

# Building Peaceful States and Societies

## A DFID Practice Paper





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and Societies  
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# Building Peaceful States and Societies

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
## Executive Summary

We will not achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) or eliminate global poverty if the international community does not address conflict and fragility more effectively. Simply increasing the volume of aid will not be enough without tackling the underlying causes directly. There is a tendency in development to work ‘around’ conflict and fragility. A step change in international approaches is required.

This paper outlines a new, integrated approach, which puts state-building and peace-building at the centre of our work in fragile and conflict-affected countries. It is based on four objectives:

- 1. Address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility, and build conflict resolution mechanisms**
- 2. Support inclusive political settlements and processes**
- 3. Develop core state functions**
- 4. Respond to public expectations**

### GOAL: Building peaceful states and societies



The approach should be applied **as a whole**. It aims to increase the impact of international assistance, while recognising that state-building and peace-building are primarily internal processes. The four objectives are not sequential – they form a ‘virtuous circle’, creating a positive dynamic and strengthening state–society relations.

Strong **state–society relations** are critical to building effective, legitimate states and durable, positive peace. In most fragile and conflict-affected countries, weak state–society relations based on patronage and lack of accountability are the norm. Strengthening them will require engagement with non-state and informal institutions as well as the state.

### The Four Objectives:

- Objective 1: Address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility, and build conflict resolution mechanisms.** This objective provides a ‘lens’ through which to analyse the context, and assess priorities within the other three objectives. It highlights the importance of focusing on prevention, supporting positive capacities for peace (e.g. education systems that promote tolerance), working with both state and non-state conflict resolution mechanisms and addressing regional dimensions of conflict and fragility.
- Objective 2: Support inclusive political settlements and processes.** Political settlements define how political and economic power is organised. Exclusionary settlements are more likely to lead to instability. Supporting inclusive settlements means understanding the incentives of the elites and identifying when and how to empower different actors to push for a broader settlement. Peace processes provide windows of opportunity to reshape existing settlements, but may not address underlying power dynamics. Support to democratic and political processes can help promote more inclusive decision making.
- Objective 3: Develop core state functions.** Security, law and justice, and financial and macroeconomic management are essential for states if they are to govern their territories and operate at the most basic level. States also need a minimum level of administrative capacity to deliver their functions. This objective focuses on the importance of accountability within each function to ensure states become responsive rather than repressive. Support to security, law and justice should include working with both state and non-state actors as appropriate.
- Objective 4: Respond to public expectations.** States need to be seen to meet public expectations in order to maintain legitimacy and stability. International actors should be careful not to make assumptions about the expectations of different groups in society, and must recognise that public goods are often delivered in ways that maintain an exclusionary political settlement. Public expectations that are high priority in many fragile contexts include jobs and growth, delivery of basic services (including security and justice), human rights and democratic processes.

## Key Operational Implications:

### 1. Recognise that politics are central to our work in conflict-affected and fragile countries

State-building and peace-building are internal, political processes. Effective support requires a high level of political awareness, identification of opportunities to support social and political change and a good understanding of elite politics and the nature of the political settlement.

All donor actions have political ramifications.<sup>1</sup> For example, financial aid through the state can strengthen the position of a regime and shift the balance of power between elites. Political analysis must inform programme design and dialogue with international partners and governments.

### 2. Build consensus with our external partners

It is essential to ensure that development, political and security approaches to state-building and peace-building are coherent. This includes building close links with humanitarian and stabilisation approaches where relevant (e.g. in highly insecure contexts). Joint assessments and joint strategies are an important step forward.

In many contexts, bilateral donors will be supporting a multilateral-led international effort. Working together to improve the performance and coordination of multilaterals (particularly the UN, World Bank and EU) in fragile countries is critical, particularly ensuring there are sufficient levels of high-quality, skilled staff on the ground.

### 3. Analyse the context using the integrated framework ...

Where international actors fail to invest in good political and conflict analysis, actions can result in more harm than good. Various analytical tools are available to help us better understand state-building and peace-building processes and dynamics. However, translating analysis into practical decisions and programmes can be challenging. It requires working through the implications for international engagement and making hard choices.

### 4. ... leading to different priorities and choices

Applying the framework is not easy, but it is an opportunity to re-focus strategy and ensure we 'do no harm'. **The key is to use the approach to prioritise rigorously.** In Nepal, an integrated approach to state-building and peace-building has informed priorities within the DFID country plan and UK strategy:

- Support to the **peace process** and peace agreement implementation;
- Work to foster an **inclusive political settlement** – e.g. by supporting excluded groups to articulate their needs, and by facilitating dialogue on the management of political tensions.
- Strengthening core **functions of the state** – e.g. public security, public financial management and more inclusive central and local state institutions.
- Strengthening **service delivery** and support **growth and job creation** to deliver a 'peace dividend' and meet public expectations;
- Producing up-to-date **political economy and peace analysis**.

<sup>1</sup> For the purposes of this paper, 'donors' refer to both bilateral and multilateral donor organisations.



Consideration of issues of **gender, human rights** and **inclusion** is crucial. Peace-building and state-building can offer unique opportunities to address the injustices and inequalities of the past, and set new precedents for the future.

Sequencing interventions and clarifying division of labour between donors can help resolve **dilemmas** between short-term and long-term objectives. In Sierra Leone, DFID focused initially on building core state functions, and supporting progress on security to sustain the peace. Service delivery and growth were seen as second-generation reform areas. DFID increased support for service delivery later, in response to changing public expectations.

## 5. Engage at the interface between state and society

A 'bottom-up' approach that engages with non-state and community-level institutions is central to building peaceful states and societies. These institutions may compete with the state in negative ways, but they can also provide a bridge between state and society.

Practical ways of engaging at the interface include: (i) supporting links between traditional authorities and local governance structures; (ii) strengthening civil society to engage with the state and hold it accountable (particularly as a complement to budget support); and (iii) community-driven development programmes that channel funds to local communities while building local governance capacity (e.g. Yemen Social Fund for Development).

## 6. Adapt delivery mechanisms

The transaction costs of working in situations of conflict and fragility are higher, including programme design, coordination, influencing and monitoring and evaluation. This needs to be reflected in **staff planning** in fragile countries.

Choices about **aid instruments** must be politically informed. Aid modalities (including predictability of aid) have the potential to enhance or undermine a state's relations with society. Donors need to clarify the form of alignment with the state that is appropriate in each context: whether *through* the state, *with* the state or *outside* the state. Instruments will often include pooled funding arrangements with other donors (usually led by the UN or World Bank). It is important that such mechanisms do not detract from engaging with the state to help it manage funds and pursue positive reforms in the future.

A rigorous approach to **risk management** is important. Risks are higher in fragile contexts, particularly given the nature of state-building and peace-building interventions – for example, decisions to align with particular elites (political or reputational risks), or support for measures to counter violent extremism (programme or staff security risks). When considering specific options for intervention, three factors – transaction costs, risk and expected return – can help us compare their relative **value for money**.

Linked to this, our **results frameworks** also need to be adjusted to include indicators and targets that focus explicitly on state-building and peace-building objectives. The MDGs are important as long-term measures of development success, but they might not capture medium-term results in fragile states. Measuring results against the four objectives contained in this approach will help test its validity, and will build the evidence base for the future.

# Introduction

1. Conflict and fragility are significant challenges to international peace and security and to achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Of the 34 countries furthest from reaching the MDGs, 22 are in, or are emerging from, conflict.<sup>2</sup> Forty per cent of armed conflicts recommence within a decade of hostilities ending.<sup>3</sup> Fragile countries account for a fifth of the population of developing countries, but they include a third of those living in extreme poverty, half of children who are not in primary school and half of children who die before their fifth birthday.<sup>4</sup>
2. Although the number of countries in conflict is declining overall, conflicts that remain are becoming increasingly entrenched. Half of the world's current conflicts have endured over 20 years. Local and regional conflict is also becoming more common, fuelled, for example, by resistance to central authority. Civilians, especially women and children, account for the majority of those adversely affected, and women are particularly vulnerable to sexual violence as a weapon of war.<sup>5</sup>
3. Conflict or weak governance in one country can also have a negative influence on the quality of governance in neighbouring countries, especially if they are poor. The cross-border movement of weapons, armed groups and conflict resources, including diamonds, has become a feature of conflicts in West and Central Africa. A range of global factors, such as financial systems, criminal networks, climate change and interstate relations, can also have a significant effect on conflict and fragility.
4. International support can make a positive contribution. In Sierra Leone, a combined approach to development and security has helped to restore peace. In Mozambique, after more than 20 years of conflict, aid contributed to a fall in poverty from around 70% in 1996 to under 55% by 2003. International support has been critical to the recent peace agreements reached in Nepal and Sudan.
5. But significant challenges remain. Eliminating global poverty and achieving the MDGs will not be possible unless the international community tackles conflict and fragility more effectively. Simply increasing the volume of aid is not enough – many fragile countries lack the capacity to use and absorb financial and technical assistance.



Young Maoist insurgents in Nepal

<sup>2</sup> UN Millennium Project (2005) *Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals*, New York.

<sup>3</sup> Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2004) 'Greed and Grievance in Civil War', *Oxford Economic Papers*, 56 (4). Also Fearon, J. and Laitin, D. (2003) 'Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War', *American Political Science Review*, 97 (1).

<sup>4</sup> DFID staff estimates (2009) using World Bank World Development Indicators database 2009 (for data on population, children out of school and the proportion living in extreme poverty [on less than \$1.25 a day]); and UNICEF State of the World's Children 2009 (for data on child mortality).

<sup>5</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 1325, October 2000. See also Vlachova, M. and Biason, L. (eds.) (2005) *Women in an Insecure World: Violence Against Women, Facts, Figures, and Analysis*, DCAF, Geneva.

6. A step change in international approaches is required. There remains a tendency to work 'around' conflict and fragility and focus on traditional development activities. Our engagement in these states must be targeted towards a set of objectives that address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility head-on. In conflict-affected and fragile countries, state-building and peace-building objectives are the necessary building blocks towards achieving poverty reduction and the MDGs.
7. The international system must be equipped to deliver. In many of these situations, the UN, World Bank, regional and other organisations play crucial roles, and have unique legitimacy, mandates and resources to address the challenges of peace-building and state-building. DFID is strongly committed to strengthening international institutions to ensure a more effective and rapid response to conflict and fragility.
8. This paper sets out an **integrated approach** that puts building peaceful states and societies at the centre of our efforts in fragile and conflict-affected countries. Drawing on evidence, it brings state-building and peace-building together into a single framework, and is based on four closely linked objectives:

- 1. Address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility, and build conflict resolution mechanisms**
- 2. Support inclusive political settlements and processes**
- 3. Develop core state functions**
- 4. Respond to public expectations**

9. State-building and peace-building are primarily internal processes driven by a range of national and local actors. But they are also affected by the regional and global context. International actors will often have limited influence, but we can support positive processes that lead to more effective states and to durable, positive peace.
10. This approach is intended to increase the impact of international assistance in fragile countries, and should be used to prioritise interventions rigorously. It will help ensure that state-building and peace-building initiatives are complementary, provide greater policy and operational coherence, and increase synergies between the development, diplomatic and defence communities.
11. The approach is relevant in all fragile contexts. In countries with deteriorating governance (e.g. Kenya, Yemen), it can highlight ways to mitigate risks of conflict. In protracted crises (e.g. Burma, Somalia), it can help identify opportunities to support the emergence of a more inclusive political settlement. It is equally relevant in stable states with 'pockets' of conflict or fragility (e.g. parts of India) and post-conflict situations (e.g. Nepal).
12. This paper is supported by a series of **Briefing Papers on 'Working Effectively in Situations of Conflict and Fragility'**, which provide operational guidance on implementing the OECD DAC's *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations*.<sup>6</sup> To access these, go to <http://www.gsdr.org/go/fragile-states> and click on the link 'DFID guidance on working effectively in fragile states'.

<sup>6</sup> The Principles were agreed by DAC members in April 2007. See [http://www.oecd.org/document/48/0,3343,en\\_2649\\_33693550\\_35233262\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/48/0,3343,en_2649_33693550_35233262_1_1_1_1,00.html)

# 1. Definitions and frameworks

## 1.1 State-building

13. State-building is concerned with the state's capacity, institutions and legitimacy, and with the political and economic processes that underpin state-society relations.<sup>7</sup> The effectiveness of the state and the quality of its linkages to society largely determine a country's prospects for peace and development.<sup>8</sup>
14. State-building is a long-term, historically rooted and internal process driven by a wide range of local and national actors. In fragile contexts it often reveals tensions between state and non-state actors, with each wanting to exert influence and establish a dominant position. In Afghanistan, state institutions coexist uneasily, with complex local power structures, including tribal and clan groups, religious institutions, armed militias and criminal networks. The dominance of these structures is a significant challenge to the state-building process.

### Box 1: Defining state and non-state actors

The **state** is the principal unit for exercising public authority in defined territories in modern times. It is also the central structure in international relations. The state consists of:

- (a) *institutions or rules* which regulate political, social and economic engagement across a territory and determine how public authority is obtained and used (e.g. constitutions, laws, customs). These may be formal or informal.<sup>9</sup>
- (b) *organisations* at the national and the sub-national level which operate within those rules (e.g. the executive, legislature, judiciary, bureaucracy, ministries, army, tax authorities).

