

Policy Memorandum

International Migration and Development 2008



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Foreword

The document before you, *International Migration and Development 2008*, is a joint policy memorandum by the Minister for Development Cooperation and the State Secretary for Justice. With the publication of its memorandum on *Development and Migration* in 2004, the Netherlands was something of a pioneer in the field of migration-and-development policy, and has already made some headway. It is very important that the Netherlands continues to step up its efforts, for we are convinced that there is more to be gained by stimulating mutually positive policy outcomes where migration meets development.

In part because of enduring disparities in the living standards, migration is not expected to fall. Nor are the numbers migrating from developing countries to developed countries like the Netherlands expected to drop. Migration flows are becoming more complex, however. Countries that historically have been countries of origin are now simultaneously becoming transit and/or destination countries.

Migration presents both developing and developed countries, like the Netherlands, with challenges. International cooperation on migration is therefore essential. Developing and developed countries' interests and notions of this cooperation are not always the same. Where developing countries are often chiefly concerned with broadening the scope for legal migration, the Netherlands attaches great importance to maintaining a selective and restrictive admissions policy, based on an effective control and return policy.

In many areas, however, the interests of developing countries and the Netherlands converge. Capacity building can help improve developing countries' ability to realise the development potential of migration while at the same time minimising the more negative features, such as human trafficking and people smuggling, two problems which also affect the Netherlands. Migrants are important for the economies of destination countries and they can also contribute to the development of their countries of origin. They may return temporarily, for example, or transfer money back home. In this way, migration can make a modest

contribution to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

In recent years migration and development has also received far greater attention in international forums. It was the subject, for example, of the UN High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development in 2006 and the follow-up Global Forum on Migration and Development in Brussels in July 2007. A second global forum is planned for Manila in October 2008.

The European Union has been working constructively to formulate a comprehensive approach to migration, and solid agreements have been made within EUROMED and at the EU-Africa Summit on cooperation with countries of origin and transit.

The 2004 policy memorandum on Development and Migration covered a great range of subjects, and in the intervening years a large number of activities have been initiated. It is now time to draw lessons from the experience that has been gained to date, to alter our course where necessary, to make choices and formulate concrete action points. In this policy memorandum we therefore present six priorities which will be the focus of our efforts over the next few years.

These choices have emerged from a scientific analysis of trends in international migration and of the activities that have been carried out in recent years.

We have also consulted with civil society. We would like to thank everyone who contributed their expertise, in particular Dr Hein de Haas of the International Migration Institute, at the University of Oxford.

Bert Koenders
Minister for Development Cooperation

Nebahat Albayrak
State Secretary for Justice

Summary

This policy memorandum will set out the government's migration and development policy for the coming years, based on six key priorities. It is underpinned by a scientific analysis of migration and development trends, and the links between them. Our analysis has shown that the relationship between migration and development is not clear cut, and that the effects of government measures are often visible only in the longer term. It can further be concluded that government policy can make a modest contribution to strengthening the positive effects of migration on development and mitigating the negative effects.

The number of migrants worldwide has more than doubled since 1960, rising from 75 million to around 200 million in 2007. As a percentage of world population however, the number has remained almost constant (between 2.5 and 3%). The nature and direction of migration flows are determined largely by geographic proximity, the establishment of migrant networks and income disparities. The majority of migrants still limit their movement to their own region. Yet the number of migrants living in developed countries (South-North migration) has risen more sharply in recent decades than the number of migrants in developing countries (South-South migration). The growing complexity and diversity of these migration flows is an important trend, as it means that countries are simultaneously becoming countries of origin, transit and destination. This applies mainly to a number of North African as well as Central and Eastern European states. In addition, migrants are now less focused on a particular destination country and are travelling greater distances. Advances in transport and communications technologies are enabling them to have increasingly transnational lifestyles.

Both countries of destination and origin increasingly consider migrants to be a potential source of development, by virtue notably of the funds they send home but also by making use of their competencies and networks for socioeconomic and political development. For example, migrants can play an important role in the social and political debate in their countries of origin. Such political influence

can be controversial, however, when it extends to offering financial or political support to repressive regimes, or indeed resistance movements. Research suggests that migration represents a small but crucial source of development potential for countries of origin. However, migrants' ability to realise this potential depends partly on economic and political circumstances, and their socioeconomic and residency status in the host country. Relatively speaking, money transfers (remittances) have a greater impact on societies that have already reached a certain level of development, due to the fact that such countries offer a better investment climate and higher levels of education.

Remittances to developing countries (USD 240 billion in 2007) account for almost twice the total amount of global development cooperation expenditure. In general, however, remittances go to middle-class families with relatives working abroad, which means that most of these funds do not directly reach the poorest people. Nevertheless, remittance spending often has a positive multiplier effect on local economies, and in this way makes a limited, but genuine contribution to reducing poverty. One recent study has shown that an increase of 10 % in remittances translates into a reduction of 3.5% in the number of people who live on less than one dollar a day. What is more, remittances mean that more money is available for education and health care, which in turn contributes to attaining a number of Millennium Development Goals. Generally speaking, the effects of migration on development can only be fully felt in the longer term: around 20 years after the start of large-scale emigration. This is partly due to the fact that it usually takes a number of years before migrants can afford to send substantial amounts of money home. Furthermore, the better integrated a migrant is in the host country, the more enterprising he or she is likely to be in the country of origin.

'Brain drain' is an oft-quoted negative effect of migration from developing countries. The healthcare sector in developing countries is particularly affected by this phenomenon. The reason is the financial 'pull' of the West, combined with sociopolitical push factors in the country of origin, such as poor working conditions. Moreover, many developing countries would suffer from a structural shortage of health workers even if none of them emigrated. In fact, beyond the health sector, many countries currently face high unemployment rates among the highly skilled. It is also worth remembering that, in the longterm, brain drain can be linked to 'brain gain', provided migrants are able to play an innovative economic role as transnational entrepreneurs. Given the low numbers of knowledge workers from developing countries in the Netherlands, the Dutch contribution to the brain drain phenomenon is considered to be minimal.

However, the Netherlands does devote attention to this issue in broader development cooperation terms and at European Union level.

Where the gender impact of migration is concerned, a number of empirical studies have shown that male migration rarely has any systematic effect on traditional gender roles. When women participate in the migration process, the opposite is true. The increasing feminisation of migration suggests, therefore, that migration has positive long-term benefits for female migrants, such as economic independence and access to contraception. The gender impact of policy decisions will be weighed as each migration-and-development policy priority is carried out.

Development cooperation in general can offer only an indirect long-term contribution to gradually reducing the need for migration, through an emphasis on sustainable development, political stability and good governance. Initially development in the poorest countries tends to lead to more, rather than less, migration.

In recent years the issue of migration and development has received a real boost both within the research community and in international forums.

The Netherlands greatly values global cooperation in this area, and will work to further promote and define the issue in concrete terms. The return of failed asylum seekers forms an integral part of this process. The Netherlands is working to step up its dialogue with developing countries on migration and to translate cooperation into partnerships.

Policy priorities

Six policy priorities have been identified for the coming years, aimed at areas in which the Netherlands can make a difference. The government has decided to limit its activities to Dutch partner countries, with the exception of three other countries that are considered to be significant from a national migration perspective. For the 2008-2009 period Morocco, Sierra Leone and Angola have been selected. In principle the choice of countries will be reviewed every two years.

1. Focusing more on migration in the development dialogue and on development in the migration dialogue

Just as gender and human rights are treated as cross-cutting themes in development policy, migration too must, where relevant, play a role in Dutch foreign policy. Including a migration perspective in poverty analyses and/or Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), as well as in Dutch embassies' Multi-Annual Strategic Plans (MJSPs) in partner countries, is just one example. At the same time, wherever possible and applicable, the interests of developing countries will play a role in Dutch and European migration policy. This can already be seen, for example, in Dutch efforts at EU level to establish a code of conduct for the ethical recruitment of health workers.

2. Fostering institutional development in migration management

In order to realise the development potential of migration and mitigate the negative effects, governments in developing countries must have the necessary insight, capacity and opportunity to operate an effective migration policy. In many developing countries whose experience is limited mainly to South-South migration and transit migration, an adequate migration system simply does not exist. The mixed nature of migration flows is a complicating factor in managing them effectively: refugees use the same routes and resources as migrants. Depending on the needs of the land of origin or transit, efforts can be made to improve data collection, combat illegal immigration (e.g. by improving border controls), facilitate legal migration (in part via information services), combat human trafficking and people smuggling, and provide adequate protection to refugees and asylum seekers.

3. Promoting circular migration/brain gain

Circular migration means migration in which the migrant successively spends a relatively long time in various countries, including his or her country of origin.

For the purposes of this memorandum, the pursuit of a 'triple-win' scenario is implicit in the concept of circular migration. This means that the migrant, the country of origin and the destination country all benefit from the migration process. In the context of circular migration, the Netherlands will continue its policy of encouraging temporary assignment to the country of origin, whereby migrants who live permanently in the Netherlands serve temporarily as experts,

contributing to development and/or reconstruction efforts in the developing country of origin. The governing principle is that such assignments be demand-driven and take place in consultation with the country in question.

The process of temporary migration from developing countries to the Netherlands is also included within the term ‘circular migration’. There are still many questions, however, as to how this process works in practice and whether it is effective. A pilot project will provide greater insight into the risks, opportunities and limitations. To this end, agreements will be made with a country of origin (including joint arrangements for return) and with a group of businesses that will be involved in the pilot. The project will be aimed at people who have completed basic professional education. After two years, the migrants will return to the country of origin to apply the knowledge and experience they have gained in the Netherlands. The companies involved in the scheme will provide the participants with a minimum wage, housing and health insurance. There will be two pilots, each involving a maximum of 100 circular migrants per country.

4. Strengthening the involvement of migrant organisations

Thanks to their remittances, networks and local knowledge, migrants and therefore migrant organisations can play a meaningful role in reducing poverty. Many migrant organisations are therefore active in development cooperation activities. The government has commissioned a study of how the added value offered by migrants can be utilised most effectively. Further research will consider whether migrant organisations have sufficient access to funding. If this is not the case, the government will consider raising the amounts available to existing sources of funding and/or increasing migrants’ access to those sources.

In implementing this policy memorandum, efforts will be made to involve migrant organisations more closely when discussing and carrying out policy related to development cooperation. In this connection the government will remain alert to potentially controversial political activities of migrant organisations. The goal is to make use of migrants’ thematic and/or country-specific knowledge and expertise. To this end it would be useful if migrant groups were to form an umbrella group, but this would be the responsibility of the organisations themselves. The government could offer assistance if necessary, possibly in the form of an initial grant.

Equally, funds may be made available for targeted support to organisations that meet relevant criteria. The aim is for a number of migrant organisations to grow into fully fledged, valuable partners in development cooperation.

5. Strengthening the link between remittances and development

The Netherlands works on the assumption that remittances relate purely to private finance, and therefore it is not the government's place to interfere in how they are spent. The government can, however, facilitate in the creation of favourable conditions. It will work, for example, on improving transparency in the Dutch remittance market and on increasing the poverty-reduction impact of remittances by stimulating migrant initiatives. In addition, in 2008 a memorandum on financial sector development will be presented to the House of Representatives, setting out Dutch policy on the financial sector in developing countries.

6. Encouraging sustainable return and reintegration

In order to manage and maintain support for Dutch asylum and immigration policy, it is important that migrants who are not (or who are no longer) entitled to remain lawfully in the Netherlands leave the country, preferably voluntarily. In recent years the Netherlands has gained some experience of financial reintegration assistance on the one hand, which could serve to encourage independent return, and reintegration assistance in kind on the other, in the form of education and job placement, among other kinds of assistance. With due consideration for the results of evaluations of this scheme, we will continue financial reintegration assistance over the next few years (for all countries of origin) and expand assistance in kind (for the 40 + 3 partner countries only), especially for vulnerable groups such as victims of human trafficking and minor asylum seekers.

All the activities described in this memorandum will be funded within existing budgets. Consultations between the ministries concerned will be held in order to divide the funds available among the various activities.

The activities that result from this memorandum will be funded using a grants framework known as the Migration and Development Programme. The earlier Return, Migration and Development Programme will be reorganised within the new programme according to the priorities set out in this memorandum.

The budget for the grants framework will be EUR 5 million per year and will be deducted from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' ODA budget. In addition to national funding, we will seek partnerships with other donors or endeavour to secure European funding or cofinancing.

1 Introduction

In 2004, at the request of the House of Representatives, the then Ministers for Development Cooperation and for Immigration & Integration presented a joint policy memorandum on migration and development, and specifically the coherence between the two. Over the last few years the policy priorities contained within that memorandum have been implemented, as the House has been informed in five periodic progress reports.¹

In the parliamentary committee meeting with members of the government on the fifth progress report of 26 April 2007, the Minister for Development Cooperation and the State Secretary for Justice agreed to issue a new memorandum that would set out new and more concrete policy principles.

The document before you is the resulting memorandum, International Migration and Development 2008.

