# Development for Peace and Security

Development Policy in the Context of Conflict, Fragility and Violence

Contents

Key messages

Supporting countries affected by conflict, fragility and violence is a key area for future-proof development. More than half of the partner countries of German development cooperation are affected by conflict, fragility and violence, either throughout their national territory or in individual regions. The negative consequences for development opportunities in these countries cannot be denied. Conflict countries and fragile states can also pose a risk to regional and global security. Contributing worldwide to peace and security is therefore a primary aim of German foreign, security and development policy.

Development policy geared towards peace and security requires targeted action. German development policy supports its partner countries in addressing the causes of conflict, fragility and violence, improving peaceful conflict management and in creating an environment for peaceful and inclusive development. The conceptual basis for this is provided by the German government's Interministerial Guidelines towards fragile states as well as the five internationally agreed Peacebuilding and State-building Goals (PSG).

→   Objectives, page 10

Detailed analysis is required for different country constellations. In some cases, fragile states and countries affected by conflict and violence have very different characteristics. Different approaches are used depending on the constellation in question. A detailed, country-specific analysis is vital to being able to take effective action, as is focusing the overall portfolio on the needs of peace and security.

→   Typical country constellations, page 15

Ensuring the effectiveness of development activities in difficult contexts is dependent on particular requirements. In fragile and conflict-affected situations, it is not only what development policy is doing that is key, but also how it is carrying out development projects and programmes. The strategy lists seven principles for action for German development cooperation, focusing in particular on risk management. In this area, for instance, risks need to be identified and strategies for mitigating such risks developed while openly factoring in the expectation that setbacks will occur.

→   Principles for action, page 16

German development policy is well positioned with its mix of instruments. In the context of conflict, fragility and violence, using a number of different development policy instruments enhances the effectiveness of any response. German development cooperation has a whole range of tried and tested instruments at its disposal in such situations. These instruments need to be closely interlinked with one another when used.

→   Instruments, page 19

Conducting development cooperation in fragile states requires a high degree of coherence. The strategy is guided by national and international provisions and new findings from the field of peace and security. It is also instrumental in helping to increase not only the level of coherence between government ministries but also coherent cooperation both with other donors as well as at multilateral level. The strategy contains binding provisions for coherent cooperation between the Federal Ministry for Economic Development and Cooperation (BMZ), which is responsible for steering policy, and the implementing organisations of German development cooperation whose task it is to carry out the projects and programmes.

→   Provisions, page 20

1. Introduction

1.1 STRATEGY OBJECTIVES AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY CONTEXT

This strategy sets out the provisions and guidance for German development policy in contexts characterised by conflict, fragility and violence. It replaces the "Cross-Sectoral Strategy for Crisis Prevention, Conflict Transformation and Peace-Building in German Development Cooperation" from 2005 and incorporates parts of the 2007 BMZ strategy entitled "Development-Oriented Transformation in Conditions of Fragile Statehood and Poor Government Performance". As an **interministerial responsibility, German commitment regarding fragile states encompasses** the entire process from crisis prevention through potential conflict resolution measures to promoting long-term development.

The objective of the strategy is twofold: firstly, to improve development policy for peace and security; and secondly, to enhance the effectiveness of the German development policy response in contexts which are characterised by conflict, fragility and violence[1].

The present strategy takes account of **national and international provisions as well as further developments in the area of peace and security. In particular, it seeks to implement the link between peacebuilding and statebuilding within the sphere of German development policy.** The Interministerial Guidelines entitled "For a coherent German Government policy towards fragile states" from 2012 underline the relevance of fragile states to German policy[2]. The BMZ's strategy on development policy from 2011 entitled "Minds for Change – Chancen schaffen. Enhancing Opportunities – Zukunft ent-

wickeln" also names helping fragile states as one of the five key areas for future-proof development. At international level, papers by the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD/DAC), the 2011 World Bank report on "Conflict, Security and Development" and the "New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States", endorsed at the OECD High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in December 2011, all stress the importance of peace and security as development policy issues. In terms of its contents, the strategy is based on the five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) drawn up in conjunction with fragile states as part of the New Deal and also adopted in Busan. It is also closely linked to the BMZ strategies on human rights, children's and young people's rights, gender, rural development, anti-corruption and integrity as well as poverty. The strategy regards these themes as **cross-cutting issues** and implements relevant recommendations from the 2010 OECD/DAC Peer Review for Germany. Reference is also made to the BMZ strategy "Promotion of Good Governance in German Development Policy" as well as to the BMZ strategy papers on recovery and rehabilitation and "Promoting Resilient States and Constructive State-Society Relations – Legitimacy, Transparency and Accountability". It also incorporates the **latest findings from research and evaluations.**

1.2 AREA OF APPLICATION

Development cooperation with countries where conflict, fragility and violence prevail throughout the national territory or in individual regions is at the heart of the strategy. These countries have the characteristics described in section 2: violent conflicts with economic, social and political roots, social and political tensions, repressive structures, deficiencies in the state's monopoly on the use of force, a low

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[1] Working definitions of the terms used can be found in the Glossary in Appendix 2.

[2] The importance of conflict management was highlighted as far back as 2004 by the interministerial Action Plan "Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building". Suggestions relating to its implementation are incorporated in this strategy.

level of governance and low development orientation, a considerable lack of legitimacy, an erosion of social trust or a combination of these and other characteristics of conflict, fragility and violence[3].

At international level, there is currently no consensus on a standard definition for this group of countries, while the existing indices fail to adequately record the dynamics and multifaceted nature of these contexts. As is the case with other donors, the BMZ therefore resorts to its own internal analysis instruments in an effort to define the group of fragile states and countries affected by conflict and violence. **The provisions and guidelines set out in this strategy are binding on development cooperation with these countries.**

The strategy's guidelines and provisions are also relevant in countries which have thus far remained largely unaffected by conflict, fragility and violence. Here, development cooperation can have a preventive effect and help both in identifying the potential for escalation at an early stage and then reducing it.

The strategy contains binding requirements that the agencies tasked by the BMZ with implementing official development assistance (ODA)[4] must adhere to. In addition, it is designed to serve as guidance for business activities undertaken by KfW Entwicklungsbank and the German Investment and Development Company (DEG) at their own risk, and for the GIZ International Services business area of Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH as well as for civil society organisations (churches, political foundations, private agencies, and social capacity building agencies) and the private sector.

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[3] This understanding corresponds to the definition given in the Interministerial Guidelines "For a coherent German Government policy towards fragile states" from 2012.

[4] These include: German Investment and Development Company (DEG), KfW Entwicklungsbank, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH including the Centre for International Migration and Development (CIM), German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR) and the National Metrology Institute of Germany (PTB).

2. Conflict, fragility and violence as central challenges of development policy

2.1 KEY FEATURES OF FRAGILE STATES AND COUNTRIES AFFECTED BY CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE

Managing conflict, fragility and violence is highly relevant to successful development policy. Overall, their impacts affect more than half of the partner countries of German development policy. Worldwide, the number of people living in fragile states and countries affected by conflict and violence is in excess of 1.5 billion. These people are more than twice as likely to be undernourished than in other development countries and the number of children who do not attend school is more than three times as high. The cost to an average developing country of a violent conflict is 30 years' worth of its GDP growth and 20 per cent more people living below the poverty line than is the case in countries without any experience of violence[5]. In addition, these countries often have a high level of criminal violence, providing fertile ground both for terrorist hubs as well as the creation of international drug and arms trafficking centres.