A **government** refers to the specific administration in power at any one moment (the governing coalition of political leaders), while the state is the basis for a government's authority, legality, and claim to popular support.<sup>10</sup> The state provides the edifice within which a government can operate.

**Non-state actors** include civil society organisations (CSOs)<sup>11</sup> and the private sector, as well as traditional authorities, and informal groupings such as social networks and religious communities.

<sup>7</sup> See also Fritz, V. and Rocha Menocal, A. (2007), "Understanding State-building from a Political Economy Perspective". Paper prepared for DFID.


<sup>8</sup> World Bank (1997) *World Development Report: The State in a Changing World*. World Bank, Washington DC

<sup>9</sup> **Formal institutions** refer to clearly defined laws, rules, and regulations ranging from the constitution to simple procedures governing the work of bureaucrats, private employees, and organised CSOs. **Informal institutions** refer to unwritten rules, systems and processes. Examples include social and cultural norms, patronage systems.

<sup>10</sup> Alford, R. and Friedland, R. (1985) *Powers of Theory*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

<sup>11</sup> Civil society organisations (CSOs) include such groups as registered charities, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community groups, women's organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trade unions, social movements, business associations, and advocacy groups.

15. This paper builds on the 2006 White Paper, which defines an effective state as one that is capable, accountable and responsive (CAR):<sup>12</sup>
- *Capable* – leaders and governments are able to get things done.
  - *Accountable* – citizens, civil society and the private sector are able to scrutinise public institutions and governments and hold them to account.
  - *Responsive* – public policies and institutions respond to the needs of citizens and uphold their rights.
16. The processes that determine how states evolve are complex and variable. It is important to develop a deep understanding of how states develop over time, including why some states become effective, while others descend into fragility and conflict. Evidence suggests that important factors include:
- the nature of the **political settlement**;
  - the state's ability to provide essential **core functions** (security; law and justice; and financial and macroeconomic management);
  - the state's ability to meet the **expectations of the population** (such as health and education services, or free and fair elections).
17. Each of these contributes to the development of **state-society relations**. The diagram below illustrates how they interact:




<sup>12</sup> DFID (2006) *White Paper: Eliminating World Poverty: Making Governance Work for the Poor*.

18. Most fragile countries combine aspects of responsive and unresponsive state-building. A state may be relatively efficient and able to maintain stability for a period without being responsive or accountable to its citizens (e.g. Cambodia). Or it may be based on an exclusionary political settlement while still relatively peaceful and responsive in the medium term (e.g. Mozambique).

## 1.2 Peace-building

19. A basic definition of peace is the absence of violence, or 'negative peace'. But this can disguise structural forms of violence, such as discrimination, underlying grievances or lack of avenues for challenging existing structures in a peaceful way.<sup>13</sup> 'Positive peace' is characterised by social harmony, respect for the rule of law and human rights, and social and economic development. It is supported by political institutions that are able to manage change and resolve disputes without resorting to violent conflict.<sup>14</sup>
20. Peace-building aims to establish positive peace. It has three inter-related elements:




21. It includes measures to address underlying **causes of conflict**, such as social, political or economic exclusion based on ethnicity, religion or gender or unequal power relations between the centre and periphery. It entails responding to drivers or triggers of conflict, such as youth unemployment, economic shocks or access to light weapons. And it requires dealing with the devastating **effects** of violent conflict, to enable communities to recover and reconcile, and prevent today's effects becoming tomorrow's causes.

<sup>13</sup> See Galtung, J. (1996) *Peace by Peaceful Means*, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo

<sup>14</sup> See also the definition of "structural stability" as given in OECD-DAC (2001), *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict*. Note this is distinct from more recent definitions of "stabilisation".

22. Non-violent conflict is normal and healthy in a pluralistic society. But without mechanisms to resolve conflict, it can easily lead to violence. Strengthening local, national and regional **capacity to prevent and resolve conflict** in non-violent ways is crucial during all phases of conflict and peace-building. Conflict is rarely a linear process, with progress and setbacks towards peace.<sup>15</sup>



Mural at a school in Mozambique: 'No to war'

23. **Inclusive peace processes and agreements** provide a focus for peace-building efforts, and often rely heavily on international support to succeed. An inclusive peace process aims to achieve a peace agreement that lays a strong foundation for a new political settlement. A sustainable, comprehensive peace agreement addresses causes of conflict, and provides for the establishment of conflict resolution mechanisms.

### 1.3 State-society relations

24. State–society relations are interactions between state institutions and societal groups to negotiate how public authority is exercised and how it can be influenced by people. State–society relations can be peaceful or contested (and at times, violent). They are focused on issues such as defining the mutual rights and obligations of state and society, negotiating how public resources should be allocated and establishing different modes of representation and accountability.



Labourers building a road in Ethiopia as part of the Productive Safety Net Programme which helps people to protect their assets in times of need through public works and cash transfers

25. Strong state–society relations underpin effective states and durable, positive peace. A population's trust in state institutions increases as it sees the state acting in the collective interest. Where the state has the will and capacity to deliver its functions, meet public expectations and uphold its obligations to protect human rights, the population is more willing to pay taxes, accept the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force and comply with laws and regulations.

<sup>15</sup> Many academics describe conflict as passing through different stages or phases. See the work of Louis Kriesberg, Dean Pruitt, Jeffrey Rubin and Sung Hee Kim, and William Zartman.

### Box 2: State legitimacy and state-society relations

Issues of legitimacy lie at the heart of state–society relations. States are legitimate when elites and the public accept the rules regulating the exercise of power and the distribution of wealth as proper and binding.<sup>16</sup> States can rely on a combination of different methods to establish their legitimacy, including international recognition, performance (e.g. economic growth, service delivery), ideology, procedural forms (e.g. democratic procedures), or traditional authority.<sup>17</sup> Building legitimacy is a primary requirement for peace, security and resilience over the long term.

For example, the authoritarian Suharto regime in Indonesia was tolerated by citizens as it delivered on basic services (primarily health and education) and the development of rural constituencies. As soon as it became apparent that personal politics and advancement began to replace these concerns, the government began to lose legitimacy, which ultimately brought about its downfall.

25. In most fragile and conflict-affected countries, state-society relations are based on patronage and fraught with tensions between different sources of authority (e.g. traditional versus modern institutions).<sup>18</sup> The state may relate to society through oppressive or violent means of maintaining authority, particularly if the state's legitimacy is very weak. The quality of mechanisms to engage different social actors in decision-making processes tends to be extremely poor.

<sup>16</sup> Papagianni, K. (2008) 'Participation and State Legitimation': in C. Call with V. Wyeth (eds.) *Building States to Build Peace*, Lynne Rienner, USA

<sup>17</sup> See Norad *The Legitimacy of the State in Fragile Situations (2009)*, prepared for OECD DAC. Available at: <http://www.norad.no/en/Tools+and+publications/Publications/Publication+page?key=134243>

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*




## 2. An integrated approach to building peaceful states and societies

27. The integrated approach brings together **four objectives** to help build peaceful states and societies. These provide a framework to help shape development programmes and broader international engagement in fragile and conflict-affected countries.<sup>19</sup> The approach combines state-building and peace-building as critical building blocks for achieving poverty reduction and the MDGs in such contexts. International actors should work with local and national partners towards the four objectives, building on internal processes.

28. The four objectives are closely linked:

1. Address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility, and build conflict resolution mechanisms
2. Support inclusive political settlements and processes
3. Develop core state functions
4. Respond to public expectations



29. The integrated approach is designed to be used **as a whole**. The four objectives are inter-related (*not* sequential), and they form a 'virtuous circle', helping to maintain a positive dynamic and strengthen state-society relations.

<sup>19</sup> DFID (2009), *White Paper: Eliminating World Poverty: Building our Common Future*.

30. There can be **tensions** between state-building and peace-building that need to be worked through. State-building has historically been a violent process, and movements to challenge an exclusionary political settlement can often lead to short-term instability or conflict, while laying the foundations for a more sustainable, inclusive settlement. States must be able to accommodate legitimate demands for change from society.
31. Political deals brokered to achieve a cessation of conflict may undermine the rule of law and perpetrate impunity. Conversely, the threat of prosecution (e.g. by the International Criminal Court) can be a disincentive for military and political leaders to negotiate peace. The UK has obligations under international humanitarian law (IHL),<sup>20</sup> human rights law and international criminal law to ensure respect for these international norms and to prevent impunity for perpetrators of violations. These are relevant to decisions about when and how to engage elites in the development of peace agreements and political settlements.
32. Other tensions include:
- *Immediate service delivery v. state-building*: where state capacity is very weak, the impetus can be to deliver services quickly through non-state mechanisms, to meet urgent needs and address grievances. However, this may weaken long-term capacity-building and state legitimacy. Conversely, premature attempts to deliver services through a weak state may overwhelm capacity and mean that basic needs go unmet.
  - *Political settlements v. economic growth*: illicit gains for elites secured through informal arrangements around the allocation of natural resources or public expenditure may stabilise the political settlement initially, but may undermine market capitalism and the economic viability of the state in the longer term.<sup>21</sup>
  - *Security and stability v. equity and rights*: where certain groups pose a threat to peace and security (such as political elites, rebel groups or unemployed youth), there is a tendency to prioritise these groups over others. This can lead to inequalities of concern from a rights perspective.
33. **Nation-building** may be an important complement to state-building and peace-building efforts. Nation-building is the construction of a shared sense of identity and common destiny, to overcome ethnic, sectarian or religious differences and counter alternative allegiances. Issues of belonging and identity can also be manipulated for political gain or to sow divisions or conflict, sometimes with appalling consequences (as in apartheid South Africa or Rwanda). Nation-building efforts can help develop greater social cohesion.
34. The way aid is delivered can confer legitimacy on certain groups and become part of identity or legitimacy contests. Donors must be aware of this risk and ensure they do not indirectly undermine efforts to foster social cohesion.

<sup>20</sup> IHL is also known as the Law of Armed Conflict. It is contained mainly in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (universally ratified) and Additional Protocols of 1977. It seeks to limit the effects of war, by protecting people who are not or no longer participating in hostilities and restricting the means and methods of warfare.

<sup>21</sup> Crisis States Research Centre (2009), 'Summary of Policy Relevant Findings', paper prepared for DFID

35. **Centre-periphery relations** are another important challenge. State-building has historically focused on the centralisation of the state at the national level. In fragile contexts, this often means that the state is more visible in capital cities. The population in areas that are more remote (and in urban slums) often has limited and unsatisfactory interaction with the state. In the periphery, non-state and informal systems compete with formal structures for authority and power. They may have more presence and greater legitimacy in the eyes of the local population.
36. The rest of this section describes the four objectives of the integrated approach:

**Objective 1: Address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility, and build conflict resolution mechanisms**

37. Conflict and fragility are caused by a complex range of factors, including **grievances**, **opportunities**, and **feasibility**, as illustrated below:<sup>22</sup>

**Table 1: Causes of conflict and fragility**

| Cause                | Explanation  |
|----------------------|--|
| <b>Grievances</b>    | Identity groups (e.g. based on ethnicity, religion, caste) facing discrimination and inequality are easier to mobilise for violence. Conflict is most likely when political, social and economic exclusion coincide, and victims do not have access to justice. Grievances may be exacerbated by human rights abuses and IHL violations, oppressive security forces, corruption and failure to deliver services. Extremist groups are likely to take advantage of grievances and build them into their narratives. States with systematic discrimination have a higher probability of instability. <sup>23</sup> |
| <b>Opportunities</b> | High rates of unemployment and poverty can make the opportunities provided by conflict attractive, and mean individuals have little to lose by becoming involved. War economies can provide viable livelihoods – e.g. through access to resources that can be looted and other illegal trades. Political leadership may be focused on accumulation of power through violent means and/or wealth from conflict resources or illegal goods.  |
| <b>Feasibility</b>   | Conflict is feasible if the state is unable to crush or buy off rebels – e.g. when security forces are weak, or the state lacks legitimacy or presence throughout its territory. Availability of weapons and general instability or conflict in the region also make rebellion easier. Availability of high-value natural resources and other sources of finance/support for groups engaging in conflict makes it more feasible.   |

<sup>22</sup> There is disagreement between analysts on the most significant causes of conflict. Frances Stewart stresses the importance of grievances arising from horizontal inequalities, Paul Collier the need to raise the opportunity cost of conflict, and James Fearon the need to address the feasibility of war.

<sup>23</sup> Political Instability Task Force (PITF) – see <http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf>

38. As well as national factors, there are also **regional and global drivers** of conflict and fragility, including organised crime, drug trafficking and corruption linked to high-value natural resources. The arms trade and demand for oil, minerals and drugs may provide warring factions with the resources and incentives to continue fighting.
39. Whatever the cause, conflict undermines development and exacerbates poverty and inequality. Patterns of history, identity and trauma can fuel violence, and its effects include divided communities, traumatised children and adults, human rights abuses (including gender-based violence), destroyed livelihoods, food insecurity and other humanitarian needs. These can all feed new grievances and conflict.

