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Joint
Doctrine
JD-3.4.4



COunter-INsurgency

N° 253/DEF/CICDE/MP as of 05 November, 2010

Entitled *Counter-INSurgency (COIN)*, the French (FRA) Joint Doctrine (JD) 3.4.4 respects the graphic standards defined in the (FRA) Joint Publication (JP) 7.2.8 (n° 161/DEF/CICDE/NP as of the 18th June, 2010). The aforementioned graphics standards are themselves in compliance with the prescriptions of the Allied Administrative Publication (AAP) 47 (entitled *Allied Joint Doctrine Development*). It also applies rules described in the *Lexicon of the used typographic rules of the Government's Printing Office* (ISBN 978-2-7433-0482-9) the main part of which is available on the website www.imprimerienationale.fr as well as the prescriptions of the *Académie française*. The front cover of this document was created by the CICDE and contains a picture from the Defence Institute for Communication and Audiovisual Production (ECPA-D)¹. This document was printed by the Paris Central Administration Service (SPAC – *Service parisien d'administration centrale*), a branch of the *École militaire* Graphics Pole of Paris (PGP – *Pôle graphique de Paris*). Please note: the reference version of this document is the electronic copy published on the Intradef² and official websites of the *Centre interarmées de concepts, doctrines et expérimentations* (Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrines and Experimentations) at <http://www.cicde.defense.gouv.fr> under the heading “*Corpus conceptuel et doctrinal interarmées*” (Joint Concepts and Doctrine Hierarchy).

¹ An Air Force Commando secures an Air Force helicopter (*Caracal*) landing zone.

² Intradef is the internal French Ministry of defence website.



(FRA) JD-3.4.4

**COUNTER-INSURGENCY
(COIN)**

N°253/DEF/CICDE/NP as of the 5th November, 2010

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Letter of promulgation



Admiral Édouard GUILLAUD
Chief of Defence
(CHoD)

Paris, 5th November, 2010
N°253/DEF/CICDE/NP

1. Current operational events brought to light the necessity to elaborate a national joint doctrine on *Counter-insurgency (COIN)*, in order to define and to refine the modalities of the contribution of the armed forces to the multiple dimensions of this kind of commitment.
2. Perfectly compatible with the allied doctrine, this joint counter-insurgency doctrine (JD-3.4.4) becomes integrated in a coherent manner into the national doctrinal corpus on external crises management.
3. It only applies to counter-insurgency situations in a context of intervention in foreign countries and in a framework clearly settled by the international community. It underlines the specificities of the French approach, based on past operational experiences. It will notably allow presenting and promoting the position of armed forces at joint level on this particular theme towards our international partners and the actors of other governmental agencies.
4. Written, above all, in an operational and pragmatic perspective, this JD mainly addresses the strategic and operational levels. After having described the context and the contemporary stakes of counter-insurgency, it details the role of armed forces in this framework, in particular at the level of the theatre of operations, as well as the specific operational capabilities this type of commitment requires.

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Record of changes

This table constitutes the collection of all the amendments proposed by readers, regardless of their origin or rank, as submitted to the Assistant Director for Doctrinal Synergy (AD-DS) of the CICDE. It is based on the table featured in Annex A (see p. 62).

1. The amendments validated by the director of the CICDE appear in this table in chronological order of review.
2. The amendments incorporated are shown in different colours in the new version according their chronology and following a specific code described in another reference document.
3. The front cover and second cover page of this document shall be corrected to indicate the existence of a new version. The official registration number shall include the following note: "*Xth edition of Day/Month/Year*".
4. The amended version of the text to be used as a joint reference document shall replace the previous version in all electronic databases.

No.	Amendment	Origin	Effective date
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References

- a. **JC-01, Capstone Concept on the Employment of Armed Forces (CCEAF), English version available,**
no. 004/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 11 January, 2010.
- b. **JC-3.4, Comprehensive Approach (CA) in CRO (military contribution), English version available,**
no. 024/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 24 January, 2011.
- c. **JC-3.4.3, Intervention in Crises Response Operations (CRO),**
no. 033/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 10 January, 2008.
- d. **JC-3.4.4, Operations against an Irregular Adversary (ADIR),**
no. 131/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 22 May, 2008.
- e. **JC-3.4.5, Crisis Management (CM),**
no. 033/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 10 January, 2008.
- f. **JC-3.4.9, Contribution of the Armed Forces to Stabilisation (STAB), English version available,**
no. 3.4.9/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 02 February, 2010 January.
- g. **JD-01, Capstone Doctrine for the employment of the armed forces (CDEAF),**
under development.
- h. **AJP-3.4.4, Allied Joint Publication for Counter-insurgency,**
under ratification.

Foreword

1. The Counter-insurgency (COIN) Joint Doctrine (JD) only applies to counter-insurgency situations in a context of commitment on foreign territory and in the framework imposed by the international community.
2. It insists on defining the modalities of the **contribution of the armed forces to the multiple dimensions of counter-insurgency**. In fact, as the commitment of the forces for the resolution of these external crises most frequently joins in a multidimensional and generally international Comprehensive Approach, counter-insurgency always takes on a multidimensional and generally multinational character. In particular, the military action integrates itself in the larger framework of a struggle aiming to cut the insurgency from its external supports (diplomatic, financial, and logistic supports).
3. Written, above all, to be operational and pragmatic, this Joint Doctrine primarily addresses the **strategic and operative levels** and concerns of all armed forces and that also includes the National *Gendarmerie* (military police) in its “*Defence*” missions accomplished under the authority of the Chief of Defence. For all that, given the multiplicity of civil and military participant in counter-insurgency, this doctrine also aims at exposing the position of the French armed forces towards all actors implied from the **other ministries** and the **international partners**, in particular these from the European Union (EU) and from NATO.
4. It constitutes in fact the **national complement** of the NATO Counter-insurgency doctrine: *Allied Joint Publication for Counter-insurgency (COIN)/AJP-3.4.4*. The JD-3.4.4 is fully compatible with this doctrine³ ratified by France and it only details the position of the French armed forces in this particular type of commitment. Besides the AJP-3.4.4, the Counter-


³ It resumes, in particular, its definitions.

insurgency doctrine is perfectly coherent with national doctrine documents on crisis management⁴.

5. Finally, although this doctrine aims to be generic and does not refer to a specific theatre, it relies on the lessons learned from the Atlantic Alliance operations in Afghanistan, which constitute the most recent experience in counter-insurgency.

⁴ See the above mentioned references.

The place of JD-3.4.4 in the (FRA) JCDH*



Caption

* Joint Concepts & Doctrine Hierarchy

- NATO Document
- French Document
- EU Document

- Classified Document (triangle on lower right-hand side)
- Promulgated document
- Promulgated document / New version under ratification
- Promulgated document / New Version in progress/Revision

- Document under ratification
- Document under development/study
- Document to be deleted after incorporation into a higher-level document or after being replaced by another document

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Chapter 1

General context of counter-insurgency

Section I – Definitions of insurgency and counter-insurgency

101. In this JD, the definitions are in accordance with those of our Allies, this means:

102. **“Insurgency** is defined as the actions of an organized, often ideologically motivated, group or movement that seeks to effect or prevent political change of a governing authority within a region, focused on persuading or coercing the population through the use of violence and subversion.”

103. **Counter-insurgency (COIN)** is the set of political, economic, social, military, judicial, and psychological activities, institutional or not, necessary to neutralize an insurgency and address the main motives for dissatisfaction of the population⁵.

104. By extension one also calls “insurgency” the set of “**insurgents**” who constitute the group(s) having insurrectional activities. These insurrectional activities are, most of the time, “**irregular**”⁶ which mean that they don’t respect the commonly admitted legal, ethic and/or operational rules. An insurgent is thus most of the time an “**IRregular ADversary**” (**IRAD**), this means that his characterization “is firstly of political order – by making reference to its status, which allows a double asymmetry, judicial and of rationality – and less of operational order (approach axed on the action modes such as terrorism or guerrilla)”⁷.

WARNING!

105. **In this joint doctrine, the term “insurgency” does not mean uprising, sometimes legitimate, from the whole (or a big part) of a population against the acting political authority**⁸. It applies to the activities of particular individuals or of groups who violently oppose themselves to a legitimate power.

106. Moreover, in this document, counter-insurgency is only envisaged **out of the national territory**, in the framework of an external crisis management, i.e. in areas marked by a profound disorganization of the concerned State¹⁰.

Section II – Counter-insurgency and stabilisation

107. Within a country or a region in the grip of an insurgency, the intervention in counter-insurgency joins in the framework of the generic stabilisation process¹¹, which aims to restore the conditions of political and social life by rehabilitating the three pillars that are governance, security, and the economic and social development.

108. Nevertheless, an insurgency being a deliberate and methodic enterprise of destabilisation by violence and subversion¹², counter-insurgency will first aim at fighting this violence by an effort in the security domain. This security effort has to go with a particularly active influence

⁵ This definition is the translation of this in the AJP-3.4.4.

⁶ Cf. AJP-3.4.4 (§ 0109): “**Irregular activity** is defined as the use or threat of force by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority.”

⁷ **Guerrilla warfare**: “military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.” 01 Mar 1973 (AAP-6 – 2010).

⁸ Cf. JD-3.4.4, Operations against IRregular ADversary (IRAD), p. 5.

⁹ See dictionary.


¹⁰ In particular in the **fragile or failed States**, torn by intra-State conflict.

¹¹ Definition of stabilisation in the joint concept of the Contribution of the armed forces to stabilisation (JC-3.4.9): “The stabilisation is one of the processes of crises management aiming to re-establish the minimal viability conditions of a State (or of a region), by putting an end tin violence as a mode of contesting and in setting the bases of a return to a normal life by the launching of a civilian process of reconstruction. This phase of stabilisation is the period of crises management during which this process is predominant.”

¹² **Subversion**: “Action designed to weaken the military, economic or political strength of a nation by undermining the morale, loyalty or reliability of its citizens”. Related terms: counter-subversion; security 1, 2, 3. 1st March 1981 (AAP-6 – 2010).

strategy¹³ in order to counter the insurgents' propaganda. The aim of this strategy consist notably in insuring the coherence of the messages and of the actions in support of the legitimacy of the operation with the aim to dominate the adversary in the "battle of the perceptions", which is always crucial in counter-insurgency.

109. For all that, the reconstruction of the other two pillars that are essential to stability which are governance and economic and social development remains indispensable in COIN. Actions in these domains are essential in order to illegitimate the insurgents in their radical critics of the existing order and to deprive them from their popular supports. It is the reason why counter-insurgency should always be dealt with in the framework of the comprehensive approach in the response to crises.



110. The re-establishment of a minimal threshold of security¹⁴ generally appears as a **necessary prerequisite** to the efficient implementation of the actions towards the two other pillars. It is first about showing the own force and determination¹⁵, then to exploit as soon as possible a reinforced position through political, social and economical actions. In this case, one can speak about "military-civilian" operations.



Figure 2 - The Force has first to secure the population in order to allow stabilisation actions.

111. **Counter-insurgency thus constitutes a specific case of stabilisation operations, particularly demanding, because of the confrontation with adversaries that are**

¹³ The **influence strategy** is the art consisting in organising and using the diplomatic, economical, informational, military and cultural capabilities, aiming to serve the interests of a State, a group of States or of the international community by acting in the psychological and knowledge fields (provisory definition).

The **military influence strategy** is permanently exercised by the armed forces with the aim to obtain effects in the psychological and knowledge and to conduct an individual or a group – favourable, neutral or hostile – to act in the sense of the national interests, of the objectives of a coalition or of the international community (provisory definition).

¹⁴ Which includes a dimension of public security ensured by the local police forces, eventually reinforced by international police forces (see JC-3.4.9).

¹⁵ See the military surge in Iraq and in Afghanistan, neutralization of some insurgency chiefs, etc.

determined to oppose by all means this stabilisation and by trying to bring an important part of the population on their side.




Figure 3
Place of the counter-insurgency in the process of stabilisation.

112. **In counter-insurgency, the aim of the stabilisation of the Host-Nation** (see definition in annex B) **is realized through national reconciliation**, i.e. from a part of the insurgents, but mainly from the population with its governing people. Whatever the duration of their presence, the external counterparts, whose intervention forces must think their actions in the perspective of this **long term political goal**, to promote them and to contribute to the **appropriation** of this goal by the local authorities and the population.

Section III – A degraded political and social situation

113. An insurgency can only develop itself by exploiting the **weaknesses of the political system** of the considered country or region. So, it principally proliferates within fragile or failed States. This fragility (or failure) of the considered Host-Nation generally has internal cause (absence of structure and frame, corruption, etc.), but also can be wished, provoked and/or maintained by neighboring countries. This (or these) hostile or rival country(-ies) may constitute more or less active and official supports for the insurgency.
114. This weakness of the State, when exploited by some local and regional actors, is intrinsically connected with the **dissatisfaction of the population**: it is born from these grievances and often it deteriorates them. That is why an insurgency always makes and provokes a **deep degradation of the social link** within the considered Host-Nation. This social link, entrenched in the sharing of common values, is built on the three pillars of stability which are governance, security and economic and social development. By compromising the security of the society, insurgency generates a **vicious circle** which weakens the pillars of stability one after the other.




Figure 4
Degradation of the social link in insurrectional situation.

Section IV – The waiting-game of the population

115. Whatever the dissatisfactions might be, the population never forms a monolithic block mainly favorable to the insurgents, otherwise these insurgents would have seized power while meeting no resistance. In addition, it is not fully opposed to them, otherwise the insurgency would not have been able to emerge and develop. It divides and subdivides itself into factions, groups or tendencies, sometimes antagonist. It often appears “*schizophrenic*” and may not adhere to the insurgency but, at the same time, reject the power in place and feel uneasy towards a foreign presence. Its allegiances are often volatile and few things are enough to make an individual or a group tip over from one camp to another.
116. In reality, the population seeks, in its great majority, security, justice and a political order allowing to develop peacefully its economic activities. This explains why a large part of the population remains generally **neutral** and adopts a **wait-and-see policy**. It engages veritably only towards the party appearing as finally victorious. This wait-and-see characteristic of the insurrectional situations lasts as long no federating political project has clearly imposed itself. The only alternative for the population is between the legal local power and the insurgency. Each party consequently seeks to extend its influence, or even seek to take the power, in order to rally the maximum of inhabitants to its aims.
117. ***The population appears as the central stake of the insurgency as well as for the counter-insurgency.***




Figure 5 - The population, stake of insurgency and COIN.

118. In the long term, the political solution can only be internal to the Host-Nation and the population knows that the presence of outer participants in support of the power in place is only provisory. Nevertheless, the determination shown by the outer participants is essential to gain the confidence of the population. Whatever their good willingness and their initiatives may be, **these participants must thus show humility and promote a political solution perceived as local.**

Section V – An eminently political confrontation

119. To allow reconciliation within the Host-Nation, the counter-insurgency requires a clear **political goal** resting on a renovated project of “*social contract*”¹⁶ for the considered country or region, in order to compete with the insurgents’ project. It can not just re-establish or only consolidate the existing order, which has demonstrated its limits when letting the insurgency emerge and consolidate itself. Counter-insurgency asks the question of the possible and wished degree of reform of the local society as well as that of the available and consented resources for this renovation of the “*social contract*”.
120. Only a local power legitimate to the Host-Nation¹⁷ may conduct this alternate political project. More than the population itself, neutral in its great majority, it is really **the legitimacy of the political system**¹⁸ which constitutes the centre of gravity of counter-insurgency.