State institutions often have very little remaining legitimacy in these countries while their monopoly on the legitimate use of force is restricted, thus preventing them from carrying out basic functions such as ensuring the population's security. It is not uncommon for there to be only a limited degree of rule of law and for the provision of basic governmental services to be inadequate. In many countries, there are regions over which the government has no control whatsoever. The populations in these countries do not regard governments as their legitimate representatives; corruption and human rights abuses are often widespread and violence pervades everyday life. In particularly precarious situations, some sections of the population are forced to flee to other parts of the country or neighbouring states. As a result of these **development constraints,** many affected states lag far behind in terms of attaining the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). As emphasised at the MDG Review Summit 2010, of the 34 countries farthest from reaching the Millennium Development Goals, 22 are either conflict or post-conflict countries[6].

Conflicts may emerge for economic, social or political reasons and, in many cases, the causes of conflicts are closely intertwined. Experiences in these countries show that this is characteristic of **cycles of conflict, fragility and violence.** For example, organised crime may thrive on fragility, further erode statehood, and thus have a further negative impact on already low levels of governance and weak state capacity. Situations like this are exacerbated by the failure of governments to focus sufficiently on development activities, a lack of political will for peaceful and inclusive development, and the presence of non-state armed groups and militia groups. The micro-logic of local actors often has a considerable influence on conflicts and violence. Furthermore, in these situations it is frequently the case that a high level of violence in the public domain is also reflected in a considerable degree of gender-specific violence. The serious impacts of war and violence on civil society often mean that (re-)establishing trust and social cohesion remains an immense challenge for societies, even long after violence has come to an end.

The way in which problems in a country or a specific region manifest themselves in practice essentially depends on what **experience** local people have of **conflict and violence,** whether the **elites are willing to work towards a political understanding and reach an inclusive political settlement** and whether government and society are capable of solving con-

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5   Cf. World Bank (2011): World Development Report 2011. Conflict, Security and Development. Washington, DC.

6   See the background paper "Achieving the MDGs – addressing conflict, fragility and armed violence" to the MDG Review Summit 2010.

flicts constructively and peacefully. As a general rule, this in turn requires state structures to have ample legitimacy and capacity and to be sufficiently development-oriented. In addition, the state must have an extensive monopoly on the use of force and the authority to enforce it. Broad sections of the population must also be given the opportunity to participate in the political process. Given that short-comings in these areas increase the potential for conflict and violence within a society, **statebuilding and promoting resilient states and constructive state-society relations are closely interlinked with peacebuilding.** The role attributed to civil society actors for achieving peaceful and inclusive development is a key one: in addition to calling for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, they examine the transparency of government actions from both a constructive and a critical angle.

Conflict, fragility and violence mean that the political situation in these countries and regions can change very rapidly and unpredictably. In many cases, there are also **significant differences between the individual regions in a country.** For instance, countries which are otherwise relatively stable may have certain regions which are hit by civil war or have violent cities and urban districts where the state is either absent or is itself engaged in violence. **Cross-border areas** can also be transformed into highly violent, fragile regions as a result of civil wars, refugee flows and organised crime operating on an international level.

2.2   TYPICAL COUNTRY CONSTELLATIONS

Many of the countries with which Germany engages in development cooperation are characterised in different ways by the features outlined above. However, despite all the differences in country-specific situations, there are **typical constellations** – for which a country-related analysis is nevertheless required – which reveal certain recurring patterns[7]. Examples of recommended action for German development policy based on the typical constellations described below can be found in the table in section 3.

→   In a number of countries, **state capacity in particular is weak,** although there is no discernible degree of violence used either in political, social or economic disputes or in connection with criminality. However, if the state is unable to deliver an adequate level of services, if the justice system operates inefficiently and corruption and nepotism are rife, then the potential for violence to escalate can increase in certain situations. This may be the case, for instance, if there are underlying conflicts of interest and ethnic, social, regional or religious dividing lines and the legitimacy of the state is undermined. These types of scenarios can lead to violence and unrest, as occurred in 2008 for example, following increases in food prices in a number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

→   **Taken on their own, efficient state institutions and a high level of capacity do not protect against violence,** as is clearly exemplified in a number of Latin American countries. For certain sections of the population at least, the capacity of these countries to deliver services is relatively high and, as a rule, they follow formally democratic rules. However, the insuf-

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7   These typical constellations are based on Grävingholt, J.; Ziaja, S.; Kreibaum, M. (2012): State Fragility. Towards a Multi-Dimensional Empirical Typology. Bonn: DIE Discussion Paper 3/2012.

ficient development orientation on the part of state actors and distinct **socio-economic disparities result in social segregation and marginalisation and lead to a high level of violence.** In many cases, violence – partly of a political nature – has evolved into organised crime (drug, arms and human trafficking, etc.). Juvenile and gang-related crime is a part of everyday life in many regions or in urban areas. Frequently, political players, the security apparatus and the economic elites are all involved in the pattern of violence. Many people regard the state's monopoly on the use of force as illegitimate. It is something which they fundamentally call into question not least because of the fact that physical insecurity, a lack of prospects, corruption and social inequality all further undermine public acceptance of the state and trust therein.

→ **States may be relatively capable yet suffer from a lack of legitimacy** if, for example, they sustain their monopoly on the use of force through **repressive measures.** These authoritarian yet at the same time often stable regimes are prone to massive corruption and enrichment of the elites. As a rule, social marginalisation and exclusion from both political and economic life are the by-products of such practices for sections of the population. In such states, the scope for civil society action is sometimes greatly restricted and a vibrant civil society is accordingly often a target of repressive measures. However, developments in Arab countries since the end of 2010 have shown how precarious this stability can be, highlighting the major potential for violence and escalation that such countries may have. Striving for political, social and economic participation can place the system under massive strain and may also trigger violent conflicts.

→ In other countries, both the **legitimacy of the state and the legitimate monopoly on the use of force are largely eroded and governmental services generally go undelivered. A high level of violence is often a feature** of people's everyday lives here. It is common for these countries to have a long history of conflict and violence. The problem may even affect entire regions. Allocating power and resources among a small number of groups or clans not only thwarts efforts to build legitimate and inclusive structures but also contributes to preserving the fragile status quo for the benefit of these elites. Political participation is often severely restricted.

→ Particular challenges arise in cases where **conflict and post-conflict countries** or a particular region already have a history of armed violence. On the one hand, this applies to what are termed post-war societies, in which peace settlements were agreed following violent conflicts in the past. On the other hand, it concerns those countries which are confronted with the consequences of ongoing violent conflicts. In many cases, **state legitimacy** may be relatively high, especially if peace negotiations have led to an acceptable outcome for the population. In other instances, however, power struggles within the ruling elites and violence, not least in the form of criminal violence, may continue beyond the peace settlement. This also depends on how inclusive the formal and informal political settlements are as regards clarifying the distribution of power. Most of these conflict and post-conflict countries also display considerable deficiencies in the delivery of governmental services and a lack of legal certainty, due in part to destruction of physical and social infrastructure. In addition, there are often particular challenges as far as the social cohesion of these societies is concerned.

3. Objectives and areas of intervention

3.1 DEVELOPMENT FOR PEACE AND SECURITY

Contributing worldwide to peace and security is a primary aim of German foreign, security and development policy. Wherever conflicts lead to violence and war and fragile statehood neglects a population's needs and expectations on a long-term basis, the prerequisites for sustainable development are undermined. As part of an overall approach within the framework of foreign and security policy, German development policy works to ensure that the conditions created in society and government will enable peaceful and inclusive development. In so doing, it contributes simultaneously to regional and global security as the causes and effects of fragility and conflict are not restricted to individual regions within a globalised world[8].

