The Flip Side of the COIN

The US Role in Stability Operations

by

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To my parents, Evan and Lisa,

None of this would be possible without you…

A Revolutionary war is 20 percent military action and 80 percent political

- David Galula

Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, 1964

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines a number of post-conflict situations to determine what lessons can be learned on how to approach post-conflict and pre-conflict stability operations for future efforts if, and more likely when, they become necessary. Too often, the United States has failed to capitalize on the lessons learned from its previous stabilization engagements, build on successful practices, or avoid predictable pitfalls.

This thesis argues that stability operations are not easy, but they are feasible – and necessary. Stability operations have not been conducted successfully in recent decades due to many failed policies and detrimental decisions. This is not to say that some elements of operations were not successful – there are both positive and negative lessons to be learned from all of these conflicts. By analyzing several case studies in depth, including US efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq, I propose a framework for the US government to use in stabilization operations around the world. These principles can be applied in conflicts ranging from conventional wars to humanitarian interventions to post-radical transitions.

These lessons stress the need for changes not only in the implementation of US policy, but in the organization of the US government itself. I conclude that an organizational failure in the US government has prevented the successful execution of stability operations and propose recommendations to fix this inadequacy.

FOREWORD

For the past four years, my Princeton career has pushed me to ask the question, "How can we do this better?" My studies, my interests, and my experiences have all culminated in this thesis. *Stability* is not a totally new topic that I simply decided to write a thesis about – this has been an interest and a passion of mine for years.

At the beginning of my senior year, I had chosen a broad topic but was not yet sure how I could help contribute something useful or original. By much luck (and extensive practice enrolling in classes at exactly 7:00 a.m.) I was fortunate to take a class with the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen. As my advisor, Ambassador Bodine and I had started to narrow my topic, but had not yet settled on one, I decided to ask Admiral Mullen what would be useful for someone in his position. He responded that the United States does a lot of planning on what to do going into a war but not on what to do the day after. Eureka.

After 4 years of studying topics all tangentially related to stabilization and experiences working for the Embassy of Afghanistan and a development-consulting firm in Amman, Jordan, I knew immediately that this was the perfect topic that I had been preparing for years to write.

This thesis aims to provide guiding principles for stabilization operations. Through my research and writing, I have realized that for the most part, one of the causes for failure in past efforts has been that as a country, we have been asking the wrong questions: we should not only ask how to conduct post-conflict stability operations better, but also how to prevent the need for major intervention in the first place. In this thesis, I look at current US capabilities and how they can and should be improved. My research draws extensively on interviews with government officials, former government officials, military personnel, and experts in the US, Brussels, and Sarajevo as well as a rigorous analysis of stability literature and studies. I conclude with guiding principles to better improve pre-conflict and post-conflict stability operations as well as propose organizational recommendations for the US government to better handle these situations.

ACRONYMS

AO – Area of Operations
CAP – Community Action Program
CENTCOM – Central Command
CERP – Commander's Emergency Response Program
CIVPOL – United Nations Civilian Police
CMPD - Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
COIN – Counterinsurgency
CPA – Coalition Provisional Authority
CRC – Civilian Response Corps
CSO – Bureau of Conflict & Stabilization Operations
DDR – Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration
DR – Disaster Relief
EEAS – European External Action Service
EULEX – European Rule of Law Mission Kosovo
FDI – Foreign Direct Investment
FSO – Foreign Service Officer
GAO – Government Accountability Office
HA – Humanitarian Assistance
ICITAP - International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
IDEA – International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IFOR – Implementation Force
IOM – International Organization for Migration
IPTF – International Police Task Force
ISAF – International Security Assistance Force
KFOR – Kosovo Force
KLA – Kosovo Liberation Army
KPC – Kosovo Protection Corps
KPS – Kosovo Police Service
KSF – Kosovo Security Force
KTI – Kosovo Transition Initiative
MOOTW – Military Operation Other Than War
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO – Non-governmental Organization
NSP – National Solidarity Program
NSS – National Security Staff
OHR – Office of the High Representative
OIF – Operation Iraqi Freedom
ORHA – Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PNSR – Project for National Security Reform
PRT – Provincial Reconstruction Team
QDDR – Quadrennial Diplomacy & Development Review
S/CRS – Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction & Stabilization

SFOR – Stabilization Force
SOE – State-owned Enterprises
SSR – Security Sector Reform
UN – United Nations
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIDDRS - United Nations Integrated DDR Standards
UNMIK – United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNPROFOR – UN Protection Force
USAID – United States Agency for International Development
USG – United States Government
USIP – US Institute of Peace

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INTRODUCTION

I don't know who the world's leading expert on warfare is, but any list of the top has got to include me, and I can't tell when it's peacetime and wartime anymore."[1]

- Admiral Percy Fitzwallace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (TV Character on The West Wing)

Since I have been politically conscious - roughly 10 years old - my country has been at war. For over half my life, I have known nothing but a war against an entity that hides and targets civilians; not a traditional war against a sovereign state, where militaries fight, but an asymmetric war against networks of individuals who wish to attack, destabilize, and murder. Such is the world we now live in, and like the fictional Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the TV show *The West Wing*, I, like many in my generation, find it hard to differentiate between wartime and peacetime. Is such a distinction even possible anymore?

Such sentiments are no longer held by fictional characters alone, but by leading government officials. In an address at the Oxford Union, former Pentagon General Counsel Jeh Johnson said, "Now that efforts by the US military against al Qaeda are in their 12th year, we must also ask ourselves: how will this conflict end? It is an unconventional conflict, against an unconventional enemy and will not end in conventional terms."[2] Johnson raises an important fundamental question: will this war, if it really is a "war," ever be over, and if so - how will it end? Whatever the answers may be, the US cannot sustain its current trajectory militarily. Fundamental changes in how we deal with this new world must be made.

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[1] "We Killed Yamamoto" *The West Wing*. (2002)
[2] Jeh Charles Johnson, General Counsel of the US Department of Defense "The Conflict Against Al Qaeda
[2] Jeh Charles Johnson, General Counsel of the US Department of Defense "The Conflict Against Al Qaeda and its Affiliates: How Will It End?" Speech at the Oxford Union, Oxford University. November 30, 2012

As conflicts through history have demonstrated, what happens in one country will not necessarily be contained to that country, but can affect the rest of the world. September 11th will forever drive this point home for Americans. Instability, insurgencies, and radical transitions across North Africa and other regions of the world pose both challenges and opportunities for the United States. Weak and failed states, which can breed insurgents or be caused by them in the first place, present dangers to their own people and to their neighbors. The international community can and should step in to help build up these societies not only for their sake, but out of self-interest as well. As the State Department's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) states, "When tensions threaten to escalate to mass atrocities, our core values as well as our security interests are deeply threatened. Addressing the problems of fragile states prevents these threats from affecting our own security."[3]

The current situations in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Mali, and others do not pose unprecedented challenges. In fact, the US military has been involved in stabilization operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan in the past 20 years alone. Though each engagement was started under different pretenses, in each the United States was unable to achieve an optimal end-state or failed outright. Surely, the wealthiest, strongest country in the world can do better.

The first step in solving a problem is recognizing there is one. The foreign policy apparatus of the United States was designed for the threats of the twentieth century - enemies whose danger lay in their strength, not their weakness.[4] The world has changed, and our national security apparatus must be updated to handle 21st century challenges and

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[3] Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. (QDDR) U.S. State Department. 2010.
[4] Eizenstat, Stuart; Porter, John; Weinstein, Jeremy. "Rebuilding Weak States." *Foreign Policy Magazine.* January/February, 2005.

opportunities. US endeavors in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated that the planning, financing, coordination, and execution of US programs for rebuilding war-torn states were "woefully inadequate."[5] Conflicts such as those mentioned above are not likely to disappear in the near future; rather, they will likely be a continuing area of concern. Many of the core issues that lead to the need for stabilization operations can and should be addressed to pre-empt rather than simply react to a conflict that spirals out of control, requiring military action. Therefore, these situations merit serious study to help shape our efforts in the future.

Too often the US has "reinvented the wheel" when it comes to stabilization efforts, failed to capitalize on the lessons learned from its previous engagements, built on successful practices, or avoided predictable pitfalls. This thesis will examine a number of stabilization operations to determine what lessons can be learned on how to approach these difficult situations for future efforts if - and more likely when - they become necessary. Based on strategic and organizational lessons learned from past efforts, I will propose guiding principles for the US government (USG) to use in stabilization operations around the world. Then, in order to implement such operations, I shall propose organizational recommendations for the USG to increase its own capacity. I contend that the need for stabilization operations has been largely ignored and that the US government must be restructured to handle such operations using a whole-of-government approach. The United States should focus on crisis prevention, rapid response, centralized coordination and preparation, and international cooperation.

Chapter 1 will address the increasing need to stabilize weak states both before and after they descend into chaos. I will explain why addressing weak and post-conflict states is not only in the United State's interest ethically, but also in terms of national security as well

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[5] Ibid.

as in the context of a 21ˢᵗ century grand strategy. Finally, I will explain why counterinsurgency doctrine (COIN) is only part of the solution in certain environments, requiring a more whole-of-government approach.

Chapter 2 will focus on the first of two case studies: NATO and international intervention in the Balkans. This chapter analyzes the strategic decisions made to end the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo and efforts undertaken to stabilize the countries and put them on paths to economic growth, political legitimacy, and stability. It will examine both successes and shortfalls to elicit practical lessons for future stability operations.

Chapter 3 will focus on another case study: Iraq – divided into the initial phase in Iraq from 2003-2006 and the period from 2007-2011 as the surge and COIN were implemented. Though the war in Iraq was not intended to be a stabilization operation, realities forced this to become its focus, thus providing lessons for future stability operations. I will analyze the strategic decisions and consequences thereof in the early phase of the war as well as the effectiveness of the shift in strategy known as COIN.

Chapter 4 will provide guiding principles for the US government to approach weak, post-radical transition,[6] and post-conflict states. It will draw on the lessons from the case studies and other best practices from around the world. I would be naïve to contend that any single framework will be applicable to every situation. This new framework, much as the Counterinsurgency Field Manual[7] serves as a general framework to approach insurgencies from a military perspective, will serve to provide principles to apply in stabilization operations using a whole-of-government approach.

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[6] By which I mean states that have undergone rapid transitions of government based on either overwhelming protest (e.g. Egypt and Tunisia) or violence (e.g. Libya)

[7] A manual written by General David Petraeus, Lt. Colonel John Nagl, and many others both in and out of the military to craft counterinsurgency doctrine

Chapter 5 will examine the current organization of the US government and the various agencies that play (or should play) a role in stability operations. Based on the case studies and interviews, it will identify structural weakness to be remedied by the recommendations set forth in the following chapter.

Finally, Chapter 6 will provide organizational recommendations for the US government to better manage stabilization operations. It will draw on lessons from the case studies, the guiding principles proposed in Chapter 4, and lessons from the organizational structure of the European Union's newly formed External Action Service.

TERMINOLOGY

Systems-building:

The emergence of the modern *state* traces back to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which introduced the concept of sovereignty within a given territory under a political authority.[8] According to Milliken and Krause, there are three main functions of the modern state: security, legitimacy, and growing wealth.[9] In order to achieve these necessities, Tilly argues that "states make war and war makes states."[10] For the purposes of this paper, I shall define a *state* as a given territory under a political authority with a monopoly on violence and institutions to provide political goods to its citizens.

Several individuals and organizations including President George W. Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the Rand Corporation, *Foreign Affairs Magazine*, and countless others have often used the term *nation-building* to describe the building of state institutions to build stable societies. However, a *nation* as defined by the *Oxford Dictionary* is "a large body of people united by common descent, history, culture, or language, inhabiting a particular state or territory."[11] Thus, unless one is engaged in creating a history, culture, etc., the term *nation-building* is inappropriate. *State-building*, in contrast, describes when "bilateral or multilateral agencies mobilize resources in order to set up or reinforce weakened or non-existent institutions in those states that are considered to be fragile, weak, moving toward failure, or

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[8] Daudy, Marwa. "State-building" *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon*. Oxford University Press. 2009 Pg. 350
[9] Milliken, Jennifer; Krause, Keith. State Failure, State Collapse, and State Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons and Strategies. Development and Change Volume 33, Issue 5, pages 753–774, November 2002 in Ibid. Pg. 350
[10] Tilly, C. *War making and state making as organized crime* IN Bringing the State Back In, by Evans, P. Cambridge University Press, 1985
[11] Oxford Dictionary. Online

which have already collapsed."[12] Rather than simply claim institutions as the end state, *systems-building* integrates all aspects of the society (economy, government, culture, security, etc.) in a sustainable, self-reinforcing manner.[13] While *systems-building* can refer the interaction between the international community and the individual state working together in an international system with common norms and rules,[14] I shall refer to *systems-building* as the interaction of institutional, psychological, economic, and security factors within a state.

Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR):

DDR is the process to disarm former combatants, demobilize the armies, militias, and/or insurgents to "control, disband, or downsize their respective fighting forces; destroy collected armaments and munitions; and provide transitional support for demobilized fighters."[15] Each DDR program will differ depending on the circumstances. However, the most important aspect of DDR is reintegration. According to retired Colonel Paul Hughes, who was involved in the DDR process in Iraq, "You have to think through the entire chain of events that an individual has to go through until they are back, employed, doing something meaningful for society."[16] In 2006, the United Nations Integrated DDR Standards (UNIDDRS) specified the objective of DDR as contributing to security and stability in post-conflict environments, as a sine quo non to recovery and development.[17]

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[12] Daudy, Marwa. "State-building" *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon.* Pg. 350
[13] Captain Porter, Wayne. Lecture. ASU. October 25, 2012 and to author
[14] See Halden, Peter. "System-building Before State-building." *Conflict, Security, and Development.* Volume 10, Issue 4. 2010.
[15] Ong, Kelvin. "Managing Fighting Forces: DDR in Peace Process" US Institute of Peace. 2012
[16] Colonel Hughes, Paul. To author. January 10, 2013.
[17] Knight, Mark. "DDR and SSR: Conventional approaches to international peacebuilding assistance." In *Post-War Security Transition: Participatory Peacebuilding after Asymmetric Conflicts.* Routledge Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution. 2012. Pg. 18

Security Sector Reform (SSR):

The OECD DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance define the security system as including "core security actors (e.g. armed forces, police, gendarmerie, border guards, customs and immigration, and intelligence and security services); security management and oversight bodies (e.g. ministries of defense and internal affairs, financial management bodies and public complaints commissions); justice and law enforcement institutions (e.g. the judiciary, prisons, prosecution services, traditional justice systems); and non-statutory security forces (e.g. private security companies, guerrilla armies and private militia)." [18] Mark Knight, author of "DDR and SSR: Conventional Approaches to International Peacebuilding Assistance,"[19] explains that SSR broadly refers to "reforms or transformations to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency, legitimacy and democratic accountability" of the security sector. SSR remains an evolving concept and support for such implementation remains in its early phases with much to be determined.[20] SSR is more comprehensive than DDR but can include DDR as an entry point to SSR.[21]

Post-Radical Transition

This term was coined by the author to describe states that have undergone rapid transitions of government as a result of either overwhelming protest (e.g. Egypt and Tunisia) or violence (e.g. Libya).

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[18] The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR) Supporting Security and Justice. 2007 Pg. 5
http://www.oecd.org/development/conflictandfragility/38406485.pdf
[19] Knight, Mark. "DDR and SSR: Conventional Approaches to International Peacebuilding Assistance." In *Post-War Security Transition: Participatory Peacebuilding after Asymmetric Conflicts*. Routledge Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution. 2012. Pg. 25
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.

Phase IV – Post-conflict Stability Operations:

A war plan contains four phases: Phase I: set the conditions; Phase II: initial operations; Phase III: decisive operations; Phase IV: post-conflict stability operations. When conflicts end in a treaty between the two parties, Phase IV refers to the time after hostilities officially end. However, in asymmetrical conflicts, treaties are rare. Lieutenant Colonel Conrad Crane describes Phase IV Operations as "activities conducted after decisive combat operations to stabilize and reconstruct the area of operations (AO)."[22] Though Phase IV is often described as *post-conflict* operations, this can be misleading. In reality Phase IV usually begins during Phase III as the two can overlap. In addition, as in Iraq, significant fighting can occur during Phase IV. A better description according to Colonel Michael Eastman involves splitting Phase IV operations into two terms: *critical stability* and *sustainable stability.*[23]

Critical Stability:

Using a limited version of the 2005 Defense Department Directive 3000.5, a Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Army, defines *critical stability* as "actions taken to provide a local population with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs – without the caveats toward institution building."[24] These refer to the immediate needs (e.g. maintaining law and order), to be addressed primarily by the military, constabulary, and police forces. This term will help to clarify elements of Phase IV operations.

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[22] Lieutenant Colonel Crane, Conrad, U.S. Army, Retired, Ph.D. "Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won." 2003
[23] Colonel Eastman, Michael. "Whole-of-government is Half an Answer." *Interagency Journal.* The Journal of The Simons Center. Vol. 3, Issue 3, Summer 2012.
[24] Ibid. Pg. 34

Sustainable Stability:

What is typically referred to as post-conflict *reconstruction* operations - which according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies include security, justice and reconciliation, social and economic well-being, and governance and participation[25] - will, for the purposes of this paper, be referred to as *sustainable stability* operations. Colonel Eastman describes *sustainable stability* as "reconstructing the political, socioeconomic, and physical infrastructure, in partnership with the affected population, to restore a state to pre-conflict conditions,"[26] not necessarily based on Western standards. This section of Phase IV operations should be carried out primarily by civilian agencies. By dropping the term *reconstruction,* I intend to avoid the common association of large projects, democratization,[27] and simply the rebuilding of infrastructure.

Constabulary Force:

In Robert Perito's book, *Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America's Search for a Post-Conflict Stability Force,* constabulary forces are defined as "armed forces of the state that have both military capabilities and police powers."[28] Such forces can serve in either a military or civilian role. They can help to fill the security gap that Dr. Michael Dziedzic of the US Institute of Peace argues is created in post-conflict situations in the absence of a force that can maintain public order and ensure the rule of law.[29] For examples of constabulary forces, see the Argentine National Gendarmerie, the Spanish Guardia Civil, the Netherlands Royal Marechaussee, the Italian Carabinieri, and the French Gendarmerie.

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[25] "Post-Conflict Reconstruction" A joint project of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) May 2002. http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/framework.pdf

[26] Eastman. "Whole-of-government is Half an Answer." Pg. 34

[27] Ibid. Pg. 34

[28] Perito, Robert. *Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America's Search for a Postconflict Stability Force.* United States Institute of Peace. 2004 Pg. 46

[29] Ibid. Pg. 36

Weak State

The terms *weak, failing,* and *failed* remain imprecise. Being poor does not necessarily make a country *weak*.[30] The weakness of states can be measured according to lapses in three critical functions that the governments of strong, stable states perform: security, the provision of basic services, and protection of essential civil freedoms. Even *weak* states, which are deficient in one or two of these areas, can still threaten U.S. interests. The article "The U.S. Interagency Role in Future Conflict Prevention: Provincial Reconstruction Teams for Select Partner Nations" characterizes a *weak* state by "decreased physical control over sovereign territory, a lack of a monopoly of the use of force, declining legitimacy to make authoritative decisions for the majority of the community, and an inability to provide security or social services to its people. Such states usually witness civil unrest, a slow or nonexistent economy, unaccountable governance, weak [government] institutions, and a wide range of other factors, such as the presence of extremist organizations."[31] An inability to provide basic tenets of government creates a "capacity gap," which can lead to a loss of public confidence, political upheaval, and other non-state actors to fill said gaps. A capacity gap can coexist with, or even grow out of a security gap.[32] Thus, a weak state can lead to violence or be the result of violence. As a weak state's performance across the political goods cited above decreases, it leads toward *failure*, hence *failing* and *failed* are subcategories of *weakness*. Though many failed states flunk each criterion of a state, they need not flunk all

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[30] Eizenstat, Stuart; Porter, John; Weinstein, Jeremy. "Rebuilding Weak States." *Foreign Policy Magazine.* January/February, 2005.

[31] Stringer, Kevin Ph.D. and Sizemore, Kaite. "The U.S. Interagency Role in Future Conflict Prevention: Provincial Reconstruction Teams for Select Partner Nations." *Interagency Journal.* The Journal of The Simons Center. Vol. 3, Issue 3, Summer 2012. Pg. 12

[32] Ibid.

of them to fail overall: "satisfying the security good weighs very heavily, and high levels of internal violence are associated directly with failure and the propensity to fail."[33]

Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)

A PRT is a civil-military or interagency organization designed to work with areas that have recently witnessed open hostilities.[34] According to a Woodrow Wilson School Graduate Workshop on PRTs, "they were designed as a transitional structure to provide improved security and to facilitate reconstruction and economic development."[35] PRTs were first implemented by the United States in 2002 in Afghanistan[36] and have since been used in Iraq and Afghanistan by NATO, the US, European, and other coalition members for post-conflict, reconstruction, security, and development activities in areas still too hostile for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and United Nations (UN) relief agencies to operate.[37] There has been little standardization of mission, operations, or structure across PRTs. The makeup of PRTs should be flexible depending on the needs of the situation.