¹⁶ It is the question of the restoration of the confidence between the governing and the governed people, whatever this contract takes in the culture of the Host-Nation.

¹⁷ It is not necessarily question of a legitimacy addressing the occidental criteria of the term: the power in place must be legitimate with regard to the cultural specificities of the Host-Nation.

¹⁸ i.e. the institutions, which have to correspond to the culture of the Host-Nation, and the political authorities.

121. In case of a weak popular legitimacy of the power in place, the outer participants will be perceived by the population as blind troublemakers, even the accomplices of an inequitable order. Knowing that their presence will not be eternal the population will neither give its credit nor its support in spite of all efforts provided. It will remain sensitive to the influence of the insurgents, even favorable to their action. The building of the legitimacy of the Host-Nation's political system¹⁹ therefore constitutes the main political responsibility of the intervening powers if they hope to contribute to the stabilisation of a country going through an insurgency. The renovated political project must also be concretely relayed locally by a loyal, competent and convinced local administration. The legitimacy and efficiency of the institutions of proximity are critical priorities for the rally of the population. In this regard, the fight against corruption and criminal economy constitutes an imperative in counter-insurgency.



Figure 6 – Elderly Afghan voter accomplishing his duty at a polling station.

122. In this regard, **more than any other forms of stabilisation, counter-insurgency appears above all as a political confrontation:** *“The political action [...] plays the principal role all along the war”*²⁰.
123. Three major types of actors are thus implicated in an insurgency: the **insurgents**, the **institutional actors** (government, justice, police, and armed forces, at national and local levels) and the **population**. For all that, these three groups are not compartmentalized and their interactions always remain complex: the military is a citizen, the insurgent has a family, the local political responsible may have links to clans or mafias with the insurgents... These interactions exist before the arrival of the intervention forces and will probably remain after their departure: the outer participants only trouble an existing balance of power by provoking a new balance.
124. ***These interactions internal to the Host-Nation must be taken into account at every level in the preparation and in the conduct of counter-insurgency actions, because a success against one or another actor modifies the existing social balance and may provoke the hostility of other actors.***

¹⁹ By favouring, for instance, the designation of legitimate representatives accordingly with the local customs.

²⁰ David Galula: **Counterinsurgency, Theory and practice**, Economica, Paris, 2008 (p. 17-18).

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Chapter 2

Characteristics of current insurgencies

201. Current insurgencies can have different causes and take very diverse forms. In particular, their use of violence can be more or less developed. This joint doctrine only looks at insurgencies reaching a level of armed violence which justifies an armed forces intervention. Its attempt is, through their variety, to outline their most frequent forms and principles.

Section I - Determining factors of an insurgency

202. An insurrection needs “**compost**”, i.e. a context in which to grow and develop. This context is mostly made of population’s cleavages and frustrations, aggravated by the cyclical weakness of the existing political system and the weakening of the social link.

Grievances of the population

203. Taking advantage of the weakness of the political system of the Host-Nation, the insurgents’ insurgency gets its support from and develops on the grievances of the population, in particular those grievances which the population has toward its government:
- a. Unsatisfied political expectations.
 - b. Feeling of injustice (in particular, towards social inequality, poverty and unemployment).
 - c. Lost confidence in public authorities (absence or ineffectiveness of public utilities, corruption, muddle, absence of justice, etc.).
 - d. Feeling of revolt in front of a rough repression, etc.
204. ***These motives for dissatisfaction must be identified to fight the insurgency’s factors or at least not to strengthen them by awkward actions (detrimentalisation, movement of population).***

Structural factors influencing an insurgency

205. Experience has shown that an insurgency also stems, more profoundly, from structural factors such as socio-anthropological features of the population, as well as geographical characteristics of the territory where insurgencies occur.

Human factors

206. History brought to light socio-anthropological characters which appeared to favour the emergence and the development of insurgencies:
- a. Clan or tribal societies, which ignore, even contest by tradition, any kind of central power.
 - b. Compartmentalized and isolated societies, worried to protect their strong cultural tradition²¹, can develop xenophobic hostile reactions against anyone or any influence which would appear as foreign to them.
 - c. Societies characterised by a dynamic demography made of a population of unemployed young men.

²¹ Even worried about the weakening of this identity under the outside pressure (globalisation).

- d. Societies having a favourable cultural relationship to violence²² (warring tradition²³, culture of “vendetta”, “raids”, etc.).
 - e. The rapidly changing societies (loss or weakening of values, implosion of traditional family models and social model, etc.).
 - f. Fanaticism (in particular religious) and lack of education, which may be exploited by the rebels’ propaganda, etc.
207. **Knowledge, for lack of understanding, of the specific culture of the considered populations and of their relations, as of their interests, constitutes a prerequisite to understand the psycho-sociological foundations of an insurgency to better fight against it.**

Geographical factors

208. Characteristics of the geographical environment also constitute factors favouring insurgencies, as they can be of use by the insurgents as safe haven:
- a. Remote, compartmentalized regions which are difficult to access (“viscous” areas such as mountains, swampy zones, deserts, etc.).
 - b. Covered or “opaque” areas (anarchy urbanization, subterranean infrastructures, forests, etc.).
 - c. “Porous” borders and borderlands, i.e. which are unchecked, as well controversial borders, which artificially divide one population.

Section II – Objectives and strategy of the insurgency

Insurrectionary strategy

209. By definition, an insurgency aims at the reversal of the existing social order between government and citizens to set up a new political order to which it aspires²⁴, *by acting inside the considered Host-Nation.*
210. In the classic theoretical models of the revolutionary wars²⁵, the insurgency has to evolve gradually from an underground movement into guerrilla warfare and develop until being able to face a classic battle against security forces²⁶. Today, without being totally ruled out, this model is less likely to occur because it involves a massive support by third countries²⁷.
211. Current insurgencies, especially if they are confronted with western coalitions and their overwhelming material superiority, will aim at **weakening** rather than breaking the will of their opponents. Acting in the long term, supporters of the insurgency seek to provoke a **rupture** between the population and its legal government to set up a new political balance that will comply with their intentions²⁸. For that purpose, the insurgents attack the power in place, while capitalizing on the grievances of the population which support is actively sought. The insurgency, in its most elaborated forms, constitutes a **deliberate and methodical campaign of destruction by violence and subversion of the existing socio-political order.**
212. In this perspective, if a victory against intervention forces does not constitute for the insurgents an objective in itself, it stands as an **obstacle** in the way of their objectives of undermining the existing social balance. **The aim of insurgents is to force intervention forces to leave the theatre of operations or at least to paralyse their action.**

²² This is usually illustrated by the presence of a significant number of weapons within the population.

²³ The attraction to the “game” and the prestige of the “caid” through the participation in an insurgency often constitutes a determining motivation to the youngest.

²⁴ Or prevent the implementation of a political change against its intentions.

²⁵ Cf. Lenin, Mao, Che Guevarra, etc.

²⁶ Just like Vietminh in Indochina.

²⁷ As it was the case within the framework of the strategy of bypassing of blocks during the Cold War.

²⁸ Or prevent the implementation of a political change going against their intentions.

The population: major stake in insurgency

213. Insurgency, which is illegal and clandestine, and sometime divided, has to have a popular support as wide as possible, without which it cannot survive. It seeks to spread this popular base through violence and the persuasion to make gradually tip over the balance of power to the detriment of the political authority in place. **The population is thus the main stake in insurgency.**
214. In its attacks against the power in place, the insurgents are less eager to weaken the legalist coercion capabilities (at least initially) than **to discredit this power** in front of the population. It will operate for instance by attacking targets having high symbolic value (authorities, official buildings, etc.). It also seeks to separate citizens from the power in place by systematically eliminating all its loyal supporters among elites.
215. At the same time, insurgents generally seek to **aggravate the motives of the population for dissatisfaction** of the power in place, for example:
- By discrediting public authorities²⁹ and by systematically exploiting their mistakes and those of the foreign participants who support them through propaganda.
 - By trying to provoke a psychological shock within the population, by means of intimidation, exacerbation of internal tensions, and possibly, terrorist actions.
 - By exposing voluntarily the population to the repression of law enforcement forces to engage a *"terrorism - rough repression"* spiral, the first victim of which will be the population.
216. Finally, the insurgency proponents often want to appear as a **credible alternative to the power in place** in the regions which it dominates, by executing sovereign functions such as justice, law enforcement, or social welfare. Such activities being performed, **it increases its influence within the population**, on which it will be able to exert a control and indoctrinate³⁰.
217. However, depending on its objectives, considering the local specificities and heterogeneousness of the population, the insurgency can exercise in many different ways its actions towards the population. It can directly look for its **support**, or at least its **passivity** (by way of persuasion, manipulation and/or terror), often so as to cover for its **underground activities**, to ensure its **logistic needs** (human, financial and material resources) and to obtain **information**. It can also directly use the population as an **instrument** in a passive way (for example, as a *"human shield"*), or in a more active way (for example, by provoking sways in the crowd or recruiting *"auxiliaries"*, etc.). Finally, it can exploit and **intensify tensions** within the population (inter-ethnic, inter-religious, inter-clan, etc) to reach its objectives (if they are of ethnic, religious or clan order), or sometimes, in the sole purpose of provoking inter-community violence and chaos and serve its interests.

Use of violence in insurgency

218. The **use of violence** characterizes an insurgency with regard to any other kind of protest movements against an established power. It justifies an appropriate security response.
219. This violence can take multiple forms: intimidation, kidnappings, terrorist attacks, actions of harassment, military attacks, etc. A threshold is reached when law enforcement forces have no more capabilities to respond to the threat. Therefore a military response must be made. Such responses, non-military and military, do not exclude one another: the same insurgent group can use successively or simultaneously different means of violence. **This interweaving of means of violence in insurgencies justifies a wider range of capabilities of the security forces cooperating in close conjunction.**
220. It should be underline that whatever the mode of action employed by insurgents, it is its **impact on the opinions** which is though rather than the concrete tactical effect. This violence, which

²⁹ Sometimes by undermining them internally by subversive activities (infiltration in the political and security apparatus, corruption, dishonest compromise, etc.).

³⁰ Cf. the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) which use the Marxist methods of control of the masses and the *Hezbollah* in South Lebanon.

for that reason can take extreme and spectacular forms³¹, serves above all the insurgents' propaganda.

Propaganda³² as the insurgency's major weapon

221. Insurgents always try to compensate for their material and often human resources weakness by trying to increase its influence and exaggerate its importance not only within the local public opinions, but also within the regional and international opinions.
222. ***Propaganda is thus existential, even vital, in an insurgency.***
223. Indeed, propaganda allows the insurgency to continue to exist in spite of the successes of security forces. Similarly, only propaganda can allow insurgents to hope for a victory:
- a. By turning to its advantage the major part of the local population.
 - b. By undermining the will and spirit to defend of the legal political authorities and local security forces.
 - c. By arousing a feeling of sympathy, at both regional and international levels, which will provide it resources (human, material, and financial).
 - d. By provoking the attrition or the switch of the public opinions of other countries intervening with security forces and, later, by provoking their refusal of the intervention.
 - e. By acquiring on the local, regional and international scene a legitimacy which confers it a status of political interlocutor and credible alternative to the existing system.
224. Therefore, propaganda is more important for insurgents than direct military actions. It is not just a simple exploitation of such actions. On the contrary, it is mainly the impact on public opinions which guides the choice of the courses of action of insurgents. Violence can be sporadic and propaganda contaminates minds in a permanent way.
225. As a result, insurgency privileges all forms of propaganda, regardless of the truth of facts, as opposed to task forces which are anxious to communicate on known facts. It bases mostly this propaganda on an ideological message, of political or religious nature, which constitutes a political and social counter-proposal to the existing order, justifies it and gives it all its substance. It also takes advantage of the access to the New Technologies of Information and Communication (NTIC) to give to its propaganda an international echo³³.

Exploitation of time by the insurgency

226. Often unable to obtain a quick victory, the insurgency tries to operate on a long term basis to capitalize over time and provoke the "decay" of a situation and affect the will of the opponent.
227. In order to last, it relies on the social fabric from which it has arisen. If necessity, it can remain "asleep" for a long period of time by establishing itself within the population which will shelter it. In that case, it limits its existence to rare actions with strong impacts in terms of propaganda³⁴. That is why ***time usually is in favour of insurgency***. Well rooted, insurgency can content itself with surviving and showing here and there its presence by symbolic actions with strong visibility, while increasing at the same time its influence on the population.
228. On the other hand, in certain cases, the ***tiredness of the population*** undermines insurgents, in particular if the continuation of the insurgency compromises the resumption of economic activities, and if it appears to the majority of the population that it represents an unbearable obstacle to development and has no real purpose.

³¹ Cf. the blind attacks in the middle of crowds or the filmed execution of prisoners.

³² **Propaganda** indicates all the actions led in the informative environment to alter, force and control perceptions, attitudes and behaviour. Its purpose is to strike a deliberate blow at the individual or collective free-will by the degradation and/or the forgery of information. To reach its goals, it proposes a voluntarily distorted understanding of a fact. Propaganda privileges the manipulation of emotions and feelings to the detriment of the faculties of reasoning and judgment. It resorts, among others, to threat, violence, terror, and lie. It can use methods to subdue, enrol and indoctrinate. Of coercive nature, propaganda acts in a hostile way which places it outside the acceptable field of influence (temporary definition).

³³ But sometimes, this propaganda can remain very informal and limit itself to rumours more or less created and maintained at the local level.

³⁴ Even rare, these actions are absolutely necessary for the insurgency to survive.

Section III – Insurgency’s structure and courses of action

A “composite” insurgency

229. Recent insurgencies seem mostly constituted of more or less autonomous groups of circle influence acting through network systems, which constitute a novelty with regard to insurgent movements generally structured in a hierarchical way during wars of decolonization. **“Composite” insurgencies are formed of complex, more or less coordinated and evolutionary networks systems of different insurgent groups.**
230. Each of these groups is characterized by:
- Its **motivations**, which can be of strictly political order (conquest of the power for the power), of ideological, religious, or economical order (even criminal). They can thus go from the simple quest for profit to the most extreme fanaticism. These motivations are often interrelated and/or evolve over time³⁵. Political demands can mask economic interests, etc.
 - Its **capabilities** (staff, armament, material and financial resources, discipline and training, etc.) which are more or less developed and which condition its choice for regular and irregular courses of action. They can allow it to lead large-scale military actions of conventional type or on the contrary, confine it to terrorist types of actions.
 - Its **legitimacy**³⁶, which may vary. A group can have a strong local hold and not be recognized at the regional level and inversely. The degree of legitimacy of a group at the level of the theatre of operations³⁷ conditions its freedom of action on the theatre of operations. In addition, its legitimacy at the regional level (even at the international level) conditions the level of human and material support it can benefit from foreign countries.
231. Every group distinguishes itself by a combination of these three characters, which allow to differentiate them but which are susceptible to evolve over time.




