

*Thematic Evaluation of European Commission  
Support to Conflict Prevention  
and Peace-building*

Final Report

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## **Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace-building**

**Final Report**

***October 2011***

**This report was prepared by**





The evaluation has been managed by the Joint Evaluation Unit in DEVCO.

The author accepts sole responsibility for this report, drawn up on behalf of the Commission of the European Union. The report does not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission.



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## List of Abbreviations

€m	Euro millions
3Cs	Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific countries
ADE	Analysis for Economic Decisions
AIDCO	EuropeAid Co-operation Office
ALA	Asia and Latin America
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AML/CTF	Anti-Money Laundering/Counter Terrorism Financing
APF	African Peace Facility
APL	Anti-Personnel Landmines
APSA	African Peace Security Architecture
ARGUS	Commission Rapid Alert and Response System
ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
AU	African Union
AUP	Aid for uprooted people
BOMCA	Border Management Programme in Central Asia
CAR	the Central African Republic
CEDEAO	Communauté Economique des Etats d'Afrique de l'Ouest
CEEAC	Communauté Economique des Etats d'Afrique Centrale
CEMAC	Communauté économique et monétaire de l'Afrique centrale
CEPGL	Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs
CEWS	African Union Continental Early Warning Mechanism
CFSP	Common Foreign & Security Policy
CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CMPD	Crisis Management Planning Directorate
CNO	Zones centre, nord et ouest (CNO) in Côte d'Ivoire
COM (2001) 211	Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention
CP	Conflict Prevention
CPCC	Crisis Planning Conduct and Capability Directorate
CPPB	Conflict Prevention and Peace Building - as covered in the COM(2001) 211
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration

DFID	United Kingdom Department for International Development
DG	Directorate General of the European Commission
DG DEV	Directorate General for Development
DG DEVCO	Directorate General Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid
DG RELEX	Directorate General for External Relations of the European Commission
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EC	European Community
ECCAS	the Economic Community of Central African States
ECD	European Commission Delegation
ECHO	European Commission - Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
ECOWAS	The Economic Community Of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EIB	European Investment Bank
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights / European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
EMCCA	Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI	European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument
EOM	Electoral Observing Missions
EPLO	European Peacebuilding Liaison Office
EQ	Evaluation Question
ERM	African Union Early Response Mechanism
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EU EOM	European Union Election Observation Mission
EU MS	European Union Member States
EUBAM	European Union Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point
EUD	European Union Delegation
EUMM	European Union Monitoring Mission (Georgia)
EUMS	European Union member states
EUPOL COPPS	Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
FAC	Foreign Affairs Council
FAFA	Commission/UN Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement
FED	Fonds Européen de Développement

FOMUC	Force multinationale en Centrafrique
G8	Group of Eight Industrialised Nations
GoSL	Government of Sri Lanka
GoSLe	Government of Sierra Leone
HoD	Head of European Union Delagation
HQ	Headquarter
HR	Human Resources
I	Indicator
IA	Integrated Approach
IC	Ivory Coast
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IfS	Instrument for Stability
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INCAF	OECD's Initiative on Conflict and Fragility
INGO	International Non Governmental Organisation
IO	International Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
iQSG	interservice Quality Support Group (of the European Commission)
IRFFI	International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq
IRSEM	Angola Institute for Socio-Professional Reintegration of Ex-combatants
JC	Judgement Criteria
JEU	Former Joint Evaluation Unit of the European Commission common to DG RELEX, DG DEV and EuropeAid. Since the Lisbon Treaty, it is referred to as the Joint Evaluation Unit in DEVCO
LDC	Least developed countries
LOTFA	Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MEDA	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Programme; Mediterranean members of the partnership
MIC	Monitoring and Information Centre
MICECI	Mission de la CEDEAO en Côte d'ivoire
MICOPAX	Mission de consolidation de la paix en Centrafrique
NAO	National Authorising Officer
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NIP	National Indicative Programme
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OQR	Office of the Quartet Representative

oQSG	office Quality Support Group (of the European Commission)
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PA	Palestinian Authority
PCBS	Post-Conflict Budget Support
PCM	Project Cycle Management
PEGASE	Mécanisme Palestino - Européen de Gestion et d'Aide Socio-Economique
PRDP	Palestinian Reform and Development Plan
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PSO	Peace Support Operations
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
RG	Reference Group
RIP	Regional Indicative Programme
RRM	Rapid Reaction Mechanism
RSP	Regional Strategy Paper
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SBS	Sector Budget Support
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SitCen	Joint Situation Centre
SSR	Security System Reform
TACIS	Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States
TFET	Trust Fund for East Timor
TIM	Temporary International Mechanism
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WB&GS	West Bank and Gaza Strip
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

# Executive Summary

## Subject and objectives

This evaluation has been commissioned by the Evaluation Unit in DEVCO on behalf of the European Commission. It assesses **European Commission support to CPPB**, as defined by the 2001 Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention (COM(2001)21) and subsequent documents. It covers all support provided during the period 2001-2010 and in all regions where Commission support is implemented, excluding OECD regions and countries and any that fall within the mandate of DG Enlargement, as well as any support provided by ECHO. It concerns a total of €7.7bn of funds contracted by the European Commission over the period covered.

This evaluation aims at providing an **overall independent assessment** of the Commission's past and current cooperation for conflict prevention and peace-building and at **identifying key lessons** with a view to improving current and future Commission strategies and programmes. It covers the five DAC evaluation criteria, as well as EC added value and the "3Cs".

## Methodology


The evaluation applied a rigorous methodology with a view to reaching useful conclusions and recommendations based on sound analysis.

It designed a **four-phase approach** consisting of structuring, desk, field and synthesis phases. During the first phase, two preparatory studies were conducted. The preliminary study provides the inventory and typology of the Commission's funding in the field of CPPB, an overview of the related regulatory framework and a description of the overall strategy of the Commission with respect to CPPB. The subsequent Concept Study clarifies the conceptual framework of the support to CPPB, defines a set of eight EQs for the evaluation and outlines the approach to be followed by the evaluation as such. On this basis, data collection took place through both desk and field work. The evaluation was structured around eight country case studies: Bolivia, Central African Republic, Georgia, Ivory Coast, the Kyrgyz Republic, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste and West Bank and Gaza Strip. Focused country visits were conducted in the first and in the latter three. The evaluation used a **combination of tools and techniques for data collection** including the analysis of around 200 documents, 180 interviews with 230 informants (including representatives from the Commission), peer institutions, civil society, national authorities and other stakeholders in the field. Other data was collected through: a survey of EUDs (complemented by telephone interviews), a systematic review of 36 CSPs or RSPs and a meta-analysis of 12 evaluation reports.

**A specific challenge of this evaluation lay in its potentially all-encompassing scope.** Indeed, support to CPPB should, ideally, be part of a paradigm shift whereby virtually all political dialogue and development support provided in a conflict (prone) or post-conflict

context should be considered as relevant in terms of CPPB. Hence the need for the above mentioned preparatory work in order to design a **specific methodology** that structured the evaluation around an examination of the four key dimensions of the Commission's intended "integrated approach" to CPPB, as illustrated by the figure below: the time dimension (short term and long term and their linkages), the integration of different activities (mainstreaming and conflict sensitivity), the geographical dimensions of conflicts, and the activities of different key players. In addition, the evaluation also examined the extent to which the Commission provided itself with the means of its ambition in terms of institutional set-up, human resources policy and specific tools and guidance.

### The four dimensions of the Integrated Approach to CPPB



## Conclusions

### On the overall Commission commitments to CPPB support

Since 2001 the Commission has implemented a substantial shift in support to CPPB by developing its funding, policy framework and instruments. Within the global context of an increased acknowledgement of the importance of CPPB by the International Community since the 1990's, the Commission has significantly increased its focus on CPPB between 2001 and 2010. It has done this by *increasing its financial support* to CPPB from €120m in 2001 to around €1bn per year from 2004, making this support not only a substantial (€7.7bn) share of the EuropeAid managed budget over the period (€73.5bn), but also transforming the Commission into one of the main donors with respect to CPPB. Furthermore, the Commission and, more broadly, the EU considerably *strengthened its policy framework* in the field of CPPB, by issuing several key policy documents concerning CPPB over the years. Finally, the Commission had at its disposal (and further developed) a wide range of financial and non-financial instruments to intervene in conflict-affected countries, ranging from "classic" long-term geographical assistance, to specific short-term instruments and a wide range of non-financial instruments such as political dialogue, high-level mediation and deployment of EU observers.



There was a gap between the Commission's policy commitment to an integrated approach for CPPB support and the actual implementation of this approach. Although the Commission has made progress in terms of taking into account each of the four dimensions of the integrated approach advocated in its 2001 Communication on Conflict Prevention, this was done for each of them with varying degrees of success and globally not to the extent the Commission committed itself. Indeed:

- ***Conceptual orientations at policy level have generally not been appropriated at operational level and were not always univocal and shared at strategic level.*** This concerned key concepts, such as conflict prevention, peace building, root causes, etc.
- ***The Commission's approach to conflict analysis, conflict sensitivity and mainstreaming was not systematised or structured.*** Efforts produced by the Commission in this respect were mostly undertaken on an *ad hoc* basis.
- ***The Commission has often reacted quickly to conflicts that had broken out, but shortcomings remained in terms of the transition to long term prevention.*** Although the Commission did not always anticipate deteriorating situations, it dedicated substantial attention to short term action (23% of CPPB funds) and often reacted quickly. The considerable efforts to link shorter and long-term support have often been challenged, for instance by the limited capacities of national authorities.
- ***The Commission devoted considerable attention to the geographical features of conflict, but synergies between different levels of intervention remained underexploited.*** When designing its CPPB support the Commission generally took into account the needs of specific zones and intervened at different geographical levels and in zones where others were not or less present, albeit with weaknesses in terms of synergies between local, national, and regional levels.
- ***The Commission took initiatives to enhance coordination at different levels, but this generally resulted more in exchange of information than in enhancement of complementarities.*** Coordination within the Commission, with other EU actors and with the wider international community consisted mainly of exchange of information as a minimum requirement. It rarely gave rise to a clear division of roles between partners so as to avoid gaps and duplication and enhance synergies at strategy, programming and implementation levels.

### On strategy issues

The ambition of the Commission regarding its role in conflict (-prone) and post-conflict countries and regions was not always clear and its support often remained wedded to a developmental perspective rather than fostering a shift towards a genuine CPPB perspective with a clear and prioritised strategy. In the spirit of the 2001 Communication on conflict prevention, CPPB should be at the heart of the strategy in conflict (prone) and post-conflict countries. The cases examined showed, however, that the precise role the Commission aimed to play in such contexts was not always clear. Only rarely was support directly geared to resolving the conflict or addressing the root causes of conflict. In most cases it aimed – at best – at mitigating the consequences of root causes or at addressing development needs in a specific conflict context.

The Commission generally had a reactive rather than a pro-active approach to conflict. The Commission did not have a systematic approach to conflict analysis, and its

early warning systems were not always comprehensive and were not widely used. Some of the cases examined in this evaluation show also that generally the Commission reacted after eruption of the conflict rather than anticipating it, although it often reacted quickly.

**The conflict (-prone) or post-conflict context challenged the relevance of the alignment of Commission support on the strategies and policies of national authorities.** The 2005 Paris Declaration advocates alignment of donor strategies with the strategies of partner countries. In conflict (-prone) or post conflict contexts, such alignment was not a self-evident choice. It has indeed been challenged by the absence of national strategies, the weakened capacities of national partners, the difficulty of deciding with whom to align and the fact that in some cases national authorities were eager to “leave the conflict” behind and move into a development phase, including for political reasons.

**The Commission channelled half of its financial support through international organisations, allowing it to intervene in a coordinated manner in contexts where otherwise it would not have been present, but which also made it vulnerable to the drawbacks of the use of this aid modality.** The Commission channelled 51% of its CPPB support through international organisations. This has enhanced coordination as funds from different donors were managed by one actor. It has also allowed the Commission to provide funding in zones (e.g. in Iraq and Afghanistan) or for activities where it could not afford (for instance for political or practical reasons) to be the sole donor. By using this aid modality the Commission experienced some of its typical drawbacks, for instance in terms of efficiency challenges when government capacities were weak.

## On results and impacts

**Through its support in conflict (-prone) and post-conflict countries and regions the Commission provided various types of value-added that differentiated it from most other actors.** More specifically six types of value-added can be distinguished: the Commission’s perceived less strong “political profile”; its reliability (continued presence and capacity to establish long-term partnerships); the critical mass of its financial support (allowing for wide geographical and sector coverage and political leverage), the ability to draw on a wide range of instruments; long-term thematic experience in sectors potentially impacting CPPB and its credibility in term of promoting democracy, peace and human rights.

**In some cases the Commission played a key role in mitigating the impact of root causes, notably through an integrated approach. Its support also generally had a positive contribution on conflict mitigation, stabilisation, reconstruction and rehabilitation. But the overall impact of its support in terms of CPPB remained impossible to predict.** The Commission’s generally did not gear its support to working “on” the conflict and to tackling the root causes as such. But in certain cases it contributed to mitigating the root causes of conflict through an approach that was, to a large extent, integrated. Its support also contributed to peace consolidation, stabilisation, reconstruction and rehabilitation. It is not possible to provide a more general judgement in terms of contribution to CPPB as one cannot predict whether or not a conflict will re-surge and as

such impacts depend on factors that go beyond the realm of the Commission's activity (e.g. the international political scene, military dimensions).

**The Commission was hampered in the increasing role it played with respect to CPPB by its mandate and differences in priorities among EU MS.** More specifically:

- it did not have a specific mandate to intervene in CPPB. Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, EU competences in CPPB were shared between the European Community and the CFSP, albeit without clear competence-sharing;
- although in the countries examined the Commission and EU MS' CPPB strategies were "broadly speaking" on the same line, there were also examples where more diverging positions limited the Commission's capacity to have political leverage;
- the Commission was often a significant financial player, but the financial support was generally not commensurate with the non-financial support, leaving the potential political leverage of the financial support underexploited.

### On means and implementation

**The Commission's institutional set-up, its human resources policy and tools and guidance were not commensurate with its policy commitments and the level of its funding for CPPB:**

- *Prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the coherence and effectiveness of the EU's approach in CPPB was challenged by the complexity of the EU's institutional set-up in the area of external affairs.* This concerned the sharing of competences between the Commission and the Council, with overlaps for specific subject matters (for instance on election monitoring), but also the division of roles between the Commission and the EUSRs. Furthermore, although the Commission progressively created dedicated units with a CPPB focus in Headquarters, fragmentation of responsibility on CPPB issues across various Commission DGs precluded the Commission from having a common and coherent approach to CPPB.
- *The Commission did not have a human resources policy designed to govern interventions in conflict (-prone) contexts.* Despite an increasing number of CPPB staff in HQ and in the field, conflict expertise remained too limited. The Commission had no HR policy geared to CPPB support, notably with respect to the hiring of specialised staff, training, a lack of consideration of CPPB in the career development of officials, and poor knowledge management on CPPB.
- *The Commission had limited operational tools and guidance for interventions in post-conflict or conflict (-prone) contexts and these were used only rarely.* Since 2001, the Commission developed a series of tools and guidance for CPPB such as the checklist on root causes of conflict, the guidance from the iQSG and a set of guidelines on CPPB-related sectors. This toolbox did not, however, allow bridging the gaps between high-level policy commitments and their concrete implementation, as it lacked operability, clarity and comprehensiveness and was not widely used or known within the Commission.

**Timeliness of the delivery of Commission CPPB support has often been challenged by insufficient anticipation of difficulties specifically related to the conflict or conflict (-prone) context, as well as by heavy Commission procedures, which**

however were at times also appreciated for their “protective” function. Delays in the implementation of Commission programmes in conflict (-prone) and post-conflict countries have often been observed and were due to classic causes (e.g. defects in design) but also to specific challenges posed by the conflict situation (e.g. security issues, resistance or shortcomings in capacities of national counterparts). Heavy Commission procedures have also impacted on the delays, but at the same time the importance of their protective character (e.g. to avoid funds ending up in the wrong hands) has also been underlined.

## Recommendations

### On the Commission’s overall role and approach

The Commission should strengthen its position as key player in terms of CPPB by consolidating and further developing its support for CPPB. Indeed, the evaluation shows that the Commission 1) is fit to play this role, having shown that it was able to provide critical mass in terms of financial support and having developed its policy framework; 2) is able to offer different types of value-added that differentiate it from other actors; 3) has proven its ability to make successful contributions in conflict (-prone) or post conflict situations.

The High Representative and the Commission should further strengthen the four dimensions of the integrated approach when supporting CPPB. The aim would be to fill the gap between commitments to an integrated approach and its actual implementation by:

- ***Ensuring clarification and common understanding of concepts among Commission and EEAS staff, including at operational level.*** Such clarifications should be gathered in a key reference document (e.g. the *vade mecum* mentioned below).
- ***Developing and implementing a systematic and structured approach to conflict analysis, mainstreaming and a “do no harm” approach.*** This would consist in developing a brief and user-friendly *vade mecum* with a template for conducting conflict analysis and guidance on ensuring conflict sensitivity, “do no harm” and mainstreaming. Its use should be made compulsory in conflict (-prone) and post conflict contexts.
- ***Creating a comprehensive, easy and flexible early-warning system and making sure it is used.*** This should be developed by the Commission and the EEAS with a view to managing information efficiently and have a sound basis for decision-making. The first step should be to rationalize and streamline the existing systems.
- ***Strengthening the synergies between the different geographical levels of intervention (local, national, regional).*** This would encompass an analysis of where support could benefit from such synergies, ensuring joint strategies and programming for regional and national strategies and developing specific monitoring indicators.
- ***Making sure that coordination mechanisms at all levels, but especially between the Commission and EU MS, go beyond a mere exchange of information and aim at enhancing complementarities at strategy and implementation levels.*** Coordination mechanisms should strive for a clear division of roles between partners, and enhanced synergies at strategy and implementation levels.

## On specific strategy issues

**The EEAS and the Commission should clarify the role they aim to play in conflict (-prone) and post conflict contexts by focusing on both crisis management efforts and the tackling of the root causes of conflict through a clear and prioritised strategy geared towards CPPB beyond “classic” development.** The role the Commission intended to play in conflict affected countries has not always been clear. It is recommended that the High Representative and the Commission continue focusing on crisis management, where good results were obtained. The evaluation also pleads in favour of increased focus on the root causes of conflict, insufficiently exploited so far. Indeed, this requires working in the long-run, with wide sector and geographical coverage, at all of which the Commission has shown to be particularly adept, both through the critical mass of funding it can provide and the different types of value-added it offers. Focusing on these two types of support would allow avoidance of two pitfalls: 1) unrealistic objectives in terms of CPPB that fall beyond the realm of what can reasonably be expected from the Commission and require high level political, diplomatic and even military action; 2) punching below the Commission’s weight, by providing development aid in a conflict context with the all-too-modest aim of easing living conditions.

**The Commission should make sure that financial support is sufficiently complemented and leveraged by non-financial support.** The lack of such leveraging has been a missed opportunity. Therefore non-financial support should be strengthened, in close coordination with the High Representative and other EU actors, for instance by being more proactive and taking the lead in terms of converting financial commitments to CPPB into policy and strategic influence at national, regional and international levels and by the active engagement in the coordination structures and strategies of the international community in given situations.

**The Commission should carefully assess the relevance of alignment with partner countries’ government priorities when providing support in conflict (-prone) or post-conflict contexts and should reserve the right to distance themselves from such priorities if this is deemed necessary from a CPPB perspective.** Mere alignment with the priorities of national counterparts has not always been the best option in conflict (-prone) and post conflict contexts. The relevance of alignment should be examined on a case-by-case basis and not be considered as the self-evident choice.

## On means and implementation

**The Commission and the EEAS should make sure that the means are made available to allow for effective and efficient CPPB support, in line with their stated aim in this respect.** This would include:

- Designing and implementing a specific human resources policy for intervening in a post-conflict or conflict (-prone) context (hiring and training of staff, sharing of experience).
- Providing mechanisms for ensuring effective knowledge management, with a view to strengthening institutional memory as well as lessons-learning on CPPB.

- Providing a focused set of workable tools and guidance for intervening in a post-conflict or conflict (-prone) context.
- Developing and implementing monitoring frameworks with specific indicators for operating in a post-conflict or conflict (-prone) context.

**Maintain the protective character of procedures whilst making them swifter.** The stringency of Commission procedures has been appreciated in conflict contexts where accountability, control and transparency requirements are even more crucial and demanding. The heaviness of these procedures also impeded the timeliness of the delivery of support. It is hence recommended that the protective character of these procedures be maintained, while nevertheless doing what is possible to speed up their implementation.

**The Commission should make sure that the difficulties of operating in a conflict context are sufficiently anticipated at all levels and that expectations in terms of timeliness and budget are realistic.** Providing support in conflict (-prone) and post conflict contexts posed a number of challenges in terms of time required (and thus cost) of delivery. Although such challenges are known, they have not always been factored in to planning calculations. It is therefore recommended to better anticipate time and cost required for delivery and have realistic expectations in this respect.

# 1. Introduction

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This document is the *final report* of the **Evaluation of the European Commission** (hereafter referred to as “the Commission”) **support to Conflict Prevention and Peace-building** (CPPB). This evaluation is part of the 2008 evaluation programme approved by the External Relations and Development Commissioners.

This evaluation was commissioned by the former Joint Evaluation Unit (JEU) common to the Directorates General (DG) for External Relations Development and EuropeAid.

## 1.1 Overall objectives, mandate and scope

The **subject** of this evaluation is the Commission’s support for conflict prevention, as defined by the 2001 Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention (COM(2001)211). The evaluation only covers activities for which the Commission has full responsibility, namely those covered under the former first EU pillar, while activities under the former second EU pillar are examined in the context of coordination and coherence issues.

The **objectives** for this evaluation can be summarised as follows:

- to provide an **overall independent assessment** of the Commission’s past and current cooperation support for conflict prevention and peace-building at a general level based on the answers to Evaluation Questions covering relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability along with coherence, coordination and complementarity and the Commission's value added; *and*
- to **identify key lessons** with a view to improving current and future Commission strategies and programmes, taking into account recent EU institutional developments (i.e. the EU Lisbon Treaty).

The **timeframe** for the evaluation’s coverage is the period 2001-2010.

The **geographical scope** includes all regions where the Commission’s cooperation is implemented, i.e. ACP, ALA, and ENP, but excluding regions and countries under the mandate of DG Enlargement and OECD countries.

The **funds** covered include Community thematic and geographical budget lines and instruments, the European Development Fund (EDF) and other financial instruments with the exception of humanitarian relief falling under the responsibility of DG ECHO.

## 1.2 Key stages of the evaluation

The overall evaluation is structured in four main **phases** as summarised in the figure below. A particular feature of this evaluation was that the JEU successively commissioned **two preparatory studies** for structuring the evaluation exercise: a preliminary study<sup>1</sup> (finalised and approved in July 2009) and a concept study<sup>2</sup> (finalised and approved in September 2010).

The **preliminary study** provided an **inventory and typology of Commission funding** in the field of conflict prevention and peace-building (CPPB) and suggested a definition of the scope for the evaluation. It also provided an overview of the evolution of the **regulatory framework** over the evaluation period and identified the **intervention logic** of the Commission's support in this field. Finally, it suggested **focusing the evaluation on the examination of the Commission's "integrated approach" to CPPB**, which was precisely at the heart of the Commission's strategy, as shown in its 2001 Communication on Conflict Prevention.

In order to determine precisely what an evaluation focusing on the "integrated approach" (henceforth referred to as the IA) would examine, the **concept study** provided a **clarification of the concept of the IA**. Following a review of CPPB concepts and policies, it provided a thorough understanding of the meaning of the concept of an **IA** (the "**meaning**") and illuminated the means provided to facilitate implementation of this approach (the "**means**") by examining the practices of the Commission and other major donors and actors in this field. On that basis, **eight Evaluation Questions** were proposed in that study and a **specific methodology for structuring the evaluation exercise as such** was suggested by the evaluation team.

The evaluation **desk phase** and **field phase** were carried out between October 2010 and April 2011. The main deliverables for these two phases were presented to the Reference Group (RG). This final report is one of the deliverables of the **synthesis phase** and builds on the work carried out in the previous phases.


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<sup>1</sup> ADE (for the European Commission), *Preliminary Study for the Thematic evaluation of the European Commission support to conflict prevention and peace-building*, 2009.  
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<sup>2</sup> ADE (for the European Commission), *Concept Study for the Thematic evaluation of the European Commission support to conflict prevention and peace-building*, 2010.  
[http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation\\_reports/2010/1277\\_docs\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/2010/1277_docs_en.htm)



Figure 1 - Evaluation process



### 1.3 Structure of the final report

This final report is structured as follows:

- **Chapter 1: Introduction:** a brief overview of the evaluation objectives, mandate, scope and stages.
- **Chapter 2: Background and context of the evaluation:** presenting the preliminary work conducted within the framework of the evaluation which sets out the context of the Commission's interventions in conflict prevention and peace-building.
- **Chapter 3: Methodology:** this chapter details the methodological approach, the tools and the sources of information used during the evaluation.
- **Chapter 4: Answers to the Evaluation Questions:** this chapter presents, for each of the eight Evaluation Questions, a summary box and the detailed answer.
- **Chapter 5: Conclusions** of the evaluation; *and*
- **Chapter 6: Recommendations** of the evaluation.

The report also contains 10 annexes (in a separate volume):

- Annex 1: Terms of Reference and Launch Note
- Annex 2: Tools and Sources for the Structured Evaluation Questions
- Annex 3: Country Case Studies
- Annex 4: General Data Collection Grid
- Annex 5: Data Collection Grid for Meta-Analysis of Evaluations
- Annex 6: Results of CSP/RSP Review
- Annex 7: Survey and results
- Annex 8: Inventory and typology of Commission CPPB funds (2001-2010)
- Annex 9: List of Persons met
- Annex 10: Bibliography



## 2. Background and context of the evaluation

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### 2.1 Regulatory framework

The Commission's interventions in the field of Conflict Prevention and Peace-building (CPPB) should be seen against a **backdrop of successive and diverse policies over the last decade at European and wider international levels**. During the 1990s the international community increasingly considered that an integrated approach was needed in development cooperation for treating the root causes of conflict. The Commission took a significant step in this regard with its **April 2001 Communication on Conflict Prevention**, which introduced the approach of 'mainstreaming' conflict prevention into all elements of its development programming and policy-making. Soon afterwards, in the aftermath of the events of 9/11 in 2001, a **renewed debate on security** took place, with an emphasis on perceived new political and military threats. Alongside these debates, international interventions in post-conflict settings were increasingly being analysed in terms of the 'security-development nexus'. This nexus denoted the emerging consensus on the causal relationship between security and development in rebuilding conflict-affected societies and promoted more comprehensive and integrated approaches to programming. This included new approaches to programmes focused on Security Sector Reform (SSR), Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), along with more conventional programmes on institution-building, conflict resolution capacities, rule of law, and economic recovery. Specific EU policies and commitments on situations of **fragility** and **security and development** were further issued in 2007, while continuing to build on the external activities framework established over previous years. Despite these different policy concepts and the number of institutions and instruments involved, there was a growing policy consensus within the EU on the need for an integrated approach (IA) linking conflict prevention, development and security, requiring close cooperation between the Commission and the Council, as well as with international players.


The figure below presents a single schematic overview of the most important **policies promulgated by the European Commission and by the European Council**, along with **international references** marking out the regulatory framework and context for the Commission's interventions in conflict prevention and peace-building. Policy documents issued jointly by the Commission and the Council<sup>3</sup> can be identified at the intersection of their respective areas in the figure. Further descriptions of these documents are provided in the Preliminary Study for this evaluation<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> Most *initiatives* involving both the Commission and the Council materialised in separate policy *documents* for the Commission and the Council. An example is the EU Concept for European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) Support for SSR (second pillar) issued by the Council in October 2005 and the Concept for European Community Support for SSR (first pillar) issued by the Commission in May 2006.

<sup>4</sup> ADE (for the European Commission), *op. cit.*

Figure 2 - General overview of policies in the field of CPPB<sup>5</sup>




<sup>5</sup> Legend of colours: *Bright yellow*: conflict prevention; *Salmon Pink*: conflict prevention in ACP; *Light yellow*: security; *Turquoise*: fragility. These colours only aim to facilitate the reading of the diagram, by providing an indication of a central theme addressed by these documents.

## 2.2 Overview of major trends in Commission financial support to CPPB over the period 2001-2010

**The Commission's financial support for CPPB kept on increasing over the evaluation period.** In 2001 the amount contracted by the Commission for CPPB interventions worldwide<sup>6</sup> was €120m. Ten years later, in 2010, this financial support reached €962m contracted for intervening in CPPB. The peak years were 2006 and 2007 when the Commission's annual financial contributions to CPPB amounted to over €1 billion. This increasing focus, in terms of financial support, on CPPB over the last ten years is illustrated in the figure below<sup>7</sup>. Overall, the total amount contracted by the Commission amounted to €7.7bn over the entire period 2001-2010. It represents around 10% of total Commission external aid over the last ten years.

**Figure 3 - Evolution of contracted funds over 2001-2010 - Distribution between EC general budget and EDF**



<sup>6</sup> Except in countries under the mandate of DG Enlargement and OECD countries, which were not included in the geographical scope of this evaluation, as mentioned in the ToR.

<sup>7</sup> The methodology used for extracting these figures from the Commission database (CRIS) is explained in detail in Annex 8. This exercise was first completed for the period 2001-2008 and approved by the JEU in July 2009 within the framework of the Preliminary Study carried out for this evaluation. A full inventory and typology of Commission's financial support to CPPB was provided. The updated version of this exercise (for the period 2001-up to end-2010) is also in Annex 8 of this report together with all the relevant graphs and figures.

**More than half of these funds (54.5%) benefitted only four countries** affected by major (post) conflict situations, namely:

- The **West Bank & Gaza Strip**, which received nearly 30% of the total amount contracted by the Commission for CPPB interventions; this is clearly illustrated by the large financial support to the Palestinian Authority and Palestinian refugees through mechanism such as the TIM and PEGASE and through international organisations, mainly UNRWA;
- **Afghanistan**, which received 12% of the funds mainly through the large reconstruction and rule of law trust funds administered by the WB and the UN, namely ARTF and LOTFA; but the Commission has also supported other major election and rural development programmes in more recent years;
- Similar support in **Iraq**, accounting for 9% of the Commission CPPB funds and also through major multi-donor trust funds (IRFFI), although there has been a decrease in financial support from the Commission during the last three years;
- **Sudan**, which has mainly benefited from Commission financial support through the African Peace Facility's financing of African Union peace-keeping operations in Darfur (AMIS). Other major contributions in that country were for large post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation programmes administered by the WB and the UN.

Besides the four largest beneficiary countries, the **Commission also supported 103 other countries or regions** through regional programmes worldwide.

The **types of activity supported were very wide and diverse**. They covered democracy, rule of law and civil society (including elections); peace consolidation and prevention of future conflicts (including DDR); population flows and human trafficking (including support to refugees and border management); the security sector; post-conflict economic support and trade cooperation; environment and natural resources; and anti-drug activities.

The Commission worked on CPPB through a **wide range of “contractors” or channels of delivery**. But most of the funds (51%) were channelled through international organisations, mainly the UN and the WB. As already mentioned above, this was mainly in Iraq, Afghanistan and WB&GS. But the Commission also worked extensively with UNDP on support to election processes; with the WB on DDR; and other UN bodies on refugees, food aid and large post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation programmes.

The Commission also had a **variety of instruments or budget lines** that it used for financing CPPB interventions. These are the geographical instruments (EDF, ENPI, ALA) but also thematic budget lines and instruments such as the RRM and IfS, the EIDHR and the NSA budget line. Over the last few years the amount of IfS funds contracted has increased greatly, from around €30m in 2007 to €170m in 2010.

## 3. Methodology


This chapter presents the main features of the methodological approach to the evaluation, in particular (i) the evaluation approach; (ii) the tools and sources of information used; and (iii) the challenges and limitations of this exercise.

### 3.1 Structured evaluation approach

The structured sequence of the evaluation process was primarily based on the Joint Evaluation Unit's methodological bases for evaluation<sup>8</sup> and its specific guidelines for thematic evaluations<sup>9</sup>. The specific methodological approaches and tools used for this complex evaluation are furthermore in line with the Joint Evaluation Unit's evaluation tools<sup>10</sup> (described in sections 3.2).

A schematic overview of the different steps is provided in the figure below. Most of the preliminary work has been summarised in Chapter 2 above. The Intervention Logic and the conceptualisation work are explained beneath the figure. The data collection and analysis phase is further detailed in section 3.2 below.

**Figure 4 - General overview of the structure of the evaluation approach**



<sup>8</sup> European Commission, Joint Evaluation Unit, *Methodological Bases for Evaluation – External Assistance (volume 1)*, 2006, and updates on the Joint Evaluation Unit's website.

<sup>9</sup> European Commission, Joint Evaluation Unit, *Guidelines for Geographic and Thematic Evaluation – External Assistance (volume 2)*, 2006.

<sup>10</sup> European Commission, Joint Evaluation Unit, *Evaluation Tools – External Assistance (volume 3)*, 2006.

### 3.1.1 Intervention Logic

The intervention logic of the Commission's support for CPPB was presented in detail in the Preliminary Study. It is indeed fundamental to this evaluation, delineating the set of objectives against which the Commission's interventions are assessed. The evaluators reconstructed the hierarchy of objectives and expected impacts pursued by the Commission, not the activities actually implemented. They tried to stay as close to the texts as possible, in line with the enunciated strategy.