In keeping with the **values of German development policy,** among the conditions for peaceful and inclusive development are institutionalised and legally secure mechanisms of political participation and the negotiation of interests, in which **human rights** are respected, protected and fulfilled and where conflicts are resolved without resorting to violence. This is the only way in which constructive relationships are created between state and society, mutual trust is established and institutional legitimacy strengthened. In this regard, it is also important to strengthen **states and their societies in terms of their adaptability and resilience to external shocks and crises** such as sharp fluctuations in food prices or the consequences of climate change.

3.2 OBJECTIVES AND AREAS OF INTERVENTION OF GERMAN DEVELOPMENT POLICY

Essential guidance for the objectives and areas of intervention for peace and security is provided firstly by the World Bank's World Development Report 2011 entitled "Conflict, Security and Development". This underlines the need to prioritise "security, justice and jobs" in order to overcome fragility and conflicts and break cycles of violence. A second key basis which

Peace- and Statebuilding Goals

PSG 1: *Legitimate Politics:* Foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution.

PSG 2: *Security:* Establish and strengthen people's security.

PSG 3: *Justice:* Address injustices and increase people's access to justice.

PSG 4: *Economic Foundations:* Generate employment and improve livelihoods.

PSG 5: *Revenues and Services:* Manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery.

carries on from the World Bank approach and specifies it in more detail are the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs)[9] which were adopted jointly by fragile states and development partners at the High Level Forum in Busan in December 2011. German development policy supports the PSGs, but also lays down three broader objectives designed to guide its

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[8] Peace was designated as a global public good as far back as 1999, see Kaul, Inge; Grunberg, Isabelle; Stern, Marc (ed.) (1999): Global Public Goods. International Cooperation in the 21st Century. New York: Oxford University Press.

[9] The PSGs are currently broken down into various sub-dimensions and given indicators (as at November 2012).

actions in supporting peace and security. These are based on the Interministerial Guidelines towards fragile states and stress the contribution made by development policy:

1. **Addressing the causes of conflict, fragility and violence**

2. **Improving the capacity for non-violent conflict transformation**

3. **Creating the environment for peaceful and inclusive development**

In order to contribute to these objectives and to address the problems described in the previous section, German development policy builds on its **many years of experience** in promoting peace and security, good governance, democracy and rule of law as well as the prevention and reduction of violence. In so doing, **German development policy** regards **integrated approaches** – which address different aspects of peacebuilding and statebuilding, combine various instruments and take into account relevant issues such as climate, environment, the economy, human rights and gender equality – as being particularly effective. This is also in keeping with the logic of the PSGs. The same applies to measures focusing on several levels, for example supraregional, national and local. In most of the countries in question, adopting a cross-project perspective, the aim of which is **to develop a harmonised and coherent overall portfolio of German development policy,** is particularly appropriate.

The areas of intervention along the lines of the three objectives, as described below, serve merely as examples and should not be considered as being exhaustive. New challenges, coupled with frequently and rapidly changing contexts in the countries concerned, mean that German development policy will be constantly required to enhance and adapt its areas of intervention.

3.2.1 ADDRESSING THE CAUSES OF CONFLICT, FRAGILITY AND VIOLENCE

The causes of conflict, fragility and violence may vary greatly. For example, weak governments, arbitrary systems of law and justice, weak or suppressed civil societies, ineffective government administrations and corruption can all hinder development and increase the potential for escalating violence. This is particularly common in places where governmental players fail to meet their obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights and where ethno-religious aspects of belonging to a particular group are used as an instrument with which to escalate violence. Moreover, the lack of access to public goods and services that are relevant to development (such as water, health and education) can both cause and exacerbate conflicts, fragility and violence. Unfavourable surrounding factors, such as rapid urbanisation and the uncontrolled development of informal settlements, strengthen these negative impacts. German development cooperation has therefore set itself the task of improving social cohesion in partner countries, reducing regional and social disparities and encouraging a more inclusive political settlement between elites. In this regard, it makes explicit reference to the human rights approach of German development policy.

In other situations, the lack of opportunities and prospects for young people are a source of conflicts, fragility and violence. For German development cooperation, this provides a chance to link the **promotion of income and employment with the prevention of violence,** for example. It also makes sense here to combine target group-specific work with other development policy approaches such as good governance, education, the protection and development of children and young people, the empowerment of women or the prevention of urban violence, thereby tackling the causes of problems. In this context, psychosocial approaches which address the

effects on individuals who have experienced trauma and violence are also relevant.

Other causes of conflict, fragility and violence have to do with environmental issues and the use of resources. **Questions relating to land rights and to the use of land and extractive resources** are often unresolved and resources are not distributed fairly. This may also benefit the emergence of illegal markets, as is the case in drug-producing countries. Where required, German development cooperation can offer various forms of support here, for example with regard to land rights reforms, participative resource management or the promotion of transparency and corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the extractive sector.

In addition, global structures and factors such as climate change or transnational organised crime may also trigger and perpetuate fragility and violence. In many cases, these causes lie beyond the confines of development policy alone and can only be addressed as a cross-cutting policy issue within the context of foreign and security policy measures and in multilateral cooperation.

3.2.2 IMPROVING THE CAPACITY FOR NON-VIOLENT CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

Social change processes and political reforms require people to be willing to change, are fraught with uncertainty and may therefore also harbour potential for violent conflicts. The capacity of both state and society to resolve conflicts and social problems peacefully and to defuse such problems in the event of their escalation is particularly low in violence-ridden countries with often weak state structures. Among the reasons for this is the fact that formal and informal structures and mechanisms of conflict management are often eroded and that people are

marked by their history of conflict and violence. As a result, there is a lack of trust towards governmental institutions which are often perceived as not development-oriented and which, moreover, have self-serving interests.

In these situations, German development cooperation provides capacity development which is designed to anchor and strengthen locally recognised or traditional **mechanisms of non-violent conflict resolution** as well as the development of peaceful conflict management capacities (e.g. dialogue, **mediation,** negotiation, extrajudicial conflict resolution or active participation in the reform of the justice sector). In those places where violence has not yet broken out, development cooperation creates opportunities for preventive action. Where conflicts have escalated, it can supplement foreign and security policy measures in supporting **peace processes** and help in bringing about an inclusive and lasting political settlement. Aided by **peace journalism, peace education and media promotion,** it contributes over the long term towards the strengthening of peaceful conflict management and civil conflict resolution. Furthermore, a range of **gender-specific approaches** focusing on the specific requirements and roles of men and women in terms of peace policy have been developed and trialled in recent years.

Measures for **strengthening regional peace and security structures** (e.g. the African Peace and Security Architecture of the African Union (AU)) aim to create a permanent framework which ensures that rapid action can be taken in the event of a conflict and enables visible contributions to be made to reducing violence, crisis management and stabilisation. German development policy also plays a role in the development and expansion of **regional and continental conflict early warning and response mechanisms** as well as efficient mediation, dialogue and quiet diplomacy structures for preventing crises and managing conflicts. Experiences using the AU's security architecture may be

applied to other regions, for example by promoting South-South exchange.

3.2.3 CREATING THE ENVIRONMENT FOR PEACEFUL AND INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT

German commitment to peaceful and inclusive development is an interministerial responsibility. Although there are limits to the work that can be done in terms of tackling causes, in many cases it is possible for development cooperation to improve the general conditions and requirements for peaceful and inclusive development and at the same time to have a preventive effect. This involves not only reconstruction in the short term but also the translation of this reconstruction into longer-term approaches. However, any other measures which in the long-term help to create an environment for peaceful and inclusive development are also relevant here.