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[33] Rotberg, Robert. "Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators" Pg. 4

[34] Stringer & Sizemore. "The U.S. Interagency Role in Future Conflict Prevention: Provincial Reconstruction Teams for Select Partner Nations." Pg. 13

[35] US Department of State, Fact Sheet: Provincial Reconstruction Teams
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/60085.htm, accessed 1 December 2007. In Nima Abbaszadeh, Mark Crow, Marianne El-Khoury, Jonathan Gandomi, David Kuwayama, Christopher MacPherson, Meghan Nutting, Nealin Parker, Taya Weiss, Robert Perito. "Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations." Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. 2008.

[36] ISAF PRT Handbook, Edition 3, 3 February 2007.

[37] Perito, Robert, et al. "Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations."

CHAPTER 1

WHY ARE STABILITY OPERATIONS IMPORTANT?

"Among the trends that are already shaping a "new normal" in our strategic environment are the decline of rural economies, joblessness, the dramatic increase in urbanization, an increasing demand for energy, migration of populations and shifting demographics, the rise of grey and black markets, the phenomenon of extremism and anti-modernism, the effects of global climate change, the spread of pandemics and lack of access to adequate health services, and an increasing dependency on cyber networks."

- *Mr. Y (A National Strategic Narrative)*

OVERVIEW

This chapter will address the need to conduct critical and sustainable stabilization operations around the world. It will explain why the United States should engage not in *state-building* but rather in *systems-building*. I will argue that addressing *weak, failing*, or already *failed* states is not only in the United States' interest ethically and in accordance with a 21st century grand strategy, but also in the interest of national security. Finally, this chapter will explain why counterinsurgency (COIN) is only part of the solution to one type of conflict (insurgency) but not to all *weak* or *failed* states, which require a second side – the flip side of the COIN.

SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

The spectrum of conflict runs from high impact, low probability (nuclear confrontation) to low impact, high probability (humanitarian assistance – HA - and disaster relief - DR). According to Captain Wayne Porter, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Assistant for Strategy and Chair of Systemic Strategy and Complexity at the Naval Post-Graduate School, "It is useful to consider this spectrum in terms of capability and capacity to help best determine where the U.S. Joint Force, interagency departments, the

private sector, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international partners can be most effective in establishing ongoing security and stability." [38] A wide range of activities from conventional warfare to humanitarian assistance falls within this spectrum, demanding a combination of numerous actors and the capabilities they bring to the table.

Figure 1 [39]

As the past two decades have indicated, the greatest threats to the United States in the 21st century are unlikely to come from standing armies of states such as the Soviet Union (now Russia) or China, or even from rising regional powers such as Iran, as indicated in the upper-left quadrant of figure 1. Instead, threats will likely come from instability within and between the weakest of states. [40] [41] How best to strengthen weak states and prevent state failure in the first place are among the most urgent questions of the twenty-first century. [42]

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[38] Wayne Porter and Mark Mykleby. *Rethinking America's Joint Force: Strength and Credibility in a Constrained Fiscal Environment* Pg. 62

[39] Ibid. Pg. 63

[40] Bodine. *When the Unconventional Becomes Conventional: Assessing Threats, Finding Solutions.* Pg. 7

[41] Kaplan, Fred. Interview. NPR. January 29, 2013

[42] Rotberg, Robert. "Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators" Woodrow Wilson Center

Number of Ongoing UN Peacekeeping Operations

Figure 2[43]

Surge in Uniformed UN Peacekeeping Personnel from 1991- Present

Figure 3[44]

[43] "List of Peacekeeping Operations: 1948-2012" United Nations Peacekeeping. Available online at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf

As figure 2 illustrates, the number of UN Peacekeeping missions has drastically increased, notably after the Cold War in 1991. Figure 3 further demonstrates that since 2000, the level of troops, military observers, and police have grown steadily in an increasing number of UN Peacekeeping missions. However, the level of police, while steadily increasing, remains quite low.

While each of the conflicts illustrated in figure 1 can and should be written about extensively, this thesis will focus exclusively on stability operations. These can be a necessary component of a response to a range of conflicts on the spectrum, from conventional war to humanitarian intervention and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief. This thesis will not focus on *when* to intervene in stability operations. I shall leave the debate about *when, why,* and the particular countries *in which* to intervene to policymakers or other scholars. This thesis, in contrast, assumes that the decision to intervene has already been made; it asks the question, "What can and should be done to stabilize weak states to prevent or respond to conflict?"

REALITIES OF OUR CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

American national security is at risk when weak states descend into chaos and lawlessness, harbor terrorists and insurgents, and promote anti-American/anti-Western radicalism. Such violence undermines American national security by fueling state and regional instability, prolonging the effects of violence, and bolstering brutal regimes that breed other threats.[45] Non-state actors can take advantage of weak states' porous borders and underground economies to establish operational bases from which they can secure financing, recruit soldiers, and plan attacks.[46] The key to American success will depend not

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[44] "Surge in Uniformed UN Peacekeeping Personnel from 1991- Present." United Nations Peacekeeping. Available online at https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/chart.pdf
[45] Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. (QDDR) U.S. State Department. 2010.
[46] Eizenstat, Porter, & Weinstein. "Rebuilding Weak States."

only on responses to unexpected crises, but also on becoming more proactive than reactive[47] to prevent weak or failing states from descending into chaos in the first place, requiring a larger, more costly (in blood, treasure, and time) response.

I contend that the United States (not necessarily the US military) should plan on assuming risk more in the bottom-right quadrant of figure 1, where irregular warfare, humanitarian intervention, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief operations can—with the proper organization—be shared among various US departments, NGOs, international organizations, partner nations' militaries and governments, and the private sector. The military alone cannot succeed in these types of engagements. There is only so much the military can do. There is only so much the military *should* do. American diplomat George Kennan writes,

> It was asserted not long ago by a prominent American that "War's very object is victory" and that "in war there can be no substitute for victory." Perhaps the term is actually misplaced. Perhaps there can be such thing as "victory" in a battle, whereas in war there can be only the achievement or nonachievement of your objectives. In the old days, wartime objectives were generally limited and practical ones, and it was common to measure the success of your military operations by the extent to which they brought you closer to your objectives. But where your objectives are moral and ideological ones and run to changing the attitudes and traditions of an entire people or the personality of a regime, then victory is probably something not to be achieved entirely by military means or indeed in any short space of time at all; and perhaps that is the source of our confusion.[48]

As Kennan aptly stated nearly 30 years ago, the US military can best be used in the capacity in which it is designed – to fight battles - though its abilities to assist in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief should not be overlooked. However, as noted before, the nature of conflicts around the world has changed. They are rarely about simply fighting opposing

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[47] Stringer, & Sizemore. "The U.S. Interagency Role in Future Conflict Prevention: Provincial Reconstruction Teams for Select Partner Nations." Pg. 11
[48] Kennan, George. *American Diplomacy: Expanded Edition.* The University of Chicago Press. Chicago and London. 1984 ed. Pg. 102

armies until surrender; "victory" implies that there will be winners and losers. Such clear-cut victories are unlikely to be seen in the decades to come.[49]

Thus, if the threats to the United States and our interests will come from within the weakest of states, then our government's toolkit must be able to address the roots of these threats both before violence breaks out - in effort to preclude military action - and after. These operations may eventually require military force, but will rarely rely on the military alone, and they will improbably require a conventional military with conventional equipment or conventional tactics. In 2006, US military tactics changed with the reintroduction of counterinsurgency, but as Kennan, and countless others argue, the military alone cannot be the answer.

During the mid-1980s and 1990s, the US military leaders called deployments in Somalia, El Salvador, and Haiti "military operations other than war" (MOOTW or *moot*-wah) and only considered big wars to be "wars."[50] In fact, Army General John Shalikashvili, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff often said "Real men don't do MOOTW."[51] During the Cold War, the United States failed to train, equip, plan, or spend for these complex MOOTW operations.[52] According to Ambassador Bodine, "To have doctrine would be to concede an ongoing challenge and an ongoing threat, a nonconventional threat not amenable to a conventional response. If somehow we didn't acknowledge it, it would just simply go away. So every 'operation other than' – Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, and Iraq – was *ad hoc.*"[53] The "higher-ups" didn't want the Army to "do MOOTW," so they kept

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[49] Admiral Mullen, Michael. To author.
[50] Kaplan, Fred. Interview. NPR. January 29, 2013
[51] Kaplan, Fred. *The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War.* Simon & Schuster. NY. 2013 Pg. 45
[52] Bodine. *When the Unconventional Becomes Conventional: Assessing Threats, Finding Solutions.* Pg. 3
[53] Ibid. Pg. 3-4

the soldiers from learning how.[54] To this day, a comprehensive doctrine for this type of conflict has yet to exist.[55]

GRAND STRATEGY

In order to help write a doctrine of any sort, it is important to first determine America's goals. As Lewis Carroll's Cheshire Cat says to Alice,[56] *If you don't know where you're going, any road will get you there.* Before making any strategic decisions, the United States first needs to decide what it wants its role in the world to be and how to manage all of its resources - America's grand strategy.

According to Princeton professor of international relations and grand strategy John Ikenberry, "The solution to the problem doesn't stop when the war stops. The solution to the problem only comes when you have a more functional, legitimate government that's reintegrated into the larger regional and global system." [57] End states must be the establishment of societies that can function on their own without dragging the international community down due to a lack of security. They do not need to be perfect, but they must not become black holes in the international community. He writes that the threats facing America reflect a worldwide rise in security interdependence: "America's security is increasingly linked to how other people live and act—in more places and more ways."[58] In an age of such interconnectedness, countries are increasingly dependent on each other and should not only see this new entanglement as a challenge but as an opportunity as well.[59] The United States should not, and need not, help weak or failing states alone - it takes a

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[54] Kaplan. *The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War.* Pg. 46
[55] Kaplan, Fred. Interview. NPR. January 29, 2013
[56] In the book and film *Alice in Wonderland*
[57] Ikenberry, John. To author. February 20, 2013
[58] Ikenberry, John. "The Right Grand Strategy." *Foreign Affairs Magazine.* January/February 2010 edition.
[59] Capt. Porter, Wayne. Lecture. ASU. October 25, 2012

community to rebuild a state.[60] Strengthening a weak state is in the interest of all states. Ikenberry writes, "What people do and how they live matter in ways that were irrelevant in earlier eras. How people burn energy, provide public health, treat minorities and establish rules and enforce treaties matter more today—and will matter even more tomorrow. This has created a growing demand for security cooperation—deep, intrusive, institutionalized, multifaceted."[61]

The United States, with its unique position in the world, has the resources and potential to help craft a larger community of stable, liberal states - a grand strategy that will bring increased security to the international community and Americans alike. The US does not need to wait for weak states to descend into chaos before acting. We should conduct the sustainable stabilization part of Phase IV operations to prevent Phases I-III in the first place. In the event that sustainable stabilization cannot prevent conflict or events are unexpected, and the decision has been made to intervene, the United States should properly engage in post-conflict critical and sustainable stabilization operations. These have been a requirement (though often ignored or actively resisted) in all military efforts for the past two decades; the US government currently lacks the organizational capacity to do so effectively. Wass de Czege, a retired soldier who participated in a war game in 2002 to simulate the coming war in Iraq, by invading a fictitious country called Nair (an anagram for Iran) circulated a memo addressing his concerns with the game as a whole. In it, he said that the games "tend to devote more attention to successful campaign-beginnings than to successful conclusions."[62] In the game he had just played, the Clausewitzian question of how to achieve the real strategic objectives had not been addressed, let alone practiced, because the game ended too

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[60] Ikenberry, John. To author. February 20, 2013
[61] Ikenberry. "The Right Grand Strategy." *Foreign Affairs Magazine.*
[62] Kaplan. *The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War.* Pg. 60

soon. If the game's managers kept playing after they believed the enemy had been defeated, they may have realized just how difficult their objectives really were. Instead, they were not addressed at all.[63] They ignored critical and sustainable stabilization.

There are those such as Nehal Bhuta, David Rieff and others (including former President George W. Bush who said, "I don't think our troops ought to be used for what's called nation building."[64]) that advocate against humanitarian interventions, *state-building*, or other stabilization operations, claiming that it is too costly or difficult, that it could lead to false pretenses for war, and raises questions of morality - drawing similarities to colonialism.[65] While some of these arguments bear serious consideration, this thesis will not focus on that area of the debate. I contend that not wanting to engage in such operations because they are politically unpopular or difficult should not leave the US totally unprepared in case they become inevitable. The 21st century poses many opportunities for increased international stability if the United States has the will to engage in what is necessary, not what is easy.

COIN IS ONLY PART OF THE SOLUTION

In 2006, recognizing the need to reform the military's role and procedure in Iraq, General David Petraeus, Lt. Colonel John Nagl, along with many others in and out of government wrote the *U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (COIN manual). While this doctrine changed the nature of the military's role in Iraq and Afghanistan, it was only a military response (albeit appropriate) to a situation that had spiraled out of control.

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[63] Ibid. Pg. 60
[64] President Bush, George W. Presidential Debate. Wake Forest University. October 11, 2000
[65] See Rieff, David *At the Point of a Gun: Democratic Dreams and Armed Intervention* At the Point of a Gun: Democratic Dreams and Armed Intervention, 2005. See also Bhuta, Nehal. "Against State-Building." *Constellations* Volume 15 Issue 4. December, 2008.

The COIN manual changed the military's approach, but as shall be conceded in chapter 3, in unconventional war the military can lose on its own, but it cannot win on its own.

The military serves a critical function and must maintain the capability of winning conventional conflicts and can be an influential tool in American foreign policy, even if no shots are fired.[66] However, even the military has changed structurally; in 1986, to address the challenges of the day, specifically inter-service rivalry evidenced by the failed Iranian hostage rescue, the Goldwater-Nichols Act restructured the military to better coordinate the various branches to utilize the full potential of a united, collaborative force. The architect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Jim Locher, suggests that such horizontal collaboration is now needed on the civilian side.

> At the Defense Department we used to have the four services that were quite capable but couldn't work together. Then in 1986, Congress passed a law mandating that the department emphasize joint-ness and unified commands into really unified commands. Serving in a joint assignment became the highest priority, and you couldn't get promoted until you had done that. The whole culture got changed to focus on that [joint-ness]. The same thing is going to have to happen with the interagency system.[67]

While there are still four service branches, these branches are now much more coordinated. To succeed in post radical-transition and other stability operations, a safe and secure environment, rule of law, sustainable economy, stable governance, and social well-being must all be attained. All of these end states interact with one another. The military, using COIN, an appropriate doctrine in the case of insurgencies, can address the *safe and secure environment* requirement. However, the civilian efforts (rule of law, social well-being, stable governance, and a sustainable economy) are still needed. A country cannot have prosperity without security: security meaning freedom from fear; prosperity as well-being,

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[66] Mullen, Michael. Speech at Kansas State University, Landon Lecture Series Remarks. March 3, 2010.
[67] Locher, James. To author. Dec 15, 2012.

not GDP.[68] The same is true in reverse; a state cannot have physical security without economic security.[69] Thus, one cannot be addressed without the other. Too often the United States has focused on security without adequately addressing the other variables.[70]

Currently the USG and other international donors lack a coherent strategy to support Security Sector Reform (SSR), a strategy that encompasses the different resources available from across government. The US and other countries continue to take an *ad hoc* approach to SSR, viewing the different sectors in isolation and not as an interconnected system.[71] [72] Donors, for example, "continue to fund individual training programs for the police without looking at how that training fits into the overall education system, or how training on crime scene management needs to be understood given the co-operation necessary with the police and prosecutors."[73] To succeed, states collectively need to view these situations as one open system with interacting variables. According to the OECD, donor countries should engage in SSR with three major overarching objectives:

1) Improvement of basic security and justice service delivery
2) Establishment of an effective governance, oversight and accountability system
3) Development of local leadership and ownership of a reform process to review the capacity and technical needs of the security system.[74]

The State Department's QDDR recognized its own inability to manage post-conflict crises and called for "the State Department and USAID to substantially improve [their] ability to address the crises and conflicts associated with state weakness, instability, and

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[68] Captain Porter, Wayne. Lecture. ASU. October 25, 2012.
[69] Fitzgerald, Jeff. To author. January 31, 2013. NATO Sarajevo
[70] Captain Porter, Wayne. To author. February 8, 2013.
[71] The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR) Supporting Security and Justice.
http://www.oecd.org/development/conflictandfragility/38406485.pdf
[72] Captain Porter, Wayne. To author. February 8, 2013.
[73] The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR) Supporting Security and Justice.
[74] Ibid.

disasters, and to support stability and reconstruction following conflict."[75] Ensuring that these tools and approaches are designed and delivered in a coherent and coordinated manner is critical to deliver effective support for the overarching US grand strategy of sustainability based on influence in an open system rather than perceived control in a closed system.[76]

Thus, there is an increasingly recognized need to engage properly in stabilization operations, formerly referred to as MOOTW. Even if we are to grant that the main criticisms of such operations cited earlier bear merit and should severely limit frequency of intervention, from a purely national security standpoint, improving our capabilities should be a clear objective.

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[75] Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. US State Department. 2010
[76] "A National Strategic Narrative" By Mr. Y

CHAPTER 2

CASE STUDY - THE BALKANS

Experience in peace operations has proven that good soldiers, no matter how well equipped, trained, and led, cannot fully perform police duties among local populations.

- General Wesley Clark[77]

BOSNIA

Understanding the conflict in Bosnia first requires a review of Yugoslavia and its disintegration. On June 25, 1991, both Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence from Yugoslavia[78] and faced war with Yugoslavia's (effectively Serbia's) national army (JNA). While the war between Slovenia and Serbia ended quickly, the war between Croatia and Serbia lasted seven months, displaced nearly 700,000 and killed more than 10,000.

Bosnia is a multi-ethnic state consisting of Muslim Bosniaks, Roman Orthodox Croats, and Eastern Orthodox Serbs. At the beginning of March 1992, Bosnia held a referendum to determine its future status as an independent state. Despite the public opposition of Bosnian Serbs - many boycotted the vote - the referendum passed. Bosnia declared its independence.[79] After the elections, Bosnian Serb paramilitary groups moved into northeastern Bosnia, harassing and killing Bosniaks. In response, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic ordered a general mobilization to defend Bosnia's territory, which the Bosnian Serb leaders interpreted as a declaration of war. Bosnian Serbs attacked Sarajevo, and with this, war was undeniable.

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[77] Jeffery Smith, "Fired On, Marines Kill Gunman in Kosovo," *Washington Post*, June 26, 1999, A17
[78] Fixdal, Mona. *Ways Out of War: Peacemakers in the Middle East and Balkans.* Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. Pg. 10
[79] Ibid. Pg. 10

During the war in Bosnia between the Croats and Bosniaks, against the Serbs from 1992 to 1995, Serbian forces conducted ethnic cleansing[80] across the country. By the winter of 1992, the Serbs had seized nearly 70%[81] of Bosnia "purifying" (killing) Croats and Muslims as they went. By 1994, 200,000 soldiers and civilians had been killed and 2 million were refugees or internally displaced persons. By March 1995, the UN had deployed a force of 38,599 including 684 United Nations military observers, 803 civilian police, 2,017 international civilian staff, and 2,615 local staff[82] under the auspices of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) with an initial mandate to protect the humanitarian aid effort. Only later did UNPROFOR try to establish peace. Traditionally, UN peacekeeping missions had the job of monitoring ceasefires between military forces that could retreat to their own territories. In Bosnia, the UN mission took place in the middle of an ongoing war.[83]

UNPROFOR's rules of engagement, equipment, and force strength had all been conceived first to engage in humanitarian assistance then peacekeeping rather than peace enforcement operations.[84] According to Colonel Erik Sandahl, commander of the UN's 4th French Battalion in Bosnia, a disconnect existed between the reality on the ground and the force sent, rendering UNPROFOR virtually useless as their mandate of peace-keeping was inappropriate – there was no peace to be kept.[85] David Owens[86] further argues, "The UN had done work on increased force numbers, but many of us felt it needed rules of

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[80] This included both genocide and forced relocation
[81] Fixdal. *Ways Out of War: Peacemakers in the Middle East and Balkans.* Pg. 11
[82] " United Nations Protection Force" by the Department of Public Information, United Nations. http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof_p.htm
[83] Fixdal. *Ways Out of War: Peacemakers in the Middle East and Balkans.* Pg. 13
[84] Colonel Sandahl, Erik. To author. January 24, 2013. NATO Headquarters.
[85] Ibid.
[86] A foreign British Foreign Secretary and the EU co-chairman of the Conference for the Former Yugoslavia and a joint author of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan [VOPP] of January 1993 which failed to end the fighting between the warring Bosnian parties

engagement and command and control procedures for peace enforcement, not peace-keeping, if the areas were to be kept safe."[87] Thus, though well intended, UNPROFOR was ill prepared and ill equipped for the task at hand. As a result, it was unable to prevent or stop the violence in Bosnia.