Figure 7 - Characterization of an insurgent group according to its motivations, capabilities and legitimacy.

232. In a composite insurgency, various groups can ally durably, punctually rely on each other, live together, be rivals, or even fight against each other.
233. **Beyond the knowledge of each specific insurgent group, it is also the understanding of the relations connecting or opposing them which is decisive to fully understand the particularly complex system of an insurgency.**

³⁵ Cf. FARC in Colombia.

³⁶ Understood here as the not legal sense of the degree of recognition, acceptance and support which the public opinion grants to the considered group.

³⁷ That is, the more or less important implementation of this group in the Host-Nation and the level of acceptance of this latter.




Figure 8 - Composite insurgency and relations between insurgent groups.

Insurgents

234. Every insurrectionary group generally consists in a nucleus of **permanent members** (executives, combatants, infiltrated agents, etc.) and **non permanent** or “*occasional*” members (auxiliaries, sympathizers). The auxiliaries, for example, take weapons or set up traps³⁸ on a punctual basis for money or because they are under threat.
235. It is therefore sometimes difficult to **distinguish an insurgent from the local population** because he is part of it and often arises from it. Furthermore, insurgency often relies on “*occasional*” insurgents, who may constitute the majority³⁹ of its manpower and represent an inexhaustible human resource, as long as the underlying causes of the insurgency are not eradicated.
236. At the individual level, insurgents’ motivations are diverse and, except for those of leaders, they can sometimes diverge from those shown by the group⁴⁰. The individual commitment to insurgency reflects, in an extreme way, widespread frustrations of the population and/or its most violent socio-anthropological characters. However, insurgent groups know how to federate these individual motivations to recruit members by proposing them a framework of materially viable action and by transcending them through propaganda in a superior project of society change.

Invariants of the insurgency

237. The insurgents’ main asset is their **large freedom of action** given:
- Their “*low signature*”, most particularly their dissimulation within the population⁴¹.
 - Their “*fluidity*”⁴².
 - Their rejection of the normative constraints adopted by their opponents (respect of the rule of law, the Geneva Conventions, the ethical rules, etc.).
 - Their advantage in terms of HUMAN INTelligence (HUMINT) capabilities and their capability to defend their organization against infiltration attempts⁴³.

³⁸ Of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) type.

³⁹ In some Afghanistan regions, they are estimated to represent about 80 % of insurgent groups.

⁴⁰ Cf. the motivations of the candidates for suicide attacks in Afghanistan.

⁴¹ They try to escape the sensors of security forces by exploiting the “*opaque*” areas (cities, covered zones) in which these sensors are less effective, even ineffective, and especially by blending in with the population.

⁴² Which is based on their tactical mobility and facilitates them to change posture (activity or “*dormant state*”).

238. However, insurgency always suffers from **structural weaknesses**:
- a. They have generally limited fighting capabilities⁴⁴.
 - b. The various groups are often badly coordinated, divided, even opposed.
 - c. They remain dependent on the support of the population (logistic, at least).
 - d. They often depend on foreign supports and/or on their backing for criminal activities.
 - e. They need a “safe heaven” (inside or outside the Host-Nation), at least for their training.
 - f. Their tactical communications still remain widely vulnerable in the age of electronic war.
239. Insurgencies are often dual in nature. They can lead concurrently their irregular and regular activities (of political, social, religious order, etc), sometimes through a “legal front”⁴⁵. This **duality** makes the identification of insurgents more complex. **It should be taken into account in the understanding of the insurgency environment⁴⁶ and intelligence activities.**
240. The different **types of military actions** of the insurgent groups go from terrorist attacks, possibly “suicide” attacks, to conventional military actions, including harassing actions such as guerrilla warfare. It depends on each groups’ specific characteristics (motivations, capabilities, legitimacy). But, because of the asymmetric nature of insurgents, they mostly seek to “bypass” security forces and lead them to a terrain where they can hardly use their superiority (in particular, technological superiority). They are therefore concerned above all by their psychological impact on public opinions. In spite of the low scale of their tactical actions, insurgents try to produce a strategic effect that would be the most important as possible. Finally, these actions are transformed according to the evolution of the situation and they adapt to the actions and reactions of security forces.
241. An insurgent has a high **capacity of adaptation**. He quickly reacts to nature, means and courses of action of the forces against which he fights:
- a. Military courses of action generally urge him to avoid confrontation and favour indirect military actions (harassment⁴⁷), even terrorists actions, according to a process of “asymmetrisation”.
 - b. Inversely, the insurgent will tend to adopt the behaviour of a criminal if he is opposed to law enforcement forces.
242. **These effects on insurgent courses of action must be anticipated when choosing the type of security forces to commit as well as their courses of action.**

Factors of evolution of modern insurgencies

243. In spite of the emergence of composite insurgencies, of less structural hierarchy and working on more or less organized networks, current insurgent groups benefit from the easy access to new technologies available on the market.

A “connected” insurgency

244. The novelty today lies especially in the access of the insurgents to **New Technologies of Information and Communication** or NTIC (internet, satellite telephones, etc.), which are available on the civilian market. These new technologies do not only allow insurgents to access

⁴³ Because of their immersion in the human environment and of their use of the population as sensors.

⁴⁴ Their access to sophisticated weapons could constitute a “strategical break” (for example, if they get themselves surface-to-air missiles).

⁴⁵ Cf. Sinn Fein and Irish Republican Army (IRA), as well as Hezbollah.

⁴⁶ In particular in the identification of local elites (Key Leaders Engagement [KLE]): cf. § 509.

⁴⁷ Cf. the development of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in reaction to the intensification of the big military operations of the Coalition in Afghanistan.

to information⁴⁸ and communicate among themselves much more easily than in past. They also offer them an access to international medias and sometimes give a world echo to their propaganda. Moreover, they have learnt to exploit these new possibilities to glorify their fight and try to subjugate western opinions.

Access to key military capabilities

245. Besides this access to NTIC, modern insurgencies can more easily have access to **military capabilities** that were, until now, reserved to conventional armed forces, in particular:
- a. Night-vision devices.
 - b. Last generation sophisticated weapons⁴⁹.
 - a. Capabilities of Chemical - Bacteriological - Radiological - Nuclear (CBRN) type.
246. An insurgency can thus today acquire capabilities allowing it to obtain punctual superiority in given domains over modern armies. Its access to particular piece of equipment and armaments (cf. surface-to-air missiles) can constitute an important risk of strategic “*break*” at the level of a theatre of operations. Its access to CBRN capabilities could provoke a major “*strategic surprise*” in the future.

⁴⁸ In particular in the “*blogs*” of task forces soldiers, which militates for an intensification of information safety within the framework of the Operations Security (OPSEC).

⁴⁹ Cf. use of antitank missiles of last generation, surface-to-sea missiles and UAVs from Hezbollah.

Operational environment of the counter-insurgency

Section I – Key counter-insurgency operational factors

301. This chapter describes the current operational environment of forces committed in counter-insurgency operations in a Host-Nation or region in the grip of an insurgency. It underlines the contemporary environment factors which influence directly the employment of armed forces in counter-insurgency.

Specificity of the context of intervention

302. Due to the influence of the particularities of human and geographical⁵⁰ environments on insurgency emergence and development, each commitment in counter-insurgency is specific to the theatre of intervention. The regional environment of this theatre is also decisive, in particular if one or more adjoining countries supports or hosts part or all of the insurgency.
303. The context of intervention also includes the legal and political framework of the commitment (international organisation) as well as the nature and number of participants (military coalition, institutional civilian and non-governmental participants, etc.).
304. ***Such diverse situations imply that there is no “recipe” in counter-insurgency. Each insurgency is unique and answers must be pragmatic and permanently adapted to the situations at a local level. External counterparts need to acquire knowledge and understanding of the context specificities, particularly taking into account the Host-Nation’s culture, religion, and history.***

Intervention in counter-insurgency in a sovereign Host-Nation

305. Unlike the “*pacification*” of past experiences, counter-insurgency aims at producing conditions allowing restoration of the social link within a sovereign Host-Nation. Intervention forces are not to impose an alien order, to conquer nor to stay in the Host-Nation, but rather to transfer the responsibility for security to local forces as soon as possible. ***The intervention forces’ action aims at supporting the local political structure. In all cases, the local political system is the one directing, and possibly constraining, their action.***
306. In the eyes of the population, the legitimacy of their local authority conditions the legitimacy of intervention forces. On the other hand, a lack of legitimacy of this political power condemns by advance any operational success in the long run. Local security forces can be seen as the instrument of an iniquitous or controversial power and intervention forces, in spite of their efforts to take into account the aspirations of the population, are extremely likely to be considered as accomplices of an unrighteous order.
307. Even if intervention forces do not have a direct impact on the legitimacy of the local political system, they must:
- a. ***Respect the pre-eminence of the system and the Host-Nation’s political decision.***
 - b. ***Understand the extremely strong interaction between their action and the political nature of counter-insurgency⁵¹.***
 - c. ***Emphasize actions promoting the appropriation of the political process of reconciliation*** by local managers and the population.

⁵⁰ As well as the decisive impact that can have climate and seasons on human activities.

⁵¹ David Galula: ***Counterinsurgency, Theory and practice***, Économica, Paris, 2008 (p. 18) “[...] politic it-self has become an operational function. Interactions between political and military operations have become so strong that they cannot be neatly separated anymore; on the contrary, any military intervention must be organized taking into account its political effects and vice versa”.

- d. **Support – and sometimes reinforce – the legitimacy of public authorities**, in particular that of local security forces, by improving their capacities whenever possible, promoting their ethics, giving them a sense of responsibility, and promoting their role in the eyes of the population.
- e. **Promote and ensure the protection of local loyalist elites** – insofar as they are exemplary, for they are the best intermediary between the population where the counter-insurgency is lying and the political alternative carried by the local government.
- f. **Be firm with local authorities of all levels that do not respect the rights of their population.**

The major role of population

308. Like for the insurgency⁵², **local population constitutes the major stake of the Host-Nation's political power**. Consequently, intervention forces must take into account its central place. They must seek, if not the adhesion, at least the **neutrality** of the population. Intervention forces may not necessarily be able to directly reduce the population's dissatisfaction but they must be aware of it in order to prevent it from increasing by acting in inappropriate courses. They also must respect local customs and beliefs. Finally, they must aim to **protect the population** from insurgent action and rising propaganda, should they not be able to guarantee its permanent and total protection.
309. The **maintain of their legitimacy**, as for any form of stabilisation and, in an even more critical way in counter-insurgency, constitutes a priority for intervention forces, in particular with respect to local population. Any defect of their legitimacy reinforces, by contrast, that of the insurgency within the population: indeed, insurgency tends to exploit errors or faults of behaviour of the forces. In this respect, **intervention forces must avoid causing collateral victims and unnecessary destruction**. Likewise, the **quality of their image** within the population is crucial.
310. Due to the intricacy of insurgents and local population, **“gaining the hearts and minds”** of the population seems an unrealistic, even unsuited⁵³, goal to achieve for intervention forces. This should not constitute an aim in itself but be achieved by leading a determined action towards **“irreconcilable” adversaries**⁵⁴ while leaving an open door to the rallying of less hostile insurgents. It should also be achieved by helping with the treatment at the source of the insurgency, by creating favourable conditions for the alternative political project carried by the local government and its intermediaries within the population. It is rather a question **“of liberating the hearts and minds”** than **“gaining them”**.

Multinational interventions in counter-insurgency

311. Current commitments in counter-insurgency are generally multinational. This **multinational environment** constitutes a great novelty compared to past experiences. It reinforces the legitimacy of intervention at an international level but also constitutes an operational constraint⁵⁵ which must be taken into account during the planning phase⁵⁶. Insurgency is most likely to seek by all the means to weaken the cohesion of the coalition adopting, for example, different courses of actions depending on the contingents.

Imperative respect of the law⁵⁷

312. **Respect of the law** is for intervention forces a requirement which must always guide the use of force⁵⁸, especially since irregular means of actions employed by insurgents aim at destabilizing them and inducing them into committing mistakes. Forces in COIN are thus subjected to the law of armed conflicts and must obey to the following basic principles:

⁵² Cf. JC-01, p. 12.

⁵³ For intervention forces, the aim resides more in obtaining respect from the population rather than *“being loved”*, it is however necessary not to be rejected, notably in order to maintain contact and obtain information.

⁵⁴ Especially if the local population regards the Force as important and respects it.

⁵⁵ Cf. national limitations (caveats) and the risk of lack of political direction always clear.

⁵⁶ These constraints can be attenuated for troops on the ground by the attribution of a zone of national responsibility; however, the risk of different approaches is high and uneven depending on zones. Distortions between contingents are then limited at the operational level. These measures have no effect on the use of air means as they fly over various contingents.

⁵⁷ Cf. JC-01, p. 12.

⁵⁸ In particular, the Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols.

- a. **Principle of distinction** between civilians and combatants, as well as between military objectives and civil properties⁵⁹.
 - b. **Principle of proportionality**: prohibition of excessive use of force and unnecessary collateral damages⁶⁰.
 - c. **Principle of humanity**: prohibition of afflicting any sorrow, inhuman or degrading treatment⁶¹.
313. Law has a great impact on some activities such as the handling of captured persons. However, legal regulations do not always cover the extent of difficulties encountered by forces in COIN. Thus, because of the superposition of legal system⁶², the absence of an established legal status of **captured insurgents** can be brought to court and sometimes be exploited through the media by sympathizers of insurgency⁶³. Consequently, the order must at least guarantee the respect of the basic principles of humanity so as to ensure the protection of these captured persons as long as their status is not defined in accordance with the Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions. It is thus necessary to anticipate the capture and detention of insurgents during the planning phase at strategic level, to issue precise orders on the matter – in particular on the **rules of engagement**⁶⁴ – and to have **adequate means** in volume and quality (specialized staff, dedicated infrastructures and logistics, etc.)⁶⁵.

Public opinion

314. Insurgents know exactly how to manipulate the **media** for the benefit of their propaganda and at the expense of intervention forces⁶⁶. Moreover, media coverage⁶⁷ on losses suffered by forces and collateral damages endured by local population touches even more the public opinion at both national and international levels. Insurgents are perfectly aware of this sensitivity and will thus use the media to cover, and even stage, losses within the Force and local population, as well as the detention and possible execution of its prisoners, so as to harm the national support for the intervention.
315. **For insurgents, the centre of gravity of intervention forces often lies in their national public opinion.** For this reason, it is imperative to concentrate on **communication strategy**⁶⁸, **the protection of the Force and local population** as well as the constant concern of avoiding **collateral losses**.