The intervention logic is exclusively based on official policy documents. The key reference document is the 2001 *Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention*, COM(2001) 211<sup>11</sup>, as this is the overarching Communication, endorsed by the Council EU programme on the prevention of violent conflict (June 2001), focusing explicitly on either Conflict Prevention or Peace-Building.

The intervention logic is presented in the form of an expected impact diagram (see Figure 5 below). It differentiates four levels of expected impact which correspond to four levels of objectives, and the intended activities for attaining the results:

- Global impact (corresponding to global objectives, over the long term);
- Intermediate impacts (corresponding to intermediate objectives, over the medium term);
- Results (corresponding to specific objectives);
- Outputs (corresponding to operational objectives).

The Commission's strategy goes beyond the levels displayed in Figure 5 and highlights a number of activities already implemented; the instruments at its disposal; and forthcoming possible activities in conflict prevention. Focusing on the latter, the Preliminary Study showed for each of the operational objectives the activities envisaged in the 2001 Communication.


The hierarchical links for attaining the expected impacts are made explicit in the diagram. The latter also highlights the level at which the Evaluation Questions (which are detailed further down in this section) are pitched within the intervention logic.

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<sup>11</sup> It should also be noted that, although in its title the Communication does not refer to "Peace-Building", this dimension is taken into account throughout the text, which makes it a more adequate reference to the Commissions' strategy regarding Conflict Prevention *and* Peace Building over the period considered.



Figure 5 - Intervention Logic of the Commission's support to CPPB




### 3.1.2 The four key dimensions of the “meaning” of the Integrated Approach

As explained in the preliminary study and through the intervention logic above, the heart of the Commission’s strategy, as shown in its 2001 Communication on Conflict Prevention, is the **integrated approach (IA)** to CPPB<sup>12</sup>. This can be brought back to **four key dimensions**, covering the “**meaning**” of an IA (see figure below, again with the Evaluation Questions placed within the figure), and referring to four categories of elements to be “integrated”:

- different time dimensions (e.g. short-term and long-term);
- different types of activity (e.g. development, political , security and also including a ‘do no harm’ approach in a mainstreaming approach to integrating conflict sensitivity across a range of actions);
- activities of different actors (e.g. within an organisation, with other organisations, with the beneficiaries); *and*
- different geographical dimensions (e.g. operating at local, country or regional levels).

**Figure 6 - The four key dimensions of the integrated approach**



It should be clear that to a certain extent there is an overlap between these categories, depending on the angle from which they are approached. As an example, understanding an IA in CPPB as combining humanitarian aid and development actions is a matter of integrating different types of activities but also different timeframes, and also has implications for the types of actors involved. That said, the primary aim is to provide a reading grid of a multiplicity of different understandings of the IA, rather than to provide mutually exclusive categories while encompassing them all together.

<sup>12</sup> For more details, see section 6.1.2 of the Preliminary Study.

### 3.1.3 The set of Evaluation Questions

The preliminary study recommended centring the evaluation on the “vault key” of the Commission’s support to CPPB, namely an **integrated approach (IA)** to CPPB, by examining whether, how, and with what results the Commission applied the IA when providing support to CPPB.

The concept study proposed a set of questions (see table below) which:

- goes to the heart of the Commission’s strategy with respect to CPPB, by covering the four dimensions of the “meaning” of the integrated approach ;
- goes beyond strategic aspects by making the link with CPPB interventions ;
- covers more transversal elements, notably with respect to the “means” to apply an integrated approach and with respect to efficiency issues; *and*
- aims at assessing the extent to which the Commission’s support had an impact on CPPB.

**Table 1 - The set of Evaluation Questions**

<b>EQ 1</b>	<b>Mainstreaming</b>	To what extent were CP and PB mainstreamed into the Commission’s financial and non-financial support?
<b>EQ 2</b>	<b>Root causes of conflicts</b>	To what extent has the Commission support contributed to tackling the root causes of conflicts?
<b>EQ 3</b>	<b>Short-term prevention</b>	To what extent has Commission support helped to enhance short-term prevention of conflicts, while ensuring the linkage with long-term prevention and peace-building?
<b>EQ 4</b>	<b>Geographical dimensions</b>	To what extent has the Commission’s support to CPPB been designed and implemented to take into account different geographical dimensions of (potential) conflicts (international, region, country and local levels) and to what extent has the support provided at different geographical levels been articulated to foster synergies?
<b>EQ 5</b>	<b>Coordination and complementarity</b>	To what extent and with what effect has the Commission’s support to CPPB been designed and implemented in coordination and complementarity at different levels both within the EU and with other donors and partners?
<b>EQ 6</b>	<b>Commission’s value added on CPPB</b>	What has been the value added of the Commission’s support in terms of reducing tensions and preventing the outbreak, recurrence or continuation of violent conflict?
<b>EQ 7</b>	<b>Means to facilitate IA</b>	To what extent have the means of the Commission facilitated the implementation of an integrated approach to CPPB?
<b>EQ 8</b>	<b>Timeliness and cost-effectiveness</b>	To what extent did the pursuing of an integrated approach towards CPPB allow results to be achieved in a timely manner and at a reasonable cost?

The Evaluation Questions, (**EQs**) along with their associated Judgment Criteria (**JCs**) and corresponding Indicators, are presented in full detail in Annex 2.

The figure below provides a schematic overview of the coverage of the evaluation criteria and key issues by the Evaluation Questions.

**Figure 7 - Coverage of Evaluation criteria and Key Issues by the EQ**

	EQ1 Mainstreaming	EQ2 Root causes of conflict	EQ3 Short term prevention	EQ4 Geographical dimensions	EQ5 Co-ordination and complementarity	EQ6 Commission's value added on CPPB	EQ7 Means to facilitate IA	EQ 8 Timeliness and cost-effectiveness
<b>Evaluation criteria</b>								
Relevance	■	■	□	■				
Effectiveness	□	■	■		■			
Impact		■			■	□		
Sustainability		□	■					
Efficiency							■	■
Coherence				■				
EC added value					□	■		
<b>Key issues</b>								
3Cs					■			

Largely covered     
  Tackled


### 3.2 Tools and sources of information

Once the structuring stage has been completed, information or facts were collected by the evaluation team through specific **evaluation tools**. That was carried out in the data collection stage which was divided into a Desk phase and a Field phase.

- Given the complexity of the subject to be evaluated, tools were chosen in order to make sure that the **combination** of all of them would yield to the collection of facts for all indicators identified.
- **Several levels of information** had indeed to be collected to tackle the more general level indicators, as well as country level and specific-intervention level indicators.
- Moreover, the tools used had to allow the **verification and cross-checking** of the information collected. For example, the country case studies (which had a particular role in this evaluation, as explained hereunder) were completed and cross-checked with answers to the EUD survey as well as through additional phone interviews.

The toolbox used for this evaluation is schematically represented in the figure below. Further details for each tool are then provided. The indicative coverage of funding by the evaluation tools is also presented at the end of this section.

**Figure 8 - Main information sources and tools**



- **Country case studies:** in order to evaluate the encompassing scope of the Commission's support to CPPB, the evaluation team, together with the RG members, decided to build the evaluation around country case studies. Indeed, analysing the integrated approach (IA) implied by definition to focus on different dimensions that could only be evaluated by lifting the investigation up to a strategic level. The case studies allowed understanding to what extent CPPB was mainstreamed throughout different activities, was integrating different time dimensions and different geographical dimensions and was coordinated between all the relevant actors.

A specific approach was developed to select the case studies<sup>13</sup> and **eight countries** were chosen: Bolivia, Central African Republic, Georgia, Ivory Coast, Kyrgyz Republic, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The following key data collection activities were carried out:

- examination of Commission strategy documents and evaluations relating to selected countries as well as on the regions;
- examination of intervention-specific documents, for up to three interventions in each country case study;
- interviews with Commission HQ staff in charge of the countries/regions;

<sup>13</sup> ADE (for the European Commission), *Concept Study for the Thematic evaluation of the European Commission support to conflict prevention and peace-building*, 2010.  
[http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation\\_reports/2010/1277\\_docs\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/2010/1277_docs_en.htm)

- extraction of lists of Commission interventions in the selected countries/regions and analysis of the major trends and CPPB related interventions;
- review of existing documented conflict assessments.
- field missions in four countries out of the eight: WB&GS, Bolivia, Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone. Interviews were conducted with EUD staff, partner country officials, other national authorities, civil society organisations, EUMS, other donors, international organisations and implementing partners of the Commission. Some specific CPPB projects were also visited.

Each country case study (see Annex 3) presents a background on the country and conflict context as well as the key lines of the Commission's strategy and the main trends in its implementation. Additionally, each country case study presents the **evaluation findings by EQ at the level of the JC**. These findings are based on the analysis of the available documentation and information arising from interviews conducted on the basis of an analytical Data Collection Grid, structured around the EQs and their associated JCs and Indicators. It should be noted however that the EQs remain those of the overall evaluation and are not country-specific; and there are therefore no country-specific answers to EQs, Conclusions or Recommendations.

▪ **General-level documents and interviews:**

- general-level policies, reports, studies and mechanisms were analysed on the basis of the analytical Data Collection Grid, in particular for EQs 3, 5 and 7 that contain several general-level indicators (see Annex 4);
- general information arising from interviews conducted during the structuring, desk and field study stages has also been carefully analysed on the basis of the analytical Data Collection Grid.

- **Inventory of CPPB interventions** financed by the Commission over the period 2001-2010. Analysis of the inventory was already provided in the Preliminary Study approved in July 2009. However, for this final report, the inventory was updated with data from 2009 and 2010. The analysis is presented in Annex 8 as well as in the EQ, where relevant.

- **Meta-analysis of evaluation reports:** 12 existing evaluation reports of Commission support to partner countries/regions and relating to specific instruments, were reviewed on the basis of the analytical Data Collection Grid (see Annex 5). Evaluation reports for Angola, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, El Salvador, Nigeria, Liberia, Rwanda, Sudan, Thailand, Sri Lanka and West Africa, and the mid-term review of the African Peace Facility, were analysed.<sup>14</sup> It should be noted that this analysis does not carry the weight and importance of the country case studies.

- **CSP/RSP review:** a systematic screening of a 36 CSPs and RSPs in 16 countries and 3 regions (including those of the eight country cases studies) was carried out by the evaluation team with a view to answering a series of questions addressing issues of


<sup>14</sup> Information drawn from the country evaluations of countries covered in the cases studies has been presented in these case studies and not in the meta-analysis.

relevance for each EQ. To this end a specific internet-based questionnaire was developed and used by all team members participating in the screening. This allowed gathering data in a harmonised manner and obtaining results that could easily be aggregated. Annex 6 presents both the questions and results of the CSP/RSP reviews.

- **Survey to EUD and complementary phone interviews:** an internet-based survey to EUD was organised in this evaluation to collect views of Commission staff in the field, as well as complementary phone interviews to several respondents for clarification purpose and deeper analysis of the survey results. The survey tackled most of the issues raised in the EQs. It allowed covering transversal issues but also a certain number of straightforward matters such as the existence of conflict analyses, CPPB training, existence of tools and guidance on CPPB that could easily be checked for the different countries. Overall, request for participating to the survey were sent to 50 EUD in countries that benefitted the most from CPPB funds and/or where major crisis took place (as well as the eight countries chosen for the case studies). This survey was sent to the EU Ambassadors and Head of Operations (when there was one) in order to have the broad perspective of the Delegation in the field of CPPB, instead of specific CPPB interventions views of Programme Officers. In total, 36 EUD responded, that is a response rate of 72%, and the aggregated results can be found in Annex 7. The analysis of these results were directly included in the answers to the EQs.

The figure below shows an **indicative coverage of funding through the evaluation tools**. Of course, several tools cover the same funding (e.g. countries analysed in the country case studies are also those covered by the EU survey as well as the CSP review). But overall, the tools used in the evaluation (except those covering the entire funding, i.e. the analysis of the inventory and general level documentary analysis) allowed the evaluation team to cover 75% of the Commission financial support for CPPB over the period 2001-2010.

**Figure 9 - Indicative coverage of funding through the evaluation tools**



### 3.3 Challenges and limitations

The limitations of the analysis are closely related to the **quantity and quality of the information**. This related in particular to the process of obtaining (i) key documents on the selected interventions; and (ii) important strategic documents. Problems encountered in information collection were mainly due to an absence of information on results and impact. This was mostly due to the absence of systematic and detailed monitoring and evaluation of the operations. The team tackled this challenge by diversifying the sources of information (e.g. general documentation, EUD survey, interviews, field visits). It then triangulated and cross-checked all information collected in the analysis.

Moreover, a **strategy-level evaluation** of this kind is a challenge *per se*. It goes beyond the mere summation of evaluations of multiple operations and tackles many high-level issues. It covers a wide range of countries, sectors, periods, and individual interventions. This challenge has been tackled mainly through the specific structured methodological approach, based primarily on the reconstruction of the intervention logic; the definition and delineation of the Integrated approach, the definition of Evaluation Questions, Judgement Criteria and Indicators; and the choice of countries and interventions for the desk and field studies.



## 4. Answers to the Evaluation Questions

This chapter presents the answers to the eight Evaluation Questions. Three different levels have been used, providing three levels of reading:

- **Answers** to each Evaluation Question (EQ) in the form of **summary boxes**;
- **Findings and analysis** on which each answer is based, as provided in the remainder of the text with indications of the Judgement Criteria (JC) on which they are based. Appropriate reference is also made to the analysis made within the framework of the country case studies (Annex 3);
- **Facts** on which the findings are based, as provided in the Data Collection Grids for the general-level data collection and for the meta-analysis (in Annexes 4 and 5). They consist of specific information on assessment at the level of the Indicators (I) under the EQs and JCs to which the different sections of this chapter refer. In addition, results of the CSP/RSP review (Annex 6) and of the survey to EUD (Annex 7) are directly provided in each EQ when relevant.

### Evaluation Question 1 on Mainstreaming

**To what extent were conflict prevention and peace-building mainstreamed into the Commission's financial and non-financial support?**

*An integrated approach to CPPB should ensure that the conflict dimension is taken into account throughout the different types of intervention conducted in a country. This means that CPPB should be a concern throughout all initiatives taken by a donor in a country, through the mainstreaming of CPPB issues - including "do no harm" approaches and conflict sensitivity - for both financial and non-financial support (such as the integration of political work into cooperation activities and vice versa).*

*This is in the first place a question of relevance, tackling issues of strategy, design and response to needs. It focuses on checking to what extent the conflict context and its interaction with the assistance provided were appropriately analysed and taken into account in the Commission's country and regional strategies and interventions. It also has an effectiveness dimension, as integrating CPPB in a transversal manner is indeed an objective of the Commission in the delivery of its assistance in conflict (-prone) and post-conflict countries.*

### EQ 1 on Mainstreaming – Answer Summary Box

*Overall, the evaluation findings point to a great variation in the levels of mainstreaming by the Commission and to an approach in this respect that was more informal than one based on systematised and structured practices. High-level commitments had not yet been sufficiently translated to country, strategic and particularly operational levels.*

The Commission's support was rarely based on its own formal documented conflict analyses, despite commitments in this respect. Indeed the Commission gathered information on the conflict situation through more informal channels, in particular through the EUD but also through other actors. In some cases, although not systematically documented conflict analyses produced by other stakeholders were used.

Overall this resulted in knowledge of the conflict situations that can be generally described as "satisfactory but with weaknesses". Stakeholders consulted confirmed the scarcity of structured and documented conflict analysis, but stressed that such analysis would have been useful.

Partial knowledge on the conflict generally informed the Commission's financial support, but not systematically and with gaps. An improvement has been noted over time with most survey respondents stating that the Commission's knowledge of the conflict was sufficient to gear the Commission's strategy programming to the situation in the country.

The Commission had a general commitment to a "do no harm" approach and more generally to conflict sensitivity. Evaluation findings suggest awareness of the importance of conflict sensitivity, but in an implicit and informal manner rather than through explicit and systematic mechanisms. More structured approaches (e.g. the use of specific indicators) were also rare.

Despite growing attention to CPPB-related matters, and despite examples of good practice, mainstreaming of CPBB into the Commission's support was not a widespread practice over the period considered.

## JC 1.1 (Elements of) conflict analyses carried out or used by the Commission

**Official Commission documents and guidance stress the importance of conflict analysis<sup>15</sup>.** As an example, the Commission's 2001 Communication on Conflict Prevention notes: *"The reasons for conflict vary, and predicting how it may evolve is a complex task. There is an evident need for enhanced common analysis (...) of conflict and of signs of emerging conflict."*<sup>16</sup> In the same spirit the 2008 Commission Programming Guide for Strategy Papers on conflict prevention specifies that *"conflict prevention objectives can be targeted indirectly through sector programmes and/or*

<sup>15</sup> As shown in the Preliminary Study, and in particular in the chapter on the Regulatory Framework, as well as in the section of the Concept Study on the "State of the Debate", Commission commitments took place within a wider context of new approaches and commitments by the international community with respect to CPPB.

<sup>16</sup> European Commission, *Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention*, COM(2001) 211, 2001, p.5.

*direct conflict prevention and peace-building initiatives. These should be based on an analysis of the causes of conflict, risk factors, actors and their interests and agendas and options for action.*<sup>17</sup>

Hence, as underlined in the September 2010 Concept Study, “*Conflict analysis is central to integrating conflict sensitivity into projects and programmes. It should be understood as the systematic study of the profile, causes, actors, and dynamics of conflict.*”<sup>18</sup> Specific guidance on a structured approach had been made available in the so-called “Resource Pack” that synthesises approaches to structured conflict analysis<sup>19</sup>.

**The Commission did however only conduct *formal and documented* conflict analyses in a few exceptional cases. There are several reasons for this scarcity of conflict analyses, notwithstanding that they were deemed useful by Commission representatives.**

- The evaluation only identified **four cases** in which such analyses had been undertaken, namely in Bolivia (2003), Nepal (2002), Sri Lanka (2002), and Indonesia (Aceh) (2002), whereas support for CPPB provided by the Commission over the period covered was provided in more than 100 conflict (-prone) or post-conflict countries. These analyses were all funded through the Commission’s Rapid Reaction Mechanism. Interviews confirmed that such analyses were the exception.
- At the same time stakeholders, notably from the Commission, underlined the ***importance of having a clearly structured and documented conflict analysis***. Indeed 52% of survey respondents stated that a structured Commission conflict analysis document was “*not available but would have been useful*”. This usefulness concerned in particular the analysis of root causes.<sup>20</sup>
- In this context, several reasons explain the quasi-absence of structured and documented conflict analyses:
  - first, 88% of survey respondents indicated that ***Headquarters did not provide specific instructions*** in this respect (which may also mean that they did not, or did not always, trickle down to the EUD’s staff)<sup>21</sup>;
  - furthermore, interviewees often pointed to ***staff constraints*** which made it more difficult to carry out what they considered heavy exercises; and they also highlighted the ***political sensitivity*** of such analyses.

**The Commission did nevertheless undertake and use other types of conflict analyses with varying degrees of detail. To do so the Commission gathered**

<sup>17</sup> European Commission, *Programming Guide for Strategy Papers – Programming Fiche – Conflict Prevention*, 2008, p1.

<sup>18</sup> ADE (for the European Commission), *Concept Study for the Thematic evaluation of the European Commission support to conflict prevention and peace-building*, 2010, Vol. 1, p. 28-32.

<sup>19</sup> Africa Peace Forum, Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies, Center for Conflict Resolution, Forum for Early Warning and Early Response, International Alert and Safer World, *Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding: A Resource Pack*, 2004.

<sup>20</sup> Indeed, 90% of survey respondents agreed that “*a structured and formal (documented) analysis of the root causes is critical to intervene in a (post-) conflict (-prone) country*”. Other stakeholders met (notably other donors) also underlined this.

<sup>21</sup> Three respondents stated that they had received instructions, while ten replied that they did not know, which at least shows that instructions did not percolate down.

information through its own channels (notably through the EUDs), but also through studies (including formal conflict analyses) conducted by others, primarily international donors and specialised agencies or think-tanks). The latter were however not systematically referred to.

- The *Commission's analyses presented in its strategy documents often contain several elements of a formal conflict analysis* (e.g. referring to the conflict profile, the causes, the main actors and/or the dynamics of the conflict), although not in a comprehensive, systematic and structured manner). Such analyses were identified in about 65% of the CSPs/RSPs reviewed.<sup>22</sup> In *several cases however there was little or no analysis*, despite the post-conflict or conflict (-prone) context. In nine of the CSPs/RSPs reviewed, the Commission mentions the conflict only sporadically, without analysing it, while in two CSPs the conflict is not mentioned at all: Kenya (2002-2008)<sup>23</sup> and Madagascar (2002-2008).
- The *Commission itself analysed the conflict situation on the basis of information provided by the EUD and other donors and specialised agencies*, as highlighted by survey respondents and interviewees. *In some cases the Commission also used formal documented conflict analyses produced by other authorities, but there are also cases where no reference was made to such documents, although they were publicly available.* Other actors (EU MS, other donors, think-tanks, NGOs, academics) have indeed conducted formal documented conflict analyses<sup>24</sup>. In three of the CSPs/RSPs reviewed such reference is made (e.g. Colombia and DRC). In some cases they could not be used because they remained confidential (including when conducted by EU MS), but in other cases no explicit reference to them was found, although they were publicly available<sup>25</sup>.

**Overall and with some notable exceptions, the information collected points to Commission knowledge of conflict situations that can be judged as “satisfactory but with weaknesses”, with an improvement over time.**

- About half of the survey respondents (55% for the first period and 48% for the period 2008-2013(2010))<sup>26</sup> stated that the Commission's knowledge of the conflict situation as a guide to its intervention in the country was satisfactory but with weaknesses.<sup>27</sup> Survey

<sup>22</sup> The CSP review did not include Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and Nepal, for which conflict analyses existed.

<sup>23</sup> The CSP for Kenya (2002-2008) notes the following in this respect: “*In contrast to many of its neighbouring countries which have been afflicted by internal or external armed conflict, Kenya enjoys relative stability and is seen as a regional stabilizing factor. It is also host to a large number of refugees from the sub-region.*”

<sup>24</sup> The country case studies provide evidence that formal documented conflict analyses had been commissioned and/or undertaken by other donors in a number of instances. This concerns, for example, analyses conducted by USAID (e.g. Bolivia, Timor Leste, Georgia), DFID (e.g. Kyrgyz Republic, Georgia), SIDA (Kyrgyz Republic), and Ireland (Timor Leste). Also analyses produced through national processes, for example by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone, are made use of in the Commission CSP (2008-2013).

<sup>25</sup> This concerns for instance the CSPs of Kyrgyz Republic, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Georgia, Afghanistan, Timor-Leste, Ivory Coast, Sudan, Central Africa, and Kenya.

<sup>26</sup> Several questions in the survey make a distinction between two programming periods: 2002-2007 and 2008-2013(2010). Dates provided roughly coincide with the two programming periods, although there might be differences according to the country (e.g. some CSPs cover the period 2002-2006).

<sup>27</sup> A minority deemed this knowledge to be insufficient, one respondent specifying: “*our level of knowledge and analysis of the conflict situation (...) is basic at the most and clearly insufficient to help plan our programmes and our political response strategy.*”

results suggest an improvement in this respect: for the period 2002-2007 37% considered the Commission's knowledge to be sufficient; for the period 2008-2013(2010) the corresponding percentage was 55%.

- Additionally, the Commission encountered *some difficulties relating to weaknesses in the analysis of the conflict context*. Although this was not observed in the majority of cases, examples were provided by both the case studies and the meta-analysis, for instance with respect to Chad, Nigeria and Timor-Leste<sup>28</sup>. Similarly, 27% of survey respondents stated that they faced difficulties that were not anticipated in the Commission's CPPB support, and which were due to flaws in conflict analysis.

## JC 1.2 Informing financial and non-financial Commission support by (elements of) conflict analyses

The Commission developed tools and guidance for conflict analysis and for the incorporation of elements of conflict analysis in the design of specific country or regional strategies. But evidence points to scarce or non-systematised and unstructured use (see section JC 7.3 for more details on these tools and JC 1.1 for the use of conflict analysis). Only one of the CSP/RSPs reviewed refers to mechanisms to ensure that conflict analyses are used.

**Elements of conflict analyses have been taken into account in the strategies and interventions, but not systematically and with notable gaps.**

- *Different sources show that elements of conflict analyses were taken into account in several cases.* Half of the CSP/RSPs reviewed refer to the elements of conflict analysis discussed under JC 1.1. Some case studies also provide examples of Commission strategy documents reporting how conflict developments affected the orientation and implementation of Commission assistance (e.g. West Bank and Gaza Strip, Georgia). Commission interviewees contended that "implicit" conflict analysis was undertaken by Commission staff on an ongoing basis so as to inform Commission support (e.g. Timor-Leste, Georgia, Sierra Leone, and West Bank and Gaza Strip). But the quality and usefulness of this "implicit" conflict analysis is difficult to verify.
- *In a number of cases, evidence shows that support was not, or was only to a limited extent, informed by an analysis of the conflict, including in contexts where a conflict broke out or had taken place.*

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<sup>28</sup> As explained in Annex 5, the Chad 2009 Country Evaluation for instance, considers (p. 21) that the Commission had a good knowledge of the country, but links the lack of success in terms of general stabilisation to a lack of analysis, specifying (p. 73) that the Commission has not been able to develop in Chad a general stabilisation strategy and drawing the lesson that (our translation) "it is not enough to react to the events, but it is important to make an analysis of the risk and define options with the partners." The report also notes that for the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF there has been a positive evolution in this respect. The 2010 Country Evaluation for Nigeria underlines that there was a lack of realistic knowledge of Nigeria's civil society and political systems. Conclusion three of the evaluation report states that: "the impact of the interventions relating to the Nigerian political system and civil society could have been enhanced by more strongly applied, realistic knowledge of them." With respect to Timor-Leste, a NORAD report underlines that after independence development partners were focused more on external conflict threat than on internal conflict risk factors and that "rather, it was assumed that Timorese society was unified after 25 years of resistance to the Indonesian occupation." This was also confirmed by different stakeholders met in Timor-Leste.

- Nearly one-half (44%) of the CSPs/RSPs reviewed do not refer to the conflict as one of the main challenges, although all those CSPs/RSPs concern conflict (-prone) or post-conflict countries. This concerns different types of situation, namely:
  - o countries where no conflict had broken out for a substantial period of time: for instance, in Sierra Leone and Angola the conflict is mentioned as a major challenge in the CSPs of the first programming period but not in those of the second programming period; *and*
  - o countries where there had been a conflict within the period covered by the two CSPs. This concerns for instance Timor-Leste, Kenya, Madagascar, Kyrgyz Republic, and Ivory Coast where none of the CSPs mentions structural causes of conflict as key challenges or as presenting a risk of emergence of a (potential) conflict; in CAR the first CSP does not mention the conflict as one of the main challenges.
- As shown under JC 1.1, the meta-analysis also allowed identification of several examples of a lack of knowledge or anticipation of the conflict situation, and thus of shortcomings in terms of informing the support.
- Finally, the country case studies show that at intervention-specific level the Commission's formulation documents were rarely informed by conflict analyses (Bolivia, CAR, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, and Georgia)<sup>29</sup>.

**The above elements, as also confirmed by survey results, indicate that weaknesses remained in terms of conflict analyses informing the Commission's support, albeit with some improvement over time.**

- As explained under JC 1.1, ***conflict analyses were not systematic and not always in line with state-of-the-art guidance***, and thus could not always have informed the support; the level of knowledge of the conflict itself also showed some weaknesses.
- In addition the above provides evidence that ***in a number of cases support was not, or was to a limited extent only, informed by an analysis of the conflict***.
- ***Survey results confirm these remaining weaknesses***, albeit indicating an improvement over time<sup>30</sup>.

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<sup>29</sup> Exceptions include the cross-border rural development project (2003) and IfS projects in Kyrgyz Republic which involved exploiting data from the Commission's Crisis Room. Some basic conflict-related risks are identified in specific intervention-level documentation in Bolivia, Ivory Coast, Kyrgyz Republic, Timor-Leste (in Elections and Rural Development), and Georgia. These risks related to the potential impact of the conflict on the intervention rather than *vice versa*.

<sup>30</sup> When asked whether they considered that the Commission's knowledge of the conflict had sufficiently geared the Commission's strategy programming to the situation in the country, 55% stated that it had not been sufficient (11%) or had been sufficient but with weaknesses (44%) for the period 2002-2007. For the period 2008-2013(2010) this figure was 35%, of which only 3% (one case) stated it was not sufficient. The respective figures from those stating it was sufficient were 44% for the period 2002-2007 and 65% for the period 2008-2013(2010).

### JC 1.3 Do-no-harm approaches

Data point to a *general* Commission awareness of the importance of a do-no-harm approach and conflict sensitivity:

- there were *general Commission commitments to do no harm and to the importance of ensuring conflict sensitivity*;
- in several cases the *Commission did make changes to strategy and programming in response to the evolving context* – with the aim of “doing no harm” (see also answer to EQ3);
- the evaluation (documentary analyses, survey, interviews) *did not come across cases where it was reported that Commission strategies or operations had done harm*, although this does not imply that such cases did not occur;
- Between 72% (second period) and 78% (period 2002-2007) of *survey respondents stated that the Commission took specific initiatives “systematically” or “in most cases” to ensure that the intervention would not inadvertently contribute to conflict or tensions*.

This general awareness was however rarely tangible and did not translate into explicit and formalised mechanisms to ensure a “do no harm” outcome.

- Country case studies show that the *Commission generally did not use tools to promote conflict sensitivity in a systematic and structured manner, nor did it have indicators for following the evolution of the conflict and its interaction with Commission support*. This was confirmed by survey respondents and by the CSP/RSP review<sup>31</sup>.
- The *meta-analysis did not allow identification of any information with respect to “do no harm” approaches being adopted by the Commission*.
- *The CSP/RSP review also points to low conflict sensitivity in the strategy documents* other than in interventions directly targeting the conflict, *viz.*:
  - only two of the CSPs/RSPs reviewed define indicators for following the evolution of conflict factors, and moreover only they define indicators for monitoring the interaction between interventions and conflict factors;
  - the majority (75%) of the CSPs/RSPs reviewed do not mention the potential impacts of the interventions on the conflict, while for the remaining 25% reference is made in “one or some cases”<sup>32</sup> although this is not a systematic practice;
  - the CSPs/RSPs reviewed do not generally present an analysis of the conflict-related risk of the interventions, this being observed in only three of the 36 CSPs/RSPs reviewed<sup>33</sup>.

<sup>31</sup> The use of such indicators was mentioned by survey respondents in only very few cases (two for the period 2002-2007 and five for the period 2008-2013). They are only mentioned in two of the 36 CSPs/RSPs reviewed, and rarely in projects analysed for this study. Even in Georgia, for instance, where there was a commitment to conflict sensitivity at programme level in some IFS interventions, no evidence could be found of actual use of any formal methods.

<sup>32</sup> More specifically, this concerned Angola (both periods), Burundi (both periods), Colombia (2002-2008), Ivory Coast (2008-2013), CAR (2002-2008), WB&GS (2002-2008) and the TACIS region. As an example the 2002-2008 CSP for Angola makes links between CPPB and its approach in the context of food security, land law, health and education.

▪ **Survey results confirm this:**

- indeed, in only a minority of cases did survey respondents indicate that the EUD had an explicit and systematised “do no harm policy” (six for the period 2002-2007, 13 for the second)<sup>34</sup>.
- In the period 2008-2013(2010), the majority (64%) stated that there was no systematised “do no harm policy” (ten out of 36) or that they did not know (13 out of 36), the latter confirming the absence of a *systematised* policy.

### JC 1.4 Extent to which the Commission took CPPB into account in its development cooperation support in a transversal manner

Although the Commission has increasingly geared its policies and support to CPPB-related matters, and although good practices have been identified, the mainstreaming of conflict prevention and peace-building was not widespread.

- The inventory shows that *Commission funding for CPPB grew steeply from a level of €120m in 2001 to above €900m from 2004 onwards* (with a decrease to €854m in 2009).
- *In terms of overall Commission policies and “regulatory framework” there has also been growing attention to the importance of conflict-related matters and sectors as well as commitments to mainstreaming*, as shown in the Preliminary Study and in chapter 2.
- Several sources show however that *mainstreaming as such was not a systematic or widespread practice* over the period considered:
  - unlike with other issues (such as gender and environment), there was no obligation to include CP in programming in a transversal manner;
  - the office Quality Support Group (oQSG) could provide conflict sensitivity in project design. The evaluation findings generally did not suggest that this was the case (see JC7.3 for details).
  - case studies identify good practices, but they also show that generally Commission support did not include specific CPPB measures in sectors not primarily aimed at CPPB; also there was no explicit commitment to, or operational strategy for, mainstreaming CPPB in Kyrgyz Republic, Timor-Leste, or Georgia;
  - the CSP/RSP review shows that conflict prevention was neither systematically nor, in the majority of cases, at the heart of the strategy for the countries or

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<sup>33</sup> The 2008-2013 CSP for Angola, specifies, with respect to the interventions in rural development, agriculture and food security that *“risk in this area of cooperation include social instability due to the lack of employment opportunities. This could have a major impact on access to rural areas and increase insecurity in the movement of goods and people”*.