By 1995, the Bosniak-Croat forces had begun to make advances in central Bosnia. When Serbian forces attacked a crowded market in central Sarajevo (Markale Market) on August 28, 1995, this marked the final straw for international actors, leading NATO to launch Operation Deliberate Force – an air operation targeting Serbian armed forces. The combination of the increasing strength of the Bosniak-Croat forces with the NATO airstrikes eventually, after long, difficult negotiations led the warring parties to agree to the Dayton Accord on December 14, 1995 which ended hostilities and created two entities: the Bosniak-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska. By war's end, almost 250,000 people were dead.[88]

US GUIDANCE AND PREPARATION

One must first understand the philosophy and directions coming from the highest levels of the US government to unwind the actors and their actions (or lack-thereof). According to Johannes Viereck, the Head of Military-Political Affairs at the Office of the High Representative in Sarajevo, after it took years to get troops on the ground in the first place, US President Bill Clinton set the general parameters when he said American troops would be withdrawn in one year (the end of 1996). US domestic factors including a lack of popular support for such interventions - particularly after US troop losses in Somalia -

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[87] Kaufman, Joyce. *NATO and the Former Yugoslavia: Crisis, Conflict, and the Atlantic Alliance.* Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. Oxford. 2002. Pg. 102

[88] Sean Kay, *NATO and the future of European Security.* Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, Pg. 79 in Kaufman, Joyce. *NATO and the Former Yugoslavia: Crisis, Conflict, and the Atlantic Alliance.*

largely drove this attitude. In order to gain Congressional support for the mission, the President limited the engagement to one year.[89] When asked whether a year would be long enough, General William Nash, Commander of Task Force Eagle, Implementation Force (IFOR) responded, "If the Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs want peace, one year is more than enough. If they don't want peace, God knows how long it will take."[90]

General Nash knew that his mission would be compromised if US forces sustained heavy casualties, so to prevent problems such as the kidnapping of UN forces in early 1995, his troops would operate in a manner to avoid such problems. In his Commander's Intent, General Nash wrote, "We will reduce vulnerability to a hostage situation or a small-unit tactical defeat by always operating with platoon or larger formations."[91] At the same time, Nash made clear that everything they were doing revolved around building peace and democracy. Thus, General Nash was mission-driven while still protecting his forces.

In preparation for eventual deployment, the US military and NATO had been working on contingencies for years. The military response was updated and prepared each day, reflecting the state of negotiations at Dayton.[92] Thus, when IFOR was sent into Bosnia, by the first morning, IFOR troops began to tear down barriers. IFOR had the resources and preparation necessary to carry out their tasks. In contrast, UN High Representative Carl Bildt "had a cell phone and a rental car."[93] There was no equivalent preparation on the civilian side.

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[89] General Nash, William. To author. March 7, 2013
[90] Ibid.
[91] General Nash, William. "Commander's Intent." January, 1996
[92] When the size of the zone of separation changed during the negotiations, the simulation at the training center in Germany changed the next day.
[93] General Nash, William. To author. March 7, 2013

IMPLEMENTATION OF DAYTON

In December 1995, NATO sent 60,000 soldiers from 32 countries (including 14 non-NATO partner countries) as Implementation Force (IFOR) to enforce the Dayton Accord and end of hostilities.[94] Heavily armed, IFOR had "robust rules of engagement" in comparison to UNPROFOR, which had been restricted by a duel-key system.[95] Thus, the terms of Dayton allowed for more involvement and use of force, which deterred the warring parties from resuming hostilities.[96] As figure 4 illustrates, IFOR had a ratio of 17 soldiers per 1000 civilians.

Figure 4[97]

This force, unlike UNPROFOR, was well equipped to fulfill its mission, which was to establish a durable cessation of hostilities, ensure force protection, establish lasting security and arms control measures, and create conditions for the safe return of displaced persons. [98] In his Commander's Intent, General Nash wrote, "We will ensure: Freedom of Movement in the AOR, that the warring factions are separated; the zone of separation is established, marked and enforced; and the

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94 "Security Through Partnership: Peace Support Operations." NATO Online Library.
http://www.nato.int/docu/sec-partnership/html_en/nato_secur06.html
95 Meaning that both IFOR and the UN needed to approve any use of force
96 Colonel Sandahl, Erik. To author. January 24, 2013. NATO Headquarters.
97 Dobbins, et. al. *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*
98 Ibid. Pg. 93

terms of the Peace Accord are implemented."[99] IFOR's mandate did not specify law enforcement or police responsibilities;[100] IFOR was thus not equipped to establish rule of law, as shall be demonstrated below.

IFOR was regularly called upon to enforce the peace; soldiers' guns were "locked and loaded,"[101] but because IFOR's presence and capabilities were well known, this served as a powerful deterrent to the formerly warring parties.[102] A Serb Colonel told an IFOR brigade commander that if IFOR tried to inspect a certain area, 500 Serbs would be killed defending it. In response and in compliance with the Dayton Accord, General Nash responded, "If 500 is all you've got, 500 is all we'll kill."[103] The Serbs backed down.

The complexity of the tasks facing IFOR had been underestimated and the likelihood of troops leaving Bosnia by the end of 1996 were nil.[104] The paramilitaries that carried out ethnic cleansing had to be disbanded, institutions need to be rebuilt, and Bosnia's economy was in shambles - GDP per capita was a mere $628.[105] Industrial production in 1995, unsurprisingly, was only a fraction of prewar levels. A vast majority of the 1.3 million workers had lost their jobs, many had lost their savings, and agricultural land was mined. Power plants, transmission lines, roads, rails, and telecommunications were significantly damaged. Two-thirds of homes, half of schools, and one-third of hospitals had been either damaged or completely destroyed. The country was in deep turmoil and had significant challenges to overcome; international efforts to complete all of these challenges would take significant time, much longer than the one-year IFOR mandate.

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[99] General Nash, William. "Commander's Intent." January, 1996
[100] Ibid. Pg. 93
[101] General Nash, William. To author. March 7, 2013
[102] Maxwell, Rohan. To author. January 31, 2013. NATO Sarajevo
[103] General Nash, William. To author. March 7, 2013
[104] Kaufman, Joyce. *NATO and the Former Yugoslavia: Crisis, Conflict, and the Atlantic Alliance.* Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. Oxford. 2002.
[105] Dobbins, et al. *America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq.* Pg. 92

The resulting intervention was shared between military and civilian efforts, with less than optimal cooperation. On the civilian side, agencies were split under the loose authority of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) which was intended to "facilitate the [local] parties' own efforts" at reconciliation but not to govern Bosnia as a protectorate.[106] The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was in charge of elections and negotiating arms control treaties, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was tasked with refugee issues, and the IMF and World Bank sought to establish economic institutions to foster sustainable economic growth. The following chart demonstrates the organizational structure of intervening organizations in Bosnia.

Figure 5: Post-conflict Bosnia Organizational Chart[107] [108] [109]

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[106] Ibid. Pg. 94
[107] Courtesy of Robert Perito

In this organization, no one coordinated with anyone else; all of these institutions simply reported back to their international headquarters, with virtually no relationship between the military and civilians.[110] Post-war efforts in Bosnia were overly ambitious and uncoordinated.[111] [112]

In the early years of post-war Bosnia, this lack of coordination had significant negative effects on sustainable stabilization. For instance, Robert Farrand, the Deputy High Representative of Brcko, was unable to secure enough funding to replace a simple water pump.[113] He explains, "As we struggled to coordinate to repair Brcko's gutted infrastructure, I soon discovered that I had no control over the financial and technical resources needed to accomplish these objectives – not even close."[114] As a result of the organizational challenges Farrand experienced, he believes that control over the disbursement of reconstruction funds should be transferred by mandate from the military to the civilian administrator, "where responsibility for economic development logically lies."[115]

In time, OHR and IFOR's successor, Stabilization Force (SFOR), developed a closer relationship, but this did not emerge during the difficult and influential first few years. It took British diplomat Paddy Ashdown's arrival as the High Representative in 2002 to change the dynamics between military and civilian efforts. Ashdown was an experienced politician, a diplomat, and a former Marine. His predecessor, Wolfgang Petritsch, conversely had no military background, was skeptical of the military, and therefore was second-guessed by the

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[108] PIC stands for the Peace Implementation Council, an international body charged with implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina
[109] The dotted box delineates efforts under the loose oversight of OHR
[110] Perito, Robert. To author. Jan. 11, 2013
[111] Carp, Mihai. To author. Jan 24, 2013. NATO Headquarters
[112] Viereck, Johannes. To author. January 30, 2013. OHR, Sarajevo.
[113] Farrand, Robert. *Reconstruction and Peace Building in the Balkans: The Brčko Experience.* Rowman & Littlefield, Oct 24, 2011. Pg. 219
[114] Ibid. Pg. 214
[115] Ibid. Pg. 220

military on a day-to-day basis.[116] Thus a key problem in this framework was that success was primarily personality dependent.

<u>RULE OF LAW</u>

Rule of law is not an absolute. There are varying degrees of rule of law from safety from common crime to lack of corruption in all institutions. Basic, street-level law and order was established quite quickly in Bosnia due in part to both luck and effective, "common sense"[117] efforts. Police forces already existed and though ethnically divided, remained in place, able to establish local security from community to community. However, they often failed to protect minorities in their areas.

To assist in law and order, the International Police Task Force (IPTF), made up of 1,721 monitors was deployed to Bosnia. However by February 23 (two months after Dayton), the start date of the transfer of power, only 230 of the 1,721 IPTF had even deployed.[118] International actors needed to help transform the police force from one that protected the corrupt state under a communist system, and was feared by the people, to one that protected the people and earned their trust.[119] The police forces were trained by the unarmed IPTF. Though the IPTF was unarmed and its mandate was limited to monitor the local police,[120] their mere presence helped deter violence.[121] Because of the limits of the Dayton Accords, IFOR could not overrule the arrest of an individual by the local police, they could interfere physically, but not after the fact – they did not have the legal mandate.[122]

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[116] Viereck, Johannes. To author. January 30, 2013. OHR, Sarajevo
[117] Tillman, James. To author. February 1, 2013. Department of Justice, Sarajevo
[118] Perito, Robert. *Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America's Search for a Postconflict Stability Force.* United States Institute of Peace. 2004 Pg. 120
[119] James Tillman. To author. February 1, 2013. Department of Justice, Sarajevo
[120] Perito. *Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America's Search for a Postconflict Stability Force.* Pg. 128
[121] James Tillman. Interview. To author. 1, 2013. Department of Justice, Sarajevo
[122] General Nash, William. To author. March 7, 2013.

As the Bosnian police force gained competency and effectiveness, the State Investigative Protection Agency was set up in 2002 to combat the larger, more complex rule of law issues including terrorism, corruption, and organized crime. The agency has already seized stolen assets, arrested mafia members, and seized many loose weapons.[123] However, in 2013 they had only just begun to seriously investigate and prosecute corruption.

Critically, Bosnian police forces were trained by other police forces rather than by foreign military forces. The police operate under the principle of "serve and protect" using minimal force, while militaries, by their very nature, are trained to kill and use maximal force.[124] To effectively establish rule of law, which necessitates trust between the police and general population rather than fear and intimidation, the police must not be militarized. In Bosnia, the training of police by other police helped instill this principle and allowed them to integrate into the community.

CIVILIAN MILITARY RELATIONS

As demonstrated by figure 5, the military and civilian components for structural, cultural, and personality[125] reasons did not coordinate well in the enforcement of the Dayton Accord, causing many issues to remain neglected. A growing security gap emerged between area security and basic law and order. IFOR represented a force that could provide area security but would not provide law and order while Bosnia's ethnically divided civilian police forces and the unarmed IPTF could not and would not enforce rule of law effectively and universally. [126]

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[123] James Tillman. To author. February 1, 2013. Department of Justice, Sarajevo
[124] Ibid.
[125] General Nash, William. To author. March 7, 2013
[126] Carp, Mihai. To author. Jan 24, 2013. NATO Headquarters

To illustrate, on March 17, 1996, Serbian residents in the suburbs of Sarajevo torched buildings being turned over to Bosniaks as part of a transfer to Croat-Bosniak control. The Serb residents were goaded by their political leadership who resented the Dayton Accord and had promised the Serbs homes in the Republika Srpska.[127] The local, ethnically-based Serbian police and fire department did not intervene, even when they heard people in buildings crying for help,[128] and IFOR (lacking the mandate) did not get involved, trying to avoid confrontations.[129] If there had been better coordination between OHR, the Bosnian government, and NATO forces, and the Bosnian President had publically guaranteed the locals' safety, it is unlikely that this incident would have occurred, or could have at least been better handled.

While Stabilization Force (SFOR) was equipped to deter resumption of major hostilities, it was often untrained and ill equipped for the types of security challenges that arose, such as a mob incident in Brcko on August 28, 1997. Tanks, armored personnel carriers, and helicopter gunships were practically useless for the responsible, let alone humane course of action that required dispersing women and children providing cover for drunken, club-wielding thugs who threw stones and Molotov cocktails at SFOR troops.[130] Though the military could overcome this group quite easily through the use of force, such a victory would be counterproductive, inappropriate, immoral, illegal, and potentially considered a crime against humanity. In such circumstances, aside from the moral implications, the use of overwhelming force could lead the locals to perceive SFOR to be at war with the civilian population. If this were to develop, civilians could subsequently turn

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[127] Viereck, Johannes. To author. 30, 2013. OHR, Sarajevo
[128] "Fires burn unfought in Sarajevo suburb: Serbs torch homes in advance of switchover." Cable News Network. March 17, 1996. http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/Bosnia/updates/9603/17/index.html
[129] Perito. *Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America's Search for a Postconflict Stability Force.* Pg. 128
[130] Ibid. Pg. 29

hostile towards the troops and view them as foreign occupiers rather than guarantors of peace.[131]

War criminals provide another example of this security gap. IFOR commander Admiral Leighton Smith insisted that he would not order his forces to hunt down war criminals as it would likely draw them into armed confrontations, forcing them to take sides in the conflict. He claimed that this would make it more difficult to perform their primary task: separate the warring parties and maintain peace in the region.[132] As General Nash explains, the military was not ordered to track down war criminals, and "you don't want the military choosing their missions."[133] These concerns are quite legitimate but do not detract from the argument that such work is necessary - only that the military is not the answer to this particular challenge. What was needed in this situation was a properly utilized constabulary force to fill the security gap.

POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

Elections held in 1996 led to the return to office of wartime leaders from functioning organizations with an existing base of support.[134] Ethnic tensions remained and these politicians represented peoples' fears of an eventual return to violence; the people wanted hardliners to protect their ethnic interests. These nominally democratically-elected, but ethnically centric, representatives have been very slow to adopt legislation to move the

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[131] Col. Sandahl, Erik. To author. NATO Headquarters
[132] Chris Hodges, "Diplomats Fault Bosnia Chief," *The New York Times,* April 28, 1996 in Kaufman, Joyce. *NATO and the Former Yugoslavia: Crisis, Conflict, and the Atlantic Alliance.* Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. Oxford. 2002. Pg. 140
[133] General Nash, William. To author. March 7, 2013.
[134] Dobbins, James; McGinn, John; Crane, Keith; Jones, Seth; Lal, Rollie; Rathmell, Andrew; Swanger, Rachel; Timilsina, Anga. *America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq.* Rand Corporation. 2003. Pg. 101

country forward.[135] As a result, the country has fallen far behind its neighbors such as Croatia in the process of EU membership and general stability and prosperity.[136]

By the end of the war, the armed forces of Bosnia numbered around 200,000. This troop level was both unsustainable financially and unnecessary. Figure 6 demonstrates the timing and pace of troop reductions. While many soldiers were satisfied with leaving the army to return to civilian life, others relied on the army for a livelihood. To help transition these individuals to civilian life, they were given a one-time payment of approximately 10,000 KM - the equivalent of a year's salary.[137] However, this payment only postponed the problem of finding employment and a sustainable livelihood in an economy that remains (at the time of writing) at 43.3%.[138]

Downsizing the Armed Forces of Boznia

Figure 6[139]

Rather than continue to simply hand out money during further cuts, in 2010 (when cuts were less drastic), NATO began the NATO-PERSPEKTIVA Program, implemented

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[135] Wilson, David. To author. January 31, 2013. Sarajevo
[136] Viereck, Johannes. Interview. January 30, 2013. OHR, Sarajevo
[137] Fitzgerald, Jeff. Interview. January 31, 2013. NATO, Sarajevo
[138] "2013 Index of Economic Freedom." The Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/index/country/bosniaherzegovina
[139] International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (Editions 1992/1993 to 2002/03); World Defense Almanac, Military Technology (Editions 1992/1993 to 2001/02)

by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). This program assists discharged troops to reintegrate into civilian life by meeting with the individuals to assess their needs, and give them the resources necessary to succeed - from training to capital investments in new or expanding businesses.[140] Such a model better serves the long-term needs of the Bosnian economy by encouraging job growth rather than prolonging and delaying the problem of finding a sustainable income, though questions about the feasibility of such a model on a much larger scale should be considered. Regardless, serious study should be given to NATO-PERSPEKTIVA, which has been a successful program for a significant proportion of its participants.[141]

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

By the end of the fighting in 1995, the economy had been crushed in multiple levels of devastation. First and most obvious, physical infrastructure across Bosnia had been destroyed. Second, though unrelated to the war, while Bosnia had formerly been mining-dominated during the Cold War, the heavy industries of Europe had steadily declined in the post-Cold War period. Finally, Bosnia and the rest of Yugoslavia had largely missed the Eastern European transition from communism to a market and globalized economy.[142] It was already a decade behind, assuming that it could get up to speed immediately, which, because of the devastation to the economy, was impossible. As a result, Bosnia is now several decades behind the curve.

To help with the physical devastation and the daily conditions after the war, the international community provided $5.1 billion in assistance between 1996 and 1999. This

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[140] Fourth Interim Report. The NATO Trust Fund for the Resettlement of Discharged Ministry of Defense Personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina over the years 2010-2012.

[141] See Ibid.

[142] Viereck, Johannes. To author. January 30, 2013. OHR, Sarajevo, Maxwell, Rohan. To author. January 31, 2013. NATO Sarajevo

was the largest per capita assistance package in post-WWII history, including the Marshal Plan. Most of this money was used to rebuild homes and infrastructure in order to lay the foundations for a functioning society. Very little was spent on longer-term investments to create a more sustainable economy. By 1999, GDP per capita had reached $1,951 - a 310% increase from 1995 - and inflation dropped from thousands of percent during the war to low single digits.[143] While the economy certainly improved immediately after the war, some of the aid was siphoned off and wound up in the hands of influential politicians and their cronies.[144] Minor roads were repaired, but a larger triangle road, connecting the major cities in Bosnia – Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Banja Luka - (much like the ring road in Afghanistan) was never built. Such a project would have had tremendous impact on the country, helping to connect areas that are largely isolated from one another[145] while putting many back to work when unemployment hovered around 70 percent.[146]

After several years of modest economic growth in the post-war period, Bosnia's economic performance has deteriorated, in part due to the global economic slowdown, but mainly due to the lack of progress in improving regulatory efficiency and open-market policies. Bosnia has failed to attract foreign investment as several factors deter potential investors: [147] a large number of companies in Bosnia remain under state control as privatization has stalled; protection of property rights is poor; corruption is widespread; contract enforceability remains weak; local courts are subject to political interference and lack the resources to prosecute complex, organized crimes effectively; bureaucratic, costly

[143] Dobbins, et al. *America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq.*
[144] Viereck, Johannes. To author. January 30, 2013. OHR, Sarajevo
[145] Ibid.
[146] Farrand. *Reconstruction and Peace Building in the Balkans: The Brčko Experience.* Pg. 209
[147] The Index of Economic Freedom covers 10 freedoms – from property rights to entrepreneurship. According to the 2013 Index of Economic Freedom released on January 10, 2013, Bosnia received an economic freedom score of 57.3 (the 103rd freest in the 2013 Index). Bosnia ranked 38th out of 43 countries in Europe, and its overall score fell below the global and regional averages.

and time-consuming registration procedures reflect a history of central planning that has been slow to transition to a more free market economy;[148] and high public spending is a large burden on the economy. Furthermore, public sector jobs offer higher wages and better benefits than do private sector jobs,[149]creating an incentive structure with numerous negative consequences, especially given the need for Bosnia to create more jobs in the private sector.

KOSOVO

Historically, within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Kosovo had been an autonomous territory. However, in June 1990, a wave of decrees from Belgrade, the capital of Yugoslavia, limited Kosovar Albanian (Kosovar) freedoms: the suppression of an Albanian-language newspaper, the closing of the Kosovo Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the dismissal of thousands of state employees. In July 1990, Serb authorities dissolved the Kosovo assembly and government, the last remnants of Kosovo's autonomous status.[150] In response, Kosovars created a shadow government with three basic goals:

1) Prevent violence
2) Internationalize the situation
3) Deny Serbian legitimacy by refusing to take part in any official Serb act, including elections.[151]

When this peaceful resistance failed to protect Kosovo Albanians and their human rights, they turned to violence as the armed Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) insurgency arose, made up of roughly 25,000,[152] which in turn led to a violent Serbian crackdown to suppress the insurgency. In response to the crisis, in 1998 the international community applied

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[148] "2013 Index of Economic Freedom." The Heritage Foundation. Available online at:
http://www.heritage.org/index/country/bosniaherzegovina
[149] Viereck, Johannes. To author January 30, 2013. OHR, Sarajevo
[150]Kaufman. *NATO and the Former Yugoslavia: Crisis, Conflict, and the Atlantic Alliance.* Pg. 151-152
[151] Ibid. 152
[152] Sandahl, Erik. To author. January 24, 2013. NATO Headquarters.

diplomatic and economic sanctions to end the conflict, ultimately leading to the use of military force.

On March 24, 1999, NATO began a bombing campaign triggered by Belgrade's rejection of an interim settlement for Kosovo that had been reached in Rambouillet, France.[153] NATO's objective: to force the removal of the Serbian military and police forces and place Kosovo under international protection until its final diplomatic status could be determined – which has yet to happen, 14 years later. After 11 weeks of NATO bombing, and the growing likelihood of a ground presence, Slobodan Milosevic, the President of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, accepted NATO's conditions; Serbian forces withdrew. Two days later, 45,000 Kosovo Force (KFOR) troops deployed to Kosovo to enforce the peace as mandated in UN Security Council Resolution 1244.

<u>CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR</u>

By the end of the crisis, approximately 10,000 civilians had been killed, 1 million people (45% of the population) were displaced, two-thirds of homes were damaged or destroyed, and the potential for acts of retribution soared. Ethnically Serbian administration officials were discredited and forced to leave, leaving Kosovo without the basic structures of governance, though a shadow government had existed since the early 1990s. The entire police force in Kosovo (Serbian) was also required by UN Security Resolution 1244 to leave the province, leaving a potential power vacuum. As Serbian forces left, KLA elements moved in before the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was able to take full responsibility.[154]

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[153] Dobbins, et al. *America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq.* Pg. 111
[154] Ibid. Pg. 113

Unlike the mission in Bosnia, which was stymied by a lack of coordination, the international response to Kosovo was much more coordinated, having learned the lessons, sometimes personally, of Bosnia.[155] This coordination was not only improved between civilian agencies but between KFOR and UNMIK as well.[156] However, this is not to say that it was perfect, for as General Nash explains, "Maintaining law and order was a constant challenge. […] There was no international, national or regional integration authority to bring everything together."[157] Figure 7 illustrates the structural organization of international actors in Kosovo.

Figure 7: Post-conflict Kosovo Organizational Chart[158] [159]

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[155] Perito, Robert. To author. Jan. 11, 2013

[156] General Nash, William. To author. March 7, 2013

[157] General Nash, William. "Striking the Right Balance." *Commanding Heights: Strategic Lessons from Complex Operations.* Center for Complex Operations. 2009. Pg. 123

[158] Perito, Robert. To author. Jan. 11, 2013

[159] It is important to note that KFOR was not subordinate to UNMIK but rather placed at the bottom of this illustration to demonstrate that it provided the precondition of security, upon which all else relied.

NATO oversaw military/security aspects while the UN oversaw the civilian side of post-conflict Kosovo. Though the UN assumed responsibility to govern Kosovo, it had no opportunity to plan, organize, or recruit in advance and therefore was slow in its deployment.[160] Police and law-and-order functions fell under the UN's responsibility, but while the IPTF took time to deploy to Kosovo, KFOR assumed responsibility to maintain law and order. KFOR filled the security gaps when necessary to avoid the problems seen in Bosnia where both sides refused to perform important rule of law related tasks such as riot control and combating organized crime.[161]

Civilian efforts were split into four pillars: UNHCR assumed responsibility under UN oversight for humanitarian issues; the UN oversaw civil administration, OSCE led democratization, press, elections, and institution building; and the EU took responsibility for reconstruction and development. The UN also assumed direct responsibility for the security sector pillar: the police, courts, and prisons. The United States, for political reasons, did not want to lead the post-conflict sustainable stability efforts and therefore only committed 16% of peacekeeping troops and reconstruction funding.[162] However, the United States was able to retain significant influence because of its role in NATO and UN hierarchies.

Coordination within civilian organizations, and between civilians and KFOR was significantly improved over Bosnia.[163] After retiring from the military, General Nash served in Kosovo with the UN and was astounded to see how well KFOR and UNMIK worked together.[164] Gail Long of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), who worked as a local program officer for the Kosovo Transition Initiative (KTI), said, "KFOR Civil

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[160] Dobbins, et al. *America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq.* Pg. 113-114
[161] Ibid. Pg. 114
[162] Dobbins, et al. *America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq.* Pg. xxiii
[163] General Nash, William. To author. March 7, 2013
[164] Ibid.

Affairs and Area Commanders attend[ed] many of our meetings in the villages. They [were] often able to address issues that don't directly pertain to KTI – security, utilities, questions, etc. – so we like[ed] to have them there. [It] also show[ed] the villagers that we [were] all working together and [knew] what the other [was] doing."[165] Furthermore, Captain Cantello writes, "Overall, the cooperation between NGOs, IOs, and KFOR was very professional and productive. I think all participants respected and realized the importance of all agencies. I never felt like someone didn't want to work with me because I was in the military. I think everyone realized that we all had a very important job to conduct and the only way for each one of us to accomplish our mission was through cooperation."[166]

<u>SECURITY</u>

Kosovo Force (KFOR) entered Kosovo on June 12, 1999 numbering nearly 45,000, organized into 5 multinational brigades under the leadership of the US, UK, France, Germany, and Italy. Much like IFOR in Bosnia, KFOR was responsible for deterring hostilities, monitoring the border, enforcing a cease-fire, enforcing withdrawal, preventing the return of Yugoslav military, police, and paramilitary forces, demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups, securing an environment for refugees to return, and allowing all transitional activities to be implemented safely.

As demonstrated in figure 7, KFOR was intended to create the basic area security foundation for other reconstruction efforts to take place. KFOR supported the work of the international civil presence and coordinated closely with it; it was a supporting force, not a supported force (e.g. the military assists in the efforts undertaken by non-military groups

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[165] Brown, Keith. *Transacting Transition: The micropolitics of Democracy Assistance in the Former Yugoslavia.* Kumarian Press, Inc. 2006. Pg. 155
[166] Cantello and Turregano (2001) in Ibid. Pg. 163

rather than non-military groups and agencies merely supporting the efforts of the military). However, many in the military, including General Wesley Clark, who commanded Operation Allied Force as the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, NATO, were worried about a dependency culture[167] on the military to take responsibility for tasks it should not be responsible for, such as policing. As part of its security duties, KFOR protected key historic and religious sites and slowly transferred responsibility to the Kosovar police.[168] KFOR transferred humanitarian authority to UNHCR and various NGOs as soon as these became operational.

Within 3 months, at the request of General Michael Jackson,[169] the KLA had adequately completed the process of demilitarization, though only roughly 11,000 of the estimated 25,000 in the KLA had turned in their weapons – most remained in weapons caches.[170] UNMIK created the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) to provide an incentive for the KLA to disarm and reintegrate as useful and productive members of society. By maintaining a military-like structure and chain of command, the forces had the psychological effect of serving a purpose with some military structure.[171] The KPC had no role in defense, law enforcement, riot control, internal security, or any other task involving law and order. Instead, it provided disaster response, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, assisted in demining, and contributed to rebuilding infrastructure and communities.[172]

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[167] Meaning that other international actors such as NGOs, civilian agencies, contracts, etc. became dependent on the military to conduct their tasks, outside the military's mandate or capability
[168] As of January 2013, only 2 sites remained protected by KFOR. (Sandahl, Erik. To author. January 24, 2013. NATO Headquarters)
[169] Jackson commanded NATO ground forces from Britain, France, Germany, Italy and the US and was deputy to General Clark
[170] Colonel Sandahl, Erik. Interview. January 24, 2013. NATO Headquarters.
[171] Ibid.
[172] Dobbins, et al. *America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq.* Pg. 118-119

RULE OF LAW

Unlike Bosnia, whose sovereignty was recognized, the recognized sovereign in Kosovo was the United Nations.[173] The armed UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL) arrived in Kosovo on August 23, 1999 and began a phased transition two months after KFOR entered Kosovo. In the meantime, KFOR assumed police duties to establish basic security and rule of law; however, constabulary forces would have proven more appropriate to enforce basic rule of law. Eventually, constabulary forces were sent and, as expected, proved more effective.

In 1999, OSCE established the Kosovo Police Service (KPS). The force, like the early days in Bosnia, still struggles with more complex issues such as corruption[174] but is quite capable at combating and preventing common crime.[175] More difficult issues such as financial crime and witness protection, in contrast, remain under the control of European Rule of Law Mission Kosovo (EULEX).

Kosovo still has gaps in the independence, effectiveness, accountability and impartiality of the judiciary, including provision of appropriate security and protection for judges, prosecutors, witnesses, and court staff.[176] Enforcement of judgments, in both civil and criminal cases, remains weak - a major impediment towards creating confidence in the judiciary.[177] The lack of success seen in the judicial, legal, and penal sectors can be largely attributed to the initial strategy implemented - top down approaches failed to address the

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[173] General Nash, William. To author. March 7, 2013.
[174] Berg, Andreas. To author. January 24, 2013 CPCC EULEX. EU
[175] Ruiz, Celine. To author. January 25, 2013
[176] "Commission Communication on a Feasibility Study for a Stabilization and Association Agreement Between The European Union and Kosovo." European Commission. Brussels, 10, 23, 2012.
[177] Ibid.

capacity issues of the lower, day-to-day challenges.[178] In contrast, recent EULEX efforts have aimed to work from the bottom up and have been met with more success.[179]

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

As part of the sustainable stabilization effort, the EU created a central fiscal authority, a finance ministry, a new tax system and administration, a new trade regime, and a customs department. However, these institutional successes did not translate to a strong, sustainable economy. In 2013, estimates suggest that unemployment was above 40% and especially pronounced among the youth – more than 70% of whom were without a job. About 80% of all unemployed had been without a job for more than a year, revealing deep structural challenges - over 13 years after the war's end. Most of the labor force is low-skilled, thus preventing potential businesses from developing sectors that demand more skills with higher "value-add."

High remittances have an important impact on the labor market, as they tend to increase the reservation wage [180] and reduce incentives to work. The lack of job opportunities, especially among the youth, has put strains on social cohesion and encourages emigration.[181] Furthermore, an incentive misalignment still exists in Kosovo; a survey done by the Kosovo Business Alliance shows that the average wage levels of private sector jobs are below public sector wage levels.[182] As a result, individuals are more inclined to wait for a public sector job opening than seek or create private sector opportunities. Though Kosovo

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[178] Ruiz, Celine. To author. January 25, 2013
[179] Ibid.
[180] The lowest wage rate at which a worker would be willing to accept a particular type of job.
[181] "Commission Communication on a Feasibility Study for a Stabilization and Association Agreement Between The European Union and Kosovo." European Commission. Brussels, 10, 23, 2012.
[182] Ibid.

has improved since the end of the war in 1999, Significant FDI with the potential to spark economic growth never flowed into Kosovo to the extent needed to flourish.[183]

The obstacles to private sector development are numerous, ranging from a weak rule-of-law, corruption, and unfair competition to an unstable electricity supply, an unskilled labor force, as well as difficult and costly access to finance.[184] Until investors feel comfortable that their contracts will be enforced, and their intellectual property and capital is protected, they will not invest the capital needed to jumpstart the Kosovo economy.[185] The lack of natural resources other than brown coal and mining have given Kosovo very little potential for growth sparked from within.[186] Until FDI increases significantly, which will be dependent, in part, on a political solution between Kosovo and Serbia, economic sustainability will remain illusive.

KEY LESSONS

ORGANIZATION AND COORDINATION

Clear chains of command should exist on both the military and civilian sides of stability operations. Civilian and military organizations must be well coordinated, something that IFOR/SFOR and OHR failed to accomplish in the initial years of Bosnia but KFOR and UNMIK improved in Kosovo. In both cases, civilian responses were slow to deploy and were initially unprepared, leaving capacity gaps.

International organizations should avoid duel-key circumstances that UNPROFOR suffered from. Under this system, the UN and NATO needed to agree to use force before

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[183] Carp. Mihai. Interview. January 24, 2013 NATO Headquarters
[184] "Commission Communication on a Feasibility Study for a Stabilization and Association Agreement Between The European Union and Kosovo." European Commission. Brussels, 10, 23, 2012.
[185] Ruiz, Celine. To author. January 25, 2013
[186] Berg, Andreas. To author. January 24, 2013 CPCC EULEX. EU

NATO could act – a major defect to UNPROFOR's capabilities. After Dayton, IFOR had the sole authority on the use of force and thus did not need to check with the UN, making the decision-making process quicker and smoother.[187]

<u>SECURITY AND RULE OF LAW</u>

The establishment of security and rule of law are preconditions to all other sustainable stability efforts. Rule of law must not be thought of only in terms of police, but of the entire security sector. As Robert Farrand explains, "You must *first* establish the rule of law throughout the territory. Until an effective local police force is set up and running under a coherent body of law, and an independent court system is in place and capable of adjudicating commercial disputes in a timely manner, the process of economic redevelopment will depend almost solely on outside taxpayer-generated funds."[188]

Militaries and police serve very different functions and ideally should not serve the role of the other. A properly trained (non-militarized) police force is needed to establish effective rule of law while a military is needed to provide area security. In the case that local and effective police forces are unavailable, constabulary forces should deploy with the military to maintain rule of law while local police capabilities are built - intervening forces must prevent a power vacuum from developing.

In the case that constabulary forces are unavailable and existing authorities cannot maintain law and order, the occupying force should establish martial law (which provides an internationally recognized legal structure, obligations, and responsibilities under the Geneva Conventions) to prevent a power vacuum until civilian counterparts can be set up. NATO secretary-general Javier Solana argues that one of the key lessons from Bosnia was that an

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[187] General Nash, William. To author. March 7, 2013.
[188] Farrand. *Reconstruction and Peace Building in the Balkans: The Brčko Experience.* Pg. 233

appropriately armed and trained force was essential in the transition from hostilities to peace.[189] Additionally, the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) provides a potential model for DDR to demilitarize armed factions while giving the forces a sense of duty and a military-like structure, all while providing much needed services to rebuild a war-torn country.

Stability operations require face-to-face, person-to-person interaction to establish rule of law. Law and order must start at the local level by integrating with locals to build a sense of trust.[190] By establishing this trust, intelligence can be gathered from locals to help prevent crime. Thus, law and order should be built from the ground up, increasing in complexity as competencies increase.

ECONOMICS

Economic growth should be prioritized along with security and rule of law. In Bosnia and Kosovo, economic assistance and development efforts were too focused on short-term needs rather than long-term sustainability. Immediate post-war growth was driven by unsustainable means. Institutional reforms alone cannot drive economic sustainability; instead systemic economic factors must be addressed, from education to contract enforceability to bureaucratic red tape to wages to corruption.

POLITICS

Elections in Bosnia were rushed, allowing politically organized, hardline groups to remain in positions of leadership. As a result, legislation critical to progress has not yet been

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[189] Perito *Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America's Search for a Postconflict Stability Force.* Pg. 131
[190] Brown *Transacting Transition: The Micropolitics of Democracy Assistance in the Former Yugoslavia.* Pg. 149

passed. A free press should first be established for a period of time to facilitate an extensive debate and hold hardliners accountable.[191]

Though the physical violence stopped in Bosnia and Kosovo, the inherent political conflicts never really concluded; this has held both countries back, as people feel helpless, hopeless, and apathetic.[192] A majority of the problems in Bosnia remain unfixed because of continued political battles between the different ethnic groups (which have effectively become sub-governments).[193] Political solutions will be critical in solving the various problems of both Bosnia and Kosovo, but this is not something the international community will be able to impose on the parties.

CONCLUSION

According to the Rand Corporation, "In Bosnia, the United States succeeded in achieving unity of command and broad participation on the military side of the operation through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) but resisted the logic of achieving a comparable and cohesive arrangement on the civil side."[194] In both Bosnia and Kosovo, the international community was able to successfully separate the warring parties and keep the peace as part of critical stabilization. However, the international community has not been as successful in sustainable stabilization as neither Bosnia nor Kosovo have developed to the point where international forces can withdraw.[195]

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[191] Spencer, Metta. *The Lessons of Yugoslavia.* 2000. Pg. 351
[192] Based on interviews by author conducted in Sarajevo, Bosnia
[193] General Nash, William. To author. March 7, 2013.
[194] Dobbins, et al. *America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq.* Pg. xxiii
[195] Carp. Mihai. To author. January 24, 2013. NATO Headquarters.

CHAPTER 3

CASE STUDY - IRAQ

Military operations alone cannot defeat an insurgency because only economic development and political action can address most sources of disaffection. If military operations are not conducted consistent with political objectives or occur without economic development, they are certain to alienate the population further, reduce the amount of intelligence available to US and Iraqi security forces, and strengthen rather than weaken the enemy.

- Major General H.R. McMaster[196]

THE LEAD-UP AND 2003-2006

PLANNING AND LACK-THEREOF

Planning for the initial use of military force in Iraq was a long, iterative process; so was planning for what to do afterwards - The Future of Iraq Project.[197] It was ignored. In order to truly understand the Iraq War and the devastating decisions made, one must first understand the ideology and logic that guided the highest levels of the Bush administration including the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense, the National Security Adviser, and others. Understanding this initial philosophy is important because it led to seemingly illogical decisions made throughout the course of war.

"Plan A" within the Bush Administration, despite numerous arguments made against it, assumed that "the Iraqi government would be quickly decapitated, security would be turned over to remnants of the Iraqi police and army, international troops would soon arrive, and most American forces would leave within a few months. There was no Plan B."[198]

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[196] Kaplan. *The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War.* Pg. 171
[197] A 13 volume interagency study of post-war Iraq
[198] Packer, George. *Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq.* Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 2006. Pg. 118

Secretary Rumsfeld and President Bush did not want to get bogged down in securing and stabilizing Iraq after Baghdad fell, so they did not make plans to do so.[199]

To understand how and why the USG enacted the policies it did in Iraq, one must first understand why the country went to war and what the USG aimed to achieve.[200] Because the Bush Administration sincerely, though naively, thought that the strategy of "shock and awe" would result in a stable democratic state and that life would quickly return to normalcy, it did not prepare nor allocate USG resources for alternative post-conflict realities. This mindset and pretense of a very quick "in-and-out" operation would set the United States down a trajectory that could be thought of as shooting itself in the foot - crippling efforts, and unable to leave, without the resources necessary to meet the challenges that reality demanded. As retired Colonel Paul Hughes, the chief of staff of the US Institute of Peace, and many others have expressed, "To have a clear strategy, you have to have a clear end-state. How are you going to get there? You have to have a clear idea of the resources you need to get there." Policymakers in the Bush administration had an unrealistic end-state in mind and thus their strategy and capacities to reach that goal did not reflect the realities that the United States would face.

Though the State Department had led an interagency project over 18 months called the Future of Iraq Project, a 13 volume study of post-war Iraq, the Pentagon ignored it.[201] Planning for what to do in Iraq after "victory" did not begin until January 20, 2003 – two months before the invasion of Iraq when the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) was established under the leadership of Jay Garner, a retired Lieutenant

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[199] Kaplan, Fred. *The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War.* Simon and Schuster. NY. 2013 Pg. 59
[200] Col. Hughes, Paul. To author. January 10, 2013.
[201] Ferguson, Charles. *No End in Sight. 2007*

General. However, ORHA was given virtually no resources and had to start its planning process essentially from scratch. ORHA had a civilian staff of approximately 120[202] when it entered Iraq on April 19, 2003. As a point of comparison, there are 84 "top-most administrators" in the top two pay grades at Princeton University.[203]

<u>MISSION ACCOMPLISHED?</u>

An often-overlooked mistake in assessments of initial US efforts in Iraq is the USG's failure to sign an official end of hostilities with the enemy military or political forces until 2008.[204] Such an agreement is paramount to "post-conflict" efforts. Simply declaring "Mission Accomplished" from the deck of an aircraft carrier does not mean that enemy forces have agreed to surrender and cooperate. Nonetheless, immediately following the fall of Saddam Hussein's military, the country reached a major crossroads. The operation in Iraq could have been successful (it was not yet doomed), or at least disaster could have been avoided if the immediate "post-war" period was handled properly.[205] Catastrophic decisions, lack of preparation, people, and resources made failure almost assured. Among these deficiencies were: 1) too few troops to secure territory 2) no formal end of hostilities 3) no effort to halt looting 4) no declaration of martial law 5) under-resourced civilian organization 6) de-Ba'athification 7) disbanding the Iraqi army, security, and intelligence infrastructure and 8) sectarianizing Iraq.

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[202] Ambassador Bodine, Barbara. "Preemptive Post-conflict Stabilization and Reconstruction." *Commanding Heights: Strategic Lessons From Complex Operations."* Center for Complex Operations. Pg. 32

[203] Tilghman, Shirley. President, Princeton University. Email correspondence, December 3, 2012.

[204] Col. Hughes, Paul. To author. January 10, 2013.

[205] Because no official end of hostilities was signed, I shall consider "post-war" to be the fall of the Saddam Hussein Statue in Baghdad on April 9, 2003 the symbolic fall of Saddam Hussein's regime.

SECURITY AND LAW AND ORDER

Law and order, enforced by the Ba'ath regime before the war, evaporated into anarchy in the wake of US operations. With no police and recently released prisoners, mass looting broke out, fostering chaos. Elements within ORHA had created a list of sites of governmental, historical, or religious significance to be protected; the only site protected by the military was the Ministry of Oil, which was not on the list.[206] There was a disconnect between the military and ORHA that proved devastating in the early days of "post-war" Iraq. This can largely be attributed to the fact that the military and senior Defense Department officials wanted to run the war their way, contrary to others' advice and offers of assistance. Though the situation in Iraq deteriorated and lawlessness spread rapidly, the military did not establish martial law – a critical mistake. To declare martial law would have belied the pretense of the invasion as "liberators not occupiers" and would have formalized US obligation under international laws governing occupation as well as international customary practice. To fulfill these obligations would have demanded resources the US leadership was not willing to commit. Soldiers watched looting all around them – knowing they could stop it, but they were ordered not to.

When General McKiernan[207] and Ambassador Bodine[208] met a group of Iraqi business leaders, elements from Ahmed Chalabi's[209] militia – trained, equipped, uniformed and flown into Iraq by the US government, who had waved McKiernan and Bodine through a checkpoint - carjacked the host's car and driver during the meeting as a blatant display of impunity and immunity. The next day, McKiernan announced martial law to get all militias - including Chalabi's – under control or disestablished. Ironically, the Iraqis had pled for

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[206] Packer, George. *Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq.*
[207] Commander of all allied ground forces in Iraq
[208] Then the top ranking State Department official in Iraq
[209] A controversial Iraqi politician who was given support from the Bush Administration

martial law during the meeting. The Pentagon struck down the order, leaving General Franks [210] and General McKiernan hanging. Had the military established martial law, proactively stopped the looting, and established law and order, the descent into chaos might have been avoided, as a commitment to the restoration of law and order would have indicated to all Iraqis that the US truly was on the side of ordinary Iraqis. Maintaining law and order would be a sine quo non of stability. Instead, the Bush administration was unwilling to break with its initial philosophy that had determined the manner in which the war would be conducted.

US and coalition forces were the only units that could have maintained public order and prevented Iraq from plunging into ethnic cleansing or civil war; [211] Iraq was not capable of providing security and law and order on its own. The Iraqi Interior Ministry's police served as death squads who kidnapped and assassinated Sunnis in broad daylight. Instead of training the Iraqi police to "serve and protect" the people and establish trust with the community, Iraqi police were trained to pursue insurgents. This is unsurprising given that the US military (instead of international police forces) trained the Iraqi police. Thus, the Iraqi police became militarized and feared by the people.

TROOP STRENGTH

The military never had the troop strength to enforce martial law in any event. General Anthony Zinni, the former CENTCOM Commander, had contingency plans to invade Iraq that called for 300,000 troops.[212] To help determine what US troop levels should be in Iraq, General Shinseki[213] told a congressional hearing on February 25, 2003 that the

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[210] Then CENTCOM commander
[211] Kaplan. *The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War.* Pg. 180
[212] General Zinni in interview "They've Screwed Up" *60 Minutes.* February 11, 2009.
[213] The former commander of NATO SFOR in Bosnia

U.S. would need "something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers… We are talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that is fairly significant with the ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems. It takes a significant ground force presence to maintain a safe and secure environment." [214] Paul Wolfowitz [215] famously responded, "It is hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam's security forces and his army—hard to imagine."[216] When President Bush declared the end of major combat in May 2003, 150,000 U.S. troops occupied Iraq along with 23,000 non-US coalition forces, [217] at best half of what most military planners thought prudent.

The estimated population of Iraq in 2003 was 25 million. There was one troop for every 145 inhabitants, or fewer than 7 soldiers for every 1000 Iraqis. The graph below compares troop levels in post-conflict situations. Troop levels in Iraq were similar to those in Somalia and Haiti (two unsuccessful stabilization operations), but less than half of the levels in Bosnia and Kosovo, which were largely successful critical stability operations.

Soldiers per Thousand Inhabitants at the End of the Conflict

Figure 8[218]

[214] Rose, Gideon. *How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle.* Simon and Schuster. 2010. Pg. 262

[215] Then Deputy Defense Secretary

[216] Paul Wolfowitz to the House Budget Committee on February 27, 2003

[217] "Coalition Forces in Iraq" Procon.org http://usiraq.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000677

[218] Dobbins, et. al. *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq.*

Lack of forces and martial law immediately after the fall of Saddam's government were costly mistakes caused by an erroneous philosophy that led to chaos throughout the country. There was an alternative. The Iraqi military remained largely intact and was willing to work with coalition forces.[219] Such an increase in available resources to the total number of coalition troops could have been instrumental in stabilizing Iraq. The process of DDR had originally been planned under ORHA's leader General Jay Garner; however, when L. Paul Bremmer replaced Garner and recast ORHA into the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), he issued CPA Order Number 2, which disbanded the Iraqi security forces. It failed to distinguish between security elements tied to the regime (e.g. Republican Guard) and elements that were more national and respected (e.g. the army) and sent hundreds of thousands of armed men into the streets, unemployed. Five days later, the first roadside bomb killed American soldiers. As Colonel Paul Hughes, the *de facto* liaison between ORHA and the Iraqi military claims, "This came about, without a doubt, as a result of the disbanding of the Iraqi military." [220] As later shown during the 2007 surge and counterinsurgency doctrine, this partnership with the local population is critical to ensuring security.

The United States should have created a system to retain the Iraqi military's structure and accountability while preventing it from engaging in security operations in the short term. Soldiers could have become members of a stabilization and reconstruction force, thereby continuing to employ and pay individuals to help reconstruct Iraqi infrastructure. Such a program likely would have been important psychologically to the soldiers in the Iraqi army,

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[219] Ferguson, Charles. *No End in Sight. 2007*
[220] Ibid.

as they would retain a sense of purpose and military organization.[221] This would have prevented tens of thousands of armed men from becoming unemployed overnight while retaining the military's structure for the future, kept arms off the streets, and helped to provide intelligence on weapons caches. This process would have cost approximately $2,740,000 (137,000 soldiers x $20[222] each) – a negligible sum that could have saved thousands of lives and billions of dollars in the long-term – and the USG did not even have to pay; the Saudis offered to fund the initiative.

Another colossal mistake was CPA Order Number 1, which sacked virtually the entire Iraqi civil service. Once again, instead of using entities to work with US and coalition forces, the CPA fired those critical to running the government. This elimination of a bureaucratic infrastructure was an unnecessary misstep that should have been avoided; its implications were quite predictable. CPA Order Number 1 stated, among other things:

> Full members of the Ba`ath Party holding the ranks of 'Udw Qutriyya (Regional Command Member), 'Udw Far' (Branch Member). 'Udw Shu'bah (Section Member), and 'Udw Firqah (Group Member) (together, "Senior Party Members") are herby removed from their positions and banned from future employment in the public sector. These Senior Party Members shall be evaluated for criminal conduct or threat to the security of the Coalition. Those suspected of criminal conduct shall be investigated and, if deemed a threat to security or a flight risk, detained or placed under house arrest.
>
> Individuals holding positions in the top three layers of management in every national government ministry, affiliated corporations and other government institutions (e.g., universities and hospitals) shall be interviewed for possible affiliation with the Ba`ath Party, and subject to investigation for criminal conduct and risk to security. Any such persons detained to be full members of the Ba`ath Party shall be removed from their employment. This includes those holding the more junior ranks of 'Udw (member) and 'Udw Amil (Active member), as well as those determined to be senior party members.[223]

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[221] Colonel Sandahl, Erik. NATO. To author. Jan. 24, 2013. NATO Headquarters
[222] Colonel Hughes, Paul. To author. January 10, 2013.
[223] Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 1, De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society

As a result of this order, individuals from all different walks of life and employment were sacked, angered, and cut out of the Iraqi reconstruction process.

In the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, the CPA decided not to support the Iraqi State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) because they were not profitable. These factories and agencies employed roughly an eighth of the nation's workforce and constituted 90 percent of Iraq's industrial capacity. [224] This sudden loss of Iraq's industrial core and many essential public utilities, which were "the sole providers of essential public utilities and the leading providers of a large number of public goods and services as well as of consumer and industrial products,"[225] caused unemployment to spike, prevented the dispersion of essential services, and effectively crippled the economy.[226]

Iraq's combined underemployment / unemployment rate of 60 percent in the years following the invasion suggests that the private sector was too weak to supply the job creation necessary to compensate for the loss of the SOEs and to keep disaffected Iraqis off the streets.[227] Thus, what may appear to be an inefficient use of resources— in this case, providing support to poorly functioning SOEs—could actually have been necessary in the short run to prevent the security environment from spiraling out of control. By cutting essential services and sending hundreds of thousands into the streets, without dignity or ability to provide for their families, the CPA severely complicated attempts at long-term

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[224] Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), p. 90. In Harrison, Todd; Meyers, John. Contracting Under Fire: Lessons Learned in Wartime Contracting and Expeditionary Economics. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. December 18, 2012

[225] Ibid.

[226] Harrison, Todd; Meyers, John. Contracting Under Fire: Lessons Learned in Wartime Contracting and Expeditionary Economics. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. December 18, 2012

[227] Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Full Impact of Department of Defense Program to Restart State-owned Enterprises Difficult to Estimate (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 30, 2009), Pg. i.

economic reconstruction.[228]

Early elections in Iraq further added to instability and delegitimized the newly formed Iraqi government. For instance, the January 2005 parliamentary elections in Iraq resulted in a near total Sunni boycott. The Muslim Scholars Association, composed of approximately 3000 Sunni clerics, called for an election boycott to protest the US assault on Fallujah and the continued US occupation of Iraq. In contrast, the leading Shi'a cleric, Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, issued an edict that called voting a religious duty.[229] Unsurprisingly, the Sunni parties earned merely five of 275 parliamentary seats, depriving them of a fair share in the constitutional drafting process.[230]

Each of these decisions, let alone the combination of all of them, proved catastrophic. Had these mistakes not been made, it is plausible that US efforts in Iraq could have succeeded. Instead, Iraq became a land of chaos, looting, kidnappings, and killings.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VIOLENCE AND SERVICES

General Peter Chiarelli[231] and his aide-de-camp Major Patrick Michaelis conducted an analysis pinpointing the locations of all violent incidents in the 1st Cavalry's area of operation in Baghdad. Their analysis demonstrated that the areas with the heaviest violence were the same areas with the gravest shortfalls in services including electricity, water, sewage, sanitation, and trash pickup.[232] A new strategy was needed to address the real root of the

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[228] Harrison & Meyers. "Contracting Under Fire: Lessons Learned in Wartime Contracting and Expeditionary Economics."

[229] Walker, Harold and Clark, Terence. Elections In Iraq - 30 January 2005: An Assessment. *Asian Affairs*. Volume 36, Issue 2, 2005.

[230] Frankel, Matthew. "Threaten but Participate: Why Election Boycotts Are a Bad Idea" *Foreign Policy at Brookings*. March 2010. Available online at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/2/election%20boycotts%20frankel/02_election_boycotts_frankel.pdf

[231] Former Vice Chief of Staff of US Army

[232] Kaplan. *The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War*. Pg. 185

violence and the center of gravity for the insurgency. The Iraqi government could not be effective or seen as legitimate until the population felt secure.[233] Security was a precondition for political settlement and effective political decision-making. The American army was taking the wrong approach and the Iraqi security forces were not capable.[234]

THE SURGE AND COIN

REASONS FOR COIN

Having used a different approach than most in Iraq - one that worked quite well in Mosul based on classic counterinsurgency theory - General David Petraeus, along with Lieutenant Colonel John Nagel and many others including non-military personnel[235] wrote the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (COIN) in 2006. In 2007 the military began to implement COIN, shifting strategy dramatically. As the manual states, "Long-term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government's rule. […] Success requires the government to be accepted as legitimate by most of that uncommitted middle, which also includes passive supporters of both sides […] Because of the ease of sowing disorder, it is usually not enough for counterinsurgents to get 51 percent of popular support; a solid majority is often essential. However, a passive populace may be all that is necessary for a well-supported insurgency to seize political power."[236] The manual further argues that military action can address the symptoms of a loss of legitimacy (such as insecurity) in part by eliminating insurgents, but longer-term success requires restoring legitimacy to the host-nation government.

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[233] Ibid. Pg. 192
[234] Ibid. Pg. 198
[235] Including the Carr Center for Human Rights at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government
[236] Petraeus, David; Amos, James. *U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual.* Dec. 2006. Section 1-108

As the COIN manual instructs, US strategy needed to shift to protecting the population rather than attacking the enemy even when that meant risking the safety of the forces in the short-term.[237] Additionally, American commanders had been turning over insurgent-cleared areas to Iraqi forces too quickly instead of staying in place longer to both clear *and* hold.[238] To improve relations with the Iraqi people and form a sense of trust, COIN forces began to live among the people rather than in military bunkers. They also established dozens of joint security stations and patrol bases manned by coalition and Iraqi forces in Baghdad and other areas throughout Iraq.[239]

A TURNING POINT

Figure 9: Estimated Number of Iraqi Civilian Fatalities by Month[240]

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[237] Ibid. Section 1-149

[238] Kaplan. *The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War.* Pg. 240

[239] General Petraeus, David, Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq. Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq. 10-11 September 2007.

[240] "Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq." Brookings Institution. www.brookings.edu/iraqindex

Ethnic cleansing within Iraq in 2006 led to a peak in violence as the situation on the ground deteriorated as demonstrated in figure 9. [241] As COIN was implemented in 2007 and US troops emphasized protection of the population over force protection, Iraqi civilian casualties declined while US fatalities increased in the short-term; however, US fatalities soon declined rapidly as well (see figures 9 and 10).

Figure 10[242]

The new tactics, strategy, and partnership with the Iraqis likely contributed to this decrease in violence. As these new strategies were put in place over time, figures 9 and 10 show compelling evidence that the implementation of COIN, combined with other factors described below, succeeded in its first objective - restoring security (a symptom of a lack of government legitimacy). However, if these strategies had been implemented at the outset of post-war Iraq, security may not have spiraled out of control.

This shift in strategy was by no means the only major development that led to a decrease in violence. The US gained a valuable partner, which arose independent of the

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[241] According to the UN, violent civilian deaths in July and August 2006 reached 6,599 an average of over 100 per day.[241] For the first half of 2007, violence did not decrease – roadside bombs remained between 400 and 500 per month and 200 suicide bombers per month.

[242] "Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq." Brookings Institution. www.brookings.edu/iraqindex

surge and COIN – the Sons of Iraq. Initially known as al-Anbar Awakening, this movement made its appearance in the summer of 2006 when local sheikhs, who had grown disillusioned with al Qaeda (which had ravaged the province during the past two-and-a-half years), cooperated with the coalition forces, as they shared a mutual interest and common enemy. [243] This group took on the task of providing local security (it did not yet exist), supported by funding from the United States. These armed militiamen agreed to stop shooting at coalition soldiers and start cooperating instead; they patrolled neighborhoods, found weapons caches, and fought against al Qaeda.[244] The Awakening movement dramatically changed the security situation in Anbar with monthly attacks dropping from nearly 1,350 in October 2006 to just over 200 in August 2007.[245]

By working with the Sons of Iraq, the United States was able to build partners rather than enemies and gained valuable intelligence on the insurgency, IEDs, and weapons caches.[246] Furthermore, on August 29, 2007, Muqtada al-Sadr issued an order to his Mahdi army to stand down for six months. By using COIN and provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), the surge encouraged new relationships among Iraqis and between coalition forces based on trust, cooperation, and mutual interest.

COIN'S SHORTFALLS

While this new strategy was a key component in stemming the violence in Iraq in 2007, as the COIN manual explains, low levels of violence alone do not determine success. A vast majority of the host nation's population must perceive its government to be

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[243] Wilbanks, Mark; Karsh, Efraim. "How the Sons of Iraq Stabilized Iraq." *Middle East Quarterly.* Vol. 17 Issue 4. 2010

[244] Kaplan. *The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War.* Pg. 262

[245] Wilbanks, Mark; Karsh, Efraim. "How the Sons of Iraq Stabilized Iraq."

[246] Lt. Gen. Odierno, "The Surge in Iraq: One Year Later" The Heritage Foundation. March 13, 2008. (http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/the-surge-in-iraq-one-year-later)

legitimate in order for the counterinsurgency to succeed. This sense of legitimacy was not achieved in Iraq.

The decrease in violence was not supplemented by a new loyalty to the Iraqi government – a critical component of COIN doctrine. According to one Gallup poll, only 28% of Iraqis approved of their government in 2008, even after levels of violence reached new lows.[247] This number did not increase much, reaching only 41% in 2010,[248] far shy of the "solid majority"[249] called for in the COIN manual. A report produced by the National Defense University explains:

> Progress in reducing violence and winning the fight against the insurgents was not matched by progress politically. In fact, in late 2007, the Iraqi government almost collapsed. Prime Minister Maliki had indicated an unwillingness or inability to create a genuine coalition government with real power-sharing among the different ethno-sectarian groups, and those who were disenfranchised got tired of waiting for him to take any forward steps.[250]

The disapproval of the government was not the only bad sign in Iraq. As Figure 11 demonstrates, even after the surge, approximately 50% of Iraqis polled said that their life was either "quite bad" or "very bad." Though this was an improvement from the previous year, it was not significant enough to make a substantial difference in building confidence among the population. When compared to figure 9, figure 11 indicates that quality of life did not improve at a rate proportionate to the dramatic decrease in violence seen in 2007.

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[247] "Iraqis More Approving of Own Leadership Than of U.S." Gallup. Aug. 26, 2010. http://www.gallup.com/poll/142670/Iraqis-Approving-Own-Leadership.aspx
[248] Ibid.
[249] Petraeus, David; Amos, James. *U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual.* Section 1-108
[250] Knowlton, William. "The Surge: General Petraeus and the Turnaround in Iraq" Industrial College of the Armed Forces Case Study. Dec. 2010. http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/icaf-case-study/icaf_casestudy-1.pdf)

How good are things in your life these day?

Figure 11[251]

As figure 12 indicates, electricity fluctuated from January 2005 to January 2008 but did not improve markedly until fall, 2008 - nearly two years after the beginning of the surge and five after the invasion. Though repairing and restoring the electric infrastructure is by no means a small feat, this evidence further supports the argument that even though security was improving in 2007, other aspects of Iraqi lives were not. Had the Iraqi army been trained into a reconstruction force as part of a DDR process, it could have been instrumental in rebuilding infrastructure, including the electricity grid – helping the daily lives of Iraqis. It is not the job of the US military to rebuild a national electricity grid; rather, adequately supported civilians with expertise should be in charge of such efforts, and they should use local civilian labor to increase local employment and set the foundations for a sustainable economy.

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[251] News/BBC/ARD German TV/NHK (Japan) Poll. Feb. 12-20, 2008
http://usiraq.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000673

Figure 12[252] [253]

ECONOMICS

As figure 13 further indicates, two years after the beginning of the surge in Iraq, approximately 70% of Iraqis polled said that economic conditions were either the same as the previous year or getting worse. Even as security improved after the surge, perceptions of the economy actually got worse over time rather than better.

Figure 13[254]

[252] "Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq." Brookings Institution. www.brookings.edu/iraqindex

[253] Data for March & April 2008 unavailable

[254] "Economic Negativity Abounds in Iraq" Gallup. http://www.gallup.com/poll/157070/economic-negativity-abounds-iraq.aspx?ref=more

Figure 14[255]

The improved security achieved in 2007 met the necessary threshold to begin to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Figure 14 shows that in 2007 as COIN and the surge were implemented and as the above discussed political developments occurred, FDI underwent tremendous growth, bringing in numerous investor countries. The following list outlines the top 10 countries that invested in Iraq in 2010: Turkey (35%), Italy (12.5%), France (10%), South Korea (8%), USA (4.7%), China (4.1%), UAE (3%), Canada (3%), UK (3%), Australia (2%), Russia (2%), Jordan (1.5%) followed by 24 other countries.[256] The figures below break down these investments by sector and region. The data indicates that FDI has been spent primarily on real estate in Baghdad rather than on inputs that could lead to a more sustainable economy. Thus, the improved security situation in Iraq could (if handled properly) have led to significant economic growth and employment. Unfortunately, as Figure 13 illustrates, this increase in FDI did not succeeded in giving optimism to Iraqis about their own economy.

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[255] Dunia Frontier Consultants. "Foreign Commercial Activity in Iraq: 2010 Year in Review." http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Dunia-2010-Foreign-Commercial-Activity-in-Iraq.pdf
[256] Ibid.

Figure 15[257]

Figure 16[258]

Before Iraqi First, a program that gave increasing opportunity and priority to contracting with local Iraqi businesses to inject money into the local economy and help reduce unemployment, one of the underlying causes of the insurgency, the United States allotted a mere $74 million to Iraqi firms.[259] Once given the chance to compete through Iraqi First, local firms proved successful in winning development contracts. In the first year of the

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[257] Dunia Frontier Consultants. "Foreign Commercial Activity in Iraq: 2010 Year in Review." http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Dunia-2010-Foreign-Commercial-Activity-in-Iraq.pdf
[258] Ibid.
[259] "Joint Contracting Command Iraq-Afghanistan Will Participate at Iraq Gathering, May 6th, Amman," available online at: http://www.i-acci.org/story_detail.php?id=1251, accessed on June 8, 2012.

program, contracts with local Iraqi firms increased from $74 million to $1.88 billion (a 2,500% increase) with continued growth the following year.[260] While this marked a drastic improvement, according to the Center for Complex Operations, "The Coalition did not stimulate local business in Iraq and Afghanistan. Only a small portion of the billions of dollars spent in either country went to local businesses and thus did not serve to stimulate the economy in a sustainable manner."[261]

AN ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE & VARYING IMPACTS

A wide range of US government actors provided development assistance in Iraq with varying degrees of success. The US military allocated roughly $3 billion through its Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), which was allocated in small amounts without layers in subcontracting.[262] This kept more money, even if it was siphoned off, in the country rather than elsewhere where it would not have multiplying economic effects.[263] In contrast, non-CERP projects were often quite large, typically infrastructure for water and sanitation, or transportation.[264] USAID also provided small-scale aid funds in Iraq, through two main programs, the $560 million Community Action Program (CAP) and the $644 million Community Stabilization Program (CSP).[265] According to the analysis of *Modest, Secure and Informed: Successful Development in Conflict Zones*, "While none of those programs (non-CERP large or small, CAP or USAID spending in general) show effects that are statistically different from zero, with the exception of CSP, they are all statistically less

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[260] Harrison & Meyers. "Contracting Under Fire: Lessons Learned in Wartime Contracting and Expeditionary Economics.