### What does this mean for DFID and our external partners?

40. Objective 1 provides a 'lens' through which to analyse the context and assess priorities within the other three objectives (e.g. which core state functions are most important to resolve future conflict, or which public expectations need to be met to prevent grievances from increasing). In Nepal from 2003 onwards, conflict analysis identified that human rights abuses committed by both the state and Maoist rebels were a key factor fuelling the conflict. By strengthening human rights monitoring, the international community was able to work with local civil society to put pressure on the conflict parties to reduce violations.
41. Addressing the causes and effects of conflict and fragility is 'core business' for DFID and our partners – **Annex A** gives examples of interventions we can support. We should seek to work through multilateral and regional organisations, such as the UN and the African Union (AU), which enjoy the trust of key players at national and local levels. As well as addressing causes of conflict, we should support positive 'capacities for peace', such as education systems that promote tolerance and social cohesion, shared infrastructure between communities and market development that expands opportunities.<sup>24</sup>
42. **Preventing conflict and fragility:** The international community's *Responsibility to Protect* civilians from suffering the worst excesses of violent conflict means that wherever possible, it should focus on prevention. Deteriorating governance and instability must be addressed early on – for example, supporting job creation and livelihoods to reduce economic incentives to engage in violence. Local civil society actors can be useful in detecting potential conflict and responding with appropriate interventions (see Box 3). Work on countering violent extremism, which identifies and addresses the grievances that drive extremist violence, is another part of prevention.

<sup>24</sup> See International Alert (2009) *Programming Framework for International Alert: Design, Monitoring and Evaluation*. Available at: [www.international-alert.org/about/files/Programming\\_Framework\\_2009.pdf](http://www.international-alert.org/about/files/Programming_Framework_2009.pdf).

### Box 3: Support for conflict prevention in Kenya and Ghana

Funded by the Conflict Pool, Saferworld responded to the 2008 post-election violence in **Kenya** by supporting the organisation Kenyan Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP). It sought to link community-level and national-level prevention and peace-building processes and establish reconciliation structures. Known as the Nairobi Peace Zones initiative, Saferworld and CCP conducted participatory, local-level conflict analysis and established peace committees in Nairobi that brought together local administration, civil society and community representatives.

Following the post-election violence in Kenya, **Ghana's** National Peace Council, which UNDP helped establish in 2006, and its chairman Cardinal Peter Turkson, a highly respected non-partisan figure, led an advocacy campaign to ensure that the same mistakes would not be made in Ghana's election in December 2008. This initiative complemented the work of the official Election Commission and the efforts of international and national NGOs to promote an inclusive process and monitor the polls. In the event, the transition of power through elections was largely peaceful. The role played by civil society also reflected the success of the state-building process, which has seen civil society in Ghana flourish over the past decade.



Traditional leaders discuss conflict prevention in Bakwu, Ghana, in preparation for a radio interview

43. **Building conflict resolution mechanisms:** This is critically important for breaking the cycle of violence. In fragile contexts, particularly when the state itself is a perpetrator of violence and human rights abuses, we should consider the role of non-state and informal systems in resolving conflict. However, these systems may also be exclusionary or discriminatory, or lack sufficient transparency and accountability. DFID has been exploring different ways to engage with informal and non-state justice systems (see para. 65).<sup>25</sup>
44. Work on deepening democracy can help ensure that the relationship between the state and societal groups is mediated in a peaceful way. This requires engagement at the formal level, through to grassroots civic education. DFID and our partners provide long-term support to political institutions and processes, including parliaments and political parties, the judiciary, media, civil society, human rights bodies and the electoral cycle.
45. **Regional dimension:** Development programmes are often focused on a single country. It is also important to think regionally and consider the linkages between neighbouring countries (e.g. Afghanistan and Pakistan). Regional economic communities can play a supportive role. The UK has provided support for strengthening the conflict management

<sup>25</sup> See DFID (2004) 'Working with Non-state Justice and Security Systems', Briefing Note.

capacity of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), which is critical to the future stability of the region. With the AU, ECOWAS has helped set and promote democratic standards in the region.

#### Box 4: A regional approach to peace-building

The UK is a significant donor to the World Bank-led Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), which has demobilised around 300,000 former combatants in seven countries since 2002 – Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda. The interlinked nature of the conflicts in the region provided strong justification for a multi-country approach. The programme has successfully arranged the demobilisation and return of many members of foreign armed groups operating in the region, such as the Rwandan Hutu Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR) based in DRC. The programme has been a major factor in improving security in the Great Lakes region in recent years.



A young ex-combatant receives carpentry skills training in the Democratic Republic of Congo

#### Objective 2: Support inclusive political settlements and processes

46. Political settlements are the expression of a common understanding, usually forged between elites,<sup>26</sup> about how power is organised and exercised.<sup>27</sup> They include formal institutions for managing political and economic relations, such as electoral processes, peace agreements, parliaments, constitutions and market regulations. But they also include informal, often unarticulated agreements that underpin a political system, such as deals between elites on the division of spoils. Political settlements establish the basic rules governing economic relations and resource allocation.
47. Political settlements come in many shapes and sizes, as shown in table 2.

<sup>26</sup> Elite power is derived from multiple sources, including popular support (sometimes through elections), the accumulation of wealth, control over the means of generating violence and waging war (warlord armies, private security operations, gang leaders) and religious authority. Elites have sufficient power and standing in the community to shape outcomes and influence the views and behaviours of others.

<sup>27</sup> Whaites, A. (2008) 'States in development: Understanding state-building', DFID

**Table 2: Political settlements typology**

| Types of political settlement | Characteristics  |
|-------------------------------|--|
| <b>Engineered settlements</b> | Explicitly negotiated, often as part of a peace process (Nepal, Sierra Leone, Northern Ireland). These tend to change as the deals struck in peace negotiations are adjusted by national elites.   |
| <b>Informal elite pacts</b>   | Uneasy arrangements between elites that find accommodation through the brokering of interests. These may stagnate, often as a result of prolonged crisis (Zimbabwe) but will remain fragile.   |
| <b>Imposed settlements</b>    | Clear victory by one group allows them to impose a settlement on others. Maintained through a high level of security capability, sometimes through coercion rather than consent (Burma).   |
| <b>Entrenched settlements</b> | High degree of legitimacy and popular acceptance that make direct challenges unlikely to succeed (China), but may not be inclusive.  |
| <b>Inclusive settlements</b>  | Settlement extends to a long-term negotiation between the state and groups in society. Societal rights and responsibilities are broadly accepted. It evolves and is responsive to public expectations (South Africa, Botswana, Denmark). |

48. Elites have often used centralised and highly personalised political parties as a way of embedding a political settlement. Many fragile countries are characterised by hegemonic party systems, where the distinction between the state and the ruling party is blurred (Mozambique, Angola, Cambodia). Many political settlements result in hybrid states, where formal, democratic institutions co-exist with more informal ones (rooted in traditional or indigenous social structures) in ways that are not mutually reinforcing. Research suggests that these partial democracies are the most unstable regime type.<sup>28</sup>
49. The inclusiveness of a settlement, and public perceptions of its fairness, is critical to state legitimacy and the sustainability of the settlement in the long term. **Peace processes and peace agreements** provide a window of opportunity to reshape an existing political settlement. They may lead to a new constitution, or extend political and economic opportunity beyond elites to groups that have traditionally been marginalised, including women. But informal arrangements that define the underlying political settlement and allocation of power may be highly resistant to change.

<sup>28</sup> Findings of the Political Instability Task Force, referenced in Chandran, R. et al. (2008) *Recovering from War: Gaps in Early Action*. CIC, New York

50. In Guatemala, a highly participatory and comprehensive peace agreement ending a 30-year civil war has failed to produce a more inclusive political settlement that delivers gender equality, indigenous rights or voice for the poor. The Kenya example also shows that while inclusive political agreements can be an important first step, the challenge is to alter the underlying settlement. See Box 5.

### Box 5: The Evolution of the Political Settlement in Kenya

With a mandate from the AU and the support of the UN, Kofi Annan mediated a post-election agreement in Kenya in early 2008 to rearticulate the political settlement and make it broader and more inclusive. The agreement led to a coalition government based on power sharing among different ethnic groups. However, this is proving to be a coalition under strain, built on a stagnant political settlement which has yet to address the underlying grievances within Kenyan society. In the long run, the fundamental fault lines in Kenyan society (e.g. ethnicity, regional identity, the distribution of land ownership) will need to be accommodated in the underlying political settlement if peace is to be sustained.



Graffiti urges peace, as riots flare in Nairobi following the contested elections in 2007

### What does this mean for DFID and our external partners?

51. Our aim is to promote inclusive settlements that meet public expectations and address the underlying causes of conflict and fragility. This requires understanding the opportunity cost to elites of different types of reform; identifying when to empower different actors to push for a broader settlement, taking into account the risks of instability<sup>29</sup>; and being sufficiently flexible to support both formal/informal and state/non-state institutions as opportunities arise. In Burma, DFID is supporting a £3.5 million Pyoe Pin ('Green Shoots') programme to strengthen local civil society and support the development of coalitions around issues, a flexible approach designed to respond to the changing political and social context.
52. When engaging with political settlements, the international community will need to distinguish between *legitimate* grievances that can lead to violent conflict and demands for a new, more inclusive political settlement, and efforts to undermine peace for *illegitimate* reasons. Those with illegitimate objectives often co-opt those with legitimate grievances for their own ends. It is important to be aware of their incentives.
53. External actors can play important roles in supporting peace processes through: mediation and facilitation; political encouragement and/or pressure on parties to pursue negotiations and dialogue; technical support to help parties engage more effectively in such processes; and helping to build public support for peace. Donors can provide aid in ways that directly and indirectly support the implementation of peace agreements. See Table 3:

<sup>29</sup> Rocha Menocal, A. (2009) 'State-Building for Peace' – A New Paradigm for International Engagement in Post-conflict Fragile States?', background paper prepared for the *European Report for Development* (2009).



**Table 3: Issues addressed in contemporary peace agreements**

| Themes  | Examples of issues <sup>30</sup>   |
|---|--|
| <b>Military/security</b>  | Ceasefires; decommissioning, demobilisation, reintegration; security sector  |
| <b>Governance arrangements</b>  | Constitution; power sharing; transitional governments; elections; democratisation; political pluralism; state structure  |
| <b>Socio-economic</b>   | Land reform; natural resource management; revenue sharing; reconstruction  |
| <b>Legal-judicial</b>   | Human rights monitoring; amnesties; prisoner releases; judicial reform   |
| <b>Transitional justice</b>   | Tribunals; truth commissions; reparations; property restitution; lustration <sup>31</sup>  |
| <b>Exclusion</b><br>(based on gender, ethnicity, religion and other factors)  | Policies to support equality, identity groups, non-discrimination and effective participation; voice and accountability programmes that focus especially on excluded groups (e.g. women, youth, disabled, ethnic groups) |
| <b>Humanitarian</b><br>(in accordance with IHL, human rights and refugee law) | Access to humanitarian assistance and protection; demining; return and reintegration or refugees and displaced persons; missing persons; separated families; detainees   |

54. Peace processes should engage all parties that are sufficiently powerful to prolong conflict, but should not be limited to armed groups. Negotiations should incorporate those who have historically been excluded (e.g. women or indigenous minorities).<sup>32</sup> They are most effective when there is a peace process support strategy involving formal and informal levels, including leaders of conflict parties (track 1), individuals close to them (track 2), and CSOs (track 3) that can address perceptions and stereotypes which sustain conflict.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Adapted from Barnes, C. (2009) 'Re-negotiating Political Settlements', draft paper prepared for DFID.

<sup>31</sup> Lustration is a process which vets those who have committed past human rights abuses, to exclude them from certain public offices.

<sup>32</sup> UN SCR 1325 requires member states to ensure women's participation in all dimensions of peace-building.

<sup>33</sup> See [www.c-r.org/our-work/influencing-policy/peace-process-support-strategies.php](http://www.c-r.org/our-work/influencing-policy/peace-process-support-strategies.php) for information on peace process support strategies, and Paffenholz, T. and Spurk, C. (2006) *Civil Society, Civic Engagement and Peacebuilding*, World Bank Working Paper Series, Washington DC

**Box 6: An inclusive peace process in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea<sup>34</sup>**

Between 1988 and 1997, Bougainville was embroiled in a violent campaign for independence from Papua New Guinea (PNG). With a deeply divided population, the peace process began by building consensus between parties, with talks facilitated by New Zealand. Direct talks with the PNG government followed.

The main negotiations in 1999 yielded agreements on the following:

(i) a constitutionally guaranteed referendum on independence, deferred for 10–15 years; (ii) constitutional reform for high levels of autonomy; and (iii) Bougainville disarmament matched by withdrawal of the state army. The agreement was implemented sequentially, with steps for one party reciprocated by the other.

External actors provided sensitive facilitation and technical support to the peace process, including security for talks, capacity-building for both negotiations teams and technical advice on constitutional reform and weapons disposal.<sup>35</sup> Reconstruction aid was matched with state-orientated technical assistance (e.g. on community policing and administrative reform) and efforts to maximise the peace-building contribution of aid. For example, a road rehabilitation project required the international contractor to develop numerous small construction businesses along the road route, involving former combatants and communities.

55. Identifying other ways in which the international community can support the emergence of an inclusive political settlement, while respecting state sovereignty, can be difficult. Support to democratic and political processes in fragile countries can promote inclusive decision making, create incentives for governments to develop a wider support base, including women and excluded groups, and encourage the peaceful transfer of power.
56. Donor support has often focused on elections. Elections can legitimise a new government internally and internationally, as in Nepal, DRC and Sierra Leone in recent years. But they can also destabilise an already fragile situation by renewing contestation for power,<sup>36</sup> or by giving formal legitimacy to leaders and elites who may have little interest in inclusive peace or the interests of the population. The timing of elections in post-conflict and fragile situations is particularly challenging.<sup>37</sup> The state may be unable to meet public expectations that are inevitably heightened by elections.<sup>38</sup> An environment may not yet exist to ensure elections contribute to a wider process of democratisation (e.g. a free and responsible media).
57. However, postponing democratic reforms until perfectly functioning institutions are in place is unrealistic. If left too late, the concentration of power within the hands of elite groups, without democratic checks and balances, may bring greater risks and reinforce the causes of conflict and instability. An incremental approach to supporting democratic

<sup>34</sup> Case study provided by Conciliation Resources. See *Weaving the Consensus: The Papua New Guinea – Bougainville Peace Process*. Available at [www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/png-bougainville/contents.php](http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/png-bougainville/contents.php)

<sup>35</sup> Australia had close relationship with the PNG government, including in defence cooperation, so was careful to play an indirect supporting role.

<sup>36</sup> Walters, B. (2002) *Committing to Peace*, Princeton University Press, Princeton. The author argues that constitutional arrangements that safeguard the interests of election losers are critical in post-conflict situations.

<sup>37</sup> UK Government How To Note on Electoral Assistance, forthcoming

<sup>38</sup> Snyder, J. (2000) *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*, W. W. Norton, London; Paris, R. (2004) *At War's End. Building Peace after Conflict*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

politics is needed.<sup>39</sup> This will have the greatest impact where international efforts are in line with internal drivers for reform. It means seeing elections as only one step in a much broader process towards building a more inclusive political system, as reflected in DFID's programme in DRC:

### Box 7: Supporting democratic reforms in DRC

In 2006, DRC held credible national elections. They took place shortly after the end of the conflict, without many of the ideal preconditions for elections. Despite this, a recent study concludes that they had a positive effect:<sup>40</sup>

- Participation in national elections produced a shift to groups seeking legitimacy through popular will, and weeded out those leaders at local and national level without a popular base.
- The electoral winner gained authority, partly through efforts to attain legitimacy, which matters for the international community, but mainly through the control of patronage opportunities.
- The international community was relatively successful in taking preventive action to reduce risks and manage outbreaks of violence; the AU sent a panel of three eminent persons to DRC to monitor pre-election conflict and facilitate dialogue.
- The stability and legitimacy of the post-election settlement depended on strengthening state capacity: in particular, its ability to provide security and regain control over its territory, monopolise tax revenues and provide services at a local level.

Democracy in DRC will require long-term donor commitment and a focus on strengthening accountability mechanisms. DFID's programme now includes assistance to parliament, political parties and the electoral commission; anti-corruption; decentralisation programmes; and work with civil society and the media to improve accountability and transparency.



Voters in the Democratic Republic of Congo are issued with identity cards ahead of the elections

### Objective 3: Develop core state functions

58. There are some functions that the state must be able to perform to govern its territory and operate at the most basic level. Evidence suggests that three are indispensable: (i) security; (ii) law and justice; and (iii) financial and macroeconomic management.<sup>41</sup> But without a clear focus on improving accountability within each function, there is a risk that the state will exert control without responding to the population's needs, creating a strong but potentially repressive state.

<sup>39</sup> Carothers, T. (2007), 'How Democracies Emerge: The Sequencing Fallacy', *Journal of Democracy* 18 (1).

<sup>40</sup> Kadima, D., Leonard, D. and Schmidt, A. (2008) 'Elections and Democratisation in the Democratic Republic of Congo', paper prepared for DFID.

<sup>41</sup> See Whaites, A. (2008).

## What does this mean for DFID and our external partners?

### Security<sup>42</sup>

59. Without security for the people and the state, the economy and public services cannot function and positive peace cannot be achieved (e.g. Somalia and Afghanistan). The state needs to be able to protect itself and its territory from internal and external challenges by establishing a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. A responsible and accountable security sector is also essential for building the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the population. Critically, the governed should have confidence that they will be protected by the police, the military and the justice system.
60. Effective support to security sector reform requires coordination between development, diplomacy and defence actors. It also requires a focus on accountability and oversight of security functions. This may involve working with state and non-state security systems (e.g. informal policing structures and community safety groups), and on the links between security and justice institutions, to ensure the system works as a whole.

### Box 8: A coordinated, holistic approach to security sector reform in Sierra Leone

DFID, FCO and MOD have come together to support the Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme, which embraces a wide range of state and non-state institutions. These include the Office of National Security, intelligence, defence, police, internal affairs and accountability institutions (parliament, civil society, media and academia). Local ownership of reform has been transferred to the Sierra Leone Ministry of Defence, where principles of accountability, civilian leadership and good management are being adopted.



A newly built Family Support Unit in Sierra Leone. The Family Support Units have been set up within the police to deal with cases of sexual and child abuse

The linkages between security and justice institutions have also been strengthened through the DFID-funded Justice Sector Development Programme – particularly the police, prisons and judiciary – to improve case management. Building on these two successful programmes, the aim is to design a new integrated security and justice programme that will support a series of interlocking interventions across the security and justice sectors.

A recent case study observed that ‘the revised national security agenda of Sierra Leone displays a remarkably progressive understanding of threats to peace and security in the country, emphasising the persistent lack of human security over regional threats’.<sup>43</sup> DFID was perceived to have been effective in building capacity and giving full responsibility to national bodies. The armed forces were effectively downsized and the capacities of the national police force were increased, helping to facilitate free and fair elections in 2007 and 2008.

<sup>42</sup> For further guidance see OECD DAC (2007) *Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice*. Available at: [www.oecd.org/dac/incaft/ssr](http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaft/ssr)

<sup>43</sup> Sierra Leone case study, in London School of Economics and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (2009) ‘State-Building in Fragile Situations – How Can Donors ‘Do No Harm’ and Maximise their Positive Impact? Summary of the Country Case Studies’, joint study prepared for the OECD DAC.

61. Gender dimensions are important, although often neglected in international responses. Entrenched social attitudes and gender-biased criminal justice systems mean that most victims of violence (including at the hands of state organisations) suffer in silence, with little recourse to justice or support. Alongside support for victims of violence, greater attention should be given to preventive measures – for example, legislation, gender awareness-raising within police and military structures, working with men and boys and tackling perpetrator impunity.<sup>44</sup>

## Law and justice

62. The state must be able to establish laws and rules that govern the behaviour of the state and society. These underpin predictable economic, political and social interactions. To build state legitimacy, this must be done in a transparent and fair way. In fragile countries, there are likely to be formal and informal ‘rules’, which do not necessarily complement each other.
63. In a responsive and accountable state, a focus on establishing rules evolves into respect for the rule of law. This means that the law is applied fairly and without discrimination, whether by state or non-state justice systems, and there is mutual agreement on the rights and obligations shared by society and the state. The rule of law also includes mechanisms to ensure state institutions are accountable and comply with international standards (e.g. on corruption, human rights and humanitarian issues), and an independent judiciary and civil society that can hold state officials to account.
64. International actors can support the development of formal systems of rules and laws, such as justice sector reforms, protection of property rights, economic regulation and trade, constitution-making and the establishment of anti-corruption mechanisms. Ultimately, everyone should have access to appropriate, affordable systems that protect their rights, keep their families safe and resolve disputes fairly and promptly. Achieving this requires a people-centred approach that recognises the importance of civil, commercial and family law alongside criminal justice.
65. A major challenge is to develop a deeper understanding of informal institutions and traditional systems, and assess whether and how these can help support equal access to justice and the rule of law. In many fragile countries, the majority of people seek justice through informal means. In Nepal, it is estimated that 85% of disputes in rural areas are settled by traditional dispute management practices. Efforts are needed to encourage non-state and state actors to work together, as illustrated in Nigeria.

<sup>44</sup> Klot, J. (2007) ‘Women and Peace-building’. Available at: <http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/Working%20Group%20on%20Lessons%20Learned/WGLLbackgroundpaper%2029.01.08.pdf> .

### Box 9: Supporting formal and informal justice systems in Nigeria

In Nigeria, the rules governing people's daily interactions are established through formal and informal institutions and at various levels (international, federal, state, community, religious and tribal). The majority of Nigerian citizens tend to rely on traditional leaders, customary courts or community-based security providers as their first port of call.

DFID Nigeria is working with a range of different security and justice service providers. These include the formal court system and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (such as citizen mediation centres) to promote access to justice, the Nigeria Police Force, and selected informal policing structures (such as 'neighbourhood watch' arrangements). Improving the capacity of informal policing structures has enabled them to work within the law, and increased their respect for human rights. Integrating their roles within the operations of the formal police has helped them become more accountable to the communities they serve. DFID also supports the training of traditional rulers and customary court judges in the use of simplified procedural guidelines to help guarantee fair hearings.

## Financial and macro-economic management

### Financial

66. States need to raise and manage revenue (e.g. from taxation, aid or natural resources). The state's ability to generate taxes has important implications for the relationship between state and society. Sequencing issues need careful consideration, as tax collection without capacity to deliver services in return may increase instability. Where taxes are raised and managed responsibly, they can have a significant impact on people's trust in state institutions.<sup>45</sup> Effective taxation is illustrated in Rwanda:

### Box 10: Rwanda Revenue Authority: Strengthening Taxation<sup>46</sup>

The Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA) was established in 1997 as a semi-autonomous executive agency. With substantial financial and technical support from DFID, and driven by high-level political commitment to change on the part of Rwanda's leadership, the RRA has helped raise revenue collection from 8.5% of GDP to over 15% of GDP.

Setting out to overcome the legacy of civil war and genocide, it has focused on strengthening state–society relations by offering a credible and stable tax system that seeks to promote economic growth and political stability. Its slogan is 'Taxes for Growth and Development'. The RRA has arguably contributed to developing a culture of participation and citizenship as part of a wider process of establishing the norms and practices of democratic governance.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>45</sup> See Everest-Phillips, M. (2010) 'State-Building Taxation for Developing Countries: Principles for Reform', *Development Policy Review*, 28 (10), for seven operating principles that link taxation and state-building.

<sup>46</sup> World Bank (2006) 'The Rwandan Revenue Authority Project', World Bank Note, Washington DC

<sup>47</sup> Land, T. (2004) 'Developing Capacity for Tax Administration: The Rwanda Revenue Authority', ECDPM Discussion Paper 57D.

67. It is important to support the state to manage revenue from other sources, such as aid and natural resources, in an accountable way. This will help to reduce the risk of corruption and seeking of illicit gains by elites. Supporting global initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative can complement support for public financial management at the national level. Donors should also seek to ensure equitable allocation of public resources across groups, including women.

### **Macroeconomic**

68. Macroeconomic stability is needed to inspire confidence that the government has the means to deliver on public expectations. It is essential for governments to implement policies that address fiscal and trade deficits and debt arrears, stabilise inflation, secure a stable currency, regulate exchange rates and reserves, and provide basic monetary and financial regulation (e.g. by strengthening central banks). International actors can support partner governments to analyse macroeconomic policy options, recognising that some options may be politically difficult or disadvantage certain groups.

69. The following table illustrates sample objectives for the core functions outlined above:

**Table 4: Examples of objectives in support of core functions**

| Core function                                 | DFID/partner objectives (examples)  |
|---|---|
| <b>Security</b>                               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Work with state and non-state security institutions to protect the personal safety and property of people, and establish a state monopoly on the legitimate use of force.</li> <li>• Strengthen civilian oversight and accountability of security institutions to tackle violence against the population and hold those responsible to account.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>Law and justice</b>                        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Work with state and non-state justice institutions to establish an environment based on transparent, predictable and fair rules, and improve access to justice for poor and excluded people.</li> <li>• Encourage respect for the rule of law by state and non-state actors, including establishing mechanisms to hold state actors to account.</li> <li>• Encourage adherence to obligations under international law, including international human rights and humanitarian law.</li> </ul> |
| <b>Financial and macroeconomic management</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support the state to raise and manage different sources of revenue (in a transparent, accountable manner).</li> <li>• Ensure aid is delivered in ways which strengthen (or do not undermine) the state's ability to manage funds effectively.</li> <li>• Work with state institutions to ensure a minimum level of financial and economic stability and sound macro-economic management.</li> </ul>  |

70. In order to deliver core and expected functions, states need a minimum level of **administrative capacity**. But building a competent, meritocratic civil service in which jobs are distributed on the basis of competence rather than patronage is a long-term process, which requires a fundamental shift in attitudes among elites.

71. As donors, we need to ensure that our own practices do not harm the development of an effective civil service. Higher salaries paid to those working for international organisations compared with those on civil service wages can have negative impacts on performance.<sup>48</sup> In Afghanistan, competition with international wage rates means the government cannot recruit or retain good staff at salary levels it can afford. DFID Afghanistan has a policy on donor salary top-ups, to ensure these are accompanied by improvements to the performance incentives of the public sector.<sup>49</sup>
72. Choosing which core functions of the state should be prioritised for international assistance will depend on the outcome of robust political economy analysis. In Afghanistan, DFID views sub-national governance as a core function given its importance for the state's ability to maintain control over its territory. Deconcentration and delegating spending and planning authority have often been considered the best response to the challenge of uneven state presence. This may promote accountability by improving service delivery to local communities and 'bringing government closer to the people'. But it may also strengthen local power brokers, or replicate inefficiencies of the central state.<sup>50</sup> In Afghanistan, an incremental approach to deconcentration is needed, focusing initially on creating linkages between the central government in Kabul, local government and other local institutions.

### Objective 3: Respond to public expectations

73. This objective focuses on state functions and behaviours which are expected by the population. States need to be seen to meet public expectations in order to maintain legitimacy and stability. The negotiation process around citizens' expectations, and whether the state is doing enough to meet them, can help improve state performance. In fragile contexts, public goods may be delivered in a biased and selective manner that helps maintain an exclusionary political settlement.



A woman addressing a community meeting in Guinea

Addressing this is essential to improve confidence in the state, and to address grievances.

74. Society's expectations of the state are diverse, and relate to people's understanding of their rights and entitlements. Expectations may range from jobs and inclusive growth, to provision of public services. There may also be expectations about the quality of governance, such as an open political system with fair elections, free media, freedom of information and association, and protection of other human rights.

<sup>48</sup> *Op. cit.* London School of Economics and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (2009).

<sup>49</sup> See **DFID Briefing Paper B (Do No Harm)** for the full case study.

<sup>50</sup> *Op. cit.* Fritz and Rocha Menochal (2007).



## What does this mean for DFID and our external partners?

75. International actors should be careful not to make assumptions about the expectations of different groups in society. Research into public expectations may be needed. Following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2006) in Nepal, DFID commissioned a series of public expectation surveys to identify priorities for peace and state reform. This was influential in shaping donor strategies.
76. The rest of this section highlights examples of public expectations that are likely to be high priority in many fragile contexts.

## Inclusive growth and job creation

77. The development of a healthy, diverse private sector is essential for jobs and tax revenues. Elites need to see an advantage in investing their funds in the country, rather than in foreign banks. The state can play a central role in providing the infrastructure and regulations for market development, not only for foreign direct investment, but also for domestic producers and investors (many of whom may be women).<sup>51</sup>



Local tailors in the rebuilt bazaar in the old centre of Dakovica, Kosovo, which was almost totally destroyed during the 1999 conflict

- Expanded social insurance packages and basic living allowances can also help prevent women's engagement in commercial sex or other exploitative practices.
78. International support to promote private sector development might include: supporting national institutions and regulatory frameworks to protect property rights, contracts and other market transactions; providing an efficient communications and energy infrastructure; promoting private investment, competition and consumer benefits; and providing easier access to credit. Donors should work with governments to help simplify procedures for setting up small businesses, and address the drivers of the informal economy, which keep businesses small and wages low.
  79. Job creation and ensuring that local people, especially women and youth, have the appropriate skills and opportunities to enter the labour market are critical. Inclusive growth that supports job creation can play a key role in diffusing possible conflict. Growth must be equitable, and in the short term the focus should be on vulnerable groups (e.g. training ex-combatants in Liberia). In the longer term, there is a need for strategies to build human capital, such as secondary and tertiary education.

<sup>51</sup> See World Bank (1997) *World Development Report: The State in a Changing World*; and World Bank (2002) *World Development Report: Building Institutions for Markets*, World Bank, Washington DC

### Box 11: Economic reintegration programme in post-conflict Liberia

Following the disarmament and demobilisation phase, ex-combatants became eligible for reintegration assistance under a UNDP programme. Options available to participants included vocational skills training (e.g. in carpentry, masonry, tailoring, auto mechanics and agriculture), apprenticeships, formal education, and financial and start-up support for agriculture and alternative livelihoods. Other benefits included subsistence allowances, counselling and temporary employment opportunities.



Demobilised youth receiving training in motor mechanics skills at a rehabilitation centre in Liberia

### Basic services

80. Basic services include security and justice (see paras. 59–65), as well as health, education, social protection and water and sanitation. Political elites engage in service delivery for different reasons, such as promoting social cohesion or consolidating their power base and buying loyalty. Alternative service providers may exist alongside the state, but these will have differences in coverage, price and quality. Service delivery can help improve state–society relations, but if handled poorly, can sow discord and discrimination (e.g. school curricula that reinforce divisions). The Sudan example shows how education programmes can be designed to reduce local conflict (see Box 12).



Women with their babies waiting to see the nurse at a health centre in Freetown, Sierra Leone

### Box 12: Education in Abyei, Sudan: building common interests

Abyei is an area disputed between the governments of north and south Sudan, populated by a mix of Dinka and Misserya communities. Following the peace agreement, large numbers of internally displaced people were encouraged to return to the area, putting pressures on limited resources. Relief efforts focused on the groups most affected by the war, and so tended to favour the Dinka, creating resentment among Misserya. Analysis supported by DFID identified this as a potential source of conflict between the two communities.

The Integrated Strategic Plan for Abyei identified education as a key priority for both communities. In response to rising tensions and against a background of limited local capacity, DFID has supported UNICEF to develop and implement a rapid school building and education programme. The goal is to reduce conflict and support the implementation of the peace agreement through creating school places and basic education programmes for adolescents, serving both communities, thus creating a point of common interest.

81. Political economy and conflict analysis should be integrated with needs analysis in the design of sector programmes. Donors should think carefully about the nature of support for basic services from a state-building and peace-building perspective, including which services should be prioritised, how to provide support, when, and for whom. The state does not need to meet all expectations or deliver all public services directly. But it should be able to organise and regulate the activities of those who are delivering them, including NGOs and private companies. In Afghanistan, a new DFID programme to support informal justice systems includes a central role for the state as regulator.

### Links with other approaches

82. Ensuring coherence between different international approaches will help maximise the added value of our efforts and minimise the risk of doing harm. This section considers two important approaches that relate to state-building and peace-building: humanitarian action and stabilisation.

#### Humanitarian action

83. Where people's lives and dignity are at risk, one of the leading international responses is humanitarian action. While the primary purpose is the alleviation of suffering, there are complementarities between the humanitarian, peace-building and state-building agendas. Humanitarian action is concerned with addressing the effects of conflict as well as potential causes. If humanitarian needs are not addressed, grievances are likely to increase and public expectations will remain unmet.



Sudanese women carry jerry cans from a water point to their temporary shelter in a refugee camp in Chad

84. In severely conflict-affected situations, humanitarian action may be the only way to provide basic services. International actors should ensure that such efforts help maintain state capacity during crises (where feasible) and are built upon in longer term capacity-building work. At the same time, building the state's long-term capacity to deliver services to the population should not distract from the international community's responsibility to meet humanitarian needs wherever they exist, when the state is unable or unwilling to do so.
85. A smooth transition from humanitarian to development programmes in the 'early recovery' phase (post-conflict) is critical to the success of peace-building and state-building strategies. There is a responsibility on both the humanitarian and development communities to address the 'early recovery gap' that is often created by a sudden cut-off between humanitarian and development programmes. We need to ensure the right architecture and processes are in place.<sup>52</sup>

### Stabilisation

86. In severely conflict-affected situations, levels of insecurity make normal development and governance interventions impossible. The stabilisation approach is designed to reduce conflict, provide sufficient stability to kick-start a political process and begin to address the underlying causes of conflict. It is the 'first step' towards progress on state-building and peace-building in very insecure environments. The UK may be pursuing a range of objectives simultaneously, and stabilisation, development and humanitarian activities may share the same operational space. Every effort should be made to reduce tensions between approaches and increase complementarity. All activities must also be consistent with international humanitarian law.



Boots and shoes are left outside a room where Norwegian ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) troops meet with local leaders in Afghanistan


<sup>52</sup> United Nations (2009) 'Report of the Secretary-General on Peace-building in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict'. Available at: [http://es.unrol.org/doc.aspx?n=pbf\\_090611\\_sg.pdf](http://es.unrol.org/doc.aspx?n=pbf_090611_sg.pdf)

### Box 13: Links with stabilisation

Stabilisation involves three dimensions:

- (i) *Preventing, stopping or reducing violent conflict* – often using military engagement and sometimes only in small areas. This lays the groundwork for Objective 1 (address causes and effects of conflict and fragility, and build resolution mechanisms);
- (ii) *Protecting people and their livelihoods*. This is an important component of Objective 1 (security for the people as a core function), and Objective 4 (responding to public expectations);
- (iii) *Preparing for peace*. This helps to lay the groundwork for a more inclusive political settlement, and a minimum level of state functionality through support to core state functions – Objectives 2 and 3.

#### Integrating stabilisation into the approach



Stabilisation, state-building and peace-building together combine short-term actions to establish good enough security and stability with actions to address the structural causes of conflict, poverty and instability over the medium to longer term. This enables us to engage earlier (e.g. pre-peace process) and more effectively in an ongoing conflict. And it helps us to fill the gap between violent instability and the establishment of normal diplomatic, development and security relations.

## 3. Key Operational implications

87. This section outlines ways in which the integrated approach to state-building and peace-building will change development practice on partnerships, analysis, strategy and planning, and programme delivery in conflict-affected and fragile countries. The typology in **Annex B** sets out questions to be considered in five types of conflict-affected and fragile situations. **Annex C** illustrates ways in which the approach can help improve our work in four different sectors.
88. The integrated approach is not intended to provide all the answers; it should be applied with some humility, given the scale and complexity of the challenge. In some countries, the integrated framework is already being used to inform analysis, DFID country plans and the development of UK strategies, but we are in the early stages of testing out its application. The approach provides a starting point for dialogue between development actors and their partners, and can help guide decision making and priorities in the most challenging environments.

### 3.1 Recognise that politics are central to our work in conflict-affected and fragile countries

89. This requires a significant shift in mindset and perspective from a traditional development approach. State-building and peace-building are political processes. Effective support requires a high level of political awareness, identification of opportunities to support social and political change, and an understanding of elite politics and the nature of the political settlement.
90. In partnership with the diplomatic community, development actors need to be able to make judgements about how best to support positive state-building and peace-building dynamics, and how to avoid reinforcing negative political trends. In Timor Leste from 2002 to 2006, a lack of political understanding and conflict analysis among international actors led to a flawed state-building strategy, which contributed to the centralisation of power in the executive branch of government and at the national level, and exacerbated political and economic exclusion.<sup>53</sup>
91. All donor actions have political ramifications. Financial support to strengthen state functions can consolidate the position of the incumbent regime and shift the balance of power between elites. Equally, support to enhance the voice and well-being of excluded groups is not a neutral activity; it strengthens their position in society and has important social and political ramifications. Political analysis should inform programme design and the development dialogue with partner governments.

### 3.2 Build consensus with our external partners

92. Ensuring that development, political and security approaches are coherent is a prerequisite for effective engagement. The UK government is committed to developing joint cross-departmental strategies in all fragile countries where they do not already

<sup>53</sup> Adapted from Norad (2007) 'Review of Development Co-operation in Timor Leste'. Available at: <http://www.norad.no/en/Tools+and+publications/Publications/Publication+Page?key=109749>

exist.<sup>54</sup> The UK Stabilisation Unit has planning capacity and guidance to support the development of these strategies.

93. No single donor or international player can address conflict and fragility alone. Building peaceful states and societies should ideally be at the heart of joint assessments (such as joint UN/World Bank/EC Post Conflict Needs Assessments) and national strategies (such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers or Transitional Results Frameworks) in conflict-affected and fragile situations.
94. In many contexts the UK and other bilateral donors will be supporting a multilateral-led international effort. To improve multilateral-led coordination and performance, we are pursuing a number of reform efforts, particularly focused on improving the coherence and effectiveness of the UN, World Bank and EU. These include pressing for sufficient levels of high-quality, appropriately skilled staff in the field, and improving the management of UN/World Bank-led Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs).
95. As outlined in the UN Secretary General's Report on Peacebuilding, an effective approach requires (i) strong UN leadership in country, (ii) joint needs assessments, and (iii) strategies which bring together the international system behind government priorities. It also requires: strengthened national and international capacity; fast, flexible financing mechanisms; and effective partnership between the UN and the World Bank, including agreement on their roles and responsibilities in the key peace-building and state-building sectors. Country offices can support the implementation and monitoring of these reform efforts – see **DFID Briefing Paper F (Coordination)**.