<sup>34</sup> In Sri Lanka, for instance, “Guiding Principles for Humanitarian and Development Assistance” endorsed by 13 donors were used with this purpose. Also a conflict sensitivity assessment of EU programmes exists. Both are reportedly used routinely for project identification, formulation, CfPs and monitoring. In a number of cases the examples provided did indeed concern conflict-sensitive behaviour but not necessarily a systematic and structured approach in this respect.



- regions concerned, although they were all conflict (-prone) or post-conflict countries;<sup>35</sup>
- the use of tools to mainstream conflict prevention measures has been rare, being mentioned by only eight of the survey respondents, whereas 15 stated that no such tools were used and 13 that they did not know, the latter category suggesting that in these cases such tools were not used;
  - There were however also **good practices**, as attested by the case studies and the meta-analysis, e.g. (non-exhaustive list):
    - CPPB in the Commission's support to WB&GS can be considered as strongly mainstreamed, as almost all the support was aimed at contributing to CPPB;
    - for the CAR the 2008-2013 strategy (unlike the previous period) has taken CPPB into account in a transversal manner, through support for development centres in line with the LRRD approach, support to DDR, etc. ;
    - the Angola country evaluation highlights and provides a positive assessment of the mainstreaming of CPPB in food security interventions, while the evaluation of the Commission's regional cooperation strategy with West-Africa for 1996-2007 highlights the progressive mainstreaming of conflict issues in Commission strategies in Africa over the period evaluated

**Document analysis and interviews with a wide range of stakeholders showed that there was little common understanding of key concepts relating to CPPB within the Commission, among EU actors, or within the wider international community.**

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<sup>35</sup> Only slightly more than half (20/36) of them (with similar figures for both programming periods) identify the conflict as one of the main challenges to be tackled; only eight identify CPPB as the vault key of the strategy; 14 identify CPPB as a focal sector, three as a non-focal sector and 13 as a crosscutting issue; 14 identify conflict prevention as a necessary condition for poverty reduction or development; eight identify poverty reduction or development as a necessary condition for conflict prevention.

## Evaluation Question 2 on Root causes of conflict

### To what extent has the Commission's support contributed to tackling the root causes of conflict?

*As mentioned in the 2001 Communication on Conflict Prevention, "the major challenge of conflict prevention is finding effective and appropriate ways to address the causes of tension and violent conflict". These root causes in terms of the underlying factors driving violent conflict can be very context-specific and every conflict setting is unique. There are also root causes common to all conflicts and referred to as "cross-cutting factors" (e.g. drugs, small arms).*

*This question sets out to assess how far the Commission's support addressed the root causes of conflicts - including the cross-cutting factors of conflicts - and contributed to mitigating the impact of the root causes. It seeks to verify (i) to what extent the Commission attempted to tackle precisely such root causes in specific situations, (ii) what initiatives were taken at a more general level in relation to the crosscutting factors in conflicts, and (iii) the results. The purpose is to assess the extent to which the Commission contributed to tackling the root causes as a whole (i.e. whether it had successfully implemented an approach aimed at tackling root causes).*

#### **EQ2 on Root causes of conflict – Answer Summary Box**

***Commission support was generally not based on an explicit analysis of root causes but focused rather on mitigating the impact of the root causes than on addressing them, with positive results in several cases.***

**Commission support was not always based on an analysis or identification of root causes, and even when it was it tended to be more on an implicit and common understanding of root causes than on an explicit and systematic documented analysis.**

**The Commission's support was geared more to mitigation of the consequences of root causes and overall development support in a conflict context than to working "on" the conflict and tackling its root causes.**

**Through the support it provided, the Commission has in several cases played a role that was considered crucial by stakeholders in terms of mitigating the root causes of the conflict. In some of these cases the Commission's approach was largely grounded in the four dimensions of time, place, the actors involved and the activities conducted.**

**The Commission was mainly an important player by virtue of its financial support; in a number of cases a discrepancy was noted between this support and non-financial support (for example in the nature and type of political dialogue).**

## JC 2.1 Tackling the root causes of conflict

***NB: The assessment made under this JC should be seen against the fact that having a common and shared understanding between the various actors of the root causes of conflict in a particular context is a challenge in itself.*** Stakeholders may well – and often do – draw divergent conclusions from an analysis of the conflict situation and its causes, and on how to respond to it.

Commission support was based more on an implicit understanding of “root causes” of conflict than on an explicit and systematic analysis of the root causes conducted by the Commission or by other stakeholders, even if this was generally considered to be critical.

- ***The Commission’s Checklist of Root Causes of 2001 has been used only exceptionally, and was not well known within the Commission :***
  - 84% of survey respondents had never heard of the checklist (67%) or had heard of it but had not read it (17%); only four (11%) had read it and used it.
  - only three survey respondents stated that this checklist had been used by the EUD for the design of the Commission’s 2008-2013 strategy or for programming;
  - interviews conducted confirm these findings.
- ***Other sources confirm an approach based on implicit and broad understanding; in a number of cases there was reference to root causes, but rarely based on an explicit and structured analysis or a clear prioritisation strategy for maximising the contribution in terms of CPPB.***
  - the iQSG Programming guide for CSPs (the 2008 Programming Fiche on Conflict Prevention) does provide guidance on consideration of root causes in CSPs but the variation across the CSPs and RSPs reviewed shows that uptake was at best sporadic: 53% of the CSPs or RSPs reviewed refer to structural causes of conflict in their context analysis section and 33% to proximate causes of conflict;
  - most case studies did not bring to light any explicit analysis or even identification of or reference to root causes; for some countries (e.g. Georgia or the Kyrgyz Republic), no explicit reference to root causes was made, but interventions were grounded in issues identified by external conflict analyses as root causes; however for Bolivia and Sierra Leone reference to root causes was more explicit;<sup>36</sup>
  - as shown under EQ 1, structured and documented conflict analyses, involving an explicit analysis of root causes, were the exception rather than the rule;
  - interviews conducted during country visits (and also at Headquarters) confirmed this implicit understanding of root causes. They also showed that stakeholders had a very broad interpretation of root causes, from specific problems (e.g. tensions between opposing groups) to issues such as unemployment or even poverty in

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<sup>36</sup> In the case of Sierra Leone, ‘root causes’ were explicitly defined and included, for instance, endemic corruption; political exclusion, and appropriation of natural wealth by a few. In Bolivia, while the first CSP did not explicitly target conflict, the 2007-2013 CSP was to some extent geared to tackling the root causes of the conflict: it explicitly identified the root causes and aimed at tackling them, with one focal sector addressing drug trafficking to prevent and mitigate conflict, the two other focal areas being linked to conflict issues and recognising their impact on conflict (social exclusion, lack of economic opportunities, water management).

general. They were not analysed in a structured manner with a view to building a strategy with clear priorities so as to maximise the contribution to CPPB;<sup>37</sup>

- ***Stakeholders underlined the importance of a structured and explicit analysis of root causes in (post-) conflict (-prone) countries, even considering it critical:***
  - this was confirmed by 90% of respondents to the survey, who gave different reasons in justification for this view, for example the need:
    - to have a common understanding (*“to ensure that all interlocutors are either on the same wavelength or have access to the same, broad and inclusive, range of information”*) and ensure better coordination and, as a result, effectiveness<sup>38</sup>;
    - to ensure that structural problems and not only their consequences are tackled,<sup>39</sup> since *“treating the symptoms of a conflict alone can aggravate the same”*;
    - to target actions well: *“in order to better target any action there is need to have an exhaustive formal procedure that would not leave out any of the often multiple factors”*;
  - it was also highlighted by several stakeholders during field visits; they stressed the risk of *“working on the basis of non-verified assumptions”* when there is no explicit and structured analysis of root causes.

**Overall, and although there were exceptions, Commission support was geared more to “mitigating the consequences of root causes” than to “tackling directly the root causes”.**<sup>40</sup> Often support consisted rather of providing “development support in a conflict context”. Political dialogue was used to a certain extent to address root causes, but several sources indicate that this was not systematic.

- Most cases studies and interviews confirm that the Commission is not gearing its support directly to the root causes of conflict. The CSP review also shows that in most cases the strategy is not geared to root causes (50%), or is only implicitly (25%). In only 25% of cases was the strategy explicitly geared to root causes.<sup>41</sup>
- This is ***confirmed by 82% of respondents to the survey over the two periods***, as can be seen in the table below, which displays the distribution of the answers from survey respondents when asked where, in their view, the main emphasis of the

<sup>37</sup> For instance in Timor Leste stakeholders, both within and outside the Commission mentioned a wide range of root causes encompassing issues relating to unemployment, impunity, IDPs, former combatants, land rights, “martial art groups” (specific groups of youngsters creating unrest), shortcomings in the security sector, etc. Although the Commission provided support for tackling one or more of these causes, document analysis and interviews did not point to CPPB as the overarching objective of the cooperation with a view to maximising the contribution to CPPB.

<sup>38</sup> *“A shared and formal analysis of the root causes would facilitate coordinated approach amongst EU Delegations and with MS and other donors. It would have an impact on our effectiveness and credibility.”*

<sup>39</sup> *“Root cause analysis should be a pre-requisite for actions in protracted crisis. / Because this analysis is seldom carried out, we attempt to tackle with 18-month projects, problems that have been decades in the making. / We tend to engage in palliative projects, addressing the effects of the root causes, but we tend not to address these root causes. / Unless structural problems are tackled at the policy level, our projects will only mitigate the impact, but not correct the causes.”*

<sup>40</sup> The frontier between “mitigating the impact of root causes” and “addressing root causes” is not always easy to establish. “Mitigating the impact of root causes” should be understood here as acting upon the consequences of the conflict (e.g. displaced persons, categories of people that have been impoverished, etc.), which in turn might contribute to the conflict. “Addressing root causes”, should rather be understood as working on the factors that have created the conflict (e.g. a dispute over territories, over natural resources, etc.). Often “root causes” are not easy to identify, may have different layers and different actors may have different interpretations of what the root causes of a conflict are.

<sup>41</sup> Some stakeholders linked this to a lack of Commission focus on governance, at least till 2006 and also cite this issue to explain the lack of systematic practice of using political dialogue to address the root causes of conflict.

Commission support was. Only in a minority of cases (nil in period 1 and 15% in period 2) did respondents consider the Commission was directly addressing root causes.

**Table 2 - Main emphasis of Commission support according to survey respondents**

	2002-2007 period	2008-2013 (2010) period
Support geared at addressing the "root" causes of the conflict (causes and dynamics)	0%	15%
Support geared at mitigating the consequence of the conflict	43%	30%
Support geared at addressing more general development needs in a specific conflict context	39%	52%
Support not addressing the conflict or suspending support until the crisis is over	18%	3%

- **Although political dialogue has been used in some cases as a means of addressing the root causes of conflict, several aspects show that this was not a systematic practice:**
  - first, as shown above, it cannot be stated that in the majority of cases there had been an analysis of root causes or a gearing of strategies to tackling root causes;
  - moreover, in only 28% of the CSPs/RSPs reviewed does the section on political dialogue explain how this dialogue would focus on conflict dynamics, and only in 14% does it explain how the dialogue would tackle the root causes of conflict;
  - on the other hand survey respondents mentioned in a majority of cases (80% for the first period and 76% for the second) that the Commission used political dialogue as a means of addressing the root causes of conflict.

**At policy level there is evidence that follow-up has been provided on the “cross-cutting factors of conflict” highlighted in the 2001 Communication.** The non-exhaustive list provided in the Communication includes drugs, small arms, management and access to natural resources, environmental degradation, spread of communicable diseases, population flows and human trafficking, and the role of the private sector in unstable areas. Several initiatives were taken in this respect<sup>42</sup>.

<sup>42</sup> As an example, in relation to drugs the 2001 Communication identifies support to combating the drug-trafficking geographic corridors of the Balkans and Latin America. It also set out the challenges in trafficking routes from Afghanistan. This follows the 1999 European Commission Communication and 2000-2004 Action Plan to Combat Drugs, and operates within an EU security and justice framework rather than an explicitly conflict prevention or peace-building framework in the affected countries. In the area of small arms, the European Council adopted an EU Strategy on SALW in late 2005, with commitments to ensuring EU coherence in seeking to control the spread of SALW. This included working with the Commission and ensuring that security and development measures on SALW are consistent, as reaffirmed by the Council Conclusions of June 2006, stressing the linkage between human security and human development in dealing with small arms. A more detailed overview is provided in the Preliminary Study.

## JC 2.2 Contribution to mitigating the impact of the root causes of conflict

In half of the country cases examined the Commission's contribution to mitigating the impact of the root causes of conflict remained at best indirect. There are however also examples where the Commission's support has played a key role in terms of mitigating the impact of root causes.

- As explained above, the Commission's support was often not based on an explicit analysis of root causes and was geared rather to mitigating the impact of root causes of conflict or providing development support in a conflict(-prone) or post-conflict context. Therefore contributions to mitigating the impact of root causes of conflict were at best indirect in half of the cases examined.
- That said, and although it is impossible to predict the final outcome, several cases were identified where the Commission's contribution was key; they also represent a substantial share of the Commission's funding for CPPB:
  - stakeholders met generally considered that in *West Bank* (see box) the Commission supported the right priorities with a view to preparing the two-states solution (as of 2006) and that its contribution was critical in this respect;
  - in *Ivory Coast* the support to the election process can also be considered a key contribution; indeed the Commission was one of the main funders of this process, which allowed the organisation of elections that were considered transparent by the international community and therefore allowed the international community to take a clear position on the election results;
  - at the level of specific interventions, it is difficult to make an overall judgment, but there are several examples of targeted interventions that were considered to have mitigated root causes or of issues that were considered factors in the conflict.

### Box 1 - Mitigating the impact of root causes in West Bank

The Commission's support to West Bank and Gaza Strip represented about 30% of total Commission funding in CPPB over the period 2001-2010. The Commission is only one of the main donors in the Palestinian territories. As of 2006, the Commission supported the two-states solution mainly through:

- strengthening of the PA, considered critical for its viability;
- support for rule of law (police, criminal justice), considered essential for ensuring security;
- support for economic and social cohesion with a view to preventing violence.

Stakeholders met generally considered that, in so doing, the Commission supported the right priorities with a view to preparing the two-states solution.

Although it is not possible to predict the results of this support in terms of CPPB, it can be considered as having contributed to mitigating the impact of the root causes of the conflict. Stakeholders generally maintained that without the Commission support the risk of flare-up of violence would have increased, on the grounds that: 1) without its support the PA would have collapsed, whereas IMF and WB reports indicate that the PA has been strengthened; 2) through direct aid to the Palestinians, TIM and PEGASE fostered social stability; 3) contributions to UNRWA reduced the risk of regional instability by providing humanitarian assistance in social, health and education programmes for Palestinian refugees.

That said, it is less clear how far it can be considered as *addressing* the root causes of conflict. The evaluation has no evidence that the Commission as such played a direct role in working *on* the Peace Process Track (although it financed the OQR).

Finally it should be noted that stakeholders had questions on whether non-financial Commission and EU support was commensurate with the financial support and notably whether the EU was sufficiently leveraging its considerable financial support.

**In the above-mentioned cases where the Commission played a key role in terms of mitigating the root causes, the approach was to a large extent “integrated”, which is a good indication of the importance of such an integrated approach in enhancing effectiveness.** As an example, the **West Bank** case study showed (see Annex 3) that the Commission's support:

- was to a large extent *mainstreamed, as all of the support could be seen as aiming at contributing to CPPB*;
- integrated the *time dimension* by being *able to react in the short run* (TIM was an example of the swift creation of a specific and innovative instrument to deal with a crisis situation) and *also because by nature the support provided in the regions was geared to the transition to the long term*; indeed a large share of the activities were targeting the longer term, including building the institutions for a viable Palestinian State, economic development and social cohesion, and a “Partnership for Peace” aimed at changing mentalities in the long run;
- focused a great deal of *attention on the geographical features of the conflict*, by:
  - *targeting geographically vulnerable areas* characterised by acute needs and by the far lower presence of other donors (East Jerusalem, Gaza, zone C);
  - being sensitive to the requests of NGOs to *extend to other zones the support initially concentrated in the green zone*;

- aiming at *favouring regional stability through support to UNRWA* (where the EU is largest donor and considered as an opinion-former);
- promoting *Arab-Israeli peace culture through the PFP* (which permitted sustaining of the peace groups; later redesigned to become a trans-community programme).
- made *substantial efforts in terms of coordination with the different stakeholders*, through regular coordination meetings at different levels. However some questions were raised here on the extent to which the EU MS were on the same track, or concerning the degree of coordination with the Council.

**Stakeholders from the Commission, but also in the donor Community and among national counterparts, considered that in general there was a discrepancy between the Commission's financial and non-financial support, the former having more weight; moreover this view:**

- was highlighted by stakeholders during several field visits;<sup>43</sup>
- was also confirmed by the survey: over both programming periods the majority of respondents considered that the financial support had received more weight (48% and 46%), while the rest considered that both were in line (42% and 43%) or that the discrepancy was the other way round (10% and 11%).

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<sup>43</sup> It was also mentioned by other stakeholders (at Commission HQ), who insisted that this discrepancy might reflect the EU institutional set-up, the Commission having tried to preserve its autonomy on financial matters whilst not representing the EU politically under the system of rotating presidencies of the Council. It was also underlined that this might change in the post-Lisbon set-up, with the creation of the EEAS and through the appointment of the High Representative as both Chair of the FAC and Vice-President of the Commission.



### Evaluation Question 3 on Short-Term prevention

**To what extent has Commission support helped to enhance short-term prevention of conflicts, while ensuring the linkage with long-term prevention and peace-building?**

*One of the four key dimensions of the integrated approach is the time dimension. This encompasses different aspects: ensuring that both short- and long-term prevention are facilitated and that both are articulated and sequenced. While EQs 1 and 2 focus on long-term prevention aspects, this question focuses on the short-term aspects and on their linkages with long-term prevention. The question examines whether the Commission had the appropriate instruments to intervene in deteriorating situations and the extent to which its instruments and mechanisms enhanced its capacity to act quickly and flexibly. It also assesses the extent to which short-term actions were framed in the context of the longer-term requirements of peace-building and development, since that is a way of ensuring that “reacting quickly” generates effects that may remain once the intervention is over. It is a question of relevance, effectiveness and sustainability.*

#### EQ 3 on Short-Term prevention - Answer Summary Box

*Overall, the evaluation findings indicate that Commission early-warning mechanisms have not enhanced its capacity to detect and react to nascent conflicts. However the Commission often reacted quickly once the conflict had broken out, through inter alia the use of dedicated crisis instruments with positive effects on stabilisation. While the Commission devoted efforts to linking its short-term and long-term support, the transition to long-term prevention was often challenged in practice.*

The Commission developed and financed various early-warning mechanisms over the period but they were either not known about or were not widely used to monitor potential conflict zones. Additionally, the comprehensiveness of the Commission early warning system as well as its operationality was questioned in a number of cases. Hence these mechanisms have not enhanced the capacity of the Commission to detect and react rapidly to deteriorating situations. Instead, the Commission was kept informed of the evolution of the situation in the country through more *ad hoc* channels, notably via information continuously gathered by the EUD, or information provided by other donors or via the political dialogue it conducted with national authorities. But this information was partial and *ad hoc* and did not replace the type of systematic information and analysis provided by formal early warning systems.

Deteriorating situations were not always anticipated by the Commission. It is not clear however whether better anticipation (through operational early-warning mechanisms or other means) could have been possible. Once the conflict had broken out, the Commission’s reaction was often quick. Indeed, the Commission often combined various financial and non-financial instruments in order to respond rapidly in crisis situations, and in some cases adapted its strategy and programming to the changing situation. It should also be noted that from 2001 the Commission enhanced its capacity to react quickly by designing specific short-term instruments and by introducing the possibility of using flexible procedures in crisis situations. But the flexibility of these instruments and procedures was however questioned in a number of cases.

Support to immediate crises, conflict mitigation and consolidation of peace has been a

major concern of the Commission: 23% of total CPPB funds were allocated to short-term prevention and the Commission also resorted to political dialogue. The evidence gathered throughout this evaluation generally showed a positive contribution from the Commission in its support to conflict mitigation, stabilisation, reconstruction and rehabilitation.

The Commission devoted efforts in its country and regional strategies to linking its long-term support to shorter-term support. It often envisaged an LRRD approach, linking with programmes financed through ECHO or Community budget lines. It also tried to link its short-term interventions with programmes financed by long-term financial instruments, often with IfS programmes as a forerunner of subsequent programmes. But the success of the transition to long-term prevention at the level of specific sectors or of the strategy as a whole has often been challenged, particularly on account of the lack of capacity of national authorities along with insufficient exit strategies or premature transition from rehabilitation to development.

### JC 3.1 Mechanisms for the detection of deteriorating situations and for rapid reaction

Formal Commission early-warning mechanisms existed but were generally not known about or widely used within the Commission. Instead, the latter mostly used informal and *ad hoc* channels to keep itself informed on the evolution of the country situation.

- The *Commission developed or financed several formal early-warning tools and mechanisms*<sup>44</sup> (see box below).

44 As part of the effort, it should be noted that the Commission supported several international NGOs through a special programme on conflict prevention and civil society dialogue network with EPLO, the platform of European NGOs and think-tanks active in the field of peace-building. These civil society organisations and think-tanks took an active role in advocacy, development of methodology and early-warning mechanisms. The Commission also supported the African Union in the set-up of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), of the Early Response Mechanism (ERM, which has been financed through the African Peace Facility under EDF10), and of the OSCE to strengthen the early-warning capacities of its executive structures.

**Box 2 - Major formal early-warning tools and mechanisms that the Commission utilised or engaged in**

- **Checklist for root causes of conflict** (2001) (see also JC7.3): a set of indicators to monitor developments in CPPB-related fields, to be used for both early warning and structural prevention.
- **Confidential “Watch List”**: based on the indicators of the checklist for root causes of conflict, the countries receiving the highest scores are drawn to the attention of the General Affairs and External Relations Council as countries most at risk of imminent instability or crisis through a “watch list”. This list provides a snapshot at one moment in time and is subject to constant revision. It is intended to inform basic choices on the appropriate response to a crisis scenario.
- **Commission’s Crisis Room** (2001): this hosted the infrastructure of the DG Relex duty system and aimed at providing a platform for exchange of information between Commission Headquarters in Brussels and EU Delegations during acute crises. It was also set up to analyse Open Source Intelligence at the request of the Instrument for Stability planners, geographical units and EU Delegations.
- **ARGUS rapid alert and response system** (2005)<sup>45</sup>: consisting both of an internal communications network for sharing information and to provide a specific coordination process within the Commission (see also JC5.2).
- **Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC)** (2010): operated by ECHO, providing access to a platform of civil protection procedures available to all the participating States.

- But these *tools and mechanisms, as well as others developed by other donors, were generally not known about or widely used*. In most country cases examined, the EUD did not know or use existing early-warning mechanisms and tools<sup>46</sup>. Similarly, only two of the 34 CSPs and RSPs reviewed refer to existing early-warning mechanisms or to the setting-up of such mechanisms by the Commission<sup>47</sup>. When information provided by early-warning mechanisms set up by the Commission was available, only 23% of survey respondents considered it useful. Commission interviewees also *questioned the extent to which the Watch List played its role*: the list has been reported as having responded more to political logic at EU HQ and as not being operational. Indeed, while the conflict analysis work conducted to decide which countries should be put on the list was done, it did not translate into concrete operations. Interviewees and documents reviewed also highlighted the *fragmentation of the Commission and EU-wide early warning system*.

<sup>45</sup> Commission provisions setting up the "ARGUS" general rapid alert system in European Commission, *Commission Decision of 23 December 2005 amending its internal Rules of Procedure* (2006/25/EC, Euratom), 2006.

<sup>46</sup> This concerned Bolivia, CAR, Ivory Coast, Kyrgyz Republic, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste. Exceptions were reported: in Georgia, the Commission drew on early-warning mechanisms developed by other actors; in the Kyrgyz Republic, information from the Commission’s crisis room informed the design of IfS interventions and information of the OSCE Centre in Bishkek and Osh was used for early warning.

<sup>47</sup> The “Mécanisme d’Alerte Rapide d’Afrique Centrale” financed by the Commission

- ***The Commission generally followed the evolution of the situation in the country through more ad hoc channels:***
  - it mostly used ***information gathered by EU Delegations***. 92% of survey respondents considered the information gathered by the EUD on a regular basis critical or important and 67% considered the information provided by the EUD political section as critical or important. Several country case studies highlight that the reporting by the EUD on CPPB-related issues (e.g. through flash notes) along with dialogue and exchange of information with the EUD, were favoured channels of information for Commission HQ. Over the evaluation period ***political sections*** have been created ***in some EUDs*** and they have been perceived as ***reinforcing the Commission's watching capabilities***<sup>48</sup>;
  - it also used ***information provided by other donors***: 86% of survey respondents considered the information provided on the conflict situation by other donors as critical or important;
  - ***political dialogue with national authorities was also used as an early-warning mechanism and for monitoring the conflict zone***. For the 2008-2013 (2010) period, 65% (respectively 72%) of survey respondents mentioned that the Commission used political dialogue as an early-warning mechanism (respectively to monitor the conflict zone).

**Deteriorating situations were not always anticipated by the Commission. Once the crisis was obvious, its reaction was often quick. The flexibility of its instruments and procedures was however questioned in a number of cases.**

- There was ***mixed evidence on the extent to which the Commission detected quickly deteriorating situations:***
  - more than half of the 36 countries covered by the ***survey*** have been confronted with a rapidly deteriorating situation, and 75% of survey respondents mentioned that the deteriorating situation had been anticipated by the Commission<sup>49</sup>;
  - but in a number of cases, and in particular in more than half of the ***country case studies***, the Commission did not anticipate the crises. For Central African Republic, interviewees and evaluation reports explicitly mentioned that during EDFs 8 & 9 the Commission did not anticipate the crisis. In Ivory Coast, despite several signs since the early 1990s, the EDF 9 CSP initially did not aim to address a conflict situation (but a swift reaction was implemented, see below). In the Kyrgyz Republic, the 2010 crisis was not anticipated by the Commission. In Timor-Leste, evaluation reports and studies conducted by other donors (NORAD and OECD) and the field mission conducted within the framework of this evaluation showed that the international community (including the Commission) had not anticipated the 2006 and 2008 crises. In Georgia, the 2002 and 2008 crises were not anticipated.
  - it is however not clear ***whether or not better anticipation could have been possible*** (e.g. by using other early-warning mechanisms).

<sup>48</sup> For instance, interviewees reported that the set-up of the political section within the EUD in Ivory Coast in 2005/06 strengthened the Commission's political watch

<sup>49</sup> e.g. Zimbabwe, Lebanon, Burundi, Guatemala, Nigeria, DR Congo, Nepal, Sri Lanka, etc.

- **Since 2001 the Commission has increased its capacity to react quickly:** it designed specific short-term instruments and introduced flexible procedures for crisis situations. **Flexibility was however questioned in a number of cases.**
  - The Commission designed an **innovative instrument** with simplified procedures to respond rapidly to deteriorating situations: namely the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), successively replaced in 2007 by the much-enlarged **Instrument for Stability (IfS)**<sup>50</sup>. The RRM-IfS was considered by most interviewees as **useful and swift** (e.g. 86% of survey respondents considered the RRM-IfS as adequate for intervening in a conflict country). But its **capacity to react sufficiently quickly was questioned** in all the country case studies where it had been used (Bolivia, CAR, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Sierra Leone): even though the deployment of the IfS has been faster than other EU instruments, its administrative requirements were still such that it took two to four months to start an intervention<sup>51</sup>, which was slower than that of certain other donors. The IfS was **also used for long-term prevention**: in three country case studies (Bolivia, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste), the IfS financed interventions aimed more at structural prevention because the instrument allowed more rapid mobilisation of the funds than the long-term geographical assistance. In all these cases, the maximum duration of 18 months posed problems.
  - The Commission also introduced the possibility of using **flexible procedures**<sup>52</sup> in crisis and emergency situations<sup>53</sup>. They concerned (i) the use of negotiated procedures for procurement contracts (services, supplies, and works); and (ii) the possibility of applying a number of exceptions to some basic rules for grants<sup>54</sup>. The emergency (and post-emergency) assistance defined in articles 72 and 73 of the Cotonou Agreement may also benefit from these flexible procedures. Over the evaluation period, 64% of survey respondents mentioned that flexible procedures for short-term action were used. But from the country case studies, there is **mixed evidence on the extent to which these procedures enhanced swift implementation**. The use of these procedures was reported as being essential in WB&GS for intervening in a fast-moving environment. However these procedures were reported by Commission interviewees as not having promoted swift implementation in Sierra Leone and as having not been adapted to the post-conflict situation in Timor-Leste.

<sup>50</sup> Council Regulation n° 1717/2006 establishing an Instrument for Stability repealed as of 1 January 2007 the Council Regulations that established Community action (i) on rehabilitation and reconstruction operations in developing countries; (ii) in crisis or emergency situations through the rapid-reaction mechanism; (iii) against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries; (iv) in third countries other than developing countries; and (v) for uprooted people in Asian and Latin American developing countries (*see also EQ7*).

<sup>51</sup> INCAS Consulting, *Evaluation of the Crisis Response and Preparedness Component of the EU's Instrument For Stability (IFS)*, Final Report, 2011.

<sup>52</sup> In 2009 flexible procedures were used in 17 countries: Burundi, CAR, Chad, the Comoros, DRC, East Timor, Guinea Bissau, Guinea Conakry, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe.

<sup>53</sup> European Commission, *Guidelines on contractual procedures to be used in cases of crisis and emergency and post emergency situations*, no date.

<sup>54</sup> Exceptions concern: a) the obligation of Annual Programming is not applicable in a crisis situation; b) the possibility of financing in full the cost of the action (vs. co-financing); c) the fact that grants may be awarded without a call for proposals; d) eligibility of expenditure for an action that has already begun (retroactive effect).

- The Commission also used *traditional instruments* to mobilise assistance for CPPB on a short-term basis, *in particular the EIDHR*. Although not initially designed for CPPB, the Commission used EIDHR in a number of countries for short-term prevention<sup>55</sup>. While the EIDHR has been valued by a wide range of interviewees as an *interesting conflict prevention tool* (in particular with respect to the possibility offered by this instrument for financing projects in sensitive areas without the government's approval), its *lack of flexibility* for intervening in the short term has also been often stressed.
- ***Once a crisis was obvious, the Commission often reacted quickly, notably in combining various instruments and in adapting its strategy and programming to an evolving situation.***
  - The country case studies and the meta-analysis of evaluation reports reveal several examples where the Commission reacted quickly to an evolving situation by *combining various instruments* (e.g. food security, EDF, political dialogue, civilian crisis management missions, etc.). In Angola, for instance, the country-level evaluation mentions that in 2002 the Commission responded rapidly to short-term needs including emergency relief, food aid and food security, re-integration and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons, and de-mining operations. Programmes were implemented through the UN and NGOs. In Georgia an ESDP mission (EU Monitoring Mission financed by the CFSP budget administered by the Commission) was rapidly deployed following the outbreak of conflict in August 2008. Similarly, 69% of EUD respondents mentioned that the Commission was able to provide a rapid reaction to a crisis situation.
  - Interesting practices also showed the *Commission adapting its strategy and programming to an evolving situation*. In Ivory Coast, in recognition of the conflict situation and owing to the fact that the EDF 9 CSP had not yet been signed, the programming was adapted after the “coup”, with A-envelope funds transferred to the *B-envelope* to finance programmes in a post-crisis context. In Georgia the strategy was adapted in such a way as to respond to security concerns: the 2002-2006 CSP and related NIPs were reviewed outside the regular CSP reviewing process because of security incidents in 2001 and 2002. As a result a new CSP/NIP was signed for the period 2003-2006: it gave specific priority to conflict resolution and peace consolidation.

### JC 3.2 Preventing recurrence of crises and consolidating peace

The Commission provided support for immediate crisis, conflict mitigation and the consolidation of peace through specific programmes and political dialogue.

- The inventory shows that *contracted Commission funds for “rapid intervention”* over the period 2001-2010 represented *23% of CPPB support* (€1.7bn).
- In a number of cases, the *Commission explicitly envisaged support for the immediate consolidation of peace in its strategy documents*. 53% of the

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<sup>55</sup> E.g. in Bolivia, Kyrgyz Republic, Angola, Moldova, Pakistan, Uganda, and Eritrea.

CSPs/RSPs reviewed<sup>56</sup> include support for the immediate consolidation for peace. Similarly, support for short-term prevention was envisaged in three of the country case studies<sup>57</sup>.

- The Commission *increasingly used political dialogue for short-term prevention over the evaluation period*. 50% of survey respondents mentioned that the Commission used political dialogue for short-term prevention over the period 2002-2007 (60% for the period 2008-2013(2010)). It should be noted that the absence of a political section in the EUD in specific countries (e.g. Kyrgyz Republic) constrained the use of political dialogue for short-term prevention.

**The evaluation found little evidence on the sequencing of peace-building activities.** Only 26% of the CSPs and RSPs reviewed<sup>58</sup> mention a strategy for sequencing peace-building activities, and none of the country case studies provides any evidence of a strategy for such sequencing.

**The Commission's support often contributed positively to conflict mitigation, stabilisation, reconstruction and rehabilitation** (see box below).