As a general rule, in **conflict and post-conflict situations** as well as situations where there are weak governance structures and a lack of development orientation, there are particular requirements for improving general conditions in a way which is both visible and rapidly effective. In such circumstances, German development policy focuses on crisis management measures which are quick to take effect and soon reveal visible successes in order to win the population's trust and guarantee their protection as quickly as possible, in the sense of a peace dividend. An important area of intervention in this regard is **reconstruction for crisis prevention,** which in addition to improving the economic and social infrastructure also comprises psychosocial measures and combines the traditional approaches of reconstruction with conflict management and the strengthening of state structures. Examples of other such areas include the demobilisation and **(re-)integration of ex-combatants as well as the repatriation or (re-)integration of refugees.**

The political and social integration of societies that have lived through a period of open violence is particularly important, and often remains so many years later. The central aspects of **transitional justice approaches** involve dealing with the past, reconciliation and justice. **Recovery and rehabilitation** measures designed to guarantee basic human needs – including food security – are also highly relevant in these contexts.

The contributions made by development cooperation to short-term crisis management should be transformed as soon as possible into **longer-term strategies** for improving legal, political and social conditions. Promoting **good governance** is of major importance[10]. Principal areas of intervention in this respect are

— respecting, protecting and fulfilling human rights;
— democracy, rule of law and justice as well as freedom of the press and freedom of opinion;
— gender equality;
— administrative reform and decentralisation; as well as
— functioning public finance systems, transparency in the extractive industries and anticorruption.

The focus here is on establishing constructive state-society relations and, in many cases, on creating scope for civil involvement. Strengthening a **democratically legitimated state monopoly on the use of force** is also required. Development policy can provide support with regard to the democratic organisation and professionalisation of the security sector, for example by **strengthening the sector's democratic supervision.**

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[10] See also BMZ (2009): Promotion of Good Governance in German Development Policy, Bonn: BMZ Strategy 178, and BMZ (2010): Promoting Resilient States and Constructive State-Society Relations –Legitimacy, Transparency and Accountability. Bonn: Strategy Paper 1/2010.

Economic conditions which are characterised by violence and conflict also need to be permanently transformed and opportunities should be created for planning capacity development and alternatives to violence. One option to this end is to create **income and employment prospects** for specific target groups, access to which is not restricted as a result of discrimination. Key areas of intervention in this regard are

— promoting the private sector in a conflict-sensitive manner;
— stimulating local economic cycles, for example through vocational education, micro-finance approaches; and
— providing social and economic infrastructures for marketing, trade and transport as a means of encouraging peaceful exchange and, for instance, of **stabilising fragile border regions through their targeted integration into regional economic cooperations.** Conflicts and high levels of violence do not stop at national boundaries.

Finally, **supporting conflict-relevant processes of reform** (e.g. the handing back and allocation of land) helps to improve the environment for peaceful and inclusive development. For these and other areas of intervention, **triangular cooperation** can also provide interesting gateways as some of the new donors in particular have suitable experience of the relevant problems, for instance urban violence[11].

*This table is based on experiences of successful development cooperation in the relevant contexts and gives recommendations for selecting areas of intervention. It is for **illustrative purposes,** provides examples and does not claim to be exhaustive[12].*

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[11] See also BMZ (2011a): Strategy for Development Cooperation with Global Development Partners (2011-2015). Bonn: BMZ Strategy Paper 6/2011e.

[12] The table reflects the typical constellations described in section 2 for countries and their regions which are characterised by conflict, fragility and violence. In accordance with these constellations, the right-hand column shows potential areas of intervention for German development cooperation. These are ideally embedded in a whole-of-government approach comprising foreign, security and development policy measures.

TABLE: EXAMPLES OVERVIEW

Typical constellations of conflict, fragility and violence	Potential areas of intervention
Countries with **weak state capacity**. In most cases there is no noticeable occurrence of armed violence in the form of civil war or otherkinds of organised violence.	• Political participation, government action focused on citizens' needs, state-society relations • Sub-national governance structures • State institution building (e.g. justice system, public financial management)
Countries with a relatively high level of state capacity and at least follow formally democratic rules. Distinct **socio-economic disparities result in social segregation and marginalisation and lead to a high level of violence.** Juvenile and gang-related crime is often part of everyday life in **individual regions or in urban areas.**	• Participation and strengthening of the legal status of marginalised groups, promotion of income and employment (e.g. young people, women) • Democratically legitimated state monopoly on the use of force, supervision of the security sector • Mechanisms and capacities for non-violent conflict management • Prevention of urban violence • Strengthening revenue sharing for the benefit of weaker regions
Countries which are relatively **capable yet suffer from a lack of legitimacy or insufficient development orientation on the part of state institutions** if, for example, the monopoly on the use of force is sustained through **repressive measures** or political participation is prevented.	• Promotion of human rights • Government action focused on citizens' needs, state-society relations • Peace journalism, peace education • Integrity in justice, transparency and anti-corruption
Countries in which the **legitimacy of the state and the monopoly on the use of force are largely eroded** and governmental services generally go undelivered. A **high level of violence** is a feature of people's everyday lives.	• Reconstruction for crisis prevention, security sector reform/supervision of the security sector • Regional peace and security structure • Cross-border cooperation
Conflict and post-conflict countries with high shortcomings in service delivery, due among other things to the destruction of infrastructure. Here there are often particular challenges as far as social cohesion is concerned, for example with regard to reconciliation and justice.	• Reconstruction for crisis prevention • Demobilisation and reintegration • Peace processes • Reconciliation processes, transitional justice • Legitimate monopoly on the use of force, professionalisation of the security sector • Recovery and rehabilitation

4. Structure of cooperation

4.1 PRINCIPLES FOR ACTION

In fragile contexts and those affected by violence and conflict, two factors play a role. These are namely *what* development policy does, as well as *how* it carries out actions so as to **ensure that they are effective.** The principles for action set out below are based on the relevant international debates and build on the experiences of German development cooperation in these difficult contexts[13]. In countries which are marked by conflict, fragility and violence, these principles for action need to be applied.

Design development activities so that they are context-related and focused on the needs for peace and security

German involvement in development issues is based on the conviction that social changes are primarily endogenous processes and that development inputs need to be embedded in the respective social, historical, cultural and political contexts. A good knowledge of the specific context and local conditions, as well as of possible scenarios, is needed to identify the **needs for peace and security.** These needs provide the foundation on which to carry out activities in fragile states and countries marked by conflict and violence and are the basis for a context-related approach, since each separate situation requires an individual strategy. Standard solutions do not go far enough here. **An essential starting point in determining what is required to achieve peace and security is a conflict or context analysis** which is continually reappraised and updated at regular intervals. It must take account of potential scenarios and development trends. Often, the contexts of conflict, fragility and violence are politically charged and those actors involved in conflict or violence inter-

pret the analysis itself as an intervention. As a result, analyses must always consider different perspectives and interests of the relevant governmental and civil society actors, including gender perspectives.

Dealing openly with conflicting objectives and dilemmas

There are major challenges to implementing development policy measures in fragile contexts:

→   the implementation capacity among partner countries is weak;

→   corruption is often widespread;

→   there is only a limited degree of acceptance of the partner structure among some sections of the population;

→   conditions are constantly changing;

→   the security situation is tense; and

→   the scope for development activities is constrained by different violence-related phenomena.