### 3.3 Analyse the context using the integrated framework...

96. In fragile countries, context analysis is especially important. Experience shows that where there is a lack of such analysis, donor actions can lead to more harm than good. In Rwanda in 1994, donors failed to identify and address the underlying conditions of the genocide, and instead pursued a 'narrow economic-technical approach'.<sup>55</sup> **DFID Briefing Paper B (Do No Harm)** provides further examples.
97. DFID has developed a range of analytical tools to help understand state-building and peace-building dynamics and the implications for our programmes. **DFID Briefing Paper A (Analysis)** provides a summary of these tools and a range of country examples. The tools include Country Governance Analysis, Political Economy Analysis, Strategic Conflict Assessments, and Gender and Social Exclusion Analysis. The UK's Countries at Risk of Instability framework is useful for capturing national, regional and global dimensions together. Drivers of Radicalisation studies have helped identify grievances or extremist influences, and ways to prevent them from escalating.
98. However, translating analytical findings into practical changes to programmes can be challenging. Applying the integrated approach to state-building and peace-building not only requires a concerted focus on context analysis, but also a thorough assessment of the implications for programme choices. DFID country offices have started explicitly

<sup>54</sup> DFID (2009) *Op. cit.*

<sup>55</sup> Uvin, P. (1999) 'Development Aid and Structural Violence: The Case of Rwanda', *Development*, 42 (3).

analysing state-building dynamics and their implications, as illustrated in Box 14. Future analysis should cover all four objectives of the integrated approach, including peace-building dimensions, as well as regional and global issues.

#### **Box 14: Understanding state-building dynamics in Afghanistan**

DFID Afghanistan used the DFID state-building framework developed in 2008 to improve its understanding of the relationships between political, human development and governance issues. The exercise formed part of a wide-ranging context analysis process called 'Understanding Afghanistan' and informed the development of DFID's approach within the UK strategy for Afghanistan. The use of the framework helped to illustrate the relationship between increased corruption and problems with the political settlement, as well as stalled progress on revenue generation and management capacity. It also demonstrated that for Afghanistan, establishing sub-national government fitted the criteria for a core function, along with anti-corruption, public administration reform, tax, security and justice. Finally, it suggested a long-term focus on state–society relations.

### **3.4 ... leading to different priorities and choices**

99. The integrated framework should first be used to review an existing country strategy and programme, to offer a fresh view on strategic direction and priorities. Applying the framework can be challenging as it may raise questions around current strategy and choices. However, it should be viewed as an opportunity to improve engagement, and to ensure we 'do no harm'. Kenya provides an early example:

#### **Box 15: A state-building 'health check' in Kenya**

In Kenya, DFID and FCO undertook an analysis of state-building and its implications in September 2008. The process concluded that the state-building lens provided a useful means of identifying critical objectives, beyond the MDGs. It highlighted the fragile nature of the political settlement, the risks of a return to violence and the limited potential for reform. It identified gross failures in core state functions, in particular state control of violence and the rule of law. It concluded that a renewed focus on judicial and police reform was needed.

The analysis also identified that the DFID Kenya programme may have been neglecting, or even undermining, state-building through its major service delivery programmes. Traditional DFID sectoral approaches may overlook critical sources of fragility, such as youth, exclusion, urbanisation and informal settlements. New partnerships and change agents may help strengthen the fragile political settlement, such as youth, the middle class, the business sector and the media – actors who will be integrated into the new Drivers of Accountability Programme.



100. This stage should include clarifying future strategic direction and objectives, and considering how best to align and position a country programme in light of the integrated approach. This will depend on context (see Annex B).

101. For example, Yemen is a deteriorating governance environment with declining state legitimacy and rising risks of instability and conflict. DFID has brought a focus on state-building and peace-building into the renewed UK strategy. UK objectives 2010 to 2012 are based on analysis of the key issues that need to be addressed to slow down Yemen's decline and buy time for longer term reform and state-building. Priorities are:



Young soldiers in Sana'a, Yemen

- Yemen builds **political structures** that govern in the best interests of all Yemenis (short term);
- Yemen must address the **causes of conflict** and build solutions;
- Government of Yemen effectively addresses Yemen's role as an **incubator of terrorist threats**; and
- External support to deliver **services and jobs** to the population (short term), and if political will is demonstrated, Yemen must develop its capacity to deliver the **functions of the state** expected by its citizens (long-term).

The next step is to take decisions on specific priorities and allocate resources to deliver. Depending on the stage of the country planning cycle, this may feed directly into a new country plan, or it may mean adjusting priorities and resources within an existing portfolio. **The key is to use the approach to prioritise rigorously.** In Nepal, an integrated approach to state-building and peace-building has informed priorities within the DFID country plan and UK strategy:

### Box 16: Aligning with state-building and peace-building objectives in Nepal

In 2006, Nepal emerged from a ten-year conflict driven by decades of poverty, exclusion and an unresponsive state. Key challenges for the country included redefining the nature of the political settlement and renegotiating the relationship between citizens and the state. A UN political mission was established in 2007 at the request of the conflict parties to support the Constituent Assembly and the entire peace process.



Villagers in front of pro-Mao-ist graffiti in Rukum district, Nepal

Building on previous work to address the causes of conflict and fragility – particularly the Gender and Social Exclusion Assessment initiated by the World Bank and DFID to understand the political, social and economic exclusion of women and non-elite groups – the UK increased its political and financial resources to support critical elements of a peace-building and state-building agenda which are in line with the integrated approach. These included:

- Support to the **peace process** through joint donor funds to implement the peace agreement; and through building domestic capacity to engage in the process.
- Work to foster an **inclusive political settlement** by: supporting poor and excluded groups to articulate their needs and views; strengthening new political leaders and voices; supporting elections to the Constituent Assembly; and facilitating dialogue among the parties on the management of political tensions across the country;
- Support to strengthen the **core functions of the state** – including public security, public financial management, more inclusive and accountable central and local state institutions, and planning and monitoring functions;
- Strengthening **service delivery** capacity and supporting **growth and job creation** strategies in order to deliver stability and a ‘peace dividend’ through development; and
- Producing up-to-date **political economy and peace analysis** to inform UK government internal planning processes and debates on issues such as federalism and local governance.

Focusing on this agenda has meant a lower priority afforded to other issues (e.g. water, HIV/AIDS). While these issues were clearly important, they were, in DFID’s analysis, less critical for consolidating peace than growth and employment, and were to some extent being covered by other donors. Our experience suggests that such choices must be informed by a careful analysis of ongoing and emerging opportunities for sustaining the peace-building and state-building effort, and must take account of the potential harm that disengaging from a sector might have on people, communities and political processes.

102. The process of prioritisation may mean reconsidering the relative priority given to traditional areas of development programming. The degree to which delivery of basic services and growth strategies should be prioritised will depend on an assessment of needs, and on their contribution to state-building and peace-building objectives. Service delivery and job creation may be critical to achieving state legitimacy (even where the state is not a direct provider) and responding to public expectations.
103. Issues of gender equality, human rights and inclusion must be considered as part of strategy and programming decisions:

### Box 17: Why gender matters for building peaceful states and societies<sup>56</sup>

Unlike other inequalities and types of exclusion (e.g. on the basis of religion, ethnicity or caste), gender inequality is not usually a key cause of conflict, and addressing it is often seen as a lower priority. But responding to gender inequality early is a crucial element of state-building and peace-building strategies. If gender is deprioritised, inequalities can become entrenched in new or rebuilt systems and it is much more difficult to bring about positive change at a later stage.

Peace-building and state-building can offer unique opportunities to address the inequities and injustices of the past, while setting new precedents for the future. Efforts to reshape gender relations are central to addressing the legacy of violent conflict (which often disproportionately affects women), to building inclusive state–society relations, and to increasing the prospects of a durable peace by maximising the contribution that women can make. Research by RAND on Afghanistan sets out strong arguments that an early emphasis on gender equity and women’s inclusion is central to building a stable state.<sup>57</sup>

**Briefing Paper D (Non-discrimination)** provides further guidance on how to consider gender, human rights and inclusion as part of the integrated approach.



Women at a community meeting in the Democratic Republic of Congo

104. As noted earlier, significant dilemmas may emerge when prioritising. In Afghanistan, counter-narcotics activity is an important part of creating a more formal, licit economy that will increase public revenues through taxation. However, this threatens the interests of powerful elites, state officials and warlords complicit in drug trafficking and may, in the short term, increase conflict. Similarly, counter-insurgency work needs to ensure that short-term measures to address security concerns do not undermine public confidence in the state.

<sup>56</sup> Adapted from **DFID Briefing Paper D (Non-discrimination)**, and from Klot (2007) *op. cit.*

<sup>57</sup> Benard, C., Jones, S., Oliker, O., Thurston, C., Stearns, B. and Cordell, K. (2008) 'Women and Nation-Building'. Available at: [www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND\\_MG579.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG579.pdf)

### Box 18: Difficult choices: Peace, security and state-building in Sierra Leone

In 2001, following ten years of conflict, Sierra Leone was confronted with serious challenges to consolidate peace and become a democratic and effective state. DFID's political economy and conflict analysis concluded that security and restoration of the rule of law were preconditions for progress in other areas; it also found that building the state and transforming formal and informal power-sharing mechanisms were critical to the peace-building process.

DFID and donor partners took difficult choices about what to prioritise and how to manage the tensions between short-term and long-term objectives. It was agreed that in the first few years, DFID would primarily invest in: (i) building the key capacities of the state; and (ii) supporting progress on security, to sustain the peace. Service delivery and growth promotion were seen as second-generation reform areas, with budget support the main delivery mechanism.

Part of the rationale for limiting support to service delivery initially was that other development partners would cover this sufficiently. The recent Country Programme Evaluation found that this did not hold true, highlighting the importance of continually reassessing priorities and monitoring assumptions. By 2007, DFID had increased its support to service delivery and civil society (reflected in a new joint EC/DFID strategy) and started to shift the focus away from security.

The evaluation concluded that DFID has made a significant contribution to the restoration of peace and stability in Sierra Leone. Human security has improved since the end of the conflict, but Sierra Leone remains fragile. Questions remain about whether a stronger focus on service delivery at an earlier stage was needed. However, this would have required a much larger aid framework, or reducing other areas of the programme.

## 3.5 Engage at the interface between state and society

105. When considering specific programme interventions, we must identify opportunities to work at the interface between state and society. This may require a shift away from the traditional donor focus on central government, towards a 'bottom-up' approach that engages with non-state and community-level institutions. The aim is to link state and society in ways that promote inclusive decision making and accountability.
106. International actors should avoid making assumptions about informal and non-state institutions; such institutions can compete with the state in negative ways, but they can also provide a bridge between the state and society. Empirical research should be carried out to identify the challenges and opportunities they present.<sup>58</sup>
107. Working through formal CSOs is often an appropriate channel for engaging with informal or customary institutions. For example, DFID funding supports the Bangladesh National Women Lawyers' Association,<sup>59</sup> which sponsors grassroots 'vigilance teams' to intervene in cases of rights violations (e.g. domestic violence, dowry extortion) and

<sup>58</sup> Kelsall, T. (2008) 'Going with the Grain in African Development?', *Development Policy Review*, 26 (6), 627–655, cited in Norad (2009) *op. cit.*

<sup>59</sup> This funding is channelled through the Rights and Governance Challenge Fund managed by Manusher Jonno Foundation.

advocate women's rights to religious and community leaders. In Sierra Leone, traditional chiefs are being integrated into formal local governance structures to help reduce tensions between the systems:

### Box 19: Improving links between traditional chiefs and local governance in Sierra Leone

DFID provides pooled funding to the Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Programme (IRCBP), with the EC and the World Bank. The IRCBP has identified opportunities to strengthen links between traditional chiefs and formal local governance structures. It has organised ward committee training and district-level orientation activities that provide opportunities for traditional chiefs to increase their understanding of local governance. Chiefs have actively participated in the preparation of the decentralisation policy, which will provide a framework to improve the relationship between chiefdom councils and local councils. The IRCBP has also financed the printing of local tax receipt books and handed them to local councils for joint action with the chiefdom councils.



Community meeting with local chief, Bombali district, Sierra Leone

A lesson learned through the programme is that issues of revenue sharing can seriously affect the relationship between chiefdom councils and local councils. Struggles for supremacy between traditional chiefs and local council authorities surfaced very early in the implementation of Sierra Leone's decentralisation policy, and concerted efforts continue to diffuse these ongoing tensions.

108. Other ways of engaging at the interface include: (i) strengthening the capacity of civil society to engage with the state and hold it accountable, particularly as a complement to budget support or other forms of financial aid<sup>60</sup>; and (ii) community-driven development programmes, which channel funds directly to local communities while building local governance capacity. In Yemen, the Social Fund for Development (SFD) employs a bottom-up approach, involving beneficiaries in community projects. The SFD has contributed to state-building by increasing the visibility of the state as a service provider, introducing democratic practices into local communities and building links between communities and local authorities.<sup>61</sup>

## 3.6 Adapt delivery mechanisms

### Staffing

109. Ensuring that DFID and our external partners have sufficient numbers of appropriately skilled staff on the ground is critical to delivering on the integrated approach. The transaction costs of working in situations of conflict and fragility tend to be higher,

<sup>60</sup> The 2009 White Paper includes provision for 5% of budget support finance to support domestic accountability institutions and organisations in partner countries.