**Box 3 - Examples of positive contribution of the Commission's support to conflict mitigation, stabilisation, reconstruction and rehabilitation**

**Angola:** the country-level evaluation provides a positive assessment of the contribution made by the Commission's support (emergency relief, food aid and food security, re-integration and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons, and de-mining operations) in terms of consolidation of the peace process, and underlined the importance of governance interventions.

**Liberia:** the country-level evaluation indicates that the Commission's contribution to the DDDR process through a UN Trust Fund helped to stabilise the post-conflict situation *"by signalling the availability of post-war livelihoods opportunities and by helping to jump-start the return of IDPs and refugees"*.

**Sierra Leone:** the country-level evaluation and the analysis conducted in the framework of this evaluation provide evidence of a positive contribution from the International Community, including the Commission, in the immediate consolidation of the peace phase (including through the PCBS): in particular, the Commission's support did help GoSLe in its efforts towards creating a functioning bureaucracy and macro-economic stability which contributed positively to stability, peace and rehabilitation in the immediate post-war phase.

**Central African Republic:** interviewees and mission reports indicated that FOMUC and MICOPAX, financed through the African Peace Facility, had a stabilising effect on certain parts of the country, notably by creating security conditions under which the

<sup>56</sup> Countries concerned were Angola, Burundi, CAR, Colombia, MEDA and ENPI region, Georgia, IC, CAR, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Timor Leste, and WB&GS.

<sup>57</sup> In Georgia it concerned conflict resolution, peace consolidation through Commission financing instruments and the actions of other EU bodies such as the Council (through CFSP Joint Actions), EUSR, political dialogue, etc. In Sierra Leone in the 2002-2007 period, the Commission envisaged support for GoSLe efforts in rehabilitation, while specific interventions for stabilisation, mostly by means of post-conflict Budget Support, were designed.

<sup>58</sup> Countries concerned were Angola, Burundi, Colombia, DRC, Region ENPI, IC, CAR, Sudan, and Timor Leste.

population could conduct social and economic activities.

**Timor-Leste:** specific support for short-term prevention, although not part of the strategy, was however implemented. It contributed to reconstruction and rehabilitation in the early evaluation period (e.g. through the TFET) and to political stabilisation in 2007 through the support for the electoral cycle.

**Bolivia:** support for immediate crisis and conflict mitigation was not part of the Commission's strategy. However, the EU played an increasing role in providing support during the election processes in response to the political trends in the country, with the deployment of several EU EOM missions over the period 2005-2010. The EUD has also been active through political dialogue. A wide range of stakeholders met stressed the positive contribution of this support to the electoral process.

### JC 3.3 Transition between short-term and long-term prevention

The Commission often envisaged in its strategy documents linking its short-term and long-term support, in particular through an approach Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD):

- 44% of the *CSPs/RSPs reviewed* explicitly refer to linkages between crisis management and conflict prevention. They often envisage an *LRRD approach linking up with programmes financed through ECHO or Community budget lines* (in particular the Food Security Budget Line) to ease the transition from humanitarian aid to rehabilitation.
- *Most country case studies and the meta-analysis of evaluation reports*<sup>59</sup> provide evidence that the *Commission often designed an LRRD approach to take over from ECHO relief*<sup>60</sup>.
- The inventory shows that *contracted Commission funds in support of LRRD* represented *2.4% of total CPPB funds* (€167.94m) over the period. The Democratic Republic of Congo has been the major beneficiary of LRRD funds (50% of LRRD funding).

The Commission often tried to link its short-term interventions with programmes financed by long-term financial instruments, IfS programmes in particular being forerunners of subsequent programmes during the 2008-2010 period.

- The *EUD survey* showed that over time the *Commission increasingly ensured a linkage between its short-term and long-term support*. 70% of EUD respondents mentioned that the Commission took specific initiatives to ensure a linkage between its short-term and long-term assistance during the period 2002-2007 (85% during the period 2008-2013(2010))<sup>61</sup>.

<sup>59</sup> Countries concerned are Angola, Chad, Liberia and Rwanda.

<sup>60</sup> For instance in Central African Republic and Ivory Coast, the EDF 10 support is articulated around an LRRD approach with several short-term actions linked to longer-term interventions. The 2003-2007 CSP for Sierra Leone aimed to link up short-term relief with rehabilitation programmes and long-term development objectives. LRRD programmes were expected to take over from ECHO relief.

<sup>61</sup> For instance, in Lebanon, the mobilisation of the IfS was followed by ENPI interventions; in Pakistan linkages between the Instrument for Stability and the Development Cooperation Instrument on issues such as support to democratisation, counter-terrorism and floods response were reported during the 2008-2013 period; in Nigeria EDF interventions during the 2008-2013 period were based on IfS interventions.



- In *most country case studies*<sup>62</sup>, attention has been put on ensuring coherence between interventions financed by short-term and long-term financial instruments, although this was generally not explicitly planned for in strategy documents. For instance, in the Kyrgyz Republic specific linkages were reported between the IfS and the DCI (2008 IfS Support for judiciary reform followed by the 2009 DCI support for prison reform). In Timor-Leste, under EDF 10 long-term interventions were based on lessons learned and success stories from short-term interventions such as those funded under the IfS.

**The degree of success of the transition from short-term to long-term support at the level of specific sectors or of the strategy as a whole has often been challenged, in particular by lack of capacities combined with insufficient exit strategies or the premature transition from rehabilitation to development.**

- In a number of cases the *lack of capacities of national or local authorities to take over interventions* constituted challenges to a successful transition to the longer term. For instance, in CAR the durability of the effects of the FOMUC/MICOPAX was in doubt in the absence of further Commission support. Similarly the regional evaluation for West Africa indicates that ECOWAS remained dependant on further Commission financial support and that capacity-building had not been a focus of its support. The mid-term evaluation of the Africa Peace Facility indicates that capacity-building in the African peace and security architecture had so far been limited.
- An *exit strategy to ensure a continuum with the long-term was generally not planned at design stage*. The CSPs and RSPs reviewed show that only 21% planned for such a strategy<sup>63</sup>. The mid-term evaluation of the African Peace Facility also highlights that limited attention has been given to defining an exit strategy from peace support operations.
- Individual cases also illustrate the *risk of moving too rapidly towards development, both for the Commission's strategy and for the priorities of the partner governments*. For instance, in Liberia just after the war ended, the Commission's strategy (CSP 2004-2007) explicitly focused on more long-term-oriented development with education as a focal sector, on the grounds that relief and short-term rehabilitation were covered by other instruments (support through ECHO, budget lines and EDF8). However, the transition proved to be rather slow (humanitarian aid staying in place for a long period, and rehabilitation and development interventions being slow to take off owing to staff shortages in the EUD) and there is a change in approach in the second CSP which focuses on the need to respond to the "rehabilitation gap" as humanitarian assistance is phased out. In Timor-Leste several stakeholders met underlined the risk of moving too rapidly towards development, as suggested by the Government's slogan "*Goodbye conflict, welcome development*" as this could indeed lead to ignoring conflict risks as yet unresolved.

<sup>62</sup> Countries concerned are Bolivia, Central African Republic, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Timor Leste and West Bank and Gaza Strip.

<sup>63</sup> Countries concerned are Angola, Burundi, Kenya, CAR, Sierra Leone and WB&GS.

## Evaluation Question 4 on Geographical dimensions

**To what extent has the Commission’s support to CPPB been designed and implemented to take into account different geographical dimensions of (potential) conflicts (international, region, country and local levels) and to what extent has the support provided at different geographical levels been articulated in such a way as to foster synergies?**

*Conflicts may occur at different geographical levels and there may be conflict dynamics linking these levels. A conflict may be very local, specific to a single country, involve several countries or an entire region. Some can have an international dimension, such as is the case in some of the crosscutting factors of conflicts, for instance in drugs-related conflicts which involve the entire “drug route”. It is therefore essential that CPPB support intervenes at the most appropriate geographical level and addresses the links between these levels. This may imply adoption of an adequate regional strategy when for instance a conflict affects an entire region or when causes have a regional dimension. The concern for the relevant geographical level of the Commission’s CPPB support constitutes one of the four key features of an integrated approach to CPPB support. Accordingly, the present question aims precisely at verifying to what extent this has been taken into account by the Commission in its CPPB support over the period evaluated.*

*This question is concerned with the relevance and internal coherence of the Commission’s CPPB support. It determines the extent to which the Commission’s CPPB strategy took geographical features of the conflict into account. Second, it addresses the coherence of the Commission’s CPPB support by determining the extent to which the Commission’s support has been articulated, in a coherent manner, at different geographical levels (e.g. country and regional levels).*

### EQ 4 on Geographical dimensions – Answer Summary Box

***In the design of its CPPB support, the geographical dimensions of the conflict and the ensuing needs of specific zones generally informed the CPPB support provided. While the Commission strategically aimed to amplify its capacity by deploying aid at different geographical levels, evidence of actual synergies is mixed.***

The Commission generally analysed the geographical features of the conflict context, paying attention for instance to:

- regional or cross-border dimensions of the conflict and their implications (management of displaced persons, of porous borders etc.), the existence of internal geographical divides, particularly conflict-affected areas or communities, etc.
- aid planning at different geographical levels (local, regional, national, cross-border),
- the interests and policies of neighbouring countries, regional powers or regional organisations.

Moreover, geographical considerations informed the development assistance provided by the Commission. CPPB support targeted for instance: (i) cross-border areas or the regional level, (ii) internal lines of fracture, and (iii) particularly hard-hit conflict-affected areas or communities. In so doing the Commission often intervened in zones that were not, or were less, targeted by others.

In terms of linkages between different geographical levels of support, the Commission

embedded its support mostly in national initiatives or frameworks (peace accords, reconciliation processes) by (i) linking its support at grassroots level to national frameworks/initiatives, but not systematically, or (ii) involving local populations at the design stage but not systematically. The Commission also supported regional organisations involved in CPPB, most notably in Africa where the Commission provided substantial support to African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the AU, ECOWAS, and other RECs.

Although support was provided at different geographical levels, evidence shows that the linking of support between these different levels was insufficient: whilst the strategic objective existed, evidence of actual synergies was mixed.

#### JC 4.1 Appropriateness of the geographical level of intervention

Several elements indicate that the Commission generally analysed the geographical dimension of the conflict and the ensuing needs of specific zones.

- In most of the country case studies, *conflict descriptions or assessments made or used by the Commission included geographical characteristics, notably:* (i) regional or cross-border dimensions and their implications such as the management of displaced persons and of porous borders (CAR, Kyrgyz Republic, WB&GS)<sup>64</sup>, and (ii) the existence of internal geographical divides which can take on additional religious and socio-economic dimensions (Ivory Coast, WB&GS, the Kyrgyz Republic, Georgia).
- This is less clear in the CSPs where 50% of the CSPs/RSPs reviewed include geographical elements in the conflict description or assessment, when there was one.
- Despite a general trend towards being sensitive to conflicts' geographical characteristics, *some shortcomings in the understanding of conflicts' geographical contexts were reported.* For example, in the case of Timor Leste the Commission (which had no EUD in the country at the time) and other international actors at first focused on relations with Indonesia and were surprised by the increase in internal tensions (see also EQ1).

These geographical considerations informed the support provided<sup>65</sup>. Evidence shows that the Commission's CPPB reasoning and aid planning was targeted on (1) cross-border or regional areas, (2) internal lines of fracture, (3) conflict-affected areas or communities. It was also informed by consideration of the interests and policies of the countries neighbouring the beneficiary as well as regional powers.

- According to two-thirds of *survey* respondents, *the conflict or instability which has affected the country included either a strong regional dimension (33%) or a certain regional dimension (33%)*<sup>66</sup>. Survey respondents stated that *it had been taken into account in the Commission's strategy and programming* in almost all

<sup>64</sup> For example the problem of porous borders in the CAR, and the ethnically-mixed and conflict-prone Ferghana valley in the Kyrgyz Republic, the Palestinian refugee question in WB&GS and its neighbouring countries.

<sup>65</sup> 82% of survey respondents stated that, for the period 2002-2008, as well as the period 2008-2013, strategy and programming choices were based on specific geographical features of the conflict.

<sup>66</sup> Regional dimension e.g. several countries (potentially) involved in the conflict, problems of refugees, problems of return of former combatants, illicit resources, mobile rebel groups; hostile policies and actions of neighbouring countries.

cases. Six survey respondents also specifically indicated that the Commission had considered the interests and policies of neighbouring countries and regional powers in its reasoning and aid planning. For example, the Commission included Russia in its confidence-building projects but overall M&E is scarce.

- Case studies also provide examples of *the Commission's regional or cross-border support*. In the WB&GS, the Commission's support to Palestinian refugees covered the WB&GS but also Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. In the Kyrgyz Republic, there is evidence that the Commission's assistance was sensitive to the North-South divide as well to tensions in mixed community areas: it funded poverty reduction measures with conflict prevention objectives in cross-border areas (Ferghana valley) as well as NGO initiatives aimed at building trust at grassroots level in mixed communities (additional evidence from case studies for Rwanda, Georgia Bolivia<sup>67</sup> and also from the survey).
- *In countries characterised by an internal divide*, there is evidence that the *Commission's support took it into account*. In the Kyrgyz Republic, the Ferghana valley, a tension-prone, cross-border region characterized by a patchwork of ethnicities, has received substantial rural development and poverty alleviation support. In Ivory Coast, the Commission assisted both the government-controlled South and the rebel-controlled *Centre-Nord-Ouest* of the country, notably by providing substantial humanitarian support, support to DDR and to the electoral process. The short-term Commission support to the MICECI peace force acted as a stopgap measure to prolong the presence of this peace force along the line of demarcation between the rebel-controlled CNO and the South (additional evidence from the case studies for WB&GS, Georgia<sup>68</sup>).
- There is evidence that the Commission *targeted its assistance particularly on conflict-affected, isolated or vulnerable areas or communities prone to conflict factors*: for example, in WB&GS, notably in Gaza, East Jerusalem and Area C, the so-called "orphan zones", where the effects of the conflict have been the most acute or where the implementation of aid has been most difficult, and in CAR, through its "*pôles de développement*" initiative implemented in economically- and conflict-vulnerable areas which had up until then received only limited Commission assistance, concentrated in Bangui. The MICOPAX - ECCAS' peace force financially supported by the Commission was also redeployed to areas where a DDR process was to take place or in the areas selected as "*pôles de développement*" to ensure basic security conditions prior to those interventions (additional evidence from case studies on Georgia, Bolivia, the Kyrgyz Republic<sup>69</sup>). Evidence was also found in the survey and country evaluations for

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<sup>67</sup> The Commission supported the DDR process through its contribution to the MDRP, regional multi-donor trust fund for DDR in the greater Great Lakes region. In Georgia, certain projects were given a regional dimension (gatherings of cross-national experts or summer camps). In Bolivia the *Rio Group*, a permanent regional-level political dialogue authority to address drug issues at regional level was introduced in 1990. However the EUD reported a lack of instruments for regional calls for proposals.

<sup>68</sup> In WB&GS the Commission sought to intervene in Areas B and C, in Gaza and in East Jerusalem, as well as in Area A, according to the security and administrative division of the control of WB&GS between the PA and the Government of Israel as set out in the 1995 Oslo interim agreement. In Georgia support was provided to IDPs but there was also involvement in Abkhazia at project level with the *de facto* Abkhaz authority according to the principle of "engagement without recognition". In South Ossetia the Commission had no relations with the *de facto* authority.

<sup>69</sup> In Georgia, in the breakaway regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia (largest donor according to the NIP 2007-2010); in Bolivia it supported rural and indigenous populations, particularly in coca production areas (more from 2007 onwards; the CSP 2002-2007 was not CPPB-related); and in the Kyrgyz Republic, under its poverty reduction schemes over the period 2002-2006.

Pakistan, Uganda, the Eastern provinces in DRC, South Lebanon, Sri Lanka in the Eastern and Northern Provinces and Angola. The Commission has supported *other vulnerable groups subject to instability* such as Palestinian refugees, notably through UNRWA and support to camps in the Lebanon, and IDPs from conflict zones in Georgia (one of the main priorities of the Commission's cooperation). In so doing the Commission often intervened in zones that were not, or were less, targeted by others (WB&GS, Ivory Coast, Georgia, and CAR).

#### JC 4.2 Addressing local and national needs<sup>70</sup>

There is evidence that the Commission embedded its support in national CPPB initiatives or frameworks, where they existed (five of the eight country cases) but that coherence with its support at local or grassroots level had not been systematic. It was also found that the involvement of local populations in the design of Commission's CPPB support had not been systematic either.

- *the Commission has supported peace processes or the implementation of peace accords as well as national reconciliation processes.* For example, in Ivory Coast Commission assistance addressed those areas identified in the 2003 *Marvoussis* peace agreement signed by the parties to the conflict and which the national reconciliation government was to implement. The Commission also supported national policies or reform plans contributing to CPPB: for example, in WB&GS, the Palestinian Civil Police intervention analysed supported ESDP mission EUPOL COPPS which underpinned implementation of the 2005-2008 Palestinian Civil Police Development Programme in the context of its Roadmap for peace security obligations; while the PEGASE mechanism supported the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP) for 2008-2010. In Sierra Leone, support was informed by needs as identified in the *Agenda for Change* Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It also supported the national DDR process in CAR, Ivory Coast and Rwanda. The Commission also *provided support at the request of national authorities*: for example, in the Kyrgyz Republic, it supported reform of the judicial sector at the request of the Minister of Justice in 2007; while in Bolivia it funded a national coca leaf study requested by the Government of Bolivia to support the authorities in the development of an anti-drug national policy. Alignment was however also problematic in some cases, as further analysed under EQ5.
- *There is little information on the coherence of the Commission's support at national level with its support at the grassroots or local level.* The meta-analysis of evaluation reports shows that the evidence is negative in the following cases: in Liberia, the country-level evaluation reports that support to capacity- building at national level had been relatively successful but had weaknesses, in particular at local level; and the CPPB evaluation in Sri Lanka reported that the focus of EC/EIDHR programmes on grassroots peace-building and community-based human rights advocacy had been particularly relevant because the grassroots approach had been complementary to macro-level initiatives but that *real* connection or complementarity had not been

<sup>70</sup> According to the OECD-DAC, *DAC guidelines on conflict, peace and development cooperation*, 1997, establishing close linkages between local-level initiatives and their counterparts at provincial and national levels is essential to ensuring the consistency of the approach in terms of coherence and sustainability of results. Additionally the involvement of national and local authorities or groups, including representatives of the parties in conflict, in the formulation of programmes has been considered as a way of ensuring national ownership of the development process.

apparent. Finally only 29% of the CSPs/RSPs reviewed refer to the participation of local authorities, including representatives of parties in conflict, in the formulation of interventions.

**The level of involvement of local populations/beneficiaries in the Commission's CPPB support was not a recurrent issue. No systematic practice was identified. Rather, some positive cases and some less positive cases were identified.**

- ***In the following cases, the involvement of the local population was considered insufficient.*** The West-Africa regional evaluation concludes that CSOs' participation in the management of conflict issues had been deficient and that some aspects of the Commission's management of conflict issues had not paid sufficient attention to its effects on different societal layers. This relates to conflict sensitiveness and 'do-no-harm' issues. The mid-term evaluation of the APF reports that the "*Close civilian-military cooperation has been important in building the conditions for peace in both the CAR and Darfur*" but could have been done more systematically even though it had improved over time.
- ***In other cases, the Commission consulted the local populations or beneficiaries in the course of the formulation of its support.*** For example, in Georgia IDPs were consulted and efforts to involve all minority groups were also reported. The Angola evaluation reported that a factor of the Commission's successful LRRD approach was intervention at local level and involvement of local authorities, which had notably contributed to facilitating the viability of resettlement and handling of potential conflicts at local level.
- ***In other cases, the Commission's involvement with CSOs focused on funding their CPPB projects.*** For example, in the Kyrgyz Republic the Commission funded NGO initiatives aimed at building trust at grassroots level in mixed community areas as well as in cross-border areas (large interventions in the Ferghana valley at the border with Uzbekistan).

### JC 4.3 Regional dynamics of conflicts<sup>71</sup>

**Evidence shows that the Commission's support to regional organisations involved in CPPB was strong.**

- 36% of *survey* respondents stated that the Commission had coordinated the design and implementation of its support to CPPB with regional authorities (44% stating that the Commission had not done so). Similarly 47% of the CSPs/RSPs reviewed include the objective of providing support to regional mechanisms, specifically with a view to ensuring CPPB.
- Since the decision in 2003 to use the EDF to fund a specific APF in support of the African peace and security architecture (APSA)<sup>72</sup>, the AU and regional African organisations, ***the Commission has first and foremost provided substantial support to African regional organisations***<sup>73</sup>.

<sup>71</sup> According to the OECD 2001 Guidelines and the 2001 Communication on CP, CPPB was also to be supported by contributing to regional integration and to regional organisations with a clear conflict prevention mandate. The European Security Strategy in 2003 also identified the need to work with regional partners to counter existing threats.

<sup>72</sup> European Commission, *The African Peace Facility, Annual report 2010*, 2010, p.7.

<sup>73</sup> ECDPM, *African Peace and Security Architecture: the nature and consequences of European Union support*, p.4, in *op. cit.*

- It is currently the *largest donor to African-led peace support operations* through the APF. €440 million was committed under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF and a further €300 million under the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF for the period 2008 to 2010<sup>74</sup>.
  - The EU has also been the *largest financial backer of APSA*<sup>75</sup>.
  - The regional evaluation for West Africa provided evidence of the positive results of the Commission's support to ECOWAS, in terms of contributions to its institutional CPPB capacity-building and to technical expertise, but highlighted the fact that support had been mainly limited to a funding function.
  - The Commission supported peace forces deployed by African organisations in the CAR (ECCAS and EMCCA peace forces, FOMUC and MICOPAX) which had an essential stabilization function<sup>76</sup>. In Ivory Coast, it supported a one-month ECOWAS mediation mission, and also the MICECI, a three-month ECOWAS deployment.
- *Supporting regional economic integration and building trade links as a contribution to CPPB*<sup>77</sup> was rarely mentioned (although it was for Nicaragua and DRC<sup>78</sup>).

#### JC 4.4 Articulating support at different geographical levels with a view to fostering synergies

Evidence shows that the Commission (1) planned the deployment of its aid at different geographical levels but (2) that support had not always been sufficiently articulated between the different geographical levels. The strategic objective was more evident during the period 2008-2013(2010) but only in a few cases is there evidence of creation of actual synergies.

- In the case of the Kyrgyz Republic the Commission's support was regional<sup>79</sup> and included a commitment to ensuring synergies between regional, national and cross-border levels. This strategic aim was reflected in actual programming: key regional risks such as borders and water were supported in regional projects (BOMCA) whilst other risks were addressed at national level (irrigation, road construction to avoid enclaves and support to communities via EIDHR support). In Ivory Coast the Commission supported ECOWAS's mediation mission in 2002 and ECOWAS's MICECI peace force. Evidence was also found in the DRC and Angola<sup>80</sup>. In parallel 53% of respondents reported that the Commission coordinated the design and implementation

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid*, p.2.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid*, p.3.

<sup>76</sup> "Since 1 November 2004, the APF has funded €61m for peace support operations in the CAR" in European Commission, *The African Peace Facility, Annual report 2010, 2010*, p.9.

<sup>77</sup> As specified in the COM (2001) 211.

<sup>78</sup> via support to the Communauté économique des Pays des Grands Lacs (CEPGL).

<sup>79</sup> No country strategy papers for Central Asia.

<sup>80</sup> In the DRC, the Commission supported the Communauté économique des Pays des Grands Lacs (CEPGL) under the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF's regional and national envelopes. The country evaluation for Angola highlighted that the Commission supported DDRR-supported beneficiary groups which could have been excluded from the regional ADRP Multi-Donor Trust Fund.

of its support to CPPB with the other EUDs of the region<sup>81</sup>. 61% of the CSPs and RSPs reviewed explicitly refer to the *need to articulate different geographical levels*. In some of the countries or regions where this was not the case, it would still have been relevant.

- *In other cases however there was evidence of lost opportunities in cases where interventions were not coordinated with similar action in neighbouring countries or at regional level.* In Chad for instance the programmes targeting areas populated by refugees and IDP populations, including from Darfur and CAR, were not designed with a view to creating synergies with parallel programmes in CAR and Sudan. Country Evaluations for CAR and Nigeria also highlighted discrepancies in support at national and regional levels.

## Evaluation Question 5 on Coordination and Complementarity

**To what extent and with what effect has the Commission's support to CPPB been designed and implemented in coordination and complementarity at different levels both within the EU and with other donors and partners?**

*CPPB requires a holistic approach, not only in terms of activities conducted, integration of time-frames and of different geographical dimensions, but also in terms of coordination and complementarity between the activities of different actors, at all levels. This concerns activities between different entities (directorates, departments) within a single donor organisation, but also with other donors and organisations (including Non-State Actors), as well as different governing bodies within the partner countries.*

*This question mainly concerns coordination and complementarity, but also effectiveness, impact and Commission added value. Indeed, within an integrated approach, ensuring coordination and complementarity within the EU and with other donors active in the field of CPPB is more than a means of providing aid in an effective and efficient manner; it is a genuine objective per se since providing a coherent international response to conflicts is key to contributing to structural stability<sup>82</sup>.*

<sup>81</sup> Dialogue between HoD was reported in West African countries, as also was strong coordination on regional cross-border projects between the EUD to the Kyrgyz Republic and other regional EUDs.

<sup>82</sup> Structural stability was a core concept of the 2001 Communication on conflict prevention. It originated in the policy sphere in the DAC-OECD in 1997 and 2001 supplement to the guidelines on "Preventing Violent Conflict". But it rapidly faded away because it did not capture the dynamic of conflict – the link between the profile of the conflict, the actors and the structural, proximate causes and triggers of violent conflict - or the more transformative and process-based approaches as characterised by most of the academic literature on conflict and peacebuilding. Hence an approach entirely defined by structural stability was seen as inappropriate. After 9/11 other concepts were key such as human security, peacebuilding, security and development, then situations of fragility/fragile states and state building that had greater resonance with policy makers.



**EQ 5 on Coordination and Complementarity – Answer Summary Box**

*At all levels (between Commission DGs, within the EU and with other international actors), coordination was more a matter of exchange of information than a coordinated approach to CPPB with a shared strategy and a division of labour along with leadership to ensure complementarity between donors. Whenever the latter was achieved, the support had greater impact. With the partner countries, coordination and alignment were not straightforward concepts to apply in a CPPB context, and raised difficulties.*

Within the Commission, the division of roles between RELEX, DEV (strategic level) and AIDCO (implementation level) was not conducive to coordination on CPPB issues for ensuring rapid decision-making, flexibility and tailored responses to local needs. While general coordination mechanisms between the three DGs existed, there was no dedicated operational coordination mechanism for CPPB issues and as a result the latter were not systematically taken into account. Specific CPPB instruments (APF and IfS mainly) and units were created over the evaluation period and contributed to an improvement in the exchange of information on CPPB issues between the three DGs and between HQ and EUDs.

EU institutions and the EUMS did not have a shared strategy with clear objectives, leadership and joint instruments to ensure a whole-of-EU approach. However, regular exchanges of information took place and were key to avoiding overlaps and to a common approach to (post-) conflict situations. Within the EU the Commission had limited leverage, apart from its financial weight, to ensure a coordinated approach with the EUMS.

The Commission channelled half of its CPPB financial support through international organisations (mainly UN and WB), the great majority through MDTF in Afghanistan, Iraq and WB&GS. This favoured a coordinated response to these conflict-affected areas and allowed the Commission to intervene in situations where acting alone would have been difficult.

In the cases examined, whenever a coordinated approach from the entire international community took place during or after a conflict or crisis, it yielded stronger impact.

Although in many partner countries the Commission's CPPB support was aligned with governmental priorities, in certain situation such alignment raised challenges.

The Commission was a strong supporter of civil society organisations around CPPB issues, mainly through international NGOs and specialised CPPB networks.

## JC 5.1 “Whole-of-government approach” between and within the Commission’s DGs

The Commission mechanisms put in place to ensure coordination between the External Relations DGs did not systematically take into account CPPB-related issues. Over the evaluation period the creation of specific CPPB units and instruments proved conducive to exchange of information between DGs.

- Mechanisms such as the inter-Service Quality Support Group (iQSG) and the operational Quality Support Group (oQSG) were set up to ensure quality, harmonisation and coordination of DGs’ positions. Guidance notes on CPPB-related issues were produced to inform the development of country strategies and the design of CPPB projects but these documents did not include CPPB-related criteria to be systematically included at the design stage of CSPs or projects (see EQ 7).
- Following the 2001 Communication on conflict prevention, *specific CPPB units and instruments were nevertheless set up within DGs RELEX, DEV and AIDCO*:
  - in 2001: the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM)
  - in 2004: the African Peace Facility (APF)
  - in 2007: the IfS was set up with specific units within RELEX and AIDCO, around 20 IfS project managers in EUDs, and eight regional crisis response planners.

According to several interviews at HQ level and in EUDs, *the creation of these units and instruments facilitated more exchange of information* on CPPB-related issues between the Commission DGs. But it also fragmented the spread of CPPB issues across DG and units (see EQ 7).

**Overall, the division of roles between AIDCO and DGs RELEX and DEV was considered as insufficiently adapted for interventions on CPPB. Nevertheless, joint CPPB initiatives between DGs were developed over the evaluation period and these increased the exchange of information on these issues.**

- Several interviewees at HQ considered that the different organisational cultures between AIDCO (responsible for implementation) and RELEX/DEV (responsible for development of strategy), did not make for a common approach to CPPB interventions.
- Similarly, 48% of the survey respondents stated that this division was not well adapted to practical need. Reasons given mainly concerned the difficulties inherent in linking strategy and implementation in a conflict context: the long-term programming exercise through the CSP and geographical instruments was not well adapted to (post-) conflict countries which need rapid interventions.
- Joint CPPB initiatives such as joint needs assessment missions, training and working groups were nevertheless developed over the evaluation period and improved the exchange of information on CPPB matters, but took place more on an *ad hoc* basis.

**Coordination between HQ and EUD took place on a more informal basis than through structured mechanisms. It was considered as functioning rather well even if some shortcomings were reported.**

- According to the eight case studies, relations *between EUDs and HQ were mainly informal and were reported as good in general*. For example, in Sierra Leone the staff from the EUD working on elections had regular contacts with the “election unit” at HQ for providing expertise. In Timor Leste the day-to-day work on CPPB was mainly carried out by the IfS programme officer who had regular contact with the IfS unit within RELEX.
- The majority of the EUD survey respondents (74%) considered that the *division of roles between HQ and EUDs was well adapted* to intervening in a (post-) conflict (-prone) context.
- *But some shortcomings*, due mainly to lack of communication, were mentioned by several EUD stakeholders<sup>83</sup>.

## **JC 5.2 Coordination and complementarities between the Commission and the General Secretariat of the EU Council, the European Union Special Representative and with EU Member States (“whole-of-EU approach”)**

**In general, the Commission and the Council lacked an explicit shared strategy with clear objectives and shared analysis to ensure coordinated support to CPPB.**

- Between the Commission and the Council, *regular meetings or consultations took place to ensure coordination around CPPB issues*:
  - a specific unit within RELEX entitled “Crisis platform – Policy coordination in CFSP” was created in 2005 to ensure, whenever a crisis emerged, that policy coordination with second pillar operators and with Commission geographical desk officers;
  - before taking the decision to launch an ESDP mission, the Council and EUMS involved the Commission in the preparation of that decision within the Political and Security Committee (PSC) meetings;
  - at country level, in Georgia and WB&GS for example, the Head of Delegation and Head of ESDP mission had regular coordination meetings during the operations.
- But in general *no shared strategies were developed jointly between the Council and the Commission before intervening in a specific country*. According to the case studies for Georgia and WB&GS, when the decision was taken to send ESDP missions (EUMM in Georgia and EUPOL COPPS in WB&GS), the Commission and

<sup>83</sup> This concerned for example programming carried out at HQ level without enough information on the local situation and the changing drivers of the conflict ; lack of flexibility to change projects’ financing agreements once they were signed; the fact that the decision had to go through heavy procedures within HQ before approval was given to the EUD to proceed ; unilateral decisions taken by HQ on the list of fragile states without informing the Delegation (this being the case in Timor-Leste which benefitted from the flexible EDF procedures aimed at facilitating project implementation in fragile states; HQ considered at one stage that Timor-Leste was no longer a fragile state, without informing the EUD of their decision) ; and lack of experience assimilation exercises/lessons learnt between EUD and HQ on CPPB issues, except for election processes.

the Council had no explicit shared strategies for intervening in the country. According to a review of EU SSR support<sup>84</sup>, it was the same in Guinea-Bissau and DRC<sup>85</sup>. According to this review and interviewees met at HQ and in the field, the lack of a shared strategy or shared analysis created uncoordinated action with overlaps in activities carried out by both actors.

- The *shortcomings in respect of a coordinated approach between the Council and the Commission* were also reported by several other stakeholders met at HQ and in EUDs, the reasons invoked being mainly that:
  - they did not have a shared country assessment and strategy;
  - the respective roles of the Head of Delegation and Head of ESDP missions were not well defined;
  - there was often overlap of activities in which the Commission and Council could work on the same thematic area, e.g. justice, police;
  - the two bodies had different organisational cultures, mandates and timeframes for engagement which necessitated a careful sequencing of their respective interventions, which in practice however frequently did not take place: short-term Council missions often took place in situations where the Commission was already engaged on a long-term development assistance programme.