The memorandum builds on new insights into international migration and the relationship between migration and development, and is in part an expression of the Netherlands' commitment to make up lost ground in reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).² These new insights, as well as their impact on the MDGs, have been fleshed out in six policy priorities that will be the focus of our efforts in the coming period. They concern the interface between migration and development, where we can stimulate mutually positive policy outcomes. For this reason, the memorandum makes a clear delineation of the policy area 'migration and development' and only considers the overlap between the two.

Where related themes are concerned, reference will be made where necessary to

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- 1 House of Representatives, 2004–2005, 29 693, no. 4; House of Representatives, 2005–2006, 29 693, nos. 6, 9 and 11; House of Representatives, 2007–2008, 29 693, no. 14
 - 2 The project, 'Getting closer to the Millennium Development Goals' is included as a cross-cutting project in the fourth Balkenende IV government's coalition agreement.

other documents of which the House of Representatives has been or will in due course be advised. This policy memorandum does not, for example, consider Dutch admission policy. This was the subject of a separate memorandum published in May 2006, 'Towards a modern migration policy',³ which will be the basis for establishing the parameters of future Dutch policy in this area.

This memorandum will also not touch on Dutch asylum and return policy. The Dutch House of Representatives will shortly be informed about improvements to the asylum admission procedure and supplementary policy measures aimed at making return policy more effective. Cooperation with third countries on return (and other issues), does however form an integral part of migration and development policy.

Nor will this memorandum consider the broader field of development cooperation. Where necessary, reference will be made to the Policy Letter on Development Cooperation,⁴ which sketches the broad lines of development policy over the next few years. In order to do justice to policy regarding 'protection in the region', a subject that was included in the previous memorandum, the House will be informed separately. Where policy on related areas like human rights and financial sector development is concerned, reference will be made to the relevant memoranda.

The 2004 memorandum 'Development and Migration' was broad in scope and theoretical and descriptive in nature. The document before you goes one step further: from theoretical, exploratory policy to concrete action points.

The trends and connections discussed in chapters 2 and 3 clearly illustrate the points at which migration and development meet. A lack of future prospects can be a key motivation for migrating, while a certain amount of development can, at least in the longer term, lead to reduced migration. Migration is an age-old phenomenon, and one that is largely determined by economic and/or sociopolitical factors. Migrants often have a diverse range of motivations. The migration issue is complex, and the effects of specific measures can often only be seen in the long run.

Nevertheless, the government cannot avoid the issue, nor does it wish to.

3 House of Representatives, 2005–2006, 30 573, no. 1

4 House of Representatives, 2007–2008, 31 250, no. 4

The effects of migration directly influence our society and those of developing countries. By focusing our efforts on specific elements of migration and development policy, and by taking an innovative approach that includes learning by doing, we hope to make a modest but meaningful contribution to the development of such countries as well as the Netherlands.

In recent years, interest within international forums in the relationship between migration and development has increased dramatically. It is no longer a subject reserved for the national agenda. The policy priorities the Netherlands has identified, which are set out in detail in chapter 4, have emerged in part from the international and European agendas. Needless to say, the Dutch context has also been considered carefully. We have looked at areas in which the Netherlands can be expected to make a difference, areas in which we possess particular expertise, which are important politically and where the interests of the Netherlands converge with those of developing countries. Finally, new insights and trends in migration and development, and the experience gained in the Return, Migration and Development Programme have all influenced the government's choice of policy priorities.

Those priorities are as follows:

1. focusing more on migration in the development dialogue and on development in the migration dialogue;
2. fostering institutional development in migration management;
3. promoting circular migration/brain gain;
4. strengthening the involvement of migrant organisations;
5. strengthening the link between remittances and development; and
6. encouraging sustainable return and reintegration.

The government has decided to limit its activities to the Dutch partner countries, with the exception of three other countries that are considered to be significant for migration to the Netherlands. For the 2008-2009 period Morocco, Sierra Leone and Angola have been selected. In principle the choice of countries will be reviewed at political level every two years.⁵

All the activities described in this memorandum will be funded within existing budgets. In order to divide the funds available among the various activities, consultations will be held between the ministries concerned.

At least some of the activities will be funded by a grants framework. The existing

5 Geographic restrictions do not apply to the Assisted Reintegration and Return Programme.

Return, Migration and Development Programme will be reorganised in accordance with the priorities and countries identified in this memorandum. The budget for the grants framework will be EUR 5 million per year and will be deducted from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' ODA budget.

Where return is concerned, the only funding available within the Ministry of Justice's budget is that of the standard REAN⁶ contribution and, to a very limited extent, other measures aimed at promoting sustainable return and capacity building.⁷ No explicit funding has been set aside in the Ministry of Justice's budget for activities to support countries of origin and transit in combating human trafficking and people smuggling, strengthening institutional development, immigration services and border control, or protecting refugees and asylum seekers.⁸

The House of Representatives will be kept up to date with an annual progress report on new developments in international migration and on the six policy priorities. The report will be issued at the end of each calendar year.

This memorandum is structured as follows. Chapter 2 will discuss trends in international migration flows, while Chapter 3 will examine the links between migration and development, as well as migration's development potential. In Chapter 4, the six policy priorities will be set out in detail, based on the analysis and trends discussed in the previous chapters. For each policy priority, this memorandum will identify the Netherlands' aims and the actions it needs to take within international and European forums. Finally, Chapter 5 will consider the resources necessary for implementing each policy priority, and specifically the establishment of the new grants framework, the Migration and Development Programme.

6 Return and Emigration of Aliens from the Netherlands

7 For 2008, approximately EUR 6.8 million has been earmarked for the International Organisation for Migration.

8 In the 2008 budget, EUR 283 million has been earmarked for the return of aliens. This figure includes the cost of activities by the Repatriation and Departure Service and the International Organisation for Migration, the detention of aliens and expulsion centres but not for activities outside the Netherlands.

2 Trends in migration

The 2004 policy memorandum on development and migration included a study of the most significant migration patterns, both globally and by region.

This chapter will describe the main trends that are changing the shape and orientation of international migration flows.

It is possible to identify a variety of different forms of migration. One important distinction is the difference between refugees and other migrants. According to the definition laid down in the Refugee Convention of 1951, a refugee is a person who is outside his or her country of nationality or habitual residence; has a well-founded fear of persecution because of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country, or to return there, for fear of persecution. Parties to the Convention have an obligation to offer refugees asylum. People who have fled their homes but not crossed international borders are known as internally displaced persons (IDPs). While in principle the state in question is responsible for protecting and assisting its IDPs, in practice this task is often assumed by UNHCR and other international organisations.

The term 'other migrants' includes anyone whose reasons for migration are other than the pursuit of international protection. These are often divided into international migrants, who have crossed an international border, and internal migrants, who have not.

Given the special status of refugees under international law, it is important to keep the distinction between refugees and other migrants in mind.


This chapter also identifies two main migration flows: South-North (migration from developing countries to developed countries, see 2.2) and South-South (migration from one developing country to another, see 2.3). It should be noted, however, that while this distinction is a useful analytical tool, an increasing

number of states are now simultaneously countries of origin, destination and transit. This chapter begins with an overview of global migration flows.

2.1 Global migration flows

In 2007 there were approximately 200 million migrants worldwide.⁹ Between 1960 and 2005 the estimated number of international migrants, in absolute figures, more than doubled from 75 to 191 million. Throughout this period, women have accounted for around half of all migrants (46.8% of migrants were female in 1960, compared with 49.6% in 2005). The percentage of migrants as a proportion of the global population has remained relatively stable at 2.5% to 3% (see figures 1 and 2).¹⁰

Figure 1 Number of international migrants (millions), 1960-2005




Of the total number of international migrants, 115 million live in developed countries and 75 million in developing countries. As figure 1 shows, the number of

9 In these statistics the number of international migrants is defined as 'the mid-year estimate of the number of people who are born outside the country' (UNDESA 2006). This broadly corresponds with the Netherlands' definition of immigration: when 'people from abroad settle in the Netherlands' (www.cbs.nl). Second-generation immigrants - individuals who were born in the Netherlands and who have at least one foreign-born parent - are not included in the total.

10 Statistics relate to registered migrants.


international migrants living in developed countries has risen more sharply in recent decades than those living in developing countries. Between 1960 and 2005 the percentage of migrants in developed countries rose from 43% to 63%.¹¹

Figure 2 International migrants as a percentage of the world population, 1960-2005



There are approximately 17 million legal migrants in Africa, 53 million in Asia, 64 million in Europe, 7 million in Latin America and 45 million in North America (see figure 3).¹² In many cases these people have migrated within these regions.

Figure 3 International migrants by region



¹¹ UNDESA 2006

¹² UNDESA 2006

In 2005 13.5 million migrants worldwide (7%) were refugees. The percentage is higher in Africa (18%) and Asia (15%). The largest concentrations of refugees can be found in West Asia (4.7 million) and Southeast Asia (2.3 million).¹³ In 2006, the number of refugees rose for the first time since 2002, from 8.7 to 9.9 million. The increase was mainly due to the 1.2 million Iraqis who fled to neighbouring countries such as Jordan and Syria.¹⁴

2.2 Trends in South-North migration

Up until 1945 the primary migration flows could be found in the North, but with the process of decolonisation South-North migration increased sharply. Migration to the EU is now comparable in scale with migration to the United States, a classic immigration country. Since the oil crisis in the 1970s the Gulf region has also emerged as a major destination for migrants from developing countries. It seems unlikely that in the future we can expect any substantial reduction in South-North migration as a result of labour-market, economic or demographic trends.¹⁵ It is more likely that South-North migration will increase further due to factors such as population growth and globalisation.

Most immigrants in the EU and the Netherlands either hail from EU countries or from countries that have direct borders with the EU to the south or east.¹⁶ Migration from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe is relatively limited by comparison. There are currently approximately 2.6 million North Africans legally resident in the EU while the number of legal migrants from sub-Saharan Africa is only 1 million. Since 2000, increasing numbers of African guest workers from Libya and other migrants from sub-Saharan Africa have joined the ranks of North Africans heading to Europe. That said, the numbers are not huge. It is estimated that 65,000 to 120,000 Africans migrate to the Maghreb every year, around 25,000 to 35,000 of whom risk crossing over to Europe. Many illegal immigrants travel legally to Europe and subsequently become 'overstayers'.¹⁷

13 Ibid.

14 UNHCR 2007

15 IMI 2006

16 In 2005 the main countries of origin among immigrants in European OECD countries were Poland (324,000), Romania (202,000), Morocco (128,000), Bulgaria (82,000), Germany (77,000), Ukraine (70,000), Turkey (66,000), the United Kingdom (65,000) and the Russian Federation (54,000).

17 De Haas 2007a

The growing complexity of global migration processes is a significant trend in South-North migration. More and more countries are experiencing substantial levels of immigration, emigration and transmigration. Countries such as Morocco and Algeria, which until recently were regarded as typical emigration countries, have been transformed in the last few decades into transit and destination countries for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, Libya, a traditional destination for temporary migrant workers from North and sub-Saharan Africa, has developed into an important transit country.¹⁸ Central and Eastern European countries such as Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic also appear to be remoulding themselves into immigration societies.¹⁹

In addition there is evidence of increasing diversity and globalisation in migration trends, whereby migrants from a certain country no longer focus exclusively on another specific country as their destination. In the past, for example, Senegalese and Moroccan migrants would generally migrate to France, the formal colonial power, while more recently they have begun to opt for other European or North American destinations. The same kind of diversification can be seen in emigration patterns in countries like Ghana and Nigeria, which are becoming less focused on the United Kingdom.²⁰

Another recent trend is the increasingly transnational character of migration. This is mainly due to the increase in communication and transport options, which enable migrants to maintain socioeconomic and political ties with their countries of origin.

2.2.1 Migration to the Netherlands

Following a drop between 2002 and 2005, immigration since 2006 has been on the rise again. In the first decade of the new millennium the composition of immigration to the Netherlands has continued to change. The number of immigrants from the four traditional countries of origin (Turkey, Morocco, Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba), as well as the number of asylum seekers has continued to fall. In contrast, the number of migrants from some other countries such as Poland, Bulgaria and China is increasing. A glance at the regions of origin shows that immigration from Africa and Asia is falling. Only migration from within Europe itself is increasing.

18 De Haas 2006a

19 IMI 2006; Kirisci 2003

20 Bakewell and De Haas 2007; Zoomers and Van Naerssen 2006

The declining number of asylum applications since the millennium has been even more pronounced since 2004. This is partly due to the fact that the number of asylum seekers from Afghanistan and the former Yugoslavia dropped sharply. Approximately half of all asylum applications in 2007 were submitted by Iraqis (2,500 applications) or Somalis (2,000 applications). These were also the largest groups of asylum seekers in 2006. Since then the number of applications has dropped for all nationalities with the exception of Somalis, whose number of applications in 2007 was around one-third higher than the previous year. Over the years, the composition of the flow of asylum seekers has changed greatly. In the 1980s a relatively high number from Ghana, India, Suriname, Turkey and Zaïre (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) arrived in the Netherlands. In the 1990s, a high proportion of asylum seekers in the Netherlands were from the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia.