This produces a range of **dilemmas:** for instance, between the long-term development of state capacities and the short-term creation of parallel structures designed to make rapid contributions to the peace dividend. A further dilemma can result where development activities in practice are tied in with extensive steps towards democratisation – elections, for example – which often cannot be implemented quickly. In many cases, capacity deficiencies also pose a problem when selecting partners, while the aim of broad-based social involvement can create dilemmas when set against the need for rapid implementation. **Conflicting objectives** are therefore an

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[13] Based on OECD (2007): Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States. See also OECD (2012): A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, in particular the sections on Focus and Trust.

issue which development cooperation needs to **carefully weigh up** depending on the context. Conflicting objectives cannot always be resolved; however, in such difficult contexts, development policy should deal with dilemmas in a transparent manner and openly communicate the decisions taken, both in the partner country and in Germany.

Formulating realistic objectives

In difficult contexts, the objectives of development policy measures cannot always be achieved. Expectations are often very high and the power of external players to exert any influence is overestimated. Sometimes, involvement in the area of development policy can achieve positive results at local level but fail to make the anticipated contribution to peace and security at national level. In many cases, development policy must assume that the lasting effect of any measures will be limited. Against this background, and measured against the risks involved, **realistic objectives must be drawn up and any failure to meet these objectives accepted.** Alternatively, in order not to jeopardise the legitimacy of development policy in these sensitive contexts, these factors need to be balanced against the risks of deciding against taking action.

Improving risk management at all levels

Improving risk management[14] is an essential precondition for becoming involved in, as well as **for *greater* involvement** in fragile states and countries affected by conflict and violence. Development policy actors first need to recognise the existing risks and assess these realistically with the help of

regular in-depth risk analyses[15]. Using this as a basis, strategies are developed in close consultation with other international actors in order to mitigate the risks identified. Finally, the continued existence of residual risks in the vast majority of cases needs to be acknowledged. Here, it is important to list these residual risks and to be adequately prepared in the event of an emergency.

This process takes account of risks at different levels:

→ **Context risks** relate to the environment in which development activities are carried out; development policy is unable to have any major impact on these risks.

→ **Programmatic risks** relate primarily to the investments and objective attainment of projects and cover factors such as high corruption.

→ **Institutional risks** endanger the reputation of an institution, for example, thereby restricting its capacity to act.

→ **Personnel risks** relate to the security of staff, always take priority and must be appropriately addressed through corresponding measures.

Do no harm: avoid making negative situations worse

German development policy follows the principle of "do no harm" and therefore aims to avoid exacerbating conflicts, fragility and violence through its

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14 This also means reducing the number of countries which are not given adequate support on the basis of their fragility; keyword: under-aided countries.

15 This section is based closely on the current international debate on this issue within the context of the OECD. Cf. OECD (2010): Transition Financing: Building a Better Response. OECD (2011): Managing Risks in Fragile and Transitional Contexts: The Price of Success? BMZ (2012): Antikorruption und Integrität in der deutschen Entwicklungspolitik *[Anti-corruption and integrity in German development policy]*. Bonn: Strategy Paper 4/2012.

activities[16]. Achieving this aim is often a major challenge given the dilemmas and conflicting objectives that have already been described. If the international community, for instance, appears as being too dominant and is thus undermining the legitimacy of the partners, it can make already negative situations worse. Moreover, external measures which are not planned to be inclusive can further marginalise key parties to the conflict and disadvantaged groups, or strengthen individual groups disproportionately. If state institutions of the partner country's government exploit development policy activities for their own purposes, this can serve to strengthen and legitimise the country's poor governance. Particular challenges may arise if military intervention also takes place alongside civic engagement. For this reason, rigorous adherence to the do no harm principle is an essential principle for action on the part of German development policy. Such a principle **is also in keeping not only with German development policy's vision of itself but also with its ideals.** A do-no-harm approach is also **in the own interests of development cooperation actors:** any party which acts in a manner that is sensitive to the relevant context can generally increase the degree to which its own work on the ground is accepted, which in turn can offer protection against attacks on personnel and interference in investments. This makes German activities in the field of development policy more sustainable and more effective.

Align strategies with local structures

Effective and sustainable development cooperation requires ownership. As a basic principle, German development policy therefore strengthens the **governments of its partner countries and regional organisations in terms of their political responsibility.** One reason for doing so is to increase their

legitimacy. However, scenarios in which there is a lack of political will for peaceful and fair development and where partners are not sufficiently development-oriented may also create **dilemmas.** In aligning development cooperation with local strategies, civil society actors in the partner country play just as important a role as international civil society, especially in contexts where there is a deficit of statehood. Involving such actors as early as the strategic discussion stage is therefore recommended. Another challenge lies in structuring political participation and understanding so that these are inclusive processes as not all stakeholders will agree all of the time. A balance then needs to be struck between the different alliances that are sufficiently authorised and representative, while at the same not specifically excluding any particular stakeholder.

Enable rapid successes while taking a long-term perspective

Sustainable changes in climates characterised by conflict, fragility and violence require a lot of time and are not linear processes. Nevertheless, development cooperation often needs to achieve rapid and visible successes in order to bolster public trust in existing institutions. In so doing, it may sometimes employ streamlined and fast-track procedures in emergency situations and, above all, in fragile contexts. This is done within the parameters of recovery and rehabilitation measures, for instance. **A long-term perspective, which to partners is evidence of dependability, is only possible if a high degree of flexibility can be guaranteed in the planning and implementation process.** In this regard, the realistic planning of objectives and different scenarios are factors to be borne in mind when choosing topics, partners, regions of intervention and instruments.

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[16] Cf. Glossary.

4.2 INSTRUMENTS OF GERMAN BILATERAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

The highly unpredictable nature of framework conditions and the greater risks entailed in contexts of conflict, fragility and violence are the factors that dictate the way in which instruments are used. It makes sense to employ a number of different instruments and to combine these with one another so as to improve **the effectiveness of the response** provided by development cooperation. Sometimes, an individual project, or an instrument on its own cannot contribute greatly to the obtaining of objectives. This is why it is important to gear the **overall portfolio of instruments systematically and strategically to the respective development policy objectives** for peace and security while also making deliberate use of multilevel approaches.

German development cooperation has a whole range of tried and tested approaches at its disposal. Most of all, if cooperation with government agencies is neither possible nor desired, cooperation with non-governmental organisations, measures for recovery and rehabilitation, the Civil Peace Service (CPS) as well as a German contribution via international organisations are useful additions and alternatives. In such situations, the aim should always be to "Stay engaged, but differently."

Official **Technical Cooperation** uses a differentiated range of approaches in providing context-specific support to fragile states and countries affected by conflict and violence. In the process, it aims to strengthen the powers of partners on the ground and supports these at local, regional, national and supraregional/international level. The broad spectrum of complimentary approaches adopted by Technical Cooperation for the purposes of capacity development range from targeted policy, specialist and organisational advisory services, the development of key personnel, encouraging dialogue and the creation of networks, through to educational initiatives and public relations work. In these contexts, greater use is also made of formats for South-South exchange, short-term deployment of regional experts as well as the structuring of complex negotiation processes.

Financial Cooperation also has a broad range of coordinated instruments which can be used to support fragile states, depending on the specific requirements. These include open and flexible programmes such as peace funds, stabilisation aid and contributions to basket funding. Joint financing arrangements such as Multi-Donor Trust Funds can be a suitable instrument for sharing risks and pooling strengths. In fragile states, however, general budget aid is less of an issue from a German perspective since the states in question not only have little capacity but generally fail to fulfil the minimum criteria as far as general political, fiduciary and macroeconomic conditions are concerned[17]. In acute emergency and crisis situations, Financial Cooperation provides rapid and needs-based support to relevant multilateral organisations and specialist non-governmental organisations.

An adverse investment climate coupled with a lack of access to long-term financing pose major obstacles in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. **Private-sector development cooperation** as provided by the German Development and Investment Company (DEG) helps firms to invest and act under these particular challenges.