That said, some *successful sequencing of interventions between the Commission and the Council provided good results*. In the cases examined during this evaluation, the EU support for criminal justice in Georgia was considered a good example (see box below).

#### **Box 4 - Successful sequencing of Council and Commission interventions for criminal justice reform in Georgia**

The EU started supporting the criminal justice sector with a Commission-funded TACIS programme (in 2001). It mainly worked on the reform of the penitentiary system in Georgia. After the “Rose Revolution” (November 2003), Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) funds were made available to facilitate prompt intervention in this sector. This was then followed by an ESDP mission (EUJUST Themis from 2004 to 2005) to support the Georgian authorities for the establishment of the criminal justice reform strategy. Then the EUSR ensured the transition during the six-month interval between the ESDP mission and the Commission’s longer-term support. This support was provided through a TACIS programme and then the ENPI Sector Budget Support (SBS) for the criminal justice reform, combined with technical assistance and EIDHR projects involving civil society. This SBS is still ongoing and is already considered to be very successful.

<sup>84</sup> Netherlands Institute for International Relations - Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme, Conflict Research Unit, Derks Maria and More, Sylvie, *The European Union and Internal Challenges for Effectively Supporting Security Sector Reform*, 2009.

<sup>85</sup> In DRC, this was reinforced in Netherlands Institute for International Relations - Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme, More Sylvie, Price Megan, *The EU’s support to Security System Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Perceptions from the field in Spring 2010*, 2011.

At country level coordination took place between the Commission and EUMS mainly through regular exchange of information which was crucial in a CPPB context for avoiding overlaps and staying broadly on the same track. But there was no shared explicit strategy with clear objectives, strong leadership and joint instruments to ensure a whole-of-EU approach.

- In the eight countries analysed for the case studies, the *exchange of information between the Commission and EUMS took place on a regular basis* through formal and informal meetings. In most of these countries EU formal coordination groups existed at political and operational levels to ensure coherence and avoid overlaps in their actions<sup>86</sup>.
- The perception of *EUD staff was broadly positive in terms of being on the same track as EUMS* on several issues:
  - 86% of respondents to the survey considered that the Commission and the EUMS had a clear common position or broadly agreed, with some nuances, on the strategy to adopt in the country;
  - 78% of respondents considered that they had a common understanding with EUMS on the root causes of the conflict.
- But in most of the partner countries *the Commission and EUMS still had their own bilateral country strategy paper*. The exception is Sierra Leone (and South Africa although this was not a country analysed in the case studies), for which a joint CSP between the Commission and DFID exists. That said, implementation of the strategy remained separate.
- Most of EUD survey respondents considered that there was *no clear leadership from the Commission within the EU* (but also within the donor community, see JC5.3) on issues such as coordination of CPPB support, promotion of an integrated approach, and dialogue with the country authorities.

**Within the EU the Commission had limited leverage, apart from its financial weight, to ensure a coordinated approach with EUMS.**

- In countries such as Ivory Coast or Sierra Leone, the major donors and those with historical ties are France and UK respectively. In that context, in which both EUMS had military forces in the country, the Commission had limited political leverage to ensure a whole-of-EU approach. But in both cases the financial weight of the Commission allowed it to be a major player by providing large contributions to peace-keeping forces (in Ivory Coast for the MICECI) and directly to the government through General Budget Support following the conflict in Sierra Leone. Moreover the Commission was able to ensure a presence in Ivory Coast during the 2002-2005 crisis whereas all other EUMS ceased their cooperation. This allowed the Commission to play a leading role in coordination in the wake of the crisis when the EUMS re-started their cooperation.
- In WB&GS the Commission was a major donor in financial terms but at political level saw itself limited in its ability to ensure a coordinated approach to the situation: the

<sup>86</sup> For example, in Bolivia several EU coordination groups were established on security, human rights and drugs issues; for example the group on human rights was created by the EUD in 2006 and drew together nine EU MS, with meetings held twice a month; in WB&GS a “Vademecum on EU Local Aid Cooperation in the oPt” was released by the EUREP with coordination groups at strategic, sectoral and sub-sectoral levels.

Commission was not a major actor within the Quartet and divergences existed between EUMS on the strategy to adopt in WB&GS. According to several stakeholders, because of these differences the Commission could not take up strong positions agreed by all EU actors. However, this was considered, on some issues, as an advantage for the Commission, given that it is considered as a neutral, less politically-driven, player capable of delivering its aid.

- In countries where a small number of EUMS were present, such as Timor-Leste or Central African Republic, the EUMS with small resources considered the Commission as a strong and neutral partner with which to coordinate.

### JC 5.3 Coordination and complementarities with other non-EU donors, international and regional organisations

There were strong commitments and support from the Commission for the multilateral approach to coordination in fragile situations.

- at political level the *Commission endorsed a number of commitments to multilateralism and better coordination* within the international community in *fragile situations*<sup>87</sup>;
- there were a number of initiatives to *strengthen partnership with multilateral institutions*<sup>88</sup>.

The Commission channelled half of its total financial support to CPPB through international organisations. Most of it was in countries affected by large-scale conflicts (Afghanistan, Iraq and WB&GS). In these circumstances channelling was conducive to a coordinated approach within the international community.

- *Between 2001 and 2010 the Commission channelled through international organisations 51% of the total amount contracted for its CPPB interventions*<sup>89</sup>; the UN family and the WB were the main recipients. The bulk of these funds (73%) for both the UN and the WB were concentrated in seven countries<sup>90</sup> of which three were major post-conflict or conflict prone countries: *Afghanistan, WB&GS and Iraq* (see figure below).

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
<sup>87</sup> Some of these commitments are more high-level declarations on aid in general but in which conflict/fragility context are specifically mentioned, such as the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action. Others are those developed by the OECD DAC on security, peace and development such as: OECD-DAC, *DAC guidelines on conflict, peace and development cooperation*, 1997, *DAC guidelines on helping prevention violent conflict*, 2001, *DAC guidelines on SSR and governance*, 2005, *DAC guidelines on whole of government approach to fragile states*, 2006, *DAC Handbook on Security System Reform*, 2007 and *DAC Principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations*, 2007.

<sup>88</sup> For example: joint post-conflict needs assessments in Georgia, Timor-Leste, Iraq, Afghanistan; specific administrative and financial agreements for enhanced cooperation (FAFA); and the Crisis Room's provision of a platform for the Commission's policy dialogue with EU Member States, the UN, other international organisations and civil society actors on early warning for conflict prevention.

<sup>89</sup> These funds were mainly used for Multi-Donor Trust Funds for major emergency reconstruction programmes such as in Iraq, Afghanistan and Timor-Leste; Palestinian refugees in WB&GS (via UNRWA); and for specific thematic activities related to CPPB, such as DDR (e.g. MDRP in the greater great lakes region, in Sierra Leone and Liberia), and elections (in DRC, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste).

<sup>90</sup> The benchmark used to put these seven countries on the diagram was the 2% threshold for total Commission CPPB funds channelled through IO. All of the other 86 countries benefitting from channelled funds represented less than 2% in each case. These figures comes from the inventory of Commission's support to CPPB, see Annex 8.

**Figure 10 – Breakdown by country benefiting from Commission CPPB funds channelled through IO (in €m contracted amount, 2001-2010)**



- Channelling these funds through IO using post-crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTF) allowed the Commission to<sup>91</sup>:
  - intervene in countries where acting alone would have been impossible and risk-laden;
  - adopt a coordinated approach with the international community towards conflict-affected areas;
  - provide a critical mass of funding to support reconstruction and rehabilitation in these conflict-affected areas;
  - re-start its cooperation with countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan.
- Drawbacks of channelling were also observed in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and sustainable impact, especially in conflict-affected countries where the situation is challenging and risky. Indeed, previous evaluations carried out by the Commission on channelling as well as EU Court of Auditors reports showed that the design of interventions did not adequately take the conflict situation into account; most of the results obtained were not sustained; issues on lack of information sharing and communication were more frequent than through other channels (see EQ 8 on efficiency).

<sup>91</sup> This is mainly based on interviews held at HQ and in the field as well as the following evaluation reports and reviews on the channelling of funds: ADE (for the European Commission) *Evaluation of Commission's aid delivery through development banks and EIB*, 2008; ADE (for the for the European Commission) *Evaluation of Commission's external cooperation with partner countries through the organisations of the UN family*, 2008; Scanteam (for NORAD) *Review of post-crisis multi-donor trust funds*, 2007; European Court of Auditors, *The efficiency and effectiveness of EU contributions channelled through United Nations Organisations in conflict-affected countries*, 2011.

Having a coordinated approach was considered essential in post-conflict or conflict-prone contexts and, whenever it occurred, it provided positive benefits for the international community. Specifically:

- The results of the EUD questionnaire showed that *72% of respondents considered that coordination was even more important in a (post-) conflict (-prone) context* for various reasons:
  - because of the sensitive political context, necessitating a single approach with a shared analysis and a shared message between donors;
  - because of the limited resources, financial and human, of the donors and the partner country when compared to the enormous level of need (short- and long-term) following a conflict;
  - because efficiency and positive results were needed quickly to avoid a fall-back into conflict.
- However, it was considered by several stakeholders as *harder to achieve* because of the multitude of actors (Afghanistan and WB&GS) and the need for more mutual trust and confidence between partners (Kyrgyz Republic).
- *Ivory Coast* and *Sierra Leone* were two examples where a *coordinated approach by the international community was taken, with a positive impact on the conflict situation*.

#### **Box 5 – Examples of benefits of coordinated approaches in (post-) conflict situations**

**Ivory coast election crisis 2010:** an aligned and coordinated response to the election crisis of 2010 in Ivory Coast allowed the international community to have a common position on the legitimisation of the election's winner. The work of the Commission and UNDP before and during the election process allowed them to ensure the transparency and fairness of the elections. The Commission, EUMS and other donors such as the USA strongly supported the election results. The African Union and the ECOWAS then also adopted the same position, providing strong legitimate support to the winner of the election.

**Sierra Leone post-conflict support:** since the end of the civil war, with the signature of the Lomé peace accord in 2000, the international community (mainly the Commission, UK, UN and WB) played a major role in the stabilisation of the country. It adopted a coordinated and complementary approach, *viz.*;

- the Commission provided substantial **support to the government** through post-conflict Budget Support in collaboration with the UK and WB. It provided **macro-economic stability** and helped the government to set up an administration for providing key social services to the population;
- the UK on its side was mainly working on **SSR and DDR** directly after the conflict along with the UN and WB. This provided the necessary secure environment in which to start re-building the country.

Although major needs are still present ten years after the conflict, Sierra Leone has not relapsed into violence and held relatively violence-free presidential elections in 2007.



- In some cases the *Commission took on an important role in ensuring coordination in crisis situations*. This was the case in Central African Republic and Ivory Coast (for the 2002-2005 crisis) where the Commission continued to be present in the countries while other donors suspended their cooperation. It allowed the Commission to play a leading role in coordination when donors re-started their cooperation following the crisis.

#### **JC 5.4 Coordination and complementarities with partner countries governing bodies and with Non-State Actors**

Although in many partner countries the Commission's CPPB support was aligned with governmental priorities, in certain situation such alignment raised challenges.

- In most of the cases analysed the *Commission usually aligned its strategy with partner countries' strategy and priorities*. This was observed in the eight country case studies and through the EUD survey, in which most of them indicated that the Commission support was aligned with the partner government's priorities.
- But in some conflict-affected countries *alignment raised a certain number of challenges and disagreements between the Commission and the partner government on the strategy to be adopted* (see box 3). The reasons invoked by EUD respondents and other interviewed stakeholders for these difficulties in aligning with partner government priorities were:
  - lack of clearly-defined national strategy and weak capacities (Lebanon, Yemen, Afghanistan, Peru, Timor-Leste);
  - restriction of donor activities imposed by government (Zimbabwe);
  - little clarity on whom to align with (Chad, Sri Lanka);
  - differing vision as to what needs to be achieved for CPPB: security measures involving military and police; pure development activities; or the need to go further and tackle human rights, problems of minorities etc. (Pakistan, Indonesia, Timor-Leste).

#### **Box 6 – Issues on alignment in Timor-Leste**

##### **Timor-Leste: “goodbye conflict, welcome development”**

In terms of alignment, the Timor-Leste strategic plans and needs were taken into account in the Commission strategic documents and interventions but there were some clear divergent views on whether to support infrastructure, as requested by the government, or instead to strengthen the capacity of national counterparts. Donors also raised questions as to how to engage with the government statement “goodbye conflict, welcome development”. The message behind this statement was the need to leave the conflict behind and go forward towards economic and social development. While this was a political message underlining the merits of the work done so far, such a statement had impacted on the government's and donors' willingness to continue supporting CPPB activities, despite - in the view of several stakeholders - the remaining needs in this respect.

The Commission often referred to civil society organisations as important actors in its strategic documents and political dialogue. The Commission delivered a substantial share of its CPPB aid through these organisations. But problems concerning the capacity and clear political role of civil society organisations on CPPB issues were reported.

- The *Commission was a strong financial and political supporter of CSOs on CPPB issues*:
  - this support is often referred to in most of the CSPs reviewed, with explanation as to how the *Commission country strategy takes into account civil society needs in terms of CPPB*, this being more systematic for the second programming period (2008-2013) than for the first (2002-2007);
  - *civil society organisations were the third main channel* (after international organisation and State/public authorities) used by the Commission to deliver its CPPB support, representing 12% of the total funds contracted or €928m over the period 2001-2010;
  - *international civil society organisations were the major beneficiaries of these channelled funds*; they played a major role in the implementation of CPPB interventions in the field, providing an alternative channel in countries where official cooperation was difficult or suspended;
  - growing involvement of the Commission in *strengthening the role and capacities of international NGOs and specialised CSOs on CPPB*, through initiatives such as the Conflict Prevention Network and later the Initiative for Peacebuilding, and the ongoing Civil Society Dialogue Network (with EPLO). The presence of these specialised NGO, networks and platforms at HQ level brought European, international and country-specific civil society issues and representatives to the policymaking centre.
- **But problems concerning capacity and clarity of the political role of local civil society organisations on CPPB issues were reported.** In the eight countries analysed in the case studies, local civil society organisations were supported by the Commission but their capacity was reported as still low, and their involvement in interaction between the government and the Commission was in general not strong. The challenging post-conflict context in countries affected by several years of war (e.g. in Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste) did not help the development of strong civil society organisations capable of challenging government priorities.

## Evaluation Question 6 on Value Added

**What has been the value added of the Commission's support in terms of reducing tensions and preventing the outbreak, recurrence or continuation of violent conflict?**

*Ultimately the Commission's support to CPPB aims at preserving peace and strengthening international security. In addition to EQs 1 to 5 which examine the role of the different dimensions of an integrated approach in this respect, this question aims at assessing the extra benefit generated by the fact that the financial and non-financial support was implemented through the Commission. In particular the question aims at assessing (i) the extent to which the Commission had a specific role in the promotion of an integrated approach to tackling CPPB and (ii) the extent to which the Commission's support generated other types of additional benefit.*

### EQ 6 on Value Added – Answer Summary Box

*The Commission provided several types of value added in terms of CPPB. Although it took initiatives to promote an integrated approach, it did not play a leading role in this respect.*

The Commission took several initiatives at Headquarters level to promote an integrated approach. Although there are examples of the Commission playing a specific role in this respect, within the donor community the Commission did not play a leading role in terms of promoting an integrated approach.

The evaluation identifies several types of specific Commission value added in terms of reducing tensions or preventing the outbreak, recurrence or continuation of violent conflict. This concerned in particular the Commission's:

- perceived less strong “political profile” in the sense of not being tied to national interests and of conducting a dialogue with the different parties concerned in the conflict; this facilitated dialogue with partner country authorities and led EU MS in some cases to confer a specific mandate on the Commission;
- reliability in terms of its capacity to establish long-term partnerships; its continued presence, notably when others had suspended their cooperation and also in geographical areas in which others were not present or were less in evidence; plus the key role played by the EUD;
- critical mass in terms of financial support, allowing for political leverage, wide geographical and sector coverage, and strengthening of its authority as a big player;
- ability to draw on a wide array of instruments, allowing intervention in the short and longer terms as well as in different sectors;
- longstanding thematic experience in the field or in sectors potentially impacting on CPPB, as well as in specific issues more indirectly related to CPPB, although not with respect to CPPB in general;
- its credibility in terms of democracy, peace and human rights.

## JC 6.1 The Commission's role in promoting the integrated approach

Over the period considered, the Commission took several initiatives at policy level to advance an integrated approach. Indeed, the Commission reiterated at policy level the necessity of adopting an integrated approach to conflict prevention and peace-building. Several strategic documents published by the Commission between 2001 and 2010 refer to such an approach.<sup>92</sup>

At country level, examples of the Commission playing a specific role in terms of promoting an integrated approach to CPPB have been identified, but generally the Commission did not take a *leading* role in this respect.

- The 2009 country evaluation of Angola, for instance, concludes that the mainstreaming of LRRD constitutes value added by the Commission's intervention in Angola and is even its most specific characteristic.<sup>93</sup> It is presented as a good example of integration of different activities, time and geographical dimensions, not only in close coordination with the different partners, but also in promoting this approach among the partners.
- That said, the evaluation team did not find other examples of other donors or members of the international community building their approach on the basis of the Commission's policies or experience with the integrated approach.<sup>94</sup>
- The CSP/RSP review points in the same direction. In only eight cases out of 36 examined (equally distributed across the two periods) did CSPs/RSPs refer to the need for the Commission to promote an integrated (or "comprehensive") approach.
- However survey results provide a more mixed picture: about half of the respondents (for the two periods) considered that the Commission played a leading role in the donor community's support for CPPB, specifically in the promotion of an integrated

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<sup>92</sup> The Commission emphasizes "*the need to take a genuinely long-term and integrated approach*" in its Communication on Conflict Prevention (2001) 211 (*op. cit.*, p. 4), but also in its EU Strategy for Africa COM (2005) 489 (European Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee of 12 October 2005 - EU Strategy for Europe: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa's development*, COM (2005) 489 final, p.2), in the EU's strategy against proliferation of WMD (2003) and to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW (2006), in its chapter on addressing State Fragility in the European Consensus on Development COM (2006) 421, in its related concepts for EC support for SSR COM (2006) 658 and EU support to DDR (2006). In its 2007 Communication on an EU response to situations of fragility COM (2007) 643, it states that such approach is in fact prioritised by all donors. Finally, the last 2010 revision of the Cotonou Agreement insists on a "*comprehensive approach combining diplomacy, security and development cooperation*" to be developed in situations of State fragility.

<sup>93</sup> The country level evaluation for Angola states that (*op.cit.* p. 72) "*By adopting the LRRD strategy as well as using its worldwide experience in several sectors, the EC has produced a value added through its intervention in Angola. (...) The adoption of LRRD as a guiding principle is the most important specific characteristic of EC intervention and its most important value added. LRRD has been disseminated to all implementing partners, not only at the level of international and national NGOs, but also at the level of UN Agencies (e.g. UNICEF) and at some Government institutions (IRSEM intervention modalities were clearly inspired by the LRRD philosophy).*"

<sup>94</sup> Stakeholders met (notably during country visits) did not highlight any specific role of the Commission in this respect. Some of the case studies show that the Commission implemented an integrated approach or parts of it (for instance in the CAR through an LRRD process, or in the Kyrgyz Republic where at intervention level the Commission aimed at a comprehensive approach rather than at piecemeal action). These are however rather exceptions and none of them identify a *specific role* for the Commission in terms of promoting an integrated approach. In some cases, e.g. Bolivia, a wide range of stakeholders stressed that the Commission was not a leading actor in CPPB, other actors benefitting from stronger visibility in this field.

approach. That said, examples provided by respondents mainly concerned coordination in general and not the promotion of an integrated approach.

- The above should be seen in the light of the specific context of the period covered. In the aftermath of 9/11 the CPPB agenda shifted to adopting a more explicit security focus.

## JC 6.2 The Commission's specific value added with respect to reducing tensions and/or preventing the outbreak, recurrence or continuation of violent conflict

The evaluation allowed identification of different types of specific value added of the Commission in terms of reduction of tensions or of preventing the outbreak, recurrence or continuation of violent conflict, all detailed below.

Compared with the support from other actors including the EU MS, the **Commission's support was perceived as having a less strong "political profile"**, as it appears from several case studies (Bolivia, CAR, Kyrgyz Republic, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste), but also from country evaluations (Nigeria). It should be understood in two ways:

- first, a perception of *not being tied to national interests*, as compared both to EU MS and also to other actors (e.g. the USA, China, and Russia);<sup>95</sup>
- second, neutrality was *also highlighted in the sense of conducting a dialogue with the different parties concerned in the conflict*, without favouring one over the other. This is for instance explicitly acknowledged in the Ivory Coast case study.

This perception had different types of consequence, *viz.*:

- it *facilitated dialogue with partner country authorities*, as observed in the cases of Bolivia, CAR, Ivory Coast, and Sierra Leone;
- it led the EU MS in some cases to *confer a specific mandate on the Commission*. In the CAR the Commission took over a specific role as other donors wished to have a less prominent role. Certain interlocutors considered that without the Commission's support a peace force intervention in CAR might not have been deployed.

The **reliability of the Commission** was also an important element of added value. This encompassed:

- Its *capacity to establish long-term partnerships*, cited as value added in several cases (e.g. in Georgia, where the Commission has been involved since Georgia's independence, or in West Bank and Gaza Strip where, according to interviewees, the Commission was seen as a long-term player and a reliable donor, which was for instance important in terms of predictability of salary payments). Some set this predictability against the rigidity and slowness of Commission support. An interviewee

<sup>95</sup> This is, for example, explicitly underlined in the Nigeria country evaluation (*op.cit.*) which states that "EC value added arises from the EC not being tied to particular national interests in, for example, energy supply or migration, thus enabling the EC, more than the MS, to support Nigeria in such essential but politically sensitive areas as the census, the election cycle or the promotion of peace and stability in the Niger Delta area". The evaluation also explains that this has been challenged by EU MS. In Timor-Leste stakeholders stressed that the Commission was perceived as "neutral" because it was not tied to specific geostrategic interests.

noted in this respect that “*the EU has great potential to think longer-term compared to bilaterals that are tied to political cycles and [domestic]elections*”.

- The Commission’s ***continued presence, where other donors suspended their cooperation***. This was notably the case in CAR, where the Commission remained, together with France, the only donor during the 2003-2005 crisis and gave the Commission a leadership position which contributed to the return of different development partners.<sup>96</sup> The situation in Ivory Coast was similar.
- The Commission’s ***presence in geographical areas in which others were not present or were less in evidence*** (specifically in West Bank & Gaza Strip).
- The ***importance of the Delegation***, which was also stressed in several cases. In Georgia the presence of the Tbilisi Delegation since 1995, the largest Delegation in the Caucasus region, was considered a value added for the EUMS who were able to rely on the experience, material and staff of the Delegation for their mission. Conversely, in Timor-Leste the fact that the Commission did not have a fully-fledged Delegation was one of the factors explaining its channelling of funds through the TFET Trust Funds.

The **critical mass of the Commission’s financial support** was identified in several cases as a key value added. Indeed, in several countries examined or in specific zones of these countries, the Commission was a ***large or even the main donor in financial terms, which conferred on it different advantages***.

- In CAR, for instance, the Commission was the largest donor, which provided it ***with political leverage***. The Commission’s weight was critical for the adoption of important policies for the reduction of poverty and for macro-economic and sector policies, all key to reconstructing the country.<sup>97</sup> In Georgia, the Commission was the largest donor in the conflict zones (Abkhazia and South Ossetia). The Commission’s support was also considered critical in Ivory Coast, especially as other donors had withdrawn, although the level of funding involved was not as great.
- This critical mass in financial terms also explains that, in the different countries and as shown under EQ4 and mentioned above, the Commission could ***ensure wide geographical and sector coverage***. Indeed, the case studies show that the Commission was active in a wide range of zones and sectors in each country.
- In some countries, for instance Timor-Leste, the financial weight of the Commission - but also the fact that it represented 27 EU MS - conferred on it the authority necessary to be an ***major entity alongside other powerful players, for example Indonesia and Australia***.
- It is the largest supporter to the development of African Peace and Security Architecture through the African Peace Facility.

The **Commission’s ability to draw on a wide array of instruments, allowing intervention in the short and longer terms as well as in different sectors** (cf. above), was also mentioned as a real value added. The country level evaluation for Sierra Leone for instance notes that the availability of different instruments proved to be a strong strategic

<sup>96</sup> Country-level evaluation for Central Africa Republic, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*

advantage of the EU, notably because “*major support has been provided without interruption, passing from humanitarian aid, over support to reconstruction and rehabilitation, to support for social and economic development of the country.*”<sup>98</sup> This is also mentioned for instance in the context of the Kyrgyz Republic case study, where reference is made to several instruments (regional cooperation, thematic instruments, IfS, EU SR) or in the case of Timor-Leste (short-term: IfS-RRM, Rehabilitation; and long-term: EDF).

In several cases, the **longstanding thematic experience of the Commission** was stressed. In particular:

- This concerns ***the fields or sectors potentially impacting on CPPB***, such as water and sanitation (Bolivia), food security (Bolivia, Angola), health (Angola, CAR), transport (CAR, and Sierra Leone for road infrastructure), rural development (Kyrgyz Republic), where the Commission built on ongoing support for rural development in other regions as an entry point for social conflict reduction in the Ferghana Valley), and good governance (mentioned in Commission strategy documents as a value added).
- ***While little evidence has been found on specific Commission value added for CPPB matters in general, examples on specific issues have been identified.*** For the Kyrgyz Republic it was stated that the Commission was more sensitive to do-no-harm approaches and conflict sensitivity than other donors. The Georgia case study highlights the Commission’s longstanding experience in IDP issues (first with ECHO support) and its pioneering and longstanding involvement in separatist regions (Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the past). In Timor-Leste one of the projects referred to the long-standing experience of the Commission and UNDP in supporting electoral processes in other countries. There is also the example mentioned under JC 6.1 on the Commission’s role in LRRD in Angola. The Angola Evaluation Report also mentioned the ECs “*vast experience in dealing with humanitarian emergencies*”, as well as its worldwide experience with demining.

Finally, the Commission’s **credibility in terms of democracy, peace and human rights** was mentioned by several stakeholders. Also interesting to note in this respect - although this was mentioned in only one case (Bolivia) - is the perception of the EU as “*an example of peace and stability*”.

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<sup>98</sup> Similarly, the Angola country evaluation (*op. cit.*) underlines as value added “*the deployment of a wide array of instruments and partnerships for security, stability, income generation, development, democratic experience and promotion of human rights*”.

## Evaluation Question 7 on Commission means

### To what extent have the means of the Commission facilitated the implementation of an integrated approach to CPPB?

*This question aims at verifying whether the Commission provided its staff with the means required to successfully set up and implement an integrated approach to CPPB. More specifically it aims at verifying the extent to which the Commission's institutional set-up and its human resources policy allowed it to implement an integrated approach. Apart from this more organisational aspect in the broad sense, the question aims also at examining whether specific guidance and tools and specific financial and non-financial instruments were provided to further an integrated approach.*

*The question does not tackle one specific dimension or aspect of the Intervention Logic but is transversal. It is a question of efficiency as it aims at verifying whether adequate means were available to ensure that an integrated approach was implemented.*

#### EQ 7 on Commission means – Answer Summary Box

*Overall, the evaluation findings show that the Commission's means, in particular the institutional set-up, the human resources policy and the tools and guidance, have constrained the fulfilment of the Commission's policy commitments in the CPPB area. On the other hand, the wide array of Commission financial and non-financial instruments was an asset in tackling CPPB.*

Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the coherence and effectiveness of the EU's approach in CPPB was challenged by (i) the complexity of the EU's institutional set-up in the area of external affairs, (ii) the uncertainties regarding the precise roles of the Commission and the Council in the CPPB area, and (iii) the fragmentation of CPPB issues across various units of different Commission DGs progressively created over time to reflect the Commission's increased attention to CPPB. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, several institutional changes (such as the creation of the EEAS) aim at enhancing the consistency and unity of the EU's external action. These changes are still at a transitional stage and details of the organisation and functioning of the EEAS still need to be defined.

Over the period the Commission had an increasing number of dedicated CPPB staff. But conflict expertise remained too limited in extent. Moreover, the Commission's human resources policy was not geared enough to developing the conflict analysis skills of the staff and has not ensured that the staff adopted a conflict-sensitive focus.

In line with its policy framework for conflict prevention, the Commission has since 2001 developed a series of tools and guidance for CPPB. This toolbox was generally not widely known or used. It also lacked comprehensiveness and operability for analysing conflict situations and addressing CPPB.

The Commission had at its disposal a wide array of financial instruments for undertaking both short-term and long-term prevention. In some cases it combined these instruments and was able to ensure continued support for CPPB. A wide range of non-



financial instruments (political dialogue, use of preventive sanctions, deployment of EU Electoral Observation Missions, of EUSR, and of civilian crisis management missions) has also been used by the EU with examples of positive contribution to CPPB. But there was a discrepancy between the Commission's financial and non-financial support, the financial support having more weight.

## JC 7.1 The institutional set-up for intervening in CPPB

### *At EU level prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty*

Several elements of the EU institutional set-up have not been conducive to a coherent and effective EU approach to CPPB:

- ***The uncertainties on the roles of the Commission and of the Council in CPPB:***
  - Over the period from 2001 to the end of November 2009, ***EU competences in CPPB were shared between the European Community (EU first pillar) and the CFSP (EU second pillar)***<sup>99</sup>. The Community's external powers, derived from the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), encompassed a number of areas relevant to CPPB: common commercial policy, development cooperation, environment, etc<sup>100</sup>. Under the EU second pillar created by the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), crisis management operations launched in the framework of the ESDP fell within the competence of the Council<sup>101</sup>.
  - From the outset of the TEU, the ***question of competence-sharing in the area of external relations between the Commission and the Council has been posed***. Whereas ***overlapping competences*** were identified by the Treaty with provision for a consistent and coherent approach, other issues such as election monitoring, border management, civilian crisis management, actions in support of the rule of law, and control of SALW<sup>102</sup> were sources of overlap which did not make for clear-cut responses. Similarly, some Commission interviewees highlighted the ***competition*** that took place ***between the Commission and the***

<sup>99</sup> See also ADE (for the European Commission), *Preliminary Study to the Thematic evaluation of European Commission support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building*, 2009.

<sup>100</sup> Decisions were taken by the Community method, involving the Commission, Parliament and Council. The Community method is the EU's usual method of decision-making, in which the Commission makes a proposal to the Council and Parliament who then debate it, propose amendments and eventually adopt it as EU law.

<sup>101</sup> The latter was the driving force behind the decision-making process under the CFSP and EUSRs. Indeed, the EU MS preserved their independent decision-making powers and restricted themselves to an intergovernmental form of cooperation in which the Council adopted all legislative acts.

<sup>102</sup> See the Court case between the Commission and the Council on competence in SALW in 2008 (European Commission, *Summary of important judgments, C-91/05 Commission vs. Council, judgment of 20 May 2008*, 2008) in which the Court clarified the division of competencies between the First and Second EU Pillars in the area of external affairs. Following the Council decision 2004/883/CFSP which aimed at contributing to the initiatives of the Economic Community of West African States within the framework of the moratorium on small arms and light weapons, the Commission brought an action before the Court of Justice for its annulment taking the view that it had been adopted on an incorrect legal basis. The Court has been finally prompted to annul the Council decision: "*Having found that the contested decision pursued a number of objectives falling, respectively, within the CFSP and within development cooperation policy, without any one of those objectives being incidental to any other, the Court was therefore prompted to annul that decision inasmuch as it was based on a CFSP provision*".

**Council.** Moreover, 40% of survey respondents noted that the *division of roles between the Commission and the Council* was *not well adapted* to intervening in a post-conflict context. 65% of survey respondents noted the same for the division of roles *between the Commission and the EUSR*.

- Interviewees generally noted that the *differences in organisational cultures* and in ways of working have not facilitated cooperation *between the Commission and the Council*.
- The evaluation findings generally show that the *complexity of the EU set-up* has not enhanced cooperation between different professional communities (diplomacy, security, development).

#### **Box 7 - Key implementing bodies for CFSP/ESDP**

- **Political and Security Committee (PSC):** mandated to deal with all CFSP issues, including defence, and made up of Ambassadors of EUMS.
- **Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM):** tasked to manage civilian crisis operations and support the PSC.
- **Directorate General E “External and Political-Military Affairs” of the Council Secretariat:** the Council Secretariat played an active role in the preparation and implementation of ESDP missions. DG E undertook the political and strategic planning up to the Council decision on the Crisis Management Concept (strategic document drafted when the PSC considers EU action appropriate, making the case for possible ESDP engagement and outlining major political objectives). **Directorate E IX** was in charge of civilian crisis management and **Directorate E VIII** of defence aspects. Directorates VIII and IX were merged as of April 2010 into the single directorate entitled **Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD)** to promote a more integrated approach to crisis management.
- The **Civilian Planning Conduct and Capability Directorate (CPCC):** involved in the operational planning and implementation of ESDP missions and operating under the political control and strategic direction of the PSC.
- Council Geographic Working Groups
- The EU also has two Intelligence providers based in Brussels: the Joint Situation Centre (known as SitCen which drew on open and closed sources) and the Watch-Keeping Capability.

*At Commission level prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty*

There was mixed evidence on the extent to which CPPB was sufficiently promoted at high level. Commission interviewees generally reported a lack of strong ownership on the part of senior management in promoting an integrated approach. But 65% of survey respondents for the period 2002-2007 (70% for the period 2008-2013(2010)) considered that CPPB was sufficiently high on the Commission’s agenda.