[261] "Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan for a Potential Post-Qafhafi Libya: Workshop Report" July 15, 2011. Center for Complex Operations. Pg. 11

[262] Eli Berman, Joseph Felter, Jacob N. Shapiro, Erin Troland "Modest, Secure, and Informed: Successful Development in Conflict Zones." February 2013.

[263] Shapiro, Jacob. To author. March 15, 2013

[264] Berman, Felter, Shapiro, & Troland "Modest, Secure, and Informed: Successful Development in Conflict Zones."

[265] Ibid.

violence-reducing than is small CERP (at α=.05), including large-CERP."[266] Small-scale CERP projects proved most violence reducing. Their analysis further shows that spending in Iraq was more violence-reducing as the number of battalions per district increased.[267] In Iraq, the USG overemphasized heavy infrastructure: "Reconstruction came to be defined as construction [by US firms]," one participant in a Center for Complex Operations Workshop said. The USG devoted $18 billion to heavy infrastructure in the early years in Iraq, while only $100 million was allocated for governance.[268]

In addition to the size and targeting of development projects, the expertise provided by PRTs to both small and large CERP and CSP projects has been statistically proven to reduce violence as the development programs are enhanced.[269] Small CERP projects are almost three times as violence-reducing when a PRT is present.[270]

As a point of comparison, under the National Solidarity Program in Afghanistan, certain communities formed their own Community Development Council (a group of village leaders) through secret ballot, universal-suffrage elections. With the input of local villagers and the advice of development experts, these councils created a prioritized list of economic projects. The Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development then distributed block grants of up to $60,000 to these councils.[271] Villagers provided the labor.[272] An MIT study conducted a large-scale, randomized controlled trial across 500 villages in which half

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[266] For the full analysis, see Ibid.

[267] Ibid.

[268] "Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan for a Potential Post-Qadhafi Libya: Workshop Report" July 15, 2011. Center for Complex Operations. Pg. 13

[269] Berman, Felter, Shapiro, & Troland. "Modest, Secure, and Informed: Successful Development in Conflict Zones."

[270] Ibid.

[271] Beath, Andrew; Christia, Fotini and Enikolopov, Ruben. "Winning Hearts and Minds? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan," Working Paper No. 2011-14, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Political Science Department, September 2011, p. 9.

[272] Harrison & Meyers. "Contracting Under Fire: Lessons Learned in Wartime Contracting and Expeditionary Economics."

were randomly selected to participate in the National Solidarity Program (NSP) and half were not. Figures 17, 18, and 19 demonstrate that while NSP did not improve actual unemployment by a statistically significant margin, NSP positively affected villagers' perception of economic well-being, future economic welfare, safety, and attitudes towards the government[273] by statistically significant margins among both men and women in villages that were part of the NSP trial. [274] As demonstrated in figure 18, NSP also improved attitudes toward local and national elected officials, NGO personnel, and ISAF soldiers.

Figure 17[275]

[273] Beath, Christia & Enikolopov, "Winning Hearts and Minds? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan," Pg. 4.
[274] Harrison & Meyers. "Contracting Under Fire: Lessons Learned in Wartime Contracting and Expeditionary Economics."
[275] Ibid. Pg. 23

Attitudes Toward the Government

Figure 18[276]

Perceptions of Violence

Figure 19[277]

NSP was widely hailed and considered a "pathway to success."[278] Though statistical evidence shows that NSP improved locals' attitudes and perceptions, this alone does not necessarily lead to overall mission success. The NSP spread to 29,474 villages in nearly all of Afghanistan's districts and distributed $973 million in block grants, much of it funded by the United States.[279] The program can be credited to have built schools, labor-saving water pumps, and irrigation networks.[280] Such programs should be replicated in future stabilization operations as they have been proven to improve attitudes not only towards the economy but also towards the government, helping to foster a sense of government legitimacy - something that an outside force cannot impose. Programs such as NSP may help to solve this major challenge.

However, it must be noted that a minimal threshold of security is necessary for programs such as NSP to succeed, as further supported by the analysis of Shapiro et al.[281] The data from the two most violent provinces included in the study show that violence persisted despite the introduction of the NSP.[282] The program did not have the same effect on economic perceptions, attitudes toward the government, and the security environment in places where the level of violence was already high. Therefore, a baseline of security must be met before NSP-type programs or other small-scale development projects such as CERP

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[278] John A. Nagl, Andrew M. Exum and Ahmed A. Humayun, A Pathway to Success in Afghanistan: The National Solidarity Program (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, March 2009), p. 2; and Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia and Ruben Enikolopov, "Winning Hearts and Minds? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan," Working Paper No. 2011-14, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Political Science Department, September 2011, p. 9.

[279] Ibid. Pg. 9.

[280] Ibid. Pg. 2.

[281] Berman, Felter, Shapiro, & Troland. "Modest, Secure, and Informed: Successful Development in Conflict Zones."

[282] Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia and Ruben Enikolopov, "Winning Hearts and Minds? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan," Working Paper No. 2011-14, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Political Science Department, September 2011

should be expanded. [283] As NSP and other local, small-scale programs create a positive feedback-loop, security forces can relocate to the more violent areas to provide the baseline of security necessary for development projects to succeed.

KEY LESSONS

WRONG STRATEGY; BAD RESOURCING

The Administration, despite expert testimony to the contrary, adopted an approach that was blind to the realities that US forces would face in Iraq. As a result of such ignorance and misperceived end-states, the forces sent were only prepared for the end-state envisioned by the Administration rather than what they faced in reality. In Iraq for instance, "an economic plan was not developed because planners did not think it would be necessary. […] During OIF, U.S. Central Command was focused on the near fight and current operations."[284]

RULE OF LAW

In future stability operations, power vacuums and anarchy must be prevented by declaring martial law and/or using constabulary forces. Without filling security vacuums, looting and chaos can ensue, further destabilizing a country.

A capable, well-trained police force is necessary to enforce rule of law in the long-term. Such a force should not be feared by the population but must operate under the principle of "serve and protect," building local trust and using minimal force. In Iraq and Afghanistan, police were trained by the military as "little soldiers" and thrown into offensive

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[283] Harrison & Meyers. "Contracting Under Fire: Lessons Learned in Wartime Contracting and Expeditionary Economics."
[284] "Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan for a Potential Post-Qafhafi Libya: Workshop Report" July 15, 2011. Center for Complex Operations. Pg. 10

operations against insurgents.[285] Therefore, to avoid the militarization of police, police forces must be trained by other police forces.

LIMITATIONS OF COIN

The surge and implementation of COIN were effective in achieving critical stability and curbing the violence that had spiraled out of control. If COIN had existed and been used with appropriate troop levels in 2003 instead of 2007, the insurgency may have been prevented or at least mitigated. The surge provided enough troops to *clear* and *hold* more than one area at a time.[286] However, the surge and COIN were not successful in addressing sustainable stability through systems-building. Counterinsurgency operations conducted by the military must be accompanied by civilian efforts to improve locals' daily lives and provide opportunities to establish a legitimate, functioning government.

The Iraqi government was given numerous tools and resources to utilize, but ultimately their legitimacy could not be determined or even ensured by the US. The Iraqi government was not an ideal partner for stabilization, as the US often had to protect Iraqis from their own government. Successful stability operations will thus demand willing and capable local partners.

ECONOMICS

Small development projects in secure areas with PRT expertise and local ownership are most effective. Increased troop strength is also more violence-reducing with the addition of small-scale development spending. The operational changes that accompanied the surge, the increased integration with communities, and the focus on protection of the local population instead of targeting insurgents gave commanders better insight into the needs of

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[285] Perito. *Getting it Right: Recommendations for American Policy.*
[286] Kaplan. *The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War.* Pg. 269

local communities, improving their ability to distribute funding effectively. [287]

The closing of the Iraqi SOEs proved devastating to the country's economy and distribution of essential services. While inefficient in the short-term, a more gradual shift would have stabilized the economy and prevented the further increase in unemployment. Moreover, little emphasis was paid to building Iraq's economic sustainability. Instead, most economic assistance went into large infrastructure projects. Future efforts should incorporate programs similar to Iraqi First to help spark local businesses, which drive the economy in a sustainable manner.

STABLE GOVERNANCE

Take advantage of existing local security and bureaucratic infrastructure rather than eliminate it. CPA order number 1 effectively forced ORHA to rebuild the entire Iraqi civil service from scratch. CPA order number 2 disbanded all Iraqi security forces without making distinctions between institutions loyal to Iraq vs. the regime. In the future, those in charge of such decisions must think about the broader systemic implications of their actions rather than the immediate gains. Instead of effectively rebuilding state institutions after sacking the vast majority (if not entirely) of the institution, international actors should slowly reform the institution to keep people employed, maintain their functions, and slowly weed out the individuals who need to be removed.

To ensure long-term political stability, a constitution-writing process should take place prior to national elections. In the case of Iraq, the 2005 parliamentary elections resulted in a near total Sunni boycott, which later prevented Sunni's from a fair share in the

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[287] Harrison & Meyers. "Contracting Under Fire: Lessons Learned in Wartime Contracting and Expeditionary Economics."

constitution-drafting process. The sectarianization of Iraq had numerous implications that haunt Iraq to this day.

CONCLUSION

It is evident that the implementation of COIN in conjunction with other political factors drastically reduced the level of violence in Iraq and created a much more secure society. PRTs were able to work with local Iraqis to enhance the capacities of the local government by forming stronger partnerships based on trust and mutual interest. Had US efforts incorporated these strategies from the outset, the surge and COIN likely would have succeeded in their broader aims; instead, the US had to play "catch-up" rather than move forward to improve Iraqis' daily lives. Many of the shortcomings of the surge and COIN were associated with the delay of their implementation rather than the strategy itself, which did not even exist until late 2006.

While COIN was successful in reducing violence, it was not successful in the larger mission of the COIN doctrine – legitimizing the host-nation government in the eyes of the vast majority of the population. The United States needed to complement its focus on the surge and COIN with a civilian equivalent to address the issues that the military could not. The USG can give the new Iraqi government technical expertise, guidance, and the opportunity to implement reform and gain legitimacy. Alas, no matter how much effort the United States puts forward, it is up to the host government to attain legitimacy by entering into an agreed upon social contract with its people. It must is not seen as a puppet government or one that only supports one ethnic group - rather it must represent all of its citizens' interests. Though it is not seen as legitimate, the Iraqi government has held onto power and maintained relative stability even after US combat troops withdrew in December

2011. This relative security, despite numerous bombings, may not last in the long-term unless the government becomes more legitimate and improves Iraqis' daily lives.

CHAPTER 4

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

The political object – the original motive for the war – will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires.

- Clausewitz[288]

<u>OVERVIEW</u>

This chapter gathers the lessons learned from the previous case studies as well as existing literature to provide guiding principles to achieve the end states necessary for stability: safe and secure environment, rule of law, social well-being, stable governance, and a sustainable economy (illustrated in figure 20).


Figure 20[289]

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[288] Von Clausewitz, Carl. *On War.* Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton University Press, 1984. Pg. 81

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

CLEAR END-STATE:

Sun Tzu says in *The Art of War,* "Enlightened rulers deliberate upon the plans, and good generals execute them."[290] When policymakers - not the military - decide to engage in stabilization operations, they must base the mission on appropriate end-states, not merely an end to hostilities. Without a clear, realistic goal, it is impossible to derive an appropriate strategy that encompasses a complex intergovernmental and intragovernmental effort. Thus, policymakers must first set clear objectives before devising a strategy that incorporates various organizations that interact collaboratively.[291] [292]

PLAN FIRST, THEN FUND

Before allocating funds and resources to a major reform project, international donors should first - determine an end state, second - devise a strategic plan, third - identify sources of resources, and finally - implement the plan. Budgets must remain flexible to be able to allocate funds as unexpected challenges or opportunities arise. When determining the size of organizations for the host state - such as the police - a realistic assessment should be conducted to determine what the host state can actually sustain. For instance, training too many police and military forces, which for budgetary reasons the state is later forced to fire, not only wastes resources, but can itself be a source of instability.

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[289] Provided by the US Institute of Peace

[290] Sun Tzu. *The Art of War.* Translated by Samuel Griffith. Oxford University Press. Pg. 142

[291] In the Gulf War in 1991, very explicit objectives were clarified in a UN Security Council Resolution, in a Congressional Resolution, and Presidential Directive 54. Once those objectives were met, the mission was over. General Colin Powell (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under President George H.W. Bush and Secretary of State under George W. Bush) has advocated, as part of what has become known as The Powell Doctrine, "When you do find it is necessary to use military force, use it with a clear political objective in mind, and use it for a decisive result." (January 10, 2013 – *Meet the Press)*

[292] Col. Hughes, Paul. To author. Jan. 10, 2013.

WORK MULTILATERALLY AND REGIONALLY

There should be no need for the United States to engage in stabilization operations alone; instead America should always look to work with international partners, be they governments, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, or private actors. Neighboring countries and regional powers suffer most from the immediate consequences of weak states and their potential collapse.[293] Thus any stabilization operation should look to involve neighboring countries[294] as they often have the most at stake, will be seen less as "European colonialists," and have the ability to stay in the area for a longer period of time.[295] However, this must also be balanced against historical tensions, should they exist.

THINK LOCAL

Success in stabilization will depend on the degree to which the local population drives the process. The United States should treat the local population respectfully and gain its trust, be sensitive to local demands, and establish and implement mechanisms for gradual transitions back to full, local sovereignty and control. It must do so while not appearing like the US is not invested in the host nation's success.[296] A transition from US to local control should be smooth and gradual rather than abrupt in order to build competency and confidence.

The US has often failed to understand local cultures, politics, and challenges.[297] Without such understanding, getting locals to have a stake in the reform process is all the

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[293] Eizenstat, Porter, & Weinstein. "Rebuilding Weak States."

[294] Dobbins, James. "Retaining the Lessons of Nation-Building." *Commanding Heights: Strategic Lessons from Complex Operations.* Center for Complex Operations. 2009. Pg. 75-76

[295] Lt. Col. Rafael Saiz. To author. Brussels

[296] Fixdal. *Ways Out of War: Peacemakers in the Middle East and Balkans.* Pg. 214

[297] For instance, of the one thousand US officials in the Baghdad embassy, only 33 spoke Arabic, six fluently. Though language is not directly correlated with cultural understanding, this is an indicator of the ability to interact with locals.

more difficult.[298] The United States has repeatedly failed to deploy military and civilians at all levels (with rare exceptions) with the political skills necessary to work with and influence locals.[299] Understanding local culture is essential to setting realistic expectations and goals, so that an appropriate strategy can be pursued in the first place.[300] This understanding should be supplemented by protecting key historic, cultural, religious, and governmental sites.[301] Over time, protection of these sites should be transferred to local security forces once they develop the necessary capabilities.

<u>START SMALL; BUILD CONFIDENCE AND MOMENTUM</u>

Small, realistic and achievable tasks should be undertaken as soon as possible, be they fixing a local well or maintaining traffic in the streets. According to the Center for Complex Operations,[302] "Providing a predictable environment and tangible benefits to local populations tend to quickly and effectively increase support for the coalition."[303] However, a balance must be struck between providing quick wins and confidence-building measures and taking time to understand the larger context with appropriate analysis and assessment for projects that build sustainability.[304]

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[298] Ibid. Pg. 142
[299] Locher, James. To author. Dec 15, 2012.
Phillips, Rufus. *Fostering Positive Political Change: The Key to Stabilizing Vulnerable States*. Working paper. National Strategy Information Center
[300] Ambassador Herbst, John. To author. Jan. 11, 2013.
[301] Admiral Mullen, Michael. To author. February 28, 2013.
[302] A Congressionally-authorized think tank at the National Defense University tasked with furthering the understanding of complex operations
[303] "Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan for a Potential Post-Qafhafi Libya: Workshop Report" July 15, 2011. Center for Complex Operations.
[304] OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice. 2007 ed. Pg. 16

<u>TACKLE CORRUPTION AT THE ROOT</u>

According to the Afghan Deputy Chief of Mission to India and former Deputy Chief of Mission to Washington, D.C., "Corruption = Authority + Discretion – Accountability."[305] Corruption is the result of individuals in positions of authority with the means and desire to exploit their position for personal gain that are able to do so without punishment due to a lack of accountability. Corruption has a negative affect on every sector and necessary end-state addressed in this paper. It is such a monstrous issue that I cannot go into appropriate depth in this thesis; I shall leave this topic and all its intricacies to others. In general, corruption diminishes the authority of the rule of law, deters investment needed to help societies toward the path of sustainable stability, and can impede political progress and the perceived legitimacy of a government. Corruption must be dealt with at all levels. Though requiring different strategies, both petty corruption and more complex corruption must be tackled. To correct for petty corruption, often driven by police, salaries must first be raised to ensure that police are given adequate means to support their families and thus do not need to rely on corruption for a livelihood.

<u>SAFE AND SECURE ENVIRONMENT</u>

<u>SECURITY AS A MULTIDIMENSIONAL SYSTEM</u>

Currently, donor countries, including the United States, lack a coherent strategy to support security sector reform (SSR) that encompasses the different resources available from across their respective governments. Instead, the US and other international actors continue to take an *ad hoc* approach to SSR, "viewing the different sectors in isolation and not as an

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[305] Haidari, Ashraf. Former Afghan Deputy Chief of Mission to Washington, DC, current Deputy Chief of Mission to India. Facebook Post, March 12, 2013

interconnected system." [306] Donors need to view the local justice and security system as a whole, have a shared understanding of SSR, and work collectively to provide coherent and coordinated support to the host country.[307] Accordingly, the international community should shift its focus from outputs, such as the number of police or military personnel trained, to a focus on the impact of programs and whether they have improved security and access to justice for citizens. [308] In short, consider systems-building over numerical outputs.

<u>REINTEGRATE COMBATANTS THROUGH DDR</u>

The overwhelming importance of security and rule of law in post-conflict situations can justify an initially disproportionate allocation of resources to the justice and security sector. Alas, unless carefully planned out, later cutbacks can themselves be a source of insecurity.

Identifying former combatants as a specific beneficiary group is important and necessary for security considerations. Demobilizing large numbers of soldiers without compensation poses a high security risk to the peace process.[309] Instead of firing large numbers of security personnel, adding to the pool of the country's unemployed, these forces should be slowly transitioned into society by one or a combination of the following methods:

1) Maintain their structure and apply them in reconstruction-oriented tasks
2) Provide adequate severance pay to cushion unemployment and transition
3) Create a program to provide training, education, or seed capital for individuals to enter civilian life in the capacity that they desire

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[306] OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice. 2007 ed.
[307] Ibid.
[308] Ibid.
[309] Sultan Barakat and Alpaslan Özerdem. "Impact of the reintegration of former KLA Combatants on the Post-War Recovery of Kosovo." International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 10, Number 1, Spring/Summer 2005 Pg. 41
http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol10_1/Barakat&Ozerdem_101IJPS.pdf

However, vocational training is only effective if there are adequate employment opportunities in the local labor market. Thus, the reintegration strategy should also contain complementary measures for the demand side of the labor market to help match employers with employees.[310] DDR's success will depend on an adequate private sector and the willingness of former combatants to disarm. These programs should be extended to both former soldiers and insurgents.

FILL SECURITY VACUUMS

Former combatants or extremists tend to exploit security vacuums between area security and rule of law. Such security gaps must be filled, ideally by a constabulary force. To develop this capability, organizational recommendations will be provided in chapter 6.

APPROPRIATE FORCE LEVELS

In stability operations, governmental legitimacy is the objective, local police its primary instrument, and military force its operational enabler.[311]According Kalev Sepp, an expert on counterinsurgency, "Historically, robustness in wartime requires a ratio of 20 police and auxiliaries for each 1,000 civilians."[312] [313] In stabilization operations, it is better to over-estimate than to under-estimate and under-resource. As necessary, military and paramilitary forces can support the police to ensure rule of law;[314] however, they should not replace police.

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[310] Ibid. Pg. 42
[311] Perito. *Getting it Right: Recommendations for American Policy.*
[312] Bruce Hoffman, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq," Washington, D.C., RAND Corp., June 2004. In Sepp, Kalev I. Ph.D. "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency."
[313] Such claims are further supported by figure 8
[314] Sepp, Kalev I. Ph.D. "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency."

APPROPRIATE FORCE, MANDATE, AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Militaries and police have different comparative advantages, and the unique capacities of each must be tailored and deployed to address the specific situation. They are not fungible or interchangeable. In stability operations, the military should create area security and allow the police to do what police do – "win the public for the government and hence to the struggle against insurgent and terrorist violence."[315] While in ideal stability operations, constabulary forces would be deployed simultaneously with military forces - allowing each force to perform its given responsibilities and capabilities - in reality, if the military cannot provide sufficient security to allow constabulary forces or police to maximize their comparative advantage, then they should not be deployed at that time.[316] However, once basic security, not optimal security, is achieved, handoff to international constabulary and (if deemed appropriate – local) police should occur as quickly as possible.

MISSION OVER FORCE PROTECTION

If the United States has deemed it necessary to involve itself in stability operations, efforts should be mission driven and not fear driven. Too much emphasis on protecting US forces can lead to increased civilian casualties, alienating US forces from the population. Force should be used sparingly and only when appropriate, but not at the unnecessary risk to troops – they must be able to take defensive action. In the short term, this could mean putting troops at increased exposure, though it should decrease risk in the long-term. Insurgencies may be a reality or result of stabilization operations; in such cases, emphasis should be placed less on attacking insurgents and more on protecting the local population, as the COIN manual instructs.