Table 1 Asylum applications in the Netherlands by country of nationality

| | Iraq | Somalia | Afghanistan | Iran | Angola | Sierra Leone | Serbia and Montenegro | Burundi | Turkey | China | Total |
|--------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|-----------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
| 2002 | 1022 | 538 | 1077 | 665 | 1891 | 1620 | 516 | 452 | 638 | 541 | 8960 |
| 2003 | 3472 | 451 | 492 | 555 | 370 | 314 | 393 | 402 | 414 | 295 | 7158 |
| 2004 | 1043 | 792 | 688 | 450 | 177 | 138 | 395 | 405 | 338 | 265 | 4691 |
| 2005 | 1620 | 1315 | 902 | 557 | 222 | 189 | 336 | 419 | 289 | 333 | 6182 |
| 2006 | 2766 | 1462 | 932 | 921 | 212 | 203 | 607 | 455 | 341 | 314 | 8213 |
| 2007 | 2445 | 2006 | 519 | 355 | 79 | 228 | 64 | 168 | 147 | 272 | 6283 |
| Total | 12368 | 6564 | 4610 | 3503 | 2951 | 2692 | 2311 | 2301 | 2167 | 2020 | 41487 |

Source: IND Information System

2.3 Trends in South-South migration

As table 2 shows, 47% of all migrants from developing countries are in other developing countries. The true number of South-South migrants is probably far higher when under-registration is factored in.²¹ Of Southern migrants, 40% are located in rich OECD²² countries and 13% in rich non-OECD countries, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong (China) and Singapore. The percentage of South-South migrants is highest in sub-Saharan Africa, where 64% of international migrants are located within the region.

Table 2 Global Migrant Stocks – regions of origin and destination (millions)

| Migrants from | Migrants in Developing countries | High income countries (OESO) | High income countries (non-OESO) | Total |
|-------------------------------------|--|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Developing countries | 73.9 47% | 61.8 40% | 20.1 13% | 155.8 100% |
| High income countries (OESO) | 3.4 11% | 25.5 85% | 1.2 4% | 30.1 100% |
| High income countries (non-OESO) | 0.8 17% | 3.6 77% | 0.3 6% | 4.7 100% |
| Total | 78.0 41% | 90.9 48% | 21.6 11% | 191 100% |

Source: Ratha and Shaw 2007

Intraregional migration within Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and Asia is largely determined by geographical proximity, the availability of migrant networks and disparity in incomes. One notable pattern in this regard is that migrants from low income countries tend to select middle income countries, while those from middle income countries mainly migrate to high income countries. Most West African migration from poor countries in the Sahel like Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso is therefore towards the relatively stable and prosperous countries on the coast, such as Ghana and Senegal.

21 Ratha and Shaw 2007

22 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

Just as in South-North migration, there appears in Africa too to be a growing diversity in migration patterns, which sees migrants covering larger distances across the continent. Since 1990, Libya and South Africa in particular have emerged as the new intra-African countries of destination. Emigration countries such as Nigeria, Gabon, Ghana, Senegal, Kenya and Algeria are also now major destination and transit countries for African migrants. Only North African migration (with the exception of Egypt) is primarily towards Europe.

In East and Central Africa conflicts have led to extensive refugee flows out of Sudan, Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda to countries like Egypt, Chad, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.²³ In West Africa conflicts in Sierra Leone (1991-2001), Liberia (1989-1996 and 1999-2003) and Guinea (1999-2000) resulted in at least 1.1 million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).²⁴ According to UNHCR 80% of all refugees are women and children.

Given South-South migrants' low incomes and often illegal status, most live under harsher conditions than many South-North migrants. They often encounter discrimination based on their sex or ethnicity, are subjected to sexual abuse, receive little or no protection from the governments of either countries of origin or destination and are usually exploited in the labour market. Large-scale expulsions have occurred frequently in West Africa and Latin America.²⁵ What is more, a recent World Bank study shows not only that South-South migrants earn far less than South-North migrants, but also that it costs far more to send remittances from South to South than from North to South.²⁶

23 Zoomers and Van Naerssen 2006; Bakewell and De Haas 2007

24 Drumtra 2006

25 Between 1983 and 1985 the Nigerian government expelled a large number of West African migrants, including around 1 million Ghanaians. Recently the Libyan government has started expelling African migrant workers, but economic growth and increasing demand for cheap labour have meant that Libya remains an attractive destination for migrants.

26 Ratha and Shaw 2007

2.4 Illegal migration

A number of sources indicate a rise in illegal migration and the increasing use of people smugglers by migrants.²⁷ One explanation is the discrepancy between supply and demand in migrant labour. The supply of migrant labour in the South is growing faster than legal demand in the North.²⁸ Another explanation may be the existence of migrant networks. In the Netherlands however, this trend toward rising illegal migration cannot be observed directly. In 2004 the number of illegal immigrants in the 1997-2003 period was estimated at 125,000 to 225,000. Between April 2005 and April 2006, the estimated number of illegal aliens in the Netherlands was between 75,000 and 185,000. While the latter range is lower than that of the earlier study, these figures cannot tell us whether the number of non-European illegal aliens has risen or fallen.²⁹

The persistent pressure of migration offers criminal groups (large- or small-scale, organised or otherwise) the chance to direct their efforts at smuggling migrants, and take advantage of new means of communication and transport in the process. People smuggling³⁰ is not a new phenomenon – the Chinese networks in particular have long been active – but in recent years it has noticeably increased, with new routes and points of entry constantly being sought. The organisations involved in the trade vary widely, as does their degree of professionalism, and include a large number of small-scale networks based on village or family ties, for example. People smuggling often carries considerable risks and hardships for migrants. There are countless examples of migrants who have not survived the journey. What is more, people smuggling often results in the kind of exploitation and duress that are the hallmarks of human trafficking.³¹

Human trafficking is often, but not exclusively, concerned with the sex industry. A relatively high number of victims are women and children. The Netherlands is primarily affected by East-West and South-North flows.

27 Schoorl et al. 2000; Castles and Miller 2003; Reyneri 2001

28 In its report the Global Commission on Migration and Development also explicitly called for a focus on creating jobs and improving the possibility of building sustainable livelihoods in developing countries (GCIM 2005).

29 House of Representatives, 2006-2007, 29 344 and 19 637, no. 60

30 For a definition of people smuggling, see article 3 (a) of the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea or Air.

31 For a definition of human trafficking, see article 3 (a) of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children.

To a large extent, East-West traffic flows through the Balkans, including Bulgaria and Romania. These are countries of origin as well as transit countries for migrants travelling from points further east. In South-North flows, human trafficking from West Africa is most notable. In autumn 2007, a Dutch police operation, conducted in association with a number of other European police services and the Nigerian police, succeeded in rounding up an extensive human trafficking network of Nigerian origin.

3 Links between migration and development

3.1 Introduction

Migration today should be considered primarily as the inevitable consequence of globalisation and economic integration. In an increasingly globalised world relations between countries are constantly growing. Goods and capital move virtually unchecked across national borders, while the movement of people is subject to restrictions. One downside of globalisation has been the growth of criminal networks, in the form of human traffickers, for example. Since 2000, the links between migration and development have received a great deal more attention from the research community. The main focus is the development potential of migration, which is generally discussed in relation to the MDGs. Most relevant is MDG1, reducing extreme poverty, but migration is also tied to other goals, such as MDG3, gender equality (in which the relationship with migration can be positive: greater equality, or negative: greater vulnerability among migrant women), or MDG7, environmental sustainability (in which migration may be linked to environmental degradation).

Migrants are increasingly viewed as a source of development potential in countries of origin, in so far as they send money home and apply their skills for the purpose of socioeconomic and political development. Such efforts may or may not be combined with migrants' return to their countries of origin.

While South-North migration may often have positive effects on migrants' lives and their families and communities, it is unrealistic to expect that migration alone can set in motion a broader development process. To achieve this, favourable conditions for economic and political development are needed. It therefore seems more sensible to speak of the development potential of migration, rather than any automatic effect.

3.2 The development potential of migration

3.2.1 The influence of migration on poverty and inequality

Most studies agree that South-North migration has reduced poverty, both directly and indirectly.³² One study of 71 developing countries concludes that a 10% increase in remittances per capita would reduce the number of people living on less than a dollar a day by 3.5%.³³ This directly illustrates the relationship between migration and achieving the Millennium Development Goals.

A range of studies have shown that international migration is a survival strategy among middle-class families and households, designed to spread income risks, dramatically raise incomes and provide access to a potential source of investment capital with the ultimate aim of increasing their economic security.³⁴

Empirical studies have also shown that South-North migration often enables migrants and their families to increase economic security and substantially improve their living conditions by obtaining better food, accommodation, clothing and education. In addition, migrants' consumer and productive spending often has a positive multiplier effect on local economies, which allows non-migrants to profit indirectly from remittances from abroad. This contributes to a modest but genuine degree of poverty reduction and socioeconomic development as a result of migration.

It is difficult, however, to draw unequivocal conclusions about the effect of migration on socioeconomic disparities in countries of origin. When members of the middle-class or social elite migrate, which is frequently the case with South-North migration, the money they send home often serves to reinforce existing inequalities. Yet when relatively poor groups migrate, as was the case with the influx of 'guest workers' in the 1960s and 1970s, migration can reduce such disparities and offer greater freedom to poorer groups.

It is also worth noting that the effect of migration on socioeconomic inequality often changes over time. Due to the high costs and risks involved, a country's first migrants are often members of elite groups, who pave the way for poorer groups. What originally served to reinforce inequality may actually have a levelling effect

32 Taylor et al. 1996; Adams and Page 2005

33 Adams and Page 2005

34 Agunias 2006b; Stark and Taylor 1989; Taylor 1999; Massey et al. 1998

in the longer term.³⁵ Within countries too, migration initially causes greater inequality in regions of origin. However, as regional prosperity levels rise over time, spreading outward from the cities to surrounding provinces, the disparities between urban and rural areas are reduced.³⁶

3.2.2 Brain drain versus brain gain

It has long been the consensus that migration of highly skilled workers has a negative effect on the development of countries of origin – the so-called brain drain. New research suggests that the situation is not so black and white. For a number of countries, small ones in particular, emigration by highly skilled workers is a problem. In Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Liberia, for example, more than half the doctors and nurses have emigrated, clearly to the detriment of health care in those countries.³⁷ In Ghana in 2000, twice as many nurses left as had qualified that year. Two years on, the Ghanaian Ministry of Health estimated that 57% of nursing vacancies could not be filled.

While a recent analysis by the OECD suggests that international migration is not the main cause of the health worker shortage in developing countries, migration can exacerbate the problem. Alongside the ‘pull’ factors created by growing demand for health workers in destination countries, ‘push’ factors in countries of origin also play an important role. Unattractive working conditions and insufficient investment in basic health care are just two examples.

The World Health Organisation (WHO) also estimates that regional shortages of health workers far exceed the numbers of health workers who have migrated from those areas. Even if there were no migration from these regions, there would still be a major health worker shortage. Of the 57 countries facing a major shortage, 36 are in Africa. That is three-quarters of all African countries.

An increase of around 140% in the number of current health workers would be necessary to improve the situation. It is estimated that 12% of this 140% capacity is working in OECD countries.³⁸

35 Stark et al. 1988; Rapoport and Docquier 2005; Adams 1989; Mishra 2007; Stark 1988; Bauer and Zimmermann 1998; Jones 1998

36 Jones 1998; Taylor and Wyatt 1996

37 OECD 2007a

38 Ibid.

Although emigration by highly skilled workers can cause personnel shortages in some countries and sectors, many developing countries are currently facing widespread unemployment among the highly skilled demographic. Some countries, including the Philippines, intentionally create a surplus of educated personnel that can go and work overseas.

Brain drain can, at least in the longer term, be accompanied by a process of 'brain gain'. In emerging economies such as China, India, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey, emigrants play an important innovative and economic role as transnational entrepreneurs. Research also shows that remittances often have a positive effect on school attendance and the educational level of the children who remain behind. Numerous studies have shown that emigration among highly skilled people can motivate non-migrants to study longer, in part because of the better prospects for emigration that result from completing a higher level of education.³⁹ Among low-skilled emigrants, the effect on motivation to study longer appears to be non-existent or even negative.⁴⁰

3.2.3 Circular migration

There is currently a great deal of international interest in circular migration. This is a form of legal migration that is suited to globalisation and the emergence of transnational networks. In this context migrants are increasingly seen as potential sources of development for their countries of origin.

There is no international consensus on the precise definition of circular migration. The Netherlands employs the definition set down in the 2004 memorandum: 'migration in which the migrant successively spends a relatively long time in various countries, including his or her country of origin'. In circular migration it is important to seek the most profitable and sustainable outcome, the 'triple win': the receiving country, the country of origin and the migrant should all benefit. In the context of its migration and development policy the Netherlands promotes two specific forms of circular migration:

39 Stark et al. 1997, World Bank 2005; RathaYang 2004; Cox Edwards and Ureta 2003; Kapur 2003; Buch et al. 2002; Rapoport and Docquier 2005; Bencherifa 1996; Thieme and Wyss 2005; Fan and Stark 2007

40 McKenzie 2006

1. Temporary labour migration from developing countries to the Netherlands

There are various forms of temporary labour migration to the Netherlands, but here we are specifically concerned with circular migration with development potential: migrants from developing countries coming to work or study temporarily in the Netherlands and then returning to their countries of origin. By applying the experience, knowledge and possibly financial resources they have gained, they can contribute to these countries' development. However, given the limited practical experience to date with this form of circular migration, its contribution to development goals as well as to the labour market is not expected to be substantial for the time being.

The international debate on temporary labour migration is also going on within the WTO.⁴¹ For years developing countries have been pressing for the liberalisation of, and more flexibility in, the market for temporary labour.

The discussion is taking place mainly in the negotiations on the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The GATS identifies four different kinds of trade in services, or 'modes of supply'. Mode 4 deals with the right to stay, for a predetermined period of time, in another country with the aim of offering a service, as either an employee or a self-employed person. It does not include acquiring permanent residence in or the citizenship of another country.

Despite the increasing demand on the EU labour market (partly due to demographic ageing and higher levels of education), and the growing realisation of the potential benefits that greater labour mobility can have for worldwide economic growth, the progress of negotiations on mode 4 has been very limited and has frequently been hindered further by national visa, employment and social security legislation.⁴² Although mode 4 can – thanks to its largely demand-driven character – strengthen host countries' economies (or economic development) in a targeted and tightly-regulated manner, few potential host countries are making optimal use of the opportunity. Developing countries believe that the developed countries' requirement that the temporary nature of the stay be possible to guarantee can be accommodated within a more flexible, selective, demand-driven market for temporary services offered by labour migrants.

41 World Trade Organisation

42 Winters 2005

2. Temporary assignments from the Netherlands to the country of origin

Temporary assignments are aimed at getting migrants with permanent residency in the Netherlands to undertake temporary work, such as reconstruction activities, in their countries of origin. When managed effectively, temporary assignments can be beneficial for all parties. As a supplement to other development strategies, temporary assignment can make a modest development contribution in the country of origin: a form of brain gain.

3.2.4 Remittances

In studies of the effects of migration on development there has been a particular focus on remittances: the money that migrants send home to their countries of origin. Remittances provide states with an external source of hard currency, which covers part of their balance-of-payment deficits. What is more, remittances have proved to be a stable and reliable source of foreign exchange, compared with other flows of capital to developing countries, such as foreign direct investment and development aid.⁴³ After foreign investment, remittances are the main source of external finance for developing countries.⁴⁴ The amount of money being transferred by migrants to developing countries rose from USD 31.1 billion in 1990 to USD 84.5 billion in 2000. In 2007, migrants transferred USD 240 billion in remittances to developing countries.⁴⁵ The official total of remittances is almost double the amount spent worldwide annually on development cooperation and ten times higher than net capital transfers to developing countries.⁴⁶

43 World Bank 2005; Ratha 2003; Kapur 2003; Buch et al. 2002

44 GCIM 2005

45 Because transfers are frequently made through unofficial channels, the actual amount of remittances is far higher. According to recent estimates, more than USD 300 billion was transferred via formal and informal channels in 2006 by some 150 million migrants. Furthermore, not all of this money comes from rich countries. Recent estimates suggest that South-South remittances from migrants account for between 10% and 29% of total remittances worldwide. The actual figure may be even higher if allowance is made for under-registration of South-South migration.

46 Kapur and McHale 2003; Ratha 2003; Ratha and Shaw 2007; Kapur 2003; World Bank 2007a

Table 3 Estimated remittances, 2006⁴⁷

| | Remittances (in billions of USD) | As percentage of BBP |
|--|-------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| All developing countries | 207.528 | 1,9% |
| Low income countries | 54.296 | 3,6% |
| Middle income countries | 153.232 | 1,6% |
| Lower middle income countries | 92.922 | 2,1% |
| Higher middle income countries | 60.310 | 1,2% |
| East Asia and Pacific | 47.542 | 1,4% |
| Europe and Central Asia | 32.419 | 1,4% |
| Latin America and Caribbean | 53.264 | 2,0% |
| Middle East and North Africa | 25.162 | 3,5% |
| South Asia | 39.886 | 3,6% |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 9.256 | 1,5% |
| High income countries (OESO members) | 69.852 | 0,2% |
| High income countries (non-OESO members) | 3.546 | 0,6% |
| Worldwide | 280.926 | 0,6% |

Although these are relatively large amounts, it is important to recognise that the economic significance of remittances differs from region to region and country to country. The importance of remittances compared with foreign investment is greatest in Africa and the Middle East. And while remittances form the highest proportion of GDP in poorer countries, their effectiveness as a development resource is greater in countries that have already reached a certain level of development, as in parts of Asia and Latin America. This is because they have stronger investment climates and higher levels of education, which enables those who remain behind to make better use of the remittances they receive.

While registered remittances account for an average of 1.9% of GDP across all developing countries, this percentage is highest for the low income countries. Within this group, the GDP percentages are far higher among small and poor countries, such as Eritrea (37.9%), Guinea-Bissau (48.7%) and Lesotho (24.1%). By far the most remittances (USD 153 billion) go to middle-income countries, for the simple reason that by far the most South-North migrants hail from these countries.

47 World Bank 2007b

In the principal emigration countries remittances seldom account for more than 10% of GDP. Consider, for example, Morocco (11.2%), Ghana (6.6%), Senegal (7.5%), the Philippines (12.5%) India (2.7%), China (0.8%) and Mexico (2.9%).⁴⁸

The suggestion by some that dependence on remittances carries the risk that migrants will rapidly grow less inclined to send money home once they are established and socioeconomically integrated in the destination country⁴⁹ is not supported by research. In many cases there is no such decrease in remittance transfers. In others the decrease is very slight or occurs only very gradually. Studies suggest that the absolute figure for total remittances only peaks 15 to 20 years after migration peaked.⁵⁰ This can be explained partly by the fact that migration, contrary to earlier expectations, has continued as a result of family unification and illegal migration. In this way, migrants' ties with their countries of origin are continually being renewed. It is true, however, that such a stable flow of income inevitably breeds dependence on remittances.

Finally, globalisation and the development of transport and communications technology are enabling greater numbers of migrants to maintain transnational lifestyles. Integration, therefore, is not necessarily followed by weakening ties to their countries of origin.

3.2.5 Migration, investment and development

While it is an accepted fact that South-North migration has facilitated a substantial and relatively sustainable increase in living standards in regions of origin and has made a contribution to poverty reduction, there is less consensus on the degree to which migration can engender investment and sustainable economic development in these regions. Given the growing phenomenon of demographic ageing in Europe and the Netherlands, immigration is one of the instruments that receiving countries can use to counter the negative effects. Immigrants often perform tasks for which existing nationals are no longer available.⁵¹ In many European countries, where the birth rate is too low to withstand demographic ageing, immigration also offsets the effects associated with this trend.

48 Percentages are based on estimates that include unofficial remittances (Source: IFAD 2007).

49 Merkle and Zimmermann 1992; Ghosh 2006

50 Brown 1994; Fokkema and Groenewold 2003; De Haas and Plug 2006; Taylor 1999; Agunias 2006a; Dayton-Johnson et al. 2007

51 Sometimes called the 4 Ds: 'dirty, difficult, demeaning and dangerous'

In research and policy circles, it has long been a widely held belief that remittances are used mainly for everyday consumer spending, and that such consumer behaviour has very little impact on development. To counter that view, it should first be noted that consumer spending in areas like education, food, health care and housing makes a substantial contribution to development. Some sources report that women generally send a higher proportion of their incomes home to their families than men. What is more, they apparently make remittances more frequently and consistently. In countries of origin, remittances made by women are generally spent on daily essentials, health care and education, while those made by men are used more for consumer items such as cars and televisions, as well as land and livestock.⁵² Second, an increasing number of recent studies point out that families that receive money from migrants are more inclined to invest capital than families without migrants, even when the figures are adjusted for the higher incomes usually enjoyed by families with migrants among them.⁵³

As with poverty and inequality, migration's effect on investment and economic growth changes over time. While initially remittances might be spent mostly on clothing, food, health care, housing and paying off debts, including those associated with migration, in the longer term it is often possible to invest in education and small-scale enterprise. For this reason, the full effects of migration on development can usually only be seen in the longer term, around twenty years after large-scale emigration started.

It is also important to note that such positive development effects are not necessarily linked to the return of migrants. Many migrants invest without returning for good, or travel frequently to and fro. These kinds of 'shuttle migration' and transnational entrepreneurship also suggest that the traditional distinction between migrating permanently and returning permanently can, in practice, be too rigid.

Positive development effects like investment, employment and economic growth do not simply happen automatically, however. The extent to which migrants invest socially, politically and economically in their countries of origin depends on their socioeconomic and residence status in their destination countries and on the general political and economic climate in their countries of origin.

52 UNFPA 2006

53 Massey et al. 1998; Taylor 1999; Woodruff and Zenteno 2007; Adams 1991; Rapoport and Docquier 2005

Finally, as stated earlier, migration's potentially positive development effects are not limited to greater investment in commercial enterprise in countries of origin, but positively influence the prosperity of such countries as a whole.⁵⁴

3.3 The sociocultural and political effects of migration

3.3.1 The sociocultural effects of migration

Emigration can lead to a 'migration culture', in which migration is viewed as the primary means of socioeconomic progress. A migration culture can be said to exist when members of the population direct all their efforts toward emigrating and emigration becomes an increasingly important element of survival strategies. The focus on migration often comes at the expense of tackling a country's internal problems. In some cases, high migrant incomes can even lead to widespread disdain of traditional, local activities, such as agriculture. Coupled with the drain on the labour force, this may explain why migration can initially be accompanied by a decline in agricultural productivity.⁵⁵ On the other hand, migrant incomes have been shown to ultimately enable people to invest in local commercial enterprise, both in and beyond agriculture.⁵⁶ In the longer term, therefore, short-term negative effects can be transformed into positives. As well as being a major factor in socioeconomic success, migration can also change traditional social, gender and ethnic relations in countries of origin for the worse. Expected remittances might fail to appear, families may be scattered and separated, women may be left behind without housing, land or possessions and children may end up living on the streets. There is also the question of whether, over time, remittances may have a negative influence on the motivation and initiative to succeed of those individuals and families left behind in the country of origin.

54 Although recent research tends to paint a rosy picture of the direct socioeconomic effects of migration and remittances on development in regions and communities of origin, studies of their effect on macroeconomic growth and employment are far less unambiguous. While the effect in some countries is positive, it is neutral or even negative in others. The variation is probably due in part to the varying extent to which countries of origin are able to create the kinds of political and economic conditions that make investment and return (whether temporary or otherwise) attractive to migrants.

55 Lucas 1987; De Haas 2006b

56 Lucas 1987; De Haas 2006b

3.3.2 Migration and the position of women

In its coalition agreement, the fourth Balkenende government announced its intention to be more ambitious where equal opportunities are concerned. The result was the adoption by Parliament in the autumn of 2007 of the policy memorandum *Improving Women's Prospects: Equal Opportunities Policy 2008-2011*.

The government formulated four key goals in this memorandum:

1. more job opportunities for women;
2. more opportunities for women from ethnic minorities to use their talents;
3. preventing and combating violence against women and girls (sexual or otherwise) and
4. more opportunities for girls and women in the rest of the world, especially developing countries.

The third goal points to the steps needed to protect migrant women and girls against violence, including domestic and sexual violence, forced prostitution and harmful traditional practices such as genital mutilation. For the fourth goal, the government distinguishes a number of sub-objectives including:

- a. guaranteeing a structural focus on the position of women in developing regions;
- b. improving sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR), particularly for girls and women and
- c. placing a structural focus on improving the position of women in all international areas of policy.

In migration and development policy, we have the chance to put these equal opportunities goals into practice. This can lead to concrete improvements in the position of migrant girls and women.

According to many researchers there is a growing trend toward the feminisation of migration. The *State of the World Population* report of 2006 by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), devoted particular attention to gender and migration, reporting that almost half of migrants are women (95 million, or 49.6%). The most notable change is the rising number of female labour migrants who emigrate independently, thanks to increasing demand for women in the industrial, domestic services and care sectors, for example.⁵⁷ Throughout the

57 Salih 2001

migration process, however, female migrants are vulnerable to abuse and exploitation, for example by fellow migrants or people smugglers.

The international community has only recently recognised that men and women have different motivations for emigrating. Equally, it is only now coming to appreciate the importance of female migrants to societies' economies and social welfare. A number of empirical studies show that migration often does not involve any profound changes in traditional gender roles.⁵⁸ While male migration often means that women take on greater responsibilities, this is usually only temporary. For women left behind, faced with uncertainty and caring for children on their own but without any long-term prospect of greater power, migration often means more work, worry and hardship.⁵⁹ And for women with children who migrate as dependants with their husbands and wish to escape physical abuse or seek a divorce, the choice between their personal safety and their legal status is a terribly difficult one. This makes women especially vulnerable. Furthermore, traditional practices such as forced marriage, honour crime and female genital mutilation regularly take place among immigrant women in the Netherlands.

In cases where women participate in the migration process themselves, there is evidence that migration can have positive long-term benefits for women in general, such as economic independence and access to contraception. Migration is not the only cause of these changes, but it does reinforce and accelerate the process.⁶⁰

In numerous emigration regions, migrant spending benefits education, and schooling for girls in particular.⁶¹ Some researchers claim that large-scale migration from North Africa to Europe has accelerated the drop in the birthrate in countries of origin by spreading modern ideas about family planning, family size and the role of women.⁶² This is another example of migration's contribution to achieving the Millennium Development Goals.

58 Taylor 1984; Myntti 1984

59 Day and İçduygu 1997; Van Rooij 2000; King et al. 2006; Taylor 1984; Myntti 1984; Hampshire 2006

60 King et al. 2006; Taylor et al. 2006

61 Yang 2004; Cox Edwards and Ureta 2003; Hanson and Woodruff 2002; Bencherifa 1996

62 Courbage 1994; Fargues 2006

3.3.3 Migrants' influence on political and other change processes

Increasingly, governments in developing countries see their emigrants as a vital resource for development. For this reason, many such countries develop 'diaspora' policies, aimed at strengthening ties with emigrants and their offspring in order to maximise remittances and investment from abroad.⁶³

The importance that states attach to such transfers and investments can ultimately promote more general political and economic reforms, including anti-corruption, simplification of administrative procedures and democratisation.⁶⁴

Migrants can also play an important role in the social and political debate in countries of origin, and in doing so contribute substantially to the growth of civil society. Equally, migrant organisations for religious or ethnic minorities can be instrumental in promoting equal opportunities for minorities in countries of origin.⁶⁵

The political influence of migrants can also be controversial, however. Migrants can provide repressive regimes or indeed resistance movements with financial or political support, thus facilitating or prolonging repression and/or violent conflicts in their countries of origin.⁶⁶ Governments in destination countries therefore need to be aware of such risks when working with migrant organisations.

The positive contribution that migrants are able to make to development in their countries of origin partly depends on the degree of success they enjoy in the destination countries.⁶⁷ Effective integration and participation by migrants is important to the development of countries of origin as well as destination countries. If migrants are acclimatised to their destination countries and have made certain norms and values their own, they will be able to do more for their countries of origin. Although the government has a role to play in integrating migrants, it is not considered the government's task to mobilise the migrant community to work on behalf of their countries of origin. That is the migrant's own choice.

63 Barry 2006; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Gamlen 2006

64 Newland and Patrick 2004; De Haas 2005; Van Hear et al. 2004; Massey et al. 1998; Eckstein 2004

65 De Haas 2006b; Taylor et al. 2006

66 Van Hear 2004; Nyberg-Sorensen et al. 2002; Castles and Miller 2003

67 Koser 2007

3.4 The effects of development on migration

The effects of development on migration partly depend on the type of migration, the definition of development, and a given country's stage of development. If we consider only voluntary migration, and we view development as a process that increases people's ability and freedom to shape their lives as they choose, we can argue that the relationship between development and migration is generally positive.

Voluntary migration, in which migrants move in order to achieve a better life, is usually the result of a certain measure of development combined with a degree of relative (but not absolute) deprivation and a wide international disparity in incomes. As long as there continues to be a substantial South-North disparity in incomes, a climate of strong growth will be associated, initially at least, with an increasing readiness to emigrate, because people need a certain level of capital before they are able to migrate.⁶⁸ Domestic and international migration are often an intrinsic part of more general social and economic development processes.

Various studies point out that emigration generally slows down only gradually following a long period of sustainable development and economic growth – provided, that is, that the country of origin can inspire confidence and offer prospects for the future, chiefly through political stability and an increase in democratic freedoms.⁶⁹ Such change is accompanied by a rise in migrant return and immigration, allowing net emigration countries to make the transition to net immigration countries.

By fostering sustainable development, political stability and good governance, development cooperation can contribute, indirectly and in the long term, to gradually making migration less prevalent, or at least less necessary. However, the development of the poorest countries is not expected to lead directly to a reduction in emigration to Western countries. In fact, it is more likely that development take-offs in the very poorest countries will encourage emigration, at least in the short term, a phenomenon known as the 'migration hump'.⁷⁰

68 Skeldon 1992; Martin and Taylor 1996; Zelinsky 1971; De Haas 2007c; Skeldon 1997

69 Rotte et al. 1997; Martin and Taylor 1996; Bohning 1994; Olesen 2002

70 Martin and Taylor 1996; see also Hatton and Williamson 2003

4 Policy priorities

As demonstrated in previous chapters, the processes of migration and development are closely linked. Theoretically speaking, it is difficult to draw unequivocal conclusions about how migration affects development. Nonetheless migration has real, if limited, development potential for countries of origin. Whether developing countries realise this potential or not is, however, partly dependent on whether they can create the right political and economic conditions.

Although migration, especially of highly qualified migrants, is seen as important for the economic development of the Netherlands, much migration from developing countries is illegal and undesirable. If we are to encourage desired legal migration and implement return policy while combating illegal migration, a good working relationship with countries of origin is vital.

Traditionally, migration policy has been based on the domestic agenda. In recent years, however, there has been more and more international interest in the relationship between migration and development. The Netherlands believes that global cooperation on migration and development is vital, which is why we will continue to pursue the active international role we have played in recent years. The House of Representatives has already been advised of the UN High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development (2006) and the Global Forum on Migration and Development (2007).⁷¹ The Netherlands contributed to the Forum substantively, financially and with human resources, and will continue to do so. A second meeting of the Forum will take place in Manila in October 2008.

Various international organisations have recognised the importance of the relationship between migration and development. The Netherlands supports

71 House of Representatives, 2006–2007, 29 693, no 10; House of Representatives, 2007–2008, 29 693, no. 14

work in this field and, at the same time, advocates effective cooperation between international organisations. In this light, we welcome the establishment of the Global Migration Group.⁷² Where possible the Netherlands will encourage and support such initiatives.

Since the European Council adopted the Global Approach to Migration in 2005 the issue has gained great momentum in terms of European policy. Steady progress has been made in integrating migration into EU external and development policy and development into migration policy. A great deal of effort has gone into improving dialogue and cooperation with origin and transit countries. Over the next few years the priority will be implementing the Rabat and Tripoli action plans, the Euromed declaration and the EU-Africa partnership.⁷³ The guiding principle will be a balanced approach, focusing on mutual interests and obligations and, specifically, on development and return. Tools will include both partnerships and platforms for dialogue on migration. The Netherlands will endeavour to work with a number of like-minded countries.

The Netherlands aims to enter into and/or step up dialogue on migration with developing countries, and to formalise cooperation in partnerships with third countries, specifically within the EU framework mentioned above. Within these partnerships there will be scope for offering support and organising migration and development activities. Partnerships must respect mutual concerns and interests but also, where appropriate, comprise agreements on commitments and their fulfilment, particularly those concerning a country's readmission of its own nationals. Migration and development activities can encourage countries to cooperate on return. Countries that do not cooperate will in principle be excluded from these activities. Moreover, where possible, dialogue with these countries will

72 The Global Migration Group (GMG) is a network of ten international organisations whose work relates to migration. The GMG's chair rotates every six months. At the end of 2007 the following organisations were part of the network: the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the World Bank (WB).

73 'EU-African Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment' (EU-Africa Summit, Lisbon, December 2007). One of the three priorities in this partnership is implementing the action plan adopted at the Migration and Development conference (Tripoli, November 2006).

focus on the return issue. New partnerships will be linked in with future country strategies, in the interests of return policy.

The following six policy priorities have been identified. They are based on the analysis presented in chapter 3, and on the international and European developments set out above. They will be practically and strategically elaborated at international, EU and national level.

1. focusing more on migration in the development dialogue and on development in the migration dialogue;
2. fostering institutional development in migration management;
3. promoting circular migration/brain gain;
4. strengthening the involvement of migrant organisations;
5. strengthening the link between remittances and development; and
6. encouraging sustainable return and reintegration.

The other subjects touched on in this chapter – human rights, health care, brain drain and environmental migration – will also play a part in fleshing out policy. All policy priorities emphatically take account of promoting human rights and women's rights and equal opportunities.

A conscious choice has been made to implement activities in the Netherlands' partner countries, plus another three countries that are significant from a national migration perspective.⁷⁴ In 2008-2009 these will be Morocco, Sierra Leone and Angola, countries with which a partnership would be particularly valuable given the migration situation in the Netherlands and in the countries in question. In principle the country choices will be reviewed at political level once every two years.

4.1 Focusing more on migration in the development dialogue and on development in the migration dialogue

The first priority is to raise awareness within the Netherlands. People who are now primarily responsible for implementing migration policy, or whose work centres on development cooperation, need to be aware of the effects each has on the other. Integrating migration into development policy and development cooperation into migration policy in the Netherlands is an important condition

74 This limitation does not apply to the Reintegration Scheme for Returnees (HRT) (see section 4.6.1)

for the effective and coherent implementation of migration and development policy.

4.1.1 Migration in the development dialogue

Migration could play a positive role in policy planning and implementation in developing countries in which migration is a major factor. However, recent studies have shown that the positive contribution that migration can make is not usually considered in poverty analyses or Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).⁷⁵ By contrast, negative features of migration (such as brain drain, the spread of crime, the spread of HIV/AIDS and rapid urbanisation) are usually taken into account in PRSPs.

As agreed under the EU-Africa partnership, in the joint annual PRSP review the Netherlands will highlight relevant aspects of migration and development in countries that do not consider migration in their PRSPs or comparable national development strategies. This will take place in collaboration with other donors, with respect for the ownership principle. It should be said that PRSPs are democratically drawn up and directed by the country in question. As such they are not simply a compilation of Western issues and the wishes of donors. Even if migration is not a permanent feature of PRSPs, it can be included under one of the regular pillars, e.g. the economic pillar (monetary policy and pro-poor growth) or the governance pillar (migration management).⁷⁶

In fragile states, which as a rule do not have PRSPs with broad support, migration can be an important part of dialogue between the country in question and other donors in two different ways. Firstly, such countries often have to contend with the issue of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees and reintegrating them as the situation improves. Secondly, the diaspora can have an important role to play, both politically and financially.⁷⁷

So far the question of migration has also been given little room in Multi-Annual Strategic Plans (MJSPs) drawn up by embassies in Dutch partner countries. In MJSPs embassies detail how they plan to respond to developments they have observed in the country in question, given their relative influence compared with

75 Black 2004

76 It should be noted that PRSPs are only compiled by Least Developed Countries (LDC)., Many countries from which people migrate to the Netherlands are therefore not covered by PRSPs.

77 See sections 4.3 and 4.4 and the upcoming memorandum on fragile states.

other players. In countries in which migration has significant favourable or unfavourable effects, embassies identify the opportunities and risks they can address in dialogue with local authorities.

Migration is increasingly a feature of EU external and development policy, for example in planning for the tenth European Development Fund (EDF). Migration as a theme is increasingly a feature of the European Commission's Country Strategy Papers (CSPs). In preparing the papers the Commission has drawn up migration profiles for many Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. The Netherlands supports this step-by-step method of integrating migration into external policy, and will push for this information to be used in policy formulation.

4.1.2 Development in the migration dialogue

In the same way, possible consequences for developing countries will be taken into account as much as possible when formulating Dutch policy on migrants. In the analysis in chapter 3, we observed that whether or not migrants can play a positive role in developing their countries of origin is partly dependent on how successful they are in their country of destination. Full integration and social participation on the part of migrants is therefore potentially beneficial not only to the country of destination but also to the country of origin.

In encouraging migrants to make positive contributions to developing their countries of origin, we need to focus on the possible economic, cultural or political impact of their involvement both on the integration process in the Netherlands and on Dutch integration policy. In this light we refer to a report by the Rotterdam Institute for Social Policy Research (RISBO) on transnational involvement and integration, published in November 2003,⁷⁸ which showed that transboundary activities such as trade and remitting money to the country of origin are not necessarily good or bad for integration. The report was unable to conclude unequivocally whether or not migrants' increasing transnational involvement hinders integration; nor is there proof either that a strong transnational orientation results in poor integration in Dutch society, or that the opposite is true.

For example, remittances strengthen ties with the country of origin, but if they

78 Engbersen et al. 2003

compromise certain vital investments in the country of destination they could be said to hinder integration. At the same time, remittances and/or trade with the country of origin strengthens the migrant's economic position in the Netherlands and thus stimulates integration. These kinds of investments boost migrants' socioeconomic opportunities. The Netherlands wishes to stimulate the development of those transnational activities that have a positive effect on migrant's integration in the Netherlands, and to prevent any possible negative effects. However, engaging in transnational activities is and must remain above all an individual choice. At the same time, there are a number of ways in which government can guide such activities. In the case of initiatives to encourage migrants to employ their skills to contribute to the development of their countries of origin (for example, through a temporary assignment to developing countries), the possible benefits for a prolonged stay in the Netherlands should be made clear in the accompanying information.⁷⁹

In the interests of encouraging migrants' social integration and participation, the State Secretary for Social Affairs and Employment has submitted a number of policy measures to the House of Representatives designed to get highly qualified asylum seekers with residence permits into employment as quickly as possible. The covering letter accompanying the report on the labour market position of highly qualified refugees⁸⁰ refers to a number of measures that will be key to its implementation, all of which had been mooted in a previous letter to the House of Representatives: the Job Offensive for Refugees, the publicity campaign aimed at refugees, employers and municipalities, and tailored learning pathways for highly qualified refugees.⁸¹

Blanket admission measures which can benefit nationals of developing countries are also relevant. For example, as of December 2007 the deadline within which foreign students who have completed their studies in the Netherlands have to find a job has been extended. They now have one year in which to find employment meeting the criteria specified in the knowledge migrant scheme.

People from developing countries can also take advantage of the Dutch knowledge migrant scheme and the proposed EU Directive on entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment (the

79 Integration in the Netherlands is not, in principle, relevant in the case of temporary labour migration.

80 House of Representatives, 2005-2006, 27 223, no. 80

81 House of Representatives, 2005-2006, 27 223, no. 78

proposed Blue Card). The Blue Card proposal provides scope for rules limiting recruitment of knowledge migrants to combat brain drain from developing countries. Under the proposal it will be possible for Blue Card holders who are long-term residents in their destination countries to return to their countries of origin for an extended period of work or study without losing their right of residence. This will encourage circular migration.

Recruiting healthcare professionals from outside the EU should be a low priority in employment policy. A repetition of the situation that arose in 2000 and 2001, when several care institutions recruited nurses from developing countries (including South Africa and the Philippines), is undesirable. At the government's request, healthcare employers have since developed a certification standard for placement and recruitment agencies. The Netherlands is encouraging healthcare employers to draw up a code of conduct that will state that healthcare professionals should not be actively recruited from developing countries or from countries with a shortage of such professionals.

Asylum seekers cannot fully participate in society. Nonetheless, it is recognised that drawing as much as possible on asylum seekers' potential can help make their sustainable return possible. It can also aid integration in the Netherlands, should asylum be granted. The House of Representatives has been assured that legislation on access to the labour market for asylum seekers whose cases are being assessed will be broadened by the recent relaxation of the past employment reference requirement laid down in the Unemployment Insurance Act (WW).⁸² Asylum seekers whose cases have been under consideration for longer than six months will thus be able to work for 24 weeks out of 52, instead of 12.

4.2 Fostering institutional development in migration management

As noted in chapter 3, migration can play a positive role in countries' development. There are, however, negative features associated with migration, at individual, national and international level. These include exploitation of migrants, brain drain, instability (also in transit countries) and an increase in people smuggling and human trafficking. In order to realise the development potential of migration and minimise injustice, governments in developing countries require the insight, capacity and opportunity to operate effective, sound migration policy focused on return, reintegration and refugee protection.

82 House of Representatives, 2006–2007, 29 861 and 30 573, no. 17

Many developing countries, which are primarily affected by South-South migration and transmigration, lack these strengths. A complicating factor in migration management is that many migration flows are mixed: refugees use the same routes and means as other migrants. This can make it difficult to distinguish refugees from other migrants and to afford them the protection to which they are entitled.

The complexity of the problem means that developing countries need to build up their capacity for migrant management in several fields. There is currently a lack of alignment and harmonisation. Developing countries are increasingly acknowledging the need to work together in the interests of effective migrant management and the positive role migration can play, and are pushing for support. Support could take the form of contributing to managing migration flows, including contact with the diaspora; improving data collection; fighting illegal immigration and facilitating legal migration; fighting human trafficking and people smuggling; or providing adequate protection for refugees and asylum seekers. What is required depends at least in part on the wishes and needs of the country of origin or transit, and the specific migration situation. Capacity building also encourages local ownership by combating the negative aspects of migration, thus making migration policy as sustainable as possible.

4.2.1 Data collection for policy and legislation

Sound migration policy needs to draw on relevant information and recent data if it is to achieve an evidence-based approach. In a number of countries there is not enough available information on the population breakdown and regional and national migration dynamics, and insufficient insight into policy and legislation and the scope to develop them further. Where necessary, the Netherlands will support data collection programmes and projects.

4.2.2 Border control

Border control is an important part of migration management, particularly as a means of combating people smuggling and human trafficking. Effective border control can help reduce illegal migration and facilitate legal migration. In the next few years the Netherlands will continue to contribute to improving border control in third countries, for example through knowledge transfer in the field of identity and document fraud and by making equipment available.

Border control also requires an efficient immigration service able to contribute reliable and accessible data on migration flows, in the interests of balanced

migration policy. So far the Netherlands has limited experience of helping build immigration services, but projects such as the immigration service project in Ghana set up by the Netherlands together with other donors have been promising. In the light of this positive experience, which drew on local expertise and knowledge transfer, more projects will be supported or developed over the next few years, focusing on encouraging regional cooperation on the movement of persons and developing local expertise. Other donors' cooperation and coordination will again be sought.

The Netherlands will also be supporting the work of FRONTEX, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Coordination at the External Borders. FRONTEX has been allocated a special role in working with third countries and capacity building. The aim is to get third countries involved in joint training programmes, and to strengthen information exchange between the EU and third countries so as to smooth the way for operational cooperation.

The Netherlands is committed to ensuring that there is sufficient focus on protection and asylum (including border control and building immigration services) within migration management.

4.2.3 Human trafficking and people smuggling

Chapter 2 highlighted the considerable risks to which migrants who use smuggling networks are often exposed. People smuggling often results in exploitation and coercion, characteristics of human trafficking, which in itself is essentially a modern form of slavery. A robust approach to both human trafficking and people smuggling therefore needs to be adopted. This will remain a policy priority. The human rights strategy submitted to the House of Representatives in November 2007 specifically addressed the problem of human trafficking. As the strategy states, human rights considerations are at the fore in every phase of the proposals to tackle the problem. Protecting the victim comes first.

Given the transnational nature of people smuggling and human trafficking, close international cooperation, at bilateral and multilateral level, is essential for an effective approach. The main frame of reference for global cooperation is provided by the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime's Human Trafficking Protocol and People Smuggling Protocol (2000), to which the Netherlands is party. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) can help countries that need technical assistance to comply with the Convention

and its Protocols. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) can also help countries to receive and take care of victims.

In Europe, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe are key in setting norms. The Netherlands will continue to promote close cooperation in the EU to combat human trafficking and people smuggling, in both the Union's internal and external policy. This is supported by the Conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting of 8-9 November 2007. The EU provides assistance to countries that lack capacity in terms of the justice authorities and the police, and countries that cannot provide adequate care for victims. The EU-African Union joint Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings (the Ouagadougou Action Plan) has provided a framework for African countries.

Supplementing these multilateral efforts, bilateral cooperation is also in place with the main transit countries and countries of origin for human trafficking towards the Netherlands. A chain approach has been adopted, encompassing prevention, investigation, prosecution and victim support. Projects, financed by a variety of instruments, are being set up in a number of countries of origin. In the interest of preventing human trafficking the Netherlands is considering introducing rapid response teams. These teams would combine the document-fraud and risk-profiles expertise of the Royal Military and Border Police (KMar), the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) and the Expertise Centre for Human Trafficking and People Smuggling (EMM). Pooling this experience will make it possible to respond swiftly and flexibly to unusual changes in migration flows and the activities of human traffickers.

4.2.4 International protection

Activities designed to strengthen protection in the region are still a Dutch priority. They can help prevent secondary migration flows (migration which takes place after protection has been, or could have been, secured), thus addressing the problem of mixed migration flows. The House of Representatives will be informed in a separate report about protection in the region.

The Netherlands is striving to make every form of migration management protection sensitive, i.e. to ensure that it always does enough to ensure international protection (including the non-refoulement principle and the ban on torture). Furthermore, states and relevant organisations (including the UN Refugee Agency UNHCR, IOM and the International Red Cross) are actively

encouraged to work together on asylum and migration. This has added value not only in the case of mixed migration flows, but also when a refugee crisis passes and the situation begins to improve.

4.3 Promoting circular migration/brain gain

The Netherlands sees encouraging circular migration as a means of reinforcing the positive contributions migrants and migration can make to development. It is also a means of working more with other countries on migration.

In its memorandum 'Towards a modern migration policy', the government states that it has no intention of ignoring the pressure of migration from developing countries. Facilitating and regulating temporary labour migration from developing countries is, however, largely dependent on the forms devised for it. The WTO Mode 4 negotiations could provide a framework for effectively shaping the forms of temporary migration, in so far as its purpose is providing temporary transnational services. Dutch policy is to place as few limitations as possible on Dutch businesses wishing to temporarily employ transnational labour migrants for this purpose. At the same time, as part of the GATS negotiations, the Netherlands emphasises the particular importance of certain sectors and forms of service provision to developing countries.

Brain gain can be fostered by employing the two forms of circular migration referred to in chapter 3; temporary labour migration to the Netherlands and temporary assignment from the Netherlands to the country of origin.

4.3.1 Temporary labour migration to the Netherlands

Several schemes already exist or are currently being developed to allow highly educated individuals to reside in the Netherlands. One example is the knowledge migrant scheme.⁸³ 'Towards a modern migration policy' introduced a new talent scheme with a points system for innovative entrepreneurs, independent researchers and creative people of outstanding ability. In October 2007 the European Commission presented proposals for the introduction of the Blue Card system, which will allow highly educated migrants from third (non-EU) countries to work in an EU country for two years, with the possibility of extension. Once the migrant has lived in the EU for five years he or she may apply for a permanent residence permit. These schemes offer more scope, but do not encourage labour migrants to return to their countries of origin. In principle, the Netherlands would like this category of migrants to stay in the Netherlands and contribute to the Dutch knowledge economy. In the short term there is the chance that this will result in brain drain. However, in the longer term many of these migrants contribute to the development of their countries of origin through making remittances and investments and sharing their knowledge and experience.

Although circular migration is a very topical subject in international forums on migration, there are still many doubts about how it works in practice. A pilot will help us understand the risks, opportunities and limitations, and assess whether or not circular migration as a new approach to development cooperation will bring added value. Agreements will be made with a country of origin (on cooperation on return etc.) and the businesses that will be involved. The people involved will already have completed basic vocational training and will return to their country of origin after a period of two years to share their knowledge and experience. The government will arrange with the employers for recipients to receive the minimum wage, housing and healthcare insurance. Two pilots will operate, each involving a maximum of 100 migrants from each country.

83 Under the knowledge migrant scheme, labour migrants earning more than EUR 47,565 gross a year (or EUR 34,881 gross a year for knowledge migrants aged 29 and under – NB there is no wage stipulation for academic researchers) who do not have an employment permit can be employed by an employer who has a voluntary agreement with the IND. The knowledge migrant's residence permit, and any permits required for his or her family members, will be fast-tracked (ideally within 2 weeks). Since December 2007 foreign students graduating from a Dutch higher education establishment will have one year to find work. If they find a job with a salary of at least EUR 25,000, they will also fall under the knowledge migrant scheme.

4.3.2 Temporary assignment from the Netherlands to the country of origin

Since 2004 the Netherlands has been providing grants to organisations temporarily assigning migrants living in the Netherlands to the developing countries from which they originate. The kind of projects involved are demand-driven (depending on the needs of the labour market in the countries in question) and voluntary (migrants apply to the organisations themselves and are selected if they match existing demand). In supporting these projects the Netherlands is building on the EU-Africa partnership, which calls on countries to deploy the knowledge and expertise of diasporas in their countries of origin.

Two examples of projects which have been in operation for some time are the IOM's Ghana Health Project, in cooperation with Ghana's Millennium Development Authority (MiDA), and its Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals (TRQN) project. A third, smaller-scale project is being run by a Burundian migrant organisation.

MiDA's Ghana Health Project enables Ghanaians working in the health sector in the Netherlands and other EU countries to temporarily return to Ghana in order to transfer their skills, knowledge and other capital to the Ghanaian health sector. The project also gives Ghanaians the opportunity to follow training programmes in the Netherlands. The project has recently entered its second stage, which will improve institutional anchoring.

TRQN temporarily assigns migrants living in the Netherlands who have permanent residence status to their countries of origin. In 2006 a number of countries were selected, all of which are currently undergoing reconstruction: Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo. Since the start of the project some 160 people have been temporarily assigned and have contributed to the reconstruction of their countries of origin in various sectors, such as education and health, by successfully transferring their knowledge and experience. This has been of particular benefit to local organisations. Participants, recipient countries and organisations have all given positive feedback to the TRQN project.

Over the next few years the Netherlands will continue to support projects of this kind. The guiding principle is that they must complement the policy of the countries of origin designed to strengthen the role of the diaspora in their development. The Netherlands will also look at whether other donors would be interested in getting involved in similar projects.

4.4 Strengthening the involvement of migrant organisations

As chapter 3 points out, the role migrants can play in the development of their countries of origin must not be underestimated. Remittances, networks and other forms of involvement can make a useful contribution to poverty reduction and to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Migrants have always contributed to development, but mostly outside existing frameworks. What has changed is that migrants' contribution is now more visible, and there is more dialogue with them.

4.4.1 Development cooperation by migrant organisations

Countless migrant organisations are involved in development cooperation, running a large number of small-scale projects that complement the work of regular development organisations. These are laudable initiatives, which can produce excellent results without government involvement. Migrants' activities can bring added value to the development of their countries of origin. Migrants have useful networks, and are often better acquainted with legislation in their countries of origin. A study will be carried out into the conditions under which the added value of migrants can be put to the best possible use.

There are a number of ways in which migrant organisations can strengthen their capacity and apply for project grants. Like other organisations, they can get in touch with their local International Cooperation Centre. Financial support from Cordaid, Impulsis (the Edukans, Inter-Church Organisation for Development Cooperation (ICCO) and Kerk in Actie joint network), Oxfam Novib, the Humanist Institute for Cooperation with Developing Countries (Hivos) and the National Committee for International Cooperation and Sustainable Development (NCDO) is available through the Linkis programme.

The NCDO also runs a dedicated desk for Small-scale Local Activities (KPAs).

The cofinancing organisations Oxfam Novib, Cordaid, the ICCO alliance and Hivos have earmarked more than EUR 12 million for these front offices.

The Hindu Seva Network Foundation, for example, also offers support to migrant organisations.

The Netherlands will consider whether or not the government can do more to increase migrants' involvement in the development of their countries of origin, for example by looking at whether migrant organisations have sufficient access to funding. If this turns out not to be the case, more funding will be made available

through existing channels and/or migrants' access to such funding will be improved.

Migrants' added value can also consist in a bridging function. Increased cooperation between traditional Dutch development organisations and migrant organisations can maximise this potential. The migrants themselves are largely responsible for realising it; perhaps they could do more to identify their own potential added value. However, early findings of the Cross Over Programme currently being run by the Association of Dutch NGOs for Personnel Service Overseas (PSO, an association of 46 development organisations) shows that integrating migrants into established development organisations can be challenging. The programme will be evaluated to see if more efforts are needed.

4.4.2 Migrant organisations as partners in policy and implementation

While it is important that the government has partners for dialogue in the migrant community, it is aware that it should not expect to find representatives who can speak for whole countries; there is often too much dissension. The government will remain alert to controversial political activities in which migrant organisations may be engaged in their countries of origin. The government would like migrant organisations to set up their own umbrella organisation,⁸⁴ or a similar construction, through the migrant organisation would bear primary responsibility for the process. It is prepared to offer them assistance in doing so, perhaps by providing an initial grant. This would be a means of sharing thematic or country-specific migrant knowledge and expertise with ministries and other appropriate organisations. Over the next few years an annual consultation day will also be held.

It is also important that migrant organisations with the strength and capacity to expand are given the opportunity to do so. This is a long-term process. Funding will be made available for targeted investment in a number of organisations which meet the criteria. The objective is to enable a number of migrant organisations to grow into full-fledged development cooperation partners at country and thematic levels.

84 Such as the African Diaspora Policy Centre established in 2006.

4.4.3 Diaspora policy of countries of origin

Governments of countries of origin are showing increasing interest in their diasporas. Emigrant populations are increasingly seen as a vital source of development, and governments are keen to use their knowledge, skills and resources for development purposes, adopting specific measures designed to convince migrants to return or make some other sort of contribution to the development of their countries of origin. The EU-Africa Partnership has also agreed to work more closely to get the diaspora and migrant organisations involved in development. Where necessary and feasible, and where there is demand on the part of developing countries, these initiatives will be supported. Talks on developing the diaspora's role will be held with the authorities and other interested parties in countries in which the Netherlands has an active migration and development policy and which have a substantial migrant population in the Netherlands. A number of developing countries, the Dutch government and organisations running brain-gain projects all want to learn more about the make-up of various diasporas; the Dutch government could help facilitate this. A number of initiatives are already in operation.

4.4.4 Migrants and enterprise

A great many enterprising immigrants from developing countries live in the Netherlands. Many of them set themselves up in business, often operating internationally and, more specifically, with their countries of origin. These activities could contribute to sustainable development, increased employment and knowledge transfer in those countries. There are no special tools or grant schemes in place for Dutch businesspeople of immigrant origin, but measures are being taken to bring existing instruments to their attention and/or make institutions more accessible for them. The Agency for International Business and Cooperation (EVD) is backing this by actively making its own network available to these new entrepreneurs.⁸⁵ The EVD supports specific target groups, for example businesspeople of Moroccan origin, by organising special fairs and networking events. Those with other backgrounds can also attend. The IntEnt (Internationalisation of Entrepreneurship) foundation is also active in encouraging migrants to do business in their countries of origin.

85 In April 2006 the EVD published the brochure *Nieuwe Internationaal Ondernemen* ('New International Entrepreneurship'), which includes examples of role models and information on running a new business.

4.5 Strengthening the link between remittances and development

The great volume of remittances made by migrants is not, in itself, reason to conduct active remittances policy. The money in question is privately owned, and it is up to the recipients to determine how they will spend it.

The Netherlands believes that, while it is not up to government to direct people's choices, it can create a favourable environment.

Remittances in themselves cannot trigger development. It is up to countries of origin to create favourable economic and political conditions for development. The Netherlands contributes for example through financial sector development. These are ways to ensure that the purchasing power enhanced by remittances will benefit the entire population more sustainably, and in the long term.

For example, if the right conditions were put in place by the local financial sector, recipients could save, make electronic or regular payments and obtain credit. The private financial sector is key to this, and to developing a common money transfer system; the government can only play a facilitating role.

4.5.1 Improving the transparency of the Dutch remittance market

Transferring funds to countries of origin is sometimes difficult and often relatively expensive. Given the important role that money transfers play in improving living conditions in countries of origin, and as a source of hard currency for national governments, government need to make remitting money cheaper and easier by encouraging fair competition in the remittance market and keeping a critical eye on legislation. The House of Representatives was informed of the costs of remittances on an earlier occasion.⁸⁶

In 2006 the Dutch Money Transaction Offices Act was evaluated. The evaluation was submitted to the House of Representatives.⁸⁷ The Act is currently being amended so as to implement the European Payment Services Directive which applies to money remitters and must be implemented by 1 November 2009. Its consequences for the Money Transaction Offices Act are currently being surveyed.

86 House of Representatives, 2004-2005, 28 106, no. 6 and 26 234, no. 56

87 House of Representatives, 2005-2006, 30 598, no. 1

It should be noted that a number of studies (including ‘Effective money transfer’,⁸⁸ published by the Dutch Consumers’ Association in October 2005) have noted that speed and reliability are more important considerations than price. Research conducted by the Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) concluded that the Dutch market is sufficiently competitive, but that extra transparency and insight into the various options and transaction costs would stimulate competition. In response to this, the IntEnt foundation set up the website www.geldnaarhuis.nl. In 2007 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs helped fund the expansion of this website. The idea is that in the future it will be able to operate without being reliant on grants. The Netherlands will decide whether such initiatives for stimulating competition will continue to receive funding.

4.5.2 Making remittances more effective in reducing poverty by encouraging migrants’ initiatives

Operating through various civil society organisations, the Netherlands offers migrants’ organisations different ways of using remittances for development purposes, supplemented with funds from the cofinancing system (MFS). As previously mentioned (see section 4.4.1) we are currently assessing whether or not the existing organisations offer migrants enough scope. If we conclude that they do not, more funding will be made available through the existing organisations and/or access to funding will be improved.

4.5.3 Financial sector development

At present fewer than 25% of people in developing countries have access to formal financial services. Research⁸⁹ has shown that the financial sector is an important engine of economic growth, and that this growth primarily benefits the poor. In the next few years Dutch policy will therefore be focusing on financial sector development. For more information see the memorandum on financial sector development, to be submitted to the House of Representatives in 2008. Recipients of remittances should be seen as a possible target group for savings products, insurance, credit and modern payment services.

It is up to the financial sector in recipient countries to grasp these opportunities, and up to their governments to facilitate these developments and get them on

88 The report drew on the experiences of Dutch nationals of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, Antillean, Somalian and Ghanaian origin.

89 Claessens and Feijen 2007

track. The Netherlands is encouraging this by supporting initiatives such as the International Finance Corporation, Women's World Banking and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, and through the work of embassies in e.g. Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia.

In promoting financial sector development, the Netherlands is focusing on the following aspects of migration and development:

- a. encouraging the use of formal channels for remitting money;
- b. improving the financial and economic infrastructure in countries of origin in order to simplify the remittance process and improve access to financial services;
- c. working to make more people financially literate (particularly women) by making information available (e.g. 'banking for the poor', in line with an initiative proposed by the UK Department for International Development). Both the sender and recipient of remittances should be made aware of the possibilities and risks of financial services;
- d. linking remittances with other services (see section 4.5.4);
- e. exploiting technological advances such as digital transfer and mobile banking (transferring money by mobile phone), and perhaps cooperating with microfinancing initiatives.

4.5.4 Using remittance corridor data

A corridor is defined as the total flow of funds from country A to country B. For each corridor, problems such as lack of competition or technical inefficiency can be identified. This requires a multidisciplinary approach. Various studies on corridors have been carried out, some by the World Bank, others by the European Investment Bank.⁹⁰ The Ministry of Finance has had the Netherlands-Suriname corridor examined, while Ecorys examined the Netherlands-Morocco corridor. The conclusion was that major remittance flows should serve as an extra incentive for financial sector development in migrants' countries of origin. It is up to the banking sector in the recipient country to take advantage of this growth market, and up to the authorities there to create favourable conditions for it.

Knowledge of remittance corridors can be used to link money transfers to other financial services such as loans, mortgages, savings and microcredit. The availability of all-in-one financial packages would make this group of potential clients a much more attractive prospect for banks. Governments can

90 ECORYS 2006; EIB/FEMIP 2006

play their part by alerting banks to major corridors.

4.6 Encouraging sustainable return and reintegration

To ensure that Dutch migration policy is enforced and enjoys public support, it is vital that migrants who are not, or no longer, legally entitled to be in the Netherlands leave, preferably of their own free will. Financial support or support in kind can help returnees with their resettlement. The Netherlands can also help by anticipating the concerns and capacity limitations experienced by countries of origin in accommodating and reintegrating returnees.

In recent years the Netherlands has had experience in facilitating voluntary departure, partly through cooperation with IOM. This has shown that offering returnees financial support for reintegration can be one effective incentive for voluntary return.⁹¹ Offering returnees reintegration support in the form of training, help in finding a job and guidance in setting up a business, including accessing microcredit, have also proved successful. Other projects have focused on the reintegration of vulnerable groups, such as unaccompanied aliens younger than 18. Over the next few years the Netherlands will continue to work towards the reintegration of these groups, with a special focus on the specific needs of women.

In light of the experience with these projects, more forms of reintegration support will now be made available. A maximum of EUR 2 million will be earmarked each year from the migration and development budget. Provisions will include:

1. the Reintegration Scheme for Returnees (HRT), an extension of the current scheme;
2. reintegration support in kind for asylum seekers (personal development fund in kind);
3. national returnee programmes in countries of origin;
4. projects for special groups that do not fall under points (1), (2) or (3).

4.6.1 Extending the Reintegration Scheme (repatriation grant)

91 Since July 2004 3700 migrants have returned of their own accord under the Reintegration Scheme for Returnees (HRT), and its predecessor (the Return Project Reintegration Scheme (HRPT)).

The existing reintegration scheme (HRT), which provides an individually tailored financial incentive for aliens' voluntary departure, will remain in force until July 2008. The grant can in principle be awarded on a case-by-case basis to former asylum seekers who apply to IOM wishing to leave the Netherlands of their own accord,⁹² to provide financial support for reintegration in their countries of origin. One of the conditions is that the former asylum seeker must register his or her intention to apply either within the legal 28-day time-limit after appeals have been exhausted, or within a week of being placed in detention. People from all countries of origin can apply for the grant, not only the 40 + 3 countries on the country list (see 'Summary of development cooperation partner countries', p. 75). This means that the HRT can also be used by those who unsuccessfully applied for a residence permit under the amnesty scheme and by former asylum seekers now accommodated in municipal facilities. These facilities will be phased out entirely by 31 December 2009.