In order to close this gap between humanitarian aid and longer-term approaches of development cooperation, the BMZ has set up a financing channel for measures to **recovery and rehabilitation** as

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[17] Under its new approach for providing budget aid, the European Union envisages the instrument of "State Building Contracts" in fragile states for its development cooperation. However, this too needs to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.

an instrument of development cooperation. This is designed to create medium to longer-term structures which will increase the survival chances and development opportunities of crisis-affected populations, as well as to subsequently preserve and improve these structures. Examples of this include agricultural food security and healthcare projects. Where possible, the capacity to tie in with regular, long-term development cooperation needs to be guaranteed.

In the field of development policy, one particular instrument of the German contribution to peace and security is the provision of peace experts under the **Civil Peace Service** (CPS). Here, governmental and non-governmental agencies work together to strengthen the capacity for civil society dialogue and reconciliation within conflict societies. In exactly the same way as recovery and rehabilitation measures, the CPS can be used in a number of different contexts and phases of conflict outside of the bilaterally agreed priority areas. The variety of local partners and approaches is reflected in the CPS's many support agencies, some of which are civil society organisations[18].

4.3   PROVISIONS AND PROCESSES

In fragile states and countries affected by conflict and violence, portfolios as well as projects need to take account of the challenges and risks listed in section 4.1 and implement the principles for action. On a regular basis, the BMZ uses suitable

analysis tools[19] to decide which countries this applies to in practice. The BMZ country strategies in these countries must reflect the particular way in which involvement in development policy is structured by drawing a reference to the needs for peace and security and by taking risks into account. When designing projects in these countries, there is a duty on bilateral Technical and Financial Cooperation to apply minimum standards, based on the findings of a Peace and Conflict Assessment (PCA), for example, and to gear the projects to the aforementioned provisions of the country strategies in terms of requirements and risks. This must be reflected in programme proposals, reporting and in audits. As a result, the coherence of development activities between the political level and implementation level is increased.

Irrespective of this, all projects in all partner countries of German development cooperation are allocated the national marker for peace and security in accordance with their respective contribution to the objectives specified in the strategy (see Appendix 1)[20]. This marker replaces the KR marker.

Monitoring and evaluation play a key role in making development cooperation more effective. The particular issue raised in relation to this concerns the traceable results logic and effectiveness of development measures. In future, the BMZ will increasingly examine country portfolios to see if the provisions of this strategy are taken into account. Furthermore, it will entrust the German Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval) with the task of carrying out regular assessments of development activities in contexts

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[18] The organisations that constitute the CPS are as follows: Action Committee Service for Peace, Association for Development Cooperation, Bread for the World – German Protestant Church Development Service, EIRENE – International Christian Service for Peace, Civil Peace Service Forum (*forum* ZfD), GIZ, KURVE Wustrow, Peace Brigades International and Weltfriedensdienst (World Peace Service).

[19] At present, the instrument in question is an early warning mechanism which each year lists countries where there is increased or acute potential for escalation and divides partner countries into green, yellow and red countries. The provisions are binding for red and yellow countries.

[20] Provisions for implementing organisations are drawn up on the basis of the binding minimum standards dating from 2007.

marked by conflict, fragility and violence[21]. At implementation level too, random checks will be introduced in future so as to examine the implementation of the provisions set out in the Strategy. Monitoring by implementing organisations is to be organised in such a way that even unintended negative effects are considered and projects are implemented with a particular emphasis placed on the do no harm principle.

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[21] One of the guidance frameworks will be the current DAC guidelines "Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility".

5. Cooperation and coordination with other actors and partners

5.1 PARTNERS IN COUNTRIES WITH WHICH GERMANY COOPERATES

Selecting suitable political partners and implementing partners often poses a particular challenge in countries marked by conflict, fragility and violence. These partners are – or have in the past been – frequently involved in conflict and violence and may therefore be part of the problem. German development cooperation needs to adopt a position with regard to these partners and must strengthen them, preferably as legitimate actors. This means constantly weighing up the risks of taking development action against the consequences of not doing so. In government negotiations and consultations as well is in ongoing political dialogue, the aim of German development policy is to communicate even sensitive topics and, accordingly, to demand democratic legitimacy, rule of law as well as the respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights.

In view of the ambivalent attitude adopted by governmental partners in many fragile and conflict-ridden states, Germany's involvement in development issues should be geared in particular towards **cooperating with a number of different partners from government and civil society.** By focusing on interaction between powers at state and society level, development policy can encourage relations between these two groups of actors, for instance by means of confidence building measures. Religious groups and organisations too, as well as traditional elites, may also be relevant here, in the same way that diaspora can play an important role for developments in these contexts and, wherever possible, should be considered as an actor.

5.2 MULTILATERAL ORGANISATIONS, FORUMS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

In settings of conflict, fragility and violence, both cooperation at European level and coordination within the framework of multilateral organisations is particularly important. These multilateral organisations often coordinate the various development inputs of different donors on the ground. In so doing, they support those fragile states which lack sufficient capacity and contribute to aid effectiveness in these countries.

German development policy is also involved in **financing European and multilateral instruments** for crisis prevention and peacebuilding. In smaller and underfinanced fragile states especially, where there is an absence of bilateral actors, multilateral organisations and the EU play a crucial role. As **"donor of last resort"**, they mobilise substantial development contributions and spread the associated risks across several parties. This enables donors to reach a greater number of countries in crisis and to reduce the number of under-aided countries[22].

As far as international law is concerned, the **United Nations** is the institution primarily responsible for international peace and collective security and enjoys special legitimacy on the basis of its universal membership. In recent decades, the United Nations has repeatedly generated key momentum and ideas for the global agenda for peace and security policy, which have been reflected in national policy and strategy approaches. Furthermore, the United Nations has a range of diplomatic, security and development policy instruments which it can use to manage conflicts. It is precisely in the area where traditional UN peace missions (peacekeeping) and medium to long-term post-conflict engagement (peacebuild-

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[22] See OECD (2011): Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation: Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Paris.

ing) meet that the United Nations is enhancing its range of instruments. The United Nations therefore holds an important coordinating role in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, a fact underpinned by the positive evaluations of its capacity by the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network. German development policy wants to further strengthen the role played by the United Nations and **therefore supports the programmes of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR)** in order to promote peace and security within the sphere of the UN Development Programme **UNDP.** The BMZ also gives its backing to the Safer Cities Programme, adopted by UN-HABITAT to actively prevent local and urban violence.

As the thematic priority area of the World Development Report 2011, the issue of "Conflict, Security and Development" has continued to grow in importance at the **World Bank.** With this report, the World Bank has drawn up a **key reform agenda** for itself and the international donor community, and one which **Germany actively supports on the World Bank's Board of Executive Directors.** For instance, Germany works hard to ensure that the World Bank continues to develop its capacities as a provider of knowledge in the field of fragile states; one of the ways it has done this is by setting up a Global Center on Conflict, Justice and Development in Nairobi. Germany supports the State and Peace-Building Fund in order to both pilot and firmly establish new and innovative approaches at the World Bank. Within the International Development Association (IDA), Germany is advocating a reform of the way in which funds are allocated, in line with the findings of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States and the World Development Report 2011.

With their specific regional expertise, **regional development banks** can also play a decisive role. The African Development Bank, for example, has its own funding pool in the form of the African Development Fund which provides financing for capacity development activities in fragile states. This too is supported by German development policy.