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[315] Perito. *Getting it Right: Recommendations for American Policy.*
[316] Ibid.

RULE OF LAW

CIVILIAN LEAD ON SSR

Security Sector Reform (SSR) should be seen as an integral part of ongoing post-conflict and sustainable stabilization efforts.[317] Security sector reform includes not only military and police but also judicial, legal, and penal reform as well. Appropriate civilian counterparts should address these various needs rather than the military, which understandably has very limited (if any) expertise. The State Department should continue to provide policy guidelines and desired end states while the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) should coordinate other departments and non-USG actors to use their expertise to carry out the objectives.

PROTECT THE PEOPLE, NOT THE STATE

Police training in sustainable stabilization operations must focus on correcting what has alienated local populations from the police in the past: "Without exception, in countries where peace-building has been undertaken, the police have served the interests of elites rather than ordinary citizens and have acted illegally, abusively, and for personal gain."[318] The police, which had heretofore been seen as a threat, must become integrated into communities so that the locals can gain a sense of comfort and trust. As this relationship develops, individuals will be less hesitant and fearful of approaching police with problems. From a tactical perspective, such a change can help the police to gather intelligence, often the most powerful tool, to not only combat crime, but to prevent it in the first place.

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[317] OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice. 2007 ed. http://www.oecd.org/development/conflictandfragility/38406485.pdf pg. 116
[318] Perito. *Getting it Right: Recommendations for American Policy.*

<u>START LOCAL AND SIMPLE</u>

Security and rule of law must spread from community to community.[319] Easier or less politically sensitive problems should be tackled first (such as traffic and basic security). This allows for confidence to be built and quick wins achieved within a community so that locals and police integrate, creating a symbiotic relationship. As simple tasks are achieved and security is established, harder security issues can then be considered.[320]

The US should not address issues of law and order only from the top down but rather from the bottom up or a dual approach of high-level reform with lower level instruction.[321] [322] As competencies increase, responsibilities should be gradually transferred to the local organizations. In the interim, international bodies will need to fill the void.

<u>DO NOT MILITARIZE THE POLICE – TRAIN THE POLICE BY POLICE</u>

Policing and training police in post-conflict situations is one of the most important yet difficult tasks.[323] The military and police have very different mindsets on the use of force. A police force abides by the guiding principle of "serve and protect" whereas a military is trained to conquer and/or defend against an enemy using maximal force.[324] It is critical that the police are seen as partners of the people, not an offensive force that should be feared.

Violence and the potential for violence tend to divert peace-enforcers from core policing and push them toward militarized defense. However, this is precisely the time that core policing is needed most to maintain security and law and order. Kalev Sepp explains,

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[319] Tillman, James. To author. February 1, 2013. Department of Justice, Sarajevo
[320]OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice. 2007 ed. Pg. 178 http://www.oecd.org/development/conflictandfragility/38406485.pdf
[321] Initial strategies in Kosovo, for instance, of top down approaches have failed to address the capacity issues of day-to-day challenges. More successful efforts recently in Kosovo have taken the approach of working from the bottom up.
[322] Ruiz, Celine. Interview. January 25, 2013.
[323] Admiral Mullen, Michael. Interview. January 10, 2013.
[324] Tillman, James. To author. February 1, 2013. Department of Justice, Sarajevo

"Constant patrolling by government forces establishes an official presence that enhances security and builds confidence in the government. Patrolling is a basic tenet of policing, and in the last 100 years all successful counterinsurgencies have employed this fundamental security practice."[325] Thus, to prevent the militarization of police, local police should be trained by international police forces (not the military) to instill the principle of "serve and protect."[326]

SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY

SYSTEMIC ELEMENTS

When engaged in a stability operation, the United States and other international actors should not worry about economic growth *per se,* but rather focus on systemic elements that will enable the economy to be self-sustaining.[327] A lack of physical security impedes virtually any economic reconstruction activity. Thus, in order for a sustainable economy to be developed, basic security must be ensured; however this is exceptionally complicated as a weak economy contributes to the deterioration of the security environment, creating a vicious, destructive, and self-reinforcing cycle.[328] Such a cycle must be broken through tackling the various sources of potential collapse simultaneously. Economic development efforts without a baseline of security are virtually useless.

Aside from a basic threshold of security, other elements must also be addressed. For instance a legal system must be able to enforce contracts as a precondition to attract foreign direct investment, which could spark new industries. Deterrents to investment can vary from

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[325] Sepp, Kalev I. Ph.D. "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency." 2005
[326] Tillman, James. To author. February 1, 2013. Department of Justice, Sarajevo
[327] Serwer, Daniel; Thomson, Patricia. "A Framework For Success: International Intervention in Societies Emerging From Conflict."
[328] Harrison & Meyers. "Contracting Under Fire: Lessons Learned in Wartime Contracting and Expeditionary Economics."

corruption to insecure communications networks to bureaucratic red tape. All of these issues must be dealt with to create the conditions for economic sustainability and attract FDI.

LOCAL, SMALL-SCALE PROJECTS

Small development projects funded and managed at the local level should be emphasized over larger, more complicated and expensive infrastructure projects.[329] Empirical evidence[330] shows that small projects are more effective than large projects. Critically, as noted before, a minimal threshold of security must first be established before economic projects can have their full potential impact. Thus, small, labor-intensive projects should be prioritized and locals should be given significant input to determine needs and priorities while developing a sense of ownership. These strategies have proven to enhance non-tangible (psychological) benefits that can positively contribute to systems-building.

Local firms should be given the chance and indeed the priority in winning development contracts. Enabling local firms to win contracts is critical as the goal of a "local-first" program should not merely be to obtain quality goods and services at the lowest possible cost. Rather, the larger strategic goal should be to enhance local firms and the local economy to promote endogenous economic growth and, through it, long-term economic stability.[331] This extension of contracts to local firms is based on two preconditions: 1) There are local firms able to take on contracts and 2) rule of law can enforce said contracts.

GRADUAL ECONOMIC TRANSITION - PREVENT UNEMPLOYMENT SPIKES

Propping up State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) temporarily until alternative employment opportunities can be created may prevent a spike in unemployment, hostility

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[329] The US had avoided such endeavors until Iraq (Dobbins To Author)
[330] See Harrison & Meyers. "Contracting Under Fire: Lessons Learned in Wartime Contracting and Expeditionary Economics." See also Chapter 3.
[331] Ibid.

towards the intervening force, and thus the security environment from spiraling out of control. This enhanced security would make other economic reconstruction programs more effective.[332] What may appear to be an inefficient use of resources in the short-term could actually be necessary to maintain stability.

STABLE GOVERNANCE

REFORM INSTITUTIONS, DON'T REINVENT THEM

The international community should work with whatever institutions exist, retain most civil servants, and provide technical assistance in critical areas, such as budgeting and law and order rather than build institutions from scratch in the eyes of Western standards.[333] Maintaining existing structures allows for connections and expertise to be maintained, along with continuity of services and steady employment. Thus, if the removal of individuals from office is deemed necessary, do so in a surgical manner rather than broad cuts.

AVOID PREMATURE ELECTIONS, START LOCAL, AND DRAFT A CONSTITUTION FIRST

Conflict cessation without modification of the political environment, even where systems-building is undertaken through technical electoral assistance and institution or capacity-building, is unlikely to succeed in the long-run.[334] A substantial proportion of transitions have resulted in weak or limited democracies.[335] Paramount to a stable, functioning government in a time of uncertainty is a constitution, achieved by a legitimate constitution-making process. An ill-conceived or otherwise faulty constitution-making

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[332] Ibid.

[333] "Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan for a Potential Post-Qadhafi Libya: Workshop Report" July 15, 2011. Center for Complex Operations. Pg. 12

[334] For a general discussion of these interventions, see Chetan Kumar, Building Peace in Haiti, IPA Occasional Paper (Lynne Rienner 1998); Adekeye Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau, IPA Occasional Paper (Lynne Rienner 2002).

[335] See Carothers, Thomas. "The End of the Transition Paradigm." *Journal of Democracy*. 2002.

process can harm the prospects for stable governance even in countries that offer promising conditions.[336]

The content of a constitution, and the extent to which it sets up a democratic process rather than merely divides power between political elites, will impact the state's chances of long-term peace and the quality of governance and legitimacy. More representative and inclusive constitution drafting processes result in constitutions favoring free and fair elections, greater political equality, more social justice provisions, human rights protections, and stronger accountability mechanisms. In contrast, processes dominated by one interest or faction tend to result in constitutions favoring that interest or entrenching power in the hands of certain groups.[337]

Holding elections in the immediate aftermath of a violent conflict can make it more difficult to build a viable state and a stable peace. Moreover, the short-term concerns of the political parties may be at odds with the long-term systems-building needs of the society.[338] The elections themselves and the outcome of the elections may re-enforce the incompatibilities that were the basis for violent conflicts in the first place. [339] The recreation of a predatory, shadow, or authoritarian state is likely to lead to a return to conflict.[340] A

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[336] Benomar, Jamal. "Constitution-Making after Conflict: Lessons for Iraq" *Journal of Democracy. 2004*

[337] Kirsty, Samuels. "Post-Conflict Peace-Building and Constitution-Making." *Chicago Journal of International Law.* 2006

[338] Donald Rothchild, "Settlement Terms and Postagreement Stability." in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, eds, *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements.* Lynne Rienner, 2002. Pg. 117-118

[339] Timothy Sisk, "Pathways of the Political," in *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations,* ed. Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (New York: Routledge, 2009) 198. See also Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. In Fixdal, Mona. *Ways Out of War: Peacemakers in the Middle East and Balkans.* Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. Pg. 200

[340] Michael Bratton. "State Building and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Forwards, Backwards, or Together?" Afrobarometer Working Paper No 43, 8 (2004), available online at <http://www.afrobarometer.org.ezproxy.princeton.edu/AfropaperNo43.pdf> (visited Oct 25, 2005).

carefully designed and managed political and governance transition to democracy is integral to any sustainable stability strategy.[341]

Instead of rushing national elections based on a hard timeline, benchmarks and conditions should determine the timing of initial elections.[342] Such conditions will be determined on a case-by-case basis. Before national elections are held, a constitution should be written so that elections do not merely empower one group to impose its will upon another, without legal protection and guarantees. Furthermore, provincial or local elections should be held prior to national elections to minimize the degree of national polarization and to allow leaders to emerge based on the ability to deliver services rather than political ideologies.[343]

While timetables can put a certain amount of useful pressure on the parties and the international community alike to move a peace process forward, goals such as constitution-making and elections require legitimate processes and sufficient planning. These processes should not be rushed to meet pre-set dates. Deliberative processes that promote national reconciliation, conflict resolution, and consensus-building take time.

BE PREPARED TO GOVERN

Countries that require stabilization operations are often in a situation of "extreme emergency," where it is necessary to temporarily set aside democratic rights in order to establish the conditions for long-term peace [344] (critical stability). The international community should be prepared to effectively govern (while reforming or building local

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[341] Kirsty, Samuels. "Post-Conflict Peace-Building and Constitution-Making."

[342] Admiral Mullen, Michael. To author.

[343] Serwer, Daniel; Thomson, Patricia. "A Framework For Success: International Intervention in Societies Emerging From Conflict."

[344] Caplan, Richard "Who Guards the Guardians? International Accountability in Bosnia," *International Peacekeeping* 12, no 3 (2005): 464. in Fixdal. *Ways Out of War: Peacemakers in the Middle East and Balkans.*

institutions) a country in the immediate post-conflict phase in order to let peace take hold. However, international actors should not assume roles that national actors can and should play. To ensure local ownership, the process should be conducted at an appropriate pace to allow for national actors to fully understand their role, learn from comparative experts, deliberate on options, and enhance and/or build capacities where needed.[345]

[345] Brandt, Michele. "Constitutional Assistance in Post-Conflict Countries. The UN Experience: Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan." United Nations Development Programme. June 2005.

CHAPTER 5

CURRENT ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES

The weaknesses in complex operations that we never fixed were in interagency support, [...] where are the contingency budgets, reserve personnel, and trained and willing experts in the fields of public health, agriculture, business development, accounting, police and law enforcement, public affairs, youth activity, family counseling, and dozens of other disciplines that we desperately need?

- General Wesley Clark[346]

OVERVIEW

This chapter will briefly outline the current organization and capacities in the US government relating to both critical and sustainable stability operations. It will point out some of the various weaknesses of the current system that could prevent the effective implementation of the principles provided in the previous chapter.

HOW DID WE GET HERE?

The US government has made efforts to address the challenges of post-conflict and pre-conflict stability operations, but has not yet succeeded in creating adequate capacity. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), "In 2011, nearly 7,800 Foreign Service positions were filled—or 11 percent more positions than in 2008—but the total number of positions increased to over 9,000, resulting in the same vacancy rate."[347] Even if all the positions were filled, the staffing would be far less than that of 2 carrier strike groups.

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[346] General Clark, Wesley. "No Formulas: Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo. *Commanding Heights: Strategic Lessons from Complex Operations.* Center for Complex Operations. 2009. Pg. 60

[347] US Government Accountability Office Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate "DEPARTMENT OF STATE Foreign Service Midlevel Staffing Gaps Persist Despite Significant Increases in Hiring" June 2012

With more than 285 missions overseas,[348] this averages to less than 32 Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) per mission.[349] In order to succeed in their missions, FSOs need appropriate training, leadership, staffing levels, and positioning.[350]

Since the 1980s, the number of personnel in the State Department and USAID overall has decreased. See figures 21, 22, and 23. While diplomatic staffing has remained relatively steady, USAID staffing decreased while its responsibility increased. The number of missions has also increased, leaving fewer people with more responsibility. The US government has a limited available pool of officers able to deploy to stabilization missions when needed. However, it must also be noted that expertise in stability operations does not reside solely in the State Department or USAID; the departments of Agriculture, Justice, Energy, Commerce, Transportation, Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, etc. can and should all play their roles. Though this highlights the need to ramp up capacity within the US government, it also underlines the importance of actively partnering with other governments, international institutions, NGOs, and the private sector, as budget constraints will prevent the US from being able to significantly increase USG personnel or funding.[351]

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[348] US Department of State Website. http://www.state.gov/m/ds/about/faq/index.htm#13

[349] The American Academy of Diplomacy states, "Many big box retail stores have staffing sizes larger than this, and they often only serve a few square miles in a city."

[350] American Academy of Diplomacy. "Supporting the Foreign Service Supports our Military" posted by Matthew Wallin on December 18, 2012.

[351] The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR) Supporting Security and Justice. Pg. 18.

Figure 21:[352] State Department employees over time

Figure 22:[353] Diplomats over time

Figure 23:[354] USAID employees and responsibilities over time

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[352] "A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness." The American Academy of Diplomacy. October 2008
[353] Ibid.

A SHIFT IN FOCUS & RESPONSIBILITIES, BEGINNING OF S/CRS & CSO

To achieve the end-states demonstrated in figure 20, the State Department created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in 2004 to "lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations and help reconstruct and stabilize a country or region that is at risk of, in, or is in transition from, conflict and civil strife."[355]

To address the challenges that realities in Iraq and Afghanistan posed, the military refocused its mission. As demonstrated in the proceeding chapters, for years, military leadership did not take "military operations other than war" (MOOTW) seriously. However, after a long process, this changed in November 2005, when Defense Department Directive 3000.05 stated:

> Stability operations are a core US military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organization, training, education, exercises, material, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.[356]

The directive noted that proper planning and execution of the post-combat phase of operations was essential to achieve victory and the rapid withdrawal of US forces. However, it critically does not say that the military will *lead* stability operations – an appropriate exemption. On December 7, 2005, National Security Presidential Directive-44 ordered that the State Department be the lead agency in sustainable stabilization and required it to

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[354] Ibid.

[355] S/CRS Archive. US Department of State Website. http://www.state.gov/j/cso/scrsarchive/index.htm

[356] Defense Department Directive 3000.05 available online at: http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3000_05.pdf.

coordinate all governmental activities in this area.[357] NSPD-44 remains in effect; therefore, responsibility to lead sustainable stabilization efforts resides with the State Department. With the creation of S/CRS and its successor, the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), it would be logical for these organizations to fulfill the State Department's mandate.

During the first years of S/CRS operation, Congress did not appropriate money for its programs, requiring its administrative costs to be paid out of the Department of State budget.[358] S/CRS started with a "shoestring" budget of $6 million.[359] As a new organization with minimal funding or resources and little experience to stand upon, S/CRS was rarely used, leaving the organization without a clear mission. As a result, the Senate Appropriations Committee cut funding because it was not being used.[360] Had S/CRS been given a wider mandate and been able to demonstrate its "value-add," its budget likely would have grown.[361] Instead, S/CRS lacked the personnel or resources required to lead US stabilization operations.[362]

In an effort to improve the much needed capabilities of S/CRS, CSO was established in November 2011 (as a successor of S/CRS) to focus on conflict prevention, crisis response, and stabilization activities as mandated by the first-ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), but its size and resources have been cut significantly as its mission was redefined.

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[357] "A Foreign Affairs Budget For the Future. Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness." The Academy of Diplomacy. http://www.academyofdiplomacy.org/publications/FAB_report_2008.pdf
[358] Perito. *Getting it Right: Recommendations for American Policy.*
[359] Ambassador Herbst, John. To author. Jan 11, 2013.
[360] Ibid.
[361] Ibid.
[362] Serwer, Daniel; Thomson, Patricia. "A Framework For Success: International Intervention in Societies Emerging From Conflict."

S/CRS - CSO Funding

Figure 24[363]

As of January, 2013, CSO had 162 paid staff members, including "direct hire foreign service and civil service employees, as well as contractors and staff members who are detailed from other agencies or organizations in support of the CSO mission."[364] As part of CSO's overhaul and changing role, the State Department Budget Summary explains,

> The skill sets contained in the interagency Civilian Response Corps (CRC) are being focused toward conflict prevention and response and away from post-conflict reconstruction, requiring more emphasis on key conflict and political skills and less on specialized technical expertise. In order to have a more agile, flexible and cost effective response corps, the CRC component of CSO will be reduced by 76 members from the FY 2012 level of 144, offset by enhancing the deployable capacity of CSO's remaining core staff.[365]

> This restructuring was designed to make the Bureau more agile and expeditionary, with greater emphasis on creating flexible response capacity with smaller staff. This will produce greater deployment capacity, but with significantly less overhead. Response capabilities represented by CSO and the interagency Civilian Response

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[363] Congressional Budget Justification. Volume 1: Department of State Operations. Fiscal Year 2012, Executive Budget Summary. Function 150 & Other International Programs. Department of State. Fiscal Year 2013. Available online at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/183755.pdf
[364] United States State Department Official. Email Correspondence. January 25, 2013.
[365] Executive Budget Summary. Function 150 & Other International Programs. Department of State. Fiscal Year 2013.

Corps (CRC) can be augmented – as needed – with experts mobilized and paid only when deployed on specific missions.[366]

As the QDDR acknowledges, "there remains a broadly recognized need for a civilian surge capacity that can be deployed prior to conflicts and to assist with stabilization and reconstruction after conflicts abate."[367] With such a restructuring, CSO's "value-add" should theoretically become more specialized and valuable; yet it should still maintain the capability to deploy a civilian surge when needed. The State Department Budget Summary further explains, "When deployed, the salaries and benefits of CRC Standby component members are supported within deployment funding. As previously noted, there is no cost to CSO for the Standby component unless and until deployed."[368] Thus, such reorganization should prove more efficient, so long as the larger surge capacity is not lost in the case that a larger response to a crisis is needed.

Over the past year, CSO has improved significantly. It has worked to demonstrate its "value-add" in a few target countries, acting primarily as analyst of potential crises, coordinator of USG and foreign expertise, and, in some instances, at the operational level when local capacity gaps are identified and can be filled.[369] CSO personnel have been sent on small-scale deployments to such countries as Syria, Kenya, Libya, and Honduras.[370] According to the one-year progress report, among other missions:

> CSO co-funded the Syrian-run Office of Syrian Opposition Support, the hub for an expanding network of nearly 500 Syrian activists, administrators, and journalists. This connection provides insights about events inside Syria, expands assistance networks, and identifies local leaders. Through U.S., Canadian, and UK support, creative Syrian

[366] Ibid.
[367] Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. US State Department. 2010
[368] Executive Budget Summary. Function 150 & Other International Programs. Department of State. Fiscal Year 2013.
[369] Anonymous CSO staffer to author. March 25, 2013.
[370] See US Department of State website. http://www.state.gov/j/cso/where/

opposition TV ads and social media promote unity and tolerance among broad audiences.