The Commission’s increased attention to CPPB over time has been reflected in the Commission’s organisational set-up with the progressive creation of dedicated units with a CPPB focus. Specialised Commission units with a CPPB focus (see table below) were first created in DG External Relations, with responsibility for coordinating the Commission’s general policy line on CPPB. Unit DG1/A4 and then A2<sup>103</sup> had the mandate to set the Commission’s general policy line on CPPB and to promote the mainstreaming of CPPB.

**Table 3 – Specialised Commission units with a CPPB focus or direct relevance**

<b>Directorate General for External Relations</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ DG 1 - Directorate A - Crisis Platform - Policy coordination in Common Foreign Security <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Unit A2: Crisis response and peace-building</li> <li>○ Unit A3: CFSP operations</li> <li>○ Unit A4: Security Policy</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>Directorate A also comprised the Commission’s Crisis Room<sup>104</sup>.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ DG 1 - Directorate B - Multilateral Relations and Human Rights. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Unit B1 : Human rights and democratisation</li> <li>○ Unit B2 : United Nations, Treaties Office</li> <li>○ Unit B3: Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and Council of Europe</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Directorate General for Development</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ DGA/C2: Pan-African issues and institutions, governance and migration</li> </ul>
<b>EuropeAid Cooperation Office</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ E4: Quality of operations - governance, security, human rights and gender</li> <li>▪ F2: Central management of thematic budget lines under EIDHR and IFS</li> <li>▪ C6: African Union and Peace Facility</li> <li>▪ C2: Focal point for fragility within the unit on geographical coordination and supervision for ACP countries</li> </ul>

*Source: Annex 4 – General-level data collection grid*

<sup>103</sup> Until 2006, Unit A4 was dealing with Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and ACP political issues. It was then changed to Unit A2 “Crisis response and peace building”.

<sup>104</sup> See also JC3.1.

## Two major elements have not facilitated implementation of an integrated approach:

- The **fragmentation of CPPB issues across the Commission's DGs** (see also JC5.1). 47% of survey respondents noted that the division of roles between DG Development, DG External Relations and EuropeAid was not well adapted to interventions in a post-conflict context. The division of roles between the Commission HQ and the EUD was however perceived as well-adapted to interventions in a post-conflict context by 74% of survey respondents. Interviewees also generally noted a lack of communication between DG Relex and EuropeAid.
- The **staff constraints on the policy side within RELEX A2 which limited its capacity to effectively promoting mainstreaming of CPPB**. Indeed, several Commission interviewees pointed out that the bulk of the staff of RELEX A2 began working on the design and management of the IfS (crisis response, and to a lesser extent the longer term component) when it came into being (20 people at the end of the evaluation period), whereas there was only one CPPB focal point for the policy aspects of CPPB.

## At EU level after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty

**Institutional changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty aim at enhancing the coherence and effectiveness of the EU's approach to CPPB but are still at a transitional stage.**

- The Lisbon Treaty entered into force on 1 December 2009. It **introduces institutional changes and modifies working methods**. In particular it creates the post of a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is also a Vice-President of the Commission, in order to enhance the consistency and unity of the EU's external action<sup>105</sup>. The High Representative is assisted by a joint service, the European External Action Service (EEAS), which is composed of officials of the Council, the Commission and the diplomatic services of the Member States. The EEAS is required to concentrate and coordinate prevention activities, including CSDP structures. It aims at increasing the visibility, coherence and effectiveness of the EU's foreign policy.
- **But details of the organisation and functioning of the EEAS still need to be defined and it needs to be fully staffed**. The organigram of the EEAS reveals the establishment of a Directorate for Conflict Prevention and Security Policy (as well as a specific Division for Conflict Prevention, Mediation and Peace-building) and of a Foreign Policy Instruments Service which is a service of the Commission reporting directly to the High Representative in her role as Vice-President of the Commission. But the mandates of the divisions of the EEAS have not as yet been set and linkages between the various CPPB-related divisions, under the Managing Director for Global

<sup>105</sup> The Lisbon Treaty provides that the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy will be at once the Council's representative for the CFSP, the President of the Foreign Affairs Council and a Vice-President of the Commission. He is responsible for steering foreign policy and a common defence policy. He also represents the Union on the international stage in the field of the CFSP.

and Multilateral Issues and other prevention-related parts of the EEAS, in particular the crisis management structures, are not clear.

- The Treaty also gives the *EU Delegations* a legal personality enabling them to represent the Union in the full range of Union competences. Hence, the EU Ambassador has taken over the former role of the EU's rotating Presidency at country level, strengthening the role of the EU Ambassador in political dialogue with partner countries.
- The advent of the EEAS also precipitated the merging of DG DEV and EuropeAid into *DG DEVCO* (Development and Cooperation) in the Commission. Separate units focus on CPPB-related areas: "Fragility and Crisis Management" (A4), "Instrument for Stability & Instrument for Nuclear Safety" (D5) and "Africa-EU Partnership and Peace Facility" (E4). It is yet not fully clear how these units are going to interact among themselves and with the EEAS.

**Box 8 - Views generally expressed by Commission staff interviewed on changes brought about by the EEAS**

*Perceived positive changes*

- reinforcement of CPPB with the new Directorate for Conflict Prevention and Security Policy and the new Division for Conflict Prevention, Mediation and Peace-building;
- strengthening of the political dimension of the Commission's action, in particular reinforcement of the political capacity and function of the Delegations by bringing in MS diplomats;
- housing within the EEAS of the crisis management structures and the conflict prevention structures;
- strengthening of coordination between the Commission and EUMS.

*Perceived risks*

- EEAS: another EU institution which could end up "competing" with the Commission; extent of collaboration between the EEAS political section and the DG DEVCO-Operations section;
- within EEAS: lack of effective coordination between short-term crisis management structures and separately-housed longer term conflict prevention and security policy staff;
- creation of Foreign Policy Instruments Service outside of EEAS;
- challenges in internal coordination on the ground between EUD, Commission HQ, EEAS, Council and EUMS;
- possible introduction of EUMS-driven "political conditionality"(vs. EU interests); challenges in aligning political dialogue and aid.

## JC 7.2 Human resources policy for intervening in CPPB

Overall, the Commission's human resources policy was not geared to developing and applying the conflict analysis skills of the staff and has not ensured that the staff adopts a conflict-sensitive approach.

- ***There was no dedicated human resources policy favouring the hiring of specialised CPPB staff to work on conflict issues or in conflict countries.*** 65% of survey respondents indicated that the EUD did not have an explicit recruitment policy with respect to CPPB matters over the period 2008-2013. Country case studies show that, while attention was placed on previous experience in conflict countries when recruiting staff, no specific policy of hiring staff specialised in CPPB was in place, i.e. staff that had worked "in" conflict contexts but not "on" CPPB.
- ***The Commission offered training in HQ in various CPPB-related fields (e.g. conflict prevention, mediation, SSR, LRRD, anti-corruption, early-warning systems, etc.).***
  - These training events were however ***not compulsory*** for the staff working on CPPB issues or in conflict-prone or fragile countries.
  - Interviews showed that the ***staff of the Crisis response and peace-building Unit (DG Relex-A2) generally attended*** CPPB training events and were encouraged to do so by the hierarchy, while ***staff of geographical units generally did not attend*** these events owing to a ***lack of availability and awareness-raising regarding these issues***. Additionally, staff from other DGs did not have priority access to these training events.
  - Moreover, ***almost none of the EUD staff interviewed*** within the framework of the country case studies ***had taken part in CPPB-related training***<sup>106</sup>. Major reasons given were the absence of a specific incentive on the part of the hierarchy to attend this type of training, and a lack of time or availability of EUD staff to attend.
- ***CPPB was insufficiently considered in the career development of officials.*** Commission interviews held in HQ and in the field within the framework of the country case studies, as well as the documentation reviewed, did not provide evidence of the existence of ***performance-related incentives for staff to adopt a conflict-sensitive approach***. 92% of survey respondents for the period 2002-2007 (89% for the period 2008-2013(2010) considered that ***CPPB was taken insufficiently into consideration*** in the career development of officials ***in the form of performance review, promotion and incentives***.
- ***Knowledge management in CPPB within the Commission has been poor.*** 90% of survey respondents mentioned that specific practices for the capitalisation of experience between EUD in a conflict environment did not exist. In 93% of cases they would have considered such practices useful. The country case studies further show

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<sup>106</sup> Exceptions were reported in Ivory Coast and in Georgia. In Ivory Coast, following the 2002-2004 crisis the EUD staff underwent training in LRRD, corruption issues, electoral assistance and frontier management. In Georgia, one EUD member participated in training in conflict sensitivity but the application of this training was limited.

that experience-sharing and lesson-learning mechanisms in CPPB have been rare over the period<sup>107</sup>.

**The Commission had an increasing number of dedicated CPPB staff over the period but overall its conflict expertise remained too limited in extent.**

- In line with the creation of specialised CPPB units, the *Commission's specialised staff in CPPB increased over time*. It consisted *mostly of programme managers and some dedicated CPPB staff*. The table below presents the Commission staff working on CPPB across the Commission's DGs from the RELEX family and highlights in bold dedicated CPPB staff.

**Table 4 – Commission staff working on CPPB**

<b>Directorate General for External Relations</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ DG1 - Directorate A - Crisis Platform - Policy coordination in Common Foreign Security               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Unit A2: <b>half of the unit had a background in peace and security</b>. The unit mostly included staff working on crisis response (through the IfS) and dealing with CFSP sanctions;</li> <li>○ Unit A3: included CFSP Programme managers;</li> <li>○ Unit A4: included staff handling civil-military relations in the context of ESDP missions, WMD, disarmament, mine actions</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ DG 1 - Directorate B - Multilateral Relations and Human Rights.               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Unit B1 : includes staff following human rights situations worldwide;</li> <li>○ Unit B2 : around ten people, with two handling relations with the UN on peace and security;</li> <li>○ Unit B3: includes staff handling relations with the OSCE and the Council of Europe.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Directorate General for Development</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ DGA/Unit C2: includes staff working on peace, security and migration issues. It also includes <b>one peace-security-development/fragility expert and one working on AU Peace and Security Partnership</b>;</li> </ul>
<b>EuropeAid Cooperation Office</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Unit E4: includes staff working on quality aspects in justice and human rights, security and terrorism. It also includes <b>one CPPB expert</b>.</li> <li>▪ Unit F2: includes staff managing Electoral Observation Missions, EIDHR and IfS long-term component.</li> <li>▪ Unit C6: includes APF programme managers.</li> </ul>
<b>EU Delegations</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Creation of <b>political sections</b> as of 2006</li> <li>▪ <b>Eight Regional Crisis Response Planners</b> and around 20 IfS project managers (mostly contract agents) towards the end of the evaluation period (2007-2010)</li> </ul>

Source: Annex 4 – General-level data collection grid

- *But overall the Commission's conflict expertise remained too limited in extent.* Interviews held in HQ indicate that CPPB staff within the HQ and in the EUD was insufficient in number. 71% of survey respondents over the period 2002-2007 (65% over the period 2008-2013(2010)) noted that the EUD either did not have CPPB staff at all or did not have enough. All country case studies also highlight that CPPB staff in

<sup>107</sup> An exception was reported in the Kyrgyz Republic where Commission interviewees reported that exchanges of experience between the IfS programme managers of Georgia and of the Kyrgyz Republic informed the design of programmes in the Kyrgyz Republic.

the EU Delegations were insufficient in number: political sections have progressively been created since 2006 and IfS project managers posts have been funded under the IfS since 2007 but, overall, in the countries visited each EUD had only between one and three CPPB dedicated staff.

**Non-dedicated CPPB staff was generally not sufficiently experienced in CPPB issues and there were few in conflict or fragile countries.**

- Commission interviewees in HQ and in the field generally noted that *non-dedicated Commission staff were generally not sufficiently experienced in CPPB issues or sufficiently oriented to conflict-related aspects.*
- Commission interviewees in HQ and in the field (e.g. Ivory Coast, Liberia) also highlighted that the *staff shortages within the EUD posed even greater challenges* than the fact of not having the appropriate CPPB expertise. The *difficulty of attracting and finding staff both willing to work in a conflict or fragile country (EUD) and qualified in CPPB* was stressed.

### JC 7.3 Tools and guidance for intervening in CPPB

*NB: Early-warning mechanisms and tools, as well as provisions and guidelines favouring flexible aid implementation, are addressed under EQ3 (JC3.1).*

**The Commission developed some tools and guidance for conflict analysis but they have not been widely adopted and used.**

- *Country Conflict assessments and Country Conflict indicators* (see JC1.1 and JC1.3).
- *EC checklist for root causes of conflict* (2001): this consists of various indicators aimed at monitoring developments on a yearly basis in CPPB-related fields<sup>108</sup>. The country case studies show that awareness of the existence of this checklist was *generally lacking among EUD staff* (except in the cases of Georgia and Sierra Leone).
- *Governance profile*<sup>109</sup> within the framework of the *“governance incentive tranche”* enabling *ACP States*, under EDF 10, to top up the initial allocation according to their willingness to undertake reforms in this area.
- *Guidance from the inter-Service Quality Support Group (iQSG) to give CSPs a conflict lens:*
  - The *successive Frameworks for Country Strategy Papers*<sup>110</sup> recommend that CSPs analyse security and stability measures in countries that have not yet reached structural stability.

<sup>108</sup> E.g. legitimacy of the State; rule of law; respect for fundamental rights; civil society and media; relations between communities and dispute-solving mechanisms; sound economic management; social and regional inequalities; and geopolitical situations.

<sup>109</sup> The profile is a programming tool aimed at providing a qualitative assessment that helps identify (i) the main constraints in governance-related areas (political/democratic governance; political governance/rule of law; control of corruption; government effectiveness; economic governance; internal and external security; social governance; international and regional context; quality of partnership) and (ii) specific areas of cooperation in governance.



- The programming guides for Strategy Papers in the field of conflict prevention and fragile states issued in 2008, and in the field of governance, democracy, human rights and support for economic and institutional reforms issued in 2008 and 2009, provide guidance on (i) designing direct and indirect CPPB programmes<sup>111</sup>, (ii) mainstreaming democracy and human rights at programming level<sup>112</sup>, and (iii) taking into account CPPB-related areas in an analysis of a country's situation (in particular on such areas as rule of law; anti-corruption; anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CTF); Small Arms and Light Weapons, Anti-personnel Landmines, Explosive Remnants of War; transition approach/LRRD; fragility; democracy and human rights<sup>113</sup>).
- Interviews held within the framework of the country case studies highlighted that this **guidance was generally either not known about nor widely adopted**.
- Commission interviewees met generally stressed that the **quality control set up by the iQSG for the drafting of CSPs did not ensure that CSPs take into account CPPB-related issues** (e.g. no use of specific CPPB criteria in the quality checklist).
  - The **office Quality Support Group** (oQSG) in charge of peer review during identification and formulation phases of programmes and projects managed by EuropeAid: Directorate E from EuropeAid, and in particular Unit E4, could provide conflict sensitivity in project design. The evaluation findings generally did not suggest that this was the case. With the new DEVCO set-up, this peer review process no longer exists.
  - Interviews and case studies also highlighted that **conflict impact assessments have generally not been carried out** prior to the design of programmes.

The Commission or the Council also developed guidelines in CPPB-related sectors, but operational guidance on how to take into account or mainstream CPPB was generally not fully developed.

- **Sector guidelines generally provide for technical and financial Commission support in CPPB-related areas** (e.g. development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law<sup>114</sup>, and support for addressing the problem of anti-personnel

<sup>110</sup> European Commission *Commission staff working paper: Community-cooperation: framework for Country Strategy Papers*, 2000 and European Commission, *Common Framework For Country Strategy Papers* (document based on the Common Framework adopted in April 2006).

<sup>111</sup> European Commission, *Programming Guide for Strategy Papers, Programming Fiche Conflict Prevention*, 2008.

<sup>112</sup> European Commission, *Programming Guide for Strategy Papers, Programming Fiche: Democracy and Human Rights*, 2008.

<sup>113</sup> European Commission, *Programming Guide for Strategy Papers: Programming Fiche Fragile situations*, 2008; European Commission, *Programming Guide for Strategy Papers: Programming Fiche Democracy and Human Rights*, 2008; European Commission, *Programming Guide for Strategy Papers: Programming Fiche Integrated transition strategies*, 2008; European Commission, *Programming Guide for Strategy Papers: Programming Fiche Anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing*, 2008; European Commission, *Programming Guide for Strategy Papers: Programming Fiche Conventional weapons : Small Arms and Light Weapons, Anti-personnel Landmines, Explosive Remnants of War*, 2008; European Commission, *Programming Guide for Strategy Papers: Programming Fiche Anti-corruption*, 2009; European Commission, *Programming Guide for Strategy Papers: Programming Fiche Rule of law*, 2009.

<sup>114</sup> Council of the EU, N° 975/1999 *Council Regulation laying down the requirements for the implementation of development cooperation operations which contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms*, 1999.

landmines<sup>115</sup>) *or affirm Commission/EU principles* in specific CPPB-related fields (e.g. protection of children affected by armed conflict<sup>116</sup>; security sector reform<sup>117</sup>; governance<sup>118</sup>; SALW<sup>119</sup>; DDR<sup>120</sup>) *but do not give concrete guidance on how to mainstream CPPB.*

- **More details could be found in the sector guidelines relating to the areas of governance, DDR and SSR.** In the area of governance the 2003 Communication<sup>121</sup> presents in more detail the Commission's policy agenda. It contains a focus on post-conflict situations with an indication of the main priorities to be addressed. In the DDR area, the EU Concept for support to DDR<sup>122</sup> gives specific attention to mainstreaming. In the SSR area, even if there is no explicit reference to the mainstreaming of CPPB in Commission and EU Council documents<sup>123</sup>, they contain in themselves the principles of CPPB and of the integrated approach.

Overall, most Commission interviewees met in HQ and in the field reported a **gap between the theoretical framework of the integrated approach and its implementation**, characterised by a lack of a clear and comprehensive toolbox for analysing conflict situations and addressing CPPB.

## JC 7.4 Financial instruments for intervening in CPPB

*NB: The adequacy of instruments for rapid reaction is addressed under EQ3 (JC3.1).*

**The Commission had a wide range of financial instruments for undertaking both short-term and long-term measures in CPPB** (see table below). Several instruments were not explicitly designed for CPPB but were considered to be part of the task, while others were directly and clearly relevant in targeting CPPB. In particular, the **long-term geographical assistance** could be used to address the causes of conflict, support its resolution and re-start the process of economic and social development. The **specialised sectoral assistance instruments** could be used for (i) both short-term and long-term actions (food security, APL, IfS long-term and short-term components), (ii) bridging the gap between short-term emergency aid, notably from ECHO, and long-term development assistance (rehabilitation and reconstruction, AUP), or (ii) responding to emergency situations or to emerging crises (RRM). Annex 8 of the Preliminary Study conducted prior to this evaluation provides a detailed explanation of each instrument.

<sup>115</sup> Council of the EU and European Parliament, N° 1724/2001 *Council and European Parliament Regulation concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries*, 2001.

<sup>116</sup> Council of the EU, *EU Guidelines on children and armed conflict*, 2003; European Commission, *Communication A concept for EC support for Security Sector Reform*, 2006.

<sup>117</sup> European Commission, COM(2006)658 Final, *Communication A concept for EC support for Security Sector Reform*, 2006.

<sup>118</sup> European Commission, COM(2006)421 final, *Governance in the European Consensus on Development – Towards a harmonised approach within the EU*, 2006.

<sup>119</sup> European Council, *EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition*, 2006.

<sup>120</sup> European Commission-European Council, *EU Concept for support to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration*, 2006.

<sup>121</sup> European Commission, COM(2003)615 final, *Communication on governance and development*. 2003.

<sup>122</sup> European Commission-European Council, *EU Concept for support to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration*, 2006. It states that “*conflict sensitive approaches taking into account the long-term reintegration needs of ex-combatants should be integrated in relevant development programmes, including in sector programmes dealing with health, education, rural/urban development, rule of law and security.*”

<sup>123</sup> Council of the EU, *EU Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform*, 2005; European Commission, COM(2006) 253 final, *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, A concept for the European community Support for Security Sector Reform*, 2006. Council of the EU, *Draft Council Conclusions on a Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform*, 2006.

**Table 5 – Commission’s financial instruments to tackle CPPB<sup>124</sup>**

Long-term geographical assistance instruments	Specialised sectoral assistance instruments	African Peace Facility (EDF) (2003) <sup>125</sup>	Suspension / selectivity of cooperation assistance
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ EDF</li> <li>▪ ALA (1992-2006)</li> <li>▪ TACIS (2000-2006)</li> <li>▪ MEDA (1996-2006)</li> <li>▪ ENPI (2007)<sup>126</sup></li> <li>▪ DCI (2007)<sup>127</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Food security<sup>128</sup> (1996)</li> <li>▪ Rehabilitation and reconstruction (1996)</li> <li>▪ Aid for uprooted people (1997)</li> <li>▪ Rapid Reaction Mechanism (2001)</li> <li>▪ Anti-personnel landmines (2001)</li> <li>▪ Instrument for Stability<sup>129</sup> (2007)</li> <li>▪ EIDHR (Initiative (1994) and Instrument (2007))</li> </ul>		

Source: ADE (for the European Commission), ‘Preliminary Study prior to the Thematic evaluation of the Commission’s support for CPPB’, 2009.

**In specific cases a flexible combination of short-term and long-term instruments ensured continued support for CPPB** (see also JC3.3). For instance, in Sierra Leone (i) EDF-funded interventions slowed down owing to the conflict, and humanitarian and short-term relief was then provided, (ii) a successful handing over of ECHO to the LRRD programmes was financed under the B-envelope, and (iii) budget support was used in a context of stabilisation and rehabilitation under EDF 8 and to link short-term and long-term needs under EDF 9. Similarly, in Georgia the combination of short-term financial support under the IfS and long-term support through the ENPI ensured continued support for post-conflict rehabilitation of IDPs.

**There were mixed views on the adequacy of the long-term geographical assistance for interventions in conflict countries.** While 80% of survey respondents considered that the long-term geographical assistance was adequate for intervening in conflict countries, several Commission interviewees met in HQ and in the field within the framework of the

<sup>124</sup> The dates indicated refer to the dates of issuance of the Regulations establishing the instruments.

<sup>125</sup> The APF is a specific financing scheme created by the EU in response to a request made by the African Union Summit in Maputo in July 2003. It supports African-led peacekeeping operations in Africa as well as capacity-building for the emerging security structure of the African Union (AU). These operations are launched and implemented by the African Union's organisations or by sub-regional organisations.

<sup>126</sup> Council of the EU and European Parliament, *Regulation (EC) n° 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006 laying down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument*, 2006. The ENPI replaces the TACIS and MEDA programmes and is addressed to ENP partner countries including Russia.

<sup>127</sup> Council of the EU and European Parliament, *Regulation (EC) n° 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation*, 2006. Operational since 1 January 2007, the DCI replaces the former ALA, part of TACIS and ten thematic budget lines.

<sup>128</sup> As of 1 January 2007, *Regulation (EC) n° 1292/96 of 27 June 1996 on food-aid policy and food-aid management and special operations in support of food security* was repealed by *Regulation (EC) n° 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006, establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation*.

<sup>129</sup> *Council Regulation n° 1717/2006 establishing an Instrument for Stability* repealed the following Council Regulations as of 1 January 2007: *Council Regulation (EC) n° 2258/96 of 22 November 1996 on rehabilitation and reconstruction operations in developing countries*; *Council Regulation (EC) n° 381/2001 of 26 February 2001 creating a rapid-reaction mechanism*; *Council Regulation (EC) n° 1724/2001 of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries* and *Council regulation (EC) n° 1725/2001 of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in third countries other than developing countries*; and *Regulation (EC) n° 2130/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 October 2001 on operations to aid to uprooted people in Asian and Latin American developing countries*.

country case studies (Kyrgyz Republic, Georgia, Sierra Leone) stressed its inadequacy for responding to conflict situations. In particular they stressed the difficulty of adapting CSPs, RSPs and programmes to changing situations owing to the inflexibility of Commission decision-making procedures (e.g. impossibility of changing focal sectors during the mid-term review, and the heavy and lengthy process for radically changing programmes).

## JC 7.5 Non-financial instruments for intervening in CPPB

**Beyond financial support the Commission, together with the Council, also had a wide range of non-financial instruments for tackling CPPB**, in particular political dialogue; high-level mediation through EU Special Representatives; deployment of EU observers; deployment of civilian and military crisis management missions (E/CSDP missions); and use of preventive sanctions. Annex 8 of the Preliminary Study conducted prior to this evaluation provides a detailed explanation of non-financial instruments.

**These non-financial instruments have been used with examples of positive contribution to CPPB** (see box below). **Evaluation findings also generally pointed to a discrepancy between the financial and non-financial support, the financial support having more weight.** For instance, 48% of survey respondents for the period 2002-2007 (46% for the period 2008-2013(2010)) mentioned that there was such a discrepancy (see also JC 2.2).

### Box 9 - Use and effects of non-financial instruments in country case studies

#### *Political dialogue*<sup>130</sup>

CPPB-related issues have been covered through political dialogue in Bolivia, Central African Republic and Ivory Coast with positive results:

Bolivia: EU political dialogue - including the active participation of the Head of Delegation - covered support for constitutional transition and support for counter-narcotics, and was reported as effective by a wide range of beneficiaries interviewed.

Central African Republic: the Commission's political dialogue focused mainly on election preparation, the DDR process and on implementation of peace agreements. The role of the Commission was particularly important during the 2003-2005 period when the Commission was the only donor to maintain its role following the departure of most EU MS and donors from the country.

Ivory Coast: once post-crisis support became a priority of the Commission's support, political dialogue, with the active participation of the Commission's Commissioner for Development, intensified. Political dialogue was not structured according to Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement but the presence of the NAO at the level of the Prime Minister made possible effective information exchanges during the post-crisis period. Additionally the neutrality of the Commission enabled it to engage all parties in conflict

<sup>130</sup> Official documents promote the conduct of a comprehensive political dialogue as a contribution to CPPB. Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement provides for a comprehensive political dialogue encompassing cooperation strategies as well as global and sectoral policies. The 2001 COM on CP (*op. cit.*) also recommends more systematic use of political dialogue when a crisis appears, along with efforts to ensure an EU common political line on sensitive issues.

resolution.

### ***Preventive sanctions***

EU sanctions have been used in one of the countries covered by the case studies, namely Ivory Coast, where the possible use of Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, which allows imposing sanctions on the partner country, was examined during the peak of the crisis but was decided against owing to a lack of consensus among the EUMS. Following the results of the 2010 presidential elections, the EU imposed sanctions against Ivorian leaders (visa bans and freezing of assets).

### ***Electoral Observation Missions***

EOM have been deployed in Bolivia (2006, 2008, 2009), Ivory Coast (2010), Sierra Leone (2007), Timor-Leste (2002, 2007), and WB&GS (2006):

Bolivia: in 2005 the GoB explicitly asked for the support of the EU as observer for the elections. Several EU EOM missions were accordingly deployed over the period 2005-2010. A wide range of stakeholders met stressed the positive contribution of these missions to the electoral process.

Sierra Leone: the EU EOM accompanied the 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections to give confidence in the electoral process and to detect potential fraud. It was deployed at a decisive moment as these elections were the first to be fully administered by Sierra Leonean authorities since the end of the civil war. These elections were conducted in a non-violent context.

Ivory Coast: the EU deployed an EOM in 2010 following continuous and significant Commission support for the electoral process (Presidential and legislative).

### ***Mediation through EUSR***

The EUSR for the Middle East has been deployed in WB&GS, the EUSR for Central Asia in the Kyrgyz Republic, and EUSRs for Georgia and the South Caucasus were deployed in Georgia.

Georgia: The EU (represented by Pierre Morel, EU special representative for Georgia), co-chaired, together with the UN and the OSCE, the “Geneva talks” set up in 2008 as a forum for dialogue and the only platform allowing for an ongoing political conflict resolution process. It has met numerous times since 2008 and has had some successes; notably, the establishment of the Incident Prevention and Reporting Mechanism, restoring water and gas supply to the South Ossetian region; and discussions on a comprehensive set of Agreed Undertakings focusing on humanitarian issues related to conflicts. The EUSR for the South Caucasus also had a significant role in the Georgian conflict and at times had better access to *de facto* authorities in Abkhazia for brokering political dialogue than other EU actors in Georgia.

### ***Civilian Crisis Management Missions***

Two missions have been deployed in WB&GS and one in Georgia, all financed by the Commission:

EUBAM Rafah (WB&GS): set up in 2005 to monitor the operations of the Rafah border crossing point, its mandate evolving from a purely operational one to one which, when the crossing point was closed in June 2007 following Hamas’ taking control of Gaza, provided information on the ground to EU policymakers. Since the suspension of EUBAM in 2007, its continued, albeit much reduced, presence close to Gaza has evolved into monitoring the situation in Gaza (humanitarian and political situation,

within and between Palestinian factions), including an objective of cross-checking the official information provided by COGAT (the Coordinator of Israeli Government Activities in the Territories).

EUPOL COPPS (WB&GS): launched in 2005 to provide support to the Palestinian Civil Police's operational priorities and longer-term transformational change as set out in the 2005-2008 Palestinian Civil Police Development Programme. Overall the stakeholders met noted the relevance of the Commission's support to the needs.

EUMM (Georgia): set up in 2008 to monitor and analyse the stabilisation process, a total of 340 observers being deployed in two weeks. With this large civilian mission, the EU has contributed to providing stability in the country and has played a more important political role in Georgia.

## Evaluation Question 8 on timeliness and cost-effectiveness

**To what extent did the pursuing of an integrated approach to CPPB allow results to be achieved in a timely manner and at a reasonable cost?**

*The question verifies the extent to which the implementation of an integrated approach in the field of CPPB enabled the Commission to achieve the intended results in a timely and cost-effective manner. Delivering assistance in the field of CPPB while ensuring that the four dimensions of the integrated approach are all duly taken into account can indeed be time-consuming and costly. The combination of mainstreaming CPPB in the Commission's support, devoting efforts to both short-term and long-term prevention, intervening at all geographical levels in a coherent way, and ensuring coordination and cooperation within the EU and with other donors active in the field, implies deployment of considerable effort in terms of human resources and time spent.*

*The question tackles "classical" aspects of efficiency, in particular the extent to which the regulatory and institutional set-up and the Commission's capacities, in terms of human and financial resources, were conducive to timely and cost-effective implementation of the support. It also devotes specific attention to the objective of implementing an integrated approach and the impact it has had in terms of timely and cost-effective delivery of support. Finally, as the channelling of funds through international organisations has accounted for a significant share of the Commission's support to CPPB<sup>131</sup>, this question assesses the extent to which channelling through international organisations has been an efficient way of delivering aid. It is important to note that addressing timeliness and cost-effectiveness in the context of conflict prevention is delicate. Indeed, the Commission's support to CPPB addresses conflict or conflict-prone situations in which human life and security are often at stake. Human life and dignity are of unquantifiable value.*

### **EQ 8 on timeliness and cost-effectiveness – Answer Summary Box**

***Delays were observed in most cases examined. Typical development cooperation constraints as well as conflict-specific challenges accounted for them. The overall efficiency of the Commission's support to CPPB has also been challenged by some of the specific characteristics of the EU's external action (institutional set-up, methods of implementation of aid, financial instruments, human resources). The Commission sought to alleviate these constraints by creating specific financial instruments and procedures, improving human resources and adapting the EU's institution set-up. Improvements were noted although some shortcomings remain.***

**Delays were observed in most cases. Evidence on the extent to which delays were sufficiently anticipated was mixed. In some cases, they resulted from specific challenges posed by the conflict such as: (i) The lack of progress in the political or conflict situation, which determines the relevance and coherence of the support provided; (ii) the difficulties of working in a conflict situation, which were often underestimated; (iii) the level of sensitivity of some CPPB projects, or the resistance to them from some national counterparts, or the lack of ownership of the process supported; and (iv) the quality of**

<sup>131</sup> The inventory of Commission funds directed to CPPB presented in the Preliminary Study showed that for 83% of the funds, 66% was channeled through international organisations (mainly UN and WB).

governance and capacities of public institutions in a conflict context.

The overall efficiency of the Commission's support has been challenged by aspects related to EU means. The Commission devoted efforts to alleviate these constraints and the evolution of the EU set-up aims at ensuring a more efficient support. In particular:

- For the pre-Lisbon Treaty period (2001-2009), the institutional set-up for the Commission's support to CPPB was not sufficiently conducive to efficient delivery of support in conflict situations. This was due to (1) the break-up of the Commission's development assistance cycle across several DGs, (2) the fragmentation of reporting lines and accountability between different institutions or DGs, and (3) additional needs for coordination with EU Member States (see EQ5). The Lisbon Treaty has introduced some changes aimed at improving the efficiency of the EU's external action but it is too early to clearly identify any effects.
- The Commission's methods of aid implementation and procedures were not fully conducive to the delivery of efficient support. The following shortcomings were identified as hampering the reactivity of its support: multi-annual programming, difficulties in re-allocating programmed funds, length and complexity of decision-making procedures, use of centralised management. Efficiency requirements have however been counterbalanced by others, notably the need to control and monitor the use of funds in view of the sensitiveness of conflict contexts where accountability, control and transparency requirements are even more crucial.
- Over time the Commission has designed specific instruments and procedures and developed specific practices which have improved the efficiency of the delivery of aid in conflict situations, although some shortcomings remain.
- Finally, shortages of human resources, in terms both of numbers and of their CPPB expertise, has had some impact on the efficiency of the support provided. Over the evaluation period, improvements were made.