Due to its global presence and its powers in terms of finance, politics and instruments, the European Union (European Council, European Commission and the European External Action Service) plays a central role in promoting peace and security. As part of the realignment of its development policy (Agenda for Change), the EU has reinforced its commitment to fragile states and underlined the need for development cooperation, conflict prevention, as well as statebuilding and post-conflict peacebuilding to be more closely intertwined and, where necessary, to be accompanied by appropriate humanitarian measures. Through the EU, the BMZ also takes an active involvement in fragile and conflict states where there is no bilateral cooperation. The EU also provides a good forum for donor coordination – both at local level as well as in Brussels.

Another important international player is the **OECD-DAC International Network for Conflict and Fragility** (INCAF). It is here that the BMZ incorporates the experience gained by German development cooperation into international recommendations for action in fragile contexts and settings of conflict and violence. Within the sphere of the INCAF, German development policy also helps to give fragile states a stronger voice. In 2008, the governments of a number of fragile states joined together to form the g7+ group. Since its creation, and as part of the **International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding,** the states have reached agreements with donor countries on fundamental principles of cooperation. The BMZ is heavily involved in the Dialogue and contributed to the endorsement of the New Deal on International Engagement in Fragile States during the Fourth High Level Forum in Busan in November 2011. This New Deal emphasises ownership on the part of fragile states and can in future serve as

a central reference for donor and partner countries. Propagating and implementing the New Deal is one of the current priorities of INCAF, the OECD's specialist network to which the BMZ gives its active support.

Many of the countries with which Germany cooperates are members of **regional organisations,** part of whose mandate is to intervene in conflicts. In particular, the **AU** and African regional organisations are using mediation and peace operations to play an increasingly active role in terms of crisis prevention and peacebuilding. In these scenarios, the support provided by German development policy is aimed at strengthening capacities for peace and security.

The network of the eight largest industrialised nations **(G8)** helps to strengthen the crisis and conflict management capacities of developing countries. For instance, within the framework of the G8, Germany is actively involved in the Deauville Partnership, launched in 2011. This comprises on the one hand a political process designed to support the democratic transition in the countries of the Arab Spring (MENA region), and on the other hand, the promotion of sustainable and inclusive economic growth in these countries. Other joint priority areas are support in the development of Afghanistan, in particular with a view to the period following the withdrawal of NATO troops in 2014, as well as dialogue with Africa, most notably in the areas of food security and governance reform.

5.3   BILATERAL DONORS

Consultation between bilateral donors is key to **increasing the effectiveness** of development cooperation. Most recently, the Busan Global Partnership in 2011 saw donors adopt a set of principles which represent a major step forward towards making international development aid more effective.

Fulfilling these principles – ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability – is the expression of an important basic consensus. As far as consultation with other donors locally is concerned, one thing to remember in particular is that the uncoordinated presence of a large number of donors is more likely to make already weak governmental structures and civil society actors even weaker than it is to strengthen them. Increased consultation between donors can help to prevent development cooperation from becoming fragmented. It is also important to provide constructive assistance to the activities carried out by the **global development partners** Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, India and Mexico in contexts of conflict and violence[23].

5.4   OTHER MINISTRIES

Supporting peace and security is a key priority for German foreign policy. At the same time, it is an overarching responsibility and requires excellent consultation and coordination between the various policy areas. Coordination instruments and processes developed at national level, particularly the Interministerial Steering Group for Civilian Crisis Prevention and other interministerial steering groups, provide the foundation for a policy that covers the whole of government.

The Interministerial Guidelines from 2012 entitled "For a coherent German Government policy towards fragile states" underline the need for foreign, security and development policy to work together, particularly in difficult contexts. In crisis situations especially, temporary interministerial task forces are set

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23 BMZ (2011): Strategy for Development Cooperation with Global Development Partners (2011-2015). Bonn: BMZ Strategy Paper 6/2011e.

up for a specific country or region[24]. The duties of such task forces include coordinating proposals and resources from individual ministries and agreeing on interministerial procedures, as well as defining clear objectives and criteria for the German commitment, an integral part of which is also involvement in development policy issues.

In addition to fundamental coordination and cooperation with foreign policy, for example in structuring political dialogue with the partner country, **civil-military interfaces** are also relevant. This is particularly the case in partner countries where Germany is actively involved both militarily and in the field of development. Joint training courses, for instance at the Federal Armed Forces Command and Staff College as part of the interministerial training module for civilian and military collaboration in fragile states, have proven their worth in such countries, as have joint exercises. A good example of civil-military cooperation is the joint support in the building up of a multi-dimensional African Standby Force, as provided by the BMZ, the Federal Foreign Office (AA), Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg) and temporarily by the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) as well.

Other ministries too, such as the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety and the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, can contribute to peace and security in fragile situations and settings of violence and conflict. In consultation with these ministries, issues such as food security, food crises, the effects of climate change, migration, raw materials governance and financial crises are particularly relevant. For this reason, they are also part of the Interministerial Steering Group for Civilian Crisis Prevention.

5.5   GERMAN CIVIL SOCIETY

In addition to state instruments, civil society actors play a special role in helping to shape peace and security. They do so not only by complementing official development cooperation but also through their work in contexts where official development cooperation plays no active role. Political foundations, church development agencies and non-governmental organisations often have many years of experience in partner countries. Their strategies and working approaches, coupled with their established networks and partner structures, prove instrumental to peace and security by strengthening civil society groups on the ground and by carrying out civic education domestically, aimed at the German public. In recent years, the expertise of civil society actors has become differentiated. In 2001, the BMZ set up the **Working Group on Peace and Development (FriEnt)** together with political foundations, church development agencies, civil society networks as well as representatives from the academic community and an implementing organisation[25]. It is responsible for making peacebuilding a more firmly established topic in all areas of development cooperation, addressing specific issues and country contexts in depth, initiating joint learning processes and strengthening and networking the skills of different institutions.

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[24] For details, please see AA/BMVg/BMZ (2012): For a coherent German Government policy towards fragile states. Interministerial Guidelines, pp. 6-7.

[25] The members of FriEnt are BMZ, GIZ, Brot für die Welt – Church Development Service, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (hbs), Catholic Central Agency for Development Aid / Misereor, Civil Peace Service Group, German Platform for Peaceful Conflict Management/Institute for Development and Peace (INEF) and the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF).

6. Brief outlook

Work in the context of conflict, fragility and violence remains complex and ever-changing. This strategy does not therefore lay claim to cover all aspects, and certainly not in any great detail. A number of other important international and national guidance notes and papers on particular topics are listed in the bibliography. Further papers are still being drawn up. In order to take account of more recent developments in the field of peace and security, the BMZ is also constantly adapting its range of training courses for development activities in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

Annex 1: Marker guidelines

GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY GOALS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY

BACKGROUND

Following the standard system laid down by the OECD Development Assistance Committee, statistical data on development contributions to the objectives of peace and security is collected based on a national marker. The cross-sectoral markers for peace and security are called FS 2, FS 1 and FS 0.

The FS marker replaces the KR marker and applies with immediate effect to all new projects and follow-on phases. All existing projects and programmes shall continue with the KR marker.

The issue of peace and security has evolved greatly in recent years. Germany has played an active part in the international debate which has seen new standards set for development assistance in fragile contexts and those marked by conflict and violence. Examples include the World Development Report 2011 from the World Bank entitled "Conflict, Security and Development" as well as the "New Deal on Engagement in Fragile States" endorsed at the Busan High Level Forum at the end of 2011. This debate, together with the findings from evaluations and research, has influenced the strategy "Development for Peace and Security. Development Policy in the Context of Conflict, Fragility and Violence". This replaces the former "Cross-Sectoral Strategy on Crisis Prevention, Conflict Transformation and Peace-Building in German Development Cooperation" dating from 2005. The understanding of close inter-relationships between conflict, fragility and violence which underpins the strategy requires instruments to be adapted and leads to the replacement of the hitherto KR marker.