Time factor

316. Counter-insurgency is usually committed to continuity, especially if the insurgency takes deep roots in a society and durably weakens its pillars of stability, whose reconstruction always requires much time. This lap of time usually benefits to insurgents and plays against intervention forces. Unfavourable propaganda may denounce the prolonged presence of intervention forces as an occupation. Likewise, it does not satisfy the requirement for performance and impatience of Western societies. Public opinions are sensitive to losses and are also concerned about the financial costs of intervention, especially if it lasts. They are often prompt to denounce it as “*bogging down*”.
317. **For this reason, time factor is a decisive parameter during the strategic planning phase of the intervention forces in counter-insurgency.**

⁵⁹ In particular, articles 48 and 52, 2nd paragraph, of the Additional Protocol I of 1977 regarding the protection of victims of international armed conflicts.

⁶⁰ In particular, article 57 of the Additional Protocol I and articles 22 and 23 of the convention regarding laws and customs of the 1907 war.

⁶¹ In particular, articles 12 and 50 of the Geneva Convention I on the condition improvement of the injured and patients in the armed forces in campaign; articles 12 and 51 of the Geneva Convention II on the condition improvement of the injured, patients, and shipwrecked in the armed forces at sea; articles 17, 87 and 130 of the Geneva Convention III relative to the treatment of prisoners of war; articles 32, 100, 118, and 147 of the Geneva Convention IV relative to the protection of the civil people in time of war; article 3, common with all four Geneva Conventions in the event of non-international armed conflict; article 75 of Additional Protocol I; article 4 of Additional Protocol II relative to the protection of the victims of the non-international armed conflicts.

⁶² Superposition of international law, national (and customary) law of the Host-Nation, national law of intervention forces. Problem may arise particularly when there is contradiction between the law of the Host-Nation and that of one or several intervening States, for example.

⁶³ Cf. prisoners of IRA, etc.

⁶⁴ Conditions of arrest, interrogation, safeguard of prisoners, etc.

⁶⁵ Cf. concept of management of the captured persons (under development).

⁶⁶ Cf. report of **Paris-Match** after the ambush of Uzbeen to the autumn 2008.

⁶⁷ Cf. JC-01, p. 11.

⁶⁸ Starting from the objectives and topics established by high ranking civil and military authorities, the **communication strategy** consists of developing communication actions and key messages supporting a military campaign. It is formalized by a plan of communication (provisional definition).

318. **The “desired goals – dedicated means – estimated duration of intervention” equation** must be considered during the pre-decision phase and clearly presented to the political decision-maker at the time of the choice of a strategic option. Likewise, objectives of a military intervention must remain realistic, concrete, with a reasonable level of ambition. Tangible results must be reached within delays compatible with the impatience of Western opinions. For this purpose, it is necessary to **elaborate precise, relevant, and significant indicators so as to appreciate the evolution of a situation, measure its progress, and communicate on concrete criteria**⁶⁹.
319. The **first months of commitment**⁷⁰ appear decisive in the exploitation of the new balanced situation provoked by the intervention within the Host-Nation’s society. Intervention forces may reduce insurgents’ military capabilities; they should then prevent insurgents from regaining military power by first privileging a police answer and concentrating its efforts on public safety. This action must be combined with concrete improvements in governance, economic and social development, so as to keep up with local population’s hopes for change brought by the intervention. At this stage, it is important not to foster false hopes by making unrealistic promises.
320. Lastly, **(re)construction of local security forces’ capabilities** constitutes a priority so that they can take over responsibility for the security constituent of the counter-insurgency. Intervention forces must act quickly in this mission of Operational Military Assistance (OMA) and possibly take the initiative to start military assistance as soon as possible.

Section II – Actors of counter-insurgency

321. Intervention forces are only one of the multiple actors of counter-insurgency. They intervene in an already complex internal interaction between actors of the Host-Nation⁷¹. As their action modifies the existing balance, they must interact with the other actors of counter-insurgency.

Intervention forces in counter-insurgency

322. Objects of the doctrine defined here, intervention forces in counter-insurgency have assets but usually lack of freedom of action when facing insurgents.

Positive asymmetries

323. Intervention forces are by far superior to insurgents in terms of capabilities, particularly in the following fields:
- a. Air assets (fire support, transport, observation, versatility, etc.).
 - b. Continuous and all-weather combat (night vision capabilities, thermal imagery devices, radars, etc.).
 - c. Firepower of direct or indirect fire weapons.
 - d. Protection (personnel, vehicles and infrastructures).
 - e. Command and Control (C2) thanks to the Communication and Information Systems (CIS).
 - f. Technical means of collection of information (IMINT, ELINT and computer data).
324. Intervention forces are also superior in terms of legitimacy at the international level, as their intervention is often authorized and supported by a UN Security Council’s resolution. Lastly, their intervention provokes a rupture of the existing balance established by insurgents, which can bring hope to local population⁷².

⁶⁹ Measures of Effectiveness (MoE), as well as Measures of Progress (MoP).

⁷⁰ Sometimes called “state of grace” or “Golden Hour” by Anglo-Saxons. Analysts estimate its duration to approximately six months.

⁷¹ See § 118.

⁷² See § 322.

325. **These positive asymmetries of intervention forces must be exploited, namely to partly compensate for the relative small numbers of deployed units.**

Negative asymmetries

326. Intervention forces dispose of **limited manpower** that often does not meet requirements for control over large areas⁷³ for extended periods of time. Vast zones may thus be left under the grip of insurgents, allowing them to regenerate and to move assets through these areas when they shift their tactical point of effort.
327. Taking into account the sensitivity of Western public opinions over losses, the absolute requirement for **protection** can restrain the employment of armed forces. Individual protections limit combatants' mobility in rough terrain at the benefit of very mobile insurgents at a tactical level. They also hamper contact with the local population harder⁷⁴. Indeed, tanks and armoured vehicles do not go unnoticed and thus generate tensions within the population (public road damage, obstruction, dust, noise, aggressive posture, etc.). Quarters in extremely protected large bases not only break with the French land forces' culture, by appearing like a timorous and self-oriented force, but also constitute easy targets for insurgents, in particular through indirect fires⁷⁵. In addition, protection tasks overburden manpower needed in mobile operations. A right compromise must thus be found between Force protection and control of the ground through small outposts scattered all over the area.
328. Intervention forces own powerful technical sensors but, on the other hand, they can lack efficient capabilities of human intelligence to penetrate a human environment which is often very different (local languages and dialects, culture, etc.) and where insurgents reside. However, as the human and cultural dimension of COIN is decisive in the preparation and conduct of action, knowing this handicap⁷⁶ is necessary to fully understand the operational environment. It can be partly compensated by a stability of the personnel dedicated to the collection of HUMINT and by maintaining information sources going. Likewise, intelligence forces must contribute to the **"Human Terrain Initiative" (HTI)**⁷⁷ analysis, as well as receive training (learning languages, etc.) for a better awareness of the cultural specificities of the theatre of operations.



Figure 9 - Operational Search Operations (OSO) collect intelligence.

329. Intervention forces maintain air superiority but not necessarily **ground tactical mobility** superiority. Geographical nature of the theatre of operations can adversely affect their transportation means (poor highway network, landlocked and isolated zones, etc.). Likewise, free

⁷³ On average, one soldier per 40 inhabitants is needed to control a zone for long periods of time in a relatively hostile context. This ratio fluctuates depending on the nature of the insurgency and of the human and geographical environment.

⁷⁴ And consequently, reduce the liberty of action of the information means of human intelligence.

⁷⁵ Rocket - Artillery - Mortar (RAM) threat.

⁷⁶ Which sometimes may appear as an aggressive cultural behaviour.

⁷⁷ The **Human Terrain Initiative (HTI)** is defined as the sum of interactions between individual or collective actors, constituted in systems which can affect the employment of forces in a given zone. Its analysis aims at bringing the knowledge and understanding of the HTI in order to contribute to the politico-military decision, the preparation and conduct of operations, the steering of the choice of courses of action, and to update the behaviour and skills of the deployed force. It contributes to evaluate the effects of the strategy carried out on the human environment of an open theatre or upcoming theatre of operations.

access to main roads and logistic flows is a particularly significant challenge. Thus, intervention forces need significant airmobile transportation assets (in particular, heavy-lift helicopters).

330. Lastly, forces undergo many constraints in their action, making them extremely **predictable** (political and legal constraints, multinational contingents, media coverage of their action, Force protection, etc.). This visibility, along with their vulnerability to adverse intelligence, makes it extremely hard to produce a surprise effect on insurgents. However, this predictability can be turned into an asset⁷⁸ and produce positive outcomes.

Local security forces

331. The fragility or inexistence of local security forces has usually triggered external military intervention.
332. **Enhancing operational capabilities of local forces must be one of the priorities of intervention forces from the moment they commit into action.** This key goal is planned and conducted at the operational level and is implemented by land and Special Forces components, starting at the local level up to national training centres.



Figure 10 - The Force has to monitor the training of the local police.

333. **Operational Military Assistance (OMA)**⁷⁹ contributes to the education and training of these local forces. It is thus a key support which must be developed in counter-insurgency. The build-up, as well as the employment of these local forces, must be respectful to their specific assets and cultural traditions (organization, style of combat, etc.). In such operational context, these forces must be directed towards capabilities (in particular, in **intelligence**) and courses of actions of counter-insurgency based on their knowledge of the human and geographical environment of the theatre. Indeed, they can bring a considerable contribution to gain the control of the environment thanks to their high numbers and human intelligence capabilities, without requiring sophisticated means.
334. Likewise, intervention forces must **support local forces** as soon as these latter regained a sufficient operational level to lead operations and promote them on each occasion. This “*behind the scenes*” action can be an operational constraint⁸⁰ but is required both to achieve the political goal of stabilisation and to preserve the legitimacy of the intervention: supporting local forces, themselves being legitimate, is the only way to justify the long-term presence of foreign forces in the eyes of the population⁸¹.

⁷⁸ By combining it with Military Influence Operations (MIO) towards designated “*targets*”.

⁷⁹ Cf. Joint Exploratory Concept (JEC) 3.21 on *Operational Military Assistance (OMA)*.

⁸⁰ In particular in terms of counter-intelligence, considering the risks of insurgents infiltration of local forces.

⁸¹ Cf. article 15, “*Twenty-Seven Articles*”, The Arab Bulletin, 20th. August 1917 de T. E. Lawrence: “*Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.*”

335. Intervention forces must also consider legalist paramilitary forces, such as self-defence militias and auxiliary units⁸². They must be able to possibly ensure operational military assistance on their behalf, and even direct monitoring should the necessity arise.

Local elites

336. Local leaders, whether institutional, traditional (chiefs of tribes, religious authorities, etc.) or economic, can have a strong impact on their audience and followers. These public personalities play thus the key role of “*ombudsmen*”, in particular within the framework of negotiations (release of hostages, etc.). Intervention forces must know them and interact with them⁸³.
337. **Loyalist elites** (insofar as they are exemplary and effective) are the best conveyor of legal government policy, and thus of counter-insurgency policies towards the population. It is thus important to **promote** them within the framework of a reconciliation policy. Their importance is such that insurgents constantly try to eliminate or intimidate them, at the very least. Their **protection** by security forces is thus required⁸⁴. As long as **moderated opponents** do not support the insurgency and exert a recognized authority, they can have an efficient influence because they are less suspected of being “*paid by foreign powers*”.



Figure 11 - The local elites must be involved in the securing of their village.

338. Contrary to these defended and supported personalities exerting positive influence (“*Positive influencers*”), **personalities exerting a negative influence** (“*Negative influencers*”), in behaviour and public speech, must be denounced and discredited by all the legal means available. Indeed, their bad example may endanger the credibility of the process of reconciliation in the eyes of the population. Force may be used to send them deterrent messages.

Civilian participants

339. Intervention forces interact with an increasingly significant number of institutional (International Organizations [IO], Governmental Organizations [GO]) or non-institutional (Non-Governmental Organizations [NGO], private companies, including Private Security Companies [PSCs]) civilian participants, who contribute, each one in their field, to the stabilisation of the Host-Nation. Intervention forces must know them, cooperate, and coordinate to avoid redundancies and frictions⁸⁵. However, it would be naive to think that all participants will share the same goals⁸⁶.
340. A special attention must be paid to **PSCs** as their activities may interfere with the actions of forces and even blur their perception by the population. However, cooperation and coordination with these societies may be considered on a case-by-case basis.

⁸² See § 507.

⁸³ See § 508.

⁸⁴ See § 651.

⁸⁵ See chapter 5, section II.

⁸⁶ Cf. principles of neutrality and impartiality of some NGO.

341. Overall, external participants have financial resources by far superior to that of insurgents. These resources must be optimized to take the advantage on the insurgency⁸⁷. However, the impact of the economic assistance on the adherence of the population remains hard to evaluate. International funds can be misused and feed corruption. Likewise, a civilian action perceived as imposed from abroad can be counter-productive for the local public opinion. It may disrupt local practices too brutally, be too Western-oriented and thus disconnected from the local culture and habits. This can reinforce the negative opinion, often spread by insurgents, of foreign agents being arrogant. Intervention forces, in particular through their actions of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) for the benefit of the population, must thus ***reinforce the legitimacy of the Host-Nation's public authorities by involving local actors in development projects, by strictly controlling the use of resources allotted to them, and by supporting these projects through a promotion campaign on the collaboration of forces with public authorities.***

⁸⁷ In particular, the allotted funds to the actions of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), on the principle that "money is a weapon".

Contribution of the armed forces in counter-insurgency

Section I – Global role of the armed forces in counter-insurgency

Main role of the armed forces

401. ***The main role of the armed forces in counter-insurgency is to participate in close conjunction with local security forces to the restoration of a safe environment by reducing insurgents' capabilities of action.***



Figure 12 - French, British and ANA soldiers preparing a common mission.

402. ***Contribution to the training and reinforcement of the Host-Nation's military forces (Operational Military Assistance) is also one of the major priorities of intervention forces.***
403. ***Population protection***, described as one of the goals of the military contribution to counter-insurgency in the AJP-3.4.4 (§ 0501 and 0548), is a requirement whose completion is often out of reach, considering the relatively small numbers of deployed units and insurgents' courses of action (terrorism). Efforts must thus be focused on the population of key zones under control, by protecting in priority local elites prone to support the counter-insurgency⁸⁸ and the population from insurgents' propaganda.

Secondary role of the armed forces

404. ***The secondary role of the armed forces is to promote and support other pillars of counter-insurgency (governance/development), as well as to support the alternative political project through the promotion of local security forces.***

Section II – Basics of the military action in counter-insurgency

405. In order to meet the final goal of counter-insurgency, i.e. the ***reconciliation of the Host-Nation***⁸⁹, the five following basic founding principles are to be respected as they are essential to the implementation of military action in COIN. If not respected, the action is usually bound to fail.

Political primacy in COIN: the promotion of a legitimate alternative project

⁸⁸ See § 508 and § 651.

⁸⁹ See § 108.

406. The reconciliation of the Host-Nation requires a political unifying project, carried by the Host-Nation's legitimate authority. This political project must propose and promote a real alternative to the population in order to minimize dissatisfaction and facilitate the process of reconciliation. It must have a clear, strong, and steady political orientation, shared by all actors of the counter-insurgency⁹⁰. The existence of an alternative political project is mandatory for military action to make sense and succeed.

Buying-in of the political project by local authorities and population

407. Above all, external participants, including intervention forces, are supporting the local political project and government in charge. They must integrate their action to the project and promote its local ownership by both authorities and population. This appropriation guarantees the legitimacy of their intervention in the Host-Nation.

Necessity of a comprehensive approach

408. The prominently political nature of counter-insurgency requires a coherent implementation of actions in multiple fields (safety, governance, economy, social and educational action, etc.). Counter-insurgency is therefore multidimensional: the action of forces only is not enough to neutralize an insurgency. These activities require diverse skills and competences, whose military action is only one aspect. A **comprehensive approach**⁹¹ must thus be promoted at the planning phase at strategic level and applied from the theatre of operations downwards to the local tactical level (see § 409 and chapter 5, section II). The action of intervention forces must respond to, and sometimes initiate⁹², this comprehensive approach on the theatre.

Understanding the context as a guide to action

409. In counter-insurgency, the understanding of the context and its evolution is an absolute prerequisite of action, especially with military means. Any action would be useless, even counter-productive and likely bound to fail if this condition is not met. The intelligence function⁹³ plays a key role during phases of planning, and conduct and assessment of the operations in order to reach this level of understanding. Elements of the context must be scanned to plan military actions, assess their opportunity, maximize their impact or find palliative accompanying measures with a view to limiting possible harmful effects.

A decisive strategy of influence

410. Perceptions are decisive in counter-insurgency as they determined the legitimacy of actors at stake. A dynamic strategy of influence is thus essential to counter unfavourable propaganda and discredit the insurgency. Military-wise, this strategy is not limited to the support of operations any longer but orientates them as early as the strategic level. It resides in the acquisition of information dominance⁹⁴ so as to discredit and possibly persuade the opponent to renounce armed struggle.

Section III – Action principles of the armed forces in counter-insurgency

411. The ten following principles⁹⁵ describe the basis of counter-insurgency for intervening armed forces. Their implementation contributes to the success of an intervention in counter-insurgency.
- a. **To adapt to the local context, whatever the command level may be.**
 - b. **To reinforce the credibility of the Force with the whole range of military capabilities and by systematically exploiting positive asymmetries⁹⁶.**

⁹⁰ This implies a strong political commitment of the coalition and of each participating country (and thus acceptance of the investments and agreement to sharing risks).

⁹¹ Cf. letter No 550/DEF/EMA/EMP.1/NP of June 9th, 2010 relative to the comprehensive approach.

⁹² In particular when safety remains fragile.

⁹³ In addition to other functions relative to the knowledge of the environment (cf. CIMIC, HTI analysis, etc.), as well as measurement indicators of the evolution of the situation.

⁹⁴ Situation in which one actor has the advantage to gather, process, and disseminate data on a theatre of operations, allowing him to derive an operational advantage on his opponent.

⁹⁵ These principles are the synthesis of the partial conclusions detailed in the main body of this doctrine.

⁹⁶ To exploit air superiority, night vision capabilities, etc.

- c. **To take and maintain the upper-hand onto the adversary: to impose one's own rhythm of decision to the insurgency and to control operational time.**
- d. **To seize opportunities⁹⁷ and to seek for action continuity⁹⁸.**
- e. **To act as soon as possible in support of local forces.**
- f. **To plan and conduct a coordinated and "agile" operational campaign at the theatre level by combining military actions and actions of influence.**
- g. **To exploit the fragility and heterogeneity of insurgents, to rally the least hostile insurgents to the process, to marginalize and neutralize the irreconcilable ones.**
- h. **To take into account the population: to protect it from the influence of insurgents and particularly, to protect people of positive influence.**
- i. **To seek for a synergy between military and civilian actions on all levels within the framework of a comprehensive approach.**
- j. **To maintain violence on the lowest possible level⁹⁹ by using the sufficient amount of force in actions and by anticipating unwanted effects.**


Section IV – Operational approach

412. To implement a counter-insurgency, and particularly military contribution to a comprehensive approach, the operational framework selected by the AJP-3.4.4 resides on three axes of advance: "clear", "hold", and "build". The national doctrine¹⁰⁰ adds "shape" to these axes of advance (to prepare and shape perceptions in particular).

The Shape – Clear – Hold – Build framework

413. The national operational approach favours the **Shape – Clear – Hold – Build** framework. This operational framework can apply to military and civilian action in counter-insurgency: it involves intervention forces, the Host-Nation, and civilian participants.

Figure 13
The operational Shape – Clear – Hold – Build framework in COIN.



414. **These four axes of advance are not implemented sequentially¹⁰¹ but rather are simultaneous and interconnected. They are balanced in different proportions depending on the situation and evolution of the security level in each considered zone.**

⁹⁷ In particular, by decentralizing command and promoting subsidiarity.

⁹⁸ Namely, by avoiding a change of method with each military commander relief.

⁹⁹ In order to avoid feeding the "insurgent violence – repression" cycle, provoked by the insurgency.

¹⁰⁰ Like the British doctrine (cf. JDP 3-40, p. 4-15: "Shape – Secure – Hold – Develop").

¹⁰¹ Which somewhat differs from the approach exposed in the AJP-3.4.4 (§ 0561).




Figure 14 – Balance of the Shape – Clear – Hold – Build axes of advance in COIN.

Military tasks in the Shape – Clear – Hold – Build framework

415. Diverse military tasks in each axis of advance are listed in the table below:

Shape	Clear	Hold	Build
Intelligence, knowledge and understanding of the context, observation	Direct combat actions increasingly implying local forces	Control of key points Control of itineraries	Emergency humanitarian assistance
Operational preparation	Local forces combat actions support	Reinforcement of local security forces capabilities	Training of military local forces
Planning phase (within the comprehensive approach framework)	Sealing up, screening, hunt and search	Protection of the population, local elites, infrastructures, etc.	Assessment of reconstruction needs
Identification and initial contact with local elites ¹⁰²	Containment and reduction of the insurgency	/	<i>CIMIC</i> Transfer of support activities to the population to civilian organisations (IO, GO, and NGO)
Information operations	/	/	Support to civilian reconstruction actions (governance, economy, etc.)

¹⁰² Cf. Key Leaders Engagement (KLE): § 508.

Specificities of the operational campaign in counter-insurgency

501. The operational level plays a key role in the implementation of military contribution to counter-insurgency. The operational command is located on the theatre of operations, allowing it to better understand a situation's characteristics and closely observe its evolution. Its representatives are the main correspondents of participating organizations and especially of political and military authorities of the Host-State. Lastly, they can deploy a large range of joint forces' capabilities so as to lead an integrated operational campaign, shift efforts, and sustain action of the Force over time.

Section I – Three complementary axes

502. In counter-insurgency, the planning phase and the conduct of operational campaign must always **combine three complementary and interconnected approaches** in order to serve the political objective of reconciliation: the approach towards insurgents, the approach depending on the terrain, and especially, the approach with respect to the population and local elites. A simultaneous action in these three directions can put the insurgency under pressure so as to limit its freedom of action and drive it to a reactive posture. But **putting effort on one approach and striking the right balance between these approaches must be adapted to the local context specificities.**

Approach towards the opponent

503. Most of the time, a strategy of attrition is useless and counter-productive¹⁰³ in counter-insurgency. The popular base available to insurgents provides them with an extensively renewable pool of human resources, especially when the insurgency has not been isolated yet from its external supports.
504. Intervention forces must rather seek to **confine** and **dismantle the insurgency** in conjunction with local forces, i.e.:
- a. To **know** – so as to **understand** – the whereabouts of the various insurgent groups, their ambitions, motivations, capabilities, legitimacy within the local population, but also their relations, opponents, external supports, etc¹⁰⁴. For that purpose, the intelligence function has to play a key-role¹⁰⁵;
 - b. To seek to **rally** the maximum of “reconcilable” groups within the framework of the national reconciliation project but to be able to negotiate in a position of strength. It is thus necessary to maintain a permanent contact with the maximum of insurgent groups, either directly or via adapted correspondents, and to maintain an open door to the least radical ones¹⁰⁶. Here too, the intelligence function plays a decisive role. This rallying must be based on a structured **Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)** process, in particular on the last pillar (which must be financed), if possible.
 - c. To **isolate** insurgent groups by driving them back to least inhabited areas, reducing their influence on the population and cutting them from their external supports.

¹⁰³ Cf. the US “Body Counting” during the Vietnam War.

¹⁰⁴ To reach this understanding, the skills of local loyalists are to be drawn upon.

¹⁰⁵ This knowledge must also allow the set up of Red Teams in command posts which simulate insurgents to test the considered courses of actions of the Force.

¹⁰⁶ Particularly local insurgents who seek in insurgency opportunities more than anything else.

- d. **To divide insurgency by erecting barriers between insurgent groups (physically and through different negotiation processes depending to each group) and by exacerbating their rivalries, even through “intoxication”¹⁰⁷.**
- e. To **neutralize** “irreconcilable” groups by discrediting and/or destroying them. Physical elimination of certain insurgent chiefs allows to reset the dialog or afford a pause until insurgent groups reorganize themselves.




Figure 15 - Action of intervention forces towards insurgent groups.

Approach depending on the terrain

505. Intervention forces must reduce the insurgents' freedom to operate in conjunction with local actors of security by:
- Closely controlling **key zones**¹⁰⁸ of the theatre of operations.
 - Supervising **borders** (should they not be kept closed) to cut insurgents from their supports and external bases.
 - Gradually **extending controlled areas**, while preventing insurgents from gaining back control to one of them. Any retreat would have a disastrous impact on the population's confidence in the law enforcement force of order and would be immediately exploited by insurgents' propaganda.
 - Preventing **uncontrolled areas** from being used by the opponent. Security forces must create and maintain insecurity on the adversary's side in areas that they do not control directly and which can become “refuge” zones by combining the observation and intelligence, important coordinated operations, as well as the implementation of the renovated concept of “light units for counter-guerrilla warfare”¹⁰⁹.

Approach with respect to the population and local elites

506. To **deprive insurgency from its popular support**, intervention forces must carry out the following tasks in conjunction with local actors:
- Support a real **political alternative** to the adverse propaganda in coherence with the local elites and political actors.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. the “bleuite” which decimated the Algerian National Liberation Army (FLN) starting from 1958.

¹⁰⁸ This is about prioritized areas and cities due to their demographic, political, economic, strategic, symbolic, etc., importance (see chapter 5, section III: “Priority zones”).

¹⁰⁹ See § 536.

- b. Support this political project through **Information Operations (IO)**: to convince, disclaim¹¹⁰, act for the benefit of the population by CIMIC actions, fight against adverse propaganda, disseminate a positive image of the Force, etc., by concentrating efforts on areas under control so as to persuade bordering areas to reject insurgents.
 - c. Seek to **reduce the population's dissatisfaction** in conjunction with civilian actors taking part in reconstruction. Intervention forces should employ civilians and outsource part of their support to local companies in order to resume economic activities¹¹¹.
 - d. Systematically **avoid collateral damages**¹¹².
 - e. Contribute to the **population protection** by concentrating efforts on key zones and to the benefit of local elites.
 - f. Support the **control** of the population by local security forces. Possibly issue curfews and set up check points. However, any imposed displacement or regrouping¹¹³ of population elements that could worsen its grievances against the existing system is proscribed.
507. Considering the risks, it is better to avoid arming **self-defence militias** within the population¹¹⁴ whenever possible. Indeed, these militias could join the rows of insurgents, compete with local security forces, or sow the seeds of civil war. However, this solution can be adopted as a last resort to compensate a lack of manpower¹¹⁵. It must then be closely supervised¹¹⁶ and fit in the Security Sector Reform (SSR)¹¹⁷ in the medium term. However, the population may directly participate to the action with security forces by setting up **light formations for counter-guerrilla warfare**¹¹⁸, formed of locals and supervised by military command and support teams at all times. In all cases, these political choices are the responsibility of the Host-Nation. Likewise, protection of these formations' personnel and of their relatives must be taken into account¹¹⁹.
508. Seeking the adhesion of the population may represent a too vague, out of reach, and sometimes counter-productive objective, the effects of which are difficult to assess. Intervention forces must thus seek the **local elites'** active mediation by relying on those exerting a positive influence and by neutralizing those exerting a negative influence¹²⁰. Likewise, considering the political dimension of the intervention forces' action – including their tactical courses of action, any military action should be preceded, accompanied, and exploited by a public information action towards the Host-Nation's institutional and traditional authorities.
509. **Forces must thus develop and maintain close ties with local authorities at all levels of command**¹²¹.
510. Official authorities as well as local leaders (traditional, religious, economic authorities, etc.) must be identified, along with other aspects such as:
- a. Their obedience (political, ethnical, religious, etc.).
 - b. Their opinions (regarding the ruling regime and the insurgency).

¹¹⁰ With simple and adapted messages, particularly to the illiteracy of most of the population.

¹¹¹ Other solutions may be tested, like the French Adapted Military Service (SMA) concept.

¹¹² For example, civil losses during operations, road accidents, destruction of infrastructures caused by inappropriate machines, etc.

¹¹³ Exceptionally, temporary moves (a few days) of population can be planned to evacuate it from zones of combat and to put it under cover.

¹¹⁴ As Americans did with the Sunni militia "Sons of Iraq".

¹¹⁵ Cf. Maintenance Road Teams (MRT) in Afghanistan.

¹¹⁶ In particular, by setting up a control system of distributed weapons.

¹¹⁷ For example, by integrating militiamen into the local police in the long term.

¹¹⁸ See § 539.

¹¹⁹ Rashtrian Rifles, Kashmiri auxiliaries of the Indian army, operate with covered faces to avoid reprisals.

¹²⁰ See § 339 to 341.

¹²¹ Cf. **Key Leaders Engagement (KLE)** is the planned and coordinated employment of various levels of command to operate on civilian and military relays of influence within the operation zone in order to establish sustainable and deeper relations supporting the objectives of the Force's military influence strategy (provisional definition).

The KLE aims at identifying all the actors likely to have a local audience so as to plan actions of influence. For this purpose, the KLE must:

- know the principal local personalities' character: behaviours, ambitions, motivations, objectives (short and long terms), addictions, psychological profiles, personal history, etc.;
- identify the relation and existing bonds of dependence between the different actors within the theatre of operations.

The IO function coordinates the FCdr's Key Leaders Engagement Plan (KLEP), which contains the considered contacts of the command with targeted relays of influence, the objectives, the principal topics or issues at stakes, the desired effects and effectiveness assessment.

- c. Their affiliations (actual and displayed), possibly with criminal networks.
 - d. Their networks and actual influence on the population.
511. Identifying these local personalities and sustaining suitable relationships with them require a deep knowledge of the Host-Nation's social structures, culture, customs and habits in order to behave accordingly.

Section II – Integration of the Force to the comprehensive approach in counter-insurgency

512. Comprehensive approach is necessary to take into account the multiple dimensions of counter-insurgency. It is, in theory, coordinated at the international level by the organization commissioned for the intervention, and controlled at the national strategic level by the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (MAEE)¹²². Whatever the context is, taking into account the aspirations of the Host-Nation's government is decisive in the comprehensive approach direction as it is not the intention to replace it for the crisis resolution.

Civil-military coordination on the theatre of operations

513. Considering the interaction between insurgency, population, and actors of COIN, comprehensive approach must be crafted in great detail and coordinated at the theatre of operations level. In particular, the intervention forces' action must be coherently conducted with the action of local actors and civilian participants (IO, GO, NGO, private companies).
514. A “*high representative*”, appointed by participating parties, can be in charge of coordinating all of their civilian and military actions on the theatre of operations¹²³ in close conjunction with the Host-Nation government. This representative gets support from regional and local correspondents. These “*expeditionary administrators*” allow a better synergy of actions at all levels, at least for institutional representatives¹²⁴.
515. Operational command's representatives (Force Commanders [FCdrs]) have a major responsibility regarding the coordination at the theatre of operations level as they are the main correspondents of participating organizations, Host-State's political and military authorities, as well as representatives of civilian participants¹²⁵.
516. In any case, a regular information exchange system among participants must be set up at the theatre of operations level through a civil-military advisory body meeting periodically, following the example of NATO's civilian and military “*Joint Committees*”¹²⁶. Should there not be such a structure, the FCdr can take the initiative to set it up.
517. “*Joint Committees*” must namely allow:
- a. The mutual information of various participants¹²⁷.
 - b. The two-way exchange of information requirements:
 - (1) Assessment of humanitarian assistance to the population needs.
 - (2) Assessment of reconstruction needs.
 - (3) Above all, two-way exchange on local security conditions, etc.
 - c. The definition of priority zones of interest.

¹²² *Ministère des affaires étrangères et européennes.*

¹²³ It is generally the role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in UNO operations, or of the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) EU operations.

¹²⁴ Usually, these “*expeditionary administrators*” are civilians but they can be top military officials if required by the security situation.

¹²⁵ In particular when the security situation is critical, but also because the F-Cdr plays a mediation role via the use of the armed force and because he yields resources that no other actors have (particularly in the field of intelligence collection and analysis).

¹²⁶ Cf. MC 327/2 of 1st June, 2001.

¹²⁷ Likewise, an Intelligence Theatre Committee (*Comité du renseignement de théâtre - CRT*) coordinates the action of all institutional agents and allows data exchange between all civilian and military parties at the operational level.

- d. The elaboration of intermediate objectives (decisive points) and deadlines.
- e. The definition of shared situation indicators, particularly so as to assess the local security level, which is crucial in COIN.

518. Works of “Joint Committees” feed the operational planning phase¹²⁸, the latter feeding back the “committees” with information summaries.

519. At the local level, civil-military coordination is essential and all the more efficient as it is not disrupted by powers struggles, insofar as it is coherent with the theatre of operations level. The Reconstruction Teams concept, mainly constituted of civilians, can be useful as a coordination level between local politicians, civilian participants and intervention force units. However, this structure must remain flexible and, above all, should not endanger the handover of responsibilities from intervention forces to local security forces as soon as possible.

Integrated campaign plan in counter-insurgency

520. Civil-military dialog at the theatre of operations level allows the operational HQ to gradually develop an integrated campaign plan where the intervention forces’ action fits in the political, economical, and social reconstruction objectives, by defining “lines of progress” (military, political, economic, etc.) that are parallel but distinct.




Figure 16 – Visual graphic example of an integrated campaign plan in COIN.

521. This campaign plan, defined in the AJP-01¹²⁹, has been derived from NATO’s planning guide: Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive (COPD).

522. The integrated campaign plan pursues medium term objectives. It allows:

- a. To visualize at the operational level the operation picture at one given moment in the various fields (civilian and military).

¹²⁸ See footnote 127.

¹²⁹ Cf. AJP-01 – D (p. 67): “**Campaigning** is distinct from operations in that it will normally encompass more than one operation, and will endure over a longer time scale. A campaign is defined as: ‘a set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces’. It demands a way of thinking and specific processes that together enable the effective use of military capability, usually as part of a comprehensive response, to achieve favourable outcomes. It is underpinned by a number of guiding principles :

- a. Take a long-term view about both the underlying causes and symptoms of conflict.
- b. Focus on strategic and operational outcomes as well as the conditions required to realise them.
- c. Plan and execute a campaign in concert with the other instruments of power where practicable.
- d. Embrace collaborative engagement with those multiple agencies sharing the intent to improve the situation.
- e. Consider the whole situation and recognise that it is complex, adaptive, non-linear, and to a certain extent unpredictable.
- f. Conduct continuous analysis and assessment to deepen understanding of changing environments and to modify planning and execution.”

- b. To build a vision shared with other agents (timeframe, space, actions, objectives, etc.).
- c. To develop an assessment tool allowing a regular measurement of the reached intermediate achievements contributing to the realization of the Desired End State (DES).
- d. To highlight the Force's contribution to all lines of operation (security, governance, development) and interactions between intermediate objectives (decisive points) of these various lines.
- e. To facilitate decision-making (priorities, *deconfliction*, feasibility and consequences of the available options).

Role of the CIMIC¹³⁰ function

- 523. In the framework of comprehensive approach implementation at the theatre of operations level, the CIMIC function facilitates the civilian-military coordination between the Force on one hand, and international and local actors as well as the population on the other hand.
- 524. CIMIC contributes to the civilian reconstruction indirectly; however, its primary task consists in supporting Force integration in its human environment, first of all, its acceptance by the local population. In spite of observed evolutions in NATO's doctrines, it should neither serve civilian reconstruction nor humanitarian purposes as a matter of priority. It must rather be focused on populations of secured zones so as to increasingly attract populations that have remained under the influence of insurgents. CIMIC actions aim at making the population dependent on the established rule and at urging other population to reject the insurgency¹³¹.
- 525. For this purpose, population's real needs should be identified by taking into account the cultural context. Usually, Medical Assistance to the Population (MAP) and veterinary support to stockbreeders play in favour of the acceptance of the Force.

Section III – Operational agility at the theatre of operations level

Theatre “zoning” in counter-insurgency

- 526. Due to their usually limited availability of means, intervention forces cannot act uniformly on the whole Host-Nation territory. To optimize the employment of forces, their efforts should be focused in selected prioritized areas.
- 527. **Theatre zoning** is thus a major responsibility of the operational command in conjunction with the strategic level direction and the Host-Nation's political and military authorities¹³².
- 528. Three types of areas can be distinguished:
 - a. *Priority zones (PZ)*.
 - b. *Control zones (CZ)*.
 - c. *Surveillance zones (SZ)*.
- 529. **International borders** require particular attention depending on their sensitivity. At the operational level, controlling¹³³ borders of the theatre of operations is a pre-requisite to any success against insurgency. Some parts may correspond to priority zones or control zones (transit areas for insurgents). Use of modern technologies (passive sensors, UAVs, etc.) must be considered in order to control them with a view to sparring assets¹³⁴. Coastlines usually fall under surveillance zones.

¹³⁰ CIMIC: Civilo-Military Co-operation (cf. CIA-9).

¹³¹ See § 560.

¹³² This setting up of boxes must be congruent as much as possible with the Host-Nation's existing administrative units in order to facilitate dialog between local military and civilian authorities.

¹³³ Or at least, monitoring.

¹³⁴ Cf. monitoring of international borders between Israel and Lebanon, in the Indian Kashmir, etc.




Figure 17 – Theatre of operations “zoning” in counter-insurgency.

Priority zones (PZ)

530. PZ are key zones where intervention forces are focusing efforts until local forces take over¹³⁵.
531. They must be carefully selected at the operational level, in agreement with the Host-Nation's authorities and, if possible, in line with the principal civilian agents of the reconstruction (international agencies). Usually, they are the Host-Nation's vital areas from a demographic and economic point of view, but they can also be selected for their strategic (main crossroads, maritime or airport hubs, specific local resources, etc.) or symbolic importance (historical safe haven of the insurgency, etc.)¹³⁶. These PZ are often urbanized and densely populated; hence, the selected forces must have the suitable capabilities to commit in urban areas.
532. PZ should neither be too numerous nor too large to allow a sufficient security forces/population ratio so as to contain any military settlement of the insurgency¹³⁷ in these areas.
533. They must be (possibly) gradually but rapidly conquered¹³⁸ by concentrating efforts on all available forces on the theatre of operations if needed. Then they must be closely controlled¹³⁹ through small outposts and patrols scattered all over the area¹⁴⁰. Their access must systematically be controlled (Check Points) and supervised. The population must be listed as soon as possible by local security forces. Controlling the informational environment¹⁴¹ is also required. These PZ must be sustained and consolidated over time so as to prevent insurgents from gaining back control of any of them.
534. So as to **strengthen** rather than spread efforts, the population of these PZ must at least initially benefit from the maximum of CIMIC actions in order to contribute in making the population dependent on the established rule.

Control zones (CZ)

535. **CZ play a less decisive role than PZ; however, they should not be left free for insurgent action**, as insurgents could organize bases and increase their numbers with a view to threatening adjacent priority zones.

¹³⁵ Then they are considered as stabilized zones.

¹³⁶ Priority zones are inter-connected by major lines of communication (LOCs).

¹³⁷ This ratio fluctuates depending on the nature of the insurgency and of the human and geographical context. On average, one police officer or soldier per 40 inhabitants is needed in a relatively hostile environment.

¹³⁸ At the beginning of the intervention, during the “Golden Hour” period.

¹³⁹ Referred to as the systematic splitting of the area into “boxes”.

¹⁴⁰ Including air surveillance (helicopters, UAVs, etc.).

¹⁴¹ **Informational environment:** “Virtual and physical space in which information is received, processed, and disseminated. The concept of information includes information itself as well as information systems. Informational space includes cyberspace” (cf. DIA-3.10).

536. As soon as local security forces and intervention forces are controlling PZ, they should make CZ unsafe for insurgents so as to prevent the adversary from settling there over time. This climate of insurgent insecurity is maintained by the combination of:
- a. Ongoing intelligence collection, hunt and search missions by light counter-guerrilla warfare formations, possibly composed of local agents¹⁴².
 - b. Coordinated joint operations for sealing up and subsequent screening of targeted areas in conjunction with the theatre general reserve¹⁴³.
 - c. Interventions and interceptions using means that are kept under control of the area local command (airmobile assets)¹⁴⁴.
 - d. Air surveillance and observation.
 - e. Fire supports of any nature¹⁴⁵ on short notice.
 - f. Exceptionally, local self-defence militias.
537. **Light counter-guerrilla warfare formations** keep in maintaining CZ unsafe for the adversary. These units must be mainly composed of Host-Nation's forces if possible, and accompanied by intervention forces' specialized teams¹⁴⁶, particularly having capabilities¹⁴⁷ to apply fire supports¹⁴⁸ on short notice.
538. Sensitivity of public opinions over losses implies for accompanying intervention forces to minimize risks by using the maximum of fire supports and air means (planes, helicopters, UAVs), in particular for their intelligence collection, support, and rapid build-up by dropping intervention reserves¹⁴⁹.
539. Likewise, for their safeguard, these light counter-guerrilla warfare units should only be employed when main insurgent groups have been reduced in numbers by important joint operations. This way, they can have an often more favourable balance of power to face residual enemy elements.
540. These light counter-guerrilla warfare units may have the advantage of being composed of regional security forces recruits, even of auxiliary troops from the local population and supervised by security forces command and support teams¹⁵⁰. These local recruitment troops give an undeniable advantage due to their familiarity with the physical and human environment of their sector. Their proximity with the population allows to maintain contact, counter the insurgents' influence, and to make this population benefit from civil-military assistance, which is likely to consolidate its loyalty. Exceptionally, local but controlled **self-defence militias** can be constituted to defend the surest and most exposed populations¹⁵¹.
541. These light counter-guerrilla warfare units' courses of action should mirror those of a guerrilla:
- a. Immersion in local population.
 - b. Long-term nomadisation.

¹⁴² Like the "hunting commandos" in Algeria. These units were directed by Metropolitan officers. They primarily consisted of Harkis (locally recruited soldiers, whose enrolment had been enlarged for this purpose) who were perfectly familiar with the ground, local population and fellaghas' courses of actions. This disposition was supplemented by armed village militias. Adaptation to the current operational environment of the "hunting commando" principle to keep control zones unsafe for the opposing force should be studied in accordance with the available manpower resources. On the other hand, the direct armament of the population, in the absence of permanent supervision by adequate security forces, deserves accurate consideration before any such decision (see § 507).

¹⁴³ See § 554 to 557.

¹⁴⁴ Quick Response Force (QRF).

¹⁴⁵ Ground artillery, air support and sea-based fire support.

¹⁴⁶ For example, Operational Military Assistance (OMA) of the Operational Mentoring & Liaison Teams (OMLT) or Special Forces type.

¹⁴⁷ In particular, transmissions.

¹⁴⁸ Joint supports that must be integrated, even partially decentralized, down to the lowest level in counter-insurgency.

¹⁴⁹ Helicopter intervention reserves.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. Mountain dwellers of Upper-Tonkin commandos groups of during the Indochina war, SAS (Special Air Service) missions in Malaysia, Combined Platoons Action (CAPs) supervised by the American Navy during the Vietnam War, Rashtrian Rifles of the Indian army in the Indian Kashmir, etc.

¹⁵¹ But this solution must be taken at the political level and be carefully assessed taking its risks into account (see § 507).

- c. Observation, intelligence collection and systematic screening of the “*hunting area*” in order to detect possible hiding posts.
 - d. Harassing and reduction of residual insurgent bands.
 - e. Preference for night action in order to benefit from the positive asymmetry thanks to night vision devices.
542. When a light counter-guerrilla warfare formation locates an insurgent band of superior capability, it maintains contact to precisely refine the intelligence collections and rapidly causes its interception using fire supports and ***means that are kept under control of the area local command.***

Surveillance zones (SZ)

543. In other areas, usually the most offset and least populated, forces can not deploy troops on the ground over the long-term.
544. However, ***SZ require constant monitoring***, using the coalition’s air superiority (aircrafts and UVAs) so that insurgents do not settle bases there. Located targets are neutralized by air support or short-term actions of emergency intervention forces dedicated to this task (for example, Special Forces), with a special attention to avoid any mistake or collateral damage within the population¹⁵².

Role of components and distribution of efforts

545. At the theatre of operations level, the success of forces’ contribution to counter-insurgency lies on a true coordinated operational campaign based on a coherent comprehensive approach. Each component – air, land, maritime, Special Forces and the *Gendarmerie* – has specific capabilities enabling it to bring a particular contribution in counter-insurgency¹⁵³.
546. For as much, a distribution of efforts between components is required.
547. By reconsidering the “***supported/supporting***” relationship¹⁵⁴ depending on the selected zone, combination of the various components capabilities allows a true operational campaign synergy and a better sparring of assets, taking into account limited means.

Possible role of each component in counter-insurgency

Land component

548. The land component can fulfil the following roles:
- a. Terrestrial and human environment control in PZ¹⁵⁵.
 - b. Contribution to joint action in CZ.
 - c. Support to other components in SZ.
 - d. Contribution to intelligence collection.
 - e. Local terrestrial forces support.
 - f. Contribution to the targeting process.
 - g. Priority contribution to CIMIC and MIO actions.

¹⁵² Creation of prohibited areas and displacement of population are no longer possible nowadays. These courses of actions prove to be particularly counter-productive as they maintain, even reinforce, the roots of insurgency.

¹⁵³ See chapter 5, section III: “*Possible roles of each component in COIN*”.

¹⁵⁴ Cf. doctrines of the operational commitments command (DIA-3), booklet I.

¹⁵⁵ This role requires consequent manpower: cf. *Capstone Concept on the Employment of Armed Forces* (JC-01): “*Monitoring the land environment proves particularly complex because of its great diversity and the presence of population concentrations.*”

- h. Participation in local forces' Operational Military Assistance (OMA).

Maritime component

549. The maritime component can fulfil the following roles:

- a. Intelligence collection and coastlines monitoring.
- b. Maritime traffic protection and anti-piracy.
- c. Ports and off-shore hubs control.
- d. Inshore and lagoon operations support.
- e. Contribution to the targeting process.
- f. Participation in local forces' Operational Military Assistance (OMA).

Air component

550. The air component can fulfil the following roles:

- a. Contribution to the control of the battle space (air superiority; detection, monitoring and control of the airspace).
- b. Intelligence support: contribution to the establishment and maintenance of the tactical situation on the theatre of operations (reconnaissance, monitoring, geographic information, etc.).
- c. Terrestrial campaign kinetic support (fire support; armed escort; prohibition; CSAR¹⁵⁶; TAC¹⁵⁷ deployment; etc.).



Figure 18 - A 'Rafale' flying on Afghanistan.

- d. Terrestrial campaign non-kinetic support (show of presence and force, jamming, listening, participation in intelligence operations, etc.).
- e. Mobility support (logistic transport in and out of the theatre of operations, air delivery, medical evacuation, airborne medical support, setting up and creation of airport hubs, in-flight refuelling, etc.).
- f. Contribution to the targeting process.

¹⁵⁶ Combat Search and Rescue.

¹⁵⁷ Tactical Air Controller.

- g. Participation in local forces' Operational Military Assistance (OMA).

“Special Forces” component

551. The “*Special Forces*” component can fulfil the following roles:

- a. Contribution to intelligence collection.
- b. Contribution to the targeting process.
- c. Local forces supervising.
- d. Specific to Military Influence Operation (MIO)¹⁵⁸ support.
- e. Participation in Operational Military Assistance (OMA) to local forces.

“Interior security armed forces” of the Gendarmerie¹⁵⁹ type component

552. If the “*internal security armed forces*” component is implied at a different level than that of other components in counter-insurgency operations, it contributes nevertheless to the overall campaign by its deployment capability in civilian and military missions on a same theatre of operations. In its “*Defence*” missions, it can fulfil the following roles:

- a. Intelligence collection, via its military police function, which besides from its judicial main function participates to the acquisition of information¹⁶⁰.
- b. Public safety, with the implementation of dedicated means to control the crowd and allow the restoration of public order.
- c. Command counselling in the judicial police, penal expertise, and coordination with local police forces and institutions fields.
- d. Special expertise support in dismantling insurgent networks¹⁶¹.
- e. Participation in local forces' Operational Military Assistance (OMA)¹⁶².
- f. Occasional contribution to special operations with specialized units.

Role of components depending on zones of responsibility (see Fig. 19, p. 52)

553. In counter-insurgency, operative campaign at the theatre of operations level must be promoted through the support of the different components and the adaptation of the “supported/supporting” relationship depending on the selected zone.

- a. In **priority zones**, which must be controlled on the ground, land component is the “*supported*” component in its principal action while the other components are the “*supporting*” component of this action.
- b. In **surveillance zone**, the air component¹⁶³ can be “*supported*” (in particular, by relying on its air monitoring capabilities), while other components are “*supporting*” its action. It allows to free as many land forces as possible for the control of other zones and joint intervention reserves.
- c. In **control zone**, distribution of efforts can evolve and the “*supported*” component could be:

¹⁵⁸ See chapter 6, section V.

¹⁵⁹ Within the framework of its “*defence*” missions under the Chief of the Defence Staff operational command (cf. *Gendarmerie* operational contracts, PIA-03b).

¹⁶⁰ Moreover, each gendarme deployed in external operations, regardless of his function or rank, is a privileged sensor in the field of intelligence collection and analysis, particularly valuable in the fight against insurgents (information on environment, public order or criminals).

¹⁶¹ For example: deployment of criminal identification technicians, in the various anti-improvised explosive devices structures (cf. participation in WIT teams: Weapon Intelligence Teams).

¹⁶² Moreover, expertise and police education missions allowing to maintain close relations with local security forces.

¹⁶³ Or the maritime component if it is a coastal area under monitoring.




Figure 19 – Operational campaign at the theatre of operations level in counter-insurgency.

- (1) First, the air component.
 - (2) Then, the Special Forces component.
 - (3) Last, the land component.
- d. This balance of efforts by zone contributes to a more effective employment of their means depending on their capability, as well as to a better sparring of forces at the level of the theatre of operations, taking into account a limited manpower.
- e. Overall and in all zones of responsibility, of the “*Special Forces*” component intervenes more in the early phase and during handling of responsibilities due to its special capacities (flexibility, reactivity and secrecy).

Coordinated operations in counter-insurgency

554. Coordinated operations combining airmobile, airborne, envelopment and terrestrial screening and all kinds of fire supports operations, considerably reduces the opponent’s combat potential¹⁶⁴.



Figure 20 - Night airmobile operation in Kapisa (Afghanistan).

555. They are first carried out in order to (re)take control of PZ, then successively in CZ so as to smash the most important insurgent bands settled there (cf. Fig. 19).
556. Coordinated operations require powerful and toughened for battle intervention troops, as well as adequate transportation and fire support means. These reserves are gradually constituted with the handling of PZ to local security forces. The extent of the operation depends on their volume and capability.
557. Considering how foreseeable these operations are, usually the adversary has time to disperse before first contact. These operations are often a complete waste if the zone is not sealed up tight and if it does not last long enough to methodically proceed to the grid squaring of the besieged terrain in order to neutralize the maximum of insurgents and to confiscate or destroy their hiding posts and depots. They are worth only if they prevent the opponent from regaining power while maintaining light counter-guerrilla warfare formations on the ground. However, whatever the result is, they allow regaining the upper-hand, inducing insurgents into adopting a defensive posture and displaying the security forces’ determination¹⁶⁵.

Extension of controlled zones

558. Controlled zones can be extended by the following methods:

¹⁶⁴ Cf. Challe Plan successive operations in Algeria (1959-1960), Moshtarak operation in February 2010 in Helmand, Dinner Out operation of the “joint tactical group of Kapisa” (GTIA Kapisa) in spring 2009, etc.

¹⁶⁵ Which is particularly favourable in a “war of perception”.

- a. One of the major goals of the operational campaign in COIN is to gradually extend PZ in order to reduce zones under the insurgents' influence. This territorial extension concretizes the counter-insurgency's progress and must lead to the paralysis of insurgent groups by domino effect.
- b. The historical "oil spot" method, invented by Gallieni during pacification campaigns, is no longer transposable and must be updated. First, this method corresponded to a goal of conquest which is not a current goal anymore. Second, the reduced numbers of terrestrial intervention troops cannot carry out this kind of campaign anymore without withdrawing troops from secured zones. This could be dangerous and detrimental to the action of the Force if a secured area falls under the insurgents' control¹⁶⁶.
- c. The two complementary methods described below modernize the "oil spot" concept to gradually extend PZ.

Handover of zones to local forces

559. The gradual extension of zones controlled by the counter-insurgency relies on local security forces reinforcement in PZ. They must gradually handle the responsibility of PZ. While preserving a capacity of rapid reaction in the event of a degradation of the situation in PZ, withdrawn intervention forces can focus efforts on other zones, starting with key areas of CZ.



Figure 21 - Strategic Command and Staff Course (SCSC) in Kabul.

The domino effect (influence)

560. The extension of controlled zones can also be done "by capillarity" with bordering regions. The goal is to provoke the gradual reversal of contiguous regions to secured zones by "dominos effect"¹⁶⁷ by urging the local populations to join the loyalist side and to reject any support to the insurgency. This urge can be generated by favouring loyalist populations, namely through CIMIC actions¹⁶⁸.

¹⁶⁶ Often irremediable loss of the population's confidence in the success of security forces.

¹⁶⁷ In particular, thanks to information operations.

¹⁶⁸ See § 524.

Chapter 6

Joint operational capabilities in counter-insurgency

601. Counter-insurgency requires specific capabilities and capacities. This chapter deals with some of the indispensable abilities as well as the possible axes of development.

Section I – Operational preparation for counter-insurgency

602. French armed forces do not set up forces that are only dedicated to counter-insurgency but they adapt the unit committed to this type of operation by relying on their **versatility, modularity** of the forces and **Deployment Preparation (DP)** adapted to different theatres.
603. In addition, they do not develop specific equipments dedicated to COIN only, but, depending on the needs of the theatre of operations, they adapt the equipment of forces to the situation by a **process of “reactive adaptation”**, which allows modifying and acquiring certain equipments on short notice.
604. Without questioning the principle of a priority given to the training of French forces in high intensity conventional fight, forces committed in counter-insurgency require **a specific training strengthened and adapted** to the context of intervention. This PBP needs to be done at joint task forces, and often, multinational level (practice of English as a foreign language, knowledge of multinational procedures, etc.).
605. Efforts should focus on acquiring the **knowledge of the physical and, most of all, human environment**¹⁶⁹.
606. For all, the global knowledge on natives' culture has to allow getting in touch with the population by avoiding behaviour misconduct. For the command, it is about knowing the environment in all its dimensions (politics, history, culture, human and physical geography, religion, economy, etc.) in order to grasp all the complexity of the situation and try to understand the intentions of the various protagonists.
607. As a supplement to the recruiting and training of high-level linguists employed for specific tasks (interpreters, interpreters of voice communications, etc.), the learning, even elementary, of local languages can favour contacts with the population, including its elites, and, consequently, improve the image of the Force while favouring the collection of information and the recruitment of sources to the benefit of intelligence.
608. Concerning the acquisition of these types of cultural knowledge, the support of specialized centres and university expertises is to be looked for.

Section II – The “Command and Control (C2)” function in counter-insurgency

Improvement of the civil-military coordination

609. Because of the multiple dimensions of counter-insurgency, the organization of the command and the decision-making process have to allow a better unity of military and civilian efforts within the framework of the global approach to the crisis.
610. At strategic level, the largest number of national and international actors (IOs and member Nations of the coalition) must be associated to the preparation of the operation. In the case of a coalition, it is first at the multinational level that the comprehensive approach of an operation of counter-insurgency is built. At national level, the planning of French contribution must be driven

¹⁶⁹ See **Human Environment of the Operations (HEO)**, i.e. all interactions between actors, individual or collective, constituted in systems which can have an incidence on the employment of the forces in a given zone (see chapter 3, section II).

while associating all the ministries and the concerned institutional operators¹⁷⁰, within the perspective of an integrated inter-ministerial planning. The information exchange with the non-institutional actors (NGOs, private companies) should contribute to the understanding of the environment to the greatest possible extent.

611. This strategic planning is translated at the level of the theatre by an integrated campaign plan¹⁷¹.

Subsidiarity and ability to react

612. Command must be decentralized¹⁷² in a logic of **subsidiarity**, up to the lowest level, so that tactical leaders have an autonomy allowing them to seize opportunities and adapt themselves to the local context¹⁷³. The spirit of initiative and the imagination of the individuals must also be developed in basic schools and during PBP.
613. HQs, at every level, must be **flexible, dynamic, and reactive** in order to adapt themselves to the evolution of the situation and its needs. They have to be capable of deploying rapidly light elements so as to command operations as close as possible to the action scene.
614. In the field of air operations, considering the management of a unique air space, command remains centralized and conduct decentralized thanks to liaison detachments as close of the ground elements as possible.
615. The process of learning and adapting is permanent in counter-insurgency. It has to lean on a continuous and reactive **“Lessons Learned” (LL)** process at every level of command. Teams such as **Red Teams** (opposing forces) can be created in order to test the envisaged courses of actions.
616. The measure of progresses of the counter-insurgency requires the implementation of a simple and pragmatic campaign evaluation process in order to inform the command, feed the integrated planning (see § 520) and verify that the undertaken actions indeed contribute to the realization of the objectives that were determined for the achievement of the EFR.
617. The **Operational Information and Communications Systems (OISCS)** must allow this decentralization and this ability to react in counter-insurgency. In particular, they should down to the lowest level:
- Facilitate and accelerate the decision-making process and the elaboration of orders by reducing the deadlines of the decision-making loop (graphic interfaces).
 - Be capable of facilitating the implementation of all kind of supports by increasing the security for friendly forces (identification friend/foe).
 - Be interoperable with local forces, allies and civil participants.

Needs of specific expertises in counter-insurgency

618. Headquarters (HQs) in COIN have to rely on strengthened expertises (down to the tactical level):
- In the field of intelligence and knowledge of the human environment¹⁷⁴.
 - In the field of actions of influence¹⁷⁵.
 - Within the framework of the implementation of the comprehensive approach¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁰ Agence française de développement (AFD)/French Development Agency, etc.

¹⁷¹ See § 520 to § 522.

¹⁷² Decentralized, to command actions a great distance away, and decentralized, to confer on subordinated levels a bigger autonomy.

¹⁷³ Which can be very different from one village to another.

¹⁷⁴ See the cultural *attachés* (Cultural Advisor).

¹⁷⁵ The **actions of influence** indicate all the deliberate activities to obtain an effect on the perceptions (collections) to modify attitudes and/or the behaviour (temporary definition).

¹⁷⁶ DEvelopment ADvisor (DEVAD), GOVERNance (GOVAD), etc.

The command of the operational level in counter-insurgency

619. Operational command plays a decisive role in the coordination of civilian and military actions of the various actors at the theatre level. The possible echo on the media and political plan of the operations requires a solid operational planning, elaborated by taking into account actions of the other participants¹⁷⁷.
620. Whatever the retained organization of the operational HQ is, it has to remain flexible in order to adapt itself to the evolution of the situation and to the directives of the Force Commander (FCdr), and its expertise cells (or of “*business*” - *Jx*) must be coordinated throughout a matrix organization (under the responsibility of the Deputy Chief of Staff or DCOS) around the following three functions:
- a. Understanding the operational context¹⁷⁸.
 - a. Capabilities/resources management.
 - b. Operations/organization of action.
621. The Force HQ also has to rely on high-level expertises (POLAD, LEGAD, GOVAD, DEVAD, etc.) which have to feed the work of the whole staff.
622. Considering the zoning of the theatre¹⁷⁹, the structure of command on the theatre of operations has more to rely on **regional commands**, keeping reserves for joint task forces at every level (theatre, zone, and sector) rather than on a classic structure of component commands. These regional commands execute the operational planning by adapting it to the local context.