<sup>61</sup> See **DFID Briefing Paper E (Alignment)** for full case study on the Yemen SFD.


including programme design, coordination, influencing, and monitoring and evaluation – this should be reflected in staff planning. DFID is working to increase incentives and improve preparation for staff to work in such contexts, and the World Bank has initiated a staff training programme tailored to fragile contexts.

### Aid instruments

110. It is important to make politically informed choices about the mix of instruments in a given context. Experience of good practice in choosing aid instruments in conflict-affected and fragile countries is emerging, and **DFID Briefing Paper E (Alignment)** illustrates the range of instruments available. Donors should work to strengthen accountability between government and citizens, ensuring they do not weaken that relationship. Aid modalities (including the predictability of aid) have the potential to enhance or undermine the state's relations with society.<sup>62</sup>

111. When considering the mix of aid instruments to be used, it is helpful to clarify the form of alignment with the state that is appropriate at the current time, and think through how this may change. DFID's conditionality policy is particularly relevant here.<sup>63</sup> The following typology may also help:

- (i) *Through the state* – In situations where the state is increasingly responsive, risks are decreasing or there is an urgent need to increase people's confidence in the state, instruments prioritising delivery through the state may be used (e.g. budget support, non-budget support financial aid and some MDTFs). It will be important to complement financial aid with other aid instruments focused on strengthening bottom-up accountability and state–society relations.
- (ii) *With the state* – In situations where state responsiveness is mixed, or the governance situation is deteriorating, it is possible to use aid instruments that work with the state and encourage state–society interaction. The Yemen SFD operates as a quasi government body alongside and aligned with government policy. Its managing director is Yemen's Deputy Prime Minister and its board is chaired by the Prime Minister. It reaches all 333 districts in Yemen (compared to the more limited reach of government ministries) and is highly responsive to local priorities (see para. 108). UNWorld Bank managed MDTFs underpinned by a strong strategy may also be an appropriate instrument in this context.
- (iii) *Outside the state* – In contexts where the legitimacy of the state is questioned, or the state is largely unresponsive or absent, it may be necessary to deliver aid outside the state (e.g. through UN-managed pooled funds or civil society). Instruments that work through non-state actors can provide a platform for state-building, supporting



A child fills up from a UNICEF water tank in Harare, Zimbabwe

<sup>62</sup> Norad, (2009), *op.cit.*

<sup>63</sup> DFID (2005) 'Partnerships for Poverty Reduction: Rethinking Conditionality'.

legitimate demands for a more inclusive political settlement. In Zimbabwe (until 2009 when a power-sharing arrangement was agreed), DFID supported non-state actors to deliver services, and to help sustain a fragile civil society so that it would be able to engage with the state following political change.

112. The choice of aid instruments in many fragile contexts will include pooled funding arrangements with other donors (usually led by the UN or World Bank), which are an effective way to improve coordination, lower transaction costs and manage risk. However, such mechanisms must not detract from engaging with the state where appropriate – for example, by providing technical assistance to the government to help it manage funds in the future, or conducting political dialogue around reform processes, which technical secretariats or steering committees of pooled funds are not always well equipped to take forward.
113. A further concern in many fragile countries is the quality and transparency of the decision-making processes around investments by the international community. Weaknesses in government or donor processes such as contracting or monitoring can open up opportunities for corruption, and create serious difficulties in building public trust. Donors (particularly bilaterals) can play an important role in encouraging transparency and public participation in monitoring of major investments.

### **Risk management**

114. Working in conflict-affected and fragile situations requires an increased appetite for risk, and a thorough approach to risk management. Many decisions and programmes are likely to be high risk, due to both the dynamic context and the nature of state-building and peace-building interventions. This is particularly true in deteriorating governance situations, protracted crises and highly insecure environments. Examples include decisions to align with particular elites (political or reputational risks), or support for measures to counter radicalisation and extremism (programme or staff security risks). **DFID Briefing Paper H (Risk Management)** sets out a number of options for managing risks at different levels, with examples of emerging good practice.

### **Results**

115. Putting state-building and peace-building objectives at the centre of the development approach also means adjusting the way we think about results and impact. While the MDGs remain critically important as long-term measures of development success in all our partner countries, they may not capture medium-term results in conflict-affected and fragile countries. Our results frameworks need to be adjusted to include specific indicators and targets on state-building and peace-building.
116. In DRC, DFID monitors at country plan level how the programme as a whole is contributing to sustaining peace as well as tackling poverty, jointly with FCO and MOD. The monitoring system uses seven indicators covering conflict reduction and security, human rights and the rule of law, corruption, democratic process, basic service delivery, public financial management and economic growth.

117. The practicalities of monitoring and evaluation activities in conflict-affected and fragile situations are challenging. Perception surveys are useful for assessing whether public expectations are being met, and whether state legitimacy or grievances are increasing or decreasing. In highly insecure environments, it may be necessary to rely more heavily on reporting by implementing partners and other secondary sources. Monitoring of impact by beneficiaries can be effective, including through public or social audits. **Briefing Paper I (Monitoring and Evaluation)** provides further guidance.

### Value for Money

118. Three factors – transaction costs, risk and expected return – can help compare the relative value for money (VFM) of different priorities or options. For example, a cost–benefit analysis of options for the Safety and Justice Programme in Bangladesh concluded that informal sector programming represented significantly better VFM than formal sector engagement, which carries greater risk. DFID is planning to pilot test a revised approach to VFM that includes specifying the expected returns of each intervention. This pilot can help test the feasibility of assessing VFM in the area of state-building and peace-building, where there are particular challenges in defining and measuring impact, and attribution.
119. Evidence on the effectiveness of different approaches is growing. For example, an evaluation of DFID’s work in fragile countries concluded that ‘DFID’s support for inclusive political settlements – from peace agreement negotiations to the holding of elections – has successfully underpinned state–society relationships, particularly through its work with the media and support for civic participation (including women)’<sup>64</sup>. Current DFID research is also looking at the effectiveness of peace-building interventions.<sup>65</sup> But future research and evaluation will need to focus more explicitly on relative cost effectiveness and VFM to address the lack of evidence in this area.

## Conclusion

120. Achieving the MDGs in conflict-affected and fragile countries requires a step change in international action. This is increasingly recognised by the multilaterals and the major OECD donors. The integrated approach set out in this paper provides a platform for more effective engagement in the most difficult, fragile environments. We are at an early stage of applying the approach in practice. Given the complexity of the challenge, our focus must be on learning from experience.
121. The integrated approach recognises that a new route to achieving the MDGs is required – one that is focused on achieving social and political change. It means prioritising differently, and using new skills and partnerships to achieve our aims. DFID is committed to working with our partners to put these changes into practice.

<sup>64</sup> Chapman, N. and Vaillant, C. (2010), Draft *Synthesis of DFID Country Programme Evaluations Conducted in Fragile States*, prepared for DFID Evaluation Department

<sup>65</sup> This work will be published as ‘What Price Peace?’ in 2010.



## Annex A: Practical ways of addressing causes and effects of conflict and fragility

| Stage of conflict and fragility          | Examples of interventions that donors can support <sup>1</sup>   |
|--|--|
| <b>Prevention (all stages)</b>           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Measures to reduce discrimination and exclusion, including gender inequality</li> <li>• Reforms to strengthen checks and balances, reduce abuse of power and curb opportunities for private gain by elites</li> <li>• Measures to strengthen a domestic private sector, linked to promotion of youth and women's employment</li> <li>• Measures to counter radicalisation and violent extremism</li> <li>• Support for democratic processes/free and fair elections</li> <li>• Delivery of security and justice as basic services, security sector reforms, reduction of availability of small arms and light weapons</li> <li>• Protection and humanitarian action where people's lives, integrity and dignity could be at risk</li> </ul> |
| <b>During violent conflict</b>           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Humanitarian action to save lives when populations are displaced and livelihoods and coping mechanisms have broken down</li> <li>• Quick impact development work, focused on social protection, infrastructure and employment for vulnerable groups</li> <li>• Support for human rights monitoring and civilian protection, and measures to ensure humanitarian and development access</li> <li>• Measures to counter violence against women</li> </ul>   |
| <b>After conflict, fragility remains</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Continued protection and humanitarian assistance</li> <li>• Transitional justice mechanisms to address war crimes and human rights violations, including gender-based violence</li> <li>• Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), including a focus on women and girl combatants</li> <li>• Return of refugees and internally displaced people</li> <li>• Community-based recovery and reconciliation activities</li> <li>• Restoration of land/property rights</li> <li>• Resolution of disputes over cross-border mineral rights</li> <li>• Smooth transition from humanitarian to development assistance</li> </ul>   |

<sup>1</sup> For further examples of policy tools available at different stages of conflict see Lund, M. (2006) *Preventing Violent Conflicts – A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*, United States Institute for Peace, Washington DC.

## Annex B: Applying the integrated approach in different fragile situations

This table illustrates the types of issues to be considered under each of the four objectives of the integrated approach, in five types of fragile situations. It is *not* intended to be comprehensive, but may help assist the discussions and considerations of international actors working in such contexts.

In all contexts:

1. Analysis – political economy analysis of underlying drivers of conflict/fragility, and sources of resilience within societies. Supplement with regular, light-touch analysis of dynamics as situations change. Map all actors (including UK, national and international partners), their interests, incentives, contributions and capacities for (or against) progress on peace-building and state-building.
2. Conflict and fragility sensitivity of aid, based on analysis, to ensure that aid does no harm, and where possible helps to address causes.
3. Consider gender, exclusion and respect for human rights as important cross-cutting issues in all four objectives.
4. Monitoring of humanitarian indicators, protection issues, ensuring respect for international humanitarian law (IHL) and humanitarian access.
5. Note that different areas of a country/region may be characterised by different types/stages of conflict and fragility.

| Objective   | Deteriorating governance   | Prolonged crisis/ impasse   | Ongoing violent conflict  | Post-conflict/crisis or political transition  | Gradual improvement   |
|---|--|---|---|---|---|
| <p><b>1. Address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility, and build conflict resolution mechanisms</b></p> | <p>What are the main risks of descending into instability and violent conflict? How can these be monitored on a regular basis? What are the potential risks to staff and programmes?</p> <p>How might the risks be mitigated? Can we help reduce incentives to engage in violence before it breaks out? Can internal and external stabilising factors be strengthened (e.g. responsible media, regional integration)?</p> <p>Is the response from international actors (especially the UN and World Bank) effective?</p> | <p>What are the key factors that could precipitate a positive change (e.g. bring parties to the negotiating table)? Are there opportunities to provide support (e.g. regional dialogue)?</p> <p>What might encourage parties to feel they are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament?</p> <p>Is the current international engagement strategy helpful? Could it be more so?</p> | <p>How can humanitarian and development space be maintained?</p> <p>How can the worst effects of violent conflict on civilians be reduced?</p> <p>What are the prospects for a ceasefire or peace negotiations? Are there third parties who could convene negotiations?</p> <p>What local capacities for peace can still be supported?</p> <p>If a UN or other international mission is present, does its mandate support addressing causes? Is the mission delivering?</p> | <p>What measures are needed to support the implementation of the peace or political agreement?</p> <p>How can the effects of conflict be alleviated (e.g. human rights violations, trauma, breakdown of communities)? Options for transitional justice?</p> <p>What is the risk of a return to conflict?</p> <p>What capacities do the state and communities have to manage the risks and resolve future conflict?</p> <p>Does the international transition support strategy address causes and effects sufficiently?</p> | <p>What are the current risks of instability? How can these be mitigated?</p> <p>What are the long-term effects of previous conflict or fragility – including psycho-social? How can these be identified and addressed? Is reconciliation still needed?</p> <p>Are the conditions for durable, positive peace emerging or in place?</p> |

| Objective  | Deteriorating governance   | Prolonged crisis/impasse  | Ongoing violent conflict   | Post-conflict/crisis or political transition   | Gradual improvement   |
|--|--|---|--|--|---|
| <p><b>2. Support inclusive political settlements and processes</b></p> | <p>Are there opportunities to support positive dialogue and interaction between elites and/or societal groups?</p> <p>Are there upcoming events that can increase/decrease inclusion (e.g. elections)? What opportunities are there to support more inclusive decision making?</p> <p>What 'preventive diplomacy' initiatives might be relevant (e.g. sanctions)? Is enhanced monitoring of our development partnership principles needed?</p> | <p>Are there opportunities to support the emergence of a more inclusive settlement? Which actors would we need to engage with? (How) should we engage with imperfect elections? What would be the potential risks and benefits of engaging?</p> <p>Could coalition-building – under regional, UN or other international leadership – help shift the balance of power or create openings?</p> <p>How can the space for civil society be preserved or strengthened?</p> | <p>How can the incentives of those who are benefiting (politically/economically) from the conflict be changed?</p> <p>How can we help prepare for a future peace process? What might elements of an inclusive peace agreement look like (including mechanisms for implementation)?</p> <p>Is it possible to develop a shared vision of society and progress? Can we support consultation processes? Might mediation initiatives be helpful? Can we support them?</p> | <p>How can we support opportunities for excluded groups and non-violent actors to participate in political negotiations or peace processes?</p> <p>How can links between different 'tracks' of the peace process (e.g. official, civil society) be encouraged?</p> <p>Are there informal, underlying exclusionary elements of the political settlement that need to be addressed? How might this be done?</p> <p>How can state legitimacy be improved?</p> | <p>How can inclusive political or democratic processes be further strengthened? Are there ways to support a transition to sustainable, democratic politics (e.g. following transitional power-sharing arrangements, or identity-based politics)?</p> <p>Are there opportunities to work at the interface between state and society to strengthen linkages?</p> <p>Are there tensions between formal democratic systems and informal/traditional systems of authority? How might these be addressed?</p> |

| Objective                                     | Deteriorating governance   | Prolonged crisis/impasse   | Ongoing violent conflict   | Post-conflict/crisis or political transition  | Gradual improvement  |
|---|--|--|--|---|--|
| <p><b>3. Develop core state functions</b></p> | <p>Are core functions being supported in ways that improve accountability and inclusion as well as efficiency?<br/>Is instability being exacerbated by the way in which core functions are delivered? How can this be addressed?<br/>What are the incentives for the state to improve its governance record?</p> | <p>If direct support to state institutions is not appropriate, are there opportunities to work with the state on its policy and oversight roles?<br/>Are there ways of supporting non-state actors to deliver core functions, without undermining the future role of the state (shadow alignment)?<br/>Are there clear future priorities where preliminary analysis and strategic thinking can be carried out (e.g. security and justice)?</p> | <p>Could support for core functions generate incentives/disincentives towards peace?<br/>Could further support to encourage state institutions (especially security and justice) to comply with human rights law and IHL be helpful? Can human rights monitoring by non-state actors help?</p> | <p>Is the international system equipped to support the development of state functions during the transition process – including long-term financing? How can we ensure donors do not undermine the state's administrative capacity?<br/>What are the most important core functions to support the transition to peace?<br/>What measures would strengthen macroeconomic stability, and create the environment for inclusive growth?</p> | <p>What are the key priorities for reform within the core functions, in order to strengthen the inclusive political settlement, address causes and respond to public expectations?</p> |

| Objective                                | Deteriorating governance   | Prolonged crisis/impasse  | Ongoing violent conflict  | Post-conflict/crisis or political transition   | Gradual improvement   |
|--|--|---|---|--|---|
| <b>4. Respond to public expectations</b> | What expectations need to be met most urgently to reduce the risk of violent conflict? How can these be identified (e.g. Afrobarometer surveys)? | Can non-state actors help meet basic needs? What role for the state is appropriate in the context? Is shadow alignment possible/appropriate? Are there internal coalitions based on unmet public expectations that could precipitate positive change? Are the state and/or elites under pressure to deliver? Can these dynamics be supported? | What are the key needs and expectations of conflict-affected communities? What local capacity exists to address them? To what extent should needs and expectations be met by humanitarian actors? | What are people's expectations for a peace dividend (if any)? Does the transition offer opportunities to redefine rights and entitlements, in ways that meet the expectations of all groups in society? How can the recovery of lives and livelihoods be supported? Is job creation being given sufficient priority? | What are people's expectations of a peaceful state? How can the state be supported to meet these? Are there tensions between the state's demands on society (e.g. for taxation) and its capacity to deliver? How can these be resolved? |

The above typology is based on the OECD DAC's<sup>2</sup> with the addition of a fifth category for *ongoing violent conflict*. The types of fragility are: **Deteriorating governance:** increasing risk of conflict and instability; likely to include increasing tensions between government and the international community on development strategy (and other policies).

**Prolonged crisis/impasse:** entrenched situation characterised by violent repression, instability and/or weak state legitimacy. Limited or no opportunities for the international community to work with government on development strategy.

**Ongoing violent conflict:** highly insecure situations, with very limited stability, reach, capacity and legitimacy of the state. International community may be engaged militarily as well as politically.

**Post-conflict/crisis or political transition:** peace agreement, national reconciliation or agreed political transition process supported by the international community.

**Gradual improvement:** state effectiveness improving and reform efforts have made some progress with international support, but situation remains fragile. Includes 'post-post conflict countries', where reform progress has been positive but gradual.

<sup>2</sup> See Principle 1 in the OECD DAC's *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations*, at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/45/38368714.pdf>

## Annex C: Applying the integrated approach to our sector work: some examples

This annex illustrates how applying the integrated approach can help us improve and adapt our development programmes. Using four different sectors, examples are given under each of the four objectives of the approach, to show how positive support can be provided and how potential harm can be done.

| <b>Access to justice</b>   |   |   |  |
|--|---|---|--|
| <b>Objective 1: Address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility</b>   |   | <b>Objective 2: Support inclusive political settlements and processes</b>   |  |
| <b>What to support</b>   | <b>How to do harm</b>   | <b>What to support</b>  | <b>How to do harm</b>  |
| <p>Address war crimes and human rights violations through transitional justice mechanisms</p> <p>Support measures to provide effective, fair and equitable justice mechanisms (formal and informal) for addressing grievances (e.g. land disputes)</p>   | <p>Ignoring the requirement to balance the goal of peace with the goal of justice and accountability for those who have committed crimes during conflict</p> <p>Ignoring those who lose out from changes in power sharing in the security and justice sectors</p> | <p>Support inclusive, participatory and transparent constitution-making processes</p> <p>Ensure peace agreements include fair and equitable judicial reform, and transitional justice measures (e.g. truth commissions, prisoner releases)</p>  | <p>Rushing through peace agreements and constitution-making processes to fit donor deadlines and priorities</p> <p>Reinforcing political interference and elite capture of the judiciary</p>   |
| <b>Objective 3: Develop core state functions</b>   |   | <b>Objective 4: Respond to public expectations</b>  |  |
| <b>What to support</b>   | <b>How to do harm</b>   | <b>What to support</b>  | <b>How to do harm</b>  |
| <p>Ensure the provision of affordable, accessible and equitable justice systems</p> <p>Balance support to both formal and informal systems such as community mediation services and paralegal committees</p> <p>Assist the judiciary to become an independent branch of government, able to check the power of the legislature and executive</p> | <p>Ignoring the linkages between justice and security systems and negative impacts of 'silo' support (e.g. support to police with sufficient attention to prisons or court systems, exacerbating issue of pre-trial detainees)</p>                                | <p>Support a people-centred approach</p> <p>Address not only criminal justice but also local issues (e.g. protection of land, property and livestock; family disputes and inheritance rights; civil and commercial justice)</p> <p>Address violence against women through legal advocacy, paralegal services, judicial reform and awareness raising within police, judiciary and traditional leadership</p> | <p>Supporting unaccountable formal and informal justice systems that reinforce discrimination against women and marginalised groups</p> <p>Ignoring local security and justice mechanisms in favour of state provision only, without analysing the challenges and opportunities they present</p> |

| <b>Education</b>   |  |   |  |
|--|--|---|--|
| <b>Objective 1: Address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility</b>   |  | <b>Objective 2: Support inclusive political settlements and processes</b>   |  |
| <b>What to support</b>   | <b>How to do harm</b>  | <b>What to support</b>  | <b>How to do harm</b>  |
| <p>Ensure the education system and curricula do not exacerbate societal divisions or conflict legacies, but widen social and economic mobility</p> <p>Encourage approaches to learning that strengthen tolerance of differences and resilience to extremist ideologies</p> | <p>Judging success only in terms of increased enrolment or numbers in education</p>  | <p>Develop a long-term vision of how excluded groups (e.g. girls) can develop skills and confidence to enter politics</p>   | <p>Reproducing an education system which favours an elite few</p>  |
| <b>Objective 3: Develop core state functions</b>   |  | <b>Objective 4: Respond to public expectations</b>  |  |
| <b>What to support</b>   | <b>How to do harm</b>  | <b>What to support</b>  | <b>How to do harm</b>  |
| <p>Support codes of conduct within education institutions that hold people to account for unacceptable behaviour (e.g. using girls as teachers' servants, rape in schools)</p>   | <p>Improving efficiency of the education system without increasing accountability of its management and leadership to the public</p> | <p>Ensure the education system has institutionalised ways of communicating with parents and responding to issues they raise regarding fees, safety, standards, opening hours etc.</p> | <p>Allowing elites or special interest groups to dominate decision making on curriculum choice, girls' attendance etc.</p> |



| <b>Job creation – labour-based contracting</b>  |  |  |  |
|---|--|--|--|
| <b>Objective 1: Address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility</b>  |  | <b>Objective 2: Support inclusive political settlements and processes</b>  |  |
| <b>What to support</b>  | <b>How to do harm</b>  | <b>What to support</b>   | <b>How to do harm</b>  |
| Ensure that benefits extend to groups involved in conflict as well as the general population  | Rewarding combatants or ex-combatants only   | Ensure economic elites see the benefits of investing in inclusive job creation schemes   | Allowing those with power to seize economic opportunities without ensuring other groups also benefit                                       |
| <b>Objective 3: Develop core state functions</b>  |  | <b>Objective 4: Respond to public expectations</b>   |  |
| <b>What to support</b>  | <b>How to do harm</b>  | <b>What to support</b>   | <b>How to do harm</b>  |
| Allocate resources and opportunities on the basis of transparent, acceptable rules (e.g. use standard pay scales for particular jobs in accordance with market norms) | Distorting labour market with perverse incentives, creating suspicions or exacerbating tensions through a lack of transparency | Ensure that what is being produced through the jobs created is useful, as perceived by the local population<br><br>Ensure enforcement of local anti-corruption standards | Creating white elephants that do not benefit the majority of the population<br><br>Ignoring serious corruption that alienates local people |

| <b>Political institutions and processes</b>  |  |   |   |
|--|--|---|---|
| <b>Objective 1: Address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility</b>   |  | <b>Objective 2: Support inclusive political settlements and processes</b>   |   |
| <b>What to support</b>   | <b>How to do harm</b>  | <b>What to support</b>  | <b>How to do harm</b>   |
| Support political reforms to recognise/protect the rights of marginalised and excluded groups (e.g. women, indigenous people), and address disparities between different sub-regions | Ignoring the underlying historical and structural legacies that determine what kind of political change is possible  | Develop a gradual approach to democratisation and view elections as part of a broader system of reforms rather than as one-off events<br><br>Engage with both formal and informal institutions to see how a more equitable and representative political system can be developed | Having a narrow and short-term focus on elections<br><br>Transplanting political models from outside<br><br>Focusing only on formal institutions without taking into account how informal practices and arrangements shape power relations<br><br>Ignoring the power dynamics and potential struggles/conflict that may be involved in altering political systems |
| <b>Objective 3: Develop core state functions</b>   |  | <b>Objective 4: Respond to public expectations</b>  |   |
| <b>What to support</b>   | <b>How to do harm</b>  | <b>What to support</b>  | <b>How to do harm</b>   |
| Support reforms to strengthen checks and balances, and reduce abuse of power and opportunities for illicit gains   | Relying on individual champions rather than focusing on institutions<br><br>Working only with strong government departments for the sake of expediency and quick results | Support measures to strengthen citizens' voice and state accountability (e.g. free media, freedom of information)<br><br>Work with both state and non-state providers of basic services (e.g. justice, education), and explore synergies and linkages between them              | Strengthening citizens' voice without strengthening the capacity of the state to respond to expectations and demand<br><br>Placing undue expectations on the state to deliver, especially in the short term<br><br>Bypassing state institutions altogether in the provision of key functions and services, rather than considering a regulatory/oversight role    |



## What is Development?

## Why is the UK Government involved?

## What is DFID?

### **International development is about helping people fight poverty.**

This means people in rich and poor countries working together to settle conflicts, increase opportunities for trade, tackle climate change, improve people's health and their chance to get an education.

It means helping governments in developing countries put their own plans into action. It means agreeing debt relief, working with international institutions that co-ordinate support, and working with non-government organisations and charities to give communities a chance to find their own ways out of poverty.

### **Getting rid of poverty will make for a better world for everybody.**

Nearly a billion people, one in 6 of the world's population, live in extreme poverty. This means they live on less than \$1 a day. Ten million children die before their fifth birthday, most of them from preventable diseases. More than 113 million children in developing countries do not go to school.

In a world of growing wealth, such levels of human suffering and wasted potential are not only morally wrong, they are also against our own interests.

We are closer to people in developing countries than ever before. We trade more and more with people in poor countries, and many of the problems which affect us – conflict, international crime, refugees, the trade in illegal drugs and the spread of diseases – are caused or made worse by poverty in developing countries.

In the last 10 years Britain has more than trebled its spending on aid to nearly £7 billion a year. We are now the fourth largest donor in the world.

### **DFID, the Department for International Development, is the part of the UK Government that manages Britain's aid to poor countries and works to get rid of extreme poverty.**

We work towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals - a set of targets agreed by the United Nations to halve global poverty by 2015.

DFID works in partnership with governments, civil society, the private sector and others. It also works with multilateral institutions, including the World Bank, United Nations agencies and the European Commission.

DFID works directly in over 150 countries worldwide. Its headquarters are in London and East Kilbride, near Glasgow.

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