MARKER SYSTEM

FS 2	Peace and security are the objective (expected long-term result, programme and/or module level) of the project, i.e. they are key to its implementation. This can be checked by asking the following question: "Would the project have been carried out even without this development objective?"
FS 1	Peace and security are a key secondary objective (sub-aspect of the programme or module objective, output), but not one of the main reasons for carrying out the project.
FS 0	Peace and security are not the focus of the project.

SCOPE OF APPLICATION

The way in which development policy measures contributing to peace and security are organised may vary greatly, i.e. they may have a variety of CRS codes.

For certain measures, classification in FS 1 or FS 2 is dictated by the CRS code. All projects which are allocated to one of the following CRS codes are <u>always</u> given the marker FS 1 or FS 2:

→   Security system management and reform (CRS code 15210),

→   Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution (CRS code 15220),

→   Participation in international peacekeeping operations (CRS code 15230),

→   Reintegration and SALW (small arms and light weapons) control (CRS code 15240),

→   Removal of land mines and explosive remnants of war (CRS code 15250),

→   Child soldiers (Prevention and demobilisation) (CRS code 15261),

→   Narcotics control (CRS code 16063),

→   Food aid/Food security programmes (CRS code 52010),

→   Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation (CRS code 73010),

→   Disaster prevention and preparedness (CRS code 74010).

DEFINITION AND ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA

The list above is not exhaustive. Projects with other CRS codes may also be given the marker FS 1 or FS 2. Moreover, different markers may be given to several projects carried out within the same sector in a country, depending on the importance of peace and security as an objective for the relevant measure.

As set out in this development strategy, peace and security consists of measures which help towards

→   addressing the causes of conflict, fragility and violence,

→   improving the capacity for non-violent conflict management,

→   creating the environment for peaceful and inclusive development.

EXAMPLES OF TYPICAL PROJECTS TO RECEIVE THE MARKERS FS 2 AND FS 1

Examples of marker FS 2 projects

→   Transitional justice, addressing the past and fostering reconciliation;

→   Strengthening dialogue capacities and mechanisms for peaceful conflict management;

→   Preventing urban violence;

→   Civil Peace Service measures;

→   Revitalising local economic cycles in crisis regions;

→ Reintegrating ex-combatants, e.g. by involving former conflict parties in the reconstruction of infrastructure in conflict regions.

Examples of marker FS 1 projects

→ Poverty reduction and food security with refugees in need of reintegration;

→ Promoting the rule of law;

→ Conflict management within the context of an environmental programme;

→ Improving basic sector services (e.g. water supply or health care) in crisis regions.

Annex 2: Glossary

This strategy is based on the following working definitions:

CRISIS PREVENTION

The term "crisis prevention" covers early, systematic and coherent action at various levels of government and society to prevent violent conflicts. Crisis prevention measures aim to reduce the potential for violence and the escalation of crises by mitigating the causes of conflict and to also encourage the establishment of institutions, structures and cultures for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Crisis prevention measures are taken either before, during or after a violent conflict.

CONFLICT

Conflict is an essential component of social change and is not undesirable per se. In this strategy, however, conflict is understood as interaction with violence and fragility and therefore has a negative connotation in all cases. Accordingly, the term conflict as it is used here means the relationship between two or more mutually dependent parties where at least one of the parties perceives this relationship in a negative sense or has interests and needs which conflict with those of the other party(-ies). The aim of development policy is to prevent or help put an end to violence (see below) being used as a means of resolving conflicts as well as to reduce the impact that fragility has as a breeding ground for violence. In so doing, the focus is on social and political conflicts.

"DO NO HARM" PRINCIPLE

The "do no harm" principle propagated by Mary B. Anderson is by far the most important rule governing development cooperation in crisis situations. Under this principle, the unintended consequences of humanitarian aid and development cooperation and the inadvertent exacerbation of negative trends should be recognised, avoided and mitigated.

FRAGILITY

There is no standard international definition of fragility. Fragile contexts distinguish themselves by substantial shortcomings in one or more of the three classic dimensions of statehood: monopoly on the use of force/functioning governance; legitimacy; and the delivery of basic governmental services. In most cases the legitimacy of state institutions and social trust have been eroded; in addition, the level of governance and development orientation are very low. Relations between state and society are not constructive and the scope for civil society engagement is restricted. Significant social and political tensions and violent conflicts also often compound the situation.

LEGITIMACY

Legitimacy means that society accepts the claim made by a government or group representing it to act alone in enforcing binding regulations. Legitimacy is based on the conviction that social, economic and political decisions are taken and implemented in a fair and appropriate manner. Legitimacy is gained through the build-up of trust in a relationship between a population and the institution representing it.

PEACE

Negative peace relates to the absence of any direct, organised physical violence, whereas positive peace is only achieved when there is an absence of structural violence, for example when discrimination ends (see under Violence). Positive peace is characterised by political participation, social cohesion, rule of law and the respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights. Achieving positive peace is an aim of development policy.

PEACEBUILDING

The English word "peacebuilding" has established itself as standard international terminology. Peacebuilding comprises a range of measures aimed not only at strengthening national governmental and civil society capacities for the peaceful resolution of conflicts at all levels, but also at creating the basis for a lasting and sustainable peace.

POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

Political settlement refers to the way in which state authority is organised and exercised between the decision-making political, economic or military elites. In a political settlement, both formal (e.g. elections, constitutional reforms, peace negotiations) and informal mechanisms for reaching agreement (e.g. unofficial, often personal deals for the exploitation of resources or the casting votes in elections) are used. Depending on the power structure in place, an agreement is negotiated using more or less inclusive channels or is imposed by those in power.

RESILIENCE

The opposite of fragility, resilience describes the capacity of state structures to configure changes to governmental capacity, legitimacy and effectiveness and to conduct constructive and peaceful negotiations between state and society which meet the population's expectations. Changes of this kind may occur suddenly as a result of external shocks or very gradually through long-term erosion. Strengthening resilience is a key aim when cooperating with fragile states and is guided, among other things, by the principles of inclusive political participation and the rule of law.

SECURITY

In this strategy, security is understood as a wide-ranging concept. On the one hand, it entails defending against threats posed by direct violence and establishing a basic level of security. On the other hand, establishing security also involves political, economic, environmental and social requirements. In order to guarantee lasting and comprehensive security, various institutions and ministries need to work together on an equal footing and in a concerted and coordinated manner.

STATEBUILDING

The term "statebuilding" describes the specific enhancement of institutional capacity, authority and legitimacy of state structures in order that these may carry out their basic functions. Contrary to an earlier definition, often motivated by security or defence policy (especially in the context of military intervention), the OECD now refers to statebuilding as a political process which requires the support of the elites and stakeholders in the partner country. The long-term aim here is to achieve peace and security as well as sustainable development.

VIOLENCE

There is no standard definition of violence either. Organised violence between different groups is a focus of the strategy; interpersonal and domestic violence are treated as symptoms of far-reaching problems.

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Annex 4: List of abbreviations

AA	Federal Foreign Office
AU	African Union
BMZ	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
BMVg	Federal Ministry of Defence
DAC	OECD Development Assistance Committee
DEG	German Investment and Development Company
DIE	German Development Institute
EU	European Union
FC	Financial Cooperation
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH
INCAF	International Network on Conflict and Fragility
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NGO	Non-governmental organisations
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PSGs	Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme