework

outbreaks of violent conflict. Movement along the framework does not have to be linear. The movement can fluctuate between periods of conflict and peaceful conditions. Countries that decline to a condition of a failed state or into violent conflict are more likely to require more military effort, particularly to provide civil security.

(d) The framework has four categories of states: failing, failed, recovering, and stable, although the distinction or exact transition between categories is rarely clear.

1. Failing State. The failing state is still viable, but it has a reduced capability and capacity to protect and govern the population. Based on the situation and level of stability, a failing state may be moving toward becoming a stable state or a failed state.

2. Failed State. A failed state may only have remnants of a government due to collapse or regime change or it may have a government that exerts weak governance in all or large portions of its territory. A failed state is unable to effectively protect and govern the population. It may not have any government with which to work and, consequently, conducting stabilization efforts is difficult, especially with respect to establishing legitimacy of the government and governmental security forces. Under these extreme circumstances, the intervening authority may be legally or operationally required

to install a transitional authority. Even with a national government, a failed state may include large ungoverned areas (UGAs).

3. Recovering State. The recovering state is moving toward stability but may still experience varying levels of instability. This state is able to protect and govern its population to some degree. A key consideration is whether the population considers the level of protection and governance acceptable and normal. Based on the situation and level of stability, a recovering state may be progressing to being a stable state or regressing to being a failed state.

4. Stable State. A stable state is able to protect and govern its population to degree. The population considers the level of protection and governance acceptable and normal. Characteristics of a stable state include: the civil populace perceives the government as the legitimate authority with a monopoly on the use of violence, governments have the ability to resolve disputes, governments have the ability to provide for essential services for the people, the government has the ability to positively influence key regional and international leaders, and the civil population perceives the government is able to secure the future of the population.

See paragraph 4c(2), “Elements of Stable States,” for further discussion of a stable state.

(e) The distinction among failing, failed, and recovering states is not always clear in practice. For example, such labels may mask substate and regional conditions (insurgencies, factions, etc.) within the OE that are more informative and relevant for the JFC. It is more important, therefore, to understand how far and quickly a country is moving from or toward stability than it is to categorize a state as failed or not. Therefore, the JFC, working in consultation with the country team, GCC, and combatant command (CCMD) staff, must distinguish between fragile states that are vulnerable to failure and those that are already in crisis.

1. Vulnerable States. Vulnerable states are those states unable or unwilling to meet the expectations or demands of significant portions of their populations to an extent that the legitimacy of the government is in question. These states are not in crisis and may even be moving toward stability, but their vulnerability to failure remains an important consideration for the HN government and USG decision makers.

2. Crisis States. Crisis states are those states where the central government does not exert effective control over its own territory or is unable or unwilling to assure the provision of vital services to significant parts of its territory. Crisis states are already in failure or are quickly spiraling toward violent conflict.

For further details on the fragile states framework, refer to USAID’s Fragile States Strategy.

(2) **Elements of Stable States.** Understanding the elements of a stable state provides context for understanding the sociopolitical, economic, and governance aspects of a failing, failed, or recovering states (see Figure I-2). Elements of a stable state can be




Figure I-2. Elements of a Stable State

related to the five USG stability sectors, which are discussed in Chapter II, “An Integrated Approach to Stabilization.”

(a) Security, economic development, infrastructure development, governance, and rule of law encompass the substantive functionalities and competencies of the state. However, the context is also determined by the societal relationships that underpin and are interwoven with these elements. In a stable state, the social, cultural, and ideological factors that bind society are broadly consistent with the manner in which state institutions discharge their responsibilities and gain consent from the population.

1. Nations protect and defend their population from internal and external threats (i.e., provide civil security) to protect individuals from persecution, intimidation, reprisals, and other forms of systematic violence (i.e., personal security). In addition,

nations attempt to ensure the basic physiological needs of the people are met, whether through direct provision or by enabling the population to do so for themselves. Human security, a requirement for building and sustaining stability, is met when the personal security needs and basic physiological needs (e.g., food, water, and shelter) of the population are met. Where the state lacks the capability or will to meet security needs, individuals tend to transfer loyalty to any group that promises to meet those needs, including adversarial groups such as insurgents and foreign fighters, as well as belligerents and opportunists. These groups can exploit human insecurity by providing money, basic social services, and even a crude form of justice. Securing the population, therefore, is fundamental to the development of HN government authority and ultimately the national security of the state.

2. Economic and infrastructure development are characterized by the level of natural resources, degree of technological development, industrial base, communications network, and level of government revenue. These factors, when applied appropriately, reduce the drivers of conflict and instability and may prevent a downward spiral from vulnerability to crisis and state failure. Thereby, shaping the ability of the state to provide stable governance and ensure security in the long term.

3. Governance and rule of law in a stable state includes a sustainable political structure that permits the peaceful resolution of internal contests for power, and dispute resolution systems that reasonably satisfy the needs of the population. The prospect of long-term stable governance can occur when effective influence is exercised over a population and territory by methods viewed as broadly legitimate by the majority of the governed, though a brittle form of stability can exist using brutality and corruption.

4. The commitment to the rule of law is also fundamental to a stable state and includes legal frameworks, public order, accountability to the law, and access to justice. Over the long term, adherence to the rule of law prevents abuses of governmental mechanisms by those with power over those mechanisms and promotes the ability to provide security and to encourage economic stabilization. If populations experience inequitable treatment under the law and/or perceive favoritism of one group over another regarding provision of essential services, government legitimacy may be questioned and state vulnerability to crisis increases. In the short term, access to justice is an immediate concern, as it provides a state-sanctioned mechanism to resolve conflicts rather than resorting to violence or seeking assistance from destabilizing actors (such as insurgent groups).

(b) The structures of a state are the result of a political settlement forged by a common understanding among elites and the communities they represent. Their interests or beliefs are served by a particular way of organizing political power. The political settlement may be a formal agreement or an informal understanding, and serves as the foundation of a political process.

For a more detailed discussion of political settlement, see paragraph 3d, “Political Settlement.”

(3) The fragile states framework and the elements of a stable state are tools to help understand how stability is achieved. Although capacity building at the national level plays a crucial role, societal strength and stability are ultimately rooted at the community level. The JFC must be careful to avoid focusing too heavily on national institutions as a panacea for fragility and instability. This is because ultimately, stability results from government effectiveness and perceptions of its legitimacy by the people it represents, and there are no quick fixes to strengthen governance or build a country's ability to improve the lives of its citizens. The JFC's role in stabilization, therefore, must be focused on the critical tasks associated with the initial to medium term phases of a long term process.

(4) The scale of military involvement and commitment in creating stability can range from a team of personnel highly trained in stability missions, tasks, and activities to a sizeable joint force. Generally, early involvement and commitment to prevent a downward spiral in a fragile state will be considerably less onerous than the scale necessary to facilitate recovery of a failed state.

d. Understanding the Immediate Drivers of Instability. The root causes are critical to understanding why a state is unstable, but additional analysis is required to understand how they have manifested in specific political dynamics that threaten the HN. To develop an effective plan for stabilization, the joint force must analyze the immediate drivers of instability. These factors can be categorized as a gap in HN government control over its population or territory that creates an opportunity for resistance; a combination of objective and perceived shortcomings of the HN government that provides the motive to join or support a violent actor; and access to the means of opposition. Opportunity, motive, and means are central to understanding and mapping the drivers of instability as a basis for the design and detailed planning to create stability.

For more information, see JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency.

(a) **Opportunity.** Opportunity may emerge slowly over time due to a decline in HN capacity to control its territory and population. It can also arise when HN security force capacity remains level, but the willingness of the HN population to cooperate with HN forces declines. Conversely, opportunity can also emerge suddenly as the result of a natural, industrial, or humanitarian disaster that overwhelms the capacity of the HN government to maintain control. In these cases, the HN government may face criminal or political opportunists seeking to exploit a sudden vacuum of authority.

(b) **Motive**

1. The motives for violence vary between individuals and communities, and between elites, combatants, and supporters. For a joint force conducting stability activities, it is important to distinguish between the root causes that made a society vulnerable to instability, and how those conditions were transformed into drivers of instability by established or aspiring elites. The existence of grievances does not automatically cause instability: poverty, unemployment, economic inequality, inadequate essential services, political marginalization, and repression are unfortunately commonplace, and exist in many places that are reasonably stable. It takes leaders to build

a compelling narrative that links grievances to a political agenda. Those leaders use that narrative to mobilize support for some political purpose, including possibly undermining the government's ability to constrain their freedom of action. The narrative explains who is to blame for the grievances, how the grievances should be addressed and what the population should do. The success of a narrative is based not only on the substance of its promises and threats, but how it is presented to the target audience. Successful narratives typically frame grievances in terms of an ethnic, religious, political, class, or geographic identity, emphasizing its marginalization by the HN government. The identity provides the symbols, myths, and historical references that are woven into the narrative to bolster its credibility and appeal. Those challenging the authority of the HN government consistently reinforce the credibility of their narrative through communication and propaganda of the deed.

2. In many cases, opponents of the government do not immediately resort to violence, and the response of the HN government may determine whether a crisis is resolved through peaceful political processes or escalates. Responding appropriately requires the HN government to accurately distinguish between legitimate criticism and determined subversion. HN governments may default to heavy-handed repressive responses that drive moderates into alliances with extremist hardliners, deepening the instability and pushing the crisis towards open violence. Escalation often involves deliberate attacks by both sides on important civic institutions, and the disruption of the norms that help societies function, creating physical and psychological trauma for individuals, communities, and the nation as a whole that can hamper efforts to resolve the conflict.

(c) **Means.** Finally, acquiring the **means** to mount a violent challenge to the incumbent government authorities is a significant task for armed actors, and the way such groups go about securing those resources can strongly influence their behavior. The leaders of destabilizing actors must assemble and organize personnel, funds, weapons, and systems of secure communications and logistics—often covertly. Leveraging existing social networks, diaspora support, illicit economies, or state sponsorship can all provide armed actors with the means to challenge HN authority, but each comes with drawbacks as well. Relying on existing social networks can provide a resilient, deeply rooted source of people and funds, but that social identity may limit the ability to win broader support. Diaspora politics and priorities can diverge significantly from those in the theater of operations, creating tensions between local factions and their geographically removed backers. Deepening involvement in illicit economies can transform organizations into criminal organizations as profit becomes an end in itself. State sponsors can often prove the strongest support base, but have their own agendas and expect to wield influence or even outright control. Analysis of how the conflict actors—including the HN government and its allies—secure vital resources can provide key insights to inform an effective plan.

5. Principles of Joint Operations to Achieve Stability

Although the principles of joint operations (see Figure I-3) apply to aspects of any joint operation, emphasis on certain principles, especially legitimacy, and their




Figure I-3. Principles of Joint Operations

applicability during stability actions is appropriate. Commanders should understand the joint principles in the context of stabilization efforts.

For further details on the principles of joint operations, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

a. **Objective.** The objective of a stabilization effort is to achieve and maintain a workable political settlement among the elements of the HN society. Actions, both civilian and military, at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels should be carefully aligned to this objective. Disjointed activities can be wasteful or counterproductive. Aligning activities to the core objective can be particularly challenging in the context of interagency or multinational efforts. The JFC has a key role in shaping the conditions for, and providing a military perspective on, this dynamic process.

b. **Offensive.** Seizing the initiative is critical. Ceding the initiative to other actors allows adversaries to identify and exploit vulnerabilities that can hamstring the operation's ability to shape the OE. Various actors are likely to test the resolve of stabilization efforts during its initial phases; decisively responding to such challenges establishes its credibility at the outset. That credibility is central to the effectiveness of such efforts, and may embolden potential allies—including the local population—to take the risk of cooperating with the force conducting stability actions despite threats of retaliation from determined adversaries.

c. **Mass.** Deploying a military force to protect the population and neutralize hostile groups will be a major planning consideration. The problem is compounded when the level of violence or need requires joint force participation in stabilization efforts beyond providing security. Availability of appropriate and capable forces also factors into mass.

d. **Unity of Command.** Unity of command is difficult to achieve with all participants in stabilization efforts, many of whom will not fall under military chains of command. Commanders therefore must strive to achieve unity of effort by fostering open dialog with all stakeholders. Stability actions must be closely coordinated with and through

appropriate interagency authorities, interorganizational stakeholders, as well as HN and other partner nation authorities as appropriate. Coordination arrangements among the military and interorganizational stakeholders will often be informal, relying largely on personal relationships and trust built over time, so early and habitual communication is key. In some cases, deconfliction may be the only achievable goal.

e. **Restraint.** The use of a carefully considered level of force is essential toward achieving the overall objectives. The credibility and legitimacy of the operation depends on using the appropriate amount of force to achieve the desired impact on the perceptions of adversaries, allies, the HN population, and other relevant actors. In most cases, this will require restraint to minimize the potential for the loss of civilian life and property. However, in select circumstances the carefully targeted application of overwhelming force may be useful in deterring potential spoilers and instilling confidence in allies and the civilian population in the credibility of the stabilizing forces. Exercising restraint may reduce civilian harm, but will not eliminate it entirely. Because some amount of harm may occur, it goes hand in hand with restraint that incidental harm be acknowledged and addressed if it occurs. Forces conducting stability actions should consider the employment of nonlethal weapons and tactics to allow for flexibility in the application of minimum force necessary and the prevention of unintended death, serious injury, and destruction of property. Finally, forces need to consider the secondary effects that military operations may have on the ultimate objective of stability. For example, if HN government actors and/or structures are casualties of force, how will that destruction impact subsequent stability efforts?

f. **Perseverance.** Stabilization efforts run the risk of exhausting political will when a response requires a long-term presence. Commanders must assess the appropriate military capability to accomplish the objective, but the capability provided should be balanced against its sustainability. With this delicate balance in mind, initial military response activities should address the immediate shortfalls in enabling civilian control of stabilization efforts. This facilitates earlier withdrawal of military forces and preserves the long-term focus of international stability activities. If possible, it is best to not turn over stabilization efforts before other institutions, particularly HN security forces, are prepared. If this happens, the stabilization effort risks losing the objectives achieved.

g. **Legitimacy**

(1) Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation, stabilization process it supports, and the HN government as it evolves to address the root causes of instability. HN government credibility and its ability to generate consent is crucial. Consent for the presence of US forces conducting stability actions will encompass a spectrum of attitudes and vary from active opposition, through grudging tolerance, acquiescence or apathy, to active support. Measures undertaken to mitigate civilian harm will inevitably contribute to acceptance of the stabilization mission and legitimacy of the HN government. Actions of the US, partner nations, and interorganizational stakeholders must progressively and inexorably convince the majority of the population and wider audiences, including adversaries, that an acceptable political settlement will be reached.

(a) A political settlement is unsustainable if the HN government is unable or unwilling to build sufficient authority and legitimacy. All governments exercise control through a combination of consent and coercion. Legitimate governments function with the tacit consent of the governed and are generally stable, whereas regimes generally considered illegitimate rule entirely or mainly through coercion. The more a state relies on coercion, the greater the likelihood of collapse, if that power is disrupted.

(b) Legitimacy is a condition based upon the perception by specific audiences of the legal or moral rightness of a set of actions, and the propriety as well as authority of the individuals or organizations taking them. Legitimacy reflects, or is a measure of, the perceptions of several groups, the local populace, individuals serving within the civil institutions of the HN, neighboring states, the international community, and, where the USG is involved, the American public. In political contexts, legitimacy manifests in the population's voluntary cooperation with an actor seeking to exercise some sort of authority over them. Such actors can be viewed as being a legitimate authority in some matters but not others. Political stability is based on the general acceptance of a set of governing principles, institutions, and processes as legitimate. While many states employ some level of coercion to maintain public order, enforce laws, and prevent subversion, legitimacy reduces the level of coercion—and therefore human and material resources—required to maintain control of population and territory. A lack of legitimacy can manifest as a preference for non-state providers of essential state functions (e.g., justice and conflict resolution); a lack of civic engagement with governance processes; civil disobedience, demonstrations, or riots; or as organized violent resistance to state authority. In a stability context, legitimacy can have specific local or subnational contexts. The perceived effectiveness or fairness of governance—including distribution of national wealth, economic opportunities, or dispute resolution—can vary from location to location or social group to social group. When such perception is negative, it can drive instability; when functioning well, it serves as a resiliency factor in the OE. In addition to the formal characteristics of state legitimacy, the government effectively and fairly providing services builds credibility that fosters stability among communities.

(c) Gaining support and participation from the indigenous population and institutions is fundamental to legitimacy. The principles, policies, laws, and structures that form a government are rooted in the HN's history, culture, legal framework, and institutions. Notably, the needs, priorities, and circumstances driving stability differ substantially from one country to another. Forces plan assistance to support local civil authorities, processes, and priorities to ensure the sustainability of stabilization activities.

(d) While reestablishing HN legitimacy is the ultimate goal, the joint force and its partners will need to ensure their own legitimacy in the eyes of local, international, and US domestic audiences to succeed. This comes into play, for example, when the JFC needs to work in partnership or closer alignment with key nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or United Nations (UN). Even after rudimentary civil authority is established, the JFC's effectiveness in coordinating a unified response or activity may depend on the partnering organization's perception of the legitimacy of the military operations, as well as the perceptions of the local population.

(e) In addition, commanders at all levels have an obligation to assert and protect the legitimacy of operations. Restraint and focused application of force are not just legal obligations; they are critical to sustaining the support of international, local, and US populations.

(f) Once the decision is made to intervene, the JFC must adhere to the mandate or policy.

(2) **Factors of Legitimacy.** Legitimacy is a matter of perception. The legitimacy of the state, intervening forces, or intervening organizations depend on the successful amalgamation and interplay of four factors: mandate, manner, consent, and expectations.

(a) **Mandate.** Mandate is the perceived legitimacy of the means by which the mission or HN government gained its claimed authority. The mandate or authority that establishes the mission often determines the initial perceptions of legitimacy. Multilateral missions with the broad approval of the international community have a higher degree of legitimacy than unilateral missions do. These might include missions conducted by a multinational force under a UN mandate.

(b) **Manner.** Manner is the perceived legitimacy of the way in which those exercising the mandate conduct themselves, both individually and collectively. The credible manner in which intervening forces conduct themselves and their operations builds legitimacy as the operation progresses. Highly professional forces are disciplined, trained, and culturally aware. They carry with them an innate perception of legitimacy further strengthened by consistent performance conforming to the standards of domestic and international law, and whenever possible, local culture. For military forces, a clearly defined commander's intent and mission statement establish the initial focus that drives the long-term legitimacy of the mission. Military forces also make every effort to minimize civilian harm. When civilian harm does occur, they address it in a culturally appropriate way.

(c) **Consent.** Consent is the extent to which factions, local populations, and others support, comply with or resist the authority of those exercising the mandate. Consent, or its absence, ranges from active resistance, through unwilling compliance, acquiescence, and apathy, to freely given support. Consent is essential to the legitimacy of the mission. The legitimacy of the mission may be called into question if it lacks the consent of the HN or an internationally recognized mandate. Locals rarely perceive unilateral missions to impose regime change as legitimate, even in cases where that regime significantly threatens national or international security or willfully creates conditions that foment humanitarian crises. Military leaders must consider this dynamic in the analysis of the local context and when planning operations.

(d) **Expectations.** Expectations are the extent to which those exercising the mandate manage or meet the expectations and aspirations of elites, local populations, and the international community. Expectations inform perceptions. Perceptions are the final arbiter of whether relevant actors believe the mandate and operations to be legitimate. Realistic, consistent, and achievable expectations—in terms of goals, time, and

resources—help ensure legitimacy during a lengthy operation. Missions that are not perceived to achieve a degree of progress consistent with expectations inevitably degrade the will of the HN government, the local populace, the international community, and the American people.

(3) **Guidance for Maintaining Legitimacy.** Maintaining the legitimacy of the HN and of the joint operation is an ongoing and vital concern for the JFC. The following guidelines apply:

(a) Conduct interagency and interorganizational coordination at all levels of interaction to promote legitimacy through a common narrative. The operation is an inherently integrated activity so considerations for legitimacy must be part of the planning across all USG activities. The JFC, under the direction of the COM, should work through and with the country team to ensure the USG effort is in accordance with the HN government requirements, and complementary to efforts being undertaken by multinational partners, international organizations, and NGOs.

(b) Legitimacy has a strong legal component. Understanding the relationships between cultural and social legitimacy and its manifestation in legal forms and institutions is essential and requires in-depth analysis. As in any operation, the staff judge advocate (SJA) can be of assistance but this will require additional expertise from the CA community and other national and international agencies.

(c) Recognize that a perceived lack of legitimacy in any one operation will impact operations elsewhere. How the US is perceived as performing operations in one part of the world has a direct impact on the ability of the US to conduct operations worldwide.

(d) Leaders at all levels must reinforce that legitimacy is a core consideration for all forces. Rules of engagement (ROE), guidelines for interaction with the civilian population, and tactical actions should all support the legitimacy of US actions and respect for the legitimacy of the HN authorities. Regardless of whether an operation is conducted under the law of war relevant to military occupation, or is conducted with the consent of, and in support of, the HN and its domestic laws, if the HN population does not consent to the authority that is being exercised, they will be less willing partners in promoting the rule of law.

(e) Do not overlook non-state security organizations when analyzing the legitimacy of HN authorities and other partners. Military and other state sponsored security agencies may not be the sole source of civil security in the operational area. Private security contractors and local militias may be present, whether officially sponsored or not. The population may not distinguish between their behavior and that of state security forces.

(f) Recognize that all of these factors and functions are key components of a commander's communications synchronization (CCS), and should be pursued as such. The establishment of the legitimacy of joint force members and actions, and the discrediting of those of the adversary, are critical components of a CCS effort. A conscious

comprehensive approach to CCS is necessary to ensure the coherent, effective, and synergistic union of these activities and concerns.

6. Fundamentals of Stabilization

Joint forces supporting USG stabilization efforts should consider the use of the fundamentals of stabilization and the principles of joint operations to plan and execute military activities to facilitate long-term stability.

a. Conflict Transformation

(1) Conflict transformation is the process for addressing the underlying causes of violent conflict while developing viable, peaceful alternatives for people to meet their needs and pursue their political and socioeconomic aspirations.

(2) Successful conflict transformation relies on the empowerment of local stakeholders, at times with the assistance of intervening actors, to identify and resolve the primary sources of instability. These efforts reflect the constant tension between the time commitment required to achieve sustainable progress and the need to build momentum quickly. National interest and resources are finite; therefore, conflict transformation efforts focus on the underlying sources of instability while managing its visible symptoms. In countries seeking to transition from war to peace, windows of opportunity exist to address sources of instability. This may include identifying issues of harm, trauma, and injustice experienced by the conflict parties, as well as developing approaches that build relationships and include marginalized groups through consensus-building mechanisms, checks and balances on power, and transparency measures. Additionally, civilian casualty mitigation measures should ensure that incidental harm caused during military operations is not a detriment to conflict transformation.

b. HN Ownership

(1) Long-term stability is unachievable without HN ownership. Commanders must demonstrate respect for the views of the HN regarding what it perceives the stability solution should look like, while conducting its own analysis regarding the viability of different courses of action (COAs). Where existing HN social, political, and economic institutions and structures remain viable and legitimate in the eyes of the HN population, joint force stabilization efforts should work with rather than seek to circumvent or reinvent them. At the same time, joint forces should carefully assess how those institutions must evolve to address the root causes and drivers of instability. Where such adaptation is required, it cannot be imposed from outside: both the reality and perception of HN ownership are critical to success. Commitment and constructive participation by the HN's political, civic, cultural, economic, and religious leaders and the population at large ensure that institutions, capabilities, and forces developed during stabilization efforts will endure beyond the withdrawal of external support. In seeking HN participation and ownership of stabilization processes, joint forces must distinguish between genuine ownership and mere acquiescence to an externally imposed solution. This can be a challenge in societies where open disagreement is not acceptable.

(2) Military forces coordinate their activities through HN agencies and as part of a whole-of-government approach to mitigate sources of instability and build the HN's legitimacy and capacity. However, in the case of a failed state, then a transitional authority may be required to assume responsibility for governing. This can be a transitional civil authority (typically authorized by the UN and under international lead) or a transitional military authority, but should seek to transfer responsibility to the HN government as soon as responsibly feasible. For additional information on transitional authority, refer to Appendix D, "Transitional Governing Authorities."

c. Unity of Effort

(1) Where military operations typically demand unity of command, the challenge for military and civilian leaders is to forge unity of effort among the diverse array of actors involved in a stabilization effort. Unity of effort is fundamental to successfully incorporating all the instruments of national power in a collaborative approach when conducting stabilization efforts.

(2) A Whole-of-Government Approach

(a) A whole-of-government approach for the US is one that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.

(b) Civilian and military efforts often encounter challenges during a whole-of-government approach. Military forces should try to coordinate efforts with USG departments and agencies and HN and other government civilian agencies, to mitigate these challenges. These challenges may include differing organizational capacities, perspectives, approaches, and decision-making processes. Each USG department and agency often arrives in the operational area with differing unstated assumptions or interpretations of events and solutions.

(c) In practice, USG civil-military interaction is often not as robust or complete as desired. Additionally, USG civilian departments and agencies may not be able to participate until the OE is conducive and resources are available. JFCs may have to temporarily assume responsibility for tasks outside of those normally associated with the joint stability functions. The JFC must work with the COM, DOS, and other interagency entities to integrate CMO with the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power in unified action. Other USG departments and agencies may remain after military forces have departed.

(d) Establishing a whole-of-government approach to achieve unity of effort should begin during planning. Achieving unity of effort is problematic due to challenges in information sharing, competing priorities, differences in lexicon, and uncoordinated activities. The unity of effort framework, contained in the Unity of Effort Framework Solutions Guide is designed to improve unity of effort across the USG by setting the conditions for increased collaborative planning.

For further details, refer to the Joint Staff J-7's [Directorate for Joint Force Development's] Unity of Effort Framework Solutions Guide and Unity of Effort Framework Quick Reference, in the Joint Electronic Library at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/jwfc_pam.htm.

Further discussion of the whole-of-government approach and interagency and interorganizational coordination is in JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations.

(3) The Comprehensive Approach

(a) The comprehensive approach integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG, and to the extent possible, the HN, international organizations, NGOs, multinational partners, and private-sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. A comprehensive approach integrates the perspectives, activities, capacities, and capabilities of external organizations that may positively influence and/or support the JFC's mission. This requires mechanisms and processes that promote interorganizational coordination in the pursuit of unified action. Successful operations involve actors participating at their own discretion or present in the operational area but not acting as a member of a multinational force. Integration and collaboration often elude the diverse array of actors involved, and may vary significantly given the degree of overlap between each actor's priorities and goals. A comprehensive approach achieves unity of effort through extensive cooperation and coordination to forge a shared understanding of a common goal. A comprehensive approach is difficult to sustain but can be key to achieve success in an operation with a wide representation. It is vital to recognize that interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental entities present in the OE will likely have different priorities, objectives, and authorities. At the very least, JFCs must be aware of the entities in the OE; at most, civil-military leadership at the strategic and operational levels will ensure that collective efforts are aimed at a set of common goals.

(b) Unlike a whole-of-government approach that aims for true interagency integration toward unity of effort, a comprehensive approach requires a more nuanced, cooperative effort. Leaders forge a comprehensive approach, leveraging the capabilities of the interorganizational stakeholders, to achieve broad conflict transformation goals and attain a sustainable peace. Leaders support the activities and goals of other actors by sharing resources. In a comprehensive approach, actors are not compelled to work together toward a common goal. Instead, they participate out of a shared understanding and appreciation for what that goal represents. If attainment of the end state is seen as being in the best interests of the participating actors, then the actors will be more likely to forge the bonds that help achieve unity of effort. Some groups, such as NGOs, must retain independence of action. Reconciling that independence with the mission requirements may pose specific challenges to unity of effort or make it impossible.

(c) Using a comprehensive approach with NGOs and other nongovernmental actors can prove challenging. Some humanitarian actors will not actively cooperate or coordinate with the USG or military actors. These actors may be guided by the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence. Adhering to these principles may

mean not participating in any political agendas due to the need for the organizations to rely upon their neutrality to assist with the safety and security of their staff. Nevertheless, military leaders should put a particular effort into understanding their role, actions and constraints with regard to stabilization efforts.

For more information on nongovernmental humanitarian actors, see Guidelines for Relations Between US Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments.

Further discussion of the comprehensive approach can be found in JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations.

(4) Negotiation and consensus building are key tools to attain unified action in any stabilization efforts. Negotiation and consensus building should be fundamental to all interagency coordination and coordination with HN government entities. The coordination and cooperation toward common objectives and purpose are likely products of a pyramid of negotiations and consensus building activities among responsible and influential leaders of social, economic, informational, political, law enforcement, and military institutions, and the relevant population. It is paramount that the JFC have an understanding with the COM and all interagency partners as to the commander's responsibilities, designated authorities, and limitations for negotiation during all aspects of interagency and interorganizational coordination.

d. Building HN Capacity

(1) In many cases, the primary role of external military forces during stabilization efforts is to build HN security force capability and capacity. The secondary role is to support the comprehensive efforts of interagency and intergovernmental entities, which are in place to develop HN capacity to execute in critical government functions. Capacity-building activities must be carefully aligned with USG strategic objectives and to the HN political strategy at the heart of the stabilization efforts. Decisions about which capacities to develop; the sequence in which different types of capacity are developed; the process used to develop new or rehabilitate existing capacities; and the link between functional capacities and systems of governance all have political implications that must be carefully assessed and integrated into the design and implementation of building partner capacity efforts. Building HN capacity programs that fail to assess and consider these political aspects often have unintended and potentially counterproductive effects on broader stabilization efforts. Capabilities must be developed in ways that are sustainable within the resources available to the HN, and balance effectiveness with sociocultural, economic, and political considerations. The primary role of military forces in building HN capacity is to develop security forces of the HN in particular this is done in COIN operations. However, joint forces may also have a role to support efforts led by other USG departments and agencies to enhance the HN's ability for governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions (e.g., disaster preparedness).

(2) Building HN capacity will vary depending upon the nature of the operation. For example, stability activities following armed conflict are likely to require

comprehensive interorganizational activities, programs, and military-to-military engagements, and CMO that enhance the ability of partners to re-establish critical government functions and care for those affected by the conflict. Military forces apply in collaboration with their civilian counterpart agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, USAID, and DOS, a sustained approach with foreign and domestic partners to co-develop mutually beneficial capabilities and capacities to address shared global interests. Unified action is an indispensable feature of building partner capacity.

(3) Building HN capacity creates an environment that fosters HN institutional development, community participation, human resources development, and strengthened managerial systems. Building capacity includes efforts to improve governance capacity, political moderation, and good governance—ethos as well as structure—as part of broader capacity-building activities within a society. Supported by appropriate policy and legal frameworks, building capacity is a long-term, continuing process, in which all actors contribute to enhancing the HN’s human, technological, organizational, institutional, and resource capabilities.

(4) Activities for building capacity support a partner-nation leadership or build on existing capacities across the five joint stability functions discussed in Chapter III, “Joint Stability Functions.” To some degree, local capacity always exists; capacity-building activities aim to build, nurture, empower, and mobilize that capacity. Planning for effective activities that build capacity should consider the capabilities and processes the HN possesses.

(5) Activities for building partner capacity develop and strengthen skills, systems, abilities, processes, and resources. HN institutions and individuals adapt these activities to dynamic political and societal conditions within an OE. Most activities for building partner capacity focus on long-term technical assistance programs, which may include SC activities, but may also be targeted to specific responsibilities or functions to achieve decisive results sooner.

(a) Education and training lie at the heart of development efforts.

(b) Organizational development is the creation or adaptation of management structures, processes, and procedures to enable capacity building. This development includes managing relationships among different organizations and sectors (public, private, and community).

(c) Institutional and legal framework development makes the legal and regulatory changes necessary to enable organizations, institutions, and individuals at all levels and in all sectors to perform effectively and to build their capacities.

7. The Stabilization Framework

a. **Introduction.** The stabilization framework is a construct to help the JFC conceptualize part of the OE of a nation-state that requires stabilization in support of US national strategy and interests. The framework helps to emphasize the training and organization of forces prior to initial deployment and later during force generation. The

framework helps to organize stabilization efforts and scopes the stability actions to achieve their objective whether, supporting TCPs and integrated country strategies, or in major contingency operations. The stabilization framework is constructed from the fragile states framework, which is based on the USAID Fragile States Strategy, and the elements of a stable state construct. A discussion of the fragile states framework and the elements of a stable state construct is presented in subparagraph 4c(1), “The Fragile States Framework.”

b. The stabilization framework is intended to encompass the process for which all actions across the conflict continuum achieves stability. It guides the understanding of the USG efforts and commitment necessary to conduct stabilizing activities during peacetime to prevent conflict, or to conduct a crisis response or major operation using the joint force to return stability to an affected HN torn by conflict or disaster.

c. Military forces can operate at any point in the fragile state framework. In each case, attaining the end state requires quickly reducing the level of violence while creating conditions that support safely introducing other government agencies and international organizations and securing essential humanitarian access for NGOs. Military operations focus on stabilizing the OE and supporting those working to transform economic, social, political conditions toward stability. In a failed or failing state, conditions typically require more coercive actions to eliminate threats and reduce violence. As conditions of the OE improve, the constructive capabilities of military forces can focus on building HN civil security capacity and enable sustained development through DOS, USAID, and other partners.

d. The stabilization framework facilitates unified action and an understanding of the broad range of activities by the military and civilian agencies in an OE characterized as a fragile, failing, or recovering state. The framework characterizes an OE, identifies distinct stages of activities, assists in defining the types and ranges of tasks performed in that environment, and provides the basis for tools with which to measure progress toward the desired end state. (See Figure I-4) The tasks and activities that make up these stability operations fall into three broad categories:

(1) The **initial response** stage generally reflects actions executed to stabilize an OE in a crisis state. During this stage, military forces perform stability actions, in concert with other agencies, during or directly after a conflict or disaster when ongoing violence poses a threat. These actions may also be in support of ongoing civilian, USG, HN, international organization, and NGO activities. Care should be taken that military action does not impede civilian actions, which, in many cases, may have been ongoing prior to military intervention. In the case of a disaster, as directed, DOD supports USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, which is the lead in any international disaster relief effort. Activities during the initial response phase aim to provide a safe, secure environment; they allow both the military and civilians, to attend to the immediate humanitarian needs of the HN population. Forces support efforts to reduce the level of violence and human suffering while creating conditions that enable other actors to participate safely in ongoing efforts.

(2) The **transformation** stage represents the broad range of post-conflict reconstruction, stabilization, and capacity-building tasks. Military forces perform these




Figure I-4. The Stabilization Framework

tasks in a relatively secure environment, free from most wide-scale violence, often to support broader civilian efforts. Forces often execute transformation phase tasks in either vulnerable or crisis states. These tasks aim to build HN capacity to include support of other organizations. While establishing conditions that facilitate broad unified action to rebuild the HN and its supporting institutions, these tasks facilitate the continued stability of the OE. Transformation in a stability context involves multiple types of transitions, which can occur concurrently.

(3) The **fostering sustainability** stage encompasses long-term efforts that capitalize on capacity-building and reconstruction activities to establish conditions that enable sustainable development. This stage also represents those stability actions undertaken to prevent instability and conflict. Military forces usually perform fostering sustainability tasks only when the OE is stable enough to support efforts. Such efforts implement long-term programs that commit to the viability of the institutions and legitimacy of the HN. Often military forces conduct these long-term efforts to support broader, civilian-led efforts.

CHAPTER II AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO STABILIZATION

“The Department [of Defense] shall have the capability and capacity to conduct stability operations activities to fulfill DOD [Department [of Defense] Component responsibilities under national and international law. Capabilities shall be compatible, through interoperable and complementary solutions, to those of other US Government [departments and] agencies and foreign governments and security forces....”

**Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05
Stability Operations
16 September 2009**

1. Linking Military and Civilian Activities

a. Leaders link military and civilian activities to achieve true unity of effort. They attain the integrated method necessary in a comprehensive approach to stabilization through close, continuous coordination and cooperation among the actors involved. With unity of effort, leaders overcome internal discord, inadequate structures and procedures, incompatible or underdeveloped communications infrastructure, cultural differences, and bureaucratic and personnel limitations. Within the USG, the National Security Strategy guides the development, integration, and coordination of all the instruments of national power to achieve national objectives.

b. During stability actions, commanders achieve unity of effort across the stability sectors by focusing all activities toward a shared understanding of the desired end state and a common set of objectives. The end state focuses on the conditions required to support a secure, lasting peace; a viable economy; and a legitimate HN government capable of maintaining its legitimacy by meeting the expectations of its citizens and protecting its population and territory. Commanders foster unity of effort by applying these concepts:

- (1) Shared understanding of defined authorities.
- (2) Assigned support relationships.
- (3) Joint planning.
- (4) Structure and mechanisms to execute.

2. Stabilization and Reconstruction Essential Tasks Matrix

a. A detailed list of stability-focused, stabilization and reconstruction essential tasks was developed by DOS in conjunction with DOD and various other USG departments and agencies as an evolving interagency document. The stability essential tasks matrix (ETM) assists planners to identify specific requirements supporting HNs in transition in order to prevent armed conflict, prevent civil strife, or restore stability in a post-conflict environment. Forces can apply the stability ETM as a resource for

both peacetime and conflict situations. The ETM can be found online at <http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/crs/rls/52959.htm>.

b. The stability ETM is designed as a starting point to help frame analysis of a stabilization and reconstruction activity, not as a checklist or as a comprehensive analysis tool. Effective planning for stabilization efforts begins with robust analysis of the underlying drivers of conflict and resiliencies to mitigate them. Not all the tasks outlined in the matrix work for every situation, and many situations may have key or critical dynamics not captured by the matrix.

c. The stability ETM divides the tasks conducted during operations and their relative time frame for execution across five broad technical areas and three timeframes (initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability). The stability ETM addresses many requirements necessary to create stability. The matrix serves as a means to leverage functional knowledge and systemic thinking into planning, preparation, execution, and assessment. The stability ETM facilitates:

- (1) The execution of tasks focuses on attaining-the desired end state.
- (2) Tasks executed by actors outside the USG are highlighted and responsibility for these tasks within the international community is identified.
- (3) Sector specialists understand the interdependence among the sectors.
- (4) Stabilization activities are logically sequenced based on immediate, medium-term, and long-term needs of the HN. The JFCs activities will most often fall into the first two columns of the ETM, given the predominance of tasks associated with the security sector at the early stages of stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction.

d. Effective stability operations require a broad spectrum of interorganizational activities. Tasks from across different sectors are integrated into coherent, carefully synchronized lines of effort (LOEs) organized around objectives, such as winning the support of a particular community or suppressing illicit economic activities.

e. The assignment of specific tasks and prioritization among them depends on conditions of an OE. The stability ETM facilitates visualizing the conduct of an operation, sequencing necessary activities within an operation, and developing appropriate priorities for those activities and resource allocation. Depending on the scope, scale, and context of the operation, those priorities help to deconflict activities, focus limited resources, and delineate specific responsibilities. Detailed planning enables staffs to integrate and synchronize activities in time and space, identify complementary and reinforcing actions, and prioritize efforts within and across the stability sectors.

f. The stability sectors represent the five key focus areas for civil-military efforts. Although forces execute some tasks sequentially, success necessitates an approach that focuses on simultaneous actions across the operational area. These tasks are inextricably linked; positive results in one sector depend on successfully integrating and synchronizing activities across other sectors.

g. Security Sector

(1) Efforts in the security sector focus on developing legitimate institutions and infrastructure to maintain stability. Intervening forces stabilize the OE by protecting the lives of local civilians from the violence of conflict and opportunistic criminals, and restoring the territorial integrity of the state. This stability allows for broader participation by civilian and military personnel from other stakeholder organizations in comprehensive reform efforts.

(2) In the most pressing conditions, joint forces assume responsibility for all stability actions in the security sector. These actions typically include protecting the territory and population of the HN using an approach that integrates interorganizational activities from other sectors into LOEs guided by other objectives. For results of these actions to endure beyond the withdrawal of joint forces, it is necessary to develop competent and responsible HN forces to provide security on behalf of the HN and its people. This is accomplished through transitional security sector assistance (TSSA). In executing TSSA or longer term security sector assistance (SSA), it is critical to understand that the role of different types of HN security forces—such as police, military, interior, customs and border patrol, —and the division of labor between local and national forces will vary from one geographic area to another. Joint forces should not assume that building the capacity of the central government’s military forces is always the right approach—the importance of local security forces drawn from the community they serve has proven effective, especially in tribal environments, but is often overlooked. In addition, local militia may play an important security role in some contexts at the local level.

(3) In some operational contexts, the HN government and security forces are a significant threat to their own population. This presents even greater challenges for stabilization efforts if the joint force depends on maintaining HN consent for its presence and operations. Managing such challenges often requires even tighter integration between the joint force at the operational level and below, and support from the USG at the strategic and policy levels. US forces must avoid inadvertently assisting HN governments in carrying out deliberate attacks on civilians, and may have to take action at the tactical level to prevent such violence. Planners should assess the risk associated with HN abuses against civilians during joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE), and address those risks in operational design and detailed planning.

h. Justice and Reconciliation Sector

(1) The justice and reconciliation sector encompasses far more than policing, civilian law and order, and the court systems of a state. Within the sector, efforts provide for a fair, impartial, and accountable justice system while ensuring an equitable means to reconcile past crimes and abuse arising from conflict or disaster. In some contexts, this requires integrating formal governmental institutions with informal systems (e.g., tribal or village councils) that enjoy high levels of legitimacy among all or part of the population. Tasks most closely associated with justice focus on ensuring public order and reestablishing a fair, impartial, and effective judiciary and justice system. This system addresses threats to both individuals and public order, helps to resolve disputes, and helps

enforce established contracts. Those tasks relating to reconciliation address grievances and crimes, past and present, in hopes of forging a peaceful future for a diverse but integrated society. Reconciliation efforts should not become a vehicle for exacting revenge on groups or communities associated with the actual perpetrators of grave human rights abuses. There are certain statutory human rights requirements that must be met to allow USG stabilization efforts and SC activities. It is essential that stabilization efforts focus on enhancing the effectiveness of justice systems based on local expectations while ensuring respect for basic human rights standards. Although sharing many fundamental principles, Western models of justice systems should not be employed as a universal template. Toward these ends, entities such as the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and the ICRC are often involved in this sector (the latter focuses on human rights of all parties in conflict situations). JFC awareness of and coordination with these organizations is essential to effective implementation of essential post-conflict tasks associated with the justice sector.

(2) An integrated approach to justice and reconciliation is central to broader reform efforts across the other sectors. The justice and reconciliation sector is supported by eight key elements:

- (a) An impartial, transparent, and accountable judiciary and justice system.
- (b) A fair, representative, and equitable body of law.
- (c) Effective and scrupulous law enforcement institutions responsive to civil authority and respectful of human rights and dignity.
- (d) Mechanisms for monitoring and upholding human rights.
- (e) A humane, reform-based corrections system.
- (f) Reconciliation and accountability mechanisms for resolving past abuses and grievances arising from conflict.
- (g) An effective and ethical legal profession.
- (h) Public knowledge and understanding of rights and responsibilities under the law.

(3) Successful interventions address the most critical gaps in capability and capacity as soon as possible. Justice sector reform is a long-term process, and stabilization efforts should adopt a phased approach based on realistic timelines and objectives. Addressing vital issues of justice and reconciliation is typically required to maintain the initiative against subversive and criminal elements competing to fill those gaps. HN involvement in planning, oversight, and monitoring of justice and reconciliation reform is essential and extends beyond officials associated with the central government. Subnational governments often play key roles in promoting justice and civil society's participation in governments. Promotion of justice and reconciliation initiatives at this level may enhance the populations' acceptance of their legitimacy. Generally, intervention in justice and reconciliation encompasses three categories:

(a) Restored initial response activities to institute essential interim justice measures that resolve the most urgent issues of law and order until HN processes and institutions can assume responsibility.

(b) An established system of reconciliation to address grievances and past atrocities.

(c) Long-term actions to establish a legitimate, accountable HN justice and dispute resolution system and supporting infrastructure.

(4) Justice and reconciliation closely relates to elements within the security and governance activities. Efforts in one sector can either complement or undermine efforts in another. These relationships are further reinforced by the inseparable nature of the tasks to subordinates, which reflects the dynamic interaction between security, governance, and justice. Due to the close relationships among the activities and functions that compose the security, governance, and justice and reconciliation sectors, failure to act quickly in one sector can lead to setbacks in the other sectors.

i. Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being Sector

(1) Conflict and disaster significantly stress the ability of a country's institutions to provide for the essential, immediate humanitarian needs of its people. The institutions of security and governance that enable the effective functioning of public services often fail first, leading to widespread internal strife and humanitarian crisis. In some areas, the intense competition for limited resources explodes into violent conflict, possibly causing pervasive starvation, disease, and death as obvious outward indications of a fragile nation-state in crisis.

(2) Any intervention effort is incomplete if it fails to alleviate immediate suffering. Generally, this suffering includes the immediate need for water, food, shelter, emergency health care, and sanitation. Intervening military forces also address civilian harm when it has occurred.

(3) In addition, solutions that focus on ensuring sustainable access to these basic needs also prevent the recurrence of systemic failures while ensuring the social well-being of the people. Social well-being is the ability of the people to be free from want of basic necessities and to coexist peacefully in communities with opportunities for advancement. These sustainable solutions establish the foundation for long-term development. These solutions should address the root or underlying causes of a conflict that result in issues such as famine, displaced civilians, refugee flows, and human trafficking. These issues, if unaddressed, may be further drivers of instability. Those solutions also ensure the lasting effects of the intervention effort by institutionalizing positive change in society.

j. Governance and Participation Sector

(1) Promoting governance participation addresses the need to establish effective, legitimate political and administrative institutions and infrastructure at both the national and subnational levels. Governance is the exercise of economic, political, and

administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels. It involves the process and capacity to formulate, implement, and enforce public policies and deliver services. Governance systems can include formal institutions such as constitutions and parliaments, informal ones such as tribal leaders or councils of elders, or hybrids that combine elements of each. The appropriate division of authority and responsibility between the central and subnational government authorities, and between the formal and informal institutions will vary from one context to another. Careful assessment of the OE is required to develop a problem statement and plan of action that addresses the dynamics of the crisis or instability, but can adapt as those dynamics change. For the formal institutions, effective governance involves establishing rules and procedures for political decision making; strengthening public institution management, administrative institutions, and practices; providing public services in an effective and transparent manner; and providing civil administration that supports lawful private activity and enterprise. Participation includes procedures that actively, openly involve the local populace in forming their government structures and policies that, in turn, encourage public debate and the generation and exchange of new ideas. Ultimately, the goal is to establish a governance system that reflects the political and economic realities of the HN, but is resilient enough to adapt as those realities evolve.

(2) All expressions of nation-state fragility are rooted in poor governance. Therefore, the top priority of any stabilization effort must be to help build state effectiveness and legitimacy. Effectiveness and legitimacy are the hallmarks of a well-functioning government and society.

(a) Effectiveness refers to the capability of the government to assure the provision of order as well as public goods and services. How extensive or limited the government's role is will vary from country to country and is not decisive in determining effectiveness.

(b) Legitimacy refers to a more intangible quality; that is, the perception of significant segments of the population that government exercise of state power is reasonably fair and in the interests of the country as a whole.

(3) Legitimacy and effectiveness are mutually reinforcing qualities over the long run. A government initially regarded as legitimate that fails to perform essential functions reasonably well, will lose legitimacy over time. Conversely, a government that performs its functions reasonably well can gain legitimacy. Where both effectiveness and legitimacy are weak, conflict or nation-state failure is likely. Where effectiveness is the primary deficit, the ability of external assistance to reverse a decline is the greatest. Additional resources, equipment and technical assistance deployed in concert with host government priorities and direction may make the critical difference in shoring up a fragile nation-state or in reconstructing a failed one. Where legitimacy is the primary deficit, options for external assistance narrow and shift toward nongovernmental and private institutions.

(4) Efforts to strengthen civil participation in government foster positive, lasting change in society, which enables the people to influence government decision making and hold public leaders accountable for their actions. Activities that develop social capital help local communities influence policies and institutions at national, regional, and local levels.

With this assistance, communities establish processes to identify problems, develop proposals to address critical issues and grievances, rebuild public service capabilities and capacities, mobilize the community, rebuild social networks, and develop advocacy. These social capital development activities are founded on three pillars:

(a) Human rights—promoting and protecting social, economic, cultural, political, civil, and other basic human rights.

(b) Equity and equality—advancing equity and equality of opportunity among citizens in terms of gender, social and economic resources, political representation, ethnicity, and race. HN sociocultural factors must be considered before advancing certain aspects of equity and equality.

(c) Participation—supporting involvement in public forums and self-determination in human development.

(5) Response efforts that seek to build local governance and participation should encourage HN ownership of these processes. Even when civilians lack the authority or the right to vote, they must be encouraged to take the lead in rebuilding their own government. Establishing successful, enduring HN government institutions requires this lead. Even during an intervention with a transitional governing authority performing certain governance functions temporarily, this process to establish full HN governance—complemented by a comprehensive technical assistance program—is vital to long-term success.

(6) Military forces may assume the powers of a sovereign governing authority under two conditions: when military forces intervene in the absence of a functioning government or when military operations prevent a government from administering to the public and providing public services. Transitional military authority is an interim solution. It continues only until the HN institutions and infrastructure can responsibly resume their functions and responsibilities.

For more information, see Appendix D, “Transitional Governing Authorities.”

k. Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure Sector

(1) Much of the broader success achieved in stability actions begins at the local level as intervening actors work with the populace on modest, carefully targeted economic and governance programs. These programs establish building blocks for comprehensive national reform efforts and shape political dynamics from the bottom up. These efforts aim to build the critical societal relationships, institutions, and processes to ensure the sustained viability of the state. Additionally, these activities establish the framework to minimize the risk of threat networks exploiting the situation to gain access to critical financial resources. To support the transition of the society and state to long-term stability, external actors and the HN may conduct some or all of the following:

(a) Establish the policies and regulatory framework that supports basic economic activity and development.

(b) Secure and protect the natural resources, energy production, and distribution infrastructure of the HN.

(c) Support and involve the private sector in reconstruction.

(d) Implement programs that encourage trade and investment with initial emphasis on HN and regional investors, followed at a later stage by foreign investors.

(e) Rebuild or reform essential economic governance institutions.

(f) Reconstruct or build essential economic infrastructure.

(2) Although conflict and disaster cause significant economic losses and disrupt economic activity, they also create opportunities for economic reform and restructuring. In fragile states, elites who benefit from the existing state of the economic situation can discourage the growth of trade and investment, stifle private sector development, limit opportunities for employment and workforce growth, and weaken or destroy emerging economic institutions. Intervening actors work to legitimize the HN's economic activities and institutions. Such legitimate institutions provide an opportunity to stimulate reconstruction and stabilization by facilitating assistance from the international community. This community helps develop comprehensive, integrated humanitarian and economic development programs required to achieve sustained success. Ultimately, such success can reduce the likelihood of a return to violent conflict while restoring valuable economic and social capital to the HN.

(3) The economic recovery of the HN ties directly to effective economic policies and programs of the HN government. Sound economic policy supported by legitimate, effective governance fosters recovery, growth, and investment. Recovery begins at the local level as markets and enterprises are reestablished, the workforce is employed, and public and private investment is restored. These events help to stabilize the HN currency and reduce unemployment, thus providing the tax base necessary to support the recovery of the HN's treasury. In turn, this enables the HN government to fund the public institutions and services that provide for the social and economic well-being of the people.

3. Joint Stability Functions

The joint stability functions described in Chapter III, "Stability Functions," are security, FHA, economic stabilization and infrastructure, rule of law, and governance and participation. These functions are based upon the USG stability sectors developed as interagency guidance on stabilization and reconstruction activities across the USG.

For further details on the joint stability functions, see Chapter III, "Stability Functions."

4. Joint Force Components and Stability Actions

Joint force components can include Services, SOF, DOD combat support agencies, DOD civilian expeditionary workforce, and DOD contractors.

a. Each of the joint force components has unique stability capabilities, which nest within the joint stability functions. These capabilities may sometimes be used to execute a stability action as part of a joint operation for a crisis/contingency, or an action that is part of the stabilization effort in the shaping phase of a GCC's TCP. Just as with SC activities, joint components can conduct stabilizing activities across the range of military operations from peace to major combat operations.

b. Military forces provide support to facilitate the execution of tasks for which the HN is normally responsible. Typically, these tasks have a security component ideally performed by military forces, but may also involve contractor personnel (e.g., a private security company). In addition, military forces sometimes provide logistic, medical, or administrative support to enable the success of civilian agencies and organizations. These stabilize actions may be singular in nature or grouped together as part of a stabilization effort. Each situation is unique. Assessment and analysis during planning and execution of stability actions determines the ends, ways, and means appropriate to the conditions of an OE. These actions generally fall into one of three categories, representing the collective effort associated with stabilization:

(1) Tasks for which military forces retain primary responsibility.

(2) Tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations retain responsibility, but military forces execute or are prepared to execute.

(3) Tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations retain primary responsibility.

c. Each joint force component activity should be analyzed against the stabilization framework. The joint force component activities focus on achieving objectives. For example, initial response actions executed typically focus on establishing civil security or civil control to create a safe, secure environment. This analysis will both help determine the nature of the subordinate tasks to be performed and how the tasks may change over time.

d. None of these tasks is performed in isolation. When integrated with complementary actions from other stability sectors into coherent LOE, they represent a cohesive effort to reestablish the institutions that provide for the civil participation, livelihood, and well-being of the citizens and nation-state. Collectively, the component stability tasks reflect a myriad of interrelated activities conducted across the five stability sectors in support of clearly articulated objectives. Tasks executed in one sector inevitably affect another sector; planned and executed appropriately, carefully synchronized activities complement and reinforce resulting effects. Achieving a specific objective or establishing certain conditions often requires performing a number of related tasks from different stability sectors. An example of this is the effort required to provide a safe, secure environment for the local populace. Rather than the outcome of a single task focused solely on the local populace, safety and security are broad objectives.

e. At the operational level, the component stability tasks serve as a guide to action, ensuring broader unity of effort across the stability sectors. Each task and its corresponding stability sector contain a number of related subordinate tasks. In any joint operation, the stability actions and related tasks are integrated with offensive and defensive operations and those related tasks.

f. **Joint Force Land Component Actions.** Land component stability actions can be grouped into five principal tasks that correspond to the joint stability functions and the stability sectors of the stability ETM. Together, they provide a mechanism for interagency coordination, linking the execution of discreet tasks among the instruments of national power that directly support broader efforts as part of unified action.

(1) **Establish Security.** To establish civil security, the land component undertakes a diverse set of activities:

- (a) The protection of the civilian population from violence.
- (b) The establishment of transitional public security.
- (c) The conduct of identity activities to counter illegal combatants and criminal elements by removing adversary anonymity and/or positively identifying persons of trust.
- (d) The conduct of border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement.
- (e) The protection of key personnel and facilities.
- (f) The establishment, reform, or strengthening of relationships with HN armed forces and intelligence services through SC at the local, national, and ministerial levels.
- (g) The enforcement of the cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements.
- (h) The conduct of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of belligerents.

(2) **Establish Transitional Public Security.** Establish transitional public security to promote, restore, and maintain public order. Transitional public security by US and multinational/international organization forces in major operations and campaigns involving a large US military presence complements public security. The purpose of transitional public security is to protect civilian populations when the rule of law has broken down or is non-existent. To establish transitional public security, the land component undertakes a diverse set of activities that may include:

- (a) Establish public order and safety.

- (b) Establish interim criminal justice system.
- (c) Support law enforcement and police reform.
- (d) Support judicial reform.
- (e) Support property dispute resolution process.
- (f) Support justice system reform.
- (g) Support corrections reform.
- (h) Support war crimes courts and tribunals.
- (i) Support public outreach and community rebuilding programs.

(3) **Restore Essential Services.** To restore essential services the land component undertakes a diverse set of activities that may include:

- (a) Provide essential civil services.
- (b) Support humanitarian demining.
- (c) Support public health programs.
- (d) Support education programs.

(4) **Support to Governance.** To support governance, the land component undertakes a diverse set of activities that may include:

- (a) Support transitional administrations.
- (b) Support the development of local governance.
- (c) Support anticorruption initiatives.
- (d) Support elections.

(5) **Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development.** Military tasks executed to support the economic sector are critical to sustainable economic development. The economic viability of a state is among the first elements of society to exhibit stress and ultimately fracture as conflict, disaster, and internal strife overwhelm the government. Economic problems inextricably tie to governance and security concerns. As one institution begins to fail, others likely follow. Infrastructure development complements and reinforces efforts to stabilize the economy. To support economic and infrastructure development, the land component undertakes a diverse set of activities that may include:

- (a) Support economic generation and enterprise creation.
- (b) Support monetary institutions programs.

- (c) Support public sector investment and private sector development.
- (d) Protect natural resources and environment.
- (e) Support agricultural development programs.
- (f) Restore transportation and telecommunications infrastructure.
- (g) Support general infrastructure reconstruction programs.

g. Joint Force Maritime Component Tasks

(1) Maritime component stability actions support the same objectives as land and air component tasks, but require different planning considerations due to the dynamic environment and legal complexities inherent to the maritime domain.

(a) Staging operations from the maritime domain (seabasing) can provide freedom of action and a more secure environment from which to operate. Seabasing can enable security tasks to be accomplished with little to no support from the HN, which is particularly advantageous during a crisis response. Seabasing can also reduce the joint force footprint ashore in cases where US presence is perceived negatively by the population.

(b) Stability actions in the maritime domain are subject to international law, in addition to domestic law and policy. In addition, the HN may have entered into bilateral agreements for cooperation in suppressing activity such as illicit trafficking and unsafe transport and smuggling of migrants.

(c) Including United States Coast Guard (USCG) personnel or assets into the joint force maritime component significantly expands the scope of authorities available to the JFC. Title 14, United States Code (USC), grants the USCG broad powers to make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters within US jurisdiction. Therefore, USCG vessels and aircraft, or US Navy ships with USCG detachments embarked, have the authority to conduct certain law enforcement functions at sea.

(2) **Assessment of the Maritime Environment.** The maritime component conducts civil reconnaissance and provides assessments of identified civilian infrastructure and capability requirements in support of the JFC's objectives. As with assessment in other military operations, assessment of the maritime environment should be collaborative and include other USG departments and agencies, HN partners, international organizations, NGOs, and private sector actors. Assessment begins as soon as the maritime force receives an alert or warning, and does not end until after the maritime force has ceased operations and left the area.

(3) **Maritime Security and Safety.** Maritime security and safety are critical prerequisites for effective maritime governance and the free flow of commerce. Tasks associated with the maritime security and safety function include:

- (a) Aid to distressed mariners operations.
- (b) Anti-piracy operations.
- (c) Arms control.
- (d) Maritime counterterrorism (CT) operations.
- (e) Enforcement of exclusion zones.
- (f) Escort of vessels.
- (g) Explosive ordnance disposal operations.
- (h) Foreign internal defense (FID) operations.
- (i) SFA operations.
- (j) Freedom of navigation and overflight operations.
- (k) Gas and oil platform operations.
- (l) Maritime interception operations.
- (m) Maritime safety.
- (n) Maritime SC.
- (o) Mine countermeasures operations.
- (p) Port and harbor security operations.
- (q) Riverine operations.
- (r) Securing offshore resources.
- (s) Security assistance.
- (t) Show of force operations.

(4) **FHA.** Naval forces may perform many different tasks in support of FHA operations. While forces afloat possess unique expeditionary capabilities ideally suited for initial response, other civilian agencies and organizations are chartered to focus on broader humanitarian issues and social well-being. Naval forces are often tasked to provide security to interagency and NGO relief elements. The naval forces can act as an enabler for civil organizations to achieve more enduring goals by facilitating access to isolated populations and easing the overall burden of providing essential services to effected communities.

(5) **Maritime Infrastructure and Economic Stabilization.** Maritime infrastructure and economic stabilization are inherently non-DOD undertakings. However, naval forces bring capabilities needed by many struggling maritime nations to improve maritime economies and governance. This is especially true in situations that involve emergency critical infrastructure repair. The following are the major tasks associated with the maritime infrastructure and economic stabilization function:

- (a) Expeditionary diving and salvage.
- (b) Incident response.
- (c) Emergency repair of maritime infrastructure.

(6) **Maritime Rule of Law.** Maritime law encompasses the body of law that deals with the broad set of activities linked to the sea and includes domestic law and policy and international law. The following are tasks associated with the maritime rule of law function:

- (a) Maritime law enforcement.
- (b) Visit, board, and search and seizure.
- (c) Counter-illicit trafficking (drugs, weapons of mass destruction, and humans).
- (d) Counter-piracy operations.

(7) **Maritime Governance and Participation.** Maritime governance is a subset of state governance focused on those aspects of governance that impact the seas, bays, estuaries, rivers, and ports. It is imperative that maritime states develop adequate laws to regulate maritime activities and naval forces that are capable of enforcing those laws. The following are tasks associated with the maritime rule of law function:

- (a) Administration of maritime governance.
- (b) Improvement of commercial ports.
- (c) Regulation of fisheries.
- (d) Establishment of regional maritime SC.
- (e) Management of waterways.
- (f) Intelligence collection and communications support.
- (g) Training and assistance for HN security forces.

(8) **Maritime Functional Expertise.** The maritime component is capable of conducting tasks that are specific to a wide range of maritime-related disciplines in international water, littoral, riparian, and lake environments.

h. Joint Force Air Component Tasks

(1) Air component stability tasks are executed across all the joint stability functions and the stability sectors. Since the majority of the joint stability tasks are land based, the air component will support their execution with unique air-centric capabilities. These capabilities can include mobility; strike; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); electronic warfare; logistics; base support; medical; communications; infrastructure repair; providing shelter and relief; weather, space; and cyberspace.

(2) Principal air component stability tasks:

- (a) Provide humanitarian assistance.
- (b) Establish, operate, sustain, and protect critical aviation infrastructure.
- (c) Execute medical stability actions to include aeromedical evacuation.
- (d) Global integrated ISR.
- (e) Transportation for armed forces, other USG departments and agencies, and NGOs.
- (f) Command and control (C2).
- (g) Agile combat support (particularly to remote, austere bases with extended supply lines and limited communications), which includes assessments, opening and operating airbases, bridging the gap between initial base seizure and the arrival of permanent sustainment forces, airbase defense, area security operations, communications and network operations, and aviation-related civil engineering.

(3) Secondary air component stability tasks:

- (a) Restore essential services.
- (b) Support economic and infrastructure development.
- (c) Engineer skills training for building partnerships.
- (d) Weather and environmental expertise.

i. Joint Force Special Operations Tasks

(1) SOF support stabilization efforts with a wide range of special operations core activities. These activities establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations with other

nations. SOF conduct military engagement activities that support the GCCs, country teams, and other interagency partners. These activities may shape the OE to keep day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict and also serve to develop and build HN capabilities and capacities that can be leveraged in crises in conflict. In addition, SOF seek to enhance the USG's and partners' situational awareness to anticipate, forewarn, prevent, or forestall crises.

(2) Principal Special Operations Stability Tasks

(a) Conduct special operations core activities (direct action, special reconnaissance, CT, FID, SFA, COIN, FHA, military information support operations, CA operations, unconventional warfare [UW], hostage rescue and recovery, and countering weapons of mass destruction).

(b) Support and conduct operations with conventional forces, multinational partners, and international organizations.

(c) Work closely with foreign military and civilian authorities and populations, when directed.

(d) Deploy rapidly and provide tailored responses.

(e) Gain access to hostile, denied, or politically and/or diplomatically sensitive areas to prepare the OE for future operations and develop options for addressing potential national concerns.

(f) Conduct operations in austere environments with limited support and a low profile.

(g) Assess local situations and report rapidly.

CHAPTER III JOINT STABILITY FUNCTIONS

1. Introduction

a. While the assignment of specific tasks and prioritization among them depends on the mission and conditions of the OE, the stability sectors are a tool to help visualize the scope of stabilization efforts within a joint operation. JIPOE, mission analysis, and the CONOPS sequence necessary activities within the LOEs aligned to operational and tactical objectives and develop appropriate priorities for those activities and resource allocation. Individually, the joint stability functions encompass the distinct yet interrelated tasks that constitute stability activities in a stability sector. Collectively, they are the framework through which the USG identifies the possible tasks required in a stabilization effort. Incorporating tasks within each sector into coherent LOEs is required to ensure that efforts are properly aligned to their specific objective and integrated to create cross-cutting effects. (See Figure III-1.)

b. Although some tasks are executed sequentially, success necessitates an integrated approach that focuses on synchronized actions, whether concurrent or sequential, throughout the OE. These tasks are inextricably linked; positive results in one area of stabilization depend upon the successful integration and synchronization of activities across the other areas. The JFC should establish LOEs based on the political strategy that integrates the stability functions within each LOE. Preferably, the JFC should use them simply as a guide to action, ensuring broader unity of effort across all sectors of the HN. In hostile environments, joint forces may




Figure III-1. Stability Functions and Stability Sectors Relationship

be tempted to utilize all available capacity on security efforts. However, security is usually conditional on a degree of popular consent and this, in turn, is conditional on the restoration of basic governance functions. Accordingly, the JFC should not presume that others could implement, for example, governance functions once the joint force has managed to reduce the level of violence. Some tasks are interdependent and a minimal level of security, governance, and rule of law will be necessary to facilitate an initial sense of stabilization.

c. The joint stability functions described here are security, FHA, economic stabilization and infrastructure, rule of law, and governance and participation. These functions are based upon the sectors developed in the stability ETM as interagency guidance on stability and reconstruction activities across the USG. (See Figure III-2.)

d. **CCS.** Stabilization efforts, depend on the exercise and establishment of legitimacy, credibility, and trust. Fundamental to each of these principles is the alignment of words, images, and deeds. JFCs who fail to synchronize their communication into a coherent and unifying narrative, across all LOEs and all units, agencies, and partners supporting these LOEs, risk credibility gaps that provide the threat fodder for its propaganda and jeopardize support for joint and multinational operations and, ultimately, the HN. In other words, it is essential to synchronize themes, messages, images, and actions with operations, and when appropriate, vice versa. Public affairs (PA) assists the commander with developing and articulating themes and messages, and information operations (IO) synchronizes information-related capabilities (IRC) to reinforce and continually align these themes and messages.

For further details, refer to Chapter V, “Stability Actions in Other Joint Operations;” JP 3-13, Information Operations; JP 3-61, Public Affairs, and Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 2-13, Commander’s Communication Synchronization.




Figure III-2. An Integrated Approach to Stabilization

INTERDEPENDENCE OF FUNCTIONS

On 14 August 1992, US forces were committed to emergency airlift of food to Somalia. The largest and most difficult problem was security for the food once it arrived in Somalia. Armed looters and thieves made it difficult to get the food to the hungry. On 2 December, US forces commenced Operation RESTORE HOPE, with UN [United Nations] authorization, to create the secure environment necessary for the provision of humanitarian relief and promotion of national reconciliation and economic reconstruction in Somalia. The UN resolution required that soldiers be withdrawn once order was restored. By April 1993, major installations were secured and open, and free passage of relief supplies was established. Humanitarian relief was provided and a larger disaster was averted. However, with no political reconciliation among competing elites and no functional security apparatus, incidents of violence continued as US forces turned over leadership to UN forces in May 1993.

UN operations at this point focused on transformational stability activities that would establish the institutions necessary to alleviate suffering in Somalia. These activities included efforts to build local and national governance, re-establish local and national security forces, develop food, health-care, agricultural, and water systems, foster an open and working economy, and re-establish an education system. US participation persisted as Operation CONTINUED HOPE.

Despite the appearance of political resolution, including a signed agreement among all Somali political movements, attempts by UN military forces to implement disarmament led to increasing tensions and to open conflict among the clans and UN forces beginning in June. Notwithstanding the ongoing violence, civilian organizations made significant progress in transformational stabilization in the fields of public health, education, agriculture, and other areas, and the UN attempted to build institutions that could govern Somalia and enforce the rule of law, but the protracted political impasse created a vacuum of civil authority and governmental structure in Somalia, leaving no function on which to build. With no political settlement in sight that might help bring an end to the escalating violence, the US and other nations withdrew military support to the operation in early 1994. UN military forces withdrew completely one year later.

This intervention demonstrated the vital link between humanitarian assistance and national political reconciliation. The former was geared towards the immediate amelioration of emergency situations, while the latter was necessary to ensure stability in the long term so that the positive results of humanitarian assistance could be preserved and a recurrence of the tragedy avoided. Even as intervening military forces and emerging Somali security institutions were able to establish security to enable humanitarian assistance activities, security was untenable in the long term without a political reconciliation.

**SOURCE: Joint Military Operations Historical Collection
The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping**

SECTION A. SECURITY

2. General

a. Security activities seek to protect and control civil populations, territory, and national assets such as infrastructure or natural resources. Such activities may be performed as part of a military occupation during or after combat, as a component of a COIN or peacekeeping operation, or in response to a natural disaster. They seek to reassure rather than compel the civil population, while communicating a clear, credible threat of force to opportunists or potential adversaries. Security activities are considered successful when the HN or other legitimate authority has functional control of its territory, and civil violence is reduced to a level manageable by competent HN or joint force law enforcement operations.

b. Actions taken by the joint force, other expeditionary forces, or the HN to establish security are fundamentally intertwined with diplomatic/political considerations. In many contexts, legacies of violence and conflict have created deep divisions and mistrust among different segments of the population. Joint forces must be cognizant of such divisions, and balance pragmatic measures to rapidly establish and maintain security against political considerations that could make such moves counterproductive. Such considerations can include but are not limited to the location of bases; the past record or reputation of HN security forces, units, or individuals; or the identity of security forces and officials.

c. From the initial response until responsibility is transitioned to another competent force, the joint force provides the security on which stability can be built. The goal must be pragmatic: not a complete absence of violence, but its reduction to tolerable levels that can be addressed by indigenous forces and allow normal patterns of life to resume. These efforts align with two broad priorities: securing HN territory and providing civil security.

d. **Territorial Security.** Control of the HN borders and territory by expeditionary and/or HN forces is critical to establishing a safe and secure environment. Effective control of HN territory eliminates internal safe havens for insurgents, rebels, or terrorists; prevents illicit economic activities; enables the freedom of movement required for economic recovery; and is required to secure the population.

e. **Civil Security.** The security of the indigenous population and institutions is central to the success of stabilization efforts. **Whenever it has functional control over all or a part of nation's territory, the joint force will typically be responsible for ensuring the security of the civilian population.** The nature of the OE may require US forces to conduct several types of missions simultaneously across the conflict continuum. For these missions, commanders combine and sequence offensive, defensive, and stability actions to achieve objectives, which may include implementing measures to protect the population from both internal and external threats. Civil security requires five necessary conditions: cessation of large-scale violence, public order, legitimate state monopoly over the means of violence, physical protection, and territorial security.

f. The security requirements vary greatly across the conflict continuum, and the JFC should align security activities with the mission and understanding of the OE.

(1) During major operations or campaigns conducted on the territory of an enemy state, the law of war obligates occupying forces to provide security to the enemy population who fall within the occupying forces' effective control. The provision of population security also enhances force protection by removing the veil of adversary anonymity and denying safe havens to belligerents and opportunists that have blended into the population to continue covert attacks. JFCs should provide population security through a combination of transitional public security and CMO, as required. JFCs must establish policies and guidance for population and resources control that are commensurate with legal and moral obligations of the joint force and are supported by HN interests, USG objectives, and international interests.

(2) During crisis response and limited contingency operations, the OE largely dictates the security requirement, which varies fundamentally from operation to operation. During some operations, security may be well established by local security forces and cultural norms in place, while in other operations, joint forces may be operating among warring factions battling for control.

(a) The joint force, preferably in concert with interagency, multinational, and HN partners, must be able to quickly establish and maintain a secure environment that establishes the basis for long-term stability.

1. In a hostile environment, the joint force's priorities are normally to secure the operational area and establish territorial security. Concurrently, other stabilization efforts build on those security gains. This is normally conducted area by area, rather than in a single sweeping operation.

2. In an uncertain environment, offensive actions to secure an area may not be required, but the joint force must still focus on occupying and securing the area. In some cases, US forces may provide direct support to HN security forces operating in the area.

3. In a permissive environment, security considerations focus primarily on force protection, relying on HN security forces and local cultural norms to secure the population. Despite this, the joint force should continually monitor the situation and adjust its posture according to changing conditions. Monitoring should include monitoring the behavior of HN security forces toward the civilian population and government institutions.

(b) In transitional public security, US and multinational military forces promote, restore, and maintain public order. The purpose of transitional public security is to protect civilian populations from violence when the rule of law has broken down or is nonexistent. While civil security/protection of civilians provides the overarching framework, transitional public security is a specific requirement that extends the role of the military beyond its traditional roles and missions.

(c) While the role of joint forces in addressing threats from organized military and paramilitary actors such as insurgents, rebels, terrorists, and militias is well-defined, transitional public security clarifies the responsibility of the JFC to ensure basic law enforcement and public order until those duties can be transitioned to other competent expeditionary forces or HN institutions. Transitional public security involves protecting the HN civilian population and critical infrastructure from various types of criminal or interpersonal violence, ranging from riots and looting down to individual victimization. Transitional public security will typically require the joint force to perform functions normally reserved for the civilian justice sector on an interim basis, including policing, law enforcement, investigations, corrections, and courts.

(d) Successful transitional public security operations will typically require working with those elements of the HN justice sector that retain some functional capability. In many cases, such institutions may have significant shortcomings or have contributed to the roots of the instability. However, in the absence of viable alternatives, the JFC will often have to employ elements of these institutions to ensure stability in the short term. This will typically require TSSA efforts, in which US and multinational military forces enable HN partners to provide public security and justice for their own people and respond effectively to security challenges.

(e) TSSA differs from conventional SSA in that it is focused on meeting urgent operational requirements, and sets the stage for longer-term reform and rehabilitation of HN security institutions. Joint forces will have to carefully assess which HN security sector institutions can contribute to stability, and how best to partner with them on a case-by-case basis. This will require an in-depth understanding of those institutions and the political impact of the decision to work with them. In many cases, some vetting process will be required to remove and replace individuals who are responsible for past abuses, and/or would continue patterns of destabilizing action. Embedding mentors and/or partnering with US or multinational forces will be required to ensure that HN institutions behave in a manner that contributes to stabilization objectives.

(f) When conducting TSSA, the JFC should involve interagency and multinational actors who will assist the HN with longer-term SSA and security sector reform (SSR) to foster continuity and coherence across different phases of stabilization.

(3) During military engagement, SC, and deterrence activities, the joint force is not presumed to be responsible for ensuring the security of the HN population or territory. However, the joint force should monitor the behavior of HN security forces toward the civilian population and government institutions, and continually tailor US actions to mitigate risks stemming from unaddressed root causes or potential unintended second and third order effects of US actions.

g. **SSR.** SSR is a comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken by the HN to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. In addition to providing security as required, a major joint force role in stabilization may be to provide support for SSR. Transformational activities and activities that foster sustainability in the security sector generally fall under the rubric of SSR.

SAFE AND SECURE ENVIRONMENT NECESSARY CONDITIONS

Cessation of Large-Scale Violence

- **Large-scale armed conflict has come to a halt**
- **Warring parties are separated and monitored**
- **A peace agreement or cease-fire has been implemented**
- **Violent spoilers are managed**

Public Order

- **Laws are enforced equitably**
- **The lives, property, freedoms, and rights of individuals are protected**
- **Criminal and politically motivated violence has been reduced to a minimum**
- **Criminal elements (from looters and rioters to leaders of organized crime networks) are pursued, arrested, and detained**

Legitimate State Monopoly Over the Means of Violence

- **Major illegal armed groups have been identified, disarmed, and demobilized**
- **The defense and police forces have been vetted and retrained**
- **National security forces operate lawfully under a legitimate governing authority**

Physical Security

- **Political leaders, ex-combatants, and the general population are free of fear from grave threats to physical safety**
- **Refugees and internally displaced persons can return home without fear of retributive violence**
- **Women and children are protected from undue violence**
- **Key historical or cultural sites and critical infrastructure are protected from attack**

Territorial Security

- **People and goods can freely move throughout the country and across borders without fear of harm to life and limb**
- **The country is protected from invasion**
- **Borders are reasonably well-secured from infiltration by insurgent or terrorist elements and illicit trafficking of arms, narcotics, and humans**

**SOURCE: Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction
US Institute of Peace and US Army Peacekeeping
and Stability Operations Institute (2009)**

For further detail on SSR, refer to Appendix C, “Security Sector Reform.” For further details on security and population security, refer to JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater, and JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency.

3. Evaluation and Assessment

a. To plan for and execute an intervention, JFCs and staffs conduct an in-depth analysis to provide relevant background concerning existing dynamics that could trigger, exacerbate, or mitigate violent conflict. The key lies in the development of shared understanding among all agencies and countries involved about the sources of violent conflict or civil strife. This requires both a joint process for completing the assessment and a common conceptual framework to guide the collection and analysis of information. This conflict diagnosis should deliver a product that describes the context, core grievances and resiliencies, drivers of conflict and mitigating factors, and opportunities for increasing or decreasing conflict.

b. Initial evaluation and assessments for security should determine the level of security present as well as the difficulty of establishing or reestablishing security, identifying possible obstacles to success. Analyses should include a broad political, economic, and sociological analyses to understand the drivers of possible or actual conflict and mitigating factors. Specific threats to the establishment of predictable and tolerable conditions must also be assessed. This should include an analysis of threats to the civilian population from both organized violence and interpersonal violence. Assessments must not only consider objective reality, but also the perceptions of the local population, as it is their perceptions that will drive their behavior, and therefore the politics of the stabilization process. The following list of questions, while not comprehensive and dependent on the circumstances, may guide the assessment of security during stabilization efforts:

(1) What is the current level of conflict? Is there a basic level of population security that will permit the conduct of stabilization activities by civilian organizations? If not, what conditions are required before civilian organizations can be employed?

(2) If there is ongoing conflict, are there unsatisfied aims for which disputants remain willing to fight? Even if warring parties sign a peace settlement, do unresolved

conflicts persist? Are there factions that remain opposed to the peace settlement? Will the signatories respect the settlement? Do all factions have leadership capable of speaking on their behalf?

(3) Is there an HN government with legitimacy among the population? If not, has this created a power vacuum that is likely to lead to a bitter internal struggle for power? What conditions must be met before peaceful means can effectively substitute for force in determining who governs?

(4) Can the rights of minority or disenfranchised populations be reliably guaranteed, or does at least one of the parties to the conflict perceive political settlement to likely lead to an unacceptable zero-sum form of politics? Do citizens, and in particular minorities and women, enjoy adequate guarantees for fundamental civil and political rights of speech, movement, and assembly within cultural norms?

(5) Are security threats conventional and military or subversive and criminal in nature? Do linkages involving political extremists, paramilitary formations, intelligence operatives, organized crime, and/or corrupt private interests remain potent forces? Are there networks of criminals, warlords, or corrupt or extremist ruling elites that must be addressed?

(6) Who is providing security—HN security forces, external intervention forces such as a UN peacekeeping force, or non-state entities? What indigenous security capacity must be developed to ensure that the threat of political violence ends? Did indigenous security forces disintegrate? Were they responsible for brutality and repression that led to conflict?

(7) Who wins and who loses economically if peace prevails? Does illicit wealth determine who wields political power, fueling continued conflict? What revenue streams flow to major obstructionists that sustain their capacity for coercion, terrorism, paramilitary activities, and intelligence operations?

(8) What is the likely impact of the presence of US or multinational forces? Will foreign forces be viewed as occupiers or as propping up an illegitimate government, regardless of their role in ongoing stabilization efforts? How will the armed forces address the incidental harm to the civilian population that occurs over the course of the mission?

c. Ongoing assessment of the security situation can be problematic because of the time involved for the effects of operations to become apparent. During a crisis intervention, the levels of outcome-based security metrics (e.g., numbers of attacks, civilian deaths, military casualties) may increase as a result of operations as security is implemented. During this period, intelligence and ongoing threat analysis will normally provide better indications of success. Measures of performance (MOPs) are an important link to the long-term use of measures of effectiveness (MOEs) that inform and guide decisions during stabilization efforts.

4. Military Contribution

a. **Territorial Security.** In conformity with the monopoly on the legitimate use of force, the HN government must control its borders, and must reasonably monitor and control movement within its borders, particularly movement by adversaries, militants, and criminals. Territorial integrity is a necessary condition in which ordinary citizens and legitimate goods are able to move in relative freedom within the country and across its borders and through its ports, while illicit commodities and individuals who present threats to security are denied access. As with all security concerns, territorial security must balance security requirements for restriction with the political and economic requirements for openness. Again, DOD will normally lead this effort, but may share that lead with DOS's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) with significant supporting contribution from DOJ International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), particularly USCG and US Customs and Border Protection, may also play significant supporting roles.

(1) **Border Control and Boundary Security.** A central component of security is the ability of the state to monitor and regulate its borders and ports of entry, including land boundaries, airports, inland waterways, coastlines, and seaports to prevent arms smuggling; interdict contraband; prevent trafficking of persons; regulate immigration and emigration; and establish friendly control over major points of entry. Generally, border and coastal security forces secure national boundaries while customs officials regulate the flow of people, animals, and goods across state borders. The control of border approaches, such as sea lanes, rivers, and air corridors also contributes to border security.

(2) **Freedom of Movement.** Refers to the basic human right that everyone lawfully within a territory of a state enjoys, within that territory, the right to move freely and to choose his or her place of residence. This right includes the ability to leave that state and return at any time. Freedom of movement allows children to travel to school, adults to seek job opportunities, and farmers to take their goods to market. The ability to move about also promotes social integration of communities that might otherwise remain isolated. While checkpoints, curfews, and other movement restrictions help security forces control the movement of adversaries and enhance security within the operational area, they do impinge on freedom of movement. The JFC must gauge when it is appropriate to relax the movement restrictions. At the same time, dismantling adversary roadblocks and other impediments helps the population to resume everyday activities. Security forces must strike a balance between ensuring the freedom of movement necessary for the regular activities of governance and economics and the control of movement necessary for security.

(3) **Identity Activities.** Identity activities are used to sufficiently recognize or differentiate one person from another; accurately deconflict, link, or consolidate identities; detect shared characteristics of a group; characterize identities to assess levels of threat or trust; or develop or manage identity information to support decision making. During stabilization efforts, commanders employ identity activities to help establish a safe and secure environment, re-institute proper governance, manage resources, and expand intelligence operations. Identity activities are also used to support rule of law, victim

identification, and the response to atrocities. Effective employment of biometric, forensic, and document and media exploitation (DOMEX) capabilities informs all source intelligence analysis and identity intelligence (I2) production. This provides the commander with actionable information and intelligence to establish and maintain security; validate presented credentials; protect resources and critical infrastructure; monitor and manage the local population; target threat actors and networks; vet HN personnel; and deter adversaries, criminals, and opportunists from disruptive acts. Identity activities also advance intelligence operations on key personalities, persons of interest, and groups, and enhance the commander's knowledge and awareness of the OE.

(a) Multiple capabilities augment and enable the efficacy of identity activities. Biometrics capabilities support vetting and screening activities, encourage participation in representative government, enhance physical security and access, and strengthen efforts to protect the civilian population. Additionally, forensics capabilities support counter threat network activities, enable the HN justice architecture and SSR initiatives, and facilitate the development of effective countermeasures. DOMEX capabilities provide insights into adversary, criminal, and opportunist capabilities, tools, capacity, and intent to conduct disruptive acts.

(b) Intelligence analysis and production is a vital component of identity activity support to stability actions. To produce I2, all-source intelligence analysts assess encountered identities against relevant information and intelligence to increase the commander's knowledge and awareness of the relevant actors operating within the OE, and inform operational and tactical decision making. Identity activities support force protection, HN screening and vetting decisions, threat network discovery and characterization, persistent and objective-specific targeting activities, and COA development. I2 products developed to support stabilization in one theater can also be leveraged to support global offensive, defensive, and stabilization activities across the conflict continuum.

b. Civil Security. The security of the local population and institutions is central to the success of stability activities, and whenever it has functional control over all or a part of HN territory, the joint force will typically be responsible for ensuring the security of the civilian population. This includes protecting civilians from a broad range of military, paramilitary, and criminal threats; the provision of transitional public security to ensure both the reality and perception of public order; and the clearance of explosive ordnance and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazards and threats. These categories cover more threat-specific areas as preventing human trafficking, providing security for internally displaced person (IDP) or refugee camps. While defining the category of civilians may be challenging in some environments (e.g., where private ownership of weapons is common, or where civilians are intermittently mobilized to join militias), common sense and sound political judgment—informed by appropriate legal analysis—should guide the joint force approach. In the context of stabilization, the civilian population includes the population at large; civil, political, social, economic, and religious leaders; and HN government officials who are not members of the security forces.

c. Protection of Civilians Considerations

(1) The protection of civilians is an overarching category that is at the core of stabilization efforts. The protection of civilians includes addressing specific categories of threats such as war crimes, ethnic cleansing, sexual and gender-based violence, genocide, and crimes against humanity, as well as categories of joint force action, such as transitional public security, law enforcement, or atrocity prevention. Ensuring predictable and tolerable conditions for the population is the foundation for stability; efforts in other functional areas can be pursued as opportunities arise, but without population security progress will be temporary at best. The protection of civilians does not imply an unrealistic level of universal security: prioritizing which threats to address and how to address them is a matter of military judgment for the JFC. While patterns of violence that cost the most lives should generally take precedence, in some cases the HN population may have come to see certain types of violence as normal, making them less of a threat of instability. The joint force will have to balance multiple considerations and pressure from many different perspectives on which threats should take priority. The population cannot be protected by security forces that remain on operating bases or in central police stations. In most cases, protecting civilians will require a mix of offensive actions to neutralize threats, defensive actions to reduce the vulnerability of the population, and stability actions to influence shape the political dynamics and address the drivers of instability. The success of these efforts depends on an accurate understanding of the nature of the threats to the population, and their links to the broader political dynamics of instability.

(2) Conflict can have a significant impact on civilians as they suffer a loss of livelihood, displacement, separation from their family, food insecurity, and the loss of traditional networks. Equally, sexual and gender-based violence, with its associated psychological trauma, can often be used as a tactic of war; for instance, the rape of women and girls can be perceived as an attack on the male relatives' honor by proving their inability to act as protectors. Rape not only terrorizes and humiliates individuals, but it can also be used as a deliberate strategy to target the roles of women in society, and thus destabilize communities as an aim of war. Rape can also have a long lasting economic, social, and health impact on the state and surrounding region. To deter sexual and gender-based violence, specific attention should be paid to investments in the required infrastructure (e.g., forensic laboratories), and human resources needed for the reception of victims. By adopting a more interventionist approach, forces will be able to reduce impunity for war crimes affecting women.

(3) There is a recognized link between the issues of peace, security, development, and gender equality. Therefore, it is not enough to promote the participation and the protection of women during and in post conflict. Stabilization and reconstruction initiatives are also needed to ensure that these actions are supported by wider development considerations, such as the promotion of economic security and opportunities, and women's access to health services and education. This requires collaborative work with international organizations and NGOs as well as the HN government.

d. Public Order and Safety. Public order affects early perceptions of state legitimacy and will usually be one of the first and most important public tasks. Public order is characterized by the absence of widespread criminal and political violence. Under this condition, the public can conduct daily affairs without fear of violence. Without public

order, people will never gain confidence in the public security system and will seek security from other actors, such as gangs, militias, and warlords. Public order is often a responsibility shared across various types of security forces, including the police or other policing agencies, courts, prosecution services, and prisons. The security of the population depends on active participation by security forces and citizens. Although US forces are not designed or trained, by and large, to be a constabulary force, the joint force may be called upon to conduct transitional public security functions on a temporary basis until HN or other security forces can assume those responsibilities. This requirement is largely driven by the size and presence of the joint force, particularly in the immediate aftermath of war or other devastating events. DOD, INL, and DOS's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) generally share leading roles in this area, while ICITAP and the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) may play significant supporting roles.

(1) **Policing.** Foot and mounted patrols by military forces with an eye toward preventing violent acts from adversaries and opportunists may be an important part of establishing security. While local police forces are becoming established, the joint force may provide security, maneuver, logistics, and other support to those police forces conducting regular policing activities.

(2) **Clearance of Explosive Ordnance and CBRN Threats and Hazards.**

(a) In an area already burdened by collapsed or fragile government institutions, the presence of landmines, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and CBRN hazards will likely overwhelm HN authorities.

1. Unsecured explosive ordnance in the form of landmines, unexploded explosive ordnance (UXO), or abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) can be used by terrorists, criminals, or insurgents to disrupt public order, impede economic development, or continue the conflict. These hazards restrict freedom of movement, negatively affect income producing activities such as agriculture, hinder international trade, and detract from the ability of a fragile state to secure its borders and boundaries.

2. CBRN threats and hazards include CBRN material created from accidental or deliberate releases, toxic industrial materials, chemical and biological agents, biological pathogens, radioactive materials, and those hazards resulting from the employment of weapons of mass destruction or encountered by the military forces during the execution of operations.

(b) Securing and disposing of these munitions facilitates the safety, security, and well-being of the local populace. This may include the rendering safe or disposal of explosive ordnance that has become hazardous by damage or deterioration, when the disposal of such explosive ordnance requires techniques, procedures, or equipment that exceed the normal requirements for routine disposal.

For more information on clearing explosive ordnance and CBRN hazards, refer to JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations; JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint

Operations; *JP 3-11*, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments; and *JP 3-41*, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response.

e. Separation of Warring Parties

(1) Separating warring parties involves establishing distinct areas of control that segregates the various factions and allows the joint force to monitor their actions. The establishment of security fundamentally requires a monopoly on the legitimate use of force by HN authorities. In stabilization efforts, the goal is to help the HN authorities establish this monopoly of force and to support HN protection of the populace. Toward this goal, joint forces support efforts to end residual fighting, build HN security force capacity, and disarm the warring factions. When the joint force is providing security, DOD will normally have the lead role in this area and various intelligence services could also play significant supporting roles.

(2) **Supporting the Peace Process.** Understand that stopping armed conflict and securing peace is ultimately a political—vice military—solution. A robust political settlement is the cornerstone for sustainable peace that enables warring parties to share power within an agreed framework, participate in the political process, apply for the national security forces, and resolve their political differences in peaceful ways.

(3) **Peacemaking (PM) and Peace Enforcement.** The cessation of hostilities among belligerents is an essential step toward improving security for the local populace. These may take the form of cease-fires, peace agreements, or other formal and informal settlements. Establishing these agreements is a diplomatic effort, but military support to PM includes provision of military expertise to the process, military-to-military relations, security assistance, peacetime deployments, or other activities that influence the disputing parties to seek a diplomatic settlement. The joint force may conduct peacekeeping operations (PKO) or peace enforcement operations, such as the enforcement of cease-fires or buffer zones, in support of this process.

For further details, refer to JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.

(4) **Disposition and Constitution of National Armed and Intelligence Services.** The establishment of national armed and intelligence services helps set the conditions for successful SSR. Security and intelligence institutions form the underpinnings of an effective security sector, based in a clearly defined legal framework. They provide the broad guidance and direction for the training and advising effort central to SSR.

(5) **DDR.** DDR seeks to stabilize the OE by disarming and demobilizing warring factions and by helping former combatants reintegrate into society. DDR provides a way for combatants and their leaders to facilitate political reconciliation, dissolve belligerent force structures, and permit DDR participants to prepare for their return to their communities. A successful DDR program is the gateway for subsequent SSR programs. The objective of the DDR process is to create political reconciliation so society can return to normal activities. DDR addresses numerous issues to include a mix of male and female

soldiers, child soldiers, combatant families, labor and sex slaves, and disabled veterans. Disarmament focuses on the safe collection, inspection, transportation, inventory, disposal, and control of weapons, ammunition, and explosive ordnance. Demobilization can take place in conjunction with disarmament but requires assured security for the former combatants. Success hinges on a robust public information campaign to alert everyone of the dates and locations of the DDR sites. Reintegration aims to provide the requisite administrative and medical screening, education, life skills training, and vocational training to assist former combatants return to society. DDR must be carefully coordinated and consistent with SSR plans and programs.

For more information on DDR, refer to JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency; JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations; and United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards.

f. **Protection of Indigenous Infrastructure.** Both the short- and long-term success of any stability activities often relies on the ability of external groups to protect and maintain critical infrastructure until the HN can resume that responsibility. When required, military forces extend protection and support to key HN personnel, infrastructure, and institutions to ensure their continued contribution to the overall joint operation or stabilization effort. In the interest of transparency, military forces specifically request and carefully negotiate this protection. Examples of infrastructure that may require protection include government, religious, or cultural persons or sites of importance, HN military facilities, medical treatment facilities, and power generation and distribution systems. DOD and INL normally lead this effort, with significant supporting contribution from ICITAP.

g. **Protection of Personnel Involved in the Stabilization Effort.** The joint force may be called upon to provide protection for civilian personnel from the US or other nations that are assisting in the stabilization effort. Interagency or international memorandums of agreement will be required in this instance, delineating specific rules and responsibilities as well as ROE. Only on the rarest of occasions will military forces provide protection for NGO personnel, and only when directly requested; many NGOs feel that their reputation for neutrality, that is their independence from US or any other political and military influence, forms the basis of their security—joint forces must be careful not to impinge upon this reputation. DOD and INL normally lead this effort, with support from ICITAP.

5. Threats and Vulnerabilities

a. **Participants.** Everyone present during stabilization efforts has the potential to influence the course of events in ways that may be positive or negative. The commander will strive to understand the full range of participants and their motivations, aspirations, interests, and relationships. Generically, the participants can be divided into six categories based on their aims, methods, and relationships: adversaries, enemies, belligerents, neutrals, friendlies, and opportunists. However, the category to which an individual belongs may not be immediately obvious, and over time some participants may change

categories. These generic categories can be tailored to reflect the specific groups and interests in fragile and failed states.

(1) **Adversaries.** Terms such as insurgents, rebels, spoilers, irregulars, terrorists, warlords, and criminals are commonly used in stabilization and COIN literature; each nation and organization has different understandings of these terms. Here they are all covered by the term adversary. Although the term adversaries can also be used broadly to include enemies, adversaries may be distinguished from enemies by the fact that they may be susceptible to suasion or co-option to neutralize their hostility, or at least their violence. Adversaries may directly oppose the international forces, the political settlement or process they support, or both. Some of them can be actively and violently hostile, while others will be merely antagonistic. Not all violence will be perpetrated by adversarial groups; in many societies, low-level violence has long been a characteristic of politics. Equally, many less ardent adversaries will stop short of significant violence against foreign forces or government authorities in their day-to-day behavior, but may provide materiel or moral assistance to more hostile elements. Their reasons for providing such support will not necessarily be personal antagonism toward the HN government but may, for example, be based on traditional understandings of hospitality and obligation or coercion, or fear of reprisals. Motivation and commitment will be variable across and within groups. Many may be receptive to concessions, or a path back into the mainstream, in the form of limited or national settlements and confidence building measures. Constant assessment and probing will reveal fault lines within and between adversarial groups that can be exploited to change the conflict geometry.

(2) **Enemies.** An enemy is a person, group, force, state, or other authority that can wage war and that is firmly committed to violent opposition to the HN government, friendly forces, or the US. Unlike adversaries, enemies are not feasibly susceptible to peaceable suasion or co-option to neutralize their hostility, or at least their violence, but may be susceptible to deterrence or coercion. Enemies, therefore, unlike adversaries, must be eliminated, or otherwise isolated from the population. Over time, enemies may be induced to become adversaries, and vice versa.

(3) **Belligerents.** Belligerents are primarily hostile to each other but in some cases can and do engage in hostile acts against the HN government, friendly forces and the US. Their motivations, intentions, and relationships may be influenced by historical grievance, self-interest, ideology, religion, or ethnicity. While belligerent hostilities are usually not directed toward intervening forces, they contribute to the societal conflict in destabilizing ways. Examples include competing tribes and warlords, nationalist groups, or religious organizations attempting to influence local or national power structures through the use of violence. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, adversaries attempted to mobilize belligerent groups by focusing their existing ideological, religious, or ethnic tensions toward the international force. An example of this was al-Qaeda's attempt to mobilize Sunni tribes to oppose coalition forces in Iraq by playing on preexisting Sunni-Shia tensions, and claiming that coalition forces were supporting exclusion of Iraq's Sunni political elite. In Afghanistan, the Taliban played on government corruption and limited authority to instigate anti-government activities.

(4) **Neutrals.** Neutrality covers those who remain noncommittal to either the government or the anti-government causes. They are the fence-sitters who are awaiting the outcome of the conflict. The conflict produces uncertainty for neutral groups with the potential for both risk and reward. Groups in this category will often play a critical role in the campaign, especially if they constitute a large proportion of the population. Historically, the acquiescence of neutrals has proven to be vital to the success of an insurgency. This group cannot be expected to support the HN government until it has clearly shown that it is likely to prevail.

(5) **Friendlys.** Friendly groups broadly support the HN government and the international force and the political process it backs. They may include members of HN government institutions (including the security forces), dominant groups committed to the political settlement and, if fortunate, large sections of the population. Building and then maintaining a confederation of allies (which may be in competition with one another) is part of the operational art in stabilization.

(6) **Opportunists.** Opportunists exist in all conflict-affected countries. They tend to be highly enterprising and adaptable, making use of the conflict environment to further their interests. In some cases, opportunists have an interest in maintaining the status quo and may attempt to frustrate progress or to prevent any change harmful to their interests. Examples include arms dealers, pirates, and smugglers. Some opportunists may not have a decisive impact on the situation, but criminal gangs operating in organized networks, possibly across national borders (e.g., drug criminals), can have a significant destabilizing effect. Criminal opportunists and adversaries will exploit the nexus of interests, sharing lines of communication and exploiting instability for their own ends. In addition to criminal opportunists, foreign governments may be opportunists, attempting to exploit ongoing conflict or fragility in a state to further their foreign policy agenda; this may be particularly true when the US is involved in a controversial role. Lastly, opportunists may include elites embedded within friendly or neutral groups who seek to use the conflict as a means of furthering their groups' position or their personal power or wealth. Opportunists can be helpful in changing the conflict geometry but, as with all the above groups, should be constantly re-evaluated, at least for long-term rather than declared goals.

b. **Shifting Allegiances.** Observing behavior is useful to assess allegiances under specific circumstances at a specific time; however, stagnant assessments can be misleading. Applying labels such as "adversary" or "irreconcilable" is a way to organize information when dealing with a problem. However, groups are rarely fixed and bounded entities; labeling them as such can inhibit the commander's understanding of social interactions and deprive them of identifying opportunities to influence key participants. People also have many shifting identities and allegiances. Belligerents may be friendly on some issues and hostile on others; adversaries today may be neutral tomorrow (or vice versa). Warlords, for example, may start as belligerents, squabbling among themselves, but then be drawn into the conflict and act as an enemy, or, alternatively, may partner with the HN government and, as a legitimized local government, become recognized as a friendly partner. Any categorization must balance the need to organize an approach to a problem with compartmentalization using labels to describe things that are in reality ambiguous.

c. **Insurgency.** When the Armed Forces of the United States are required to help establish security, insurgency is normally the most significant security threat. Insurgencies are primarily internal conflicts that focus on gaining control of the population. An insurgency aims to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region, win a contest of competing ideologies, or both.

For more detail on insurgency, refer to JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency.

d. **Mass Atrocities.** Large-scale, deliberate attacks on civilians of a particular racial, political, or cultural group are a direct assault on universal human values; they fuel instability, particularly in fragile states. Under extreme circumstances, such group persecution can develop into ethnic cleansing, which attempts to kill or forcibly relocate the population of entire cities or regions. Because history has shown that genocide and mass atrocities manifest themselves in highly variable ways, do not assume future perpetrators will follow old patterns.

(1) Mass atrocities are not the inevitable result of ancient hatreds or irrational leaders; rather, they require planning and are carried out systematically. The emphasis of USG efforts to prevent genocide lies in detecting, understanding, and acting appropriately on early warning signs.

(2) DOS leads efforts to detect and prevent genocide around the globe. Preventing or halting mass atrocities, however, may require the employment of a joint force. Any such intervention will require a significant stabilization component. Additionally, when operating in fragile states, joint forces may be in a position to detect early warning signs of, prevent, or deter mass atrocities.

(3) Military information collection assets and the JIPOE process can help identify early warning indicators and describe important contextual factors, such as the nature of belligerents and the status of the civilian population, connections between leaders and followers, and the means of violence.

(4) Development of security institutions, including vetting of security and intelligence personnel as well as training and other assistance, should include some emphasis on preventing and countering mass atrocities. Key leader engagement is particularly important in this area.

(5) JFCs should ensure ROE specify guidance to units or individuals that encounter other mass atrocities, as well as human rights violations that could lead to such atrocities.

6. Security Response

a. **Tailored Approaches.** A well-targeted, tailored plan for including the various participants can transform the strategic geometry of the conflict. Such a plan may allow the commander to co-opt once adversarial or belligerent groups into the emerging political settlement. Consequently, efforts should:

(1) Support, protect, empower, and reassure friendly groups and neutrals; for example, by giving public credit for changes in force posture.

(2) Persuade, provide incentives, or compel belligerents, opportunists, and reconcilable adversaries.

(3) Marginalize, disempower, and target irreconcilable and actively hostile adversaries and enemies.

b. **Population Security.** To provide protection to the population, JFCs employ a range of techniques. Not all will be popular.

(1) Static protection of key sites (e.g., market places or refugee camps).

(2) Persistent security in areas secured and held (e.g., intensive patrolling and check points).

(3) Targeted action against adversaries (e.g., search or strike operations).

(4) Population control measures (e.g., curfews and vehicle restrictions, biometrics collection and vetting).

c. **Countering Adversaries.** Direct military action against adversaries may be a central component of a stabilization effort. In which case, setting the conditions for a negotiated political settlement will entail breaking the ideological, financial, or intimidatory links within and among different adversarial and belligerent groups, as well as between them and the broader population. Developing and maintaining an understanding of the motivations of different adversarial groups allows the JFC to tailor the approach to each. Countering some of these groups may require an accommodation from a position of strength through formal accords or local bargains. However, there may be a number of actively hostile and irreconcilable adversarial groups, and countering these requires a balanced mix of the use of force, incentives, and detention.

For further detail on countering adversaries during stabilization, refer to JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency.

d. **Security Force Organization.** The JFC may organize joint forces into a number of different composite units for the purpose of establishing security in and among the population. Additionally, local non-regular militia may be incorporated into security operations.

(1) Conventional forces conduct the bulk of the routine security operations. They will largely be focused on securing key installations, locations, and population centers. Units will normally have their own operational areas for which they are responsible and should be capable of autonomous action. Likely tasks include:

(a) **Population Security.** Some elements of the force will conduct operations that directly protect the population. This will often mean living among the

people. Involvement over time provides enhanced knowledge of, and an intuitive feel for, their specific area. The aim is to become as confident and competent when operating in this environment as the adversary. The integration of indigenous security forces as quickly as possible is essential.

(b) **Infrastructure Security.** Some elements will conduct the control activities necessary to secure essential infrastructure and facilities.

(c) **Maneuver.** Maneuver elements will attempt to create security throughout the operational area by their presence within it. The maneuver element should conduct routine presence patrolling, normally from secure locations, and should be capable of gathering information for intelligence.

(2) SOF may conduct a wide range of special operations core activities against high-value military, critical, infrastructure, and high-visibility leadership targets. They should be resourced and trained according to the task and will need to act on verified intelligence. Although these missions are often lethal, they should be supported by IRCs. Integration and coordination of SOF missions with conventional forces conducting population security is vital.

(3) Additional forces are deployed to reinforce framework forces. They can be a separate part of the overall force package and can be deployed, employed, and redeployed where needed. They can be used in support of strike forces, or as a reserve for a specific operation. Although good for achieving temporary localized mass, they lack the finely tuned awareness of framework forces and will require liaison officers (LNOs) or local security forces attached to them to provide local knowledge.

(4) **Cross-Functional Staff Organization.** Depending on the complexity of the threat, there may be a need to develop specific focus cross-functional staff organizations that target narrow aspects of the conflict. These cross-functional staff organizations will usually include cross-government representation, possibly including the security services. For example, if the adversary has a dynamic improvised explosive device (IED) capability, then developing a specific counter-IED cross-functional staff organization that targets the whole of the network and IED system may be necessary to bring the threat under control. Areas that could attract the creation of specific focus cross-functional staff organizations with a diminishing military involvement may be biometrics and forensics collection and exploitation, counter-IED, counter-threat finance, counter-violent extremist organization, counter-illicit trafficking, counter-piracy, counter-narcotics, and counter-corruption operations.

(5) **Local Militias and Cadres.** As a short-term expedient to free up other security resources or to generate sufficient mass, the JFC may consider the use of locally recruited militias and other cadres as part of TSSA efforts. Being lightly armed, they can provide point security and guard vital installations such as government buildings and businesses. They should not be trained or empowered to conduct offensive operations or arrest and detain people. These militias may be drawn from armed civilian groups including concerned local citizens; former irregular parties to the conflict; or they may be

the remnant of the previous indigenous security forces that have remained outside of the SSR process. Should the option be considered, the competing advantages and disadvantages will have to be carefully weighed and judged; the key criterion is that these home guard units must be brought under HN control. Over time, these groups should be either formally incorporated into the HN security infrastructure through the SSR process, or be given new skills and returned to civilian occupation through the DDR process.

e. **SFA.** Providing protection for civil society and expanding security and development zones has historically involved greater security force ratios and been more difficult than first expected. Often, there will be hard choices to be made between allocating troops for concurrent capacity building and operations to isolate and neutralize adversaries, recognizing that the demands of these tasks require different skills and structures. Ultimately, success will involve recruiting, training, possibly equipping indigenous security forces, and embedding with them. It may also entail the creation of nonstandard security forces, such as village or neighborhood guards, to reach the critical mass which population protection demands. In addition to bolstering security force numbers, indigenous forces lower the profile of intervening organizations and reinforce the security capacities of the state. In contrast, sectarian or poorly disciplined forces may fuel the conflict. The HN government may require firm advice, as well as financial support, to sustain the capabilities required. The generation and subsequent training of indigenous security forces should be conducted in a coordinated manner with broader SSR initiatives such as the development of civilian oversight bodies, judiciary and detention institutions, as well as transitional justice mechanisms and DDR programs.

For further details on SFA, refer to Appendix C, "Security Sector Reform," and JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

7. Transitions and Transferals of Responsibility and Authority

a. The JFC should consider transferring security sector responsibilities and authorities from the military to DOS and/or an HN lead as soon as practicable. The ability to transfer this responsibility will be a function of two inputs: the threat and the capacity of indigenous security forces. If the joint force is required for the establishment of security in support of a stabilization effort, it is likely that local security forces do not have the capacity to counter ongoing threats. Some combination of a lowering threat and a buildup of local security force capacity will result in an appropriate transition point. This will be a diplomatic/political as well as security judgment. There are at least two options: transfer from US, multinational, or international organization forces to an indigenous military security lead; or transfer directly to a civil (police) lead (i.e., police primacy). In either case, the joint force is likely to be asked to assist the HN government to generate basic policing capacity so that basic public order can be maintained. Building that capacity would be the function of SC or a FID operation.

b. Police primacy should be the ultimate goal as it can bolster the perception of progress and reinforce the impression of hostile groups as criminals rather than freedom fighters. It demonstrates the HN government's commitment to governing through the rule of law. However, police primacy will often be unachievable until relatively late in

the campaign and may even be an alien concept in some societies. Premature police primacy can be disastrous.

SECTION B. FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

8. General

a. The humanitarian assistance function includes programs conducted to meet basic human needs to ensure the well-being of the population. Well-being is characterized by access to and delivery of basic needs and services (i.e., water, food, shelter, sanitation, and health services), the provision of primary and secondary education, the return or voluntary resettlement of those displaced by violent conflict, and the restoration of a social fabric and community life.

b. Civilian development agencies generally break humanitarian assistance into three categories: emergency humanitarian and disaster assistance, shorter-term transition initiatives, and longer-term development assistance. These generally parallel the military approach of initial response activities, transformational activities, and activities that foster sustainability; however, in the civilian agencies, each category has distinct operational approaches, staff, and resources.

c. With civil security, the provision of humanitarian assistance fulfills the basic requirements of human security—food, personal security, health, and survival. Human security includes protection from deprivation and disease as well as protection from violence. The assistance provided supplements or complements the efforts of the HN civil authorities, USG departments and agencies, and various international organizations and NGOs that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. In most cases, military support to humanitarian assistance will be provided only at the request of civilian agencies and will be limited to those activities for which the military has a unique capability that would otherwise be unavailable.

(1) During major operations and campaigns, sustained combat operations or atrocities committed by adversary forces may cause humanitarian disasters or near-disasters in the operational area. The presence of joint forces and the identified threats within the OE in these situations often drive the JFC to take immediate action to conduct humanitarian assistance missions to save lives, reduce suffering, and establish the conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance by civilian agencies and organizations. Operation plans (OPLANs) should include the provision of humanitarian assistance to establish the human security required to maintain operational momentum.

(2) During crisis response and limited contingency operations, the JFC may conduct FHA as a stabilizing influence, particularly when security humanitarian disaster could undermine other objectives of the joint operation.

(3) During military engagement, SC, and deterrence activities, humanitarian assistance may be conducted to assist in development in an unstable or potentially unstable area, to enhance US goals, or train foreign forces in humanitarian assistance operations. Such missions, in particular, must be closely coordinated with the local COM and country

team to ensure that efforts by the joint force are aligned with development goals established by the US. The goal of military engagement activities is to improve HN humanitarian assistance and disaster preparedness to a degree that international interventions are minimized or not required.

d. US Armed Forces participation in humanitarian assistance generally falls into one of two categories. The first is humanitarian assistance that falls under FHA and the second is some combination of humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA).

(1) FHA consists of DOD activities, normally in support of USAID or DOS, conducted outside the US and its territories to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. FHA is conducted to relieve or reduce threats to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. FHA may be conducted as a stand-alone mission (e.g., relief following an earthquake or other natural disaster) or as one component of a larger operation (e.g., relief provided during peace operations [PO]). FHA includes the provision of humanitarian relief to affected civilian populations following combat operations in a campaign or major operation conducted by joint forces.

For further detail on FHA, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

(2) HCA is assistance to the local populace provided in conjunction with authorized military operations. Assistance provided under these provisions must promote the security interests of both the US and the HN and the specific operational readiness skills of the members of the armed forces who participate in the activities. HCA programs are typically preplanned military exercises designed to provide assistance to the HN populace while also meeting the above requirements to promote operational readiness skills and mutual security. Usually these are planned well in advance and are usually not in response to disasters, although HCA activities have been executed following disasters. When at all possible, the assistance provided in HCA should be designed to increase the long-term capacity of the HN to provide for the health and well-being of its populace. DOD country team representatives will seek concurrence for project nomination from the USAID mission director or designee prior to submission of the nomination to the COM (or designee) for concurrence. Actions in this category are conducted to:

(a) Create effects that support the GCC's objectives in SC or designated contingency plans.

(b) Increase the long-term capacity of the HN to provide for the health and well-being of its populace. Such actions would be characterized as military civic action (MCA). MCA are programs and projects managed by US forces but executed by HN military or security forces that contribute to economic and social development of the HN civil society. Such actions enhance the legitimacy of the HN government and military forces in the eyes of the population. These programs use predominantly HN military forces at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and other areas that contribute to the economic and social development of the nation. These programs can have excellent long-term benefits for the HN by enhancing the effectiveness of the HN by developing needed skills and by

enhancing the legitimacy of the HN government by showing the people that their government is capable of meeting the population's basic needs. MCA programs can be helpful in gaining public acceptance of the military, which is especially important in situations requiring a clear, credible demonstration of improvement in HN military treatment of human rights. MCA can also help eliminate some of the causes of civilian unrest by providing economic and social development services. MCA may involve US military supervision and advice, but the visible effort should be conducted by the HN military.

For further detail on HCA and MCA, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, and JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

e. Humanitarian assistance is often considered a high-impact strategic effort—an important tool in building legitimacy with populations around the globe. The use of military forces to conduct humanitarian assistance has, in many examples, proven to bolster local public opinion in favor of both the US in general and the Armed Forces of the United States in particular. JFCs should be mindful, however, that it has also proven to irreparably harm the US image, particularly when such missions have failed to meet larger expectations for stabilization.

(1) Military delivery of aid may politicize humanitarian assistance and is not always welcome by external agencies, particularly international organizations and NGOs that conduct humanitarian assistance every day and consider political neutrality to be their primary means of security. The Armed Forces of the United States, regardless of intentions, may also be either an information target or a physical target for local or global adversaries.

(2) The efficiency and effectiveness with which US forces can deliver humanitarian assistance, particularly medical and dental care, can have the unintended consequence of decreasing the population's confidence in the HN's ability to provide basic care. Possibly even worse, excessive US humanitarian assistance may delay and undermine the reconstitution of existing medical and other basic needs infrastructure in the HN. To mitigate these possibilities, primary consideration should be given to supporting and supplementing existing infrastructure and to ensuring that associated IO and PA efforts focus on the legitimacy and effectiveness of the HN.

9. Evaluation and Assessment

It is normally appropriate to base MOEs for humanitarian assistance on The Sphere Project's *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response*. The Sphere Project, developed by international organizations and NGOs involved in humanitarian assistance, recommends key indicators for provision of water, sanitation, food, health, shelter, and non-food items in disasters, and establishes voluntary minimum standards for each sector. Whenever possible, the JFC should coordinate with USG departments and agencies, such as USAID and DOS, to determine what humanitarian standards and MOEs are appropriate in that country in each particular situation.

10. Military Contribution

a. **Dislocated Civilian (DC) Support Missions.** These missions are specifically planned to support the assistance and protection for DCs. DC is a broad term primarily used by DOD that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an IDP, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. These persons may be victims of conflict or natural or man-made disaster. It is important to be aware that civilian organizations, in the USG, UN, other international organizations, and NGOs may not recognize the term DC, and their policies, mandates, and levels of support will vary considerably depending on whether the individuals in question are refugees, IDPs, migrants, or others. Typically, the UN or other international organizations and NGOs will build and administer camps, if needed, and provide basic assistance and services to the population. However, when the US military is requested to provide support, DC support missions may include camp organization (basic construction and administration), provision of care (food, supplies, medical attention, and protection), and placement (movement or relocation to other countries, camps, and locations). Military personnel may also conduct identity activities while supporting DC missions. An important priority for the management of DCs should be to utilize the services and facilities of non-DOD agencies when coordination can be accomplished, as DC operations are often long term and require enormous resourcing normally not immediately available through DOD sources. However, in those cases where non-DOD agencies have significant capabilities on the ground, one or more of those agencies will normally be the lead for IDP or refugee operations, with DOD playing a supporting role, rather than vice versa. Relief providers must take care not to construct camps with a sense of permanence that discourage return, repatriation, or resettlement. Within DCHA, the Office of the United States Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) will normally lead efforts in support of IDPs, while PRM leads efforts to support refugees. Such efforts are supported by DOD's Office of Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Mine Action (OHDM).

b. **Trafficking in Persons (TIP).** Trafficking victims are persons subjected to sex trafficking (i.e., recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex act) in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has not attained 18 years of age; or the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery. Simply stated, TIP is modern-day slavery, involving victims who are forced, defrauded, or coerced into labor or sexual exploitation. Ongoing TIP in an area undermines ongoing stabilization efforts, as well as US and HN legitimacy. DOS's Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons normally leads efforts in this area, with support from USAID; ICITAP; DOJ's Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training (OPDAT); and the Department of Labor's Bureau of International Labor Affairs.

(1) Ongoing security activities, such as border protection and freedom of movement activities, should support the HN's battle against TIP. In particular, the protection of vulnerable populations, such as women and children, from TIP activities is a key part of population security.

SOCIAL WELL-BEING NECESSARY CONDITIONS

Access to and Delivery of Basic Needs Services

The population has equal access to and can obtain adequate water, food, shelter, and health services to ensure survival and life with dignity.

Access to and Delivery of Education

The population has equal and continuous access to quality formal and nonformal education that provides the opportunity for advancement and promotes a peaceful society.

Return and Resettlement of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

All individuals displaced from their homes by violent conflict have the option of a safe, voluntary, and dignify to their homes or to new resettlement communities; have recourse for property restitution or compensation; and receive reintegration and rehabilitation support to build their livelihoods and contribute to long-term development.

Social Reconstruction

The population is able to coexist peacefully through intra- and intergroup forms of reconciliation—including mechanisms that help to resolve disputes non-violently and address the legacy of past abuses—and through development of community institutions that bind society across divisions.

**SOURCE: Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction
US Institute of Peace and US Army Peacekeeping
and Stability Operations Institute**

(2) Additionally, commanders should deter activities of Service members, civilian employees, indirect hires, contract personnel, and command-sponsored dependents that would facilitate or support TIP, domestically and overseas.

For more information, refer to Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 2200.01, Combating Trafficking in Persons (CTIP).

c. **Emergency Food Assistance and Food Security.** International organizations such as the World Food Programme, NGOs such as CARE [Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere], and Catholic Relief Services support by USG lead development agency, USAID, along with other bilateral donors and multilateral agencies can be expected to support emergency food needs of the relevant populations at greater risk in countries where they have a mission or limited mission presence. In some cases, military involvement may consist of providing security for food aid warehouses and delivery convoys in uncertain and hostile environments. Civilian agencies requesting military support for food programs will have first considered effects on food production and

distribution before asking for this support. Civilian agencies estimate the degree of hunger in a population by using the household hunger scale, a rapid assessment methodology used by USAID. Food security activities are normally led by USAID's Food for Peace, with support from USAID/OFDA; OHDM; USAID's Bureau for Economic Growth, Education, and Environment; and the US Department of Agriculture's Foreign Agricultural Service.

d. **Shelter.** Although the basic need for shelter is similar in most emergencies, considerations such as the kind of housing needed, the design used, what materials are available, who constructs the housing, and how long it must last, will differ significantly in each situation. Civilian humanitarian agencies, in the USG, international organizations, and NGOs, will determine what shelter standards are appropriate in each particular situation, and may on occasion request DOD support for logistics and engineering to support these programs.

e. OFDA's Technical Assistance Group provides OFDA with a skilled cadre of technical experts in a variety of fields relevant to its disaster response mechanism. It is divided into a number of subgroups that include food security, health, most vulnerable populations, and natural hazards groups. In some cases the Technical Assistance Group, through OFDA's military liaison team, will request specific DOD support for shelter and other humanitarian programs they are designing.

f. **Other Non-Food Relief.** Disaster-affected households and those displaced from their dwellings often possess only what they can salvage or carry, and the provision of appropriate non-food items may be required to meet their personal hygiene needs, to prepare and eat food, and to provide the necessary thermal comfort. OFDA maintains stockpiles of commonly used non-food items, including plastic sheeting for shelter material, blankets, hygiene kits, kitchen sets, water treatment units, and water containers, at its commodity warehouses. DOD may also provide non-food items for humanitarian operations, generally through its humanitarian assistance excess property (EP) program.

g. **Humanitarian Demining Assistance/Humanitarian Mine Action.** Humanitarian demining assistance is any activity related to the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance with respect to the detection and clearance of land mines and other ERW. Humanitarian mine action is any activity that strives to reduce the social, economic, and environmental impact of land mines, UXO and small arms ammunition—also characterized as ERW. ERW includes both UXO and AXO. Humanitarian demining assistance is a form of humanitarian assistance and normally does not support military operations; humanitarian demining assistance must not be confused with tactical countermine operations. Within DOS, the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement serves as the lead organization in coordinating all USG humanitarian mine action activities worldwide. DOD humanitarian demining programs are coordinated by the designated combatant commander (CCDR) humanitarian mine action program manager, funded by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funds, and coordinated with interagency partners by the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. The clearance of landmines and ERW as part of humanitarian or population security measures should be carefully considered in light of US law. In accordance with

Title 10, USC, Section 407, no member of the Armed Forces of the United States, while providing humanitarian demining assistance, will engage in the physical detection, lifting, or destroying of land mines or other ERW (unless the member does so for the concurrent purpose of supporting a US military operation); or provide such assistance as part of a military operation that does not involve the Armed Forces of the United States.

For further details on humanitarian demining assistance, refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3207.01, Department of Defense Support to Humanitarian Mine Actions; JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance; JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations; the UN Electronic Mine Information Network: <http://www.mineaction.org>; and the DOD Humanitarian Demining Research and Development home page: http://www.humanitarian-demining.org/2010Design/Program_Overview.asp.

h. Public Health

(1) Joint force operations to rebuild and protect infrastructure, potable water, proper sewage disposal, and essential health services that contribute significantly to the health of the HN population must be closely planned and coordinated with the HN ministries and USG agencies responsible for health sector redevelopment assistance. USG public health stabilization and reconstruction efforts are normally led at the country level by a USAID mission with technical and program assistance from USAID regional and technical bureaus (e.g., the Bureaus for Global Health), other DOS bureaus, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Military medical forces will normally play a support role in health sector reconstruction operations, which are led by civilian organizations.

(2) The JFC may employ forces to conduct medical HCA to support local military and civilian health systems or provide direct public health care to include primary medical, dental, veterinary, and other needed care. Medical CMO must always be coordinated closely with USAID/OFDA health advisors, other USG departments and agencies, HN medical authorities, NGOs, and international organizations. Primary consideration must be given to supporting and supplementing existing medical infrastructure. The JFC must avoid operations that supplant existing public health and medical infrastructure or subvert longer-term plans.

(3) During stabilization efforts the military may need to provide public health services for humanitarian reasons as well as to build community trust in the HN government. When authorized, US forces may provide short-term health care to foreign civilian populations on an urgent or emergent basis (within resource limitations). The JFC and joint staff surgeon, in consultation with legal authorities, must develop written guidance for the treatment and disposition of non-emergent and non-military patients that are consistent across the theater. Such care will be terminated as soon as the foreign civilian population can be returned to its national health system. Medical personnel may be called on to assist in reestablishing and supporting indigenous medical infrastructure, particularly those affected by disaster. However, while improving the HN public health systems fosters self-sufficiency and may contribute to accomplishing the US military mission sooner, care must be taken to ensure that health care standards are appropriate for

the local population and at a level that can be maintained by the existing HN medical infrastructure.

(4) Health sector planning in stabilization efforts requires identifying objectives that link the initial response activities of humanitarian relief, transformational activities, and activities that foster sustainability.

For further details regarding the provision of aid in public health, refer to JP 4-02, Joint Health Services; JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance; and JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

i. **Education.** Military activities to support education programs generally focus on physical infrastructure. In some cases, trained personnel with appropriate civilian backgrounds provide additional services such as administrative or educational expertise. The efforts of civilian organizations aim to improve adult literacy, train teachers and administrators, develop curricula, and improve school-age access to education. As with any infrastructure support, military planners must ensure that schools or other contributions from the joint force are closely coordinated with HN authorities to ensure long-term sustainability. USAID's Bureau for Economic Growth, Education, and Environment normally leads stabilization efforts in education.

11. Transitions

a. Because humanitarian assistance is largely a civilian endeavor, with the military in a supporting role, the termination of US or multinational military humanitarian assistance activities will not normally coincide with the termination of international efforts. Generally, military forces operate in the initial stages of disaster relief to fill immediate gaps in assistance; military objectives will be to enable civilian control of disaster relief efforts (HN, international, or USG department or agency).

b. The transition of humanitarian efforts to HN authorities will not occur by default. Planning of humanitarian assistance must involve extensive international and interagency coordination from the very beginning to ensure a successful transition. Humanitarian efforts by the joint force should support the lead USG department or agency in restoring the capacity of the HN. The goal is to transition all efforts to HN, USG department or agency, international organization, or NGO ownership to permit an orderly reduction of the joint force's involvement and presence. All MOE, MOP, end state, transition, and termination planning should reflect this goal.

For more information, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

SECTION C. ECONOMIC STABILIZATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

12. General

a. The economic stabilization and infrastructure function includes programs conducted to ensure an economy in which people can pursue opportunities for livelihoods within a predictable system of economic governance bound by law. A sustainable

economy is characterized by market-based macroeconomic stability, control over the illicit economy and economic-based threats to the peace, development of a market economy, and employment generation.

b. Though meeting the needs of the population—both in terms of the provision of physical security and humanitarian assistance—lays the foundation for the stabilization of fragile states, economic stabilization and development help to consolidate gains made in human security and enable political solutions. Although security and governance reform remain priorities, early attention to broad-based economic growth increases the likelihood and sustainability of success. Accordingly, while economic measures and reconstruction are not the panacea for stability, they should constitute a significant component of the solution. Priorities for international agencies and military forces include measures designed to stabilize the economy, protect and reconstruct critical economic infrastructure, generate employment, and address any underlying economic drivers of conflict.

c. Economic stabilization consists of restoring employment opportunities, initiating market reform, mobilizing domestic and foreign investment, supervising monetary reform, and rebuilding public structures and HN economic capacity-building systems. Infrastructure restoration consists of the reconstitution of power, transportation, water resource management, communications, health and sanitation, firefighting, education, mortuary services, and environmental control. This includes restoring the functioning of economic production and distribution.

d. Economic and infrastructure security and development are inherently civilian undertakings; however, the presence of US forces will almost always have an impact, even indirectly, on this area. There may be times when more direct military involvement in economic development will be necessary: for example, when conditions restrict civilian movement or when civilian agencies have not yet arrived in the area.

(1) The protection and, when necessary, restoration of economic foundations and critical infrastructure, particularly during the stabilize and enable civil authority phases of a major operation or campaign, are a necessary part of planning. In all phases of the operation, planning, to include targeting, must be closely coordinated with plans for stabilizing the OE following sustained combat operations.

(2) During crisis response and limited contingency operations, participation in economic stabilization activities by the joint force will normally occur in PO or other interventions where the joint force had little influence on the conflict and post-conflict environment. The level of participation by the joint force will largely depend on the OE, civilian capacity, and the mission.

(3) During military engagement, SC, and deterrence activities, the military will rarely directly participate in stability actions involving enhancing the economy and infrastructure. The conspicuous exception may be the conduct of stability actions to support economic stabilization and rebuild certain critical infrastructure facilities and dual-use infrastructure such as sea and air port facilities. In addition to direct support for economic stabilization and infrastructure development, military forces may also serve as

the facilitator, convener, and/or coordinator of cross-sector collaborative efforts involving HN leaders, and key USG, private sector, and international actors.

e. It is important to emphasize that creating or repairing infrastructure is not the overarching goal; the ultimate goal is to assist the HN to set up the means for the provision of fundamental government services to a target population, with a view toward long-term sustainability of the economy. The importance of this approach and these projects cannot be overstated. As they are planned and come on line, service and infrastructure projects will have a direct impact on grass-roots entrepreneurship, the overall economy, and people's daily lives. These projects contribute to efforts to shape the OE and deny threat networks access to safe haven and resources, including financial support.

f. When considering economic stabilization and infrastructure, the JFC should be mindful of the fundamental differences in both approach and timeframe between stabilization and development. Conflict is a significant driver of poverty and vice versa. Consequently, US forces will often find themselves in theater working alongside, supporting, or being supported by targeted development programs from the US and other sources.

(1) Stabilization focuses on violence reduction, while addressing the drivers of conflict; it has greater immediacy and visibility in the short term. This lends itself to in-conflict or post-conflict reconstruction. Commanders will face strong pressure for immediate results; many requirements will appear urgent, but can ultimately detract from developing more permanent solutions. In virtually all circumstances, the JFC's ultimate goal, in close coordination with USG department and agency partners, should include setting viable conditions for transition of responsibility to the HN, both for services and for managing the supporting infrastructures.

(2) Development activity focuses on poverty reduction and addresses the drivers of poverty over the longer term. Development initiatives may be less considerate of current conflict dynamics, while stabilization efforts may be less considerate of long-term sustainability of projects. The commander should develop an understanding of the drivers of societal conflict and be an advocate for those development activities that best address the causes of local instability. The JFC should consider the use of joint force development funds and activities to avoid creating additional societal conflicts. The JFC should coordinate with the COM and other in-country managers to avoid undesired effects.

g. In an ongoing conflict or post-conflict environment, economic stabilization tasks should normally be conducted by a provincial reconstruction team (PRT) or some other interagency field-based team with military support and participation. These interagency teams combine expertise with operational capacity to directly support HN local institutions in establishing legitimate and effective governance, including the stabilization of economic activity. Where these interagency teams are not established, local commanders should attempt to work with USG departments and agencies, and other partner nations to assess, plan, and conduct economic stabilization and infrastructure reconstruction stability actions.

For further details on PRTs and how they are effective, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

For further details on economic stabilization and infrastructure, refer to the Handbook for Military Support to Economic Stabilization (https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jel/other_publications/econ_hbk.pdf).

13. Evaluation and Assessment

a. Each state has a unique economic structure based on its resources, the needs of the people, laws, customs, traditions, and level of development. Achieving unity of effort among HN, USG, and international actors requires an assessment that enables unity of understanding of these socioeconomic factors. During planning of economic actions, the staff should consider developing economic goals, measures, and general COAs specifying who, what, where, when, and why. Consider the following during the planning process to guide the assessment of economic performance. The assessment should describe the situation, end state, commander's intent, and national strategic objectives to stabilize a post-conflict economy, reduce the economic drivers of conflict, and increase HN institutional capacity. Military forces can assist with the gathering, analysis, and sharing of key socioeconomic information. The four steps in conducting an economic assessment are:

(1) Compile a country economic profile to understand the policy, strategy, environment, and performance of the economy. The profile provides the facts and conditions used during mission analysis and a baseline level of knowledge to share understanding with other USG departments and agencies. In addition to providing key economic data, the profile includes the country's economic strategy, economic and social policies, and the extant economic system.

(2) Develop a country economic implementation plan, based on the data collected in step one, that explains the country's economic situation and includes the interests of significant economic entities. This plan provides additional facts for mission analysis and includes assumptions. It should identify:

- (a) Pre-conflict problems.
- (b) The impact of ongoing conflict on the course of the economy.
- (c) The impact of the actual or anticipated post-conflict OE on the economic variables.
- (d) Ongoing or planned post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction programs by the HN, USG, international and other donor organizations.
- (e) HN willingness and capacity to implement such programs.

SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY NECESSARY CONDITIONS

Macroeconomic Stabilization

- Monetary and fiscal policies are established to align the currency to market levels, manage inflation, and create transparent and accountable systems for public finance management

Control Over the Illicit Economy and Economic-Based Threats to Peace

- Illicit wealth no longer determines who governs
- Predatory actors are prevented from looting state resources
- Ex-combatants are reintegrated and provided jobs or benefits
- Natural resource wealth is accountably managed

Market Economy Sustainability

- A market-based economy is enabled and encouraged to thrive
- Infrastructure is built or rehabilitated
- The private sector and the human capital and financial sectors are nurtured and strengthened

Employment Generation

- Job opportunities are created to yield quick impact to demonstrate progress and employ military-age youths
- A foundation is established for sustainable livelihoods

**SOURCE: Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction US
Institute of Peace and US Army Peacekeeping and
Stability Operations Institute**

(3) Identify and analyze the economic drivers of any ongoing conflict so actions can be planned to mitigate the drivers and reduce the risk of a return to conflict. This analysis should identify the economic centers of gravity, critical factors for mission analysis, and support developing potential COAs. This identification and analysis should provide answers to the questions:

- (a) What were the economic drivers of conflict?
- (b) How have the drivers been affected by the conflict's outcome?

(c) What are the economic interests of conflict stakeholders and power brokers, and how did those interests influence the course of the conflict?

(d) What potential measures and COAs can be taken to reduce these economic influences so that the conflict will not reignite?

(4) Prepare an economic section for inclusion in an initial staff estimate. This provides a description of the situation, a mission statement, and outlines potential general COAs for military support to economic normalization. This section should include:

(a) Summary of the structure and performance of the economy, environment, country's economic strategy, the anticipated post-conflict economic conditions, and problems.

(b) USG policy goals, both multilateral and bilateral, if available.

(c) Desired end state.

(d) Potential general COAs.

b. Infrastructure analysis should emphasize what currently exists and what is a critical shortfall locally, regionally, and nationally. Analysts should also assess the vulnerability of critical infrastructure to sabotage, direct attack, or other interference by adversaries or natural disasters. Infrastructure analysis must be tailored to orient commanders and planners on the priorities for US military, interagency, NGO, and international organization relief immediately and over time so as to prevent humanitarian crises and to reinforce a secure and stable environment.

14. Military Contribution

Civilian agencies have the lead responsibility for this mission sector, but the joint force may render support, particularly in the conduct of initial response activities of infrastructure restoration.

a. **Employment Generation.** Providing employment is an immediate peacekeeping task, a post-conflict objective, and a means of establishing the foundation for future economic growth and political stability. The initial emphasis is to provide employment quickly, even if those jobs are temporary and not sustainable. The joint force paying young men to pick up shovels provides a better alternative to being paid by the enemy to pick up guns. Even though the military focus will be on quickly implementing short-term efforts, it is essential that the military and civilian agencies have a common understanding of the problems and risks, and work to align short-term efforts to support civilian agency longer-term economic and political development strategies, as soon as practical. Key determinants of the appropriate nature of the military role in employment generation include the variables within the OE; specifically the condition of the economic-related infrastructure, the need for employment generation programs, and emergency responders access to the area. USAID's Bureau for Economic Growth, Education, and Environment will normally lead USG efforts in employment generation.

(1) The JFC should coordinate early to request flexible and immediate funding for work initiatives similar to the Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP)

utilized in Afghanistan and Iraq to quickly implement post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction programs.

For further details on DOD funding considerations, refer to Appendix E, “Legal and Fiscal Considerations.”

(2) Creating the security conditions needed to facilitate employment is a key military contribution. The joint force should assist with providing security for all employment activities, not just US projects, as conditions and resources permit. Additionally, joint force efforts to enable freedom of movement for the population, particularly to and from potential employment and major centers of economic activity, such as market places and ports, are an essential part of establishing security that facilitates economic growth. The JFC, together with other USG leaders, may consider establishing a secure economic zone, a secure area where civilians can conduct commerce and business activity.

(3) Military forces can directly generate employment opportunities for the civilian population by hiring local labor to provide sustainment support to the joint force or by funding local quick impact projects (QIPs) that will employ local labor. JFCs should take care, particularly when directly hiring local labor, to consider local labor market forces to avoid causing inflationary pressure on wages or draining skilled labor from local industry. Tribal, ethnic, and family ties to local businesses should also be considered to prevent unintentionally shifting power within the community, unintentionally alienating groups, and spurring conflict.

(4) Employment generation schemes, as part of political and economic recovery plans, should be closely coordinated with DDR programs to help enable the reintegration of combatants.

b. Monetary Policy. Establishing a central bank system and basic monetary policy is foundational to a recovering economy. The military may be required to provide security and supporting resources to the Department of the Treasury’s Office of International Affairs (OIA) and Office of Technical Assistance (OTA) in establishing monetary policy for a recovering economy.

c. Fiscal Policy and Governance. Fiscal policy is an important link between legitimate governance and economic stabilization. The military will contribute to HN fiscal actions by providing security for financial institutions and for cash distribution, including salary or contractual payments, as required. The support of customs policy while conducting border security also contributes to HN fiscal development. Additionally, military input may be required when establishing priorities for public spending, particularly on security programs such as DDR and critical security infrastructure. When civilian assistance is unavailable, the JFC may need to facilitate microcredit and other financial programs, including the use of JFC funds, when authorized. Finally, ensuring that US forces set an example for transparency in contracting provides indirect influence on HN government agencies. OIA/OTA and USAID’s Bureau for Economic Growth, Education, and Environment will lead fiscal and governance efforts for USG, with support from the

US Trade and Development Agency, Foreign Agricultural Service, and the Department of Commerce's Commercial Law and Development Program.

d. **Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources.** The joint force may be called upon to support infrastructure development by providing security, funding and materiel, CA functional expertise, or construction. Perhaps the most challenging requirement for large stabilization efforts is to conduct an infrastructure planning process that determines the priorities and sequencing of critical infrastructure construction, based on the broader planning priorities and resource availability. The restoration of essential services such as sewer, water, and energy is clearly a priority for infrastructure construction, based on both humanitarian and governance considerations. Similar considerations drive the requirement for infrastructure projects in essential industrial sectors, such as transportation, communication, agriculture, and production, though the emphasis on any one will depend on the circumstances. Reconstruction of critical infrastructure may be a labor-intensive activity that also contributes to reducing unemployment. Critical infrastructure programs are normally led by USAID's Bureau for Economic Growth, Education, and Environment and the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), with appropriate support from naval construction battalions, the Department of Transportation, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Department of Energy.

(1) **Water and Sanitation.** Water is always a priority to sustain life. It is especially a requirement for DCs. Temporary water infrastructure can be important even to meet short-term requirements. One constraint that will likely be common in water supply systems in crisis states is the imperfect state of the water distribution system. Rebuilding or restoring water facilities as part of long-term reconstruction efforts is usually necessary. Restoring water systems is constrained by the availability of electric power to drive the pumps. During military engagement, SC, and deterrence activities, well drilling or well digging is a popular activity for communities lacking easy access to potable water. In addition to knowing water table accessibility, the staff should also consider including the potential for the activity to cause conflict, the community's capacity to maintain a pump that is installed or to public works maintenance services, and any environmental considerations (e.g., aquifer depletion, wastewater flow). Attention must also be paid to the tensions and linkages between water as a life resource, water as an economic commodity (e.g., for personal or industrial use), and water as part of a sanitation system.

(2) **Food Production.** Restoration of food production is an absolutely necessary recovery activity. Infrastructure requirements in support of restoring agriculture production and delivery are generally neither an immediate nor a high priority. Food production capacity is usually not badly affected by conflict, unless there is a major population displacement or a deliberate scorched earth campaign. An exception to this is in cases of significant damage to major infrastructure, such as dams or fishing ports. Marketing of food products requires access to roads and assessing access for transporting and delivery of food products should be examined. The staff's assessment should include agriculture and aquaculture requirements. The more sophisticated the food production system, the closer the infrastructure restoration requirements need to be examined. Production (including irrigation systems), transportation, storage, processing, and marketing infrastructure requirements may exist.

(3) **Transportation.** Repair of roads and bridges will be a top priority when access to locations with at-risk populations is limited due to damage caused by natural disasters or conflict. The capacity of railroads to meet relief requirements are considered during the staff assessment. Railroads have the potential to permit high-volume surface transportation that may be critical to long-term economic viability. Inland waterways may require clearing and dredging, and related infrastructure may need to be repaired. Additionally, repair and maintenance of road, rail, and waterway services provide employment opportunities. The staff will also assess access, capability, and capacity issues associated with ports and airports. In particular, if ports are necessary to support delivery of emergency commodities or to facilitate the restoration of economic activity, they could be a priority in reconstruction. For the mid-term to long-term, road reconstruction may be a recovery priority. In addition to integrating national economic activity, expanding the influence of centralized government can be facilitated by having better roads. The high cost and longer times for delivery of transportation infrastructure, however, must be considered when prioritizing transportation reconstruction activities. The HN's ability to provide long-term maintenance of roads and other transportation infrastructure should also be considered.

(4) **Information and Communications Technology.** All post-conflict recovery experiences have placed a high priority on both restoring communications systems and assessing the opportunity for upgrading and modernizing communications infrastructures. Restoring land-line, underwater, satellite, and microwave systems to revive previously existing capacities is the first step. Restoration of these systems can not only boost economic growth but also assists in the security sector by providing the ability for the population to report security concerns. The process of assessing requirements needs to include building an effective public-private sector partnership, because private sector investment generally comes more rapidly. Assessing the regulatory environment can help those conducting stabilization efforts in making recommendations to the HN in order to have a more open and effective communications system. While transition to a market-based system that allocates resources economically is preferred over a system of political allocation of resources, care must be taken with regard to winners and losers of political power to avoid sowing the seeds of the next conflict. Media infrastructure requirements will often be a high priority, in conjunction with building effective participative governance. The JFC should be particularly attentive to the requirements of the modern wireless communications sector, to include Internet access, even in regions where the advanced technology would seem to be out of place. Experience has shown that the commercial sector puts its earliest post-conflict emphasis on creating a viable wireless network for the full range of wireless applications. Accordingly, planners must anticipate that electromagnetic spectrum management in particular will be an immediate commercial and economic issue, demanding a high degree of coordination between military users, civilian partners in USAID and the Department of Commerce, the private sector, and the HN government.

(5) **Energy.** Except for transportation and some industrial and commercial process heat applications, virtually all modern economic, social, and medical services (e.g., handheld and network telecommunications infrastructure, medical equipment, water pumps, commercial and industrial equipment) are powered at the retail or local level by

electricity. In all environments, sufficient electrical capacity to power this equipment will impact the ability of local populations to move on with their lives. Destruction or degradation of power generation and distribution facilities are considerations analyzed during the targeting process. This will include consideration of the extent of reconstruction efforts in relation to the anticipated benefits of destruction or degradation.

(6) **Production Enterprises.** Restoration of certain production enterprises is essential in support of reconstruction activities. Cement and brick-making plants, for example, supply construction materials. Metal working enterprises are necessary for normal economic activity. Assessments include the status of production facilities and requirements to restore their productive capacities. In some countries with economies dependent on an extractive industry, like oil production in Iraq and aluminum ore mining in Guinea, restoring the production operations will be a high priority. Restoration of revenue-earning enterprises can contribute to accelerating recovery.

15. Quick Impact Projects

a. QIPs are relatively short-term, small-scale, low-cost, and rapidly implemented stabilization or development initiatives that are designed to deliver an immediate and highly visible impact, generally at the local provincial or community level. Their primary purpose is to facilitate political and economic progress, promoting the legitimacy and effectiveness of the HN government. In areas where the HN government lacks legitimacy (possibly because it has not existed previously or is perceived as corrupt and ineffective), it may be necessary for the joint force to support QIPs without the presence of the HN government until initial trust can be established and relationships built that will help enhance the legitimacy of the HN government as progress continues. In uncertain environments, where it is deemed that the project is critical for early stabilization and cannot wait until the security situation improves, the joint force might implement direct QIPs. In more permissive environments, it is only where there is a capability gap that cannot be filled by another actor, or where the military possesses particular specialist skills that QIPs are likely to be implemented by the joint force.

b. It is useful to distinguish between two types of QIPs: direct and indirect.

(1) Direct QIPs are critical, rapidly implemented, security, governance, or development projects that directly support a goal on the path to stability. Direct QIPs tend to focus on key elements of security (such as the repair and refurbishment of police stations and vehicle check points), critical enabling infrastructure (such as market places, roads and bridges), or the delivery of essential services (such as schools and health clinics).

(2) Indirect QIPs are rapidly implemented security, governance, or development projects that serve primarily to generate legitimacy for the HN government or international forces, thereby indirectly contributing to stability. Indirect QIPs tend to focus on influencing perception and gaining consent. They may be used to communicate positive messages, provide incentives for compliance, facilitate key leader engagement, or demonstrate tangible benefits from peace. Indirect QIPs are particularly effective where lack of demonstrable progress is seen as an important driver of instability. Examples

include the construction or refurbishment of parks, the clearance of waste or drainage systems, and broader infrastructure refurbishment programs. Often, the most appropriate indirect QIPs are ones which cluster projects by visibly rolling out initiatives in sufficient numbers to create the perception of systematic change.

c. Where interagency field-based teams exist, much of this activity will be funded, planned, and implemented by development agencies coordinated through the interagency team. In these circumstances, development and security activities will need to be mutually reinforcing within a civil-military integrated plan. In other circumstances, however, the JFC should understand the various sources of funding in order to capitalize on opportunities for QIPs as they arise. The sources of funding for QIPs are varied and change frequently. QIPs should always be planned with lead civilian agencies accountable for transition and development assistance to avoid unintended negative impact on longer-term assistance, such as building clinics in areas that cannot maintain their operations.

For further details on funding and authorities, refer to Appendix F, “Legal and Fiscal Considerations.”

d. **Guidelines for the Effective Use of QIPs.** As previously noted, joint force action should be assessed by its actual or potential contribution toward influencing the key conflict relationship within the society and shaping the eventual political settlement. It is on this basis that the utility of each QIP must ultimately be assessed. To help the commander balance short-term and long-term imperatives and avoid unintended consequences, a number of guidelines for the effective use of QIPs are provided:

(1) **Participation.** Ensure that the host community and local government are involved in selecting, planning, design, and delivery.

(2) **Influence.** Ensure there is a process for communicating the positive benefits of the project to politically significant groups along with the appropriate HN and local community leaders. Use the project to promote understanding, if not reconciliation, and shape the emerging political settlement.

(3) **Minimize Harm.** Ensure the project avoids creating or exacerbating conflicts, jealousies, or rivalries by the selection of beneficiaries.

(4) **Efficiency.** Ensure resources are used in the most efficient and cost-effective way and that the project is not diverting resources from more important ones.

(5) **Timeliness.** Ensure the project will be implemented or completed in a time frame relevant to the JFC’s overall campaign.

(6) **Sustainability.** Address recurrent costs associated with the project, and when possible, link the project to longer-term HN development initiatives.

(7) **Coordination.** Ensure the project coheres with national priorities and is coordinated with the activities of other relevant participants.

(8) **Delivery.** Ensure the most appropriate agency delivers the project, favoring local expertise and civilian agencies whenever practicable.

(9) **Monitoring and Evaluation.** Ensure there is a plan for assessing the project's effectiveness as well as its impact on the overall conflict dynamics.

(10) **Technology.** Ensure the project is technologically appropriate for the community.

16. Other Considerations

a. **Ownership Issues.** A fundamental question that must be addressed as infrastructure projects are planned will be public versus private ownership of the project. USAID's broad experience in this area concludes that in most circumstances, private ownership is the desired end state. This involves a transformation from a culture where revenue to pay for utility infrastructure is acquired politically and utility services are likewise allocated among political allies, to a culture where investors pay for utility infrastructure and users of utility services pay fees that recover, at a minimum, the cost of construction, operations, and maintenance. Joint planners supporting civilian agencies that are implanting regulatory reforms must be wary of old political structures reemerging in almost-new forms.

(1) **Full Privatization.** The shift to privatization in infrastructure and utility operation represents a profound change in OE and conventional public policy and the staff should include this information in the assessment. The old and deceptively simple model of state ownership is rife with underinvestment, under-pricing (revenue inadequacy), high costs, low productivity, poor service quality, theft of service, political interference, and a general lack of transparency. USAID has found that privatization, if accompanied by unbundling of assets and regulatory reform, offers the highest potential for increased investment, cost-reflective tariffs, incentives for efficiency, access to superior management and service quality, political insulation, and greater transparency. All of these factors are crucial for long-term effectiveness of the utility or infrastructure project. Key stakeholders in any privatization plan will include: shareholders, politicians, boards, regulators, business managers, and, at the end of the chain, the customers who will both consume the service and pay the tariffs.

(2) **Partial Privatization.** In some circumstances, the joint force may find that local political leaders or the prevailing political culture may be unwilling to risk the certain controversy and possible loss of support that privatization may entail. In this case, joint force infrastructure planners must look at the option of improving, as far as possible, the performance of a state-owned utility, particularly as it relates to the relationship between the business itself and its government owners. The underlying issue will be improving, and in some cases developing from scratch, a climate of highly professional corporate governance. Assuming there are credible local authorities with whom to consult or negotiate, it will be critical for the host government to make a viable commitment to cost-covering tariffs (or a cost-covering combination of tariffs and subsidies). Without such a commitment, private investors will most likely not buy into the utility. Strong

consideration must also be given to reducing the government's fundamental conflict of interest in being both the owner and manager of the utility.

b. **Cost Recovery.** In the realm of stabilization-related infrastructure development, particularly regarding utilities, JFCs must keep in mind the long-term nature of the project, which by necessity means that the local population must, in one way or another, act as true customers, and pay for the services they receive from the utility. As part of the larger reform of a utility, cost recovery is often less an issue of willingness to pay and more an issue of willingness to charge. Operating costs will include, among others: salaries, energy, costs of goods or services sold, maintenance, information technology, capital costs including debt and equity, etc. Long-term success for a complex project demands contract agreements and plans that create a system that is financially solvent. The old adage, "There is no free lunch," must apply. JFCs should work with local authorities and civic leaders to help develop a culture of payment with the recipient population. Achieving a culture of payment will necessitate a break with prior political arrangements. Planners will need to assess whether publicly emphasizing such a break will calm or incite the political environment, but regardless, the new approach must be perceived to be a fair and just break with the past. Project costs may be direct, as noted above, or hidden. Security concerns in particular have been shown to add up to 20 percent to an enterprise's operating expenses. In this regard, military planners may not even be aware of the extent to which their normal force protection posture would add to a utility's budget once the intervention force is re-deployed, assuming concomitant security requirements remain steady. Turnover plans should factor this into the equation.

c. **Getting Services to Those in Need.** A key subset of cost recovery will be designing a system that will help ensure continued delivery of utility services to those in need. Direct subsidies should be avoided, where possible, as they will generally create a situation where customers and managers will lose the will to work toward actual cost recovery. A subsidized safety net of sorts can only be effective if the households are legally connected to the system and accurately metered. Poorly designed subsidies will often have the unintended consequence of encouraging inefficient consumption by the household and provide disincentives for the utility to reduce costs or expand its service.

d. **Contracting as a Management Tool.** Planners need to distinguish between contracting for construction services and creating operating contracts to manage reestablished utility services. In many post-conflict and natural disaster scenarios, simply rebuilding the infrastructure and turning it back to local authorities will not ensure improved services. USAID has learned over the years that the use of incentive-based operating contracts will often mitigate the original weak capacity of the utility staff. If operating contracts are used, planners need to factor in indigenous capacity building so that local staffs will ultimately be able to manage their own assets.

e. **Business, Legal, and Regulatory Environment.** Infrastructure is not just physical facilities. It is often a set of businesses that own, operate, and renew infrastructure facilities. A joint force is likely to be required to reform an existing enabling environment under which the infrastructure operates. This will involve fixing corporate form and governance, laws, regulation, public funding, capital markets, infrastructure institutions

and facilities. It is the business that operates and maintains the system. As such, a bankable utility has enough cash to pay all its costs, including operational and capital costs; has a predictable means of recovering its revenue requirements; has sufficient financial controls to meet high standards of creditworthiness; and can deal with the financial risks that happen in the normal course of business. It is important that statutory authorities for government operation exist before expectation of government performance can be realized. Infrastructure and services practitioners will be highly affected by the larger environment of a fragile or recovering government structure.

f. The joint force may be intervening in a societal environment where some level of regulation was already in place, but is now at some other level dysfunctional. In that case, reforms to existing structures should begin by fixing the corporate form and governance, getting the sector structure and enabling environment right, with the recognition that costs will ratchet up as the full nature of the service-infrastructure system builds to maturity. Sequencing the reconstruction is vitally important and runs from the cheap (e.g., enacting law and establishing regulation and private-sector participation); to the mixed costs of credit enhancements, improved bureaucratic efficiency, and access for the poor; to the expensive (e.g., physical utility construction, distribution systems, renewable energy). Key indicators of an effective business environment include: improved mechanisms for enforcing contracts; improving employment law; simplifying tax administration; and improved political governance (i.e., improved accountability of the government to its citizens).

g. JFCs faced with the task of establishing a reformed regulatory environment should begin with a thorough review of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD's) *Principles of Corporate Governance*. The OECD *Principles of Corporate Governance* focuses on governance problems that result from the separation of ownership and control. Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company's management, its board, its shareholders, and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined. Good corporate governance should provide proper incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company and its shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring. The principles are:

(1) Promote transparent and efficient markets; be consistent with the rule of law; and clearly articulate the division of responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory, and enforcement authorities.

(2) Protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders' rights.

(3) Ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders.

(4) Recognize the rights of stakeholders.

(5) Ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made.

For further details on corporate governance, refer to: OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (<http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/oecdprinciplesofcorporategovernance.htm>).

h. Maintenance Standards. From the moment a project or piece of equipment comes into being, it begins an inexorable process of deterioration. During a crisis response operation, normal long-term maintenance requirements for facilities and equipment are often rightly put aside in favor of more immediate operational priorities. Additionally, the majority of joint force interventions will likely be into areas and cultures where Western standards of maintenance are only honored by exception. Therefore, for joint force efforts to have lasting effects, the programs and systems must be designed with the expectation of inadequate maintenance. Project managers can accomplish multiple goals by enlisting local populations for ongoing maintenance efforts. In addition to keeping projects functioning, employing locals can create over the long term a small business or team of businesses that supports broader economic growth in the community.

i. Security. Construction of security boundaries and other force protection infrastructure is a well-understood military mission. If physical security for facilities and local populations is not assured first, very little else can be constructively accomplished. In the absence of physical security, workers can be driven away, facilities destroyed, and local populations terrorized into submission to, or even cooperation with, adversaries. That said, civilian-oriented services and infrastructure operations demand attention to the latent security situation, particularly when undertaken in an unstable intervention scenario. It is cost-prohibitive to erect enough dedicated security infrastructure to protect all essential services facilities. As a result, cost-effectiveness calculations are required. For facilities with high-value assets (e.g., power plants or facilities that provide crucial resources such as water pumping facilities that can be protected with point-specific security protection infrastructure), it is cost-effective to protect those assets. However, for facilities that have extensive distribution systems (e.g., power transmission lines, underground water pipes) where protection infrastructure becomes far more expensive than simply replacing damaged property, total security infrastructure will not be cost-effective. The greatest security in many cases is provided by sympathetic local populations. If these can be kept secure against external threats, they can multiply the effectiveness of other security precautions, and also degrade the effectiveness of most adversary threats. At times it can be cost-effective to construct parallel, redundant, or looped systems to thwart the effects of damage (e.g., road systems or electrical transmission lines that connect at geographic intervals or at the extremities so traffic or electricity can flow back around the damaged loops.)

j. Accountability, Auditing, and Financial Oversight. Infrastructure reconstruction work brings with it significant amounts of resources to implement major works. However, without the proper legal authorities and regulatory institutions in place, it also brings the propensity for inefficiencies, exploitation, substandard work, and the reestablishment of economic conditions not conducive to stability and improved governance. Attention must be paid therefore to assisting the HN build the appropriate policies and effective institutions to deter criminality and corruption right from the outset. A conscious and deliberate effort is needed to include accounting systems and internal control programs into reconstruction

operations and assign them sufficient priority to ensure that they are effectively employed and instituted. It is advisable to consult with the inspector general office to get advice on how to do this without detracting from operations. Professional accounting organizations are less concerned with the occasional inconsistency than with systemic neglect or abuse of accounting practices. Initial counseling and following good advice goes far to prevent bad reports and weak credibility of the operations.

17. Transitions

a. JFCs must anticipate the transition from military to civilian program management and plan actions supportive of the long-term strategy. Joint forces can provide immediate support for economic stabilization, but the programs are frequently not viewed as long-term solutions. To maximize project effectiveness, these projects should be sequenced with the work of international civilian agencies and with the private sector to ensure continuity of effort with employees, functions, and support. The military's role is to help restore normalcy and fill the gap until civilian-led, longer-term programs commence.

b. Cooperative planning with other agencies is needed to link short-term emergency programs and transition them to long-term HN and private sector economic initiatives. Experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has shown that not nesting local projects with larger strategies often results in projects in one sector having unintended effects in another sector, sometimes in seemingly unrelated areas. Mitigating this risk entails, among other things, continuous communication with HN officials at all levels and USG departments and agencies.

SECTION D. RULE OF LAW

18. General

a. The rule of law function refers to programs conducted to ensure all individuals and institutions, public and private, and the state itself are held accountable to the law, which is supreme. The rule of law in a country is characterized by just legal frameworks, public order, accountability to the law, access to justice, and a culture of lawfulness. Rule of law requires laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and that are consistent with international human rights principles. It also requires measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in applying the law, separation of powers, participation in decision making, and legal certainty. Such measures also help to avoid arbitrariness as well as promote procedural and legal transparency. Rule of law in conflict-affected and fragile states is difficult. Quick results are not realistic. It is often more political than technical and it must be linked to public administration.

b. The rule of law is key to legitimate governance. Perceived inequalities in the administration of the law, and real or apparent injustices, are triggers for instability. It is of paramount importance that all actions taken by a government and its agents in attempting to restore stability are legal. Though human security may be established through physical security and humanitarian assistance, and economic stabilization may be initiated, long-

term stabilization requires the establishment of the rule of law. Indeed, it is often the establishment of the rule of law, and a security sector that can enforce it, that will permit the redeployment of the joint force when supporting a stabilization effort in a failed or failing state. The rule of law is not just a collection of institutions and laws but is rather a relationship between the state and society and must be shaped by those inside the HN.

c. In general terms, the establishment of the rule of law helps ensure:

(1) The state monopolizes the use of force and coercion in the resolution of disputes.

(2) Individuals are secure in their persons and property.

(3) The state is bound by law and does not act arbitrarily.

(4) The law can be readily determined and is stable enough to allow individuals to plan their affairs.

(5) Individuals have meaningful access to an effective and impartial justice and dispute resolution system.

(6) Individuals have the ability to enforce contracts through an impartial, transparent judicial process.

(7) The state protects basic human rights and fundamental freedoms.

(8) Individuals understand and respect judicial institutions and develop a belief in their equity and fairness that guides the conduct of their daily lives.

(9) Individuals are treated equally under the law regardless of membership in any social class or category.

d. The rule of law in the HN should normally be based on the existing legal framework, in whatever state it exists. However, if the existing legal framework is manifestly unjust and repressive, a source of grievances, and driver of conflict, the joint force should be prepared to take allowable steps to address such problems. In uncertain and hostile OEs, when the US force occupies enemy territory, the joint force must be prepared to take all necessary measures under the law of war to restore, and maintain as far as possible, public order and safety within the territory it occupies, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country. The COAs available will depend on the nature of the presence of the US forces in the HN, as well as the policy guidance for the operation.

e. Planning for stability actions to support the strengthening of the rule of law can be complex. However, by adhering to a commonly accepted set of definitions and coordinating with appropriate interorganizational stakeholders, military planners should be able to identify those issues that are critical to understanding the OE and formulating viable, sustainable strategies and concrete tasks. Activities within the rule of law can

generally be categorized as structural, strategic, or functional. Examples of structural, strategic, and functional activities are listed in Figure III-3.

(1) **Structural.** Structural activities in rule of law articulate the components and structures of national and local institutions, and the public knowledge and participation in them that are essential to enabling the rule of law. Though efforts often focus on building top-down institutions, some have highlighted the criticality of bottom-up perspectives. In other words, local justice mechanisms are just as integral to success as national and provincial efforts and local justice systems may not be understood by only looking at the formal state justice system.

(2) **Strategic.** Strategic rule of law activities deal primarily with the substantive political goals and strategic context required to enable or sustain the rule of law. Operations to strengthen rule of law and SSR should be aligned with this larger context if they are to be successful and sustainable. All four are closely intertwined. Communications synchronization is essential in promoting the values expressed by the other three activities.




Figure III-3. Example Rule of Law Activities

(3) **Functional.** Functional areas of interest focus on specific types of short- and long-term rule of law-related tasks and missions that the JFC commonly supports.

f. “Traditional,” “customary,” or “informal” justice are simply terms applied to the broad range of ways in which communities resolve their disputes nonviolently using their customs and leadership structures other than those imposed by formal government systems. In many parts of the world, including those where unstable conditions may require military intervention, traditional and informal justice systems play an important role in adjudicating disputes and providing social order. It is estimated that about 80 percent of people in developing and post-conflict countries seek justice outside formal courts and institutions through such systems. Therefore, there is not a clear division between formal and informal legal systems. These systems generally have long histories and a high degree of acceptance by the populace. Often, they function parallel to formal justice systems; in some cases, they are competing. In other cases, the formal justice system of the HN government has broken down, and traditional/informal systems are the only effective mechanisms. These systems should not be romanticized as an effective substitute for a broken justice system, but in many cases, they can contribute substantially to stability by providing orderly, nonviolent methods of dispute resolution, and, in some cases, can serve as a mechanism to reconcile formerly hostile groups. There are important caveats: sometimes such systems may be inconsistent with internationally recognized human rights standards or may in some cases be a driver of the conflict. Military support to traditional justice systems may mirror that provided to more formal systems, including security for judicial officials and comprehensive reform of criminal and civil laws and their enforcement.

g. **SSR.** SSR centers not only on the security forces of the HN, but also on broader rule of law initiatives. The overall objective of SSR is to provide an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of the public. Transformational activities and activities that foster sustainability in rule of law generally fall under the rubric of SSR.

For further details on SSR, refer to Appendix C, “Security Sector Reform.”

h. **Judge Advocate Review of Rule of Law Programs.** Programs to influence the legal systems of the HN are not above the law. Apart from US policy considerations, stability actions in the rule of law must themselves be governed by the rule of law; military actions, as well as any interagency rule of law programs requiring DOD support, must be reviewed to ensure that they comply with applicable provisions of US law, international law, and HN law, as well as any UN or other international mandate governing the intervention. Such reviews must be done by or under the supervision of a military judge advocate or other attorney duly authorized to give legal advice to military commanders.

For further details on the rule of law, refer to the Handbook for Military Support to Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform (https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jel/other_pubs/ruleoflaw_hbk.pdf).

19. Evaluation and Assessment

a. The necessary first step is an effective assessment that is comprehensive enough to provide situational understanding of the status of rule of law and that describes the deficiencies in a state's justice and security systems and does so holistically. It must take into account the various activities for rule of law and the interaction between them so that as one activity is improved, a positive synergistic impact might occur on another activity, or perhaps even degradation in still another might be an unintended consequence. Best practice supports the use of a multidisciplinary assessment team composed of criminal justice actors (e.g., police, judge, and prosecutor) and non-legal experts (e.g., political scientist, sociologist, or anthropologist with specialist knowledge of the country's politics and culture).

b. One of the most important initial steps in conducting rule of law programs is determining what law applies in the HN. Such a determination is essential to assist the HN government in building security capacity; to conduct joint security operations with HN forces; and, when required, to restore, administer, and reform those laws and systems or temporarily administer the HN laws and legal systems as part of CMO either during conflict or in the immediate post-conflict period. Regardless of the type of operation, planners understand that the law of the HN will be one of the most important factors during operations to restore or strengthen the rule of law and increase stability.

c. It is essential that the JFC understand the actual state of the legal system. It is not enough to know constitutions, codes, and regulations. It is important to understand the processes for creating, changing, applying, and enforcing the law, as well as understanding the public's perception, understanding, and acceptance of the systems. If the JFC lacks understanding of the HN legal system and how it functions, it will be difficult to make informed decisions about how US forces can or should operate in relation to that system.

d. Understanding the justice system at work requires looking beyond the formal structures of courts and laws. The political and social dimensions of the justice system must be closely understood to strengthen the rule of law. A comprehensive understanding of the justice system includes the identification of key leaders, along with political, societal, tribal, or other relationships that play key roles in the operation of the justice system as a whole.

e. The Criminal Justice Sector Assessment Rating Tool (CJSART) developed by DOS is designed to assist civilian and military leaders prioritize and administer HN criminal justice in sectors needing assistance. Once the assistance programs are under way, the CJSART is a systematic tool designed to measure progress and accomplishments against standardized benchmarks. Used in its entirety, the CJSART holistically examines a state's domestic laws, judicial institutions, law enforcement organizations, border security, and corrections systems as well as a country's adherence to international rule of law standards such as bilateral and multilateral treaties.

For further details on CJSART, refer to Appendix B, "Assessment Frameworks and the Assessment Process."

20. Military Contribution

a. **Establishing an Interim Criminal Justice System.** When conditions require the restoration of governance, establishing an interim justice system is a prerequisite. This restoration requires a wide range of skilled professionals working under a clearly defined legal authority: judges, prosecutors, court administrators, defense lawyers, corrections personnel, law enforcement, and investigators. Civilian agencies normally support the development of an interim criminal justice system; however, when operating in a failed state, especially during and immediately after conflict, the joint force may be required to supply military police, legal, CA, and other personnel to fulfill these roles. The focus of these efforts should be to ensure a basic rule of law with the objective of providing a temporary respite allowing the HN to restore its capacity. There are certain short-term measures that have been successful in post-conflict states (e.g., emergency mobile courts, detention review committees, interagency working groups, and so forth). The JFC should avoid implementing long-term changes to the justice system, but rather focus on immediate needs to deal with crime while minimizing pretrial confinement. In permissive environments, efforts to establish an interim criminal justice system are led by DOS together with DOD. In uncertain and hostile OEs, the JFC must be prepared to execute HN legal functions to ensure public order and the welfare of the local population. It is advisable to have appropriate rule of law and anticorruption advisors as part of all aspects of the military planning process as early efforts impact perceived legitimacy and long-term success. This will also assist in ensuring a more seamless and successful transition to civilian authorities as the security situation improves.

(1) **Indigenous Police Forces.** Integral to establishing rule of law is the support military forces provide to law enforcement and policing operations. HN law enforcement agencies and organizations should provide this capability if the OE permits; however, in a fragile state, these institutions may have become corrupt or failed altogether. While local civilian police forces are established, the joint force may provide security to police forces conducting regular policing activities and to police institutions. These efforts may include international police advisors deployed under the auspices of an international police mission, and USG advisors, such as USCG advisory teams. USG efforts to develop indigenous police forces are led by INL, with assistance from ICITAP and DOD.

(2) **Transitional Public Security.** During the initial phases of an intervention, US and multinational forces may be required to establish, promote, restore, and maintain public order. The purpose of transitional public security is to protect civilian populations when the rule of law is broken down or is nonexistent; it may involve missions ranging from partnerships with HN security and police forces, to the US force performing policing functions, to the suspension of local judicial administration and establishment of US military courts for the trial of civilians for offenses against local law and the security measures imposed by the US force as the occupying power.

(a) Public order normally involves the restorations of some elements of the HN criminal justice system, such as policing, law enforcement, investigations, corrections, and courts. However, restoring those institutions typically requires periods of time ranging from weeks to months to years. The joint force may be responsible for maintaining public

security in the interim, and may require US military forces to perform police functions, partner with HN security and police forces, or imposing martial law.

(b) Key public order activities are required whether performed by the intervening military, international police, or HN police and include the following: community patrols, checkpoints and vehicle inspections, criminal intelligence gathering, criminal investigations, arrests and detention, security and regulation of public gatherings, crowd control, protection of critical infrastructure to prevent looting and destruction, and border security. Other potential activities for the JFC include: establish interim criminal justice system, support law enforcement and police reform, support judicial reform, support property dispute resolution process, support justice system reform, support corrections reform, support war crimes courts and tribunals, and support public outreach and community rebuilding programs.

(c) The JFC must be prepared to perform critical law enforcement functions as quickly as possible, possibly even while combat is ongoing. The JFC should coordinate the military contribution to the maintenance of public order with international police and the HN police to ensure any that any gap is closed or its effects mitigated. In the initial response phase, military forces may be the only capable force available to conduct necessary law enforcement functions. Primary to the decision making on prioritization of public order maintenance will be the capacity and capability of remaining HN police and other security forces and an assessment of the pre-conflict level of public order. The latter will assist the planning of the establishment of a minimum level of acceptable public order.

(d) The JFC should plan on transitioning these functions as quickly as possible to an international police force or HN security forces. Successful transitional public security facilitates the orderly transition of civil security and civil control responsibilities to the HN or other legitimate authority and it allows DOD entities and interagency partners to pursue training, development, and capacity-building activities aimed at strengthening HN security forces and fostering a stable criminal and civil justice system over the longer term.

(e) Transitional public security is complemented by TSSA in which US and multinational forces enable HN partners to provide public security and justice for their own people and respond effectively to security challenges. TSSA focuses on the urgent operational requirement to reestablish basic functionality to the HN justice sector in the short term, creating the opportunity for standard SSA efforts to support deeper justice sector reform over the longer term.

(3) **Legal Framework.** Establishing effective rule of law typically requires an international review of the HN legal framework, a justice reform agenda, and general justice reform programs. Many societies emerging from conflict will also require a new constitution. All efforts to establish and support the rule of law must take into account the customs, culture, and ethnicities of the local populace. Efforts to reform the HN legal system are led by DCHA, with support from INL and OPDAT.

(4) **Judicial System.** Initial tasks in the judicial system include establishing legal mechanisms for criminal and civil trials. The support provided to judicial institutions parallels efforts with police and security forces to enhance the state's capability to maintain civil control and security. Of particular importance, the joint force may be required to provide security for judges and other officials and their families to ensure an independent and fair judiciary. Efforts to establish or reestablish judicial systems are led by INL, with support from OPDAT and USACE.

(5) **Penal System.** The joint force may be required to support the establishment of appropriate penitentiary facilities to support the criminal justice system. Such facilities should be separate from military detention facilities, tying them to the criminal justice system rather than ongoing military operations. In addition, such facilities should ensure compliance with international detention standards, which require separation by gender and by age (children and adults should be separated). Immediate efforts should be taken, particularly in a post-conflict environment, to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the current prisoner population to help reintegrate political prisoners and others unjustly detained or held without due process, and to ensure that prisons conditions are not drivers of conflict or incubators for adversary or criminal organization and indoctrination. Efforts in corrections are led by INL, with support from ICITAP, USACE, and the joint force.

b. **Property.** One of the most vital services provided by the judiciary branch is the resolution of property disputes. In a fragile state, long-standing disputes over ownership and control of property are common. Authorities must implement dispute resolution mechanisms. This prevents the escalation of violence that can occur in the absence of the rule of law as people seek resolution on their own terms. Typically, the military's role in resolving disputes is limited unless the joint force implements these mechanisms in the absence of a functioning HN government. CA arts, monuments, and archives personnel can support the immediate recovery and securing of property documentation. Efforts in the area of property are led initially by the HN government, however fragile, followed by the UN or regional organizations such as the Organization of American States or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. DOS, USAID, and possibly DOJ would normally play a supporting role.

c. **Contracts.** The ability to enforce personal contracts through an impartial, transparent process is fundamental to a state's stability. Because contracts form the framework for transactions among individuals in a society, confidence in the ability to resolve contractual disputes is at the foundation of a viable market economy. As with property disputes, authorities must implement mechanisms to resolve contractual disagreements.

d. **War Crimes Tribunals and Truth Commissions.** While a military governing authority may operate military commissions and provost courts, the international community oversees the conduct of war crimes courts, tribunals, and truth commissions. As part of the broad processes that represent justice system reform, military forces should identify, secure, and preserve evidence for courts and tribunals of war crimes and crimes against humanity. However, military forces also provide support in other forms, to include helping to establish courts and tribunals, supporting the investigation and arrest of war

criminals, providing security to courts and tribunals, and coordinating efforts with other agencies and organizations. USG efforts to support war crimes tribunals and truth commissions are led by DCHA/Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM), with support from DOS, DOJ, and DOD.

21. Transitions

a. The military's role in ensuring rule of law, other than providing security, is normally limited. However, when operating in a failed or failing state, especially during and immediately after conflict, the joint force may be required to play a direct role in capacity building of justice systems and security sectors. As soon as the security situation warrants, these programs should be transitioned to civilian agencies, either from the US or multinational partners, or those of the HN. The ultimate objective of interim security should be to strengthen civilian policing and security arrangements, allowing the military to resume its military role.

b. Efforts to implement rule of law programs are closely coordinated with governance programs. Both programs will transition together as the situation and the mission allows.

SECTION E. GOVERNANCE AND PARTICIPATION

22. General

a. **Governance is the state's ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society.** Participation is a process by which authority is conferred on rulers, by which they make rules and by which those rules are enforced and modified, and refers to programs conducted to help the people to share, access, or compete for power through nonviolent political processes and to enjoy the collective benefits and services of the nation. These rules and processes must be seen as predictable and tolerable in the eyes of the population to be deemed legitimate. They are manifested in three core functions: representation, security, and welfare.

(1) **Representation** includes political participation, decision-making procedures, responsiveness to the needs of the population, and accountability for decisions and their implementation. The effectiveness and legitimacy of representation depend on their appropriateness in the local context. For example, participatory governance does not necessarily equate to Western-style democratic institutions; it could consist of local shuras—informal gatherings of village or tribal leaders common in some countries in the Middle East and Central Asia.

(2) **Security** pertains to the maintenance of a monopoly (or at least superiority) over the legitimate use of force or coercion. It includes border defense, protection of the population/public security, and maintenance of law and order.

(3) **Welfare** refers to the delivery of services according to the expectations of relevant local populations. Service delivery in this context does not refer to a suite of

public services derived from Western states' or international development models but rather to baseline expectations of the local population in a given operational area if they are to deem governance legitimate.

b. Distinguish Governance from Government. While governance may be predominantly provided by a formal central government, this is not always the case, and the two terms are not synonymous. Governance functions may be carried out by a variety of actors in an operational area with considerable local variation. Depending on conditions in the operational area and the USG strategic goal, the JFC may need to deal with different governance actors and structures depending on the local context. Formal indigenous governance structures may include central, regional, and local governments. Informal structures are likely to vary considerably between HNs and within them and may be very difficult to understand for outsiders. They could include tribal and clan structures, religious and spiritual leaders, clubs and associations, as well as criminal or insurgent organizations.

c. Stable governance provides economic activity, a public sector strategy, a public sector management, a governmental structure, civil society participation and voice, and political accountability which is the foundation on which rule of law and economic activity can thrive and become drivers of security and stability. Support to effective governance involves establishing rules and procedures for political decision making, strengthening public sector management and administrative institutions and practices, providing public services in an effective and transparent manner, and providing civil administration that supports lawful economic activity and enterprise.

d. Effective and legitimate governance and functional, efficient, and transparent public administration should not be imposed on a nation by external forces. Stabilization efforts that seek to build local governance and participation capacity must ensure their initiatives encourage HN long-term responsibility. Through these processes, planning should align with long-term USG objectives concerning the HN and the region. Although perhaps counterintuitive and initially inefficient, citizens who have been habitually disenfranchised, marginalized, and even oppressed must be encouraged to participate in governmental process. Their leadership is essential to establishing successful, enduring HN government institutions. Even when external organizations, such as the UN or regional coalitions, perform certain governance functions temporarily, the processes to build HN capacity—complemented by comprehensive technical assistance programs—are vital to long-term stability.

e. Developing stable governance in fragile states requires improvements in weakened sectors. Given limited resources of time, money, troops, and organizational capacities, prioritizing becomes essential. Common activities include initiatives to draft a constitution, institute political reform, and create an effective civil administrative framework to foster civil society. However, these activities should be left to the HN as much as possible and not imposed by the USG or the multinational forces.

f. Establishing legitimate HN government generally occurs in graduated stages. First, the contending forces must be disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated into society.

Then local governance structures are given resources and time to grow. Political parties organize under new rules. Ministries are organized and staffed with professionals. Security forces are reorganized and trained. Then, full sovereignty is returned to a legitimate government.

g. To create a durable political system under the new regime, new participants may be needed. The intervening authorities can encourage the development of new local leaders by devolving responsibility for the provision of government services to local authorities and by encouraging local input into decisions. However, security must be established to ensure safety of those involved in the process. NGOs can be especially useful in developing leadership in local communities and among women and minority groups. Members of the diaspora can also be useful in developing or supplementing local talent.

h. As the goal of a stabilization operation is ultimately to return the control of the territory to a legitimate government, stabilization operations should be carried out in such a way as to create and empower legitimate national agencies wherever possible, rather than substitute for them. Not all local governing bodies are necessarily legitimate in the eyes of the population, and so care must be taken not to empower illegitimate groups, without bringing them within a framework of rule of law and accountability to the local population.

i. Levels of local security will invariably dictate the extent of the military contribution in governance. Where possible, the bulk of this assistance, including SSR, will be led, planned, and implemented by a USG department or agency or international civilian agencies. However, the joint force must be prepared to establish or assist HN public administration, or to provide short-term support to an established HN government or interim government. Where civilian access is limited, the joint force will inevitably be drawn in to those key governance functions essential for early progress. Nonetheless, military substitution for absent international civilian leadership should be considered a temporary solution, and civilian expertise and advice integrated into the planning process through appropriate reach-back or in-theater advisors. A whole-of-government approach must be used to direct US efforts to encourage and enable the HN to develop a functional government.

For further details on governance and participation, refer to the Handbook for Military Support to Governance, Elections, and Media (https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jel/other_public/gem_hbk.pdf).

STABLE GOVERNANCE NECESSARY CONDITIONS

Provision of Essential Services

- The state provides basic security, the rule of law, economic governance
- Basic human needs services; essential services are provided without discrimination
- The state has the capacity for provision of essential services without significant assistance from the international community.

Stewardship of State Resources

National and subnational institutions of governance are restored, funded, and staffed with accountable personnel; the security sector is reformed and brought under accountable civilian control; and state resources are protected through responsible economic management in a manner that benefits the population.

Political Moderation and Accountability

- The government enables political settlement of disputes; addresses core grievances through debate, compromise, and inclusive national dialogue
- Manages change arising from humanitarian, economic, security, and other challenges
- A national constituting process results in:
 - Separation of powers that facilitates checks and balances
 - Selection of leaders is determined through inclusive and participatory processes
 - Legislature reflects the interests of the population
 - Electoral processes are seen as legitimate.

Civic Participation and Empowerment

- Civil society exists and is empowered, protected, and accountable
- Media are present, professional, and independent of government or political influence
- Equal access to information and freedom of expression are upheld
- Political parties are able to form freely and are protected.

**SOURCE: Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction.
US Institute of Peace and US Army Peacekeeping
and Stability Operations Institute**

23. Evaluation and Assessment

a. The Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Strategic Assessment framework was developed by USAID, and was designed to assist leaders in prioritizing and administering HN governance areas needing assistance. Data collection and analysis may involve a combination of research and interviews or focus group sessions with key country stakeholders. Particularly when combined with the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) assessment of any ongoing conflict, the Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Strategic Assessment helps identify and assess key issues, key people, and key institutions in HN governance.

For further details on the Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Strategic Assessment, refer to Appendix B, “Assessment Frameworks and the Assessment Process.”

b. The JFC should gather information about the state of the media prior to and after the conflict, including media facilities. Television and radio studios, presses, and communication systems are often targeted and damaged during conflict. Civilian agencies and international organizations require knowledge about who controls or supports the media, including outside countries, political parties or factions, warlords, and criminal organizations. The assessment needs to take into consideration what is being broadcast from outside the state and from where. Military information support personnel have a collection database for radio and television facilities in various countries. It includes such information as location, equipment range, and frequencies. Users can search the collection based on facility characteristics.

For further details on military information support operations and the collection databases used, refer to JP 3-12.2, Military Information Support Operations.

24. Military Contribution

a. **Support National Constitution Processes.** When the HN has no established government, as may be the case during immediate post-conflict reconstruction or interventions in failed states, developing a national constitution is typically an important step in establishing a foundation for governance and rule of law. Security is essential to allow a new government to begin the governance process. An inclusive and participatory constitutional process that helps build broad based consensus on the country’s political future may help prevent reemergence of violent conflict and enhance security efforts. The military can support this process with CA functional expertise and the provision of security and logistic support. Efforts to support national constitution processes are led in the USG by DCHA, with support from DOS’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL).

b. **Support Transitional Governance.** Prior to the return or establishment of viable HN control over UGAs, a transitional, interim government may be required. This transitional government may be a transitional military authority, normally established following the military defeat of the adversarial government, a transitional civilian authority, normally established in failed states in which security is not the overriding

concern. The military may support transitional governments through civil administration as well as providing security to governmental leaders and institutions of all government branches. Efforts to support transitional governance are shared between DOS and DOD. A transitional government is temporary, exercising the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority.

c. Support Local Governance. Before national governance institutions and processes are established, the military should support establishment of effective local level governance. Local governments are necessary to restore and protect essential services that provide the basic foundations of security and economic stability. Finding political solutions, at the local level, tends to inform the search for a higher level political settlement. The military support to local governance may include restoring essential or emergency services as required, supporting civil administration, providing security to governmental leaders and institutions of all government branches, or performing functions of civil administration, within the limits of established authorities. Local governance support is led by DCHA, with support from DRL.

d. Support Anticorruption Initiatives. Corruption undermines confidence in the state, impedes the flow of aid, concentrates wealth into the hands of a generally unaccountable and illegitimate minority, and provides elites with illicit means of protecting their positions and interests. It provides insurgents, and sometimes legitimate opposition groups, information detrimental to long-term stability. Support to anticorruption initiatives is led by INL, with support from DCHA and DOJ.

(1) There is no absolute test of corruption; practices that are acceptable in some societies are considered corrupt in others. Some practices such as bribery, embezzlement, fraud, and extortion, are considered corrupt in all societies. Nepotistic activities, such as patronage, or client-based systems, are accepted in varying degrees. Local customs and norms should guide the commander's assessment. USAID's Anticorruption Assessment Handbook can assist the JFC.

(2) It may be useful to distinguish between significant and petty corruption. Grand corruption refers to practices pervading the highest levels of government, leading to an erosion of confidence in the rule of law. Petty corruption involves exchanging small amounts of money or granting minor favors by those seeking preferential treatment. The difference between the two is that grand corruption involves distortion of the central state functions, whereas petty corruption exists within the context of established social frameworks. Only where petty corruption exceeds what is acceptable within local norms, or impinges on the population's security and well-being, will it need to be controlled as part of a stability mission. Otherwise, petty corruption is best dealt with by host government agencies.

(3) Providing the HN government legal guidance and assistance can help mitigate the near-term effects of corruption. Long-term measures, assisted by civilian agencies, ensure lasting success. The strongest military contribution, other than the provision of legal expertise, is the example set by commanders at all levels.

For more information on corruption and anticorruption, see the World Bank's Governance and Public Sector Management website (<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/0,,contentMDK:20206128~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:286305,00.html>).

e. **Support Elections.** The ability of the state and its local subdivisions to stage fair and secure elections may be a significant milestone toward establishing legitimate, effective governance. While civilian agencies and organizations that maintain strict transparency guide the elections process, military forces provide the support that enables broad participation by the local populace. This certainly includes security, but may also include logistic support. Support to elections and other participation programs is led by DCHA with support from DRL.

25. Local Governance and Building on Local Capacities

a. Joint force governance efforts should build on the foundations of existing capacity—however insubstantial they are, be they formal or informal, be they national or local. By identifying existing capacities on which to build, governance capacity building is more likely to develop approaches that are both systemically desirable and culturally feasible.

b. While some capacities may be self-evident, many will need to be rendered explicit, often for the first time. Local knowledge can help determine what is likely to work and what will not, while avoiding the dangers of misjudging the ability of local elites to gain the confidence of and subsequently mobilize the wider population. As such, intervening partners will need to assess the relationships between elites and the constituencies they claim to represent.

c. The reach of fragile states often does not extend to all parts of the country, and some localities may have weak or absent formal state institutions. Different forms of non-state authority, which derives its legitimacy from a mixture of force and local acceptance, often fills a vacuum in state governance. Though not always a panacea, strengthening these informal forms of governance may be a better choice than embarking on slow, costly, and potentially inappropriate state-building exercises. Poorly planned institution building may make matters worse by eroding existing local capacity.

d. Establishing sufficiently effective governance at the local level is necessary before developing governance institutions and processes throughout the state. Initially, effective local governance almost depends entirely on the ability to provide essential civil services to the people; restoring these services is also fundamental to humanitarian relief efforts. Essential tasks may include an initial response in which military forces establish mechanisms for local-level participation.

e. In an ongoing conflict or post-conflict environment, support to local governance tasks should normally be conducted by a civilian-military team with military support and participation. These interagency teams combine expertise with operational capacity to directly support HN local institutions in establishing legitimate and effective governance.

Where these teams are not established, local commanders should attempt to work with USG departments and agencies and other partner nations to assess, plan, and conduct governance stabilization efforts.

26. Essential Services

a. Whether following a US intervention or during PKO, COIN operation, or other intervention, or in response to a natural disaster, the restoration of essential services in a fragile area is a key action to achieve security. This basic function of local governance is often lost during conflict and other disasters; efforts to restore governance, particularly at the local level, should focus on essential services—generally referred to as SWEAT-MSO [sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, security, and other considerations]. These actions should contribute to improved public well-being and bolster confidence in local governance.

b. Decisions about what state functions intervening forces should restore, and how to prioritize these, should be made in consultation with USG departments and agencies responsible for transition and development assistance, local authorities, and established local sensitivities. Local confidence in government is enhanced by the visible involvement of HN government authorities in the provision of core functions. As such, whenever possible, intervention forces should work through and with local authorities, and be prepared to execute tasks that local authorities lead. However, due to the humanitarian concerns in regard to essential service, in UGAs or areas in which military governance has been established, this preference should not override the need to restore services as quickly as possible.

c. As with all stabilization efforts, the joint force follows the lead of other USG departments and agencies, particularly USAID, in the restoration of essential services. In many circumstances, local or international development and humanitarian organizations may be operating in theater and able to fulfill this function. The military contribution will be focused on enabling them to expand their access to the population. However, only military forces may be able to operate in some areas.

d. Rudimentary service levels can often be restored by locating and working with key existing employees, though experts in public utilities, including CA personnel, should be part of the planning process and deploy with a joint force that will need to restore essential services, to include information and communications technology.

e. Securing the provision of essential services is an integral part to providing physical protection to the population. Because essential services are often a clear sign of effective governance, facilities and personnel that provide these services are often perceived as high-value targets for insurgents and other adversaries.

27. Elections

a. In a post-conflict environment, elections are often one of the first and most visible steps toward nonviolent political transition, signaling the transfer of authority from the international community to HN leaders. Further, elections can significantly contribute to

stability by providing for peaceful dispute resolution and, by giving a voice to members of opposition movements, providing broad based support, and contributing to the legitimacy of the government. In this context, the ability of US or multinational forces to conduct an election support mission successfully, in particular through maintaining a secure environment, can be critical to the establishment of a legitimate government and attainment of overall mission objectives. Without the establishment of a secure environment, an election is prone to failure. Rather than promoting the government's credibility and the capabilities of indigenous security forces, extensive violence during an election can highlight the government and security force ineffectiveness. Additionally, where initial social rapprochement has not yet been achieved, elections may provide organization, highlight social cleavages, and resurface residual emotions that provide additional catalyst to violence.

b. Consideration must be given to the timing of the elections to ensure they are not conducted before the HN government and HN security forces are prepared to assume the associated tasks in good governance.

c. The HN government should implement the election process; however, where HN forces and agencies generate feelings of intimidation and insecurity within the population, international forces and monitoring agencies may be required to oversee and secure the election process. As such, understanding how the local population perceives local elites, HN government authorities, and international forces and agencies will influence the plan for delivering an election.

d. Planning should include military tasks to be executed continuously through the entire election process while others will only be required during one or more election stages. While it should be anticipated that joint forces will be mainly concerned with security and logistics tasks, in some cases they may be needed to perform tasks that support HN, USG, and other international civilian agencies election efforts if and when a hostile or uncertain environment precludes these bodies from operating. These tasks may include:

(1) Tasks in all phases of the election process.

- (a) Security.
- (b) Logistics.
- (c) PA.
- (d) Unified action.

(2) Tasks in the pre-election phase.

- (a) Elections security.
- (b) Legal framework for elections.
- (c) Voter registration.

- (d) Electoral system.
 - (e) HN security force training and mentoring.
 - (f) PA and CMO.
- (3) Tasks during campaigning and voting.
- (a) Protection of election materials.
 - (b) Publicity of election sites.
 - (c) Election day security.
 - (d) Election observation, monitoring, and supervision.
- (4) Tasks following elections.
- (a) Collection and storage of ballots and election materials.
 - (b) Additional security may be required.

28. Media

a. Although the development of strong, independent local media is not a primary responsibility of the military, it merits support from the JFC and should be a continuous element of planning primarily assigned to CMO and PA elements of the joint force. A free, responsible, and robust media is an important component of participation. The media can be an important accountability mechanism for the government, helping to maintain the rule of law. Additionally, media can be useful in identifying gaps in government services through advocacy. By providing communications about public and government activities, the media encourage civic participation and empowerment. In short, the media play an important role in a stable society, and the development of a free press is an important step in stabilization.

b. Joint forces may establish media outlets to meet the need to convey information to the public immediately, to dispel rumors, and to counteract the effects of hate speech and inflammatory propaganda. These efforts are often designed to preempt or compete with media outlets controlled by adversaries. The joint force may need to fill the vacuum in the provision of critical information to the population about stability activities, especially when free and independent media are lacking. Examples include information on the movement of peacekeeping forces, land mine and IED awareness, refugee returns, food and shelter programs, and voter registration and other election information. Outlets may take the form of radio stations, television stations, newspapers, magazines, the Internet, and mobile phones. The establishment of an international media outlet does not replace the need to nurture indigenous media, but it acknowledges that the latter task may take a substantial amount of time. The JFC's PA officer plays an important role in executing this capability of the joint force, and in working with other members of the staff to ensure that public

communications, whether through joint force sponsored media or local and international press, helps fulfill the CCS requirements.

c. Local and international authorities make decisions about how to develop the media, including whether to focus on private or public media outlets. A key issue is funding, as even private media outlets may not be able to support themselves. Key tasks include the creation of a legal framework for media operations, such as a licensing structure, professional standards, and associations for publishers, editors, and journalists; construction and rehabilitation of publishing houses, presses, transmitters, and other media equipment; and training and education programs for publishers, broadcasters, and journalists.

d. Media supported or controlled by the joint force may be viewed as biased. In addition, media outlets run by the joint forces may attract local talent away from the local media, weakening these outlets and leaving a vacuum when the international intervention is over. At the same time, indigenous media outlets are likely to be associated with contending political factions. The challenge is to navigate between the short-term requirement for providing immediate, critical information to the public and the longer-term imperative of creating healthy, free, independent media.

e. The intervening authorities need to examine the current capacity of the media to print, distribute, and transmit news, as well as the capacity for media education and training. Before developing a media plan, there are several questions to be answered. Who are the main participants in the crisis? Who are the opinion makers? How does the population get information and weather? Do the citizens have radios, televisions, and access to print media and the Internet? The literacy rate among the population is another factor that should be taken into account.

f. One of the main challenges in building a free, independent media is establishing an impartial, transparent legal regime that upholds freedom of speech, establishes fair licensing practices, permits the independent media to operate without harassment, and minimizes the advantages that public media may have over private providers. Laws and regulatory regimes often take longer to develop and realize than other governance goals affecting the media. In some cases, postwar governments fail to enact legal measures to support and guide media.

29. Support to Civil Administration

a. Support to civil administration (SCA) is assistance to stabilize a foreign government. SCA consists of planning, coordinating, advising, or assisting with those activities that reinforce or restore civil administration.

(1) SCA in friendly territory includes advising friendly authorities and performing specific functions within the limits of authority and liability established by international treaties and agreements.

(2) SCA in occupied territory encompasses the establishment of a transitional military authority, as directed by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), to exercise executive,

legislative, and judicial authority over the populace of a territory that US forces have taken from an enemy by force of arms until an indigenous civil government can be established.

b. The joint force may allow the existing government structure to continue under its control and supervision. This arrangement does not mean the US approves of the existing regime or condones its past actions. It represents the easiest basis for developing a functioning government on short notice, since it is already in place.

(1) The JFC may elect to retain all public officials or, for diplomatic or security reasons, may replace all or selected personnel with other qualified people. In some cases, the JFC may find it necessary to reorganize, replace, or abolish selected agencies or institutions of the existing government.

(2) When necessary, provide assistance for SCA programs directed toward effecting political reform, strengthening government agencies and institutions, and developing self-government at the national and local levels. This may include performing specific functions of governance, such as essential services restoration and security, as well as providing CA and legal expertise to support and assist HN political and governmental leaders.

c. Replacing the existing government and building a new structure is the most drastic option. The JFC should recommend this COA only if the old regime has completely collapsed, is so hostile, or poses such a threat to peace and stability that its continued existence cannot be tolerated. The President must direct establishment of civil administration to exercise temporary executive, legislative, and judicial authority in a foreign nation. The US forces will only assume control prescribed in directives to the US commander. Within its capabilities, the military authorities must maintain an orderly government in the subject territory.

(1) Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile armed forces. The occupation extends only to territory where such authority has been established and can effectively be exercised. Occupation exists whenever an HN government is incapable of exercising its authority in an area and intervening forces are in a position to substitute. Occupation establishes a specific relationship between intervening forces and the civilian population, involving rights and responsibilities on both sides. In particular, where an intervening force is deemed to be in occupation, it becomes responsible for the protection of the population as well as the administration of the territory. Here military substitution for absent HN governance becomes both a legal obligation and an operational necessity.

(2) When required to establish military governance, the JFC should establish a transitional military authority to exercise functions of civil administration. These functions include providing for the safety, security, and well-being of the populace; reestablishing and maintaining public order; and restoring essential services. Establishing a transitional military authority will require joint forces to execute tasks typically performed by the HN government. Transitional military authorities act on the behalf of the population and, in the case of occupation of enemy territory, to secure the occupying force. A UN Security

Council resolution or similar authority may prescribe specific or additional roles of the transitional military authority.

For further details on military governance, refer to Appendix D, “Transitional Governing Authorities.”

30. Other Considerations

a. During stabilization efforts, JFCs influence events and circumstances normally outside the bounds of the military instrument of national power. By virtue of their responsibilities to the local populace, they become the executors of national and international policy. They are often required to reconcile long-standing disputes between opposing parties, entrusted with responsibilities more suited to civilian rather than military expertise. They are frequently called on to restore HN civil authority and institutions, to facilitate the transition toward a desired end state that supports national and international order. The burdens of governance require culturally astute leaders and joint forces capable of adapting to nuances of religion, ethnicity, and a number of other considerations essential to success. Key resources available to the JFC include foreign area officers and other military regional specialists.

b. **Respect for Religious Customs and Organizations.** The military force should, consistent with security requirements, respect the religious celebrations and the legitimate activities of religious leaders. Religious and political factors often interact within a society, reflecting the motivations and perceptions of the local populace. Religious conventions and beliefs of a society may significantly influence the political dimension of conflict. The methods leaders use to manage religious factors can determine whether conflict and instability give way to peaceful outcomes. International law mandates that the religious convictions and practices of members of the local populace be respected. Places of religious worship should remain open unless they pose a specific security or health risk to the military force or the local populace.

c. **Archives and Records.** Military forces secure and preserve archives and records, current and historical, of all branches of the former government. These documents are of immediate and continuing use to the military force as a source of valuable intelligence and other information. They are of even greater importance to transitional governments by providing invaluable information in running the government.

d. **Mail.** Large quantities of mail and other documents are often found in post offices or at other points of central communications. These may represent an important source of intelligence and other information. The joint force should seize, secure, and protect such materials until the forces can process and deliver them.

e. **Shrines, Cultural Sites, Monuments, and Art.** In general, the joint force protects and preserves all historical and cultural sites, monuments, and works; religious shrines and objects of art; and any other national collections of artifacts or art. The destruction or vandalization of these institutions not only presents potential violations of international law, but also can provide significant propaganda victories to adversaries. The 1954 Hague

Cultural Property Convention, ratified by the US in 2009, requires joint occupation forces to “as far as possible support the competent national authorities of the occupied country in safeguarding and preserving its cultural property.” In providing such protection, however, the joint force must be mindful of the perceptions they create, and comply insofar as is possible with relevant cultural constraints.

f. **Vetting.** Successful capacity building relies on dependable vetting processes to screen potential HN civil servants. These processes help commanders select qualified, competent officials while reducing the threat of security risks. Vetting processes should include the participation of local inhabitants to ensure transparency, cultural sensitivity, and legitimacy. Commanders should monitor these processes closely to prevent the exclusion of specific religious, ethnic, or tribal groups. Commanders should include the use of counterintelligence support, biometrics screening, and I2 products to increase the effectiveness of security vetting processes.

g. **Atrocities.** Under certain circumstances, the transitional military authority may be required to contend with the aftermath of atrocities, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. To the greatest extent possible, the transitional military authority should assist in establishing commissions and with identifying, processing, and memorializing remains of victims. These are especially sensitive matters. The transitional military authority performs these tasks with appropriate sensitivity and respect for local culture and customs.

h. **Corruption.** Often, the transitional military authority contends with corruption in certain sectors of the HN. Transparent, legitimate processes are fundamental to effective anticorruption programs. Therefore, the transitional military authority needs appropriate anticorruption measures to counter the influence of corrupt officials in HN institutions. However, the military authority should not dismiss corrupt officials before considering the effect of their prestige and influence, as well as the availability of ethical and competent replacements.

31. Transitions

a. Poorly timed and conceived transitions create opportunities for hostile groups to exploit. This is particularly the case if the HN government fails to adequately discharge a responsibility that was previously successfully discharged by intervening organizations. Such an outcome severely undermines population confidence in the government. However, an overly cautious and slow approach to transition can also lead to a loss of confidence in the government, or a dependent culture that institutionalizes the international presence and prolongs the intervention.

b. The transition of governance to HN authorities will not occur by default. Establishing sustainable governance must involve extensive international and interagency coordination from the very beginning to ensure a successful transition. Joint force support to governance should focus on restoring the capacity of the HN, as well as enabling the other USG departments and agencies, and international organizations. The goal is to transfer all efforts to HN, USG department and agency, international

organization, or NGO ownership to permit an orderly reduction of the joint force involvement and presence. All MOE, MOP, end state, transition, and termination planning should reflect this goal.

CHAPTER IV STABILIZATION PLANNING

“The initiation of a campaign before adequate preparations have been made may well be as fatal in a small war as in regular warfare. Prolonged operations are detrimental to the morale and prestige of the intervening forces. They can be avoided only by properly estimating the situation and by evolving as comprehensive, flexible, and simple a plan as possible before the campaign begins.”

US Marine Corps Small Wars Manual (1940)

1. General

a. The development of OPLANs that integrate offense, defense, and stability actions and integrate the military’s stabilization efforts with the activities of interorganizational partners is the responsibility of JFCs and their staffs. JFCs must also ensure that subordinate commanders executing stability actions understand the overall planning of the operation, including, in particular, how various military and civilian stability efforts interrelate and, when possible, integrate with each other and with combat missions, tasks, and activities, if any.

b. It is the responsibility of CCDRs and their subordinate JFCs to incorporate stability actions into the deliberate and crisis action planning processes when directed by the President or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). In addition to the important role stability actions play in major operations or campaigns and limited contingency operations, stability actions contribute to shaping the OE and supporting the GCCs’ TCPs.

c. Stability actions can be an integral part of joint operations that focus on achieving both elements essential to strategic success—defeating the adversary and ensuring that in the aftermath that secure and stable conditions are in place that enable reconstruction and development toward a lasting peace. Stabilization efforts are executed continuously throughout joint operations. Executed early enough and in support of broad national interests and policy goals, stabilization efforts provide an effective proactive tool for building partner capacity and reducing the risks associated with natural disasters and violent conflict in partner states. Effective stabilization efforts do this by preparing HNs for crisis and by anticipating and addressing the possible drivers of conflict long before the onset of hostilities or disaster. There is no separate planning process for stability from that used for combat operations. The balance and simultaneity in execution of offense, defense, and stability actions within each phase of a joint operation demands a similar balance and simultaneity in planning efforts.

d. While defeating an enemy may remove a physical threat to peace and security, establishing stable conditions that will foster peace and security in the mid-term to long-term will remain a significant challenge. Therefore, joint planning must also consider the key elements of conflict transformation—of how joint, interagency, and multinational actions can transform the factors producing violent conflict over time to return stability and attain strategic end states.

For further details on joint operation planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

2. Understanding the Operational Environment

a. Understanding the OE. An understanding of the OE in stabilization enables the development of an approach that includes realistic, achievable objectives, and properly aligns ends, ways, and means. Understanding of the OE is accomplished through JIPOE and the collective staff assessment. Through enhanced understanding of the OE, the JFC can improve the ability to:

(1) Decipher the true nature of the problem the stabilization efforts is meant to resolve.

(2) Develop realistic end states and objectives.

(3) Develop an operational approach that is relevant to the nature of the conflict, appropriate for the operational area, and achievable based on JFC capabilities and available resources.

(4) Consider relevant aspects of the OE during the planning and execution of activities and operations that produce lethal and nonlethal effects.

(5) Determine second and third order effects.

(6) Inform the feedback loop from the JFC to policy makers about the operational feasibility of policy objectives for a given stabilization mission.

b. The OE is a composite of conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect how the JFC uses available capabilities and makes decisions. The OE typically encompasses the relevant actors and physical areas and factors of physical domains and information environment (which includes cyberspace). Understanding the OE requires a holistic view of operationally relevant aspects of the OE. Decision making and associated behavior of relevant actors are particularly important to understand. Success during stabilization efforts ultimately depends on the ability of the JFC and partners to apply lethal and nonlethal state power in a manner that influences the behavior of people in accordance with US stabilization objectives. Understanding the OE requires an understanding of factors that shape the decision making and associated behavior of relevant actors. A holistic understanding of all relevant components within the OE, helps the JFC to understand how the OE can be shaped, how the OE affects capabilities, and how friendly, adversary, and neutral actors' actions affect or shape the conflict. Importantly, understanding relevant aspects of the OE enables the JFC to leverage aspects of the OE to achieve its stabilization objectives.

c. Understanding the OE in stabilization informs planning, execution, and assessment of various aspects of the operation.

(1) **Planning.** To perform the mission analysis process during planning, a planner needs an understanding of the OE. It helps identify the true nature of the problem,

the mission, and the factors within the OE that must be targeted through lethal and nonlethal means to attain the desired end state. Understanding the OE enables planning missions and activities that make sense for the nature of the conflict and that are appropriate in the context of the operational area. It also enables JFC planners to improve planning by better understanding potential second- and third-order effects.

(2) **Execution.** Once a mission or activity in support of the operation is planned, understanding of relevant factors within the OE enables operators to better execute their missions in a manner that furthers progress toward the objectives of the stabilization efforts. Much of the information to support operations is gathered at the tactical level, and the process by which the operational level seeks to understand key aspects of the OE may involve tasking operators at the tactical level to collect certain information. However, operational-level planners also have the ability to pull from an assortment of national-level resources to provide operators the information they need to have the best chance of success.

(3) **Assessment.** Operational assessment in stabilization links the theoretical (prediction of relevant actors' COAs) with the actual (how are the actors behaving?). It helps answer the question: what is the current status of the OE in relation to the established objectives of the operation? By developing a clear understanding of the current state of these relevant factors, a determination can be made about progress (or lack thereof) toward the desired end state of the stabilization operation.

For more detail on the joint process for assessment, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations; JP 5-0, Joint Planning; and JDN 1-15, Operation Assessment.

d. OE in Stabilization Efforts

(1) **Components.** The various components of the OE provide a lens through which a joint force may gain an understanding of the decision making and associated behavior of the relevant actors.

(2) **Relevant Actors.** The most important component of the OE to understand is the relevant actors. These include the population, friendly elements of the joint force, and adversaries. Other relevant actors may include supporting state actors and non-state actors (e.g., transnational terrorist or criminal organizations) and/or the NGO community. By first understanding who the relevant actors are and learning as much as possible about them, the JFC develops an approach that may influence the actors' decision making and behavior (active or passive) in a way that is consistent with the desired end state of the operation. Individuals may fit into more than one category of actor (e.g., a tribal leader may also work as a district governor, while also working behind the scenes to provide financial and material support to an adversary). Identity activities are a critical enabler to identifying and understanding the relevant actors. Sociocultural factors must be taken into consideration when conducting some identity activities (e.g., biometrics collection), as they may be seen as overly intrusive by the general population or NGO. However, when conducted in concert with HN forces or NGO community, identity activities can greatly increase operational precision and general security of the HN population, as well as the effective provision of services to affected communities.

(3) **Physical Factors.** In stabilization efforts, the physical factors of the operational area typically and predominantly concern the land domain and littorals. It includes the terrain (including urban settings), infrastructure (including the location of bases and ports), topography, hydrology, and weather and climate in the operational area, as well as the distances associated with deployment to the operational area and the employment of forces and other joint capabilities. Collectively, many of these factors influence the operational design and sustainment of joint operations. In stabilization efforts, the most important aspects of the physical factors are those that either provide insight into, or impact, the decision making and behavior of the various relevant actors within the operational area. Appreciation of these aspects of the OE facilitates planning and execution of the stabilization efforts.

(4) **Information Environment.** The information environment refers to the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. The information environment is not separate from the OE but integral to it. Depending on the specific OE, relevant aspects of the information environment may include media outlets such as radio and television, Internet communications such as E-mail [electronic mail] and social networking sites, cellular telephone and radio communication, channels of information flow via word of mouth, perceptions and behaviors of various audiences in the OE, and the decision-making capacity and capability of the threat. The information environment also includes the infrastructure and technology that supports the various types of communication. Understanding the key aspects of the information environment enhances the JFC's ability to understand, anticipate, and/or influence the behavior of relevant actors within the OE.

For more information, see JP 3-13, Information Operations.

For more detail on the holistic view of the OE, see JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

e. Establish an Evolving Common Operational Picture (COP)

(1) The JFC maintains situational awareness of the OE through development of a COP. A COP is a single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command that facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. The COP is not a real-time common presentation, but is based on parameters approved by the JFC for understanding relevant aspects of the OE by joint, and if possible, interagency and multinational partners. It provides a common awareness of the OE from which to diagnose the nature of the operational problem(s) that the joint force is trying to resolve, and it helps the various partners in an operation plan solutions in a synchronized manner over time and space to create desired effects. To be successful, a COP should include significant USG partners and—to the extent possible—other interorganizational stakeholders. However, dependent upon the sensitivity of some operating information and intelligence/information, and the JFC's and COM's information-sharing procedures, a comprehensive, overarching COP may be a challenge. The COP evolves as the operation or campaign progresses. This requires agreed upon

COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE CONSIDERATIONS FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

The processes and procedures for establishing a common operational picture (COP) will differ for each operation. The following considerations may be applicable to a COP:

Collaborative. A COP is developed among all relevant members of the force. This means a COP is civil-military, joint, interagency, and multinational based on the participants—assuming all are present and relevant. To the extent possible, include elements of the host-nation government and the nongovernmental organization community.

Comprehensive. A COP incorporates information from all relevant available sources to include entities from within and outside of the intelligence community. This information is fused together through a system that makes sense for the size and construct of the force. To the extent possible, the process for development of a COP includes a strategy for overcoming cultural, classification, and information technology-related barriers to sharing information.

Continuity. A COP includes systems for maintaining continuity across deployments as personnel are moved into new roles. This is particularly essential as personnel redeploy out of theater and new personnel arrive.

Evolving. A COP includes systems for adding new information, updating information that already exists, and correcting/modifying aspects of the COP that are no longer accurate.

Process for Understanding. A COP includes systems and processes to ensure the right people develop the understanding they need from which to plan and execute. In the development of a COP, collection, collation, and analysis are only as good as the strategy for dissemination and information management.

Focused and Tailored. A COP accounts for the limits of personnel to absorb large amounts of data. The concept of a COP does not require every actor to know everything about the operational environment. Instead, at the operational level, a COP requires a collaborative understanding of the minimum information required to inform the operation.

Embracing the Fog of War, RAND study on assessment, 2012, by Ben Connable

processes for incorporating new information, updating the information that has already been accounted for, and eliminating information that is old and/or no longer accurate.

(2) Without a COP, partner entities within the joint force will likely analyze problems differently, leading to uncoordinated attempts at solutions that may undermine if not conflict with one another. This diminishes unity of effort, which dilutes the impact of

the joint forces' actions and messaging, and often leads to the inefficient or even counterproductive use of resources. While the COP is normally maintained by the JFC, subordinate commanders and leaders may also maintain their common tactical pictures (CTPs). A CTP is an accurate and complete display of relevant tactical data that integrates tactical information from the multi-tactical data link network, ground network, intelligence network, and sensor networks. At the tactical level, the CTP is a source of situational awareness. CTP data is often used to inform the JFC's COP.

f. JIPOE Process Considerations for Stabilization Efforts

(1) JIPOE is a key process by which the JFC understands the OE in stabilization efforts. The JIPOE process yields important information that informs the JFC's ability to identify relevant actors, and understand, anticipate, and/or influence relevant actor decision making and associated behavior with respect to the JFC's stabilization objectives. Through JIPOE, information about the OE is made useful to those charged with planning and executing stabilization efforts.

(2) The four steps of the JIPOE process are:

- (a) Define the OE.
- (b) Describe the impact of the OE.
- (c) Evaluate the adversary(ies) and other relevant actors.
- (d) Determine potential COAs of the adversary(ies) and relevant actors.

(3) Although military defeat of adversaries is almost always a key part of a stabilization effort, it is usually only one component of a more comprehensive approach to affect the decision making and associated behavior of relevant actors that is in line with (or at least not counter to) the joint force's desired end state. Thus, JIPOE for stabilization efforts uses the same four steps of the JIPOE process with a specified focus.

(4) A factor that can be as important as defeating existing adversaries is not creating new ones. Maintaining a good relationship with the civilian population means that any harm that is caused incidentally during military operations should be acknowledged and addressed in a culturally appropriate way. The intervening authority should have established mechanisms to mitigate civilian harm.

For a more detailed discussion on the stabilization efforts considerations for the JIPOE process, see JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment; Appendix A, "Process for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment;" and Appendix B, "Assessment Frameworks and the Assessment Process."

3. Strategic Guidance

The National Security Council assists the President in developing guidance for stability and reconstruction. ICAF provides a framework for USG assessment prior to

stability operations. This assessment can help determine roles, responsibilities, and intergovernmental relationships for all USG department and agencies.

4. Planning Stabilization Efforts

a. Joint force actions to establish stability can be a necessary and complementary effort to defeat our enemies. The goal of operation planning is to develop a comprehensive approach that integrates the capabilities and contributions of many diverse participants toward a common purpose of overcoming the destructive effects of instability and violent conflict and serves as a centerpiece for unity of effort in stabilization efforts. In developing this overarching plan, the JFC and staff employ the same principles of operational design and planning utilized in JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*. Combat and stabilization are neither sequential nor binary alternatives; the JFC must integrate and synchronize stability actions with offensive and defensive actions within each phase of any joint operation. The JFC's visualization of the operation will determine the emphasis to be placed on each type of mission or activity in each phase of the operation.

b. At the start of planning, understanding the situation and task will probably be limited and identifying conditions required for success is likely to be difficult. However, as the operation unfolds and understanding develops, the objectives and conditions required to realize them will be refined through learning, adaptation, and anticipation.

c. Operational Approach

(1) Applying operational art requires a shared understanding of an OE with the problem analyzed through operational design. This understanding enables JFCs to develop an operational approach to guide the force in establishing those conditions for lasting success. Commanders use common doctrinal terms to visualize and describe their operational approach. The operational approach provides a framework that relates tactical tasks to the desired end state. It provides a unifying purpose and focus to all operations.

(2) The operational approach conceptualizes the JFC's visualization for establishing the conditions that define the desired end state. Operations conducted among the people accept military interaction with the local populace as part of the mission. In those operations, the most effective operational approach achieves decisive results through combinations of stability and defeat mechanisms. While the stability mechanisms leverage the constructive capabilities inherent to combat power, the defeat mechanisms allow the commander to focus the coercive capabilities of the force to provide security, public order, and safety for the local populace.

(3) The conditions of an OE ultimately determine the operational approach. During planning, as JFCs and staffs frame the problem, they determine the appropriate combination of stability and defeat mechanisms necessary to resolve the situation. This begins the process that ends with an integrated, synchronized plan for an operation that attains the desired end state. At times, military forces intervene in an unstable situation when violent threats are destabilizing an area. In these cases, military forces may initially use defeat mechanisms to alter conditions sufficiently to protect the civil populace. In a

relatively benign environment where military forces primarily assist or facilitate civil efforts, stability mechanisms dominate.

(4) **Stability and Defeat Mechanisms**

(a) **Stability Mechanisms.** Commanders use stability mechanisms to visualize how to employ the force to conduct stability tasks. A stability mechanism is the primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace. Some of these mechanisms recover quickly from change in terms of conflict transformation, as they can act as mitigators for drivers of conflict. Combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that help shape the human dimension of OEs more effectively and efficiently than a single mechanism applied in isolation. The four stability mechanisms are compel, control, influence, and support.

(b) **Defeat Mechanisms.** Defeat mechanisms primarily apply in combat operations against an active enemy force. A defeat mechanism is a method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition. They are defined in terms of the broad operational and tactical effects they produce, both physical or psychological. Commanders translate these effects into tactical tasks, formulating the most effective method to defeat enemy aims. Physical defeat deprives enemy forces of the ability to achieve those aims; psychological defeat deprives them of the will to do so. Military forces prove most successful when applying deliberate combinations of defeat mechanisms. As with stability mechanisms, this produces complementary and reinforcing effects not attainable with a single mechanism. The four defeat mechanisms are destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, and isolate.

(c) Stability and defeat mechanisms complement planning by providing focus in framing complex problems; they offer the conceptual means to solve them. By combining the mechanisms, commanders can effectively address the human dimension of the problem while acting to reduce the security threat. Therefore, one element of the force can focus on reestablishing security and control while another element can address the immediate humanitarian needs of the populace. These focuses are essential in operations conducted among the people where success is often gauged by the effectiveness of long-term development efforts. Thus, early and deliberate combinations of the stability and defeat mechanisms are vital to success, especially in environments where actors may face active opposition. Combinations of the mechanisms serve to inhibit threats to stability, create an environment that people can live in some sort of normalcy, and set conditions for military forces to appropriately transition stability tasks to other partners, the HN, and or other actors.

d. **Elements of Operational Design in Stabilization**

(1) In applying operational art and operational design during stability operations, JFCs and their staffs use intellectual tools to help them understand an OE as well as visualize and describe their operational approach. The elements of operational design are essential to identifying tasks and objectives that tie stability missions to attaining the

desired end state. They help refine and focus the CONOPS forming the basis for developing a detailed plan or order. During execution, commanders and staffs consider the elements of operational design as they assess the situation. They adjust current and future operations and plans as the operation unfolds.

(2) Commanders perform all stability tasks within the framework of conflict transformation, intended either to address a source of instability or to promote a mitigator of violence. However, even planned stability tasks sometimes result in unintended consequences. During planning, commanders make all efforts to view stability tasks through a culturally focused lens and examine them beyond the first order of effects. Sometimes it is not about action, but the perception of an action. This can strike directly at the legitimacy of the operation, especially within the HN populace. The less outsiders understand the local context, the more unintended consequences are likely to occur. Instead of reducing complexity, aim for understanding and having humility about how little is known about the local context.

(3) Planning for stability in operations draws on all elements of operational design. However, certain elements are more relevant than others are, and some in particular are essential to successful operations characterized by stability tasks.

(4) End State and Conditions

(a) Generally, the end state is a set of desired conditions the commander wants to exist when an operation ends. The end state is an image of an OE consistent with the commander's visualization of the operation. JFCs attain the end state through integrated, collective activities of all the instruments of national power. Ultimately, the end state shapes the operation's character.

(b) Integrating military and nonmilitary capabilities through collaborative planning enables success. These efforts focus on the development of conditions that support a stable, lasting peace.

(c) The JFC and joint force staff should reframe the end state conditions and criteria for termination of military operations as the operation progresses and the OE evolves. At the same time, the JFC must guard against an unintentional expansion of tasks and responsibilities, sometimes referred to as mission creep. Hence, all JFCs continuously monitor operations and assess their progress against MOEs, MOPs, and the end state conditions. These conditions form the basis for decisions that ensure stabilization efforts progress consistently toward the desired end state. Effective stability actions relate back to how they support the commander's objectives in reaching the desired end state.

(d) To attain the desired end state, stability actions capitalize on coordination, cooperation, integration, and synchronization among military and nonmilitary organizations. These civil-military efforts aim to strengthen legitimate governance, restore rule of law, support economic and infrastructure development, reform institutions to achieve sustainable peace and security, foster a sense of national unity, and create the conditions that enable the HN government to reassume civic responsibilities.

(5) Decisive Points

(a) A decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success. Examples include: securing national borders, repairing a vital water treatment facility, obtaining the political support from key tribal leaders for a transitional authority, establishing a training academy for national security forces, securing a major election site, and quantifiably reducing crime.

(b) Commanders identify decisive points that most directly influence end state conditions. Effective decisive points enable JFCs to seize, retain, or exploit the initiative. Controlling them is essential to mission accomplishment. Ceding control of a decisive point may exhaust friendly momentum, force early culmination, or expose the force to undue risk. Decisive points shape the planning of operations and help commanders select clearly decisive, attainable objectives that establish the end state.

(c) Decisive points in stabilization efforts delineate key actions or events required to achieve progress toward increased stability by changing key aspects of the OE. During stabilization efforts, decisive points may be less tangible and more closely associated with important events and conditions, and typically relate to the human dimension of the problem. Examples of decisive points include changes in the disposition of any adversaries or other drivers of violent conflict and establishment of HN capacity in one of the stability functions.

(d) Essential stability tasks can offer an efficient means for commanders to identify those tasks most closely associated with decisive points. Success in stabilization efforts depends on the JFC's ability to identify the tasks essential to mission success and to prioritize and sequence the performance of those tasks with available combat power. These tasks include the essential tasks required to establish the end state conditions that define success. These tasks are linked to the end state through decisive points. Therefore, identifying essential tasks and tying them directly to decisive points and objectives most effectively identifies conditions that define the desired end state. However, commanders should not be limited to the tasks outlined in an essential stabilization framework. These tools, while a starting point, may not fully address the complexities of a given stabilization effort. As a result, commanders should be aware that key tasks may not necessarily be discerned from the stability task matrix and may have to be identified through analysis and understanding of the local situation.

(6) LOEs

(a) A LOE links multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose—cause and effect—to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions. LOEs are essential in stabilization when physical, positional references to an enemy or adversary are less relevant. In these operations, where the human dimension typically becomes the focus of the force, LOEs often work best to link tasks, effects, conditions, and the end state. LOEs are essential to helping JFCs visualize how military capabilities can support the other instruments of national power. They prove particularly valuable where

unity of command is elusive, if not impractical, and when used to achieve unity of effort in operations involving multinational forces and civilian agencies and organizations.

(b) LOEs combine the complementary, long-term effects of stability tasks with the cyclic, short-term events typical of offensive or defensive tasks. Commanders at all levels use LOEs to develop tasks, identify complementary and reinforcing actions, and allocate resources appropriately. Commanders may designate actions on one LOE as the decisive effort and others as shaping efforts.

(c) JFCs synchronize and sequence related actions across multiple LOEs. LOEs are interdependent and often a specific LOE cannot begin until forces meet certain intermediate objectives. Similarly, LOEs do not necessarily progress nor reach their desired end states simultaneously. A full complement of LOEs may also include lines focused on offensive and defensive activities, as well as an LOE that addresses the information element of combat power. Tasks along an information LOE typically produce effects across multiple LOEs.

(d) Together, the stability sectors and the joint stability functions can provide a framework for identifying the stability tasks that exert the greatest influence on an OE. They help to identify the breadth and depth of relevant civil-military tasks and emphasize the relationships among them. The stability sectors form the basis for the collaborative interagency planning that leads to developing LOEs that synchronize the actions of all instruments of national power.

(e) When planning activities, commanders consider the processes the HN had in place before the instability and the sustainability of changes introduced by stabilization activities. As operations progress, JFCs often modify LOEs after assessing conditions and collaborating with partners. LOEs typically remain focused on integrating the capabilities of military operations while other instruments of national power may support a broader, comprehensive approach to operations. Each operation, however, differs. JFCs develop and modify LOEs to keep operations focused on attaining the end state, even as the situation evolves.

(f) Detailed planning requires tying near-term objectives to decisive points along LOEs and closely coordinating with ongoing civilian efforts. The aim is to provide tangible progress consistent with supporting the USG longer-term objectives in the country. Close civilian and military coordination is required to ensure that short-term actions required to provide security do not undermine long-term political and economic development goals.

(g) Experience has shown that cross-cutting, outcome-oriented LOEs require coordinated activity across sectors and functions. LOEs defined around individual sectors or stability functions and assigned to separate functional staff elements may result in dangerous stovepiping and an inability to synchronize.

e. **Window of Opportunity.** At the initial employment of the joint force, following a transition from sustained combat operations, or following a public change in strategy, a limited window of opportunity exists to demonstrate progress in a manner consistent with

the priorities and expectations of the local population. This interlude may provide a period of political will and opportunity for the international community and HN to take actions that address the drivers of conflict and instability. This window of opportunity is an indeterminate but finite period, the length of which will depend on the circumstances.

EXAMPLE OPERATIONAL APPROACHES IN STABILITY OPERATIONS

The following vignettes are designed to illustrate key points related to operational design involving stability operations. These vignettes are illustrative, not comprehensive.

Joint Task Force (JTF) Able is tasked to train military units of Country X-ray in desert military operations. The US military is conducting this mission due to unique expertise in this training. The military end state is the establishment of the capability within Country X-ray forces. Commander, JTF (CJTF) Able, focuses the military objectives wholly toward this end state, and JTF Able will redeploy once the capability has been established.

A devastating earthquake takes place in the mountainous frontier of Country Yoke. The Department of State requests assistance from the Department of Defense. JTF Baker is tasked to support the foreign humanitarian assistance operation in the mountainous frontier of Country Yoke. The US military is able to conduct this mission because it has disaster relief supplies, a deployable logistics coordination capability, and helicopters readily available.

The military end state is described by the arrival of disaster relief supplies, the establishment of logistics coordination body by Country Yoke, and clear roads that will allow a flow of supplies into the mountains. CJTF Baker establishes the following lines of effort: support the United States Agency for International Development as it assists Country Yoke in establishing a disaster relief coordination center; conduct immediate humanitarian assistance in the affected area; and clear roads into the region to allow the passage of supplies. Once intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have facilitated the arrival of disaster relief supplies, Country Yoke has established a coordination center, and the roads are clear to permit the flow of supplies, JTF Baker will redeploy. Note that although JTF Baker focused on providing appropriate humanitarian assistance to disaster victims, the completion of this relief did not describe the end state, and indeed, relief efforts may be ongoing even as JTF Baker redeploy.

JTF Charlie is deployed to Country Zebra conducting a counterinsurgency campaign to try to bolster the newly installed Zebra government. The US military is conducting the mission because Country Zebra security forces are not capable of securing the population against ongoing insurgent attacks; additionally the US military is conducting stability operations because the operational environment is too dangerous for many IGOs and NGOs to conduct stabilization efforts. The military end state is the combination of capable Zebra security forces and declining insurgent forces such that Zebra forces can provide civil security and an operational environment that will permit civilian conduct of comprehensive stabilization efforts.

CJTF Charlie establishes the following lines of effort: conduct operations to secure the population; conduct offensive operations against insurgent groups; conduct stability operations to help normalize this fragile state; assist in efforts to achieve a political settlement; and build Zebra security force capacity. Once Zebra forces are capable of securing the population and personnel of civilian nation building institutions and conducting sustained operations against the insurgency, JTF Charlie will redeploy. Note that although the defeat of the insurgency did not describe the end state, military objectives designed to defeat the insurgency were a key part of JTF Charlie's operation, and the achievement of a political settlement among competing elites remains a primary objective of the overall US effort.

Various Sources

(1) Plans and CONOPS should address this period early and in depth. Failure to act during this period will result in a loss of operational momentum. Regaining the initiative after this period has passed is not impossible, but it is more difficult.

(2) Tasks during this period must ensure security while laying the foundation for the stability activities that will follow. The specific requirements will vary according to the circumstances, but consideration should be given to the following:

(a) Physically securing the population, critical infrastructure, and facilities for essential services. Based upon threat, establish population control measures, especially at the borders, to protect and defend the population and detect and reduce the effectiveness of enemy agents. Population control measures include curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, identification and registration cards, collection of biometric information, and voluntary resettlement.

(b) Providing humanitarian assistance to the population. This includes assisting DCs (e.g., refugees or IDPs).

(c) Executing QIPs that are verified by CA forces at the tactical level with minimum delay by a streamlined funding process to reestablish essential services and critical infrastructure.

(d) Establishing governance, possibly including transitional governance, to immediately establish the rule of law and the provision of essential services.

(3) By nature, achievement of transformation will occur over the longer-term, and attention to transformation activities and activities that foster sustainability competes intensely with the short-term action requirements during this initial period. The JFC, together with the COM and other civilian counterparts, must determine what critical immediate tasks of these longer-term programs must be taken, commit the resources, and begin implementation immediately.

(4) **Phasing in Major Operations and Campaigns.** Although JFCs determine the number, names, and actions of the phases, use of the operational phasing model

provides a flexible model to arrange smaller, related operations. In the model from JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, major operations and campaigns are arranged in six phases: shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority. During major operations and campaigns, stability actions are particularly emphasized in the stabilize and enable civil authority phases; however, major operation and campaign plans must feature an appropriate balance between offensive, defensive, and stability actions in all phases. Most importantly, planning for stabilization efforts should begin when joint operation planning is initiated.

(a) **Shape.** Activities in the shape phase primarily focus on continued planning and preparation for anticipated stability actions in the subsequent phases. These activities should include conducting collaborative interagency planning to synchronize the civil-military effort, confirming the feasibility of pertinent military objectives and the military end state, and providing for adequate intelligence, an appropriate force mix, and other capabilities. Stability actions in this phase may be required to quickly restore civil security and infrastructure or provide humanitarian relief in select portions of the operational area to dissuade further adversary actions or to help ensure access and future success. Additional activities that may be part of the shape phase are building HN capacity and support to SC.

(b) **Deter.** The deter phase is characterized by preparatory actions that indicate the intent to execute subsequent phases of the operation. Many actions in the deter phase build on activities from the previous phase, and are conducted as part of SC activities. They can also be part of stand-alone operations. Joint force planning and operations conducted prior to commencement of hostilities should establish a sound foundation for operations in subsequent phases.

(c) **Seize the Initiative.** The onset of combat provides an opportunity to set into motion actions that will achieve military strategic and operational objectives and establish the conditions for operations at the conclusion of sustained combat. Operations to neutralize or eliminate potential enemies may be initiated. National and local HN authorities may be contacted and offered support. Key infrastructure may be seized or otherwise protected. Information collection on the status of enemy infrastructure, government organizations, and humanitarian needs should be increased. IRCs, coordinated by IO used to influence target audiences can ease the situation encountered when sustained combat is concluded. IO can enhance initiative in multiple ways: it can adversely affect threat decision making in ways that favor the JFC; it can protect JFC decision making; it can influence target audiences to support the JFC, during combat and post-combat; and it can facilitate the transition from offensive actions to stability actions, such that the onset of stabilization efforts is viewed favorably in the minds of relevant audiences.

(d) **Dominate**

1. As the joint force begins to dominate the OE and achieves combat objectives, stability operations will begin to transition from planning and preparation to execution. Civil-military teams, such as PRTs or field advance civilian teams, supported by joint forces, will begin to enter the operational area if they have not done so already. Even

while sustained combat operations are ongoing, there will be a need to establish or restore civil security and provide humanitarian relief as the joint force occupies or bypasses succeeding areas.

2. The transition from the dominate phase to the stabilize phase must be carefully planned and executed. Joint force planning and operations conducted prior to commencement of hostilities should establish a sound foundation for operations in the stabilize and enable civil authority phases. The operational momentum created by seizing the initiative and dominating the OE through combat may be lost if this transition is poorly handled. JFCs should anticipate and address how to fill the power vacuum created when sustained combat operations wind down. Military units conducting combat operations in the dominate phase should have specific follow-on assignments in the stabilize phase that allow for a straightforward transition rather than a complex rearrangement of military and civilian forces. Accomplishing this task should ease the transition to operations in the stabilize phase and shorten the path to the national strategic end state and handover to another authority.

(e) **Stabilize.** As sustained combat concludes, military forces may begin to shift their focus to stabilization efforts. Of particular importance will be CMO; initially conducted to secure and safeguard the populace, reestablish civilian law and order, protect or rebuild key infrastructure, and restore public services. US military forces should be prepared to lead the activities necessary to accomplish these tasks when indigenous civil, USG, multinational, or international capacity does not exist or is incapable of assuming responsibility. Once legitimate civil authority is prepared to conduct such tasks, US military forces may support such activities as required/necessary.

1. The military's dominant presence and its ability to C2 forces and provide logistics under extreme conditions may initially give it the de facto lead in stabilization efforts normally conducted by other agencies that lack such capacities. However, most stabilization efforts will likely transition to support of US diplomatic, UN, or HN efforts. Integrated civilian and military efforts are essential to success, and military forces need to work competently in this environment while properly supporting the agency in charge. Military forces should be prepared to work in integrated civilian military teams that could include representatives from other USG departments and agencies, foreign governments and security forces, international organizations, NGOs, and members of the private sector with relevant skills and expertise.

2. During stability actions in the stabilize phase, protection from virtually any person, element, or group hostile to US interests must be considered. These could include violent activists or instigators of mob violence, a group opposed to the operation, criminals, warlords, private militias, and terrorists. JFCs also should be constantly ready to counter activity that could bring significant harm to friendly forces and organizations or jeopardize mission accomplishment. If authorized by higher authority, protection may involve the protection of HN authorities, civilian members of the USG, civilian contractors, or other interorganizational stakeholders.

(f) **Enable Civil Authority.** In this phase, the joint operation normally is terminated when the stated military strategic and operational objectives have been met and

redeployment of the joint force is accomplished. This should mean that a legitimate civil authority has been enabled to manage the situation without further outside military assistance. In some cases, it may become apparent that the stated objectives fall short of properly enabling civil authority. This situation may require adapting the joint operation as a result of an extension of the required stabilization efforts in support of US diplomatic, HN, international organization, or NGO efforts.

For further details on phasing during major operations and campaigns, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

f. **Force Planning.** Force planning encompasses all those activities performed by the supported CCDR, subordinate component commanders, and support agencies to select, prepare, integrate, and deploy the forces and capabilities required to accomplish an assigned mission. The size and composition of the force will depend on the mission, the OE, and the JFC's CONOPS. However, since stability actions occur primarily in the land domain, joint land forces (to include SOF) will normally provide the majority of the force required supported by joint air, maritime, and space forces.

For further details on joint land operations, refer to JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations.

(1) **Size of the Force.** Stability actions normally require significant forces, particularly when operating in a hostile or uncertain environment. There is no standard template for force level requirements for stability actions; the exact ratio required will depend on a number of variables, most particularly the level of violence. Generating and maintaining these force levels will be a challenge for any intervention force, so a plan to develop and integrate an effective and sustainable indigenous security capability is fundamental to success.

(2) **Integration of Conventional and Special Operations Forces.** Success is achieved when operations are planned to optimize the unique capabilities of SOF in conjunction (integrated whenever possible) with conventional forces. The selection of the appropriate ratio of SOF and conventional forces must be a deliberate decision based on

HISTORICAL FORCE RATIOS IN STABILIZATION EFFORTS

As a planning yard-stick, the number of security force personnel per 1000 head of population (expressed as a force ratio) can be a useful mechanism to indicate the mass required. Although numbers alone do not constitute a security strategy, successful strategies for population security and control have required force ratios either as large as or larger than 20 security personnel (troops and police combined) per thousand inhabitants. This figure is roughly 10 times the ratio required for simple policing of a tranquil population. Peaceful populations require force ratios of somewhere between one and four police officers per thousand residents. Recent experience has indicated an approximate benchmark of 20-25 security force personnel per thousand civilians. Where the security environment is particularly hostile, this number may be significantly higher.

For example:

- **The US as a whole has about 2.3 sworn police officers per thousand residents. Larger cities tend to have higher ratios of police to population.**
- **To maintain stability in Northern Ireland in the 1970s, the British deployed a security force (army troops plus police) at a ratio of 23 per thousand inhabitants. This is about the same force ratio that the British deployed during the Malayan counterinsurgency in the middle of the 20th century. In its initial entry into Bosnia in 1995, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Implementation Force brought in multinational forces corresponding to 23 soldiers per thousand inhabitants. After five years, the successor stabilization force finally fell below 10 per thousand.**
- **In the 2008 operations against the Tamil Tigers, force ratios were as high as 60 per thousand.**

SOURCES: Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations, James T. Quinlivan, RAND Review, Summer 2003, and Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40 (United Kingdom), Security and Stabilization: The Military Contribution

thorough mission analysis and a pairing of available capabilities to requirements. The most important factor informing this decision is the capability and expertise required rather than the size of the force required. SOF capabilities (e.g., language, cultural awareness, regional focus) are an important consideration when choosing forces to conduct stability actions. Additionally, SOF's ability to operate with little external support makes them adept at initiating programs with indigenous forces. Due to their specialized training, CA and military information support operations, personnel and units, both SOF and conventional forces play a key role in stabilization efforts.

5. Integrated Planning

a. Established policy and procedures are designed to support the military chain of command while engendering comprehensive, cooperative planning between military and civilian departments and agencies of the USG to implement stability policy and direction. Interagency planning should be an iterative process that synchronizes diplomatic, development, and defense implementation planning and tasks with a view to developing unified action to achieve overall stability goals. Whenever possible, the wider international community, including the HN and other multinational partners, should be incorporated into this integrated planning process.

b. There is no single process model that describes integrated planning between military and civilian departments and agencies of the USG. Whether or not a model is activated for integrated planning, JFCs should work closely with COMs and other civilian counterparts to establish appropriate structures and processes that will facilitate a shared understanding, interagency planning, and coordinated execution and assessment. The importance of

personal relationships between military commanders and civilian leaders cannot be overemphasized. Absent formal interagency mechanisms and given the myriad of cultural, funding, C2, and other issues that will arise among partners, these personal relationships are essential to melding a cohesive comprehensive approach to stabilization efforts.

c. Interagency operation planning takes place over three general phases: initial interagency planning; reassessment and revision of plans; and transition planning, which includes planning for ongoing operations and for when authorities are passed from one entity to another. This process should identify additional planning requirements, potential impediments, and assumptions regarding the environment. It should establish a timeline for implementation, priority tasks, lead and supporting USG departments and agencies, authorities, and cross-sector linkages and sequencing. This continuous planning process should provide a mechanism to communicate feedback, raise resource and logistic requirements, conduct monitoring and evaluation, and ensure the flexibility of USG activities.

d. It is important that any integrated plan does not become simply an inventory of activities that is implemented in a mechanical fashion, but that it focuses on success. Destabilizing actors may be motivated by ideology, grievance, or greed; the specific motivation, strategy, and tactics employed must be well understood even as they change and evolve. Operational leaders need to take adequate time to reanalyze the overall problem to assure that the integrated plan addresses the essential factors needed to mitigate the destabilizing influences.

e. Flexibility is a vital aspect of the reassessment and revision process. Different agencies and implementing units have differing reporting processes and schedules. Moreover, progress indicators will require varying timeframes for the collection and analysis of data. Noting these challenges, however, does not obviate the need to ensure that the activities and events taking place in the field (whether that is in the host capital, a province within the HN, or in the meeting chambers of our international and bilateral partners) and significant changes in assumptions underlying US plans are reflected in the integrated plan.

f. Building unity of effort is an inherent part of the joint planning process, especially when more than one USG department or agency is involved. Considerations for building unity of effort begin early in the planning process by increasing shared understanding and participation in a collaborative planning process. The collaborative planning is particularly suited to campaign planning, especially for operations such as COIN, FHA, and other operations focused on stability activities and tasks. A collaborative planning process allows solutions to problems requiring a coordinated intragovernmental effort and unity of effort in the pursuit of national objectives. It also improves the understanding of interagency interrelationships for a given operational area based on roles, responsibilities, and authorities.

For further details, refer to the Joint Staff J-7's Unity of Effort Framework Solutions Guide and Unity of Effort Framework Quick Reference in the Joint Electronic Library at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/jwfc_pam.htm.

6. Special Considerations

a. CMO

(1) CMO are the activities of a commander performed by designated CA or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions, by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or HN. At the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare, and during all military operations, CMO are essential to the integration of military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability, COIN, and other activities and operations dealing with asymmetric and irregular threats. CMO involve the interaction of military forces with the civilian populace to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Although some CMO may directly support combat actions, such as controlling vehicular traffic during urban operations, many of the missions, activities, and tasks associated with stabilization efforts are the essence of CMO. Essentially, CMO are how the JFC forges relationships with the local population and civilian leadership and performs civilian-related tasks. As such, planning and organizing for stabilization efforts requires a CMO-centric approach.

(2) Initial CMO during stabilization efforts will likely secure and safeguard the populace, reestablish civil law and order, protect and repair critical infrastructure, and restore public services. US military forces should be prepared to accomplish these tasks when indigenous civil, USG, multinational, or international capacity cannot. US military forces may also support legitimate civil authority and USG involvement will likely be conducted in coordination with and in support of HN authorities, other USG departments and agencies, international organizations and NGOs. Through establishing and maintaining communication with diverse stakeholders, CMO is one of the best ways to unify military and public-private partnerships and best practices in order to improve the HN's internal security and promote stability in the operational area.

(3) CMO cannot be separated or stovepiped from common staff functions, processes, and procedures. A CMO staff element (cell, branch, or directorate) and appropriate employment of CA forces provide connectivity and understanding that enable unity of effort within the headquarters (HQ) and among CMO stakeholders. Other enabling capabilities such as SOF, military information support operations, engineers, health services, transportation, military police, and security forces provide the diverse means necessary to execute CMO-related tasks.

(4) CA forces enhance the joint forces' ability to execute stability activities by providing military commanders knowledge and analytical and operational capabilities for CMO-related decisions and actions that promote achievement of military objectives and facilitate transition to civil authorities. In stabilization efforts, the military usually has a supporting relationship to HN civil authority. CA forces provide unique knowledge and perspective to commanders about the civil environment and through military engagement with the civilian population and governing authority, support military objectives that influence environmental change and enhance other instruments of national power.

(5) In most scenarios, joint task forces (JTFs) will conduct stability actions. The planning and execution of these actions are fully integrated with the planning and execution of offensive and defensive actions, and should not be separated into a separate staff directorate. Joint force planners should consider CMO in all phases. When the scope of the mission is almost completely focused on stabilization, with little or no combat mission, a JFC may establish a joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF) to accomplish that mission. A JCMOTF is a US joint force organization, similar in organization to a JTF, and is flexible in size and composition, depending on mission circumstances. It is normally subordinate to a JTF.

For further details on CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

b. **C2.** Traditional military C2 does not apply to relationships with civilian departments and agencies. The JFC must be able to effectively coordinate and, when appropriate, integrate efforts between the joint force and interorganizational partners. This capability also requires the JFC to manage and make available relevant, accurate information to appropriate stakeholders. Inherent in this capability must be the ability to secure and defend information systems by ensuring their integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. A holistic approach to stabilization requires communications and understanding among the various centers, commissions, staffs, augmentations, field offices, and agencies. Complicating these efforts are varying national perspectives regarding the mandate and the resulting mission interpretation. The military must understand all of these positions and maintain communications with stakeholders to resolve issues as they arise.

(1) **Leadership and Authority.** Each USG department and agency has different authorities, which govern the operation of the department or agency and determine the use of its resources. These authorities derive from several sources: the Constitution, their federal charter, presidential directives, congressional mandates, and strategic direction. It is important that early in stabilization planning, the definition of these authorities be clearly understood and documented. Of note, international organization authorities are based on their formal agreement among member governments. NGOs are independent of national governments and international organizations; each has its own unique and individual governance system.

(2) **CCS**

(a) Strategic guidance and CCS is crucial to success in stabilization efforts. The commander's narrative during an operation must support the enduring USG message with context, reason/motive, and goal/end state. When actions are conducted in areas with significant adversary or belligerent activity, there can be a continuing clash between the competing narratives of the protagonists. This is often what is referred to as the battle of the narratives. Losing this battle can translate to strategic failure of the operation.

(b) The CCS should take cultural sensitivities and perceptions into account. To facilitate this effort, education and training of joint forces should include appropriate

linguistic, historical, and cultural elements. Additionally, predeployment exercises and rehearsals should evaluate these skill sets.

(c) Throughout the operation, supporting military capabilities should be continually coordinated and synchronized, both horizontally and vertically. The CCS supports the broader interagency communications effort and closely coordinate support from other agencies and organizations. The CCS is commander-driven, proactive, and synchronized with respect to all themes, messages, images, and actions.

For further details on CCS, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs, and JP 3-13, Information Operations.

(3) **Staff Organization Considerations.** Key staff organization considerations for stabilization efforts should ensure functions are fully integrated with the commanders' decision-making process.

(a) The operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) is responsible for the direction of current and future integrated plans developed by a plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5). Combat and stability actions are planned and directed in concert. Cross-functional alignment with key staff functions such as CMO, engineer, surgeon, SJA, and comptroller is essential.

(b) The nominations of programs, projects, missions, tasks, and activities that make up stabilization efforts are normally scrutinized for prioritization and approval by a decision board based on the commanders' priorities, available resources, and staff recommendations. HN input helps determine which projects are nominated and in what order of prioritization. CMO-related projects normally require operational-level approval under the following conditions: of significant expense, based on stakeholders inability to complete (due to threat level), when resources are limited, or when projects are directly tied to a COA. Staff interdependence enriches the project review process. In addition to the standard roles of the J-2 [intelligence directorate of a joint staff], J-3, J-4 [logistics directorate of a joint staff], J-5, and J-6 [communications system directorate of a joint staff] in cross-directorate processes, the civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff (J-9) (if established and usually responsible for interagency coordination), the comptroller, and the SJA have specific roles in the approval process for stability programs, projects, missions, tasks, and activities. Other staff elements, such as the engineer and the surgeon, may also have important roles depending on the nature of the proposed activities.

1. The J-9 makes project recommendations and validates nominated projects based on its analysis of the civil component of the OE.

2. The comptroller identifies available funding programs, accounts for their expenditure, and fulfills budgeting requirements. Finance units will conduct disbursement actions, and acquisition commands will conduct contracting operations to the joint force.

3. The SJA conducts legal reviews of funding caveats.

4. The engineering staff element plays an important role when construction and project management capabilities are required, particularly when timelines, resources, construction standards, and task assessments should be applied.

For further details on engineer staff element support, refer to JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.

5. The surgeon and other staff elements with functional expertise should be a part of the process.

6. Once project nominations are fully staffed, the appropriate staff director chairs the decision board for the chief of staff, deputy commander, or commander, depending upon approval levels and authority mandated within the various funding programs used.

(c) Consideration should also be given to staff interaction with civilian organizations. Options range from exchange of LNOs between JTFs and civilian agencies to fully integrated staffs. At a minimum, the JFC should include civilian agencies in key battle rhythm events such as boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups to enhance staff integration.

(d) Consideration should be given to augmenting the JFC's staff with a foreign policy advisor (POLAD) from DOS or a development advisor from USAID. POLADs are members of the commander's staff and perform advisory functions. They can facilitate communication with DOS and the rest of the civilian interagency, but they are not LNOs.

(e) Consideration should be given to highlighting the J-9's expanded role in supporting the overall staff's functions during stabilization efforts.

1. The J-9 should develop the analysis of the civil environment serving the informational needs of other staff elements. They should produce CMO staff estimates that enrich other staff planning and assessment products and that can best be integrated into the overall operation.

2. The J-9 should provide civil-related expertise and continuous presence to the future operations and future plans event horizons.

3. The J-9 should facilitate interactions with non-DOD stakeholders in planning and execution. The J-9 facilitates cooperation and assists in developing terms of reference for mutually supportive relationships.

4. The J-9 staff should communicate cross functionally throughout the decision cycle and enable collaboration with stakeholder counterparts, higher HQ staff who are involved in interagency coordination, and subordinate unit CMO staffs when appropriate. To enable this, the J-9 staff requires codified coordinating authority with each level of command and with each stakeholder establishing a clear understanding of representation, authority for the collective sharing and reporting of civil information, and

policy for access to HQ processes and procedures. The J-9 staff should be aware that interorganizational partners may operate at the tactical and strategic levels but often do not have representation at the operational level. This may require the J-9 to create mechanisms or processes to fill this void in order to facilitate coordination at that level. The alternative is to leverage partner capabilities at the strategic level as well as accessing mechanisms at the tactical level.

For further details on staff HQ organization, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

c. Protection

(1) Protection is a joint function which is fundamental in stabilization efforts. The ability to provide physical security to the population and those conducting stability activities is often a primary reason for US Armed Forces involvement in stabilization efforts. The protection function during stabilization efforts emphasizes force protection, force health protection (FHP), and civil security. The context of the operation will dictate the intensity of protection requirements during stabilization efforts. Protection requirements should be balanced with the military operation's nature and objectives. In some stability operations, the use of certain security measures, such as carrying arms, wearing helmets and protective vests, or using secure communications, may cause military forces to appear more threatening than intended, which may degrade the force's legitimacy and hurt relations with the local population.

(2) **Force Protection.** Even in a permissive environment, the joint force can expect to encounter banditry, vandalism, and various levels of violent activities from criminals or unruly crowds. It is imperative that the joint force be trained and equipped to mitigate threats to US personnel, resources, facilities, and critical information. All deploying members should be provided with threat and force protection briefings prior to and throughout the duration of the operation. Depending upon the mission, the OE, and directives from higher level commanders, force protection may also extend beyond the joint force to encompass protection of civilian personnel and systems from the USG, the HN and other partner nation governments, international organizations, and NGOs. Particularly in hostile OEs, protection of civilians participating in stabilization efforts may be vital to their continued presence in the operational area. However, due to organizational mandates, some NGOs may refuse the protection offered by military forces to not compromise their reliance on the humanitarian principles of independence, impartiality, and neutrality. The extent to which joint forces can protect civilian partners should be addressed in the ROE.

(3) **FHP.** Public health threats do not discriminate between individuals. When planning for and conducting stabilization efforts, JFCs should consider the factors that threaten the health of the indigenous population, multinational forces, USG employees, contractors and, as appropriate, international organizations and NGOs. Personnel likely to serve in areas where stabilization efforts are conducted may enter with very little, if any, natural immunity to endemic diseases. The degree of cultural and social interaction required to support the mission, as well as the sharing of food, quarters, and recreational

facilities with local nationals, may increase the exposure of personnel to diseases endemic to the HN. Stability operations may last for extended periods of time (months or years, not days or weeks), increasing the risk of contracting endemic disease. The enforcement of proper FHP measures will help minimize the risk to personnel.

For further guidance on FHP, refer to JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.

(4) **Civil Security.** By protecting the population in fragile states, intervening forces and their interagency partners enable daily life to continue. This, in turn, helps stimulate economic activity and supports longer-term development and governance reform. Importantly, it generates confidence in local people in their security situation and an economic interest in ongoing stability, and denies adversarial groups one of their principal strategies for expanding their support base.

d. Sustainment

(1) Stabilization efforts are often logistics and engineering intensive. Therefore, the overall logistic concept should be closely tied into the operational plan and be mutually supporting. Planning also should consider the potential requirements to provide support to nonmilitary personnel (e.g., USG departments and agencies, NGOs, international organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector).

(2) Cultural and religious considerations are particularly important for logistic planners supporting stability actions. Inappropriate foods, materials, and methods will not only prolong the requirement to provide assistance and increase cost and risk, but may also have a dramatic negative impact on the local population's perceptions of the joint force and the stabilization efforts at large. Additionally, local hires and contractors may need to be divided between multiple population groups (i.e., religious sects, nationalities, or tribes) to demonstrate impartiality.

(3) Operational contract support and the various means of contracting can have a positive (and sometimes negative) effect on the civil-military aspects of the overall operation or campaign. Since the majority of contracts are awarded to local vendors, these actions can have a positive second and third order effects by providing employment opportunities to indigenous personnel, promoting goodwill with the local populace and improving the local economic base.

(a) In some operations, there may be a high degree of local unemployment that can lead to local unrest and cause local nationals to support an insurgency simply for monetary compensation. Maximizing local hires through theater or external support contracting can help alleviate this situation. However, consideration should be given to mitigating possible inflationary effects of local hiring and unintended adverse consequences, such as reduction in the number of qualified personnel to serve in HN institutions, due to variations in levels of compensation. US forces must carefully determine appropriate labor rates, so as to not set a rate that would promote nepotism or that is unsustainable after US forces leave the region. In addition, US forces must carefully determine the ethnic makeup of their local workforce and use labor from within villages

and districts rather than from provinces or other urban areas, especially if they are different from where the actual work is being conducted.

(b) During operations, commanders must vet contractors that are being considered for contracted support. This vetting includes: vetting from an enemy perspective and vetting from a business perspective. Proper vetting of HN personnel in management positions of the contract can help alleviate corruption.

(c) Integrating the operational contract support into a joint operation is especially important where there are significant contracted support requirements needed to support shortfalls in joint operational capabilities as well as reconstruction requirements.

(d) HN support, like contracted support, can be a significant force multiplier. Whenever possible, available and suitable HN support should be considered as an alternative to deploying logistic support from other locations outside of the operational area. HN support can dramatically increase the timeliness of response to a developing situation and reduce the strategic airlift and sealift requirements necessary to deploy forces to the operational area. HN support, unlike contracted support, is not binding. Situations change that may require the HN to have to use the support promised to the joint force for themselves. As such, because there is no contract obligating the HN to fully support their commitments there is risk to the use of HN support.

For further detail on theater and external support contracting and HN support, refer to JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations; JP 4-0, Joint Logistics; and JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.

e. Women in Conflict Resolution

(1) Conflict can disrupt gender roles often on the basis that the majority of women are not involved in major conflicting parties and are therefore left to take on male-associated roles as men engage in conflict. Even when women have a role in major conflicting parties, their involvement in peace processes is often neglected. Women can:

- (a) Become the local decision makers expected to rebuild homes.
- (b) Take on the roles of community leaders and heads of households.
- (c) Care for orphans and survivors.
- (d) Take on predominantly male roles.

(2) Incorporating women into the peacebuilding process can build on societal changes that may be occurring naturally, as a result of the cultural turmoil that ensues from conflict. Ignoring the experiences of women risks overlooking their legitimate needs and concerns in new institutions and settlements. The JFC should support local women's peace initiatives and local processes to ensure women's perspectives are recognized as part of an inclusive response to conflict resolution.

7. Assessment of Stabilization Efforts

a. Assessment of stabilization efforts is a key component of the commander's decision-making cycle. It helps the JFC determine changes within the OE, as well as, results of tactical, operational, and strategic actions, in the context of overall mission objectives. During the planning and execution process, the assessment informs the commander's decisions to employ limited resources to attain defined military end states. The decision to adapt plans or shift resources is based upon the assessment of the joint force's ability to conduct operations in pursuit of the end state. However, the complex, dynamic, and uncertain nature of stabilization efforts mean that some end state conditions may be ill-defined or change while the operation progresses.

b. The operation assessment helps answer the question: what is the current OE status in relation to the JFC's established stability objectives? Operation assessment for stabilization efforts uses subjective and objective analysis to determine the status of relevant factors within the OE. By developing a clear understanding of the current state of these relevant factors, a determination can be made about progress (or regression) toward the desired end state.

For more information, see JDN 1-14, Operational Assessment, and JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

8. Planning Transitions and Transferring Authorities

a. Incorporating transitions and transfers of authority is inherent in planning for stabilization efforts and stability actions in other joint operations. Successful transition planning creates the conditions for the successful transfer of authority to non-DOD agencies, non-USG entities, or the HN to preserve the gains made through more traditional military activities. The joint force focuses primarily on the transition of security functions from US and multinational forces to non-DOD agencies and the HN, but in a large footprint operation, especially following major combat operations, the joint force may have to plan for the transition of non-security functions as well. The military will also focus on laying the groundwork for robust SC activities working with DOS and other US and international partners, recognizing the special circumstances and requirements of an uncertain or hostile environment.

b. Transition is both a strategic and operational process. While the transition of security responsibility and associated SC activities from the JFC and subordinate commanders to the HN military and/or internal security commanders takes place at the operational and tactical levels, the re- assumption of responsible sovereignty for the legitimate use of force by the post-intervention state is a strategic-level process. Successful transition hinges on determining what the US future relationship with the HN will look like based on shared interests; security and acquisition agreements, authorities, resources and forces at the time of redeployment; and the capacity of its security forces to provide for the HN's internal and external security.

c. Transitions in stabilization efforts have political and functional components. The job of the planner is to understand all aspects of the transition so that the functional

activities support the strategic goals of the operation toward the end state, and to develop the functional plan to implement the necessary activities.

(1) **Governing Authority Role.** The transition of the governing authority is the handoff of authority and responsibility from the intervention force to civilian authority. This most often occurs at the HN national strategic level, and it is the area where the operational planners have the least influence. However, the goals established at this level determine the activities needed to bring it about, making this critical to structuring the transition portion of the operation or campaign. For planners, articulation of the goals at this level can be nebulous, and the goals can change over time. Goals may include acceptance of de facto spheres of influence over certain regions by certain groups, and consideration of how the needs of those various groups will be met.

(2) **Functional.** Functional plans can be divided into security force-specific and non-security force-specific areas—those activities that strengthen the security sector, such as governance, development, and infrastructure. Transition planning does not end with security forces. Transition planners must consider the continuation of essential military support to various programs (e.g., governance and development) that are assessed to be necessary to enable the security transition to succeed. This support should contribute to the attainment of the political transition.

d. In major operations, planning for phases I through III and into IV produces important aspects of a plan to achieve the JFC's military objectives. In addition, planning the transition from phases IV to V to then back to phase 0 is not possible without planners reaching 'up and out' to the strategic-political level and horizontally to the interagency, multinational, and HN participants enabling civil authorities and shaping the new normal state. The success of transitions directly depends upon understanding the goals of any intervention, and of the changes to those goals that occurred during military operations. To succeed, transition planning should begin with operation planning. Planning for the employment or redeployment of forces must be integrated with strategic planning for the re-assumption of responsible sovereignty and authority by the post-intervention host government or other legitimate authority.

e. Commanders must remember that the HN's government is also in transition, and the strategic aims of the HN and the US may not always overlap. This can lead to a fluid situation based on rapidly changing diplomatic/political considerations and conditions. Commanders and planners should make careful assessments of the HN political environment, and the effects that the military instrument of power will have on the future environment, before major transition activities are initiated. Planners maintain flexibility to meet any changing guidance.

f. Commanders and planners should not count on non-DOD USG departments and agencies to provide the majority of support during the transition from phase IV to phase V and beyond. Most non-DOD departments and agencies are not resourced to contribute the necessary amount of time, funding, and personnel. Non-DOD agencies often rely on DOD for logistics, communications, security, transportation, and other essential services in the aftermath of combat operations or other destabilizing incidents. As such, DOD planners

should assume that DOD will continue to contribute the vast preponderance of resources after the lead for the operation transitions from DOD to another agency (usually DOS). The move from a supported department (executing military operations under Title 10, USC, authority) to a supporting department (conducting SC or other foreign assistance under Title 22, USC, authority) does not eliminate the need to provide adequate support for the overall US effort.

g. Transition planners must be familiar with the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process. One of the most critical transition tasks is meeting lead time requirements in planning for funding and authorities beyond the budget and program years. Long lead times (2-3 years) necessary to influence budget decisions are inherent in USG funding cycles. Joint urgent operational needs statements may fill some of these requirements, but joint urgent operational need resources are often short-term and may not meet enduring requirements for staff and materiel. Transition of security programs is not necessarily restricted to national or regional governments. In some instances, tribal or informal organizations may take responsibility for providing security for their people. However, any outreach to informal or subnational organizations should be closely coordinated with the country team and DOS.

h. Transition of non-DOD activities and transfer of authorities during military engagement activities. The primary goal of transitioning tasks from existing mechanisms to or from DOD is to ensure strategic and regional goals are met despite changing authorities or demands in the OE. Security assistance activities are normally funded by DOS in accordance with applicable laws. DOD also conducts Title 10, USC, activities such as exercises to further the SC goals. Should the need arise for DOD to execute activities outside of Title 10, USC, authorities, the appropriate department (usually the DOS but could also be DOJ/Drug Enforcement Administration for counternarcotics or other USG departments and agencies) will fund the activity, and DOD will operate under that authority. In some instances such as training HN ministry of interior or police forces, DOD may need specific congressional authorization to accomplish the task.

i. Transition of non-DOD activities and transfer of authorities to DOD in crisis response or conflict.

(1) The primary goal of transitioning security assistance activities and effects to those that support combat or crisis operations is a gain in speed and flexibility. Some aspect of the peacetime acquisition and funding process may not be well suited to crisis or combat operations. Special authorities and processes are often put in place to support rapid transfer of typical SC activities to a crisis footing. Commanders and planners should be aware of these tools, and develop contingency plans that incorporate these tools.

(2) All of the security assistance programs administered by DSCA as SC activities require the consent of DOS. These are examples only, and the list is by no means all-inclusive:

(a) Foreign military sales (FMS) material requirements may be met in the short term by using leases, drawdown authority, excess defense articles (EDA), and third-country transfers.

(b) Support for CT, stability, and maritime security operations can be gained by increasing the priority of the affected country for global train and equip (otherwise known as Section 2282) funding.

(c) The Global Security Contingency Fund (Section 1207) is designed to support a country's military and other security forces that conduct border, maritime, and internal defense as well as CT operations.

(d) Section 1208 authorizes funds to support foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals that support or facilitate ongoing US special operations.

j. Transition of non-DOD activities and authorities to DOS or other lead federal agencies and non-DOD agencies in post conflict.

(1) Post-conflict transitions begin during the stabilize phase (phase IV) and continue through the end of phase V to the new phase 0 relationship with the HN. Moving from phase IV to phase V requires an acknowledgment of the completion of major military goals and of the increase in the role of civilian organizations, and a realization that US military authority will gradually diminish as the transition progresses. The transition between the end of stabilization and the beginning of a return of authority to the HN must be carefully considered and executed. There are few clear lines of demarcation in such a transition; progress in one area may well be offset by backsliding in another. Commanders must ensure operational plans are effectively communicated to the tactical level, just as in phases I through IV.

(2) The transition from phase V to phase 0 operations centers on the shift to a partnership with the HN, a creation of the appropriate force posture, agreements, goals, and relationships for a permanent relationship. The move from phase V to phase 0 ends US control of HN actions and resources. A paradigm shift is necessary for phase V and phase 0 planning: transitions do not entail military activities to accomplish military objectives, but rather the use of military assets in some nonmilitary activities to accomplish diplomatic/political goals. Transition planning is the link between military operations and accomplishing national strategic objectives.

(3) Many of the stability transitions cut across the political and functional areas. Planners should not consider these duties in isolation, but be consistently cognizant of the possible effects their actions can have across both areas. This requires insight into the cultures of the HN, support from intelligence sources, collaboration with interorganizational stakeholders, and a thorough understanding of the desired political outcomes of the transition.

(4) Ideally, US military operations, activities, events, and investments are to be prioritized, aligned, and integrated with US diplomatic and developmental actions at the country level to achieve unity of effort and husband scarce resources. While the JFC can

exercise command authority over assigned and attached forces, interagency actors outside of DOD will likely not reflect “unity of command” with one single authority and clearly defined roles and responsibilities. However, many USG personnel in the country will be under COM authority. Like most interagency and multinational activities, effective transitions will require a deliberate effort to ensure inclusion, rather than exclusion, of legitimate stakeholders. Commanders should strive to achieve unity of effort, rather than unity of command, when operating with interorganizational partners. Within the USG there are several touch-points in non-DOD departments and agencies, primarily those in DOS, which need to be included in the transition planning process:

(a) **DOS**

1. The DOS Bureau of Political Military Affairs has dedicated political-military planners aligned with each geographic and functional CCMD who can help planning efforts by explaining DOS’s priorities and objectives around the world. This planning element will also provide guidance in accordance with DOS joint regional bureau plans that should be integrated into CCMDs’ TCPs in order to achieve overall US goals. This office can also link CCMD planners with the appropriate regional and functional expertise in other parts of DOS.

2. The DOS Bureau of Political Military Affairs is also the lead for formulating DOS positions on DOD legislative proposals related to SC. The DOS joint regional strategy and integrated country strategy provides the DOS regional bureau’s and the COM’s goals, explains the relationship between those goals and broader USG regional goals, and describes the diplomatic/political environment.

3. DOS has assigned senior foreign service officers to the geographic CCMDs and certain other DOD components as a POLAD. At some geographic CCMDs, the POLAD may also serve as a civilian deputy to the commander, typically with responsibility for civil-military coordination.

(b) **USAID**

1. The Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation (CMC) is USAID’s office responsible for enabling civilian-military cooperation in development and security. The purpose of the office is to improve communication, mutual understanding and cooperation between USAID and DOD on the strategic and policy level. US objectives are best achieved through a whole-of-government effort that harnesses development, diplomacy and defense, and USAID seeks to advance the development agenda by cultivating and maintaining a strong relationship with DOD. CMC is a part of USAID’s DCHA.

2. Senior USAID advisors have been placed in the geographic CCMDs and DCHA/CMC hosts military representatives from each command. DCHA/CMC is responsible for USAID’s civilian-military cooperation policy. CMC plays a role analogous to DOS’s Bureau of Political Military Affairs with the alignment of planning efforts. CMC authors strategic guidance on development and stabilization in coordination with DOD and

other interagency partners. The country development cooperation strategy is USAID's primary country-level multi-year strategic plan. It describes a country's basic development challenges, outlines the strategic rationale for how challenges and opportunities will be addressed, and lays out a long term development vision for the country. USAID requires its field missions to share its country development cooperation strategies with the CCMDs, and in turn CCMDs are encouraged to share TCPs with USAID missions in their areas of responsibility.

(c) Other USG Departments and Agencies

1. The Departments of the Treasury, Transportation, Justice, Agriculture, Commerce, and Energy, have all played roles in the aftermath of previous conflicts. While DOS generally has the lead for US activities in a country once a conflict is over, DOS does not have direct authority over these departments. Planners should ensure they are familiar with the capabilities and capacities of each, and, working through the COM, decide what these other departments can contribute to the effort.

2. One key point planners must consider is that interagency partners may not be willing or able to accept all the tasks DOD believes are critical to the transition. Different departments and agencies have different ideas of what is necessary and possible. Planners should work to prioritize and cull the number of transition tasks to a bare minimum, and anticipate capacity shortfalls with non-DOD departments and agencies in implementing those tasks.

(5) DOD, DOS, and other USG interagency planners should, at a minimum, consider the following areas for both the DOD and DOS when developing transitions:

(a) DOD

1. PPBE process—planning for resourcing.
2. Joint Strategic Planning System.
3. SC (SFA).
4. FID.
5. CT.
6. FHA.
7. Stability tasks.

(b) DOS/USAID

1. DOS/USAID budgeting processes.
2. DOS and USAID strategic plans.

3. Regional bureau plans.
4. Integrated country strategies.
5. Country development cooperation strategies.

(6) Planners should be aware of the authorities under which they plan and fund the transition. These will differ from the authorities used to execute the intervention. When transitioning from a named operation—e.g., Operation ENDURING FREEDOM—to a post-operation bilateral security relationship with a partner country, DOD must employ or request authorities and funding suitable to its new mission set. (See Appendix D, “Transitional Governing Authorities,” for further discussion on authorities.) While these authorities and funds are usually established in long-standing SC programs, the post OE is likely to require variations and permutations, especially in an uncertain or hostile environment. For missions in a post-operation country, the bilateral security agreement is the vitally important basis for planners to draw on and, in conjunction with the Joint Staff J-5 [Plans Directorate] and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, to identify and request new or modified authorities via the DOD Legislative Program. CCDRs’ staffs should understand that many, if not most, of the activities after the end of phase IV may be conducted under Title 22, USC, authorities. Most phase 0 training is under Title 22, USC, auspices and hence under the direct control of the COM. What was once possible under Title 10, USC, may not be as easy under Title 22, USC.

(7) Some of the programs that will transition from DOD primacy to other USG departments and agencies are discussed in Appendix E, “Legal and Fiscal Considerations.”

k. Transition of Non-DOD Activities and Associated Property to HN

(1) Ideally, transitions of non-DOD activities and associated property come from the result of successful security activities, resulting in the HN’s ability to protect its territory, participate in multinational operations, and become a reliable partner on the world stage. In this case the transition involves movement away from temporary authorities, and into a reliance on more permanent programs such as FMS to provide defense articles and training.

(2) Planners must take into account the role the USG desires the HN to play in the region; the DOS and COM county team’s objectives and efforts; the objectives and efforts of other USG departments and agencies; and objectives, efforts, and resources of other countries that complement or undermine USG efforts. DOD’s strategic goals for its partnership with the HN are typically described along the lines of: denying sanctuary to terrorists, insurgents, criminals, or other hostile transnational elements; countering terrorism; countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; sharing intelligence; providing or protecting access to global commons; supporting a regional security framework; or deterring state aggression.

(3) For country-level mission analysis, planners should consult DOD’s basic set of strategic guidance documents (such as the *Guidance for Employment of the Force* and the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*) down through the CCMD’s TCP, globally

synchronized plans, and operation/functional plans. Planners should also reference DOS and USAID's set of comparable strategic guidance documents, especially their joint regional strategy, the country team's integrated country strategy, and USAID's country development cooperation strategy. In some instances, joint operation planners will develop a document like the integrated country strategy with their DOS, USAID and other USG counterparts, as well as their SC organization counterpart staff officers.

(4) During stability transitions, the transition planners must consider the present and likely capabilities of the HN. The planner must take into account the particular circumstances of a country, and not expect performance beyond that nation's capabilities, nor fall into the trap of establishing metrics of performance based on US abilities. During the transition of authority, progress through transition should be gauged by a process that confirms the performance and capabilities of each respective HN security force. These capabilities can be gauged through exercises similar to those used to validate the readiness of US and multinational forces for contingency operations but considers the HN capabilities and strategic goals. This prevents a premature transition of authority which can lead to a loss of confidence and cause the populace to seek alternative means of security.

(5) Commanders should also consider the regional and holistic aspects of transitioning SC efforts to the HN. Country teams focus primarily on their HN, while GCCs must consider the entire region. Close coordination with DOS regional bureaus will reduce the possibility of adversely affecting regional goals.

(6) A final consideration is the transition of SC tasks to subnational or nongovernmental actors. US authorities and processes are oriented towards interactions with the HN national government, but in some instances the national government cannot or will not provide for public order, settle disputes, or protect the population from outside malign influences. In those cases, transition of security functions to nongovernmental or subnational entities may be necessary.

9. Training for Stability Actions

a. **Joint and Interagency Training and Exercises.** Joint force stabilization training should provide for individual military and civilian instruction, military unit and civilian agency instruction, and combined military and civilian agency training in formal joint programs. While numerous humanitarian and complex crises during the previous several years have provided opportunities for military and civilian agencies to perform their mission skills, there is a clear requirement for joint forces to train to better integrate with interagency, international organization, and NGO planning and training to synchronize all components of a US response to a crisis.

b. **Training Prior to Deployment.** CCDRs should schedule interagency, international organization, and NGO coordination training as a part of routine training and exercise participation, and as training for a specific operation. The training audience should include members of the entire JTF HQ staff and relevant NGOs, the UN, and USG departments and agencies willing to participate. JFCs may also cross-train select staff

elements through other willing government agencies, international organizations, and the humanitarian assistance community. Joint force training for interagency, international organization, and NGO interaction during stabilization efforts should focus on identifying and assessing military and agency capabilities and core competencies, and identifying procedural disconnects. Such training also serves to build personal relationships and the trust so important to achieving unity of effort.

c. **Unit and Personnel Training with Nonlethal Weapons.** Use of nonlethal weapons requires special training to ensure they are properly used and effectively integrated with lethal weapons and other capabilities. Forces should be proficient in the employment of both lethal and nonlethal force options so as to reduce the potential for civilian casualties and unintended damage.

For additional information on nonlethal weapons training, see Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-22.40 (Field Manual [FM] 3-22.40)/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-15.8/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-07.3.2/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-2.45/Coast Guard Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (CGTTP) 3-93.2, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Employment of Nonlethal Weapons.

CHAPTER V

STABILITY ACTIONS IN OTHER JOINT OPERATIONS

1. General

a. Maintaining or reestablishing stability in other nations is often integral to how other joint operations achieve or contribute to US political objectives. Whether building capacity of partners to contain adversarial states, countering transnational terrorist groups, or engaging in major combat operations against a hostile regime, the strategic end state is frequently achieving stability on terms that are compatible with and promote US interests. In many cases, this creates a requirement to assess the impact of potential US COAs on stability to identify and mitigate unintended second- and third-order effects. In others, some level of stabilization effort is required to capitalize on the direct effects of other types of military operations. Integrating stability activities into the planning and execution of other joint operations helps avoid unintended consequences, translates short-term gains into lasting progress, and provides a bridge linking operational objectives with broader strategic goals.

b. This does not imply that joint forces conducting other types of operations will always be required to execute the full range of military actions associated with large-scale stabilization efforts. Rather, stability activities should be integrated into the intelligence, planning, and execution of other joint operations to the extent required by the particular strategic and operational context. This could be limited to consideration of additional factors during JIPOE and the COA development process, or as extensive as identifying additional LOEs or tasks that are required to ensure operational and strategic success. In some contexts, the joint force may lack the authority or capacity to address those LOEs or tasks. Coordination with interorganizational stakeholders, multinational partners, or elements of the HN government or civil society itself may identify other entities that are capable and willing to address the requirement, but the joint force should carefully assess the suitability of possible partners, particularly with regard to the impact on local perceptions.

2. Stability Activities in Conflict Prevention

a. Stability is at the foundation of prevention efforts. Military preventative activities often support USG diplomatic efforts before, during, or after a crisis. Taken before a potential crisis, these activities prevent or limit violence that interferes with US interests, and during a conflict, they prevent the spread or escalation of conflict. Taken after a conflict, they stop a return to violence. Prevention activities include military engagement, SC, and deterrence efforts designed to reform a country's security sector and deployment of forces to prevent a dispute or contain it from escalating to hostilities. Other potential prevention activities include military fact-finding missions, military-to-military consultations and warnings, inspections, observation missions, and monitoring.

b. Joint forces performing prevention activities focus on support to diplomatic/political and developmental efforts to lessen the causes of tension and unrest. Military forces tailor these activities to meet diplomatic/political and development

demands. During stability actions, including those where lethal actions are not likely, commanders consider that any accidental harm to civilians, such as traffic accidents and collateral damage, may severely impact their mission success.

c. Military actions to prevent conflict, promote both HN and regional stability, generally take the form of SC and military engagement, and presence activities.

(1) SC and Military Engagement

(a) SC encompasses DOD activities with foreign security forces (FSF) and institutions, including DOD-administered security assistance programs, to build relationships that help promote US interests and enable partner nations to provide US access to territory, information, and resources, and/or apply their capabilities and capacities consistent with US defense objectives.

(b) Conducting front-end assessments better informs SC planning on the context, institutional, technical, tactical military, and/or financial considerations. Institutional and technical considerations focus on the capacity of defense institutions and military organizations to develop, field, and sustain capable military forces based on the standards established in modern militaries. Tactical military considerations derive from a combination of requests from the partner nation and US assessments of the capability requirements needed to achieve shared security objectives. Defense capacity-building efforts often focus on improving the technical capability and tactical proficiency of the HN's security forces. This type of focus often neglects ministerial and defense institution capacity building. Such an unbalanced approach undermines the tactical gains that can only be sustained by an HN having effective and accountable defense institutions embedded in a broadly legitimate and responsive system of governance.

(c) However, the political, cultural, and socioeconomic context of foreign defense institutions and military forces differs enormously from those that have shaped US institutions. The relationship between the government and population, the roles and relationship between various state institutions, civil-military relations, and the internal dynamics of military in partner nations often differ enormously from the US model. Efforts to enhance the capacity of one component of the government or security forces may have unintended political effects, creating or exacerbating destabilizing tensions. Providing new capabilities to selected units or organizations can alter the balance of power between different elements of a government or society, particularly where those capabilities may be used for purposes other than those intended by the joint force.

(d) Destabilizing effects can stem not only from which institutions, individuals, or units the joint force chooses to work with or support, but from how those efforts are executed. Decisions regarding logistics, procurement, information dissemination, the timing and location of exercises, etc. can all have implications that may not be obvious to the joint force planner, SC program managers, or SC implementing partners focused on achieving immediate SC objectives. Consequently, planners must carefully consider the potential impact of proposed SC activities on the political dynamics and internal stability of partner nations. Assessing that impact requires an in-depth

understanding of all the relevant actors in the OE, including the partner nation government and its institutions (including security forces), the population, any internal or external threats, and the relationships between them. Standard SC implementation mechanisms may need to be modified or adapted to the demands of particular operational contexts to mitigate the risks posed to stability and strategic SC objectives—a challenge that requires close coordination with all the relevant elements of the US SC community. In some cases, it may also prove necessary for the joint force to complement traditional SC activities with stabilization efforts conducted in collaboration with US embassy country teams and other interagency partners.

(e) SC activities conducted to increase HN stability during peacetime are important stability actions to prevent conflict. SC occurs during any military operation or level of conflict.

(f) Military engagement is a wider category of activities that includes all routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation's armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence. Together, these activities constitute a core element of US national strategy executed across a wide range of contexts, from joint combined exercises and training to FMS, international military education and training (IMET), and FID. Individuals and elements of the Armed Forces of the United States must ensure that information sharing, with specific emphasis on military technology, is in compliance with National Disclosure Policy.

(g) Military engagement is designed to encourage regional stability. Military engagement activities are key peacetime military preventative actions that enhance bonds between potential multinational partners, increase understanding of the region, help ensure access when required, strengthen future multinational operations, and prevent crises from developing. Military engagement in peacetime comprises all military activities that involve other nations and are intended to shape the OE in peacetime. It includes programs and exercises that the US military conducts with other nations to shape the international environment, improve mutual understanding, and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential multinational partners. Military engagement activities support a CDR's objectives within the TCP. These activities may be long term, such as training teams and advisors assisting security forces, or short term, such as multinational exercises. Combat is not envisioned, although terrorist attacks against deployed forces are always possible. Policy, regulations, and SC plans, rather than doctrine, typically govern military engagement activities in peacetime. Units usually conduct military engagements bilaterally, but can involve multiple nations. Examples of joint operations and activities that fall under military engagement in peacetime include the following: multinational training events and exercises, security assistance, joint combined exchange training, recovery operations, arms control, and counterdrug activities.

(2) **Presence.** Sustained joint force presence in a region helps promote a secure environment in which diplomatic, economic, and informational programs designed to reduce the drivers of conflict and instability can flourish. Presence can take the form of

forward basing, forward deploying, or pre-positioning assets. Joint force presence can keep unstable situations from escalating into larger conflicts.

d. Joint forces often conduct military engagement, SC, and deterrence activities in relatively stable states. As such, activities that foster sustainability will dominate, though transformational activities may also play an important role. Military participation in stabilization efforts outside of war or crisis response generally focuses on SSR, especially training counterpart military units in both combat and stability actions.

3. Stability Considerations in Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

a. FHA consists of DOD activities conducted outside the US and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. FHA activities conducted by US Armed Forces range from military engagement activities supporting GCCs' SC and related programs to conducting limited contingency operations in support of another USG department or agency. FHA activities include foreign disaster relief and other activities that directly address a humanitarian need. FHA operations can be supported by other activities conducted by US military forces or they may be conducted concurrently with other types of related operations and activities such as DC support, security operations, and foreign consequence management. FHA operations are normally conducted in support of USAID or DOS. FHA provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration; designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the HN that has the primary responsibility for providing that assistance; and may support other USG departments or agencies. Although US military forces are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct military operations that defend and protect US national interests, their inherent, unique capabilities may be used to conduct FHA activities

b. The US military also conducts FHA activities as part of a GCC's SC program and/or to achieve specific TCP objectives. FHA operations involve interaction among many local and international agencies, both governmental and nongovernmental. During FHA operations unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. Because DOD will normally be in a supporting role during FHA contingency operations, the JFC may not be responsible for determining the mission or specifying the participating agencies. Appropriate organization, C2, and, most important, an understanding of the objectives of the organizations involved are all means to build consensus and achieve unity of effort.

c. FHA can be conducted simultaneously with or in support of various other types of operations, including PO, security assistance, FID, noncombatant evacuation operations, and CMO, among others. The OE for FHA is characterized as permissive, uncertain, or hostile. The character of the OE may be rooted in conflicts that predate the humanitarian crisis but have been exacerbated by the emergency, or new ones that have emerged as opportunists seek to take advantage of the situation. In conflict-affected humanitarian crises, either HN government forces or their adversaries may seek to manipulate FHA efforts to pursue their strategic objectives. This can take the form of demanding control of aid delivery or blocking aid to all or part of the population.

d. In more extreme cases, the crisis may have severely or entirely degraded the capacity of the HN government to effectively govern some or all of its territory, creating a governance and public security crisis that joint forces may be required to address to effectively deliver FHA. Under such circumstances, large-scale stabilization efforts may be required simultaneously alongside FHA operations to secure the population, reestablish basic governance, fundamental security, other essential services, and provide a basis for rebuilding the HN government.

e. Across all scenarios, joint force planners will need to carefully assess the OE, including existing or potential sources of instability, and the interests, strategies, capabilities, and perceptions of relevant actors. Joint forces should conduct such assessments in coordination with US interagency and other interorganizational stakeholders to develop a COP, and must be particularly cognizant of the risks that the timing, manner, and quantity of aid delivery may be perceived as reflecting political decisions rather than purely humanitarian or logistic considerations. Particularly in environments with current or recent histories of conflict, aid delivery can become a source of instability. Joint forces should critically assess whether and how to work with the HN government and local actors based on an understanding of how they view each other and the US. A significant IO effort carefully tailored to the OE may be required to address or mitigate many of these risks.

For more information, see JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

4. Stability Considerations in Peace Operations

a. Stability is integral to most PO. The majority of PO aim at maintaining or reestablishing HN stability; although peace enforcement operations often involve major combat operations, branch and sequel efforts often involve stabilization to secure US objectives.

b. Most contemporary PKO are deployed to help resolve complex civil conflicts linked to broader regional instability. While relevant US and multinational doctrine presumes the consent of the parties to the conflict and a political agreement to provide a framework for military operations, those characteristics are often absent or uncertain. Rather, PKO should be based on an integrated politico-military plan at the operational level consistent with the guidance or mandate to apply the full range of civilian and military capabilities in a coherent and synchronized manner. The tensions between the established principles of peacekeeping and the operational realities required to achieve peace and stability present enormous challenges for leaders and forces deployed to PKO.

c. As with other types of operations in which stability is critical to the end state, the JFC should carefully assess the OE, including existing or potential sources of instability, and the interests, strategies, capabilities, and perceptions of relevant actors. Careful attention must be paid to the potential for tensions with the HN government upon whose strategic consent PKO depend for presence in the operational area. Joint force planners deployed to serve in PKO should identify potential areas of tension with the HN government and other parties to the conflict, and develop realistic plans to address those

tensions within the context of peacekeeping. This means that while the willingness to employ military force at the operational and tactical levels is often critical to the success of PKO, such plans must take account of both the local and global political context, particularly when deployed under the auspices of an international organization, such as the UN or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

For more information, see JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.

5. Stability Actions in Major Operations

a. Major operations will normally involve large-scale combat, both offensive and defensive. Stability, while not the focus of the operations, may be a critical element to success. When executed, stability operations will likely take the form of tasks to be executed concurrently with, and may influence the planning and execution of, combat operations. In some cases, stability activities may rise to the level of being a subordinate operation, such as follow-on operations while combat operations are still occurring.

b. During the seize the initiative and dominate phases of a major operation, planners must understand and consider the effect of planned combat actions on both military logistical and follow-on combat operations, as well as, the impact on civil society during combat operations. Actions during major operations involving large-scale combat may also have significant impact on operations conducted in the stabilize phase.

c. Legal issues may require forces to provide for the protection and well-being of the civilian populations in the area they control. Generally, the responsibility for providing for the basic needs of the people rests with the HN government or designated civil authorities, agencies, and organizations. When not possible, military forces may need to provide minimum levels of civil security and restoration of essential services to the local populace until a civil authority or the HN is able. These actions provide minimum levels of security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment. JFCs should make every effort to ensure that if no civilian or HN agency is present, capable, and willing, then the military forces under their control conduct these actions.

d. The JFC should assess resources available against the mission to determine how best to conduct these minimum essential stability tasks and what risk they can accept. If unable to resource these minimum essential stability tasks, then the JFC should seek additional capabilities or capacities, including leveraging the capabilities and resources of interorganizational stakeholders, to achieve the objectives.

6. Stability in Foreign Internal Defense

a. FID refers to the US activities that support an HN internal defense and development (IDAD) strategy designed to protect against subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security, consistent with US national security objectives and policies.

b. US FID doctrine emphasizes that the true nature of the threat to the HN government lies in the adversary's political strength rather than military power. Although the HN

government must contain the armed elements, concentration on the military aspect of the threat does not address the real danger. Gaining support of the population is vital to any IDAD strategy.

c. Stability considerations are inherent to the multidimensional, interagency, and multinational approach of US FID activities. FID focuses on helping the HN to address the root causes of instability and emphasizes that joint force efforts are intended to support IDAD programs in a manner that is acceptable to the HN's cultural and political realities. Planners are directed to consider the capability of the HN government and leadership, existing treaties and social infrastructure, and the possibility that the best solution from the US perspective may not be the best solution for the supported HN. In fact, the best solution may be entirely outside the realm of FID and be better accomplished through other means.

d. The lead role of the HN government in developing IDAD makes it necessary for joint forces conducting FID to carefully assess the impediments to the creation of an effective IDAD strategy. HN governments only require outside assistance because they have proven unable to address domestic instability on their own. In many cases, this is linked to political corruption, predatory governance, or marginalization along ethno-sectarian, socioeconomic, or ideological lines. The unwillingness or inability of HN governments to undertake the necessary reforms in response to growing public dissatisfaction is typically what creates the crisis conditions requiring US FID assistance. Since US FID efforts are launched in support of US strategic interests, joint forces must assess the roots of HN government recalcitrance, and the options available to US forces to foster the necessary reforms. As with SC efforts, an in-depth understanding is required of the relevant actors in the OE, including the HN government and its institutions (including security forces), the population, any internal or external threats, and the relationships between them. However, additional information may be required to enable joint force planners to understand the potential and limits of US leverage over the HN government; identify constructive partners and obstructive hardliners within the HN government and society; and develop an approach to assistance that incentivizes the reforms required to address the political roots of instability.

For more information on FID, see JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

7. Stability in Counterinsurgency

a. COIN may be a complex protracted effort that often requires the integration of capabilities typically associated with PO, FHA, FID, and CT with those of numerous interagency partners to help the HN government marginalize insurgents and win the support of the population.

b. The stabilization considerations of COIN are rooted in the political nature of the conflict and the primary focus should be on the population, rather than just the insurgents. Stabilization efforts are typically required to reinforce the legitimacy of the affected government while reducing insurgent influence. The political and military aspects of insurgencies are so bound together as to be inseparable: military action is valuable only where it supports the political strategy, and COIN efforts are only as good as the political

strategy they support. Tactical civil and military efforts cannot compensate for a strategy that does not match the political and operational realities on the ground or lacks support from key stakeholders. Effective strategies address both the actual capability, capacity, and willingness of the HN government to meet the expectations of its citizens and how it is perceived by the population. It cannot be overstated that the political strategy must account for the sociocultural factors of the HN population. Increasing the legitimacy of the government will require a degree of political behavior modification (substantive political reform, anticorruption and governance improvement) to successfully address the immediate drivers of instability and the root causes that gave rise to insurgency in the first place.

c. Since joint forces will only be deployed to conduct COIN operations where US strategic interests are at stake, joint forces must assess the roots of HN government reluctance for addressing the identified problems, and the options available to US forces to foster the necessary reforms. As with other types of operations designed to reestablish or maintain stability, an in-depth understanding is required of the relevant actors in the OE, including the HN government and its institutions (including security forces), the population, any internal or external threats, and the relationships between them. Joint forces must also develop an understanding of the potential and limits of US leverage over the HN government, identify constructive partners and obstructive hardliners within the HN government and society, and develop an approach to assistance that incentivizes making the reforms required to address the roots of instability.

d. Those reforms will often involve stability activities that will require the support and participation of the joint force. The paramount concern is the elimination of physical violence, but other relevant factors may include maintenance of laws, the protection of human rights, freedom to conduct economic activity, public safety (fire, ambulance, etc.), and public health (such as safe drinking water and sanitation) that also are essential services, which are part of the economic functional component. The expectations and priorities of the population define which factors are relevant and what constitutes acceptable conditions, and may not necessarily be according to Western standards or assumptions. The emphasis on physical security in COIN does not imply disregard for other aspects of human security—only prioritization.

e. The end state of providing human security should be implicit in the wider efforts to improve the standard of governance down to the local level. In some areas, the sequencing is reversed, and addressing other aspects of human security—such as rule of law and security of livelihoods—may be a prerequisite to establishing a security presence capable of defending the population from insurgent violence.

For more information, see JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency.

8. Stability in Unconventional Warfare

a. UW consists of activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.

b. Four out of the five mission areas related to IW—CT, COIN, FID, and stability operations – are conducted to maintain or reestablish stability. By contrast, UW is used to coerce, disrupt or overthrow governing authorities. Undertaking these activities may be done individually or applied in combination depending on situations unique to the individual operation or campaign.

c. Military operations in UW will not terminate with the traditional concept of enemy military defeat. Dependent on US objectives, a successful UW operation may end abruptly, transition to another form of warfare, and involve protracted support through a lengthy transition to a state of normal governance. From the beginning of planning, JFCs and staffs should consider the potential unintended second- and third-order effects of UW activities for both theater-specific objectives and broader US national interests. The USG is likely to be seen as responsible for the actions of armed groups during the conflict even where only limited support is provided. Armed movements associated with a single ethno-sectarian identity can inspire similar mobilization in other communities and lead to an escalating inter-communal conflict. Conflicts—particularly involving separatist movements—that begin in one country may have wider implications for regional stability, including that of US allies. Other nation states within the region may seek opportunity to invade the country via traditional warfare or to conduct their own UW operation in the liberated territory. Even where such risks can be mitigated, it is crucial that UW factor long-term stability considerations into the campaign plan from the outset.

d. This is especially true for UW activities intended to overthrow an enemy government, which, if improperly planned for, could result in dangerous instability or counterproductive regimes. Following overthrow, US support may transition to conduct FID, COIN, and/or stabilization. Where the objectives of the UW operation are more limited and only seek to coerce or disrupt adversary government behavior, the transition phase may be equally limited in scope. Transition following coercion requires planning for preservation of the resistance or integration into the state. In the case of disruption, transition may consist of the relationship with indigenous elements being terminated, going dormant, or being handed off to other USG departments and agencies or foreign partners. However, UW planners should bear in mind the impact to future operations of being perceived as abandoning erstwhile allies to their fate.

e. Planning and operational design for UW in general, and particularly to address the stabilization considerations that may have long-term implications for US national security interests, require comprehensive in-depth knowledge not only of the indigenous group the USG is considering supporting, but all the relevant actors in the OE and the relationships between them. It also requires a detailed and ruthlessly honest analysis of the leverage and limits of US influence over the indigenous groups, and the likelihood that the joint force will be able to mitigate the strategic risks associated with UW in some contexts.

For more information, see JP 3-05.1, Unconventional Warfare.

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APPENDIX A

PROCESS FOR JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The four steps of the JIPOE process are define the OE, describe the impact of the OE, evaluate the adversaries and other relevant actors, and determine potential COAs of the adversaries and other relevant actors.

a. **Step 1: Define the OE.** To define the OE, the JFC staff first clearly understands the purpose of the operation and the JFC's intent. A method often used to organize information is PMESII systems of the OE, as well as the physical aspects of terrain and time. Within each of these components of the OE a further grouping of information can be applied detailing the aspects of areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE). Once this is established, a definition of the OE can be made.

b. **Step 2: Describe the Impact of the OE**

(1) JIPOE for stabilization is about understanding aspects of the OE that impact the decision making and associated behavior of all relevant actors involved, to include the JFC. Ultimately, understanding the impact of the OE is about understanding aspects of the OE that are relevant to the decision cycles of those involved, to include the adversary, USG, HN, and multinational personnel. This poses a particular challenge for the JFC, as it is difficult to analyze one's own actions with the same objectivity as the JFC is able to apply to the decision making of others. Similarly, the JFC must be conscious of the problem of the observer effect, where the interacting with the population itself makes changes in the OE. Understanding the impact of the OE means understanding its dynamics and includes understanding factors that are driving people to behave in a destabilizing manner and factors that may be useful to address to affect relevant actors' behavior in a manner that is consistent with stability. This understanding enables the JFC to better shape the behavior of all actors in a manner consistent with the JFC's intermediate objectives and desired end state.

(2) **Civil Considerations.** The ASCOPE framework is often used to understand the PMESII factors within the OE. The relationship of the physical aspects of the OE to the stability mission is potentially much more complex than in traditional warfare. To the extent they are relevant, understanding those aspects of the physical factors within each ASCOPE category is critical in stability activities. Aspects of each component of ASCOPE should be examined with regard to the political strategy and especially their impact on the decisions and associated behavior of relevant actors.

For a more detailed discussion of the ASCOPE framework, see JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency.

(3) **Information Environment.** Understanding the information environment is crucial in stabilization efforts. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, and exploit information. All actors in the OE affect the information environment and are impacted by

it. The most important attribute of the information environment is that it is where the actions and the messaging of all actors combine to form the narratives that impact the mental disposition of relevant actors. The JFC works to understand the information environment to project a narrative using all appropriate channels of information flow. An understanding of this environment is also important for activities such as intercepting communications of various actors to inform operations and denying and/or exploiting nefarious communication.

For more discussion on the information environment, see JP 3-13, Information Operations.

(4) **Relevant Actors**

(a) The relevant actors always include adversaries, indigenous populations, HN security forces, and the HN government. The relevant actors and the degree to which each actor is important are different in each stabilization efforts. Actors are also dynamic, and therefore certain actors may fall under multiple categories at the same time or move from one category to another over time. As operational realities, local political dynamics, and local expectations change in response to external developments, some actors may shift their allegiances based on their own perceived interests. The impending withdrawal of external military forces can be one of the most potent triggers for realignment.

(b) Other relevant actors may also exist. These actors might include additional adversaries with regional or global ambitions, criminal elements, unofficial leaders and power brokers within the indigenous power structures, indigenous unofficial security forces (local militias), state and non-state actors in other countries, and international organizations/NGOs.

c. **Step 3: Evaluate the Adversaries and Other Relevant Actors.** The most important components of the OE to understand during a stability operation are the relevant actors. Step 3 identifies and evaluates the relevant actors' capabilities and limitations, current situation, and centers of gravity. The JIPOE process also evaluates the doctrine, patterns of operation, and tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by adversary forces.

d. **Step 4: Determine Potential COAs of the Adversary(ies) and Other Relevant Actors.** Based on the holistic understanding of the OE developed during the first three steps of JIPOE in stabilization efforts, enhanced insight into the decision making of relevant actors is achieved. Decision making helps drive behavior. Improved understanding of decision making enables the JFC to better determine likely COAs of the relevant actors within the OE. The fourth step of the JIPOE process builds upon this holistic view to develop a detailed understanding of probable COAs of the relevant actors as they relate to the desired end state of the JFC.

For further information regarding the JIPOE process, see JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

APPENDIX B ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORKS AND THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS

1. Introduction and Overview

a. Operation assessment is a process that measures progress of the joint force toward mission accomplishment. A constant challenge during stabilization efforts is the difficulty to effectively analyze progress using systematic reliable indicators and data collection methods. Every operation will be unique, and a standard assessment cannot be provided in this appendix. This generic discussion of assessment must be tailored to the situation and the decision needs of the commander. Success can be measured by a wide variety of measures such as the reduction of ethnic violence, reduction in crime, reduced IED attacks, or improvement in public utility performance. An assessment criterion utilized one week may not be valid the subsequent week. Assessment can be highly subjective due to the difficulty in developing a valid assessment framework. The assessment does not replace the commanders' intuition. The assessment complements the commander's information and intelligence needs to inform critical decisions to improve progress toward the end state.

b. **Assessment Metrics.** The staff should develop metrics to determine if stability actions are properly linked to the JFC's overall plan and the larger hierarchy of operational and national objectives. These metrics evaluate the results achieved during joint operations. Metrics can either be objective (using sensors or personnel to directly measure results) or subjective (using indirect means to ascertain results), depending on the metric applied to the task, effect, or objective. Success is measured by indications that the effects created are influencing enemy, friendly, or neutral activity in desired ways among various target systems.

(1) **MOEs.** MOEs are indicators used to measure change in the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. In stabilization efforts, such measurement may not be observable for some time. MOEs can be based on quantitative or qualitative measures to reflect trends and show progress or regression toward a measurable threshold tied to specified desired effects or objectives of the stabilization efforts. Example: For an objective "defeat the insurgency," the MOE used to measure effectiveness toward that objective would be "coalition and HN defense forces can effectively detect, deter, and defeat insurgency attacks on HN government, government processes, and population centers." MOE indicators can also be added to better inform the MOE. Examples of MOE indicators include HN military capacity and capability; number and effectiveness of insurgent attacks on HN government and population centers; and HN population reporting on insurgency activities.

(2) **MOPs.** MOPs are indicators used to measure a friendly action that evaluates task accomplishment. The results of tactical tasks are often physical in nature, but also can reflect the impact on specific functions and systems. Use of MOPs in stabilization efforts should be tied to specific actions or tasks that support achievement of objectives. Assessment of results at the tactical level helps commanders determine operational and strategic progress in the stabilization effort, so JFCs must have a comprehensive, integrated assessment plan that links assessment activities and measures at all levels. A MOP

example tied to the task of: “secure HN government” may be: HN government facilities are fully supporting the population. A MOP example tied to the task of “train and equip eight HN military infantry battalions” may be the manning and equipping levels for each of the eight battalions.

For further information on assessment, refer to JDN 1-15, Operation Assessment, and JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

2. Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework

a. The ICAF is a framework that can be used to help people from different USG departments and agencies work together to reach a shared understanding of a country’s conflict dynamics and consensus on potential entry points for additional USG efforts. This assessment will provide for a deeper understanding of the underlying conflict dynamics in a country or region.

b. ICAF teams are situation-specific and should include department/agency representatives with relevant technical or country expertise. ICAF teams may be co-led by the DOS’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) and USAID’s CMM because people in those offices have conflict assessment expertise, but anytime two or more departments/agencies want to conduct an ICAF, they may do so. Unless they have conflict assessment experience, however, they should request assistance from CSO or CMM.

c. An ICAF allows an interagency team to identify potential entry points for future USG efforts in conflict prevention and conflict transformation, but it does not make direct recommendations for program design. That is the role of the sectoral assessment. Use of sectoral assessments is consonant with use of ICAF in the following ways:

(1) Results from sectoral assessments performed in the past provide data that is fed into the ICAF.

(2) During a situation assessment, the results of an ICAF identify sectors most critically in need of an in-depth sectoral assessment prior to planning.

(3) After an ICAF is conducted and a plan has been created, sectoral assessments are conducted to assist in the design of programs.

d. When interagency personnel perform a conflict/instability assessment together, they reach a shared understanding of the conflict dynamics. The ICAF has been developed by the interagency community and has interagency acceptance. Using the ICAF, members of an interagency team are able to focus their discussion on the conflict they are analyzing and avoid being caught up in a disagreement on the process they are using to analyze the conflict.

e. The USG departments and agencies most likely to participate in the use of the ICAF are agencies with responsibilities for planning or programming foreign assistance funds or other international activities. However, on occasion, USG departments and agencies

implementing domestic programs may have technical or country expertise to contribute to an ICAF even if they do not have international programs.

For more information, refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, and the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/187786.pdf>).

3. United States Agency for International Development Conflict Assessment Framework

USAID carries out conflict assessments in a country where changes in conditions or circumstances on the ground are needed to enable an environment for sustainable development, the environment requires a blend of immediate relief and stabilization assistance, or where the country context requires contingency or scenario planning due to the likelihood of a rapid change in the environment requiring resources to be redirected in response to a new or renewed crisis. USAID's CMM Conflict Assessment Framework is an analytical process undertaken to identify and understand the dynamics of violence and instability and represents USAID's unique methodological approach to better evaluate the risks for armed conflict, the peace and security goals that are most important in a given country context, how existing development programs interact with these factors, how the programs may (inadvertently) be doing harm, and where and how development and humanitarian assistance can most effectively support local efforts to manage conflict and to build peace. Other tools that USAID uses to improve understanding of the OE include the yearly Alert List for Fragility and Risk for Instability. This tool assesses fragility in terms of a given country's legitimacy and effectiveness, and instability according to the likelihood that they will experience serious political instability or the outbreak of violent conflict in the near future.

For more information, refer to USAID's Conflict Assessment Framework http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnady739.pdf.

4. Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments

a. To bring goals and resources into better balance and to provide feedback on the efficacy of strategies being implemented, policy makers require an objective system of metrics that will enable them to take stock of the magnitude of the challenges before intervening and to continuously track the progress of their efforts toward stabilization.

b. The USACE, United States Institute for Peace, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute developed *Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE)* as a framework and a user's handbook ([http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/MPICE_final_complete%20book%20\(2\).pdf](http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/MPICE_final_complete%20book%20(2).pdf)).

c. *Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE)* and the ICAF are not an either or proposition. Both can be used simultaneously and with other assessment tools. The two have two distinct, but related, purposes. Fundamentally, the ICAF is an assessment to ascertain the root causes, the drivers of conflict, and the potential resiliency of a HN. *Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE)* complements the ICAF

by providing a framework to develop metrics focused on outcomes. These outcomes are MOEs indicating the success or failure of programs and strategies focused on the attainment of objectives reinforcing stability.

5. United States Agency for International Development’s Anticorruption Assessment

This USAID handbook is tailored to the user to conduct anticorruption assessments efficiently and at a level sufficiently detailed to produce targeted and prioritized recommendations. The framework is guided by international best practice. By offering a common approach by which the dynamics of corruption can be understood and assessed, anticorruption strategies can be improved and programs made more effective and appropriate to the OE. The assessments start by casting a wide analytical net to capture the breadth of issues that affect corruption and anticorruption prospects in a country and then provide a strategic rationale for their final recommendations. This handbook provides step-by-step practical assistance to implement the methodology and produce an assessment report that addresses a wide range of issues and generates recommendations for action. The guidance provides assessment teams with tools for diagnosing the underlying causes of corruption by analyzing both the state of laws and institutions, as well as the political-economic dynamics of a country. By understanding country-specific drivers of corruption, assessment teams should be able to develop reasonable insights on government sectors and functions that are most vulnerable to corruption and the types of initiatives that can reverse or control these problems. The framework also provides a rationale for setting priorities, choosing some approaches and rejecting others.

For more information, refer to USAID’s Anticorruption Assessment Handbook, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadv270.pdf.

6. The District Stability Framework

a. The USAID District Stability Framework (DSF) is a methodology designed for use by both military and civilian personnel to identify the underlying causes of instability and conflict in a region, devise programs to diminish the root causes of instability and conflict, and measure the effectiveness of programming. It is employed to gather information using the following lenses: OE, cultural environment, local perceptions, and stability/instability dynamics. This information then helps identify, prioritize, monitor, evaluate, and adjust programming targeted at diminishing the causes of instability or conflict.

b. The DSF has four major components: gaining situational awareness (from the four lenses of data mentioned above), analyzing that data, designing effective programming based on that analysis, and monitoring and evaluating programming.

For more information, refer to ATP 3-07.5, Stability Techniques; MCWP 3-33.1, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations; and Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 11-16, Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team.

7. The Criminal Justice Sector Assessment Rating Tool

a. A fundamental and vital component of rule of law development is instituting a vigorous and impartial criminal justice sector. Proficiency in how to effectively use and measure this foreign assistance, however, continues to develop accompanied by the requirement to organize complex efforts into transferable knowledge for all of USG policy makers and implementers.

b. CJSART is designed to assist policy makers and program managers prioritize and administer HN criminal justice sectors needing assistance. Once the assistance programs are under way, the CJSART is a systematic tool designed to measure progress and accomplishments against standardized benchmarks. Used in its entirety, the CJSART holistically examines a country's laws, judicial institutions, law enforcement organizations, border security, and corrections systems as well as a country's adherence to international rule of law standards such as bilateral and multilateral treaties.

For more information, refer to the CJSART (<http://www.joomag.com/magazine/criminal-justice-sector-assessment-rating-tool-version-20/0125795001427745405?short>).

8. United States Agency for International Development's Guidelines for Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment in Disasters

a. Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment (REA) is a tool to identify, define, and prioritize potential environmental impacts in disaster situations and is used to identify and rank environmental issues and follow-up actions during a disaster. REA is designed as a best practice tool for effective disaster assessment and management. REA does not replace a formal environmental impact assessment, but fills a gap until one is appropriate. REA can be use from shortly before a disaster up to 120 days after a disaster begins, or for any major change in an extended crisis. REA does not provide answers as to how to resolve environmental problems. It does provide sufficient information to allow those responding to a disaster to formulate common sense solutions to most issues identified.

b. REA is built around conducting simple analysis of information in the following areas:

- (1) The general context of the disaster.
- (2) Disaster related factors that may have an immediate impact on the environment.
- (3) Possible immediate environmental impacts of disaster agents.
- (4) Unmet basic needs of disaster survivors that could lead to adverse impact on the environment.
- (5) Potential negative environmental consequences of relief operations.

c. REA does not require expert knowledge. Primary REA users are people directly involved in disaster response operations, with a basic knowledge of the disaster management process but no background in environmental issues.

For more information on REA, refer to USAID's Guidelines for Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment in Disasters, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnads725.pdf.

For more information on the environmental impact assessment, refer to USAID's Environmental Compliance Procedures, <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2151/reg216.pdf>.

9. Democracy and Governance Assessment

Conducting a Democracy and Governance Assessment: A Framework for Strategy Development (http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usaid/dg_assess.pdf) provides a framework for constructing donor, in particular USAID, democracy and governance strategies. The framework guides a political analysis of the country, leads to program choices, and incorporates what researchers and practitioners have learned from comparative experience. While every country is unique in some manner, there are important commonalities. This is what makes anthropology or comparative political science possible. Most countries have political systems with elements and basic construction that resemble at least some other countries. Donors, such as USAID, have found that political issues are as important to a country's development as other issues such as health and economic growth and that many developmental plans have floundered on political shoals. In particular, donors believe that support for democracy should be part of their development assistance both because it is good in itself and because it best supports the developmental effort. HNs also agree, at least officially, since most have signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international agreements that include elements of democracy. The strategic assessment framework is designed to help define a country-appropriate program to assist in the transition to and consolidation of democracy. As such, it is useful in developing strategies that address the core democracy and governance problem(s) in a country and that identify primary influences and rules of particular institutional arenas.

10. The Operation Assessment Process

a. JFCs measure the effectiveness and performance of stability actions in relation to accomplishing missions and achieving progress toward overall USG stability goals. Determining how stability actions support overall goals, especially in post-conflict situations, is important but challenging because measuring effectiveness may take months or years. Commanders need to establish accurate indicators and track them at repeated intervals, in coordination with interagency partners. Measuring the success of stability actions includes identifying and reducing the causes of instability and reestablishing or building HN capability to reduce, manage, or prevent conflict.

b. The basic steps of the assessment process are integrated into the commander's decisions for operations.

- (1) Identify critical information requirements.

- (2) Create an assessment plan to support the OPLAN.
- (3) Collect, process, and disseminate information and intelligence.
- (4) Conduct event-based and/or periodic assessments.
- (5) Provide feedback and recommendations.

For more information, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning, and JDN 1-15, Operation Assessment.

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APPENDIX C SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

1. Introduction

a. Second only to providing security as required, the major joint force role in stabilization efforts is to help reform the HN security sector and build partner capacity to make it an enabler of long-term stability. The security sector comprises both military and civilian partners and institutions responsible for the safety and security of the HN and the population at the international, regional, national, and subnational levels. As Figure C-1 illustrates, this includes state security providers, governmental security management and oversight bodies, civil society, and non-state providers of justice and security. Helping to build HN capacity in the security sector includes stability actions from the security, rule of




Figure C-1. Actors Within the Security Sector

law, and governance functions; such operations fall under the rubric of SSR. SSA refers to the policies, programs, and activities the United States uses to assist a HN in conducting SSR.

b. SSR refers to the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. Without basic security, reform and development efforts become problematic. SSR requires both a whole-of-government and comprehensive approach so as to attain the desired end states. Accordingly, the USG, in partnership with other interested actors, embraces the comprehensive approach to SSR, integrating defense and other security-related programs with development, reforms, and resources to assist partner governments in the provision of effective, legitimate, and accountable security for their citizens. Through SSA, the USG assists the HN to respond appropriately to threats within and outside its borders. SSA may include activities in support of security force and intelligence reform, justice sector reform, civilian oversight and management of military support and intelligence services, community security, and DDR.

c. SSR includes, but extends well beyond, the narrower focus of more traditional security assistance on defense, intelligence, and policing. Forces enhanced through traditional security assistance comprised of equipment and training can better carry out their responsibilities if the institutional and governance frameworks necessary to sustain them are equally well developed. SSR programs should be developed in light of the linkages among security, governance, development, and conflict. Integrating security sector, governance, and rule of law programs into a comprehensive package—in support of US and HN priorities—ultimately proves more successful and sustainable than a series of individual programs.

d. Stability actions in support of SSR take place across the conflict continuum. Whether during the conduct of military engagement, SC, or deterrence, these actions normally support relatively stable yet vulnerable states. During crisis response and limited contingency operations, such as COIN or PO, the JFC should emphasize SSR programs to build HN capacity to combat insurgency, terrorism, and other security threats, even while conducting combat operations. During major operations and campaigns, stabilization efforts accompany combat and rely on SSA to help generate HN capacities in security, governance, and the rule of law. Hence, SSR forms an important component to conflict transformation by fostering an enduring peace.

2. Unified Action in Security Sector Reform

a. SSA is a whole-of-government effort and requires the integrated support of interested USG departments and agencies. Effective SSA results from the active participation of USG departments and agencies, which provide expertise, resources, and funding in areas in which they excel. The complex and enduring characteristics of SSR demand an approach that capitalizes on the strengths of collective expertise in the USG.

(1) **DOS.** DOS leads US interagency policy initiatives and oversees policy and programmatic support to SSR through its bureaus, offices, and overseas missions and leads integrated USG reconstruction and stabilization efforts. DOS's responsibilities also

include oversight of other USG foreign policy and programming that may have an impact on the security sector.

(2) **DOD.** DOD's primary role in SSR is supporting the reform, restructuring, or reestablishment of the armed forces and the defense sector across the range of military operations.

(3) **USAID.** USAID's primary SSR role is to support governance, conflict mitigation and response, reintegration and reconciliation, and rule of law programs aimed at building civilian capacity to manage, oversee, and provide security and justice.

(4) **Other USG Departments and Agencies.** Effective SSA should draw on capabilities across the USG, as appropriate. In addition to DOS, DOD, and USAID, other USG departments and agencies provide important capabilities in the conduct of SSA programs. In particular, DOJ, DHS, Department of Energy, Department of Agriculture, and Department of Treasury may play substantial or leading roles in the development and execution of SSA. These programs should be coordinated among the departments and agencies at the strategic level as well as through country teams consistent with COM authority.

b. The USG is not alone in its pursuit of comprehensive approaches to SSR. The UN is integrating SSR across different UN offices and agencies, including the UN Development Program and the UNDPKO. NATO, the European Union, OECD, and major bilateral donors have advanced a more holistic SSR concept through combined funding mechanisms and enhanced collaboration among defense and development agencies.

For further details, refer to OECD/Development Assistance Committee publication, The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR): Supporting Security and Justice (<http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-peace/conflictandfragility/oecdhandbookonsecuritysystemreformsupportingsecurityandjustice.htm>).

c. Donors for SSR programs will normally operate through international organizations to deliver SSR as part of a broader development plan for the HN, and HN governments may have a preference for working with established international organizations and NGOs. However, some international organizations and NGOs may have a narrow focus and may not be sensitive to wider SSR priorities and the need to build a broad-based HN capability in a coherent manner, so they must be incorporated into a comprehensive reform plan. Partner nations may also bring valuable capabilities that the USG cannot provide, such as paramilitary forces. The UN can take a leading role in DDR, which itself is a multi-agency activity. NGOs may also contribute niche capabilities and consultancy advice, such as in the justice and rule of law sector, and provide local knowledge and established community links.

d. As with other areas of stabilization, the US Armed Forces may be required to conduct significant portions of SSA that are normally the bailiwick of civilian agencies, particularly when the security situation prevents significant civilian participation.

3. Military Contribution to Security Sector Reform

a. SSR planning should seek to ensure balanced development of the entire security sector, as imbalanced development can undermine the long-term success of SSR efforts. Activities of military forces are generally focused on reforming the HN military forces, but those actions may need to be only part of a broader, comprehensive effort to reform various security sector elements. Figure C-2 portrays various relationships within the security sector. Military forces gradually transfer the responsibilities accumulated during combat operations to other participants in the SSR effort, whether from one military force to




Figure C-2. Elements of Security Sector Reform

another, or to civilian groups or agencies. Transitions allow the military force to focus on their primary tasks: securing the HN and building up HN security forces.

b. The relationship of the HN military and law enforcement is necessary for these forces to work effectively together in providing internal security to the state. In many post-conflict societies appropriate distinctions between military and law enforcement roles and missions have eroded or disappeared entirely. That erosion could lead to inappropriate military involvement in local community and political affairs, including corruption of criminal justice and law enforcement functions by military forces. A fundamental task of SSR may be to restore the distinction between military and law enforcement functions and to provide robust rule of law mechanisms to sustain their separation.

c. **Defense Reform.** Military forces are developed primarily to counter external threats to the HN. The design of these forces develops from analysis of those threats and the specific capabilities required to counter them. Providing FHA and countering certain types of internal military threats can also be a necessary capability. In addition to the capability to conduct operations, military capacity building must include administrative and logistical institutions, development of a functioning ministry of defense (MOD), and a definitive chain of command. A coherent SSR program directed at defense forces should focus on providing training and advisory teams, construction or repair of basic infrastructure, and providing equipment aligned with the size and composition of the armed forces. Establishing of a strategic defense planning system (i.e., national security strategy, national military strategy, chief of staff operational guidance, and defense capabilities guidance) assists the MOD in armed forces development to include force management and budgeting. Involving the MOD in this planning process establishes ownership early and permits the staffs to see the logic behind force management and the military budget. Whenever possible, establishing interoperability is desired to enhance joint operations in accordance with the warfighting functions. Early creation of oversight and control mechanisms and processes ensures various defense sector elements are accountable to elected and politically appointed civilian leadership in the executive and legislative branches. Accountability is essential to establishing a sound foundation for defense budget planning and program implementation.

(1) Advisors, trainers, mentors, and liaison staff should be carefully selected, with maturity, experience, and patience being desirable traits, as dealing with foreign and possibly immaturely developed military forces will contribute to setbacks and frustrations. Advisor/mentor selection rests on an ability to build relationships with counterparts while maintaining professionalism and requires extensive predeployment training from official organizations. Continuity of the SSR effort requires dedicated personnel and consistent approaches. Advisory tour lengths should be 12 to 24 months to build effective relationships and maintain the continuity of training effort. Ideally, language proficiency is desired, but in view of the exigencies of time and the limited availability of qualified personnel, the use of interpreters will become the default option. The cultivation of interpreters should be included in the training program.

(2) The mentor organization and equipment should reflect the role and structure of the HN unit and the unit's activity in ongoing operations. Mentors embedded at various

levels from government ministries to tactical units need to have a certain level of interaction to enhance situational awareness. Consequently, periodic conference calls or mentor conferences will prove beneficial to reconcile ends, ways, and means.

(3) A clear understanding of the command relationship and responsibilities between partner nation and HN forces is critical to the successful transition of authority. Advisors and trainers provide the essential link between both HN and partner nation forces and have a significant role within the transition process. HQ elements on the ground should have a dedicated staff branch dealing with SSR that maintains a close link with any superior HQ.

(4) A state needs to control its territory to maintain its authority. The control of border areas by border forces is necessary to prevent any movement of irregular adversaries into its territory. Intervention forces must be prepared to augment HN border forces for fragile states that request assistance to strengthen capability. While HN capability is being developed, intervention forces may need to provide the necessary border control, as well as advisors and trainers to help build capacity and provide coordination. Border control includes the management of land borders, airspace, coastal and inland waters, territorial waters, and exclusive economic zones.

(5) Border forces are often involved in detecting and preventing crime in border areas, including illegal trafficking and entry. These forces include border guards, coast guard, and immigration and customs personnel. Their activities are closely linked with the role of the customs service in facilitating and securing legal trade, as well as migration control and antiterrorism. In many states, ineffective border management systems frustrate efforts to detect and prevent organized crime and other irregular activity. Such failures enable trafficking in illicit arms, commodities, and people, which in turn can fuel conflict and insecurity. Border forces may be associated with corruption, which reduces state revenues, erodes confidence, and discourages trade and economic activity. Issues to be considered in the initial development of a border control force are:

(a) Facilitating the efficient and regulated movement of people and goods, thereby achieving an appropriate balance between security, commerce, and social normalization.

(b) Building capacity to detect and combat illicit trafficking, organized crime, terrorism, and other factors leading to instability in border areas.

(c) Strengthening revenue generating capacity, promoting integrity, and mitigating corruption.

(d) Establishing a border guard under central government control.

(e) Harmonizing border control and customs regulations regionally and enhancing cross-border cooperation.

(f) Establishing cross-border protocols with adjoining states.

(6) A key element of defense reform is SFA, which is defined as DOD activities that contribute to unified action by the USG to support the development of the capacity and capability of FSF and their supporting institutions. SFA developmental activities provide enabling capabilities, which can support broader SSR programs as well as other security capacity-building activities. It is conducted across the range of military operations and may begin or terminate in any of the joint phases. While SFA is normally part of the larger SSR effort, it may be tied to simply building partner capacity to achieve other strategic purposes. See Figure C-3 for SFA capability/capacity.

(a) SFA improves the capability and capacity of HN or regional security organization’s security forces. These forces are composed of all the state-sanctioned security forces that provide security for an HN and its relevant population or support a regional security organization’s mission, including but not limited to, military, paramilitary, police, and intelligence forces; border police, coast guard, and customs




Figure C-3. Security Force Assistance Capability/Capacity

officials; and prison guards and correctional personnel. Conducting SFA and other capacity-building activities are the primary ways that military forces support a comprehensive SSR program.

(b) SFA can be designed to support SSR by establishing conditions that support the HN's development of legitimate, credible, competent, capable, committed, and confident security forces. This requires HN forces capable of securing their borders, protecting their population, regulating the behavior of those that pose a security risk, and holding individuals accountable for criminal activities. There are five SFA developmental tasks—organize, train, equip, rebuild and build, and advise and assist. When supporting the development of the HN security forces, the JFC must understand the command's role with the HN or the regional security organization they are supporting. These tasks facilitate the JFC and the staff to assess and allocate resources.

1. Organize is the SFA task that encompasses all measures taken to assist security forces in improving their organizational structure, processes, institutions, and infrastructure. Organizing the HN security force is based on the local social and economic conditions, cultural and historical factors, and security threats. SFA aims to create an efficient organization with a command, intelligence, logistic, and operations structure viable for the HN.

2. Train is the SFA task that assists security forces by developing programs and institutions to train and educate. These efforts must fit the nature and requirements as assessed by analyzing the OE. Training is conducted in institutions, in units, and by individual trainers. It includes a broad range of subject matter, including the key SSR issue of security force responsiveness to civilian oversight and control and mitigation of incidental civilian harm caused during security operations.

3. Equip is the SFA task that includes all efforts to assess and assist security forces with the procurement, fielding, and sustainment of equipment. All equipment must fit the nature of the OE. Ensuring long-term sustainment by the HN is a critical consideration for this task.

4. Rebuild and build is the SFA task that assesses, rebuilds, and builds the existing capabilities and capacities of HN security forces and supporting infrastructure. This task requires a comprehensive assessment of the capability, capacity, and structures required to meet the HN's needs.

5. Advise and assist is the SFA task in which US personnel work with the HN security forces to improve their individual and unit capability and capacity. Advising establishes a personal and a professional relationship between US and HN forces where trust and confidence influence the development of security forces. Assisting involves US forces providing required support or sustainment capabilities for the security forces to accomplish their objectives. The level and intensity of advice and assistance is based on local operational conditions and should continue until the security forces establish the required systems to provide for themselves.

(c) End states for SFA are described as follows:

1. Competent from the ministerial level to the individual service member and police officer, across all related fields of interest and functional specialties.

2. Capable in size and effective enough to accomplish missions, remain sustainable over time, and maintain resources within state capabilities.

3. Committed to the security and survival of the state, the preservation of the liberties and human rights of the citizens, and the peaceful transition of authority.

4. Confident in the ability to secure the country; earning the confidence of the citizenry, the government, and the international community.

For further details on SFA, refer to JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, and Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance Planners Guide: Foreign Security Forces (FSF) Force Development.

d. **Justice Reform.** The HN justice system encompasses an array of formal and informal institutions, groups, and individuals. These institutions can include the ministry of justice, law enforcement, law schools and bar associations, and legal advocacy organizations. The groups and individuals can include members of the judiciary, legislature, corrections, and prosecutor's office; public defenders; ombudsmen; regulatory bodies; and human rights and public interest groups. The legal framework includes the constitution, civil laws, rules, customs, traditions, and regulations. Peace agreements may also constitute part of the legal framework in post-conflict countries. Justice systems differ significantly across national boundaries; there may also be multiple justice systems functioning in a country. To enhance HN legitimacy, justice reform should build upon the existing legal frameworks. This may include common law, civil law, criminal codes, traditional or religious law, and international law. SSR planners must avoid imposing their concepts of law, justice, and security on the HN, except, perhaps, where characteristics are in dire need of reform such that they do not meet HN treaty obligations or customary international law with regard to human rights. Implementing such reform, even where warranted, will doubtless entail a sophisticated political analysis of the multi-ordered effects on the society. The HN's systems and values are central to its development of justice system reform.

(1) **Legal System.** An effective legal and judicial system is vital to the rule of law. Deviations from clear, widely accepted, and enforceable laws, and ready access to justice, are significant barriers to sustainable national and economic development. Consequently, legal and judicial reform has traditionally formed an important part of SSR, with the focus on the constitution, national laws, the court system, and judges. A formal justice system may be complemented by the informal customary or traditional justice systems that are unique to particular areas, cultures, or regions. Sometimes referred to as non-state justice systems, traditional justice systems frequently provide important alternatives to formal, codified systems and provide greater access to justice for remote or underserved populations. Traditional justice systems may enjoy high levels of legitimacy

with HN populations and may possess unique advantages as a means of promoting SSR programs in a broader context. Conversely, non-state systems may not adhere to human rights aspects of international law. At the very least, SSR planners should gain a thorough knowledge of any alternative systems that may be operating in a particular HN and accommodate them within the overall SSR program.

(2) Any transitional justice scheme is likely to be part of a wider reconciliation process and handling of unresolved justice concerns from past or ongoing conflicts, including war crimes and atrocities. In such cases, special venues and processes for conflict-related justice and reconciliation are often necessary. Such processes sometimes are incorporated in the comprehensive peace agreements that form the foundation of conflict transformation. Issues to be addressed in the initial development of a legal and judicial system are:

- (a) Fair and impartial laws and effective enforcement mechanisms.
- (b) Independent, impartial, and competent courts and judges.
- (c) Accountability and transparency in the judicial system.
- (d) Timely access to justice.
- (e) Transparent cooperation between state and traditional institutions.

(f) An integrated approach with other components of the criminal justice system including police and prison/penal reform bodies.

(3) Again, these considerations are politically sensitive and require evaluation at the highest levels to determine the level of reforms to be pursued toward these ideals. Many countries have legal systems based on civil law, which is widely used in continental Europe and Francophone Africa, rather than the common law system, which is typical of the US and other English-speaking countries. Western notions of fair and impartial laws and timely access to justice may not comport with the cultural norms of the HN and should not be imposed as long as those cultural norms do not violate or are not inconsistent with international legal obligations. Whatever transitional justice scheme is implemented must be perceived as legitimate by the HN and citizenry or is unlikely to lead toward long-term success.

(4) **Law Enforcement.** Law enforcement (especially police) forces supporting an effective and accountable justice system are central to a legitimate security sector. Although military forces may be involved initially in developing the justice and law enforcement forces, this task should be assumed by appropriate agencies as soon as possible. Qualified, professional justice sector and police trainers, normally from non-DOD sources, support an improved advising process and ensure sustainable development with appropriate civilian oversight. Reform of the security sector should include demilitarizing police forces and orienting policing towards service and protection of the citizenry rather than as an instrument of control from the central government. This may involve the creation of a community-based police service, with a clear separation between

the roles of the police and military forces. Professionalizing the police requires a clear distinction between rule of law and rule by law. In rule by law, law enforcement serves as an instrument of control for preservation of the regime. Rule of law refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. Ideally, any military assets assisting HN law enforcement will be drawn from military police forces as research has demonstrated that their training is similar to civilian police training offered in civilian police academies. Regardless, any military efforts should bring civilian policing advisors into military planning and implementation as soon as possible.

(5) Trainers and advisors who are tasked with the initial development of HN police services should:

(a) Assess police roles, responsibilities, structures, management, and practices.

(b) Understand the traditional role of police within the HN's society. From that starting point, they develop a force that conforms to internationally accepted law. Changing the institutional mentality of the police force to one that secures and protects the population requires extensive effort, time, and resources.

(c) Support links across the justice system to ensure system wide functionality.

(d) Improve police training, including the police education system. In the aftermath of conflict, it is important to focus training on investigative processes, including the gathering, handling, and preserving of evidence to support ongoing prosecutions. Though it is **important to note** that in some countries, **the police do not perform this function**—the prosecutor is responsible for investigation; thus, such training would be targeted appropriately. Ensure police training targets protection of civilian issues such as human trafficking.

(e) Enhance the ability of police services to plan and develop criminal intelligence analysis skills.

(f) Strengthen police accountability and integrate human rights considerations into accountability mechanisms.

(g) Develop an integrated approach that complements the broader SSR program.

(6) Law enforcement reform is nested within the larger justice system reform. The justice system consists of a number of interrelated steps—arrest, detention, prosecution, adjudication, corrections, and parole or rehabilitation. Functionality requires that all work together as a system. Law enforcement reform that outpaces the rest of the justice sector may result in more arrests with inadequate detention facilities and no means

of adjudication. This dilemma undermines the public trust and brings into question the legitimacy of the government, thereby encouraging vigilantism. Moreover, instant justice permits antigovernment movements to challenge the legitimacy of the central government.

(7) **Corrections System.** The justice system as a whole contributes to a secure, just, peaceful, and safe society through the use of appropriate and reasonable sanctions. As part of the justice system, corrections contributes to the protection of society by actively encouraging offenders to take advantage of opportunities that will assist them in becoming law-abiding citizens, while exercising only the degree of control necessary to provide for the safety of society. In the context of fragile states, overcrowded and poorly managed prisons are often characterized by abuse and torture and often present major health risks to the whole community. In some states, prisoners are often detained without charge, legal counsel, or trial. In these cases, specific SSR action is needed to reform and develop corrections systems quickly, placing immediate demands on military participation. Accordingly, corrections reform must occur simultaneously with reforms in the police and justice systems. Issues that should be considered in the initial development of a corrections system are:

(a) Ensuring respect for the human rights of detainees and the right to counsel and that they are detained in accordance with international detention standards that require separation by gender and age (adults and juveniles must be detained separately). Efforts should be made to segregate groups or persons that are at risk.

(b) Methods for reducing pretrial detention.

(c) Improving health and social services in prisons.

(d) Increasing HN civilian and multinational oversight of prisons.

(e) Promoting rehabilitation and reintegration.

(f) Developing an integrated approach with the judicial system.

(8) Priorities for technical assistance to the corrections system include staff development and training, management training, policy development, conditions of youth in detention, and the promotion of activities to address prison overcrowding. A sound policy framework is essential for the effective and efficient governance of any correctional system. However, policies must be based on the rule of law and be respectful of other international, regional, and national standards for corrections and the protection of human rights. Overall goals of corrections reform should include systemic improvements in corrections and criminal justice policies and legislation through a consistent approach to offenders based upon shared values and principles; effective programs to safely reintegrate offenders into society; and increased staff professionalism.

e. **Non-State Security Forces.** Local militias, hunting societies, neighborhood crime watches, citizen security patrols, and tribal forces are a frequent response when the state is unable to provide effective security to local communities and may be significant employers within local communities. SSR programs must acknowledge the presence of these non-

state groups and determine how best to deal with them. Indeed, intervening forces may quickly achieve a measure of local legitimacy by partnering with local non-state security groups in such situations. Because non-state security forces lack accountability mechanisms and oversight systems, over time they tend to become major abusers of human rights and predators in their own and other communities. This tendency is exacerbated by lack of training as law enforcement officers and the use of force in a community policing role. As violence increases in frequency and becomes more intense, lack of effective control over militia activities incurs proportionally greater costs. Uncontrolled violence, once accepted, tacitly or otherwise, by state authorities or intervening forces, is very difficult to restrain. To the extent that a partnership has developed between local forces and the intervening force, the declining legitimacy and problematic functionality of local militias will accrue to their sponsors as well. As discussed earlier, the DDR of non-state security forces is essential to reforming an HN's security sector. DDR is particularly challenging for local forces. Where bearing weapons is a socially accepted feature of adulthood and corresponds with the universal right of self-defense, complete disarmament does not serve society. Although counterintuitive, an armed citizenry deters predatory criminal practices and militant attacks on the local populace, thereby increasing stability. However, disarmament processes should differentiate between personal weapons and heavy or crew-served weapons. Without an effective demobilization process, which promotes confidence in the peace process (i.e., segregation and encampment of former warring factions, dismantling militia chains of command, and recognizing the honorable service of veterans upon discharge), the pathologies of violent behavior are likely to endure. Greater attention to reintegration in terms of organization, funding, resources, personnel, and time will have a more enduring impact on sustained peace and progress in SSR.

(1) **Private Military and Security Forces.** The private security industry comprises those individuals and institutions that provide security for people and property under contract and for profit. The activities of a private security industry without accountability and oversight can present unique governance problems and act as an obstacle to SSR programs of both military and law enforcement forces. Increased security provision by non-state organizations is prevalent in all regions of the world. SSR planners therefore must consider the potentially serious implications of the private security industry in the HN, as well as the effects of limited regulation and accountability of a market, which continues to grow in both size and importance. While SSR programs now recognize the value of properly scoping and reforming public security agencies such as the military and police as key to transition and democratization, the need to introduce similar levels of professionalism and accountability in the private sector has typically been neglected by SSR programs. This is despite the fact that the sector often represents one of the largest armed groups within a country. There are many types of organizations that compose the private security industry, including:

(a) Service providers that conduct mine clearance, logistics and supply, and risk consulting.

(b) Private security companies (PSCs) that protect industrial and commercial sites, humanitarian aid missions, embassies, very important persons, and military

camps/bases, as well as conducting surveillance and investigation and risk assessment and analysis.

(c) Private military companies (PMCs) that support military training, military intelligence, and offensive combat.

(2) There are significant challenges to incorporating elements of the private security industry into a comprehensive SSR program. SSR planners need to develop a comprehensive system providing for effective regulation and oversight of this industry. In the absence of adequate legislation and regulation there may be no control over the type or quality of services providing these elements. Untrained staff with questionable backgrounds may use armed force in an undisciplined or extralegal manner. More important to an effective SSR program, the introduction of armed PSCs/PMCs competes with the state's traditional monopoly on the use of force and, where unregulated, hinders rather than helps law enforcement. In states with a history of ethnic or other sectarian conflict there is the potential for PSCs/PMCs to be misused against ethnic as well as political rivals. Specific objectives of SSR programs will be dependent upon the context of the OE. They should be formulated with the overall aims of increasing democratic oversight and accountability of the entire sector. This can be achieved by formulating a comprehensive system of legislation and regulation for the private security industry, developing effective mechanisms for oversight, and encouraging a culture of professionalism. An example of this would be comprehensive licensing systems clearly defining the type of services that PSCs/PMCs may be allowed to provide and providing for the revocation of licenses in certain cases.

f. Intelligence and Security Service Reform. Intelligence and security service reform is a key element of SSR because intelligence both supports SSR and is the target of reform activities. Intelligence and security services are normally located within central government, typically reporting directly to senior decision makers. They should provide warnings and insights about threats and trends which impact the security and economic well-being of a state and allow decision makers to shape policy. The most crucial task facing countries embarking on SSR processes is to build a nationally owned and led vision of security. This can be achieved through a national security review to elaborate on overarching threats to the country's security and to support the development of a policy on national security. Such a review allows the HN government to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate security activities, and delineates between the competing claims for resources. Intelligence services can make a significant contribution to this process through the provision of accurate intelligence on the range of threats faced by the state.

(1) In addition to assisting the overall SSR process, intelligence services themselves frequently require reform. Intelligence services of the state may have been involved in human rights abuses or participated in the rule of an authoritarian or tyrannical regime. Thus, there may be a requirement to reform the intelligence services and structures of a state as a part of the comprehensive SSR program. Indicators of where services may require reform include:

(a) Balance between the necessary secrecy of the intelligence services and transparency regarding their mandates and their powers.

(b) Existence of oversight structures to minimize maladministration.

(c) Extent of control over and public accountability for the financing of intelligence services.

(d) Controls in place to govern the use of intrusive methods of intelligence collections.

(e) Professionalism and ethics of intelligence officers.

(2) There are three types of intelligence services that may be present in an HN:

(a) Intelligence on foreign or external threats.

(b) Intelligence on threats to internal security.

(c) Intelligence-led advice on policy and decision making.

(3) Two of the main drivers behind foreign intelligence capabilities are to learn and understand as much as possible about other states' capabilities and to prevent a foreign power achieving strategic surprise. This requires access to both secret and open-source information, primarily focused on national security, military and defense, political, economic, and foreign policy issues. Primary examples of the capability centered on this type of activity are the Central Intelligence Agency and the United Kingdom Secret Intelligence Service.

(4) Security intelligence focuses on those threats that operate internally to the HN. Security intelligence is generally distinctive to the law enforcement sector. However, these distinctions are often blurred as domestic and foreign intelligence activities increasingly overlap, particularly in the realm of activities such as CT, which can encompass threats to domestic targets, overseas embassies, armed forces, or commercial interests in foreign countries.

(5) Intelligence can also be used to support policy-formulation and decision-making processes of an HN government. This can occur through the provision of tactical or strategic intelligence assessments that provide a long-term view of a particular issue. It allows governments to reduce uncertainty and manage risk through scoping the possible set of future threats with which the government may be faced.

(6) In reforming and training intelligence organizations, as with the rule of law, the military might not be the ideal lead, though military intelligence personnel may need to be factored into the development of the HN military capacity. Traditionally, US civilian intelligence agencies have taken the lead in building intelligence capacity in countries where reconstruction efforts are ongoing.

4. Guidance for Security Sector Reform

a. **Support HN Ownership.** The HN's history, culture, legal framework, and institutions must inform the principles, policies, laws, and structures that form an SSR program. As a result, the needs, priorities, and circumstances driving SSR will differ substantially from one country to another. Accounting for the basic security concerns of the HN population is essential for attaining buy-in and is essential to the success of SSR. To ensure the sustainability of reforms, assistance should be designed to meet the needs of the HN population and to support HN agencies, processes, and priorities. To accomplish this, SSR generally should be developed to serve longer-term goals.

b. **Incorporate Principles of Good Governance and Respect for Human Rights.** Accountability, transparency, public participation, respect for human rights, civilian harm mitigation, and legitimacy must be mainstreamed in security force development. Military and civilian security forces must carry out their core functions in accordance with these principles. This is particularly important in rebuilding countries where the legacy of abuse by security personnel may have eroded public confidence in the sector overall. SSR programs should include constitutional checks and balances, accountability and oversight mechanisms, including thorough direct collaboration with civil society, to prevent abuses of power and corruption, and to build public confidence. The vetting of recruits or candidates is routinely done prior to giving provisional assistance or training to security forces. Likewise, SSR programs must incorporate an explicit focus on security sector governance. Strengthening the overall legal, policy, and budgetary frameworks should be an important component of SSR into any country.

c. **Balance Operational Support with Institutional Reform.** Incentives, processes, resources, and structures must be put in place so that externally supported reforms, resources, and capacities are sustained after assistance ends. Equal emphasis should be placed on how the forces and organizations that US and international assistance strengthen through capability building programs will be financed, managed, monitored, deployed, and supported by partner nation governments. Training platforms and materiel assistance must be coordinated with efforts to develop HN infrastructure, personnel and administrative support systems, logistic and planning procedures, and an adequate and sustainable resource base. Success and sustainability depend on developing the institutions and processes that support security forces as well as the human capacity to lead and manage them.

d. **Link Security and Justice.** A country's security policies and practices must be founded upon the rule of law and linked to the broader justice sector. SSR should aim to ensure that all security forces operate within the bounds of domestic and international law, and that they support wide-ranging efforts to enforce and promote the rule of law. The police in particular should operate as an integral part of the justice system and directly support other parts of the justice sector, including the courts and corrections institutions. Assistance to the police and other state security providers may need a complement of other efforts to strengthen these institutions, so as to avoid unintended consequences and to ensure security forces operate according to the law. Experience demonstrates, for example, that police assistance undertaken, absent efforts to strengthen other parts of the justice

system, can lead to increased arrests without the necessary means to adjudicate cases, as well as defending, incarcerating, or rehabilitating suspected offenders. In addition, although the tendency may be to focus on criminal justice systems, civil justice reform may have important implications for law and order, particularly with respect to the resolution of potential conflict drivers, such as land disputes.

e. **Foster Transparency.** Effective SSR programs should be as transparent and open to the public as practical. Program design should foster awareness of reform efforts among HN officials and the population, neighboring countries, the donor community, and others with a potential stake in program outcomes. Likewise, DOS, DOD, and USAID practitioners should consult broadly with other USG departments and agencies, NGOs, international organizations, international donors, and the media, to enhance program development and program execution.

f. **Do No Harm.** Donor assistance can become a part of the conflict dynamic serving either to increase or reduce tension. As with any activity that involves changes to the status quo, SSR planners and implementers must pay close attention to minimize adverse effects on the local population and community structures, the security sector, or the wider political, social, and economic climate in unanticipated or unintended ways. Developing a thorough understanding of the system for which change is sought, and the actual needs that exist, is a prerequisite for the success of any SSR-related activity. Practitioners should conduct a risk assessment prior to implementation and be prepared to adjust activities over the lifetime of the SSR program. When harm occurs despite such precautions, it should be acknowledged and addressed in a culturally appropriate way.

5. Planning for Security Sector Reform

a. **Comprehensive Plan.** The military contribution to an SSR program should be incorporated within a comprehensive reform plan, which should be developed by all the stakeholders, including the intervention force where applicable, international organizations, NGOs, and HN leadership. During a FID or COIN operation, the IDAD strategy is the overarching strategy for SSR. In any case, the overarching strategy should set out a realistic timeline for reform that recognizes the context of the issues, as well as the resources available, the HN leadership capacity to deliver change, and existing institutional capabilities. The strategic reform plan should take into account certain factors:

(1) **A Comprehensive Vision for the Security Sector.** It should articulate all threats and responses to those elements that seek to destabilize state institutions. This may take the form of a national security strategy that coordinates security, political, and economic policies.

(2) **Priorities.** Priorities among the various SSR tasks, the lead element for each, and their funding sources.

(3) **The Structure of the Security Sector.** This should also designate roles and responsibilities for the various aspects of the sector defined and measures to strengthen the relationships developed within the sector.

(4) **Transfer of Responsibility.** All elements of the strategic reform plan must have an end state of turning over responsibility to institutions of the HN.

b. **Objectives.** There are four primary objectives when conducting SSR:

(1) Increase effective governance, oversight, and accountability in the security sector.

(2) Improve delivery of security and justice.

(3) Assist local leadership in developing an ownership of the reform process.

(4) Support the development of sustainable security and justice delivery.

c. **LOEs.** In SSA the needs of each situation and each country vary greatly. As such, reform efforts must be context-driven. The USG should formulate SSA in a holistic way that encompasses institutional structures, resource management, operational capacity, and civilian oversight and governance.

(1) **Institutional Structures.** From the outset, SSR should support the HN's national structures that will manage the implementation of SSR, since national ownership and leadership are essential for effective security sector development. SSR should focus on the organizational structures and management processes within security sector organizations. Merely training and equipping judges, prosecutors, corrections officers, law enforcement officers, or other security personnel would be ineffective and unsustainable. Managerial systems and planning capacities need to be developed and supported in coordination with training and equipping programs at the various levels of government—national, provincial, and local—and need to correspond closely to local capabilities. They must also be integrated with governance reform programs.

(2) **Resource Management.** Sustainable SSR programs must take into account basic resource issues such as the number of qualified personnel, their skill levels, and existing materiel support in the HN. Capacity development is an essential component of SSR programs that must take into account the existing resource management structures and resources on hand to enhance basic security and other service delivery, while also working to increase the governance and regulatory capacities of the state.

(3) **Operational Capacity.** Capacity development refers to the ability of US and partner nation forces to train and advise HN individuals and institutions to develop security strategies, set priorities, solve problems, and achieve results with the resources available. It is a broader concept than the training and technical assistance approaches that are usually employed to address capacity shortfalls. Capacity development requires a comprehensive approach from all USG departments and agencies in coordination with partner nations, international organizations like the UN, and NGOs, and that addresses capacity gaps while tailoring them to the OE. Strengthening capacity in HN governments to develop, manage, and implement SSR should be a central aspect of all reform programs. Capacity needs are present throughout the security sector, and not just within state institutions. In the past, capacity development programs have failed because wider governance issues (e.g.,

systematic corruption) have not been understood. For this reason a thorough assessment must inform the SSR planning process.

(4) **Civilian Oversight and Governance.** Civilian oversight bodies are institutions authorized by the state to manage and oversee the activities and governance of security forces and agencies. They can be formal or informal. They may include (but are not limited to) the executive branch and ministries of defense, interior, justice, and foreign affairs; judicial branch, national security coordination and advisory bodies; the legislative branch and its committees; traditional and customary authorities; the ministry of finance and other financial management bodies; civilian review boards and compliance commissions; and local government structures. Local government structures in security include governors, municipal councils, auditing bodies, civilian review boards, and public complaints commissions.

d. **Planning Considerations.** SSR planning must account for several interrelated factors that influence reform, including cultural awareness, leadership capacity building, public trust and confidence, HN dependency, perseverance, and end state. Interactions among the security sector and these factors complicate reform efforts. Actions taken to reform one aspect of the security sector affect reform activities in another. Effective assessment of these factors, together with the sector in its entirety, will drive the process and help define success.

(1) **Cultural Awareness.** Regardless of the need to develop an HN's security forces quickly, SSA requires considerable tolerance, cultural awareness, and an environment of mutual respect. Organizations and individuals working closely with HN security forces must respect the security culture of the HN. This culture is shaped by history, language, religion, and customs and must be understood. Cultural awareness and sensitivity are necessary to dispel the natural tensions that arise when external authorities dictate the terms and conditions of SSR for the HN. Responsiveness, flexibility, and adaptability to local culture help limit resentment and resistance to reform while generating local solutions to local problems. Local help fosters acceptance and strengthens the confidence of the citizens in reform.

(2) **Leadership Capacity Building.** Challenges associated with developing capable, legitimate, and accountable security forces require capable leadership in the HN security sector at all levels. To establish the conditions for long-term success, SSA may help the HN identify and begin training and advising security force leaders as early as possible. Such efforts must avoid undermining HN legitimacy while recognizing that assistance, advice, and education may be needed. Programs focused on developing senior leaders, such as those conducted by the DOD regional centers for security studies, may prove helpful. Often the HN can augment programs for officer training and staff college courses of participating forces and may even develop similar institutions. This participation ensures that future leaders gain the knowledge and skills to manage security forces effectively while meeting the broader responsibilities normally associated with leaders in the security sector.

(3) **Public Trust and Confidence.** In rebuilding the institutions of a failed state, commanders must engender trust and confidence between the local populace and the security forces. As SSR proceeds, these security forces carry a progressively greater burden in ensuring public safety. Frequently, they do so in an environment characterized by crime and violence. This proves true in areas recovering from violent, predatory forces. Recovery requires a community-based response that uses the unique capabilities of the security forces and police. Operating in accordance with the laws of the HN, the success of these forces will help gain the trust and confidence of the local populace. Furthermore, increased public confidence engenders greater desire among the people to support the efforts of the security forces. External participants in SSR must focus on enhancing the functionality of HN security forces while sustaining and strengthening the perception of legitimacy for civilians. Public confidence is further strengthened as HN forces support activities that foster civil participation. These activities, such as providing security for elections, associate the security forces with positive processes; this improves the credibility of HN security forces while providing visible signs of accountability and responsibility.

(4) **HN Dependency.** During reform, the risk of building a culture of dependency is mitigated by adopting a training process. This process sequentially provides training and equipment to security forces, a dedicated advising capability, and an advisory presence. After initial training efforts, this reform helps HN security forces progress toward the transition of security responsibility. A robust transition plan supports the gradual and coherent easing of HN dependency, typically in the form of increased responsibility and accountability. Depending on an assessment of the OE, external forces in SSR may need to protect new HN security forces from many direct and immediate threats during their development. While this requirement usually applies only during initial training, security forces remain at risk throughout their development during SSR; these threats may contribute to problems with discipline, dependability, and desertion. In extreme circumstances, protecting HN security forces may necessitate training outside the physical boundaries of the state.

(5) **Perseverance.** SSR is a complex activity, and participants must demonstrate persistence and resilience in managing the dynamic interactions among the various factors affecting the reform program. Within the SSR processes, some failures are likely. Early identification of potential points of failure, such as corruption within the police force, allows for mitigating action.

e. SSR and the international assistance that supports it are inherently political processes. The processes that are initiated by reforms inevitably create winners and losers as they challenge traditional interests and existing power relationships. SSR therefore has an explicitly political objective to ensure that security is provided in a manner consistent with US and internationally accepted democratic norms, human rights principles, and the rule of law. Security can be provided and governed by state and non-state institutions in many ways and ultimately is driven by a country's balance of power. Therefore, SSR is best approached as a comprehensive governance issue and not simply as a technical and military activity.

6. Security Sector Reform During Nation Assistance

a. SSR may be initiated following a diplomatic request for assistance from another country and may be managed through the UN. The focus for this activity is likely to be the reform of existing security institutions and specific capability strengthening initiatives, such as improving indigenous CT capabilities or providing intelligence training and police investigative skills. The scope for this activity is wide and each act of assistance should be carefully matched to local conditions. Initial delivery of assistance to a country may lead to further involvement across the full range of security sector activity.

b. **Ministry.** USG personnel may provide advice to HN officials to enable reform in these areas:

(1) High-level reform aims to assist senior officials in the HN security sector to link threats with capabilities, leading to affordable plans for developing the sector.

(2) Reform should encourage governments to include security expenditure within standard public resource management in a transparent way and to ensure that affordability is a driving consideration.

(3) Advice on change and project management may strengthen HN capacity to deliver reform.

c. **Training.** Professional military training is the most prominent activity for routine contribution by US military forces. Routine military assistance often takes the form of a military training team that provides military advice and training for HN military forces.

d. **Education.** The US military and other countries have long exchanged instructors and students in professional military command and staff courses. With its strong reputation in staff and officer training, the US is well placed to advise other nations on the restructuring or development of their military education systems. Education should include the role of military forces in a democratic society.

7. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

a. DDR may form part of a peace agreement and is conducted as part of a wider post-conflict recovery process. DDR seeks to increase stability by ensuring that combatants, and their weapons, are taken out of the conflict and provided with at least a minimal transition package. This facilitates their return to civilian life and helps them forgo returning to arms. The complex DDR process has dimensions that are PMESII. DDR can potentially provide incentives for commanders and combatants to enter negotiations to facilitate political reconciliation, dissolve belligerent force structures, and present opportunities for former combatants and other DDR beneficiaries to return to their communities. Implementing DDR requires an examination of the desired end state and environmental variables to determine the best approach to increase stability.

b. While the process is focused on the ex-combatants, the wider community will also feel the benefits of a successful DDR program that enhances security and is a clear sign of

progress to peace. However, communities will require assistance to successfully absorb such ex-combatants. DDR is complex and fraught with potential unforeseen consequences. If combatants are disarmed too quickly, this may create a security vacuum; if they are detained for too long in encampments, this may create unrest. Without a fully funded reintegration program, militia leaders may simply reform their groups for criminal purposes, creating a different security problem. Gender, ethnic, and minority issues must also be considered in the design of DDR programs. The immediate goal of DDR is to appropriately scope the armed forces to the security requirements of the HN. Typically, a DDR program transitions from disarmament and demobilization to reintegration. Disarmament and demobilization refers to the act of releasing or disbanding an armed unit and the collection and control of weapons and weapons systems. Reintegration helps former combatants return to civilian life through benefit packages and strategies that help them become socially and economically embedded in their communities.

c. **Importance of DDR to Stability.** The DDR program is a critical component of peace and security and should be accounted for in initial planning. Often, the terms of this program are negotiated in cease-fire or peace accords. DDR focuses on the immediate management of people previously associated with armed forces and belligerent groups. DDR sets the foundation of a secure environment and for sustaining the communities in which these individuals live as contributing, law-abiding citizens. The DDR program is a central contributor to long-term peace, security, and development. DDR dictates, and is dictated by, a variety of priority areas in planning for operations and SSR. The promise of DDR to formerly competing fighting forces often plays a crucial role in achieving a peace agreement. DDR planning directly ties to SSR, determining the potential size and scope of military, police, and other security structures. In addition, reintegration of former combatants back into their communities sets the foundation for—and determines the success of—long-term peace-building and development programs. The success of DDR depends on integrating strategies and planning across all the sectors. The employment opportunities extended to disarmed and demobilized former combatants result from an effectively governed, viable economy. If the DDR program expires without providing alternative economic opportunities to the former combatants, the likelihood of a return to violence substantially increases. DDR closely coordinates with security reform efforts in all sectors to ensure an integrated approach that synchronizes activities toward a common end state.

d. Generally, the military does not lead the planning and execution of the DDR program. However, military forces must be integrated in the planning of DDR from its inception and may be involved more directly in the disarmament and demobilization stages. Military forces and police, whether from external sources or the HN, are fundamental to the broad success of the program, providing security for DDR processes.

e. Successful DDR programs use many approaches designed for specific conditions. Each program reflects the unique aspects of the situation, culture, and character of the state. The best interests of children and their protection from violence and abuse are overarching principles during DDR.

f. In operations involving the welfare of children, the entire process emphasizes integration and inherently is a community process. To the greatest extent possible, children associated with armed groups (child soldiers) should be immediately released and reintegrated into civil society. Cash payments to demobilized minors are harmful and should therefore be avoided. Juvenile justice considerations, which may involve restorative as well as retributive actions, are central to any DDR program involving child soldiers. International DDR approaches must comply with *The Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups*, also known as the *Paris Principles*. The SJA is the staff principal responsible for providing command guidance on any situations pertaining to child combatants.

For more information on DDR, refer to JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency, and JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.

8. Transitions

a. SSR programs should be monitored throughout implementation to ensure they deliver sustainable results while minimizing unintended negative consequences. Program evaluation at key decision points and at the close of specific projects will provide important MOEs to adjust ongoing programs and to provide lessons for future SSR programs. Program evaluation should identify expected outcomes.

b. Military forces gradually transfer the responsibilities they have accumulated during combat operations to other participants in the SSR effort, whether from one military force to another or to civilian groups or agencies. Transferring security responsibility from intervening to HN security forces should be done according to the tactical, operational, and strategic conditions identified during planning. As forces establish suitable conditions, responsibility for security gradually transitions to the local, provincial, and national government. During the transition of authority, progress through transition should be gauged by a process that confirms the performance and capabilities of each respective HN security force. These capabilities can be gauged through exercises similar to those used to validate the readiness of US and multinational forces for contingency operations. This prevents a premature transition of authority, which can lead to a loss of confidence and cause the populace to seek alternative means of security, damaging the overall SSR program.

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APPENDIX D TRANSITIONAL GOVERNING AUTHORITIES

1. Transitional Military Authority

a. General

(1) Military government is the supreme authority the military exercises by force or agreement over the lands, property, and indigenous populations and institutions of domestic, allied, or enemy territory therefore substituting sovereign authority under rule of law for the previously established government. Military governments are temporary national and/or local governments led and staffed primarily by military personnel, and possibly augmented by civilians.

(2) Transitional military authority is a temporary military government exercising the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority. Under extreme circumstances, in which the enemy government has failed completely or has been deposed by US forces as the occupier under the law of war, have a legal responsibility to install a transitional military authority to govern the occupied territory. Under these circumstances, the military will take the lead in the stability sectors. However, a transitional military authority may draw assistance from experienced civilian agencies and organizations. These agencies and organizations have the expertise to establish a system of government that fosters the gradual transition to a legitimate HN authority. Sometimes, however, sufficient civilian expertise is not present or conditions of an OE do not support introducing such civilian expertise. Military forces may then be required to lead until they stabilize the security situation and can safely transition responsibility for the stability sectors to civil authority and civil control. The transitional military authority exercises temporary executive, legislative, and judicial authority in a foreign territory.

(3) A transitional military authority restores and maintains public order, ensures the safety and security of the local populace, and provides essential civil services. Transitional military authority is not limited to the occupation of enemy territory. During operations outside the US and its territories, necessity may also require establishing transitional military authority in various situations, including an allied or neutral territory liberated from enemy forces, a neutral or allied territory proven to be hostile, or an UGA.

(4) The authority to establish military governance resides with the President and is exercised through SecDef and the JFC. (See Chapter II, “An Integrated Approach to Stabilization,” for a discussion of governance.) Broad policy formulation and initial planning for transitional military authority is conducted under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, the JFC, key staff, subordinate Service components, and allied commanders also participate to a lesser degree. US forces will only assume control prescribed in directives to the JFC.

(5) An occupying force establishes a military government, including a transitional military authority pursuant to international law, including The Hague and Geneva Conventions. Such authority is limited in scope by international law. In other

circumstances, military forces establish a transitional military authority pursuant to a UN Security Council resolution or a similar international legal authority, which will also describe the limits of that authority. Commanders should only take action with regard to transitional military authority after close and careful consultation with the legal advisor.

(6) Civil administration—and the tasks that support it—evolve from the essential tasks described in the stability ETM. Establishing transitional military authority may require military forces to complete tasks typically performed by the HN government. These tasks may be provided for under international law and UN Security Council resolutions. In cases other than the occupation of enemy territory, the international community generally will lead this effort through an international organization such as the UN. The occupation of enemy territory may result in one nation or a coalition of nations providing the transitional military authority.

(7) Effective transitional military authority enhances security and facilitates ongoing operations while fulfilling the legal obligations of occupying forces under international law. This authority enhances stability by promoting the safety and security of both military forces and the local populace, reducing active or passive sabotage, and maintaining public order. It helps ongoing operations by building HN capability and capacity to perform government functions and relieving maneuver forces of the responsibility of civil administration. Until the military authority can safely transition to civil authority and control, activities of the transitional military authority are performed with civilian personnel assistance and participation. These civilians may come from the HN, the USG, or other agencies or organizations. This cooperation facilitates the transition while ensuring that all activities complement and reinforce efforts to set conditions necessary to achieve success.

(8) The objective for a transitional military authority is to establish a government that supports US objectives, restores and maintains public order, ensures the safety and security of the local populace, and provides humanitarian assistance and essential civil services. The time during which a transitional military authority exercises authority varies based on the requirements of the military operation, UN Security Council resolutions, and/or international law.

(9) The goal of US military's civil administration in an occupied territory is to create an effective civil administration. This administration should not pose a threat to future peace and stability. The commander of a transitional military authority has the right, within the limits set by international law and US laws and treaties, to demand and enforce law and order in an occupied area to accomplish the mission and properly manage the area.

(10) To establish transitional military authority, commanders may require from the HN population a level of obedience commensurate with military necessity. Such obedience provides security of military forces, maintenance of law and order, and proper administration of the operational area. In return for such obedience, the inhabitants have a right to freedom from unnecessary interference with their individual liberty and property rights. Subject to the requirements of the military situation, commanders must observe the principle of governing for the benefit of the governed.

(11) The degree of control exercised by a transitional military authority varies greatly due to several factors, including the legal authorities of the military commander under international law, existing attitudes and the level of cooperation among the HN's leaders and the populace, ongoing and projected military operations, the presence of hostile or enemy forces. As conditions in the territory subject to transitional military authority stabilize, the degree of control exercised by a military authority can decrease. Authority and control can transfer either to the legitimate sovereign or to another civil authority.

b. Organization

(1) The JFC is responsible for the detailed planning and operations of the transitional military authority under the general guidelines received from the President and SecDef. The structure and organization of the transitional military authority depend on international law; UN Security Council resolution; the mission of the military force; the organization, capabilities, and capacities of deployed forces; the military and political conditions of the OE, the nature, structure, and organization of the existing or former HN government; and the physical, political, economic, and cultural geography of the HN. The JFC may execute the authorities of civil administration directly, invest the authority in subordinate operational commanders, or establish a separate JCMOTF.

(a) Concentrating authority and responsibility in the commander or in subordinate operational commands helps ensure that activities related to civil administration, including relations between the military and HN civilians, are integrated consistently with ongoing operations. However, the higher the tempo within the operational area, the less the commander is able to address the requirements of civil administration. This is partly because areas of high operational tempo will normally require frequently changing civil administration policies. Finally, operational HQ are not always assigned operational areas corresponding to existing political subdivisions.

(b) Establishing a separate JCMOTF to conduct civil administration may institute a concentration of expertise and focus on stabilization efforts. However, a command dedicated to stabilization efforts, including civil administration, represents a separate chain of command from combat forces, particularly if the JCMOTF does not report to the JFC executing combat operations. In this case, activities of the transitional military authority must be carefully coordinated with those of combat forces.

(2) The head of an established civil administration system is the civil administrator or military governor. The administrator is a military commander or other designated person who exercises authority over the occupied territory. The military governor may command subordinate military governors assigned to political subdivisions throughout the territory.

(3) A transitional military authority may draw assistance from experienced civilians from the HN, the USG, or other agencies and organizations. These agencies and organizations have the expertise to establish a system of government that fosters the gradual transition to a legitimate HN authority. This cooperation facilitates the transition

while ensuring that all activities complement and reinforce efforts to establish conditions necessary to achieve success.

(4) Where practical, the transitional military authority should retain subordinate officials and employees of the HN government. These officials can continue to properly discharge their duties under the direction and supervision of appropriately trained military personnel. Even with the use of local civilians, the occupying forces still retain the power to exercise supreme authority. HN officials working for the transitional military authority should be appropriately compensated.

(a) The transitional military authority should thoroughly vet and assess the capability of the remaining HN government officials to determine if those officials can support and contribute to the transitional military authority. Those who refuse to serve the best interests of the transitional military authority may be suspended. Additionally, if permitted by international law, offices that are unnecessary or detrimental to the transitional military authority may close temporarily.

(b) Military officials of the transitional military authority should refrain from developing or maintaining unofficial relationships with local officials and HN personnel. Military personnel must refuse personal favors or gifts offered by local government officials or the local populace unless authorized by higher authority. DOD ethics rules provide appropriate guidelines for the relationships among military supervisory officials and HN subordinates.

(5) Any member of the joint force may contribute relevant information on the local populace and other aspects of the OE. Foreign area officers, CA personnel, and others normally concentrate their efforts on specific aspects of local culture, and general customs and behaviors. Intelligence analysts will use all this information to produce timely and relevant intelligence and distribute appropriate products throughout the joint force and interorganizational partners, as appropriate.

c. Existing Laws, Customs, and Boundaries

(1) The laws of the territory subject to military authority/control may not be changed, except to the extent permitted by the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Commanders must consult closely and carefully with their legal advisors before attempting to change any local laws.

(2) In general, the military authority should not impose the customs of another nation on the governed territory. Implementing changes or reforms inconsistent with local customs may foster active or passive resistance, adding friction to an already complex effort. Commanders and their legal advisors must recognize that laws and customs often vary between political divisions of a country, such as between provinces or municipalities. Commanders need to identify issues related to ethnic and minority groups so policies of the transitional military authority do not inadvertently oppress such groups.

(3) Local boundaries and political divisions may not be redrawn except to the extent permitted by international law. Where possible, boundaries of operational areas

covered by separate or subordinate military governments should normally reflect these boundaries as closely as possible.

d. Forms of Transitional Military Authority

(1) In general, transitional military authorities are either operational or territorial. An operational form of transitional military authority expands in authority as operations continue. In the territorial form of transitional military authority, the JFC establishes a separate organization under the direct command of the JFC or an authorized subordinate.

(2) Operational Form of Transitional Military Authority

(a) The responsibilities and geographic area over which a transitional military authority exercises civil administration may expand as operations continue. Commanders oversee civil functions of government in their respective operational areas. This includes ensuring the safety, security, and well-being of the local populace as well as providing humanitarian assistance. Under the operational form of transitional military authority, the chain of command retains the responsibility for authority and is supported by its staff structure.

(b) Concentrating authority and responsibility in the commander helps ensure that activities related to civil administration are integrated consistently with ongoing operations. These activities include relationships between the military force and civilians. By ensuring the integrity of unity of command in an operational area, commanders mitigate much of the friction associated with operations in and among the local populace. As the situation permits, the responsibility for civil administration transfers to the HN or other civil authority to help the HN return to full self-governance. Using HN civilian advisory groups helps accelerate this transfer of authority.

(c) The advantages of operational form of transitional military authority, however, are tempered by the rate of military activities. Generally, the higher the tempo within the operational area, the less the commander can address the requirements of transitional military authority. In areas where the tempo of operations and civil situation are consistently dynamic, civil administration policies may change frequently. Finally, operational HQ are not always assigned operational areas corresponding to known political subdivisions. Even after hostilities, conformance of these areas to political boundaries may prove impossible, however desirable.

(3) Territorial Form of Transitional Military Authority

(a) In the territorial form of transitional military authority, commanders establish a separate organization to exercise the functions of civil administration. It may be under the direct command of the JFC or an authorized subordinate, or it may report directly to SecDef or the President. The military governor may command subordinate military governors assigned to political subdivisions throughout the HN. Generally, the territorial form of the transitional military authority follows a separate chain of command from operational forces.

(b) A territorial form of transitional military authority typically uses military manpower and expertise more effectively and economically than an operational form of transitional military authority. Established after the operational area is stabilized, a territorial form of transitional military authority may ensure improved continuity of policy and administration. It should facilitate selecting and assigning specially trained military personnel. A territorial form of transitional military authority operates under the stability principle of unity of effort and purpose, to achieve unified action.

(c) However, the existence of a separate chain of command within an operational area or a political subdivision presents unique challenges to the territorial form of transitional military authority. Activities of the territorial military authority must be carefully coordinated with those of operational military forces. These activities must not interfere with ongoing operations or expose the operational force to undue risk. To ensure unity of effort, the territorial form of transitional military authority and the operational forces must maintain close communications, cooperation, and coordination.

(4) In practice, the exact form of authority should be adapted to suit the political and military situation in the operational area. A territorial form of transitional military authority may draw certain features from an operational form, or vice versa. As operations progress, the character of the military authority may evolve according to the situation, mirroring the effort to build HN capacity. In certain cases, one type of military authority may dominate in one region of the HN, while another type is better suited for another region.

e. Local Government Officials and Departments

(1) Successfully implementing transitional military authority often depends on how the HN government and its civilians participate and contribute. The transitional military authority thoroughly assesses the capability of the remaining HN government officials. This assessment determines if those officials can support and contribute to transitional military authority. The long-term success of the operation may depend on this assessment. If permitted by international law, offices that are unnecessary or detrimental to the transitional military authority may close temporarily, and officials who refuse to serve the best interests of the transitional military authority may be suspended. However, such officials may be retained in an advisory capacity at the discretion of the military commander. In such cases, they should continue to receive compensation for their services.

(2) Generally, if a transitional military authority needs to be established, high-ranking political officials of the former government will not continue to hold office. Such officials may include heads of the HN government, cabinet ministers, and other political elites. To the extent permitted by international law, the transitional military authority may be required to perform certain duties that would otherwise fall to individuals in these positions.

(3) Typically, mere membership in unfriendly organizations or political groups is not by itself considered sufficient grounds for removal from office. However, officials who have served as active leaders of such organizations or political groups may need to

leave office. Similarly, officials who prove unreliable or corrupt must leave office through legal action or through an open, transparent administrative process. The willful failure of retained officials to perform their duties satisfactorily is a serious offense against the transitional military authority.

(4) The commander's decisions about whether to retain leaders of the local government will likely vary. In some areas, full local participation may be the norm, while in other areas entire departments and bureaus of the local government may need to close. Where practical, the transitional military authority should retain subordinate officials and employees of the local government. These officials can continue to discharge their duties under the direction and supervision of appropriately trained military personnel. Under certain circumstances, military forces may protect officials who continue to serve in, or are appointed to, local public service. Hostile elements may pose a threat to these individuals.

(5) In some areas, the local populace may have had very limited participation in government due to centralized power in an authoritarian regime or a dominating foreign power. Elitist groups may also have focused regional, provincial, or municipal power under their control, negating the participation of the local populace. In such cases, civilian officials of the former government may flee. Even if they remain, it may be impractical or unsafe for them to continue in office. For this reason, building new partner capability—training local nationals to assume certain government positions—must often precede long-term efforts in building partner capacity.

(6) When military authority removes a local official or that official is unavailable, the transitional military authority seeks a fully qualified, trained, and experienced replacement. When selecting officials, the military authority considers their reliability, willingness to cooperate with the transitional military authority, and status in the community. The transitional military authority does not make permanent appointments, however. If a suitable candidate is not available, a representative of the transitional military authority performs the duties of the position until an appropriate replacement can assume the duties. Commanders at all echelons must avoid any commitments to, or negotiations with, local political elements without the approval of higher authority.

f. **Guidelines for Transitional Military Authority**

(1) **Treatment of the Population.** Fair treatment of the local populace can help reduce the chance that it will be hostile to US forces and increase the chance for obtaining its cooperation. The proper and just treatment of civilians helps military forces establish and maintain security; prevent lawlessness; promote order; and secure local labor, services, and supplies. Such treatment promotes a positive impression of the military force, the US, and multinational and international organization partners. It strengthens the legitimacy of the operation and the transitional military authority in the eyes of the populace, bordering nations, and other members of the international community.

(a) A policy of proper and just treatment does not prevent the imposition of restrictive or punitive measures necessary to secure the objectives of the transitional

military authority. In particular, such measures may be needed in an area where the population is actively and aggressively hostile.

(b) The military's policies for treating any population vary depending on several factors. These factors include characteristics of the population, such as their attitude toward the governing forces, the degree of technical-industrial development, socioeconomic conditions, the political system, and local history and culture. Another determining factor is the policies of the US with respect to the HN government. The commander must become familiar with HN customs, institutions, and attitudes and establish policies accordingly.

(c) When determining policies for treating the local populace, commanders should consider the following:

1. Generally, less restrictive measures are appropriate for civilians of friendly or neutral states. More restrictive measures generally are needed with civilians of hostile states.

2. Depending on the culture, the local populace may perceive certain actions as characteristic of an illegitimate or weak military government. On the other hand, certain actions, though permissible under international law, may aggravate an already complex civil situation or reduce the effectiveness of the force in imposing civil control.

3. Force may be used to subdue those who resist the transitional military authority or to prevent the escape of prisoners or detainees suspected of crimes. Force is limited to what is necessary and must be consistent with international law. Legal advisors should be consulted when formulating policies for the use of force and the treatment of prisoners, detainees, and other persons.

(d) Military commanders are inherently empowered to take all prudent and proportional measures necessary to protect their forces. However, during stabilization efforts, the nature of the threat can often inhibit the ability of friendly forces to differentiate between hostile acts, hostile intent, and normal daily activity among civilians. For this reason, military commanders and forces must retain the authority to detain individuals and an acceptable framework under which to confine, intern, and eventually release them. This authority has the most legitimacy when sanctioned by international mandate or when bestowed or conveyed from the local or regional government power. The authority granted to military forces to use force and detain individuals will ultimately determine the status of the persons they detain. This status will further determine the manner in which the detained persons are processed, the degree of due process they are afforded, and whether their offense is military or criminal in nature.

(2) **Economic Stabilization and Recovery.** In certain circumstances, military forces may need to act with regard to economic conditions to promote security and law and order. When international law and the governing mandate permit a transitional military authority to conduct economic stabilization and recovery activities, two immediate goals generally exist for the economic sector. The first goal aims to use all available goods and

services as efficiently as possible to meet the essential needs of the local populace. The second aims to revive the economy at the local level to reduce dependence on external support.

(a) Issues such as stabilizing monetary policy, controlling inflation, and reestablishing a national currency generally exceed expertise resident in the transitional military authority. This lack of expertise underscores the necessity of introducing appropriate civilian expertise as soon as practical or puts the success of broader economic recovery programs at risk from the outset of operations.

(b) When resources are scarce, an equitable distribution of necessities—such as food, water, shelter, and medicine—supports economic stability. To this end, it may be necessary to establish and enforce temporary controls over certain aspects of the local economy. These controls may be designed to affect the prices of goods and services, wage rates and labor practices, black market activity, hoarding of goods, banking practices, imports or exports, and production rates within industry. However, these controls may also have adverse effects that can lead to renewed violence. These adverse effects cause potential shortages of goods and services, impeding economic progress, and causing corruption, conflict over limited resources, and social tension. Commanders must weigh the decision to implement economic controls very carefully. In doing so, they should seek guidance from higher echelons and from personnel and organizations with appropriate expertise.

For further details on resources control, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

(3) **Public Health.** Establishing public health policy is a primary concern of the transitional military authority for security, public safety, economic, and humanitarian reasons.

(a) Generally, the joint force lacks the capacity to provide sustained medical care for civilians; however, with appropriate resources and security, the transitional military authority may open and secure humanitarian access to the local populace. It may also take steps such as establishing temporary clinics, training local health professionals, and augmenting existing medical facilities.

(b) The transitional military authority should take steps to secure the public health infrastructure. Such steps can enable functioning hospitals and clinics to remain open so local medical personnel can continue to serve civilians. The transitional military authority can also repair critical transportation infrastructure to ensure continued delivery of medical supplies and accessibility for emergency patient transport. The transitional military authority should ensure the continued functioning of essential services infrastructure so that adequate power, water, and sanitation are available to support health care facilities. Public health policy should also focus on burying or cremating remains; disposing of sewage, garbage, and refuse properly; purifying local water supplies; inspecting food supplies; and controlling insects and disease.

(4) **Justice Systems.** The ordinary courts in areas under control of the transitional military authority generally continue to function during a military occupation. They may only be suspended if judges abstain from fulfilling their duties, the courts are corrupt or unfairly constituted, or the administration of the local jurisdiction has collapsed. In such cases, the transitional military authority may establish its own justice system.

(a) The penal laws of the occupied territory remain in force during the occupation. However, the transitional military authority may suspend them during an occupation if they constitute a threat to security or an obstacle to the application of the Geneva Conventions.

(b) During an occupation, the transitional military authority may enact special decrees and penal provisions essential for it to fulfill its obligations under the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, maintain orderly civil administration, and ensure the security of the occupying forces. It may not declare that the rights and actions of enemy nationals are extinguished, suspended, or unenforceable in a court of law. Penal provisions enacted by the transitional military authority during an occupation may not be enforced until they are made public to the population of the subject territory in the national language of that territory. Such penal provisions may not be retroactive and the penalty must be proportionate to the offense. Courts may only apply those provisions of law that were applicable prior to the alleged offense and are in accordance with the general principles of law.

(c) The transitional military authority may establish courts to hear cases on alleged violations of the special decrees and penal provisions enacted by the transitional military authority. It may also establish courts and administrative boards for other certain purposes. These might include considering the cases of detainees and reconsidering the refusals of requests by aliens to leave the occupied territory.

For further information on courts, commissions, and military tribunals, see the Manual for Military Commissions.

(d) During an occupation, the transitional military authority has certain requirements. During an occupation, US forces and the transitional military authority are not subject to local laws. Nor are they subject to the jurisdiction of the local civil or criminal courts of the occupied territory unless expressly agreed to by the transitional military authority or by the occupying power. Only US military courts should try US personnel subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Promptly investigating, arbitrating, and settling local damage claims—to the extent permitted by US law, regulation, and policy—can help to strengthen the credibility of the transitional military authority.

(5) **Other Considerations.** See Chapter III, “Joint Stability Functions,” paragraph 30, “Other Considerations.”

g. **Transitions**

(1) The JFC should transfer control to a duly recognized HN government or interim civil authority as quickly as possible. Authority and control can transfer either to the legitimate sovereign or to another civil authority. As conditions in the territory subject to transitional military authority stabilize, the degree of control exercised by the military can decrease; however, granting authority to civilian government officials does not of itself terminate the transitional military authority's responsibility in the occupied territory. A formal transfer to an authority capable of fulfilling the responsibilities of government and fully recognized by the USG must occur.

(2) The transitional military authority should identify, screen, and train reliable civilians to ease this transfer. As the situation permits, the responsibility for civil administration transfers to HN or other civil authority to help it return to full self-governance. The joint force may continue to advise and train HN officials to build capacity, particularly in the security sector, after transferring governance authorities.

2. Interim Civil Authority

a. An interim civil authority is set up when the collapse of a government creates a political void. An interim civil authority is also called a provisional or interim government. It can be formed by an outside nation or coalition of nations, local inhabitants or by an international organization, such as the UN.

b. Sometimes local unelected individuals organize to govern their town or region after a war, or sometimes a government may reform itself with provisional status under a coalition following a crisis. In these cases, US forces most often support the COM through collaboration with the US country team.

c. Occasionally the established government ceases to carry out its basic functions because of foreign or domestic conflict, and the situation poses a threat to international peace and stability. In such cases, the international community may decide to establish an interim civil authority instead of an interim military authority. The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia, the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor, and the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq are examples. Although under DOD, the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq was led by an ambassador and staffed primarily by civil administrators.

d. Characteristics of Interim Civil Authority

(1) The interim civil authority exercises the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority. It restores and maintains public order, ensures the safety and security of the local populace, and provides essential civil services. Because the interim civil authority is an external imposition on domestic affairs and affects the sovereignty of the state and the rights of the people, it can transition quickly to local governance. Therefore, the interim civil authority seeks an approach openly cooperative with the HN and its population to facilitate transition to the HN or international authority.

(2) The timing of this transition varies across the sectors. Success depends on a viable political process that can establish local legitimate governance. The political process can include a range of activities such as:

(a) Negotiations towards an enduring, comprehensive peace agreement between the parties to a conflict.

(b) Holding elections and strengthening democratic processes.

(c) Assistance to whatever local institutions exist in the extension of state authority.

(d) National reconciliation.

(e) Continual attention to the avoidance of a breakdown in the peace or political process.

(f) Supporting and facilitating an all-inclusive political process that can successfully move the country from a post-conflict state towards a sustainable peace.

e. The interim civil administration may organize itself in many ways that might include pillars and interim administrative structures, with combined international and local participation.

f. Military Role in Interim Civil Authority

(1) Military forces provide support to the interim civil authority. Stability tasks support the efforts of an interim civil authority when no legitimate government exists. Stability tasks leverage the coercive and constructive capabilities of the military force to establish a safe and secure environment; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; support the establishment of political, legal, social, and economic institutions; and facilitate the transition of responsibility to a legitimate civil authority.

(2) In a whole-of-government approach, commanders identify and prioritize critical objectives that need immediate attention. When other agencies, organizations, and the HN lack a capability, commanders collaborate with them to provide military expertise. With an interim civil authority, that may mean that the military provides direct support to some of the offices and agencies of that authority while the overall direction remains with that authority.

(3) The military establishes physical liaison, communication, and data sharing between the interim civil authority and any task force HQ. Generally, the responsibility for providing for the basic needs of the people rests with the HN government, designated civil authorities, or other organizations. When needed, military forces provide minimum levels of civil security and restore essential services until a civil authority or the HN is able. These essential services provide for minimal levels of security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment. Commanders at all levels assess resources available against the mission to determine how to complete these minimum-essential stability tasks and what risks they can accept.

TRANSITIONAL CIVIL AUTHORITY IN KOSOVO

The United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo was divided into four sections called pillars:

Pillar I—Police and justice (led by the United Nations [UN])

Pillar II—Civil administration (led by the UN)

Pillar III—Democratization and institution building (led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe)

Pillar IV—Reconstruction and economic development (led by the European Union)

Additionally, a joint interim administrative structure was established with UN Interim Administration in Kosovo and North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation, along with local partners. This consisted of a Kosovo Transition Council and an Interim Administrative Council to smooth the way for a permanent legitimate structure. The interim civil administration put similar arrangements in place to establish the capacity and legitimacy of local partners.

Various Sources

THE MILITARY ROLE IN THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

An example of a combined governance effort was the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq. The CPA was created and funded as a division of the United States Department of Defense, and as administrator, Mr. Bremer reported directly to the Secretary of Defense. Although troops from several of the coalition countries were present in Iraq at this time, the US Central Command was the primary military apparatus charged with providing direct combat support to the CPA to enforce its authority during the occupation of Iraq. In the CPA, military participation consisted of a joint team (civil affairs, military information support operations, and public affairs) that provided initial security, communications, and transportation. Military information support operations and other information-related capabilities enabled integrated and tailored communications among the populace and key leaders, consistent with approved overarching themes, messages, and national objectives. Additionally, the multinational coalition's military forces supported multiple CPA efforts while attempting to provide a safe and secure environment for these CPA efforts to accomplish their objectives.

In the CPA, civilian representatives provided political and policy guidance on behalf of the administrator as well as identified needs and concerns in the political districts and offices. Civilian representation synchronized local programs and policies with regional and national structures. Local leaders emerged. These leaders linked interim administration initiatives with needs and requirements determined by local town and city councils and assisted in quicker transition to Iraqi control. Expatriates bridged cultural, linguistic, and tribal gaps. Contractors provided professional training and mentoring to interim local teams of public servants and administrators.

Various Sources

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APPENDIX E

LEGAL AND FISCAL CONSIDERATIONS

This appendix summarizes some of the laws and policies that bear upon US military operations in support of stabilization efforts. No summary provided in this document can replace a consultation with the unit's supporting SJA.

1. The Law of War and the Department of Defense Policy on Stabilization Efforts

a. As stability missions, tasks, and actions are a core military function, there is no change regarding the obligation to comply with all applicable law and regulations. US forces conducting such missions remain bound to adhere to the principles of the law of war, to US laws and treaties, and to customary international law regarding human rights.

b. The nature of stabilization efforts anticipates that they will be conducted in countries, regions, or areas that lack governmental structures capable of completing basic functions and providing services to the local population. Where the environment is not sufficiently permissive to allow civilian governments, agencies, or NGOs to provide adequate assistance to local populations, US military forces may be required to conduct operations in those areas. The operation of US forces in these circumstances generates several legal issues that will be of concern to commanders at all echelons.

2. Authority to Assist a Foreign Government

a. DOS is responsible for planning and implementing foreign policy. The Secretary of State (SECSTATE) is the President's principal advisor on foreign policy and the person chiefly responsible for US representation abroad.

b. USAID is an independent federal agency that receives overall foreign policy guidance from the SECSTATE. USAID is the principal USG provider of global development and humanitarian assistance.

c. The Armed Forces of the United States have limited authority to provide assistance to foreign governments. For FID, US forces may be authorized to make limited contributions. Assistance to police by US forces as authorized is permitted.

3. Non-International Armed Conflict

a. Although stabilization efforts can be carried out while the HN is involved in armed conflict with another state, they are generally focused on the need to preserve the HN's internal security. Most often, stabilization efforts are conducted in a country with existing conflict between government forces and armed non-state actors. As such, the main body of the law of war dealing with international (inter-state) armed conflict does not strictly apply to these conflicts—a legal position that can be a source of confusion to commanders and US Service members. It bears emphasis, however, that Article 3, which is common to all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions is specifically intended to apply to non-international (including intra-state or “internal”) armed conflicts.

GENEVA CONVENTIONS—COMMON ARTICLE 3

In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed “hors de combat” by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.

To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;

(b) Taking of hostages;

(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;

(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees, which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.

An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.

The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.

The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.

Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949

b. By specifying that its application does not affect the legal status of the parties to a conflict, Common Article 3 makes clear that those taking an active part in the hostilities have no special status under international law. They are not, when captured, prisoners of war, but may be held for the duration of hostilities for analogous reasons. They may also be prosecuted as criminals for bearing arms against the government and for other offenses, so long as they are accorded the minimum protections described in Common Article 3. US forces should remember that they may be considered criminal suspects within the legal

system of the HN. US forces must carefully preserve weapons, witness statements, photographs, and other evidence collected at the scene. This evidence will be used by the HN legal system and thus promote the rule of law by holding persons accountable for their crimes.

c. During all such military operations, commanders must be aware of Common Article 3 and the status of civilians under the laws of the HN. The importance of having awareness is heightened in stabilization efforts because the crux of the overall campaign plan is to provide training and support to HN governments and security forces. The most effective means of maintaining legitimacy in stabilization efforts is to conduct the mission in a professional manner consistent with international legal standards.

d. Status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs) establish the legal status of foreign military personnel in an HN. Criminal and civil jurisdiction, taxation, and claims for damages and injuries are some of the topics usually covered in SOFAs. Other documents that may reflect the legal status of military personnel include diplomatic letters, memorandums of agreement, and memorandums of understanding. In the absence of an agreement or some other arrangement with the HN, DOD personnel may be subject to HN laws.

e. The role of the ICRC in Common Article 3 situations as an impartial humanitarian organization is formally recognized in the Geneva Conventions. In non-international armed conflicts, the ICRC formally declares itself available for carrying out its Common Article 3 designated tasks. The ICRC's efforts in non-international armed conflicts include protecting the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and endeavoring to prevent suffering.

4. Detainee Operations

a. Detainee operations of civilians, in general, should not be undertaken unless they are well planned, coordinated with the HN, and directed by the highest authority. The detention of civilians in a stabilization environment is a complex task. Detention is a highly politically sensitive issue, and the manner in which detainee operations are carried out can have a large negative impact on the civilian populace and could affect the success or failure of stabilization efforts.

b. There are two primary issues that must be considered at the base level prior to taking detainees into custody. One issue is the legal basis for detention. This will define all other actions and processes used to handle detainees. The legal basis should address the circumstances where it is appropriate to detain individuals, how long they may be held, and possibly even a standard for continued detention or release from custody. The other issue that commanders must consider is the standard for humane treatment of detainees, both from a legal perspective for US-held detainees and from a training perspective when working with HN security forces. Commanders will specifically detail the parameters of detainee operations in an operations order that is incorporated into all subordinate units' missions.

c. **Standards for Detention and Internment.** Regardless of the precise legal status of those persons captured, detained, or otherwise held in custody by US forces, they must receive humane treatment until properly released. They also must be provided the minimum protections articulated in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Specially trained, organized, and equipped military police units in adequately designed and resourced facilities should accomplish prolonged detention. Such detention must follow the detailed standards contained in Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 2310.01E, *The Department of Defense Detainee Program*, and CJCSI 3290.01, *Program for Detainee Operations*. The interrogation of detainees may only be conducted by qualified and certified personnel and must be in accordance with DODD 3115.09, *DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning*, and JP 2-01.2, *Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*. The military police personnel operating detention facilities shall not be used to assist in or “set the conditions for” interrogation. Military police have a responsibility to protect detainees in their care.

d. **Release of Detainees to the HN.** The permanent or temporary release of detainees from the custody of US forces to the HN, other multinational forces, or any non-DOD USG entity, requires the approval of SecDef, or SecDef’s designee. The permanent or temporary release of a detainee to a foreign nation may be governed by bilateral agreements, or may be based on ad hoc arrangements. However, detainees may only be released in accordance with the requirements of the applicable US law, the law of war, and US policy.

e. **The ICRC and NGOs and Other Similar Organizations**

(1) During detainee operations, commanders may encounter representatives of organizations attempting to protect detainee interests. Such representatives will often seek access to detainees, and/or offer their services to assist in the care and maintenance of detainees. Effective detainee operations planning will establish a mechanism for command interaction with such organizations in order to maximize the benefit of potential contributions to the US effort. Commanders should anticipate that, upon initiation of detainee operations, these organizations will request access to and/or information about detainees, and they will continue to do so throughout the operation. Commanders should seek guidance through operational command channels for responding to such requests prior to the initiation of detainee operations, or as soon thereafter as possible. In the absence of mission-specific guidance, all such requests for access or information should flow via the established chain of command to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(2) The ICRC is an independent, neutral organization ensuring humanitarian protection and assistance for victims of war and armed violence. The ICRC has a permanent mandate under international law to take impartial action for prisoners, the wounded and sick, and civilians affected by conflict. The Geneva Conventions give it a unique status. Commanders should be cognizant of the special status of the ICRC. Per DOD policy, the ICRC is the only organization presumptively authorized access to detainees. Consistent with the Geneva Conventions, it is DOD policy that the ICRC shall be allowed to offer its services during an armed conflict, however characterized, to which the US is a party. ICRC access to detainees is subject to temporary suspension based on

imperative considerations of military necessity. As a general rule, commanders should coordinate with a legal and PA advisor before ordering a suspension of ICRC access to a detainee.

For more information, refer to JP 3-63, Detainee Operations; DODD 2310.01E, The Department of Defense Detainee Program; and the Operational Law Handbook.

5. Investigations

a. Investigations are an essential tool to allow commanders to understand events that take place within the operational area. They are tools that allow for the enforcement of discipline when misconduct has been demonstrated. However, investigations are more than that. They allow commanders to have a record of actions taken in battle that may be disputed in the future, whether by outside organizations like the media, or by enemy IO efforts. Properly conducted investigations can be used to demonstrate a commitment to professionalism by US forces and assist in gaining or maintaining legitimacy with a local population.

b. In the event an investigation is required in a joint environment, judge advocates should determine which Service's regulation is most applicable and then conduct an investigation under that regulation. When determining which Service's regulation is most applicable consider the possible uses of the investigation, whether a particular Service requires a certain investigation, which Service has the most at stake in the outcome of the investigation, any local or command guidance regarding joint investigations, and other matters that would contribute to an informed decision.

c. Since investigations in all Services follow similar basic concepts and will result in a thorough investigation if conducted properly, the regulation ultimately used is not as important as is choosing and following a particular authorized regulation. Under no circumstances should regulations be combined and a hybrid investigation be created. The Services are shown great deference in regards to administrative matters as long as regulations are followed correctly.

6. Criminal Jurisdiction over Civilian Personnel and Contractors

Modern operations involve many DOD civilians as well as contractors authorized to accompany the force (CAAF). Article 2(a)(10) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice now allows for the prosecution of people accompanying US forces in times of declared war or contingency operations. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act further allows for the prosecution in federal courts of DOD civilians and CAAF. Typically, DOD civilians and CAAF implicated in criminal activities will be referred to the DOJ for action. However, military courts may be used to prosecute those serving with or accompanying US forces in the field during declared war or contingency operations. So, DOD civilians and CAAF may be subject to general orders. They are also subject to US laws and, unless otherwise specified in a SOFA or similar agreement, to the laws of the HN; they may be prosecuted or receive adverse administrative action by the US or contract employers. DOD

directives contain further policy and guidance pertaining to allegations of criminal activity against US civilians and CAAF.

7. Funding Issues

a. A basic tenet of fiscal law is that expenditure of public funds may be made only when expressly authorized by Congress. The fiscal rules surrounding stabilization efforts are a web of statutes, annual appropriations, policies, regulations, and directives that may be confusing. The financial impacts of stabilization efforts are a major concern of the JFC. Planning must take into account the legal authority, authority limits, funding sources, and mechanisms that allow US forces to dispense supplies and services. The SJA and the comptroller should be involved in planning for stabilization efforts as early as possible. It is important that the JFC coordinate expenditures with the appropriate agency prior to funds being expended.

b. Congress specifically appropriates funds for foreign assistance. The USAID expends such funds under the legal authorities in Title 22, USC. Provisions of Title 10, USC, authorize small amounts of money. These funds are appropriated annually for commanders to provide humanitarian relief, disaster relief, or civic assistance in conjunction with military operations. These standing authorities are narrowly defined and generally require significant advance coordination within DOD and DOS. As such, they can be of limited value in a rapidly evolving OE.

c. As was stated previously, federal law generally prohibits DOD from expending funds to provide training or materiel support to FSF. Generally, such expenditures must be made through DOS foreign assistance funds under Title 22, USC. While DOS has supervision and control of Title 22, USC, foreign assistance programs, DOD frequently implements them. The *Security Assistance Management Manual* (<http://www.samm.dsca.mil/>) should be thoroughly reviewed for an understanding of the major security assistance programs as well as the relationship between DOD and DOS in implementing those programs. The major types of security assistance programs authorized under Title 22, USC (from the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act [AECA]), as well as the administrator of each program and the funding request and approval timeline for these programs should be understood.

d. There are two exceptions to the general rule requiring the use of Title 22, USC, funds for foreign assistance:

(1) Interoperability, Safety, and Familiarization Training: DOD may fund the training (as opposed to goods and services) of foreign militaries with operation and maintenance (O&M) dollars only when the purpose of the training is to enhance interoperability, familiarization, and safety training. O&M funds may not be used for security assistance training. This exception applies only to interoperability training.

(2) Congressional appropriation or authorization to conduct foreign assistance: DOD may fund foreign assistance operations if Congress has provided a specific appropriation or authorization to execute the mission.

e. Effective foreign forces need training and equipment. US laws require Congress to authorize such expenditures. US laws also require DOS to verify that the HN receiving the assistance is not in violation of human rights.

f. All training and equipping of FSF must be specifically authorized. Usually, DOD involvement is limited to a precise level of man-hours and materiel requested from DOS under the Foreign Assistance Act. The President may authorize deployed US forces to train or advise HN security forces as part of the operational mission. In this case, DOD personnel, operations, and maintenance appropriations provide an incidental benefit to those security forces. All other weapons, training, equipment, logistic support, supplies, and services provided to foreign forces must be paid for with funds appropriated by Congress for that purpose. Examples of additional appropriations to allow DOD to provide training and assistance to foreign forces include the Iraq Security Forces Fund and the Afghan Security Forces Fund. Moreover, the President must give specific authority to the DOD for its role in such “train and equip” efforts. In May of 2004, the President signed a decision directive that made the Commander, US Central Command, under policy guidance from the COM, responsible for coordinating all USG efforts to organize, train, and equip Iraqi Security Forces, including police. Absent such a directive, DOD lacked authority to take the lead in assisting the HN in training and equipping its security forces.

g. In addition to the aforementioned authorities, Congress has passed a number of special foreign assistance authorities that are not permanent law within the USC, but rather are stand-alone authorities contained in annual authorization and appropriations acts. These special authorities often contain “dual key” or co-approval provisions that grant a certain foreign assistance authority to SecDef, with the concurrence of SECSTATE (or in other cases, with the concurrence of the relevant COM). Keeping track of the currency of these authorities can be very challenging, as they frequently expire at the end of each fiscal year (FY), making their continued availability entirely dependent upon annual renewals by Congress. Some of the major special authority programs passed by Congress since 2005 follow. Consult the local SJA and comptroller for current fiscal authority. The authorities listed are provided for historical purposes to inform the reader that temporary authorities may exist outside the traditional Title 22, USC, planning cycle.

(1) Authority to Build the Capacity of Foreign Security Forces (Title 10, USC, Section 2282). SecDef, with the concurrence of SECSTATE, is authorized to conduct or support a program or programs as follows:

(a) Build the capacity of a foreign country’s national military forces in order for that country to:

1. Conduct CT operations; or,

2. Participate in or support on-going allied or coalition military or stabilization efforts that benefit the national security interests of the US.

(b) Build the capacity of a foreign country's national maritime or border security forces to conduct CT operations.

(c) Build the capacity of a foreign country's national-level security forces that have among their functional responsibilities a CT mission in order for such forces to conduct CT operations.

(d) Additionally, Title 10, USC, Section 168, provides statutory authority for SecDef and CCDRs to conduct military-to-military contacts and comparable activities that are designed to encourage a democratic orientation of defense establishments and military forces of other countries.

(2) Support of Special Operations to Combat Terrorism (known as Section 1208.) The FY 05 national defense authorization act (as amended through FY 15), authorized SecDef, with the concurrence of the relevant COM, to expend up to \$60,000,000 during any FY (through FY 16) to provide support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals supporting or facilitating ongoing military operations by US SOF to combat terrorism.

(3) In addition to these authorities, Congress has granted temporary "dual key" authorities to region-specific areas, such as the Iraqi Security Forces Fund and Afghanistan Security Forces Fund. The Pakistan COIN fund was an example of an authority that is not an "out of O&M hide" fund, meaning that it has its own appropriated fund to draw from, compared to 2282 and 1208 funds, which simply come out of the DOD O&M fund. Congress established in 2009 the "Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund," which provided \$400,000,000 to SecDef, with the concurrence of SECSTATE, for assistance to Pakistan's security forces. The Pakistan COIN Fund was discontinued in 2013.

(4) Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP)

(a) In addition to the above temporary authorities, in 2003 Congress enacted a permanent DOD authority known as CTFP (codified at Title 10, USC, Section 2249c), which authorizes DOD appropriated funds to be used to pay any costs associated with the education and training of foreign military officers, MOD officials, or security officials at military or civilian educational institutions, regional centers, conferences, seminars, or other training programs conducted under the CTFP, including the costs of transportation and travel and subsistence costs.

(b) According to the FY 07 DOD Report to Congress on the CTFP, the CTFP's goals are to build and strengthen a global network of combating terrorism (CbT) experts and practitioners at the operational and strategic levels, build and reinforce the CbT capabilities of partner nations through operational and strategic-level education, contribute to efforts to counter ideological support to terrorism, and provide the US military with a flexible and proactive program that can respond to emerging CbT requirements. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict provides policy oversight. The DSCA provides financial management. CTFP requires approval from the COMs prior to any event or activity.

(5) CCDR Initiative Fund. Title 10, USC, Section 166a, authorizes the CJCS to provide to a CCDR DOD funds for the following activities:

- (a) Force training.
- (b) Contingencies.
- (c) Selected operations.
- (d) C2.
- (e) Joint exercises (including activities of participating foreign countries).
- (f) HCA, to include urgent and unanticipated humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance.
- (g) Military education and training to military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries (including transportation, translation, and administrative expenses).
- (h) Personnel expenses of defense personnel for bilateral or regional cooperation programs.
- (i) Force protection.
- (j) **Joint Warfighting Capabilities.** This statute further states that the CJCS, “in considering requests for funds in the CCDR Initiative Fund, should give priority consideration to:

1. Requests for funds to be used for activities that would enhance the war fighting capability, readiness, and sustainability of the forces assigned to the commander requesting the funds;

2. The provision of funds to be used for activities with respect to an area or areas not within the area of responsibility of a GCC that would reduce the threat to, or otherwise increase, the national security of the US; and

3. The provision of funds to be used for urgent and unanticipated humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance, particularly in a foreign country where the armed forces are conducting a contingency operation.”

(6) The DSCA provides FHA program assistance and support for geographic CCMDs via OHDACA funding.

h. The **Leahy Amendment** contains additional constraints on government funding of SFA/FID missions. The law, first enacted in the 1997 Foreign Operations Appropriation Act (i.e., the annual DOS Appropriations Act), prohibits the USG from providing funds to the security forces of a foreign country if DOS has credible evidence that the foreign country or its agents have committed gross violations of human rights, unless SECSTATE determines and reports that the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice.

i. **Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction.** In military operations, commands require specific authority to expend funds. That authority is normally found in the DOD Appropriations Act, specifically, O&M. In some contingency operations, Congress appropriated additional funds to commanders for the specific purpose of dealing with stabilization efforts and related mission types like COIN. Recent examples include the CERP, the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Iraq Freedom Fund, and Commander's Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction Program funds.

j. **CERP**

(1) Beginning in November of 2003, Congress authorized use of a specific amount of O&M funds for a CERP in Iraq and Afghanistan. The legislation was renewed in successive appropriations and authorization acts. It specified that commanders could spend the funds for urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects. These projects had to immediately assist the Iraqi and Afghan peoples within a commander's operational area. Congress did not intend the funds to be used as security assistance such as weapons, ammunition, and supplies for security forces; salaries for Iraqi or Afghan forces or employees; rewards for information; or payments in satisfaction of claims made by Iraqis or Afghans against the US (specific legislation must authorize such payments).

(2) The CERP is not a standing program. Any similar future program will be governed by whatever specific legislative provision Congress chooses to enact. In any program similar to CERP, commanders and staffs must make sound, well-coordinated decisions on how to spend the funds. They must ensure that maximum goodwill is created. Commanders must verify that the extra cash does not create harmful effects in the local economy. One such side effect would be creating unsustainable wages that divert skilled labor from an HN program essential to its legitimacy. Commanders must also ensure that projects can be responsibly administered to achieve the desired objective and that they avoid inadvertently financing insurgents.

k. **Foreign Claims**

(1) Under the Foreign Claims Act (FCA) of 1961, meritorious claims for property losses, injury or death caused by Service members or the civilian component of the US forces may be settled "[t]o promote and maintain friendly relations" with the HN. Claims that result from "noncombat activities" or negligent or wrongful acts or omissions are also compensable. Categories of claims that may not be allowed include: losses from combat; contractual matters; domestic obligations; and claims that are either not in the best interest of the US to pay, or are contrary to public policy.

(2) In adjudicating claims under the FCA, the Foreign Claims Commission applies the law of the country in which the claim arose to determine both liability and damages. This includes the local law or custom pertaining to contributory or comparative negligence and joint tortfeasors. Payments for punitive damages, court costs, filing costs, attorneys' fees, and bailment are not allowed under the FCA.

(3) Generally, the FCA will not apply in foreign countries where the US has an agreement that provides for the settlement or adjudication and cost sharing of claims against the US arising out of the acts or omissions of a member or civilian employee of an armed force of the US. For example, if a unit deploys to Korea, Japan, or any NATO or Partnership for Peace country, claims matters will be managed by a command claims service under provisions outlined in the applicable SOFA.

1. Condolence or Solatia-Like Payments

(1) Condolence or solatia payments are monetary or in-kind payments provided to an individual or their family as an expression of sympathy or condolence for an injury or a death. Condolence and solatia payments are not claims payments. These payments are only made in certain cultural groups where payments in sympathy or in recognition of loss are common.

(2) These payments are meant to be made immediately, and are generally nominal. The individual or unit involved in the damage has no legal obligation to pay; compensation is simply offered as an expression of sympathy in accordance with local custom. Condolence and solatia payments are not paid from claims funds. Instead, solatia payments are made from a unit's O&M funds while condolence payments may also derive from other sources (e.g., CERP Funds in Iraq were authorized to cover condolence payments in 2005).

(3) Prompt payment of condolence/solatia ensures the goodwill of local national populations, thus allowing the US to maintain positive relations with the HN. Condolence or solatia payments should not be made without prior coordination with the GCC.

m. Transitioning USG and Partner Resources

(1) Transition of Resources Among USG Departments and Agencies

(a) In the aftermath of a major conflict or disaster recovery, resources are not so much forces and their mobility platforms, but programs and their manning and funding streams and associated authorities. Rather than force formations allocated for employment, program organizations have to be established and sourced by the Services and other USG departments and agencies. This iterative planning process resembles building a program and usually will need to include a discussion of risk if the required resources are not made available.

(b) Country planning (e.g., the integrated country strategy) should inform senior leaders what the new SC effort can accomplish given available resources and what additional resources would be needed to make greater progress toward the new (desired) end state. This planning should inform/support the CCDR's inputs into the major DOD processes that allocate resources or influence resource allocation, such as global force management, program and budget review, the comprehensive joint assessment and CJCS's risk assessment, the CCMD's integrated priority list, and the DOD Legislative Program.

(c) Concurrent with its vertical reach up to the Joint Strategic Planning System/PPBE process, the phase 0 integrated planning team will have to do a great deal of horizontal outreach and planning with interagency, HN, and other international partners. As the DOD-sourced resourcing plan develops, there will become evident a ‘demand signal’ for the assumption of responsibilities and the provision of resources from other USG departments and agencies, the HN, and others conducting security/development assistance post-transition. Planners need to be informed of other USG departments’ and agencies’ strategic planning, in particular DSCA, DOS and USAID, and ought to work with counterparts to complement and support their goals and activities in the post transition country. Likewise, collaboration with all players at the receiving end of a US joint force transfer of responsibility, be they USG (DOS, USAID), HN counterparts, NATO, or UN partners in the same functional area, is desirable.

(d) As in the phase IV to phase V transition, planners must understand the annual planning, programming, and resourcing cycles into which their transition plans feed to have necessary personnel, equipment, and funds on hand when required during and after the transition. The extensive lead times (2 to 3 years) for developing long-term resources and personnel still exist. Planners must account for the transition of authorities from Title 10, USC (specific wartime authorizations) to Title 22, USC; many Title 10, USC, authorities will disappear as the operation ends. Also, many of these authorities and funding sources may be year-to-year, instead of multi-year, making long-range planning difficult.

(e) Some of the programs that will transition from DOD primacy to other USG departments and agencies may include:

1. Public security and rule of law. These activities may have been funded under the Global Security Contingency Fund or specific congressional authorization, but may now need to transfer to the DOS’s International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) program. The DOJ and DHS also have programs of similar description to INCLE.

2. Economic assistance provided under wartime authorizations may now necessitate Economic Support Fund money, administered by USAID.

3. US military activities that separate warring parties may transfer to the PKO program.

4. Specific congressional authorizations (such as the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund and the Iraq Security Forces Fund) may expire, requiring other mechanisms or FMS to create the same effects.

5. The CERP or similar authorizations will likely expire with the end of the conflict. Completion or ongoing maintenance and operation of CERP projects should be considered during the transition.

(2) **Transition of Resources to Partners and the HN**

(a) Overseas contingency operations authorities and funding streams normally expire upon declaration by the President that the operation is ended, as Operation IRAQI FREEDOM ended 31 August 2010 and post-combat advise and train Operation NEW DAWN did on 15 December 2011. After such authorities expire, transition or new acquisition of resources to partners and the HN will generally flow from one of the following programs:

1. FMS. The FMS program is a form of security assistance authorized by the AECA and a fundamental tool of US foreign policy. Under Section 3 of the AECA, the US may sell defense articles and services to foreign countries and international organizations when the President formally finds that to do so will strengthen the security of the US and promote world peace. SECSTATE determines which countries will have programs. SecDef executes the program.

2. Foreign Military Financing. The AECA authorizes the President to finance procurement of defense articles and services for foreign countries and international organizations. Foreign military financing enables eligible partner nations to purchase US defense articles, services, and training through either FMS or, for a limited number of countries, through direct commercial contracts channels. SECSTATE determines which countries will have programs. SecDef executes the program.

3. IMET. Allows countries to use their national funds to receive a reduced cost for other DOD education and training. IMET exposes foreign students to US professional military organizations and procedures and effective civilian control of the military. The program facilitates valuable interpersonal relationships that provide the US access to and influence with military and civilian leadership of partner nations.

4. International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. The DOS's INL partners with DOD to combat international drug trafficking, terrorist groups, and other transnational crime groups by providing training and other support to strengthen law enforcement and security institutions. INL may be the first organization DOD planners turn to when deciding how to transition interim security functions from DOD to other USG control. INL also has the Office of Criminal Justice and Assistance Partnerships, under which DOS enhances a HN's rule of law capabilities, including the deployment of US police officers and advisors.

5. Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). The GPOI addresses major gaps in international capacity to conduct peace support operations. Such gaps include a shortage of peacekeepers and formed police units, limited national capability to train and sustain peacekeeping forces, and a lack of international coordination mechanisms to assist deployment and employment of peacekeepers. GPOI SC programs develop partner nation capacity to provide peacekeeping forces to effectively conduct UN and regional peace support operations. GPOI is funded through the PKO account, which is managed by the DOS Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.

6. Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR). NADR are an appropriated series of grant programs administered by

DOS. NADR focus on demining activities, the clearance of UXO, the destruction of small arms, border security, and related activities. This becomes increasingly important as refugees return to their homes, and the reconstruction effort begins after a major conflict.

(b) Other programs that enable the transfer of resources from USG to the HN.

1. EDA. Under authorities established in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the AECA, defense articles declared as excess by the Military Departments can be offered to foreign governments or international organizations in support of US national security and foreign policy objectives. Typically, EDA is transferred to support US allies in their modernization efforts and to assist Latin American and Caribbean nations in their counter-narcotics programs. Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, authorizes grant transfers of lethal and non-lethal EDA to countries, which receipt of such articles were justified to Congress for the FY in which the transfer is authorized. EDA may also be sold to foreign countries under the normal FMS system authorized by the AECA. The EDA program is administered by DSCA.

2. EP Program. DOD is authorized provision of nonlethal, excess supplies for humanitarian relief purposes in accordance with Title 10, USC, Section 2557, in coordination with the DOS. The DOD EP Program is managed by DSCA and refers to nonlethal EP made available to donate for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief purposes. EP donations typically include furniture, medical and school equipment and supplies, vehicles (e.g., fire trucks, ambulances), tools, and construction equipment.

3. Transition of Material to International Organizations (UN, African Union, etc.). Transfer of material and resources to an international organization such as the UN or African Union are generally conducted on a case-by-case basis. Normally countries participating in an international effort provide their own material. Funding for UN peacekeepers may come from the DOS PKO account. DOS has used INCLE funding to support training and equipping UN police personnel for the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti. These funding sources may allow the successful continuation of public security, law and order, and justice sector activities after an intervention force hands off responsibility for these activities to an international organization.

(c) **Mechanisms.** Many of the mechanisms and policies that allow the transfer of resources are found in DSCA's Security Assistance Management Manual. Planners are encouraged to reach out to experts in this manual, including legal advisors, to understand resource transfer options in a particular situation.

APPENDIX F KEY STABILIZATION DOCUMENTS

1. Overview

This appendix provides general summaries of stabilization documents from key government, intergovernmental, and nongovernment agencies.

2. United States Government

a. DODI 3000.05, *Stability Operations*, sets policy for the DOD with regard to stabilization efforts. The DODI places stability as a core US military mission that DOD shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations. DOD will conduct stability actions throughout all levels of conflict and across the range of military operations. The magnitude of stability missions may range from small-scale, short duration to large scale, long duration. DOD will also support stabilization efforts led by other USG departments or agencies, foreign governments and security forces, international organizations, and international governmental organizations. Subsequently, lead stabilization efforts to establish civil security and civil control, restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian assistance until it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other USG departments and agencies, foreign governments and security forces, or international organizations.

b. Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks, DOS outlines key stabilization tasks within five broad areas: security, governance and participation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, economic stabilization and infrastructure, and justice and reconciliation. They are organized into short-, medium-, and long-term phases. Many tasks are crosscutting and require consideration of other tasks, especially when prioritizing efforts. The stability ETM is designed to evolve as it is used and as best practices emerge.

3. United Nations

a. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is the UN's policy-making body in humanitarian affairs. It is the primary mechanism for interagency coordination of humanitarian assistance, and is a unique forum involving the key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners. It was created to strengthen coordination and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance. *Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies* (<https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/ENGLISH%20VERSION%20Guidelines%20for%20Complex%20Emergencies.pdf>) is the first collection of core humanitarian instruments developed by the UN and IASC on civil-military relationship in complex emergencies. The aim is to assist humanitarian and military professionals deal with civil-military issues in a manner that respects and appropriately reflects humanitarian concerns at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels in accordance with international law, standards, and principles.

b. The UNDPKO plans, prepares, manages, and directs UN PKO. UNDPKO is responsible for the capstone publication, UN PKO: Principles and Guidelines.

4. United States Institute of Peace

a. The US Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan, national institution established and funded by Congress to prevent and resolve violent international conflicts, promote post-conflict stability and development, and increase conflict management capacity, tools, and intellectual capital worldwide.

b. In 2005, the Working Group on Civil-Military Relations in Nonpermissive Environments, facilitated by the US Institute for Peace, was created, which ultimately produced the **Guidelines for Relations Between US Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments** (<http://www.usip.org/resources/guidelines-relations-between-us-armed-forces-and-nghos-hostile-or-potentially>). These guidelines seek to mitigate frictions and facilitate interaction between the Armed Forces of the US and NGOs conducted in humanitarian relief efforts in hostile or potentially hostile environments.

c. **Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations** (<http://bookstore.usip.org/books/BookDetail.aspx?productID=146833>) provides short scenarios of typical international involvement in peace missions, natural disasters, and stabilization efforts, as well as an introduction to the organizations that may be present when the international community responds to a crisis. Included are descriptions of the roles of the UN and other international institutions, NGOs, the US military, and USG civilian agencies.

d. **Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction** (http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/guiding_principles_full.pdf). The manual presents strategic principles for all major activities in stabilization and reconstruction missions in one place. It provides a foundation for decision makers, planners, and practitioners—both international and HN—to construct priorities for specific missions.

APPENDIX G REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-07 is based upon the following primary references.

1. National Policy and Strategy Publications

- a. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-1, *Organization of the National Security Council System*.
- b. PPD-23, *US Security Sector Assistance Policy*.
- c. National Military Strategy of the United States of America.

2. Department of Defense Publications

- a. DODD 2310.01E, *Department of Defense Detainee Program*.
- b. DODD 3115.09, *DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning*.
- c. DODI 3000.05, *Stability Operations*.
- d. DODI 6000.16, *Military Health Support for Stability Operations*.
- e. DODI 8220.02, *Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Capabilities for Support of Stabilization and Reconstruction, Disaster Relief, and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Operations*.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

- a. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.
- b. CJCSI 3121.01B, *Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces (U)*.
- c. CJCSI 3150.25F, *Joint Lessons Learned Program*.
- d. CJCSI 5130.01F, *Relationships Between Commanders of Combatant Commands and International Commands and Organizations (U)*.
- e. JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*.
- f. JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*.
- g. JP 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*.
- h. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*.

- i. JP 3-05, *Special Operations*.
- j. JP 3-05.1, *Unconventional Warfare*.
- k. JP 3-07.3, *Peace Operations*.
- l. JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*.
- m. JP 3-11, *Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments*.
- n. JP 3-13, *Information Operations*.
- o. JP 3-13.2, *Military Information Support Operations*.
- p. JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*.
- q. JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*.
- r. JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*.
- s. JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*.
- t. JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*.
- u. JP 3-40, *Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction*.
- v. JP 3-41, *Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response*.
- w. JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*.
- x. JP 3-61, *Public Affairs*.
- y. JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*.
- z. JP 4-10, *Operational Contract Support*.
- aa. JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*.
- bb. JDN 1-15, *Operation Assessment*.

4. Allied Publications

- a. Allied Joint Publication-3.4.1(A), *Allied Joint Doctrine for Peace Support*.
- b. Allied Tactical Publication-3.2.1.1, *Guidance for the Conduct of Tactical Stability Activities and Tasks*.

5. Multi-Service Publications

a. ATP 3-07.40/Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-33.1H/NTTP 3-57.5/AFTTP 3-2.84, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conducting Engagements and Employing Engagement Teams*.

b. ATP 3-57.20/MCRP 3-33.1C, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Civil Affairs Support to Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*.

c. Navy Warfare Publication 3-07/Marine Corps Interim Publication 3-33.02/Commandant of the Coast Guard Instruction M3120.11, *Maritime Stability Operations*.

d. FM 6-05, MCWP 3-36.1, NTTP 3-05.19, AFTTP 2-3.73, US Special Operations Command Publication 3-33, *Multi-Service Techniques for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence*.

e. ATP 3-22.40 (FM 3-22.40)/MCWP 3-15.8/NTTP 3-07.3.2/AFTTP 3-2.45/CGTTP 3-93.2, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for The Employment of Nonlethal Weapons*.

6. United States Army Publications

a. Army Doctrine Publication 3-07, *Stability*.

b. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-07, *Stability*.

c. FM 3-07, *Stability*.

7. United States Navy Publication

Navy Warfare Publication 3-29, *Disaster Response Operations*.

8. General Publications

a. *Civilian Surge, Key to Complex Operations*, National Defense University.

b. *Civil-Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook*, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

c. *Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies*, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

d. *Criminal Justice Sector Assessment Rating Tool*, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, US DOS, Version 2.0.

e. *Cultural Generic Information Requirements Handbook (C-GIRH) DOD-GIRH-2634-001-08*, US Marine Corps Intelligence Activity.

f. *Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations*, US DOS.

g. *General Guidance for Interaction between UN Personnel and Military and Other Representatives of the Belligerent Parties in the Context of the Crisis in Iraq*, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

h. *Guide to IGOs, NGOs, and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations*.

i. *Guide to Rule of Law Country Analysis: The Rule of Law Strategic Framework*, USAID.

j. *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, US Institute of Peace, US PKSOL.

k. *Guidelines for Relations Between US Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations*, US Institute of Peace.

l. *Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, RAND.

m. *Integrating Civilian Agencies in Stability Operations*, RAND.

n. *Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework*, S/CRS, US DOS.

o. *MAGTF Command Element in Transition and Reconstruction Operations*, Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned.

p. *Managing Assistance in Support of Political and Electoral Processes*, USAID.

q. *MARO—Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook*, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and the US PKSOL.

r. *Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE)*, US Institute of Peace.

s. *Handbook for Military Support to Economic Normalization*, USJFCOM.

t. *Handbook for Military Support to Essential Services and Critical Infrastructure*, USJFCOM.

u. *Handbook for Military Support to Post-Conflict Governance, Elections, and Media Development*, USJFCOM.

v. *Handbook for Military Support to Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform*, USJFCOM.

w. *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks*, US DOS.

x. *The Rule of Law Handbook: A Practitioner's Guide for Judge Advocates*, The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School.

y. *Security Sector Reform*, USAID, DOD, US DOS.

z. *The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005*, Lawrence A. Yates, Combat Studies Institute Press.

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APPENDIX H ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Joint Staff J-7, Deputy Director, Joint Education and Doctrine, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Analysis Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-07, *Stability Operations*, 29 September 2011.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: Deputy Director, Joint Education and Doctrine (DD JED), Attn: Joint Doctrine Division, 7000 Joint Staff (J-7), Washington, DC, 20318-7000 or email:js.pentagon.j7.list.dd-je-d-jdd-all@mail.mil.

b. Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the Deputy Director, Joint Education and Doctrine, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Analysis Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697, and info the lead agent and the Director for Joint Force Development, J-7/JED.

c. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

5. Lessons Learned

The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine

development process by providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations, events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned are routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at <https://www.jllis.mil> or <http://www.jllis.smil.mil>.

6. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be IAW DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, *DOD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, and Declassification*, and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, *DOD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information*.

7. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are available on JDEIS Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) at <https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp> (NIPRNET) and <http://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/index.jsp> (SIPRNET), and on the JEL at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine> (NIPRNET).

b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by sending written requests to Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CD-ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies.

GLOSSARY

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AECA	Arms Export Control Act
AFTTP	Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures
ASCOPE	areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
ATP	Army techniques publication
AXO	abandoned explosive ordnance
C2	command and control
CA	civil affairs
CAAF	contractors authorized to accompany the force
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CbT	combating terrorism
CCDR	combatant commander
CCMD	combatant command
CCS	commander's communication synchronization
CERP	Commanders' Emergency Response Program
CGTTP	Coast Guard tactics, techniques, and procedures
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJSART	Criminal Justice Sector Assessment Rating Tool
CMC	Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation (USAID)
CMM	Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (USAID)
CMO	civil-military operations
COA	course of action
COIN	counterinsurgency
COM	chief of mission
CONOPS	concept of operations
COP	common operational picture
CSO	Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (DOS)
CT	counterterrorism
CTFP	Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program
CTP	common tactical picture
DC	dislocated civilian
DCHA	Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (USAID)
DDR	disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DODI	Department of Defense instruction
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOMEX	document and media exploitation

DOS	Department of State
DRL	Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DOS)
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
DSF	District Stability Framework (USAID)
EDA	excess defense articles
EP	excess property
ERW	explosive remnants of war
ETM	essential tasks matrix
FCA	Foreign Claims Act
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FHP	force health protection
FID	foreign internal defense
FM	field manual (Army)
FMS	foreign military sales
FSF	foreign security forces
FY	fiscal year
GCC	geographic combatant commander
GPOI	Global Peace Operations Initiative
HCA	humanitarian and civic assistance
HN	host nation
HQ	headquarters
I2	identity intelligence
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee (UN)
ICAF	Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (DOJ)
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDAD	internal defense and development
IDP	internally displaced person
IED	improvised explosive device
IMET	international military education and training
INCLE	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (DOS)
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (DOS)
IO	information operations
IRC	information-related capability
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
IW	irregular warfare
J-3	operations directorate of a joint staff

J-5	plans directorate of a joint staff
J-9	civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff
JCMOTF	joint civil-military operations task force
JDN	joint doctrine note
JFC	joint force commander
JIPOE	joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
JP	joint publication
JTF	joint task force
LNO	liaison officer
LOE	line of effort
MCA	military civic action
MCRP	Marine Corps reference publication
MCWP	Marine Corps warfighting publication
MOD	ministry of defense
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MOP	measure of performance
NADR	nonproliferation, antiterrorism, demining, and related programs
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NTTP	Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
O&M	operation and maintenance
OE	operational environment
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFDA	Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID)
OHDACA	Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (DSCA)
OHDM	Office of Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Mine Action
OIA	Office of International Affairs (TREAS)
OPDAT	Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training (DOJ)
OPLAN	operation plan
OTA	Office of Technical Assistance (TREAS)
PA	public affairs
PKO	peacekeeping operations
PM	peacemaking
PMC	private military company

PMESII	political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure
PO	peace operations
POLAD	policy advisor
PPBE	Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
PPD	Presidential policy directive
PRM	Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (DOS)
PRT	provincial reconstruction team
PSC	private security company
QIP	quick impact project
REA	Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment
ROE	rules of engagement
SC	security cooperation
SCA	support to civil administration
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SECSTATE	Secretary of State
SFA	security force assistance
SJA	staff judge advocate
SOF	special operations forces
SOFA	status-of-forces agreement
SSA	security sector assistance
SSR	security sector reform
TCP	theater campaign plan
TIP	trafficking in persons
TSSA	transitional security sector assistance
UGA	ungoverned area
UN	United Nations
UNDPKO	United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations
USACE	United States Army Corps of Engineers
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USC	United States Code
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USG	United States Government
UW	unconventional warfare
UXO	unexploded explosive ordnance


PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

security sector reform. A comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken by a host nation to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. Also called **SSR**. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

transitional military authority. Temporary military government exercising the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

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JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 3-07** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