## JC 8.1 Timeliness and cost-effectiveness of Commission interventions

Delays and lack of cost-effectiveness were observed in most of the cases examined. Evidence on the extent to which they had been sufficiently anticipated has been mixed.

- *Most of the country case studies and the meta-analysis identify delays in disbursements and in activities.* For example, in the Kyrgyz republic, the IfS support to the Judiciary Reform programme was delayed by a year and a half. In Bolivia delays, although of different magnitudes and for different reasons, also occurred during the course of the coca leaf study (additional evidence from the case studies in CAR, Ivory Coast, Georgia, Sierra Leone, WB&GS<sup>132</sup>).
- *Evidence on the extent to which hampering factors had been anticipated has been mixed.* 64% of survey respondents stated that, for the period 2001-2010, timeliness or cost-effectiveness of the implementation of CPPB support had, in most

<sup>132</sup> In CAR, support to the *Conseil National de Mediation* was delayed one year, owing to budgetary constraints and lack of progress in the political situation, and was also reformulated to be coherent with the new conditions. In Ivory Coast, interventions, notably support to the DDR process and to the Presidential and legislative elections, were delayed, readjusted and in some cases suspended, to reflect the changing priorities and conditions on the ground.



cases, been below expectations (requiring more time or budget). On the other hand two-thirds of survey respondents reported that hampering factors had generally been sufficiently anticipated over the period 2008-2013(2010). This was less the case during the period 2002-2007: 59% of survey respondents stated that these hampering factors had been sufficiently anticipated in the planning for the period 2002-2007.

**The observed delays and lack of cost-effectiveness resulted in some cases from specific challenges posed by the conflict:**

- ***The lack of progress in the political or conflict situation which determines the relevance and coherence of the support provided.*** For example, in Ivory Coast most of the Commission's support was dependent on the progress made by the conflict parties, as well as their priorities, with the result that several interventions were delayed, modified or simply withheld (non-existent DDR process, elections successively pushed back). In the CAR the lack of progress in the political reconciliation process led to the deferral of the planned support to the *Conseil National de Médiation*.
- ***The difficulties of working in a conflict situation, which were often underestimated.*** This was identified in the country case studies and in the meta-analysis of evaluation reports (e.g. Georgia, Angola, Liberia and Chad) and reported for the majority of interventions funded by channelling through UN organisations, where unrealistic timeframes, given the conflict, were mentioned<sup>133</sup>. Additionally 51.5% of survey respondents stated that the specific features of the country or zone (e.g. cumbersome to cross checkpoints) had an important or critical impact on delaying planning and timing, as confirmed in the WB&GS case study and in the country evaluations for Angola and the DRC. 48% of survey respondents stated that the need to take specific security measures had had a critical or important impact on delaying planning and timing whereas 37% stated it had little or none.
- ***The sensitivity of some CPPB projects, or the resistance to them from some national counterparts, or the lack of ownership of the process supported.*** Examples are the support to the electoral process in Ivory Coast, or in WB&GS given the Government of Israel's minute screening and movement and access authorization procedures (there is also additional evidence from the case study for the Kyrgyz Republic<sup>134</sup>). This factor was also reported for Sri Lanka<sup>135</sup>.
- ***The weak governance and capacities of public institutions in a conflict context.*** For example, the weak capacities of the Central African regional organisations, ECCAS and CEMAC, reduced the efficiency of the Commission's support to the MICOPAX and FOMUC peace forces in the CAR, and the budgetary constraints of CAR's *Conseil*

<sup>133</sup> European Court of Auditors, Special Report No 3/2011 — *The efficiency and effectiveness of EU contributions channelled through United Nations Organisations in conflict-affected countries*, p. 6 and "For the vast majority of projects in the sample the initial implementation period was considerably exceeded. This was to a large extent due to the fact that the time needed to achieve certain results had been underestimated in the contribution agreements, as not enough consideration was given to the difficult circumstances in the countries.", p.23.

<sup>134</sup> In Kyrgyz Republic, specifically the IFS judiciary reform programme.

<sup>135</sup> The Commission's criticism of the government of Sri Lanka's human rights record had, from January 2008, implications for permissible types of activities, beneficiaries and overall priorities which led to delays in planning and implementation.

*National de Médiation* also hampered its action. The country evaluations of Angola and of the DRC reported similar issues. 83% of survey respondents stated that the absence or lack of capacity of national or regional counterparts had had either an important or critical impact on delaying planning and timing.

**The evaluation has brought to light a number of factors which contributed to improving the timeliness and cost-effectiveness of its assistance to CPPB:**

- ***The strong coupling of political and financial support.*** In Ivory Coast, prior to the creation of the EEAS, the political section also managed operational activities which, it was reported, notably ***increased the EUD's leverage on national authorities, as well as its knowledge of the conflict situation.*** Similar evidence was found for the Kyrgyz Republic<sup>136</sup>.
- ***Mobilisation at the highest levels of the Commission*** can speed up procedures. This was notably the case for the TIM in WB&GS<sup>137</sup>. In contrast the absence of mobilisation at higher level has had negative impacts, as reported in the 2007 DRC evaluation<sup>138</sup>.
- Similarly, the Commission's support to the political transition process in the DRC over the period 2002-mid 2006, and to the Gacaca process in Rwanda, were considered as efficient, and evaluations identified the following contributing factors: (1) a consensual roadmap, (2) a strong national interlocutor or good working relations with partner authorities, (3) strong mobilisation at all hierarchical levels of the Commission, thus reflecting the priority of the conflict situation, (4) support at grassroots level.

## **JC 8.2 Impact of the regulatory and institutional set-up for the Commission's support in the field of CPPB on timeliness and cost-effectiveness**

**For the pre-Lisbon Treaty period (2001-2009), the institutional set-up for the Commission's support to CPPB was not sufficiently conducive to efficient delivery of support in conflict situations.** This was due to (1) the break-up of the Commission's development assistance's cycle across several DGs, (2) the fragmentation of reporting lines and accountability to different institutions or DGs, and (3) additional needs for coordination with EU Member States (see EQ5). The Lisbon Treaty has introduced some changes aimed at improving the efficiency of the EU's external action.

- ***The break-up of the Commission's development assistance's cycle***<sup>139</sup> required important coordination between DGs which was not always optimal, thus resulting in delays. Additionally the division of responsibility for the approval of changes in decisions and financing agreements<sup>140</sup> was considered as rigid and ill-adapted to conflict

<sup>136</sup> Political reporting was done by the Operations section with direct effect on the programming of the assistance.

<sup>137</sup> It took a record three months to be set up.

<sup>138</sup> SOFRECO (for the European Commission), *Evaluation de la stratégie de coopération de la Commission européenne avec la République Démocratique du Congo - 2002-2006*, juin 2007, p. 119-120.

<sup>139</sup> Whereby strategy formulation was conducted by DGs DEV and RELEX, approval of identified interventions by DG AIDCO, and their executions by EUDs and also DGs RELEX and AIDCO, depending on the financial instrument.

<sup>140</sup> Controlled by HQs, and not at EUD level.

contexts. This reiterates the point that whilst crisis-specific procedures existed at the level of implementation to speed up contracting procedures, none existed at the level of approval in the HQ circuit.

- ***The lack of clarity on the division of responsibilities in the field of CPPB between the Commission and Council missions or the EUSR*** (see EQ5) led to some efficiency losses. Most of the evidence points to insufficient coordination or the slow organisation of their cooperation. In WB&GS, some efficiency losses occurred as a result of a one-way coordination process between the EUREP and the EUSR. Some overlaps between Commission interventions and the Council missions in the security sector, and competition for EUMS funding, were also reported. The involvement of an EUSR or EU Head of CSDP Mission was considered by some as adding an additional actor in a sometimes already crowded donor and EU landscape (Georgia). In some cases efficiency gains, by pooling or sequencing of resources, were created: EUD use of conflict analysis provided by the EUSR, in Moldova for example, or identification of projects by the EUSR to be later funded from Commission funds in Georgia.
- ***On coordination with EU Member States***, deficiencies in the sharing of intelligence and the pooling of means were reported. 71% of survey respondents considered that the need to better coordinate with other actors had had an important or critical impact on delays.

**Provisions in the Lisbon Treaty seek to improve the efficiency of the EU's external action**, with effects on the Commission's support to CPPB. It is however too early at this stage to determine the effects of the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty on the efficiency of the provision of CPPB support. In Ivory Coast, however, it was noted that when the EUD held the Presidency of the Council (rather than a MS holding the Presidency), it carried out the coordination role as well as political leadership among EU MS.

## **(JC 8.2) & JC 8.4 Impact of methods of aid implementation and procedures on timeliness and cost-effectiveness**

**The Commission's methods of aid implementation and procedures were not fully conducive to the delivery of efficient support.**

- ***The geographical instruments funded 81% of total CPPB support over the period examined.*** Whilst 80% of survey respondents stated that long-term geographical assistance was adequate for intervening in (post) conflict (prone) contexts, a number of shortcomings have been identified, the difficulty of adapting CSPs/RSPs and programmes to changing situations was stressed by Commission interviewees in HQ and in the field (see JC3.1 for details).
- ***The length and complexity of decision procedures*** (Comitology, oQSG), whereby the time-lapse between identification of the action and its approval can take up to one year, during which period the situation on the ground may have changed (as illustrated in the country evaluations for Angola and DRC). In this regard it was highlighted that while crisis specific procedures existed (see JC3.1 and below) to speed up contracting procedures at implementation level, none existed at approval level in the HQ circuit.
- ***The use of centralised management*** which is heavy and induces slower implementation. 52% of survey respondents stated that the choice of centralised

management due to the conflict situation was a factor in delay whilst 48% considered it had little to no impact.

**Efficiency requirements have been counterbalanced by others, notably the need to control and monitor the use of funds, given the sensitivity of conflict contexts.**

- The *stringency of procedures* has been even more justified in conflict contexts where accountability, control and transparency requirements are even more crucial (WB&GS, Timor Leste, Sierra Leone).
- In several conflict contexts, the Commission has chosen to implement its assistance through *centralised management* in order to remain the owner of the implementation, control and audit of its funding.

**Over time the Commission designed specific instruments and procedures and developed specific practices which have improved the efficiency of the delivery of aid in conflict situations, although some shortcomings remain.**

- The *RRM-IfS*<sup>141</sup> was considered as useful and swift but its capacity to react sufficiently quickly was questioned in all case studies where it has been used (see JC3.1 for details).
- The possibility to use *flexible procedures* in crisis and emergency situations (see JC3.1 for details). Whilst these procedures were reported as essential by several Commission officials interviewed, the crisis declaration procedure was reported as being particularly lengthy and not sufficiently adapted to the urgency of crisis situations.
- **Channelling of funds through international organisations was efficient in some cases.** It allowed the Commission to deliver aid (1) in areas which would otherwise have been very difficult to target<sup>142</sup> and (2) where the Commission was not present or only partially. This was clear in Timor Leste where the Commission did not have a permanent EUD until 2008 but where the channelling of funds - through IOs already present - to fund the electoral process, reconstruction and rehabilitation, and community stabilisation, made possible the rapid mobilisation of funds, coordination between donors and the use of IOs' past experience in post-conflict contexts<sup>143</sup>. However the efficiency of channelling in conflict contexts has not been optimal. Rather, the European Court of Auditors has found that "*the process for deciding to implement aid through the UN did not demonstrate that that is the most effective and efficient*" and that "*for the majority of interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan the planned implementation period was exceeded*"<sup>144</sup>.
- The following *ad hoc* practices have been identified:

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<sup>141</sup> IfS-RRM funded 5% of total CPPB support (€0.4bn).

<sup>142</sup> ADE (for the European Commission), *Evaluation of the Commission's external cooperation with partner countries through the organisations of the UN family*, Final Report, Executive Summary – Page iv, May 2008.

<sup>143</sup> Notably through the multi-donor Trust Fund for East Timor (TFET) managed by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank and in electoral assistance implemented through the UN MDTF. Both were reported as having been implemented in line with schedule. Rural development projects were implemented by UNDP, WB and IOM, as going through organisations present in the country was more efficient where the Commission's local presence was small.

<sup>144</sup> European Court of Auditors, *The efficiency and effectiveness of EU contributions channeled through United Nations organisations in conflict affected countries*, European Court of Auditors Special Report No 3, 2011, p.6.

- **revision or adaptation of CSPs** so as to take into account the new conflict context (e.g. Georgia ; see JC3.1 for details)
- **transfer of programmed funds** under the A envelope which were programmed **to the B envelope**, reserved for emergency and non-programmed support, to allow maximum flexibility in the allocation of resources. This was done exceptionally in Ivory Coast (see also JC3.1).

### **JC 8.3 Extent to which Commission's human resources were sufficient and skilled enough to ensure timely and cost-effective support**

**Shortages in human resources, in terms both of numbers and of CPPB expertise, had some impact in terms of delaying planning and timing of the support provided.**

- Case studies and the meta-analysis of evaluations show that **staff shortages** have been **a source of delays and lack of cost-effectiveness**<sup>145</sup>. Similarly, 78% of respondents stated that staff shortages in EUDs had had, for the period 2001-2010, a critical or significant impact on delaying planning and timing.
- As mentioned under JC7.2, the Commission had an increasing number of dedicated CPPB staff over the period but overall its conflict expertise remained too limited in extent. The meta-analysis of evaluation reports shows cases (e.g. Nigeria) where the **lack of expertise** was reported to have had a **negative impact on the efficiency of the provision of the support**, on account of consideration of assistance through “*a technical prism rather than applying the necessary political analyses sufficiently*”<sup>146</sup>. Similarly, 69% of survey respondents considered that the lack of specific expertise within the EUD or of access to that knowledge at HQ has had a critical or significant impact in terms of delays in planning and timing.

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<sup>145</sup> Countries concerned are CAR, Timor Leste (no permanent office until 2008), Liberia and Nigeria.

<sup>146</sup> The evaluation notes in this respect that EC Member States and the donor community at large “*had reservations about the adequacy and competence of the ECD staffing. In particular, they drew attention to an alleged tendency, during the period under evaluation, for the ECD to “express everything in technical terms” and not to apply the necessary political analyses sufficiently*”, European Commission, *Evaluation of the Commission's support to Nigeria 1999-2008*, May 2010, p. 65.



## 5. Conclusions


This chapter presents the Conclusions emerging from the evaluation findings and analysis (presented above in Chapter 4 “Answers to the Evaluation Questions”). They are structured in four clusters so as to facilitate an overall synthesis (see figure hereunder), as follows:

- overall commitments of the Commission in terms of its support to CPPB ;
- strategy issues;
- results / impacts;
- means and implementation.

Each Conclusion further refers where relevant to the Evaluation Questions and other sources on which it is based.

The Conclusions are preceded by a section which aims at summarising in one page the assessment arising from the evaluation.

**Figure 11 – Conclusions**



## 5.1 Overall assessment

Within the overall context of increased awareness on the part of the international community with respect to the importance of CPPB, the Commission has since 2001 managed a shift to CPPB by substantially increasing its funding and developing an appropriate policy framework and associated instruments.

It has been able to make valuable contributions to conflict mitigation, stabilization, reconstruction and rehabilitation and has in some specific cases played a key role in terms of mitigating the impact of the root causes of conflict. In so doing it has also differentiated itself from other actors, notably the EU MS, through specific types of value added in terms of a neutral, less strong “political profile”, reliability, critical mass, appropriate instruments, specific expertise, and credibility with respect to democracy and human rights issues.

That said, the Commission’s support was generally not geared to tackling the root causes of conflict, but rather to mitigating their consequences or to provision of “classic” development support in a conflict context.

Therefore – and despite progress made in this respect – it cannot be stated that the Commission had already undergone a paradigm shift towards genuine CPPB in conflict (prone) or post conflict countries. More generally there was also a divergence between the overall policy commitment of the Commission to an integrated approach and its actual implementation.

Finally, the Commission was confronted with a number of constraints for providing its support to CPPB:

- its institutional set-up, human resources policy and practical tools and guidance were not commensurate with the overall level of funding provided for CPPB;
- it could not always sufficiently leverage its financial support with non-financial support, being hampered by its mandate and sometimes by the lack of a common position among the EU MS.



## 5.2 On Commission commitments towards CPPB support

### Conclusion 1: Importance of CPPB within the Commission

Since 2001 the Commission has operated a substantial shift towards support to CPPB by developing its funding, policy framework and instruments.

*Based on Inventory, Regulatory framework, EQ1, EQ2, EQ3 and EQ7*

During the 1990s the international community increasingly acknowledged the importance of tackling CPPB for poverty reduction, sustainable development and preservation of international peace and security. There was also a growing policy consensus on the need for adopting comprehensive approaches in this respect.

Within this global context the **Commission significantly increased its focus on CPPB** between 2001 and 2010, devoting considerable resources to it, developing a policy framework for intervening in conflict-prone countries, and designing instruments with which to address CPPB-related matters and facilitate quicker reaction times. However the Commission did not play a leading role in terms of promoting an integrated approach but rather followed (albeit often rapidly) major international developments in this area.

The Commission's **financial support** to CPPB (contracted funds) increased from a level of €120m in 2001 to between €0.9bn and €1.1bn in every year from 2004 (see inventory in Annex 8). Over the period 2001-2010 total support amounted to €7.7bn, representing a substantial share of the EuropeAid-managed budget (€73.5bn for the period 2001-2010). In the countries supported, the Commission has often been one of the major donors.

Over the same period the **EU considerably strengthened its policy framework** in the field of CPPB. Diverse and successive policies on CPBB-related matters were issued at European level (by the Commission, by the Council, or jointly). They all stressed the need for an integrated approach linking conflict prevention, development and security, requiring close cooperation between EU actors and with international players. The main components were:

- the Commission introduced the objective of “mainstreaming” **conflict prevention** into all elements of its development programming and policy-making with its 2001 Communication on Conflict Prevention;
- following 9/11 **security** issues took on a higher profile and this impacted on the agenda generally and on the scope for conflict prevention and peace-building.<sup>147</sup> In addition, given the causal relationship between security and development, more comprehensive approaches were promoted, notably in programmes focusing on SSR, SALW, DDR etc;
- specific EU policies on situations of **fragility** were issued in 2007.

<sup>147</sup> More analysis of this can be found in, ADE (for the European Commission) *Concept Study for the Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace building*, Volume I pp.8-13, 2010.

The Commission had a **wide range of financial and non-financial instruments** at its disposal to intervene in conflict-affected countries, with **specific instruments explicitly designed for CPPB-related matters and for increasing the capacity of the Commission to react quickly**. Specifically:

- the Commission designed **specialised sector assistance instruments** that aimed at targeting CPPB directly (e.g. budget lines for the following: food security, EIDHR, rehabilitation and reconstruction, anti-personnel landmines, and aid to uprooted people);
- with a view to increasing its capacity to respond rapidly to deteriorating situations, in 2001 it designed a specific short-term instrument with simplified procedures (the Rapid Reaction Mechanism, subsequently replaced by the enlarged Instrument for Stability in 2007) and introduced the possibility of using flexible procedures in crisis situations;
- While not explicitly designed for CPPB, the Commission was able also to use its **long-term geographical assistance**; it used this to address the causes of conflict, support its resolution and re-start the process of economic and social development, although its appropriateness for conflict-affected countries was sometimes questioned;
- finally the Commission (and the Council) had at their disposal a wide range of **non-financial instruments** for tackling CPPB, in particular political dialogue, high-level mediation through EU Special Representatives, deployment of EU observers, deployment of civilian crisis management missions (E/CSDP missions), and use of preventive sanctions.

## Conclusion 2: Integrated approach

**There was a gap between the Commission's policy commitments towards an integrated approach for CPPB support and the actual implementation of this approach.**

*Based on Concept Study, EQ1, EQ2, EQ3, EQ4, EQ5, EQ7*

The need for an integrated approach to CPPB<sup>148</sup> is at the heart of the Commission's strategy with respect to conflict prevention, as set out in its 2001 Communication on Conflict Prevention. This **integrated approach can be broken down into its four key dimensions**, *viz.*: CPPB support should take place through a comprehensive approach that integrates *different types of activity* (notably through mainstreaming); *different time dimensions* (short-term and long-term support and the linkages between them); the *activities of different actors*; and *different geographical dimensions* (e.g. local, country or regional levels).

As explained below, the **Commission has taken initiatives to ensure that these dimensions were taken into account, but with varying degrees of success and globally not to the extent to which it committed itself**, although progress was made.

<sup>148</sup> For more details, see chapter three of this report, the *Preliminary Study (op. cit.)* and the *Concept Study (op. cit.)*.

This should also be seen in the light of the **ambitious scope of the integrated approach** and the fact that most interviewees met, both within the Commission and within the wider international community, underlined that developing an integrated approach is still work in progress, many of them seeing it rather as an ideal to aim for.<sup>149</sup>

The five “**sub-conclusions**” below each concern a dimension of the integrated approach, the first being related more to the sharing of key concepts in this respect.

### ***C2.1 Conceptual orientations at policy level have generally not been appropriated at operational level and were not always univocal and shared at strategic level***

As explained under EQ1, both the Concept Study and this evaluation showed that some key concepts (e.g. on conflict prevention, peace building, “root causes”, conflict analysis, mainstreaming, conflict sensitivity, etc.) had not been appropriated at operational level and were also not always defined in an univocal and shared manner at strategic level. This was the case within the Commission and for other donors as well.

### ***C2.2 The Commission’s approach to conflict analysis, conflict sensitivity and mainstreaming was not systematised or structured***

As shown under EQ1, the Commission made efforts to analyse the conflict situations, to ensure that its support was conflict-sensitive, to observe the principle of ‘do no harm’ and, although to a lesser extent, to ensure mainstreaming. These efforts were however not part of a structured and systematised approach, but were to a large extent undertaken on an *ad hoc* basis, *viz.*:

- conflict analyses were indeed rarely documented and undertaken on the basis of structured approaches; they sometimes informed the support, but not systematically and often with gaps;
- the Commission showed awareness of the importance of conflict sensitivity, but did not formalise it through systematised approaches and methodologies; *and*
- there were examples of mainstreaming, but it was not a widespread practice.

### ***C2.3 The Commission has often reacted quickly to conflicts that had broken out, but challenges remained in terms of the transition to long-term prevention***

Support for short-term prevention has been a major concern of the Commission (23% of funds dedicated to CPPB). Although deteriorating situations were not always anticipated by the Commission (see EQ3, for example, regarding the limited role of early warning mechanisms) or other actors, the **Commission was in a number of cases able to react quickly once a conflict had broken out by combining various financial and non-financial instruments**. Specific instruments and procedures had also been set up for this purpose since 2001 but their flexibility was questioned in a number of cases.

The Commission devoted substantial **efforts to linking its long-term and shorter-term support** (often through an LRRD approach, but also by linking short-term interventions

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<sup>149</sup> See section 2.3.1. of the Concept Study.

with long-term financial instruments). The **success of the transition** to long-term prevention has **often** been **challenged** by the weaknesses of the capacities of national authorities or by premature transition from rehabilitation to conventional development programming.

***C2.4 The Commission devoted considerable attention to the geographical features of conflict, but synergies between different levels of intervention (local, national, regional) remained underexploited.***

In the design of its CPPB support, the **geographical dimensions of the conflict and the ensuing needs of specific zones generally informed the CPPB support** it provided. This allowed the Commission to intervene in zones where others were not present or were less so. In some regions the Commission was even the most active international player at multiple levels (Africa, neighbourhood). Although support was provided at different geographical levels (grassroots, national, regional, continental, cross-border) in the same country or region, shortcomings were identified in terms of actual synergies.

***C.2.5 The Commission took initiatives to enhance coordination at different levels, but this resulted generally more in exchange of information than in enhancing complementarities.***

The Commission made efforts to enhance coordination between different Commission DGs, with EUDs, with other EU actors, and with the wider donor community and civil society. This consisted generally in the setting-up of or participation in working groups to enhance coordination. However these groups generally focused on exchange of information, which is a minimum requirement for coordination and complementarities, and did not give rise to a clear division of roles between partners with a view to avoiding gaps or duplication and to enhancing synergies at strategy, programming and implementation levels.

### 5.3 On strategy issues

#### **Conclusion 3: Commission's role in conflict contexts**

**The ambition of the Commission regarding its role in conflict (-prone) and post-conflict countries and regions was not always clear and its support often remained wedded to a developmental perspective rather than operating a shift towards a genuine CPPB perspective with a clear and prioritised strategy.**

*Based on EQ1, EQ2*

In the spirit of the 2001 Communication on conflict prevention and subsequent documents, conflict prevention should be at the heart of the strategy in conflict (-prone) or post-conflict countries or regions.

However the precise role the Commission aimed to play in the conflict (-prone) and post-conflict countries and regions was to a certain extent blurred. Indeed, the evaluation shows (see EQ1) that mainstreaming was not widespread and that for a substantial number of conflict (-prone) or post-conflict countries conflict prevention was not at the heart of the Commission's strategy. In fact only rarely was support geared to addressing the "root" causes of conflict: in most cases the support aimed at best at mitigating the consequences of conflict or at addressing more development-related needs in a specific conflict context. Although development in the wider sense might indeed be seen as a factor that contributes to CPPB, embedding the strategy in a mere development perspective is not in line with the paradigm shift required to address the challenges of a conflict (-prone) or post-conflict context as articulated in the Commission's own policy documents. The notion of conflict-sensitive development requires more than the implementation of development programmes in the sense of 'business as usual'.

#### **Conclusion 4: Commission's reactive approach to CPPB**

**The Commission generally had a reactive rather than a pro-active approach to conflict.**

*Based on EQ1, EQ2, EQ3*

This evaluation brings to light **several elements that indicate that the Commission mostly had a reactive approach to conflict** over the period.

**There has been a lack of proper and documented conflict analysis:** the Commission's knowledge of conflict situations has not been built on proper *documented* conflict analyses but rather on information gathered on the conflict situation through informal channels, in particular the EUD but also on information from other actors. This limited the depth of its knowledge on the conflict situation and as a result the extent to which the Commission's support was properly informed by the conflict context.

**The Commission's support aimed more at mitigating the consequences of the root causes rather than at directly tackling them:** the evaluation shows that the Commission's support was more geared to mitigating the consequences of root causes and to overall development support "in" a conflict context than to working "on" the conflict by addressing its root causes.

**The Commission early-warning system was not sufficiently comprehensive and operationally useful:** the Commission developed and financed various early-warning mechanisms over the period but they were either not known about or were not widely used by those planning and implementing responses. Additionally, their lack of comprehensiveness and operationality was questioned in a number of cases.

**The Commission generally reacted after the eruption of the conflict, although often quite quickly:** deteriorating situations were not always anticipated by the Commission and in a number of cases the eruption of the crisis took the Commission by surprise,<sup>150</sup> the Commission generally reacting once the conflict had broken out. Its reaction was however

<sup>150</sup> Yet it is important to note that in most (but not all) of these circumstances the international community as a whole was taken somewhat by surprise.

often rapid, notably owing to the combined use of various financial and non-financial instruments in rapid response to crisis situations, its strategy and programming being adapted to a changing situation in some cases. From 2001 the Commission enhanced its capacity to react quickly by designing specific short-term instruments and by introducing the possibility of using flexible procedures in crisis situations. But the flexibility and appropriate speed of these instruments and procedures were questioned in a number of cases.

### **Conclusion 5: Alignment with national authorities**

**The conflict (-prone) or post-conflict context challenged the relevance of the alignment of Commission support on the strategies and policies of national authorities.**

*Based on EQ 5*

In the 2005 Paris Declaration donors, including the European Commission, committed themselves to aligning with partner countries' strategies. This means, among other things, that they should *"base their overall support – country strategies, policy dialogues and development co-operation programmes – on partner's national development strategies ..."*.

Such alignment has proved to pose specific challenges, which were accentuated or typical in a conflict (-prone) or post-conflict context:

- national development strategies did not always exist ;
- the capacities of national partners were often weakened;
- it was not always clear with whom to align;
- the national authorities were sometimes a major party to the conflict and their commitment to CPPB was questionable;
- in some cases the national authorities considered that the conflict context was part of the past and that it was necessary to enter into a developmental phase, whereas the Commission (and other actors) considered that it was too early to do so.

Therefore the Commission has in certain countries decided not to enter into a logic of mere alignment, considering that this would be out of line with the needs of the country which rather required sustained support for CPPB.

## Conclusion 6: Use of channelling

**The Commission channelled half of its financial support through international organisations, allowing it to intervene in a coordinated manner in contexts where otherwise it would not have been present, but which also made it vulnerable to the drawbacks of the use of this aid modality.**

*Based on Inventory, EQ5*

As shown in the inventory, over the period 2001-2010 the Commission channelled 51% of its CPPB funding through international organisations, mainly the World Bank and the United Nations. The bulk of these channelled funds was concentrated in seven countries, three of which (Afghanistan, WB&GS and Iraq) were affected by large-scale conflicts and accounted for 60% of the total amount channelled.

This channelling allowed the Commission to:

- intervene in countries where intervening alone would have been difficult and risky;
- adopt a coordinated approach with the international community to conflict-affected areas;
- provide a critical mass of funding to support reconstruction and rehabilitation ;
- re-start its cooperation with countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan.

However the extensive use of channelling did also make the Commission vulnerable to the typical drawbacks of the use of this aid modality, namely a perception of a donor-driven approach and impaired efficiency under specific circumstances (e.g. when government capacities were weak).

## 5.4 On results and impacts

### Conclusion 7: Commission Value Added

**Through its support in conflict (-prone) and post-conflict countries and regions the Commission provided different types of value added that differentiated it from most other actors.**

*Based on EQ6*

The analysis of the Commission's support in conflict (-prone) and post-conflict countries has allowed identification of different types of value added that the Commission provided and that were assets in contributing to CPPB. Often, but not always, the Commission differentiated itself in this respect from individual EU MS, but also from other actors of the international community. Six types of value added can be distinguished, notably the Commission's:

- perceived less strong “political profile” (no tie to national interests), which facilitated dialogue with all parties in the country or region and in some cases led EU MS to confer on the Commission the mandate to represent them;
- reliability (continued presence – including when others cancelled or suspended their presence – and capacity to establish long-term partnerships);
- critical mass in terms of financial support (allowing wide geographical and sectoral coverage and political leverage, although the last-mentioned was not often applied);
- ability to draw on a wide array of instruments, allowing action in the short and longer terms as well as in different sectors;
- long-term thematic experience in fields or sectors potentially impacting on CPPB (in some cases also on issues directly related to CPPB);
- credibility in terms of promoting democracy, peace and human rights, the EU being an example of political integration and of maintenance of peace.

### **Conclusion 8: Overall impact of Commission support on CPPB**

**In some cases the Commission played a key role in mitigating the impact of root causes, notably through a largely integrated approach. The Commission’s support also generally had a positive contribution to conflict mitigation, stabilisation, reconstruction and rehabilitation. But the overall impact of its support in terms of CPPB remains impossible to predict.**

*Based on EQ2, EQ3, EQ5*

The Commission devoted significant resources (23% of total CPPB contracted funds) and used political dialogue to **address immediate crises, conflict mitigation and consolidation of peace**. The evidence gathered throughout this evaluation generally demonstrated a **positive contribution from the Commission** through its support to peace consolidation, stabilisation, reconstruction and rehabilitation.

**The Commission’s support to long-term prevention** was generally **not geared to working “on” the conflict and to tackling the root causes** as such. In most cases the support aimed at mitigating the consequences of the root causes, or at providing overall development support in a conflict context.

There were cases where the Commission made **clear contributions in terms of mitigating the consequences of root causes, notably through a largely integrated approach**. For instance:

- In West Bank and Gaza Strip, stakeholders generally considered that the Commission supported the right priorities with a view to preparing the two-states solution (as of 2006) and that its contribution was critical in this respect.
- Similarly the Commission’s support for and around the election process in Ivory Coast was considered a key contribution. The Commission was one of the main funders of this process, which allowed the organisation of elections that were considered



transparent by the international community and thus allowed it to take a clear and common position on the results of the elections.

- In Sierra Leone, from the early years of the civil war the Commission and DFID were involved in parallel with DFID's implementation of DDR and SSR activities and the Commission's financing of post-conflict Budget Support for legitimisation of the government and macro-economic stability. The Commission's support contributed to helping the GoSLe in its efforts towards creating a functioning bureaucracy and macro-economic stability which had a positive impact on peace and rehabilitation in the immediate aftermath of the conflict. Moreover emphasis was put on the LRRD approach, successfully as it turned out given that it allowed bridging of the gap between emergency and long-term development efforts which allowed communities displaced by the conflict to return home, thus addressing a potential conflict risk.

In these cases the Commission's support could be described as being to a large extent part of an integrated approach alongside the four dimensions of the approach even though each one of the four dimensions was taken into account in varying degrees. In particular, while all four dimensions were clearly taken into account in West Bank, the support provided in Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone was not explicitly<sup>151</sup> articulated around a clear conflict-sensitive approach and did not aim at tackling the root causes. Yet these examples provide plausible indications that the delivery of Commission support through a largely integrated approach contributed to its success.