In Kenya, where more than 1,000 people died and 350,000 people were displaced after the 2007 elections, CSO is integrating State Department efforts to help Kenyans prevent violence during the March 2013 election and potential runoff. CSO staff are assisting embassy efforts to build and focus Kenyan partnerships, particularly at the provincial and local levels. CSO supported existing local entities to organize nearly 50 Kenyans to establish a violence early-warning network in targeted hotspots.[371]

In the past, CSO resources were confined to those with the right skill-set and able to deploy within the USG (a very narrow resource base). CSO now focuses on building networks both within the USG and abroad, serving as a "connecting tissue"[372] from foreign actors to the USG: "CSO broadened its model of civilian response beyond internal staff and Civilian Response Corps members by creating a network of non-federal experts from sources such as nonprofits, third-country nationals, international partners, think tanks, and state and local officials. At a time of heightened global insecurity and fiscal constraint, the most exciting innovation is the large-scale engagement of local citizens and organizations, as in Kenya."[373]

While CSO has indeed improved, it does not yet have the capabilities or resources necessary to lead in a major stabilization operation on the scale that a potential US intervention in Syria *may* require.[374] While some, including within CSO, are skeptical that additional funding or resources would help at this stage, this concern must be addressed from a larger perspective. Such resources may indeed see diminishing returns for ongoing operations and the current CSO trajectory, but if a larger US and/or international presence is needed (e.g. post-conflict Syria), CSO is not yet prepared for such an undertaking – though it

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[371] "CSO One-year Progress Report." Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations. March 8, 2013. http://www.state.gov/j/cso/releases/other/2013/206410.htm
[372] Anonymous CSO staffer to author. March 25, 2013
[373] "CSO One-year Progress Report."
[374] Anonymous CSO staffer to author. March 25, 2013.

should be. Instead, CSO has focused on establishing networks with local actors. While utilizing local actors should be America's "Plan A" as it would be ideal in terms of American resources and local ownership, its success is not guaranteed and a physical presence - US or otherwise - may be required to engage in critical and sustainable stabilization. Thus, we should not neglect the need for a sizable civilian surge capacity. To be prepared for such larger engagements, I will propose organizational recommendations for CSO in the following chapter.

Groups with the capacity and specialty in complex operations such as envisioned in CSO should logically be at the forefront of such endeavors around the world. Regional bureaus in the State Department have acknowledged that they do not have the rapid response capabilities that CSO is supposed to offer.[375] However, the current organizational structure, underutilization, and under-resourcing of CSO have prevented it from being employed to its full future potential. This organization is only in its infancy but has a unique role to play.[376]

CONSTABULARY CAPABILITIES

The US does not possess a national police force or a force that can adequately act as a constabulary force. As the previous chapters have indicated, the roles that constabulary forces play will be increasingly important, yet the US has been inadequate in training and utilizing such a force. Most of those assigned as police advisors in Iraq and Afghanistan were junior patrol officers from municipal police forces, deputy sheriffs, or others who had served in small police departments in rural areas: "In many cases, they were less experienced than the Iraqis and Afghans they were assigned to advise, and they were often younger than their

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[375] Ibid.
[376] Admiral Mullen, Michael. To author. Jan 10, 2013.

counterparts in societies that place great value on age, rank, and social status."[377] The United States should thus improve its virtually non-existent constabulary capabilities. Specific organizational recommendations can be found in the following chapter.

LACK OF COORDINATION

As has been demonstrated throughout the course of this thesis, a lack of inter- and intragovernmental coordination has stymied stabilization efforts. American reactions have been both *post hoc* and *ad hoc*. The USG has not yet developed adequate operational structures to support US and multi-partner responses. The QDDR states, "We [the USG] have responded to successive events without learning lessons and making appropriate institutional changes to provide continuity and support. Too frequently, we [the USG]:

- Miss early opportunities for conflict prevention
- React to each successive conflict or crisis by reinventing the process for identifying agency leadership, establishing task forces, and planning and coordinating US government agencies
- Scramble to find staff with expertise in conflict mitigation and stabilization, pulling personnel from other critical roles to send them to crisis zones with limited preparation
- Rush to compile resource requests and reprogram within limited budgets
- Turn to embassies that are not equipped to house or execute complex, multi-layered responses or to operate amidst significant instability
- Leave it to our civilian and military teams in the field to figure out how best to work together
- Rely on traditional diplomatic and development strategies rather than build new tools (embedded in on-going institutions and processes) tailored to conflicts and crises
- Coordinate poorly with multilateral institutions, foreign governments, and nongovernmental partners in our response
- Delay bringing conflict, humanitarian, terrorism, law enforcement, intelligence, and military communities into the same policy and planning process for emerging crises, missing opportunities for synergy, shared intelligence, and integrated solutions
- Fail to adequately understand and plan for the unintended consequences of large-scale operations and assistance, which can inadvertently intensify corruption and breed local cynicism towards our efforts[378]

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[377] Perito. *Getting it Right: Recommendations for American Policy.*
[378] Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. US State Department. 2010

CHAPTER 6

ORGANIZATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

America's experience in Afghanistan and Iraq has illustrated the costs of unprepared nation-building. The cost of sustaining the capacity to conduct these operations, and thus retaining the lessons of the past two decades, is trivial by comparison.

- James Dobbins[379]

OVERVIEW

This chapter provides organizational recommendations to help the United States better handle pre-conflict, post-conflict, and radical-transition stability operations. The US has not utilized its bureaucracy optimally; several operations have demonstrated that the USG is not yet capable of successfully carrying out necessary but complicated stability operations. Thus, to better handle the increasing requirement of stabilization operations, our institutions must be updated. In this chapter, I shall propose organizational recommendations for the bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) and the establishment of constabulary capabilities within the National Guard.

INSTITUTIONALIZE INTERAGENCY COOPERATION

The United States cannot rely on two individuals from different agencies "getting along" in order to succeed in complex, multi-agency stability operations. As Dr. Chris Lamb, who led the Project for National Security Reform (PNSR) said, "We cannot keep rolling the dice and hope the leadership works out." He writes, "History demonstrates such personality-

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[379] Dobbins, James. "Retaining the Lessons of Nation-Building." *Commanding Heights: Strategic Lessons from Complex Operations.* Center for Complex Operations. 2009. Pg. 80

driven successes are the exception rather than the rule." [380] Coordination must be institutionalized, just as it was in the Goldwater-Nichols act.[381] Though personalities will always be a factor, an organization should be created to minimize the significance of the individual so that the institution can perform well, regardless of who is in charge. To do so, a cultural overhaul should take place emphasizing the importance of coordination and cooperation. Leaders should be selected based on their ability not only to manage efforts within their administration, but also to coordinate with others. Furthermore, both in the field and in Washington, civilian and military personnel working on stability operations should share physical space to foster camaraderie, coordination, and cooperation. Such a model has already proven successful in the newly formed European Union External Action Service.[382]

CSO LEAD IN STABILITY OPERATIONS

Organizational mechanisms have not been utilized properly to ensure that US strategy is coordinated across various governments and US agencies. The US government should be structured in such a way that each agency coordinates with one another, utilizing their own expertise in a "flatter" approach rather than "stove-piping" efforts. The end-states illustrated in figure 20 should not be treated as pillars but rather as components that interact with each other.[383]

The US government should thus be prepared to utilize a whole-of-government approach to reach these interacting end-states. The military has deterred violent aggressors,

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[380] Lamb, Christopher; Marks, Edward. *Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Integration.* Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. 2010. Pg. 27
[381] Lamb, Christopher. To author. Jan 11, 2013. National Defense University.
[382] Based on numerous interviews conducted by the author with various EEAS Crisis Management and Planning Directorate staffers in Brussels
[383] Serwer, Daniel; Thomson, Patricia. "A Framework For Success: International Intervention in Societies Emerging From Conflict."

created conditions of security, and built the military capacity of foreign states. The Department of Justice through its International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) has worked since 1986 with foreign governments to develop "effective, professional, and transparent law enforcement capacity that protects human rights, combats corruption, and reduces the threat of transnational crime and terrorism."[384] The Department of Homeland Security through its Office of International Affairs has helped countries through sharing best practices and technologies to develop their capacity to control and protect their borders and infrastructure; this includes an effort in Afghanistan to mentor border guards and provide training at the Customs Academy to use cash-counting machines at Kabul airport to help detect money laundering.[385] The Department of Health and Human Services can help prevent the spread of disease that often accompanies conflict and contribute to building sustainable health systems to achieve the end state of social well-being – such as the Center for Disease Control's ongoing efforts to provide technical assistance to eliminate poliomyelitis infections in Afghanistan, India, Nigeria, and Pakistan.[386] The Department of Agriculture through its Foreign Agricultural Services can help develop agricultural systems and build states' trade capacity.[387] Through its Office of Policy and International Affairs, the Department of Energy can help establish the energy infrastructure

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[384] "About ICITAP" US Department of Justice. Available Online at:
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/icitap/fact-sheets/2012/about-icitap-fact-sheet.pdf
[385] "Factsheet: DHS's International Footprint." December 2011. Available online at:
http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/12/02/fact-sheet-dhss-international-footprint. See also "Office of International Affairs" Department of Homeland Security. Available online at http://www.dhs.gov/office-international-affairs
[386] Department of Health & Human Services Fiscal Year 2013. Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Justification of Estimates for Appropriations Committee. Available online at:
http://www.cdc.gov/fmo/topic/Budget%20Information/appropriations_budget_form_pdf/FY2013_CDC_CJ_Final.pdf
[387] "About the Foreign Agricultural Service." United States Department of Agriculture. Available online at:
http://www.fas.usda.gov/aboutfas.asp

and security necessary for recovery and economic growth.[388] The Office of Development Policy and Debt in the Treasury Department can lead the US government's efforts to promote economic growth and poverty reduction in weak states by engaging with multilateral development banks (including the World Bank and regional development banks) and improving financial systems and economic governance.[389] The Department of Commerce through programs such as the Afghanistan Investment and Reconstruction Task Force and US Commercial Service can expand business opportunities by connecting local entrepreneurs or laborers with American businesses.[390] Together, all of these capabilities are necessary (and currently exist in the USG) to achieve the end-states illustrated in figure 20.

To manage such complex stability operations and coordinate the efforts detailed above, a single oversight body should be established and utilized properly. The organization would coordinate efforts not only within the US government, but also across governments and international organizations (as demonstrated in figure 25) to mitigate costs to the US and take advantage of the resources and expertise of others, all while fostering a more engaged and competent international community.

This organization would not lead every multinational effort, simply stability operations. As Robert Perito says, "Such an institution would have to be positioned within the executive branch of government and supported by Congress in a manner that would correct the institutional 'stove piping' and weak interagency cooperation that are an endemic feature of the U.S. national security system."[391] The Office of the Special Inspector General

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[388] "IEC Documents." Office of Policy and International Affairs. Available online at: http://energy.gov/pi/iec-documents
[389] "Development Policy and Debt." United States Treasury Department. Available online at: http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Development-Policy-and-Debt.aspx
[390] International Trade Administration. Department of Commerce. Available online at: http://www.trade.gov/afghanistan/tg_aftf_003399.asp
[391] Perito. *Getting it Right: Recommendations for American Policy.*

for Iraq Reconstruction concurs, citing the lack of executive authority over interagency coordination as "the heart of the failures in Iraq reconstruction" and that "in the U.S. system, only the president has the decisive authority necessary to require interagency coordination for contingency relief and reconstruction operations.'"[392] Such an organization must lead and coordinate but not act exclusively.

Figure 25

CSO should continue to serve as this much needed institution to maintain and build its capacity to handle pre- and post-conflict stability operations, thereby allowing the government to avoid the need to reinvent plans, strategies, and organizations on an *ad hoc* basis. CSO not only has the ability to reach out to USG personnel and a robust Civilian Response Corps (CRC), but also can build a sustained network with foreign local actors who often have the specific skills that the USG lacks.[393] CSO should assess a situation and

[392] Ibid.
[393] Anonymous CSO staffer to author. March 25, 2013.

determine a strategy for execution, then serve as a managing and coordinating body for stability operations, allowing other departments, governments, and organizations to utilize their given expertise.

<u>EXPAND CAPABILITIES OF CSO</u>

In Iraq and Afghanistan, PRTs have been statistically proven to improve development projects and lower rates of violence.[394] PRTs should serve as a model for CSO-led CRC stability teams to be trained and maintained during peacetime and deployed in crisis-prevention,[395] post-conflict, or post-radical transition stabilization situations. CSO should run weekend courses (much like the reserve components of the military) on stability operations (both *critical* and *sustainable*) for both military and civilian personnel (in and out of government) to attend, learning to work together.[396]

As successful stability operations should decrease the need for military action and the associated expenses, such a training program could be funded by the military, serving as a long-term investment instead of expensive (and often unnecessary) new technologies designed for confrontations unlikely to arise in the near future. In a time of tight budgets, such an investment in prevention has obvious appeals. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote, "The work performed by diplomatic and development professionals helps build the foundation for more stable, democratic and prosperous societies. These are places where the potential for conflict can be minimized, if not completely avoided, by State and

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[394] See "An Analysis of Development Assistance & Varying Impacts"
[395] Stringer, Kevin Ph.D. and Sizemore, Kaite. "The U.S. Interagency Role in Future Conflict Prevention: Provincial Reconstruction Teams for Select Partner Nations." *Interagency Journal.* The Journal of The Simons Center. Vol. 3, Issue 3, Summer 2012. Pg. 16
[396] Montgomery, William. "Lessons Learned in Democratic Transition and Building Civil Society." *Commanding Heights: Strategic Lessons from Complex Operations.* Center for Complex Operations. 2009. Pg. 118

USAID programs - thereby lowering the likely need for deployment of U.S. military assets."[397]

CSO and the respective teams should be structured at three levels (*active*, *stand-by*, and *reserve*) so as to minimize the need for new hires and mitigate staffing concerns. The *active* component - to be available for immediate deployment - should be large enough to both staff conflict-prevention stabilization operations and serve as a coordinating body to tap other resources across the globe. The American Academy of Diplomacy and Ambassador Herbst call for an *active* response corps of around 250 people (eventually 500). A *stand-by* Civilian Response Corps (CRC) of active duty federal employees trained and available to participate in surge activities on relatively short notice should consist of around 2,000 people.[398] A CRC *reserve* force should consist of approximately 2,000 people (eventually 5,000) trained and available to participate in surge activities if needed in larger post-conflict stability operations. To convince individuals (both in the federal government and out) to give up their weekends to undergo training for a *stand-by* (federal employees) and *reserve* (non-governmental employees) component of a CRC, financial incentives can be given. These incentives will build a well-trained, large-scale CRC surge capacity, while minimizing costs unless the force is deployed. To recruit individuals outside the federal government, the CRC should be offered as a form of national service. CRC should recruit at college campuses, as do the active and reserve components of the military.

In the case that federal employees are asked to leave their posts, this will more than likely cause domestic staffing gaps. Thus, the decision to send *standby* and *reserve* components abroad in stabilization operations should not be taken lightly. We must recognize that the

[397] Secretary Gates, Robert. Letter to Kent Conrad, Chairman, Senate Budget Committee. April, 21, 2010. Available online at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140886.pdf
[398] The American Academy of Diplomacy and Ambassador Herbst to author

USG does not have unlimited resources and that sending personnel abroad will undoubtedly create costs at home. Such calculations must be weighed in the decision-making process.

EMPHASIZE ROLE OF CSO

One step to improve CSO would be to convince the Secretary of State of the importance and benefits of the bureau. In times of such budget constraints and staffing shortages, CSO's ability to manage and coordinate stabilization efforts with other non-USG organizations provides a cost-effective means of performing critical State Department tasks as mandated in National Security Presidential Directive-44. An emphasis on coordinating with local actors in Syria in preparation for its likely collapse may serve as CSO's opportunity to prove itself in such regard – if provided with the necessary resources. The Secretary of State can insist that CSO either take the lead in such pre- and post-conflict sustainable stabilization operations or at least be full partners of the regional bureaus to help coordinate across the US government and other governments as demonstrated in figure 25.

USE OTHER INSTITUTIONS FOR GUIDANCE

The European Union's External Action Service's Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) is new enough that bureaucratic entrenchments have not yet taken place and thus can still be adapted, providing a particularly useful model. According to Jean-Marc Pisani, the Head of the Division of Crisis Response Planning and Operations, the coordinating body must be as close as possible to the political level as well as the military in order to effectively coordinate.[399] Pisani emphasizes the need for a body to exist that coordinates such efforts, and that the organization develop a level of comfort with a "culture of crisis." He stresses the importance of a flat system to share information and gain a

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[399] Pisani, Jean-Marc. To author. EU EEAS. Brussels, Belgium

contextual understanding. To do so, crisis platforms are organized to engage all relevant actors to foster meaningful dialogue, collaboration and coordination.[400]

PARTNER CSO WITH RELEVANT COUNTERPARTS

The United States has often failed to deploy individuals with appropriate local political skills.[401] By lacking a cultural understanding, unrealistic expectations can be set and inappropriate responses enacted. Thus, when considering the organization for CSO operations, crisis teams must be partnered with (or include) regional experts, preferably with local language skills. Furthermore, to prevent a lack of coordination between civilian and military efforts, there should also be a direct line of communication between CSO and the military at all levels, especially in the field.

There are some who question the ability of CSO to serve exclusively as the coordinating body. Colonel Hughes explains, "You need to put it [the organization, whatever it may look like] at a level where you can't let department heads talk back to you saying, 'I'm not doing that.' If you have people at CSO manage it, people are going to blow them off." Such sentiments were echoed in numerous interviews. This is largely because CSO has yet to prove itself and demonstrate its "value-add." Once CSO is given the resources and the opportunity to prove itself, such attitudes will likely change, giving CSO a more prominent and respected role.

To help further address these concerns, CSO should head an interagency working group that meets regularly to assess situations and coordinate intelligence and operations with the National Security Staff, CIA, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and USAID. By

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[400] Ibid.
[401] Locher, Jim. To author. Dec. 15, 2012.

incorporating all of these actors in a working group under CSO's leadership, the various agencies will likely work together more collaboratively rather than view CSO as trying to dictate to other agencies. While this core working-group would meet regularly, other agencies such as the Departments of Energy, Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, and others can be coordinated through CSO when the decision has been made to stabilize in some capacity. Thus, a new organizational chart could look like figure 26.

Figure 26

ESTABLISH US CONSTABULARY CAPABILITIES

The military can serve many roles. One such role is maintaining area security in a given space. However, a "security gap" exists between a force that can maintain area security and one that can restore the rule of law. Those who oppose peace can take advantage of this gap to engage in politically motivated violence and promote civil unrest.[402] The United States should develop constabulary capabilities to close this gap.

America's "Plan A" should always be to reach out to allies and coalition partners to work together, coordinating expertise and resources.[403] Numerous countries have national police forces, and these forces should be used in critical stabilization operations when required. However, while the US should always look to engage multilaterally, partners may not be willing or able to contribute.[404] Accordingly, the United States should work better with its allies and friends, coordinating and maximizing efforts, but not be completely dependent on others.

Thus, the United States should develop constabulary capabilities - not necessarily a constabulary force. This can be done without violating Posse Comitatus,[405] establishing a new entity, or spending vast amounts of taxpayer money. The National Guard already conducts many of the essential services to establish law and order in response to natural disasters domestically.[406] The National Guard should be further trained for constabulary roles. This would solve several challenges: 1) address the security gap created between

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[402] Perito. *Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America's Search for a Postconflict Stability Force.* Pg. 36
[403] Admiral Mullen, Michael. To author. January 10, 2013
[404] I am not advocating for unilateral action, simply pointing out a possibility
[405] A United States federal law with the intent to limit the powers of the armed forces to enforce State laws. The Bill refers to the Armed Forces of the United States but does not apply to the National Guard under state authority. The National Guard can act in a law enforcement capacity within its home state or in an adjacent state if invited by that state's governor.
[406] Hoffman, Frank G, The Future of the Guard and Reserve: Roles, Missions and Force Structure, Foreign Policy Research Institute E-notes, February 8, 2005
(http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20050208.military.hoffman.rolesmissionsforcestructure.html)

civilian police and the military 2) establish constabulary capabilities within the US government, reducing the need to contract work out and pay a premium 3) preserve the Posse Comitatus Act as the National Guard is excluded from Posse Comitatus. The National Guard would serve complementary to the *stand-by* and *reserve* forces (CRC) in CSO.

This proposed recalibration would, at a minimum, have a variety of implications for how the reserve components are organized, trained, equipped, and recruited.[407] Such a shift may face tough political resistance. Objections include the need for the National Guard and reserve components to supplement the active military as it faces severe budget constrictions and high troop demands. However, as the military needs to prepare for the wide array of conflicts it may face, so too must the National Guard. Others have argued that the National Guard - or some very significant part of it - should be dedicated entirely to defending the homeland, not overseas operations.[408] While these objections bear consideration, realities demand that the National Guard be trained for a wide range of situations both at home and abroad,[409] including those requiring constabulary capabilities. Furthermore, this force already exists, has funding and resources to back it, and could be slightly augmented to address a much-needed gap in US capabilities.

CONCLUSION

The first step in solving a problem is recognizing there is one. The United States' organizational structure has led to numerous shortfalls, preventing it from succeeding in stability operations. This thesis has drawn upon lessons learned from experiences in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and other US engagements to elicit a set of guiding principles for future

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[407] Wormuth Christine; Flournoy, Michele; Henry, Patrick; Murdock. Clark. *The Future of the National Guard and Reserves: The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase III Report.* Center for Strategic and International Studies. July 2006.
[408] See Hoffman. "The Future of the Guard and Reserve: Roles, Missions and Force Structure."
[409] Wormuth, Flournoy, Henry,& Murdock. *The Future of the National Guard and Reserves: The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase III Report.*

stability operations. These lessons stress the need for changes not only in the implementation of US policy, but in the organization of the US national security system as well. The recommendations in this thesis should be enacted to help preserve American values, principles, and security in the 21st century. We as Americans must recognize changing realities, and our institutions should be updated accordingly.

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HONOR CODE PLEDGE

This thesis represents my own work in accordance with University regulations.

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