Depending partly on the outcome of an assessment of this scheme and the experience of other European countries, the intention is to extend the current HRT beyond July 2008 as part of the Migration Development Programme.⁹³ The sum awarded to applicants may be adjusted in response to the assessment and other European countries' experiences.

4.6.2 Reintegration support in kind for asylum seekers (personal development fund in kind)

Reintegration support in kind will also be introduced, allowing asylum seekers to apply for this alternative to a grant. The scheme will first be introduced for a limited number of countries, selected from the 40 + 3 country list. One condition is that the countries in question must do enough to assist the return of its citizens. The programme will be evaluated after two years.

The implementation of reintegration support in kind will be outsourced. The equivalent financial value of support in kind will be determined in

92 Aliens from the EU, the EEA and countries listed in annex 1 of the 2006 Implementing Regulation for the Return and Emigration of Aliens from the Netherlands cannot apply for this grant.

93 As it is possible that this measure might attract new asylum seekers, the current scheme includes a cut-off date; only asylum seekers who applied for asylum before 1 January 2008 are eligible. In extending the HRT this cut-off point will be extended to accommodate asylum seekers who submit applications after a later deadline (still to be determined).

consultation with organisations with experience in the field. Given variations in buying power in countries to which people will be returning, and individuals' specific reintegration preferences, the type of support offered will be tailored to each case; there will be no fixed price tag. An upper limit will however be set to the cost of support to each adult and to each child. Dependent on what the countries of origin are able to offer, forms of reintegration support may include guidance in setting up a business (including access to microcredit) and help in finding a job (with a special focus on potential cooperation with Dutch companies), training or housing.

4.6.3 National returnee programmes in countries of origin

Another option, which can in some respects be seen as an extension of or alternative to the HRT in kind, is national returnee programmes in countries of origin. Depending on its needs, a government may feel that reintegrating returnees (from any country, not only the Netherlands) is a problem. One way of dealing with this would be setting up a national returnee programme, to be implemented by the government in question itself. All aliens returning to the country, including those returning from European countries other than the Netherlands, could benefit. The Netherlands would contribute financial and possibly technical support for the entire programme; only the 40 + 3 countries qualify for Dutch support. As the programme would, in principle, be accessible for returnees from other European countries, EU and/or international cofinancing would be desirable. A study will be conducted of the possibilities at European level.

4.6.4 Projects for special groups that do not fall under points (1), (2) or (3)

The Netherlands also intends to pursue reintegration projects for special groups, as needed. The possibilities include diverse projects for vulnerable groups such as minors, victims of human trafficking or people with certain medical conditions.

4.7 Other migration and development themes

4.7.1 Human rights

Human rights are a central priority of Dutch foreign policy. Although the memorandum ‘Human dignity for all – a human rights strategy for foreign policy’⁹⁴ does not specifically examine the link between human rights and migration,⁹⁵ this does not mean that human rights policy discounts migrants. Indeed, the general principle is that effective human rights policy concerns everyone living in any given country: after all, fundamental human rights and freedoms apply to everyone over whom the government in question has jurisdiction, regardless of their residence status.

Protecting migrants’ human rights is a recurrent issue in international discussions on migration and development. The second meeting of the Global Forum on Migration and Development, which will be held in Manila in October 2008, will be devoted in part to migrants and their human rights.

Developing countries are sometimes critical of developed countries’ immigration and integration policy, including Dutch policy. As almost no Western countries have ratified the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, they are often criticised for not taking migrants’ human rights seriously. There are also concerns that North-South confrontation on this issue may complicate cooperation on other development and migration issues.

Nonetheless, the Netherlands does not intend to sign the UN Convention for the time being. In the next few years we will be focusing on implementing existing conventions, which also cover migrants, in line with the human rights strategy.

The Netherlands believes that this kind of criticism should not be allowed to undermine our commitment to migrants’ human rights. Especially outside the EU migrants are particularly vulnerable and their human rights are violated. In July 2005 the UN Human Rights Council appointed Jorge Bustamante Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants. In his February 2007 report to the Human Rights Council⁹⁶ the rapporteur included an overview of the communications he had sent to various countries concerning alleged violations of

94 House of Representatives 2007–2008, 31 263, no. 1

95 The memorandum does consider human trafficking; see section 4.2.1.

96 A/HRC/4/24 and Add. 1-3

migrants' human rights. Outside the EU, the rapporteur was most concerned about the legal position of refugees in North Africa and that of migrant workers in the Arabian Gulf States and Southeast Asia. Migrants' working conditions in the Gulf are indeed often substandard. Recent measures taken to boost employment among the Gulf States' own nationals have resulted in mass expulsion of migrants.

Dutch foreign policy includes a strong commitment to migrants' human rights. In the Euromed dialogue, for example, the Netherlands aims explicitly to raise awareness of the position of refugees. Dialogue between the EU and Gulf States repeatedly includes the issue of human rights, including the human rights of migrants. In West Africa, the EU is especially interested in agreements made under the aegis of ECOWAS on liberalising the movement of persons in the region.

Criticism of EU member states' policy expressed, for example, in the Global Forum on Migration and Development can easily be rebutted. After all, all EU member states have safeguards for due process, including the possibility of bringing cases to the European Court of Human Rights. The Court does not hesitate to censure a country if it finds that its immigration policy or its implementation conflicts with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In such cases states are obliged to change their policy or its implementation.

In the interests of conducting the best possible dialogue on migrants' human rights, we need to be able to refer to these and other legal guarantees, and have detailed information about policy at our disposal. We have therefore drawn up a list of policy areas which are most heavily criticised. The government plans to use it to compile an information pack for those involved in the dialogue on migrants' human rights, be it in a multilateral or bilateral context.

4.7.2 Health

Health is closely linked to both migration and development. On the one hand, migration involves migrants' health and their access to care, including the relationship between migrants' mobility and the incidence of disease in destination countries such as the Netherlands. On the other hand, health is important for development and vice versa. Thanks to remittances, migrants' families who remain in their countries of origin often have improved access to health care. The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health may be

one of the fundamental rights of every human being,⁹⁷ but it is also economically significant. Healthy people cost less in terms of care and are better able to take part in the economic production process.

The fact that sexual and reproductive health and rights, HIV/AIDS and health care occupy such a central position within development policy testifies to the close relationship between health and development. Migrants are a vulnerable group. There is, for example, a clear link between mobility and an increased risk of HIV infection (see the memorandum on HIV/AIDS.)⁹⁸

The Netherlands endorses the fundamental right of every person, including migrants, to good health and access to care. This issue has been given due consideration as part of development policy, which addresses issues such as improved monitoring of disease incidence; culturally appropriate access to, in particular, primary health care, in a language people can understand; and improved knowledge and awareness of migrants' health care. These measures take precedence over limiting mobility for health reasons, and have a more positive effect on public health.

4.7-3 Combating brain drain

As is clear from chapter 3, brain drain calls for a more balanced approach than was previously thought. Brain drain only affects a limited number of countries, in a limited number of sectors. Brain drain is also rarely caused by the Netherlands: the Social and Economic Council concluded in 2007 that the Netherlands is responsible for very little brain drain from vulnerable developing countries.⁹⁹ We are, however, aware of the problem and, where appropriate take it into account as part of broader development cooperation, particularly when it affects the healthcare sector. One example of this is the Dutch-backed scheme of the Zambian government to discourage brain drain from rural areas by supplementing the salaries of rural doctors. In Ghana, too, the issue of brain drain has been raised in discussions with the Ghanaian government on personnel management in health care. It is evident that governments in countries of origin also have a certain responsibility, for example for improving working conditions in the medical sector or investing more in basic health care.

97 Source: World Health Organisation

98 House of Representatives 2003–2004, 29 648, no. 2

99 SER, 2007

The EU as a whole does cause brain drain. The Netherlands will take responsibility for this problem by actively supporting EU activities to combat it, such as the development of a joint code of conduct for ethical recruitment. There are also efforts to stimulate the opposite of brain drain, brain gain (see policy priority 3: Promoting circular migration/brain gain, p. 54). The Netherlands will also actively support European and other initiatives investigating possible measures to compensate for brain drain.

4.7.4 Environmental migrants

Many poor people in developing countries are directly dependent on natural resources for their survival. Poor management of natural resources, combined with a growing population, can mean the loss of fertile ground and drinking water, fuel (wood) and food shortages. However, the causes of migration are often complex, so that the specific impact of the loss of natural resources is difficult to determine. There are also examples of improved management of natural resources resulting in the return of city-dwellers to the countryside. This makes it difficult to say who is an environmental migrant and who is not; this, in turn, makes it difficult to determine the migrant's legal status. Predictions of future numbers of environmental migrants range from 25 million to 1 billion over the next 40 years. This discrepancy is partly due to different ways of defining environmental migrants.

The Netherlands will continue to conduct an active environment and migration policy, by working with multilateral organisations, bilateral partners and NGOs to influence international discussions on environmental agreements. Investments in the environment and development amount to 0.1% of GNP.

The Netherlands will continue to follow developments in environmental migration and discussions on developing an internationally recognised definition of an environmental migrant.

5 The Migration and Development programme

This chapter examines the implications of migration and development policy objectives and priorities for the deployment of staff, available resources and the intention to publish policy rules on awarding grants.

Implementing the new priorities requires the ministries concerned to deploy staff. This will take place within the existing establishment.

All activities described in the present memorandum will be funded from existing budgets. The ministries concerned will discuss the allocation of the available resources.

Some of the activities will be funded through a grants framework. The existing Return, Migration and Development Programme will be restructured in response to the priorities and country choices specified in this memorandum. The budget for this grants framework is EUR 5 million a year, which will be taken from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' development aid (ODA) budget. Linkages with other donors or European financing or cofinancing will be sought as supplements to Dutch resources.

The Migration and Development Programme will be developed in line with the basic principles expressed in this memorandum. In 2008 and 2009 some of the available funding will go to existing commitments under the current programme. Activities which do not meet the new memorandum's basic principles – mostly activities in countries which do not appear on the country list specified in this memorandum – will be phased out.

The Migration and Development Programme will pursue the following policy priorities, in the form of contributions, grants or commissions:

1. *Focusing more on migration in the development dialogue and on development in the migration dialogue.*

Policy development and other migration and development activities: dependent on the nature of the activities, a grant, contribution or commission will be awarded.

2. *Fostering institutional development in migration management.*

A contribution or commission will be awarded.

3. *Promoting circular migration/brain gain, with an emphasis on labour migration.*

We are considering extending the current agreement with IOM for the purpose of temporarily assigning people to their countries of origin from the Netherlands. Whether or not we ultimately decide to do so partly depends on an evaluation of the results so far, which will be available in mid-2008.

Given the complex nature of the circular migration pilot (reaching agreements with job placement agencies, businesses etc.), expertise will be hired externally. Tenders may be invited.

4. *Strengthening the involvement of migrant organisations.*

Grant funding will be earmarked to strengthen a number of migrant organisations in a targeted way.

5. *Strengthening the link between remittances and development.*

If civil society organisations are not able to offer adequate options, funding for existing organisations may be increased.

6. *Encouraging sustainable return and reintegration.*

- Reintegration support from the Reintegration Scheme for Returnees: this scheme is presently being implemented by IOM (in the form of a contribution agreement), and will run until mid-2008. Given the outcome of the evaluation of this scheme, we intend to extend it.
- Reintegration support in kind: offering returnees support with their resettlement in their countries of origin. Tenders will be invited.
- Reintegration for vulnerable or otherwise special groups: contribution or grant.

Policy rules and accompanying grant ceilings will be decided and published in the Government Gazette. All grant applications received will be assessed according to formal and content-based criteria which have yet to be determined, within the framework of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Grant Regulations. One requirement will be that proposals are in line with the priorities established in this memorandum. In principle migration and development activities will only take place in the countries specified in the agreed list of 40 + 3.

An evaluation of the activities is planned for mid-2011.

Overview of partner countries

Accelerated achievement of MDGs

Main criteria:

1. Low income country
2. Fragility not dominant problem
3. Government structures offer enough potential to work with them

Bangladesh*

Benin

Bolivia*

Burkina Faso

Ethiopia*

Ghana

Kenya

Mali

Mongolia

Mozambique

Nicaragua

Rwanda*

Senegal

Tanzania

Uganda*

Yemen*

Zambia

Security and development

Main criteria:

1. Fragility or major inequality blocking poverty reduction

Afghanistan

Burundi

Colombia

Congo, Democratic Rep.

Guatemala

Kosovo SC

Pakistan

Palestinian Territories

Sudan

Broad-based relationship

Main criteria:

1. (Prospective) middle income country
2. Fragility not dominant problem

Egypt*

Georgia*

Indonesia

Moldova

South Africa

Suriname**

Vietnam

Development cooperation to be phased out over next four years:

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Eritrea

Sri Lanka***

Albania

Armenia

Cape Verde

Macedonia, FYR

Opmerkingen:

* = countries that also have an actual or potential security problem

** = agreement reached on phasing out of framework treaty resources

*** = only humanitarian relief in response to current security situation

Additional migration and development countries: **Morocco, Angola and Sierra Leone**

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