However **it remains impossible to predict the final result of the support provided**, for two major reasons:

- the final impact of a positive contribution in terms of mitigation of the impact of the root causes and of a positive effect in short-term prevention on CPPB as such remains unknown;
- the overall impact of the Commission's support on CPPB depends on developments within the country or region and on the international political scene where the Commission is not the only player.

### **Conclusion 9: Commission role in CPPB hampered by its mandate and differing positions with EU MS**

**The Commission was hampered in the role it played with respect to CPPB by its mandate and differences in priorities among the EU MS.**

*Based on EQ2, EQ5, EQ6, EQ7*

Over the evaluation period the Commission played an **increasing role** in the international scene **in the field of CPPB**. However it has **generally not played a leading role in terms of setting the policy agenda or heading up operations**. Moreover, major elements limited the role the Commission could play on the (international) political scene during acute crises. Thus:

<sup>151</sup> It should be noted that the partner Government has to accept to tackle the root causes to make it explicit in the CSP.

- The Commission **did not have a specific mandate to intervene in CPPB**, unlike the United Nations, which has the overall mandate for maintaining peace and security. Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, EU competences in CPPB were shared between the European Community and the CFSP, albeit without clear-cut competence-sharing between the two institutions (see conclusion 9.1 below). The Council, being the driving force behind the decision-making process under the CFSP, had major responsibility.
- Although the evaluation shows that the **EU MS, both among themselves and vis-à-vis the Commission**, were **broadly taking the same approach in terms of the strategy to adopt** in the different countries examined, it also provided **examples where the EU MS took differing positions** among themselves, thereby limiting the political leverage of the Commission.
- There has been a **discrepancy between the Commission's financial and non-financial support, the financial support having more weight**. This evaluation shows that the critical mass of the Commission's financial support was a key value added, notably because it ensured political leverage to a certain extent, allowed wide geographical and sector coverage of the support, and conferred the necessary authority on the Commission alongside other powerful players. However, it also brings to light that the **Commission did not sufficiently exploit the political leverage offered by the extent of its financial resources**. Overall the Commission remained too discrete on the international political arena, **notably due to the lack of, or difficulty of having, a common European voice on foreign policy matters**.

## 5.5 On means and implementation

### **Conclusion 10: Gap between policy commitments and means (including administrative set-up)**

**The Commission's institutional set-up, its human resources policy and its tools and guidance for CPPB were not commensurate with its policy commitment and the level of its funding for CPPB.**

*Based on EQ1, EQ5, EQ7*

#### **C10.1: Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the coherence and effectiveness of the EU's approach to CPPB were challenged by the complexity of the EU's institutional set-up in the area of external affairs.**

Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, **EU competences in CPPB were shared between the European Community (EU first pillar) and the CFSP (EU second pillar)**. The Community's external powers encompassed a number of areas relevant to CPPB: common commercial policy, development cooperation, environment, and others. Under the EU second pillar created by the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), crisis management operations launched in the framework of the ESDP fell under the competence of the Council.

From the launch of the TEU the **question of competence-sharing in the area of external relations between the Commission and the Council has been raised**. Whereas **overlapping competences** were identified by the Treaty, with provision made for a consistent and coherent approach, other issues such as election monitoring, border management, civilian crisis management, actions in support of the rule of law, and control of SALW, were sources of overlap which had no clear-cut resolution. Similarly, evaluation findings indicate that the **division of roles between the Commission and the Council and between the Commission and the EUSR was not conducive** to ensuring coherence, coordination and complementarity in a post-conflict context.

In line with the increased attention given by the Commission to CPPB over time, the **Commission progressively created dedicated units with a CPPB focus in Headquarters**. At the end of the evaluation period all the DGs of the RELEX family included specialised units with either a CPPB focus or certain capabilities in that regard, with a predominance of these units in the DG for External Relations which was responsible for coordinating the Commission's general policy line on CPPB. In the field, political sections have progressively been set up in some EU Delegations. However, evaluation findings show that the **fragmentation of CPPB issues across the various Commission DGs precluded the Commission from having a common and coherent approach with respect to CPPB**: the inadequate division of roles between the Commission DGs and the lack of communication between DG Relex and EuropeAid has to be stressed.

***C10.2: The Commission did not have a human resources policy that was designed to govern interventions in conflict (-prone) contexts.***

Over the period 2001-2010 the **Commission had an increasing number of dedicated CPPB staff in HQ and in the field**. This evolution reflected overall organisational developments within the Commission, in particular the progressive creation of specialised units in HQ and the setting-up of political sections in some EUD (see conclusion 9.1 above). But evaluation findings show that the **conflict expertise remained too limited in extent**. Beyond the challenge of not having sufficient appropriate CPPB expertise, EUD in conflict or fragile countries also suffered from **staff shortages** reflecting the **difficulty of attracting or retaining skilled staff to work in difficult conflict contexts**.

This situation partly resulted from the fact that the **Commission did not have a human resources policy sufficiently geared to developing the conflict analysis skills of the staff and to ensuring that staff adopted a conflict-sensitive approach**. Evaluation findings indeed show that:

- There was ***no dedicated human resource policy favouring the hiring of specialised and experienced CPPB staff to work on conflict issues or in conflict countries***. For instance, while importance was placed on previous experience in conflict countries when recruiting staff to EUD, no specific recruiting policy to hire staff specialised in CPPB was in place.
- There was **no specific pool of CPPB experts** that the Commission could easily and rapidly mobilise.

- The Commission offered *training in HQ in various CPPB-related fields* (e.g. conflict prevention, mediation, SSR, LRRD, anti-corruption, Early Warning Systems, etc.), but:
  - these training events were *not compulsory* for the staff working on CPPB issues or in conflict-prone or fragile countries;
  - while the *staff of the Crisis Response and Peace-building Unit (DG Relex-A2) generally attended CPPB training events* and were encouraged to do so by the hierarchy, the *staff from geographical units generally did not attend* these events owing to a lack of availability and awareness-raising regarding these issues, while staff from other DGs lacked priority access to these training events;
  - moreover *almost none of the EUD staff interviewed* within the frame of the country case studies *had taken part in CPPB-related training*. Major reasons were the absence of specific incentives on the part of the hierarchy to attend this type of training and a lack of time or availability of EUD staff to attend.
- *CPPB was insufficiently considered in the career development of officials*, in the form of performance review, promotion and incentives.
- *Knowledge management in CPPB within the Commission has been poor*. In particular, experience-sharing and lesson-learning mechanisms in CPPB have been rare.

**C10.3: The Commission had limited operational tools and guidance for interventions in post-conflict or conflict (-prone) contexts and these were used only rarely.**

In line with its policy framework for conflict prevention, the Commission has since 2001 developed a series of tools and guidance for CPPB. The following major tools and guidance should especially be noted (see EQ1 and 7 for details):

- *Country Conflict assessments and Country Conflict indicators*;
- *EC Checklist on root causes of conflict* (2001) that consists of various indicators aimed at monitoring developments on a yearly basis in CPPB-related fields;
- *guidance from the inter-Service Quality Support Group (iQSG) to give CSPs a conflict focus*: in particular (i) the successive Frameworks for Country Strategy Papers (2000, 2006) that recommend that CSPs analyse security and stability measures in countries that have not yet reached structural stability; and (ii) the various programming guides for Strategy Papers (2008, 2009) in the field of conflict prevention, fragile states, governance, democracy, human rights, and support for economic and institutional reforms;
- *set of guidelines on CPPB-related sectors* issued by the Commission or by the Council.

However, this toolbox did not allow the Commission to bridge the gap between high-level policy commitments and their concrete implementation, for the following major reasons:

- the various tools and guidance *lacked operationality*, notably on how to take into account or mainstream CPPB;
- while the toolbox included a variety of tools and guidance produced over time, it *lacked clarity and comprehensiveness*;

- finally, and more importantly, these various tools and guidance were *not widely used or known of within the Commission*.

### Conclusion 11: Timeliness challenged by conflict context

The timeliness of the delivery of Commission CPPB support has often been impaired by insufficient anticipation of difficulties specifically related to the conflict or conflict (-prone) context, as well as by heavy Commission procedures, although at times the latter were also appreciated for their “protective” function.

*Based on EQ8*

**Delays** in the implementation of Commission CPPB programmes have often been recorded. Beyond the usual explanatory factors in delays (e.g. defects in design, lengthy preparation, etc.), specific **challenges posed by the conflict situation** played an important role. Of particular interest are: (i) the lack of progress in the political or conflict situation which determines the relevance and coherence of the support provided, (ii) the difficulties of working in a conflict situation (specific features of the country or zone, security issues), (iii) the sensitivity of some CPPB projects or resistance to them by some national counterparts, and (iv) the weak governance and capacities of public institutions in a conflict context. These **conflict-related challenges were often either underestimated or were not sufficiently well anticipated** by the Commission.

The timeliness of the delivery of Commission CPPB support has also been impeded by **heavy Commission procedures and methods of aid implementation**. In particular multi-annual programming (through the strategy papers and indicative programmes) did not allow rapid adaptation of the assistance in changing conflict contexts (e.g. it is difficult to change focal areas and to re-allocate programmed funds between focal areas even if the mid-term review process offers the possibility of adjustment). Decision-making procedures for programmes, in particular those falling under long-term geographical assistance, were lengthy and complex: the time-lapse between identification of the action and its approval extended up to one year, during which the situation on the ground could have changed. With the Instrument for Stability, the Commission could deploy its assistance more rapidly than with other instruments, but its capacity to react sufficiently quickly was questioned in all country case studies.

Commission procedures have nevertheless been **appreciated at times for their “protective” character**. The stringency of procedures has been appreciated in conflict contexts where accountability, control and transparency requirements are even more crucial. Similarly, whereas over the years the Commission has increasingly favoured decentralising management to beneficiary countries as a method of implementing its development aid, in acute conflict contexts the Commission has deliberately chosen to implement its assistance through centralised management in order to remain the owner of implementation, control and audit of its funds.




## 6. Recommendations

This chapter presents the Recommendations emerging from this evaluation. They aim at providing policy-makers and managers with advice based on the conclusions from the evaluation (*presented in chapter 5*).

The **set of recommendations** proposed below is **addressed to the High Representative and the Commission** in view of the **institutional changes** brought by the **Lisbon Treaty** and in particular the creation of a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the setting up of the European External Action Service (EEAS) which assists the High Representative.

The recommendations are presented in clusters corresponding to those of the Conclusions (see figure hereunder).

**Figure 12 – Recommendations**



## 6.1 On Commission's overall role and approach

<b>Recommendation 1 : Strengthen Commission position as key player in CPPB</b>	
<i>Based on Conclusions 1, 7, 8</i>	<i>Responsibility: Commission Headquarters, in coordination with High Representative</i>
<b>The Commission should strengthen its position as a key player in terms of CPPB by consolidating and further developing its support for CPPB.</b>	

The combination of three different factors arising from the conclusions of this evaluation leads to this **overarching recommendation**:

- First, as shown in Conclusion 1, the Commission has already **accumulated substantial experience** over the period 2001-2010 (notably by becoming an important player in terms of financial support for CPPB) and has ensured that its **policy and instrumental framework** were increasingly fitted to providing support for CPPB;
- Second, as explained in Conclusion 7, the Commission has **specific assets to offer in the field of CPPB** that many of the other players, and notably EU MS, cannot offer or at least cannot to the same extent, thus placing the Commission in a privileged position as a key player in the field. The Commission was indeed often considered a reliable, and credible partner (notably with respect to the promotion of democracy, peace and human rights), having a less strong “political profile” (compared to bilateral donors), and able to provide critical mass in terms of financial support and the ensuing benefits (wide geographic and sector coverage, potential political leverage), as well as specific thematic experience and a range of short-term and longer-term - as well as geographic and thematic - instruments.
- Third, the Commission has proven its **ability to make successful contributions in terms of CPPB**, as highlighted in Conclusion 8.

Together, these **elements constitute a good case for advocating a strengthening of the Commission's position as a key player with respect to CPPB**. This strengthening should be done in coordination with the High Representative.

This Recommendation is overarching, implying a number of other developments and changes addressed by the other recommendations presented below.



## Recommendation 2 : Strengthen the integrated approach

*Based on Conclusions 2, 8*

*Responsibility: Commission Headquarters, EU Delegations and High Representative*

**The High Representative and Commission should further strengthen the four dimensions of the integrated approach when supporting CPPB.**

The importance of adopting an integrated approach to CPPB within the framework of the four key dimensions is generally acknowledged in the growing literature on CPPB and among stakeholders.

Conclusion 8 strengthens this by explaining that where the Commission has critical contributions to make in terms of mitigating the consequences of root causes, it has also to a large extent adopted an integrated approach.

Conclusion 2, however, states that there has been a gap between the policy commitment to an integrated approach and its implementation. This gap concerns each of the four key dimensions and calls for specific recommendations in this respect.

Hence it is recommended that the integrated approach be strengthened along with each of its four dimensions, even if such an approach is ambitious and should preferably - as underlined by many stakeholders - be seen in a realistic perspective as an ideal to aim for.

### ***R2.1 Ensure clarification and common understanding of concepts among EEAS and Commission staff, including at operational level.*** (based on C2.1.1)

Having a clear definition and a common understanding of concepts is a prerequisite for intervening effectively in a particular field. As explained under Conclusion 2.1.1, however, on the one hand CPPB-related concepts were not always defined in a univocal and clear way at strategic level, and on the other existing definitions were not taken up at operational level, as is also often the case with other players. This concerns key policy and operational concepts such as: “integrated approach”, “conflict prevention”, “peace-building”, “conflict analysis”, “conflict sensitivity”, “do no harm”, “mainstreaming”, “root causes”.

It is therefore recommended that together the EEAS and Commission:

- consults on, then provides, a set of clear and univocal definitions of key concepts in a single document (for instance the *vade mecum* mentioned under R2.2);
- ensures that these definitions are disseminated to all actors concerned and used in key Commission and EU processes with the EEAS.<sup>152</sup>

### ***R2.2 Develop and implement a systematic and structured approach to conflict analysis, mainstreaming and “do no harm”.*** (based on C2.1.2)

This Recommendation is based on Conclusion 2.1.2, which highlights the lack of a systematised approach to the issues mentioned above. It is therefore recommended that the EEAS and Commission:

<sup>152</sup> It would be gravely detrimental if the EEAS and Commission were to develop different understandings of this key terminology.

- develop a brief and user-friendly *vade mecum* that contains:
  - a template for conducting and updating structured and documented conflict analyses;
  - specific guidance on how to ensure conflict sensitivity, “do no harm” approaches and mainstreaming;
- make the use and implementation of guidance provided in this *vade mecum* compulsory in EEAS and Commission support in all conflict (-prone) and post-conflict countries.

***R2.3: Create a comprehensive, easy and flexible early-warning system and make sure it is used.*** (based on C.2.1.3)

This evaluation shows that the Commission developed and financed several early-warning mechanisms (see C.2.1.3). However, these mechanisms have not been widely used to monitor the evolution of conflict situations on the ground or to design early responses. The Council also had specific mechanisms: the Joint Situation Centre (known as SitCen, drawing on open and closed information) and the Watch-Keeping Capability. The EU system for early-warning overall lacked comprehensiveness and operational usefulness.

It is therefore recommended that the Commission with the EEAS create a fully integrated early-warning system designed to elicit a response. The purpose is not to create a system for its own sake but to have a flexible and easy system allowing the Commission (i) to manage efficiently the enormous amount of available information and (ii) to have a sound basis for informing its decision-making. The objective is to link more actively early-warning to early action and increase the effectiveness of the Commission’s and EEAS’s support for conflict prevention.

The first recommended step is to rationalise current early-warning mechanisms, in particular to decide which early-warning mechanisms are critical and useful. The institutional changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty are an opportunity to revise the current early-warning system. In particular, the setting-up of the EEAS, drawing together crisis management structures and the Global and Multilateral Issues Directorate, constitutes a potential platform that would bring together in a comprehensive way Commission and EUMS early-warning information systems. The fusion of the SitCen and the Commission’s Crisis Room are steps in that direction.

***R2.4 Strengthen the synergies between the different geographical levels of intervention.*** (based on C.2.1.4)

Integrating the geographical dimension when providing support to CPPB is not only a matter of assessing the needs of different geographical entities (e.g. zones within a country, cross-border issues, etc.) and intervening at the appropriate level, but also of ensuring that synergies between different levels are exploited (for instance by complementing actions within a country with actions at regional level when the conflict also has a regional dimension). As mentioned in C.2.1.4, such synergies were underexploited. Therefore it is recommended that such synergies be strengthened by:

- ensuring that joint strategy and programming design within responsibilities for regional and national strategies in conflict-affected countries are informed by conflict analysis;
- carefully and systematically analysing where the support could benefit from such synergies as part of conflict analysis, so as to inform programming ;

- developing monitoring indicators for programmes that take account of impacts at local, national and regional levels where relevant, so as to ensure that programmatic results are considered together as well as separately with a view to identifying interactions and synergies at the different levels;

***R.2.5 Make sure that coordination mechanisms at all levels, but especially between the Commission, the EEAS, the EU Council and EU MS, go beyond a mere exchange of information and aim at enhancing complementarities at strategy and implementation levels.*** (based on C.2.1.5)

The evaluation has shown that coordination mechanisms existed at different levels (within the Commission, with other EU authorities, with the wider international community and with civil society) but that the coordination provided has merely consisted of an exchange of information. As explained in Conclusion C.2.1.5, while essential this is not sufficient, especially in a conflict context in which the different parties concerned should as much as possible adopt the same approach and avoid fuelling of the conflict by transposing divergences between conflict actors to the international community or *vice versa*. Well-coordinated action also confers more weight to the political positions taken by the international community.

It is therefore recommended that the Commission and the EEAS take steps to ensure that the coordination mechanisms focus on:

- exchanging information between different parties concerned, as a necessary requirement, albeit insufficient on its own; *and*
- enhancing coherence and complementarities at both strategy and implementation levels, by:
  - deciding on a clear division of roles between the different actors, taking into account their respective value added (e.g. specialisation in one sector);
  - ensuring at all stages that:
    - the “political” positions of partners are coherent;
    - there is no duplication in the support provided by different actors;
    - the combined support of all actors is comprehensive in the sense of covering the needs to the greatest extent possible and avoiding gaps;
    - synergies between support provided by different actors are maximised.

The above should be done with a view to minimising the transaction costs for all parties concerned and notably for the partner countries.

It should also serve to develop (in line with Recommendation 1) comprehensive EU regional and country strategies of which CPPB is a key component.

## 6.2 On specific strategy issues

### **Recommendation 3: Clarify the role to be played in conflict countries by focusing on crisis management efforts and on tackling the root causes directly**

*Based on Conclusions 3, 7, 8*

*Responsibility: Commission Headquarters, in coordination with the High Representative*

**The EEAS and Commission should clarify the role they aim to play in conflict (prone) and post-conflict contexts by focusing both on crisis management efforts and on tackling the root causes of conflict through a clear and prioritised strategy geared to CPPB going beyond “classic” development.**

The Commission could follow different paths and aim at different objectives when intervening in conflict prone countries:

- At one end of the spectrum the Commission could limit itself to providing development support in a conflict context. This is rather a matter of improving living conditions in a conflict context, without going to the heart of the problem. The Commission could provide useful support in this respect but, given its specific value added and the role it has proved capable of playing, it should go beyond this level;
- At the other end of the spectrum, the Commission could aim at both acting quickly and flexibly when the situation deteriorates in a particular country or region and restoring or consolidating structural stability. However, working on CPPB is to a large extent also a matter of “political work” (including military action) which often falls outside the realm of what can be reasonably expected from the Commission (as acknowledged by Conclusion 9). While the Commission may have useful contributions to make in this respect, expectations should remain within a realistic view of what it can achieve given its mandate and the means at its disposal.

Considering the achievements of the Commission in terms of short-term and long-term prevention, it is recommended that the Commission clarifies the role it intends to play in conflict-prone and post-conflict context by focusing both on crisis management efforts and on tackling more directly the root causes of conflict through a clear and prioritised strategy geared to CPPB.

- With respect to short-term prevention, the Commission’s support generally positively contributed to peace consolidation, stabilisation, reconstruction and rehabilitation. Bearing also in mind that short-term interventions remain an essential component of CPPB, Commission support to short-term crisis management and conflict prevention efforts should be sustained.
- With respect to long-term prevention, the Commission aimed mainly at mitigating the impact of the root causes and at providing development support in a conflict context. Its support was only rarely geared to tackling root causes and lacked a clear and prioritised strategy in this respect. There were cases where the Commission made a clear contribution in terms of mitigating the consequences of root causes; it was often through the implementation of an integrated approach. In light of the different types of value added the Commission has had (e.g. its less strong “political profile”, the capacity

to build long-term partnerships, the critical mass of its funding), it is recommended that the Commission goes beyond addressing the mitigation of the impact of the root causes; it should tackle directly the root causes of conflict through a clear and prioritised strategy geared to CPPB going beyond mere “classic” development.

**Recommendation 4: Leverage the Commission’s financial weight with non-financial support**

*Based on Conclusion 9*

*Responsibility: Commission Headquarters, in coordination with the High Representative*

**The Commission should make sure that its financial support is sufficiently complemented and leveraged by non-financial support.**

This evaluation shows that the Commission devoted a significant amount of financial resources to CPPB (€7.7bn over the evaluation period). The critical mass and volume of the Commission’s financial support constituted a key value added. However, the Commission did not sufficiently exploit the potential political leverage offered by the significance of its financial resources because of the insufficient weight of its non-financial support, in particular its political dialogue.

It is therefore recommended that the Commission, with the High Representative, ensures that its financial support is sufficiently complemented and leveraged by non-financial support at global, regional and country levels. In leveraging its financial weight, the Commission would increase its prospects of impact for CPPB. These non-financial aspects are however not without risks in terms of generating debates on the politicisation of aid or the potential impact of being seen as less neutral.

This recommendation goes beyond the remit of the Commission’s action since the Council is a key actor in terms of non-financial support and it is difficult to dissociate the Commission’s political action from the EU’s. The institutional changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty aim at providing positive developments in that regard:

- The Treaty creates the post of a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who is also a Vice-President of the European Commission, so as to enhance the consistency and unity of the EU's external action. It also creates a European External Action Service (EEAS), composed of officials from the Council, the Commission and the Diplomatic Services of the Member States, which should concentrate and coordinate prevention activities, including CSDP structures.
- The Treaty also gives the EU Delegations a legal personality enabling them to represent the Union in the full range of Union competences. Hence the EU Ambassador has taken over the former role of the EU’s rotating Presidency at country level. This strengthens the role of the EU Ambassador in political dialogue with partner countries.

Such forms of non-financial support could include:

- Leveraging and reinforcing existing capacities and entry points for the Commission and EEAS to be more proactive and taking a lead in terms of converting its financial commitments to CPPB into policy and strategic influence at national, regional and

international levels. Some operational guidance and documentation of experience of using political dialogue for conflict prevention and peace-building for EU Ambassadors and other senior officials could be useful.

- Active engagement in the coordination structures and strategies of the international community in given situations.
- Joining up national efforts with ongoing dialogue and participation in regional and global fora and bodies such as the African Union and the United Nations in order to address particular situations and responses.
- Concerted dialogue and mediation strategies with national authorities, leaders of parties to the conflict, and civil society groups at country level.

### Recommendation 5: Relevance of alignment

*Based on Conclusion 5*

*Responsibility: Commission Headquarters and EU Delegations*

**The Commission should carefully assess the relevance of alignment with partner countries' government priorities when providing support in conflict (-prone) or post-conflict contexts and should reserve the right to distance itself from such priorities if this is deemed necessary from a CPPB perspective.**

Conclusion 5 underlines that the relevance of alignment of Commission support for the strategies and policies of national authorities has been challenged in conflict (-prone) or post-conflict contexts for different reasons (lack of such priorities; weakened capacities of national counterparts; lack of clarity on whom to align with; tendency of counterparts to enter rapidly into a classic development logic; and instances where the national authorities are a major actor in the conflict, giving rise to consequent doubts about their commitment to CPPB).

Mere alignment in such contexts has not always been the best option and might even be counterproductive in terms of CPPB. In other words, alignment as advocated by the Paris Declaration cannot be considered as a self-evident and natural option in such contexts.<sup>153</sup> Therefore the Commission should examine on a case-by-case basis how far it should align its activities with priorities defined by national authorities, and to what extent it should reserve the right to distance itself from such priorities and even support priorities deemed more relevant in terms of CPPB. This could also encompass a sustained dialogue about priorities beyond the “national authorities”, with civil society and other in-country actors.

<sup>153</sup> A more flexible position on alignment is included in the OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations which call for alignment with “local priorities” rather than explicitly with national authorities/governments.

### 6.3 On means and implementation

<b>Recommendation 6: Make appropriate means available</b>	
<i>Based on Conclusion 10</i>	<i>Responsibility: Commission Headquarters, EU Delegations, and High Representative</i>
<b>The Commission/EEAS should make sure that the means are made available to allow for effective and efficient CPPB support, in line with the aim in this respect.</b>	

The evaluation shows that there has been a gap between high-level policy commitments, the level of financial support, and the actual means the Commission deployed to fulfil its mandate. Commission means, in particular the institutional set-up, the human resources policy, and the tools and guidance have overall not facilitated fulfilment of Commission policy commitments in the CPPB area.

***R6.1: Design and implement a specific human resources policy for intervening in a post-conflict or conflict (-prone) context*** (based on C.10.2)

This evaluation shows that the Commission did not have a human resources policy sufficiently geared to developing the conflict analysis skills of the staff and to ensuring that the staff adopted a conflict-sensitive approach.

It is therefore recommended that the Commission, in collaboration with the EEAS, designs and implements a specific human resources policy for intervening in conflict contexts.

- In terms of **recruitment policy in EUD**, the human resources policy should explicitly promote the hiring of experienced CPPB staff to work on conflict issues or in conflict countries. It should also take into account the challenges of operating in conflict environments: in particular, more staff might be needed than in non-conflict contexts, and retention, turnover and security are some of the considerations for deployment of staff. It should also be possible to mobilise staff at short notice, through simplified recruitment procedures. Given the sensitivities of engaging in political dialogue for CPPB, this is often led by high-level Commission or EEAS staff and the EU Ambassador, and therefore recruitment of appropriately qualified staff should take place at this level and not merely at the level of specialists.
- In terms of **training and sharing of experiences**:
  - Training in CPPB-related fields (e.g. conflict prevention, mediation, SSR, LRRD, anti-corruption, early-warning systems, conflict sensitivity, conflict analysis, mainstreaming of CPPB, political dialogue for conflict prevention, etc.) should be made compulsory for staff working on CPPB issues or in conflict-prone or fragile countries. It may also be that CPPB components could be integrated into existing core career development training.
  - Taking into account the fact that these training events take place in Headquarters, sufficient resources (time and financial resources) should be devoted to ensuring that EUD staff can attend such training.

- Consideration might also be given to the time and cost-effectiveness of organising some training events online or on a regional basis, which may also have other benefits in terms of promoting synergy. For instance, training could be attached to existing regional or central meetings and staff gatherings.
- Consideration might also be given to having a trainer go into the EUD in fragile states so that all EUD staff benefit from the training (which could last a week and be delivered every morning or afternoon so that normal work could continue at the same time).
- A number of external and international training schemes also exist (run by EUMS, NGOs, universities, and international organisations) and consideration could be given to participation in these schemes so as to facilitate joint training with other partners and exposure to other organisations.
- Also sharing of experience of more sensitive issues associated with conducting CPPB-relevant political dialogue by senior staff (EU Ambassadors/high level EEAS/Commission staff) would be useful.

***R6.2: Provide mechanisms to ensure effective knowledge management*** (based on C.10.2)

Knowledge management in the field of CPPB has been poor. It hence recommends that steps be taken to ensure the following:

- **Institutional memory:** considering that personnel within the Commission (in Headquarters and in the field) rotates quite regularly (every three to four years) and that in conflict contexts, where the situation is sensitive, tacit knowledge can prove even more important than information provided in documents, efficient archiving of documents and hand-over of responsibilities is crucial. A common and systematic archiving of files is necessary to facilitate transfer of responsibilities. Additionally, the hand-over of responsibilities should be well-organised: for instance, the practice of ensuring a hand-over period should be systematised.
- **Experience-sharing and lesson-learning mechanisms in CPPB,** in particular between EUD operating in conflict contexts but also on thematic issues. This could for instance allow building on positive experience achieved during one programme in the design of subsequent CPPB programmes. Informal and internal lunchtime briefings, on-line blogs, reflection periods for writing-up of “experience briefing notes” for EUDs at HQ in between postings, are all mechanisms that could be considered as efficient means of knowledge generation and sharing that can build on existing resources or which are low-cost.

***R6.3: Provide a focused set of workable tools and guidance for intervening in a post-conflict or conflict (-prone) context*** (based on C.10.3)

This evaluation shows that the Commission developed some tools and guidance for conflict analysis and mainstreaming but that they have not been widely adopted and used. It further highlights that the toolbox lacked operationality and comprehensiveness.

It is therefore recommended that a clear set of operational tools and guidance be developed for intervening in conflict contexts. It would give practical guidance on how to mainstream CPPB, on how to be conflict-sensitive, and so on. Tools and guidance should not be developed for their own sake; they should be limited in number and where



appropriate draw on existing best practice and knowledge;<sup>154</sup> they should be clear and practical; they should be clearly linked to ongoing Commission processes such as PCM; and finally they should be used by the staff with the necessary incentives and controls to ensure that this all happens. In that respect they should be communicated in a visible way within the Commission and EEAS.

***R6.4: Develop and implement monitoring frameworks with specific indicators for operating in a post-conflict or conflict (-prone) context*** (based on C.2.1.2)

One of the missed opportunities in terms of conflict sensitiveness has lain in the fact that the Commission has not used specific indicators to track the evolution of conflict factors. In particular, in the various programmes reviewed within the framework of this evaluation, indicators for monitoring conflict-related results were almost never included. This constrained measurement of the effects of the programme on the conflict situation.

With a view to reinforcing the conflict focus of the programming of the Commission's support to CPPB, it is recommended that the Commission: (i) defines at design stage, specific indicators to monitor the effects of CPPB-related programmes on the evolution of conflict factors, and then (ii) monitors the programmes during implementation according to the pre-agreed set of indicators. This conflict-sensitive monitoring would contribute to ensuring that the Commission is following the effects of its programmes on the conflict context and to providing the necessary signals during the implementation phase in case mitigating action is needed.

<b>Recommendation 7: Maintain “protective” character of procedures but make them swifter</b>	
<i>Based on Conclusion 11</i>	<i>Responsibility: Commission Headquarters</i>
<b>The Commission should maintain the “protective” character of its procedures but make them swifter.</b>	

This evaluation shows that the **stringency of Commission procedures has been appreciated** in conflict contexts where accountability, control and transparency requirements are even more crucial and demanding. But the **heaviness** of Commission procedures and methods of aid implementation (e.g. multi-annual programming) also often **impeded** the **timeliness** of the delivery of Commission CPPB support. The Commission has already taken notable steps to enhance swifter implementation of its support; in particular it has introduced the **possibility of using flexible procedures** in crisis and emergency situations for implementation (e.g. use of negotiated procedures for procurement contracts and the possibility of applying a number of exceptions to some basic rules for grants). But there has been **mixed evidence on the extent to which these procedures were sufficient or consistent, or whether they enhanced swift implementation.**

<sup>154</sup> Such best practice was developed by the OECD's Initiative on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF). Also some EU-based Non-State Actors specialized in conflict prevention and peace-building also have a global reputation in this area that can be usefully drawn upon.

It is therefore recommended that steps be taken to **maintain the “protective” character** of Commission procedures to ensure that funds are not misused. However, considering that swiftness can be even more crucial in a conflict context, the Commission should also **smooth out its procedures and methods of aid implementation in conflict countries**. In particular, the following possibilities could be more systematically considered in conflict countries: (i) using annual programming (vs. multi-annual programming), (ii) changing focal sectors during and outside the mid-term review process, (iii) reallocating programmed funds between focal areas or between EDF envelopes (transfer of funds from A-envelope to B-envelope), and (iv) using flexible procedures for programming. It is also worth looking again, in the context of the negotiations for the new Financial Framework and regulations for the Instrument for Stability, at whether there is any way of speeding up decision-making and the allocation of funds to implementers.

### Recommendation 8: Better anticipate conflict-related challenges

*Based on Conclusion 11*

*Responsibility: Commission Headquarters and EU Delegations*

**The Commission should ensure that the difficulties of operating in a conflict context are sufficiently anticipated at all levels and that expectations in terms of timeliness and budget are realistic.**

The evaluation shows that **specific challenges posed by the conflict situation** often played an important role in the timeliness of the delivery of the Commission’s support and that they were **often underestimated or not sufficiently well anticipated**.

It is hence recommended that **efforts be devoted to better anticipation of the difficulties of operating in a conflict context**. In that respect, having a conflict-sensitive approach in terms of strategy design and implementation should lead to better assessment of the extent of the challenges posed by the conflict situation and that this be fully treated in the risk analysis sections of programming documents.

Additionally, while the pressure for results may also be high, **expectations with respect to timeliness and disbursement of funds should be realistic, viz.:**

- the planning of programme implementation in conflict countries should take into account the conflict context, in particular the fact that it might require more time to fully implement a programme; *and*
- expectations with respect to the rapidity of disbursement of funds should be less demanding in conflict countries than in non-conflict countries.

Expectations should also take duly into account the **levels of the national capacities (e.g. government or partners)** to implement the programmes.