Section III – “*Intelligence*” and “*counter-intelligence*” functions in counter-insurgency

623. The **intelligence** function is decisive in counter-insurgency.
624. At strategic level and before the intervention in COIN, both intelligence anticipation and planning has to allow to evaluate the complexity of the environment, situation, and insurgents’ threat, to calibrate the needs of the Force, to determine axes of effort (in particular, priority action ranges). It is first about records intelligence (historical, geographical, and academical) to grasp the physical and human context in which the task force is going to evolve. On the theatre, the chain of intelligence consists in cells being in charge of the orientation, search, exploitation and distribution of intelligence information.
625. Because of its central place in COIN, collection is also turned towards the population, as well as towards the economy, governance, informative environment, etc¹⁸⁰. Specialized units and sensors’ systems have to cover all the needs in intelligence, down to the lowest tactical level. Among the means of search, **human sensors** hold a quite prominent place in counter-insurgency. In front of insurgents who, blended in with the population, are hardly detectable by technical means, human search is the only one able to reveal insurgent networks and perceive their intentions thanks to contact with the population and its elites.
626. New capacities, as these referred to as “**of scientific police**”, which analyze indications left by insurgents, deserve to be developed to contribute to the reconstruction of these secret networks with the aim of their dismantling¹⁸¹.
627. Pieces of **information of technical origin** also have to be given particular attention, namely thanks to IMINT search through the use of satellites, aircrafts and UAVs for observation and target acquisition in areas of control and surveillance, as well as SIGINT search for the interception of insurgents’ communications (in particular through the use of mobile phones networks).

¹⁷⁷ See chapter 5, section II.

¹⁷⁸ See the merging of the concept of Knowledge Development (KN) within NATO.

¹⁷⁹ See § 525 to § 528.

¹⁸⁰ “*The traditional intelligence preparation of the battlefield is insufficient; it is the intimate knowledge of the human environment that is essential*” (training directive in the counter-insurgency of the American general Mc Chrystal, of November 10th, 2009).

¹⁸¹ See Concept and Doctrine of Operational Search Operations (CEIA and DIA-3.17).

628. Nevertheless, it is above all the combination of all these means of search in an intelligence **multisensors campaign** which allows the production of a reliable and crosschecked intelligence.
629. Commitment of all units and their staff, whatever their speciality might be, according to the principle that **“intelligence is an overall commitment”** (or *“every soldier is a sensor”*), is also indispensable to collect the bulk of information which, once exploited with that of the specialized sensors, enriches the knowledge and understanding of the complex counter-insurgency environment.
630. Furthermore, considering the interweaving of military and criminal courses of action of insurgents, the **collaboration of all intelligence services** must be looked for, in particular to reveal any threat of terrorist attack on the Force or population.
631. Considering the complexity of the insurgency and of the environment, the processing of a mass of heterogeneous information turns out essential to gain the best understanding of the situation. It requires **processing assistance tools** and specific methods of analysis, as such systematic analysis tools.
632. Finally, **information exchange** with allies and local security forces must be increased, while respecting operations' security measures.
633. The **Counter-Intelligence (CI)** function also deserves a particular attention in COIN because of the threats the insurgency represents for the Force (espionage, sabotage, subversion) and of indiscretions insurgents could exploit (soldiers' *“blogs”*). Furthermore, the cooperation with local security forces strengthens the risk of dishonest compromise.
634. The action of CI is above all preventive (studies on criticality, vulnerability, and risk), but it can help in activating offensive actions by supplying pieces of information in case of imminence or preparation of an attack against the Force. CI participates in the protection of the Force by recommending the necessary sufficient security measures to adorn the risk of terrorist attack and sabotage. It contributes to the security of operations and sometimes, can pilot it.
635. CI has to watch quite particularly local agents contracted by the Force. The data it collects thanks to the use of biometric measures must be shared with other services and can serve to unravel persons responsible for actions or attempts of action against the Force.
636. CI finally contributes to Military Influence Operations (MIO) by analyzing the speech made by insurgents and their sympathizers towards the local population to damage and discredit the Force.

Section IV – Operations in counter-insurgency: some specific capacities

637. **Decentralization** of the air-land operation, in particular in the Zones of Control (ZC) and surveillance (ZS), requires:
- a. Performing and adapted air assets.
 - b. A capability to implement, on short notice, of all kinds of support at the lowest level.
 - c. A closer cooperation of ground and Special Forces.
 - d. Powerful and reactive reserves, mostly transported by air and consistent capacities in helicopter transport (manoeuvre helicopters).
638. The level of delegation to subordinate units is generally determined by the level of security in the considered area.
639. In counter-insurgency, the units must:
- a. **Learn** permanently, thanks to a performing **“Lessons Learned” (LL)** process.
 - b. **Adapt** themselves in conduct to the situation as they are operating (new structure, change of posture, possible change of equipment).

640. **Gradation in the use of force** is necessary to avoid a spiral of “*violence – repression*” in which insurgents will try to drag security forces. Furthermore, civilian casualties and unnecessary destructions must be absolutely avoided¹⁸². In the selection of their courses of action, Forces have to favour an indirect approach, targeted actions, and go for the precision rather than the delivery of firepower.
641. **Management capabilities for the handling of captured persons** are indispensable in counter-insurgency so as to isolate prisoners and collect information. But, considering its sensitivity¹⁸³, this management requires anticipation, planning, and support by appropriate means.
642. In addition, **education and training** (“*behind the scene*” action) **of local forces** needs preparation. They require capabilities adapted to the specificities (human, cultural, material) of these forces and a particular training syllabus.

Section V – Influence in counter-insurgency

643. **Control of the informational environment** and **coordination of actions of influence** are essential in counter-insurgency in order to fight insurgents' propaganda, maintain the legitimacy of the Force regarding public opinions while discrediting opponents during the reconciliation process.
644. To win this war of perception and struggle for legitimacy requires **strengthened capabilities of influence adapted to targeted audiences** (in particular the local ones¹⁸⁴). Coordination of actions of influence also has to be a priority to display the coherence of their physical actions on the theatre and their messages. For that purpose, they are planned at strategic level to win the war of perception by shaping the informational environment and acquiring the informational superiority.
645. Discretion and specific capabilities of **Special Forces**, in particular their specific expertise in “*indirect action*”, pre-orient them to a strong contribution to Operations of Information (OI) aiming at supporting the alternate political project of the Host-Nation.
646. Finally, within the framework of the Force's legitimacy, particular attention must be paid to the gradation in the use of force and to the rules of commitment and behaviour¹⁸⁵.

Section VI – The “*protection*” function in counter-insurgency

647. **Protection of the Force should not be detrimental to the control of the environment**, as far as the best protection lies in the contact with the population. That is why rules of behaviour have to establish an acceptable compromise between security imperatives and contacts with locals. Moreover, mobile reserves of intervention must be preferred to big overprotected bases. These mobile reserves should be associated with posts of reduced size, able to ensure their own defence and to support one another with fire.
648. Moreover, individual protections and armour do not have to hinder combatants' tactical mobility.
649. **Access** to bases, infrastructures, and platforms has to be the object of active and passive protective measures against terrorists' intervention (control mechanism of the presence of explosives).
650. **Routes**, in particular vital logistic axes, have to be closely monitored, as they always constitute priority objectives for the insurgents. They must be over-watched, protected, and cleared from any mines and explosive devices.
651. Within the framework of the **protection of the population**, access to PZ must be controlled (devices of protection and surveillance, check points on the points of entry). In addition, large public events and main public places must be watched. With appropriate means (Special Forces), the Force must be capable of ensuring the **protection of authorities**: civil, military, foreign authorities, Host-Nation's authorities and local elites favourable to the stabilisation

¹⁸² See § 310.

¹⁸³ See § 316.

¹⁸⁴ See *Radio Surobi*.

¹⁸⁵ See § 310.

process. Concerning the protection of the former, if it cannot be delegated to local security forces, it has to remain discreet so as not to be perceived as “collaboration with foreign powers”.



Figure 22 - Building a Bastion Wall in a Forward Operational Base (FOB).

Section VII – Logistic support in counter-insurgency

652. From a logistic point of view, counter-insurgency imposes constraints which deserve a specific attention.
653. Logistic means, including medical assets, usually constitute **privileged targets** for insurgents, as they are more vulnerable to asymmetric courses of action.
654. Due to the absence of a “front line”, all deployments and logistic routes may be attacked. They have to receive adapted protective measures and the support personnel must be prepared to fight. Convoys must thus be planned on real operations terms. In particular, even if they have an escort, logistic vectors must be able to ensure self-defence in case of an attack of limited scale (armoured protection, use of weapons, transmissions and adequate training).
650. Due to the prevailing mission command on the ground, **medical support** must be adapted down to the lowest level¹⁸⁶ in order to take care of wounded persons as soon as possible. In addition, psychological and psychiatric support to combatants must be taken into account in order to limit the consequences of a morally demanding commitment, considering the often shocking courses of action used by insurgents¹⁸⁷.
656. Medical support must also be able to take punctually into account the local population:
- a. It is mandatory to treat possible collateral victims of the Force.
 - b. In some cases, the civilian victims of attacks by insurgents.
 - c. By contributing CIMIC efforts via Medical (and veterinarian) Aid to the Population (MAP)¹⁸⁸.
657. Finally, **logistic support to the detention of captured persons** must be anticipated and prepared starting as early as the planning phase.

¹⁸⁶ In particular, by the implementation of a “sieve of psychological decompression” at the end of mandate.

¹⁸⁷ Sanitary auxiliaries with strengthened capacities.

¹⁸⁸ See (FR)JD on Medical Aid to the Population (MAP), DIA-3.29, ed. 2009.

Annex A Incorporation of amendments

1. The readers of this Joint Concept document are invited to highlight any errors, misprints or mistakes and to make any comments or suggestions for improvement. These should be sent to the CICDE (according to the table model below) at the following address:

Sous-directeur Synergie doctrinale
CICDE
École militaire
21, Place JOFFRE
75700 PARIS SP 07

Or by telephone ([01 44 42 83 38](tel:0144428338)) for information on the latest e-mail address.

No.	Origin	Paragraph (no.)	Sub-paragraph	Line	Comment
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2. The amendments validated by the Director of the CICDE will be highlighted in red in the “*Summary of the amendments*” featured on page 7 of the electronic version of the document.

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Part I – Initialisms, acronyms, and other abbreviations

- C01. In this section, characters which constitute an initialism, acronym or abbreviation are written in capital letters so that the reader may memorise their meaning.
- C02. French initialisms, acronyms and abbreviations are written in **Arial bold font, size 9, in red italic type**. Anglo-Saxon initialisms, acronyms and abbreviations are written in **Arial bold font, size 9, in blue roman type**.

Initialisms

- C03. In initialisms, each letter is pronounced separately as though separated by periods.

AAP	Allied Administrative Publication / <i>Publication administrative interalliés</i>
AD-DS	Assistant Director for Doctrinal Synergy (CICDE)
AJP	Allied Joint Publication / <i>Publication interarmées interalliée</i>
C2	Command & Control
CA	Comprehensive Approach
CBRN	Chemical, Bacteriological, Radiological and Nuclear
CCEAF	Capstone Concept on the Employment of Armed Forces
CDEAF	Capstone Doctrine on the Employment of Armed Forces
CEIA	<i>Concept Exploratoire InterArmées</i>
CI	Counter-Intelligence
CICDE	<i>Centre Interarmées de Concepts, de Doctrines et d'Expérimentations / Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrine and Experimentations</i>
CM	Crisis Management
CIS	Communication and Information Systems
COPD	Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive
CRO	Crisis Response Operation
CZ	Control Zone
DES	Desired End State
DIA	<i>Doctrine InterArmées</i>
DDR	Disarmament – Demobilisation – Reintegration
EU	European Union
FCdr	Force Commander
FOB	Forward Operational Base
GO	Governmental Organization
JC	Joint Concept
JCDH	Joint Concepts and Doctrine Hierarchy
JD	Joint Doctrine
JP	Joint Publication
HEO	Human Environment of the Operations
HQ	Headquarters
HTI	Human Terrain Initiative
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IO	Information Operations
IO	International Organizations
ISBN	International Standard Book Number
KD	Knowledge Development
KLE	Key Leaders Engagement
LBDSN	<i>Livre Blanc sur la Défense et la Sécurité Nationale / White Paper on Defence and National Security</i>
LL	Lessons Learned
MAEE	<i>Ministère des Affaires Étrangères et Européennes / Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs</i>
MAP	Medical Assistance to the Population
MIO	Military Influence Operations
MRT	Maintenance Road Team

NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NP	<i>Non protégé</i> / Unclassified
NTIC	New Technologies of Information and Communication
OISCS	Operational Information and Communication Systems
OMA	Operational Military Assistance
OMLT	Operational Mentoring & Liaison Team
PA	Postal Area
PBP	Preparation Before Projection
PGP	<i>Pôle Graphique de Paris</i> / Graphics Pole of Paris
PSC	Private Security Company
PZ	Priority Zones
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UNO	United Nations
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SZ	Surveillance Zone

Acronyms

C04. Acronyms are made up of several syllables which can be pronounced as a single word.

CHoD	CHief of Defence
CIMIC	Clvil-Military Co-operation
COIN	COunter-insurgency
CSAR	Combat Search And Rescue
DCOS	Deputy Chief Of Staff
DEF	DEFence
DEVAD	DEVelopment ADviser
ELINT	ELectronic INTelligence
FARC	<i>Fuerzas armadas revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo</i> / Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – Army of the People
FRA	France
GOVAD	GOVernance ADviser
HUMINT	HUMAn INTelligence
IMINT	IMage INTelligence
IRAD	IRregular ADversary
KLEP	Key Leaders Engagement Plan
LEGAD	LEGal ADviser
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OPSEC	Operations' Security
OSO	Operational Search Operation
POLAD	POLitical ADviser
SPAC	<i>Service Parisien d'Administration Centrale / Paris Central Administration Service</i>
SIGINT	SIGNal INTelligence
STAB	STABILisation
TAC	Tactical Air Controller
WIT	Weapon Intelligence Team

Other abbreviations

C05. Abbreviations of convenience must be distinguished from conventional abbreviations:

- a. Abbreviations of convenience are intended to simplify specific works (archives, catalogues, codes, dictionaries, monographs, etc.). An expression must be sufficiently long and appear frequently in order for such an abbreviation to be used. As they are only used in a specific work, readers will find a list very helpful.
- b. Conventional abbreviations are: numbers, symbols (laid down in legislation) and abbreviations determined through common use, which cannot be modified without creating confusion.
 - (1) Abbreviations should be avoided in the text of literary works and non-specialised works.

- (2) However, they are used systematically in tables, notes, references, parts of the text in parentheses and, more generally, any time simplification does not compromise the quality of presentation or complicate the understanding of the text.

Cf.	<i>Confer</i> , see, refer to, etc.
i.e.	<i>Id est</i> : that's to say
no.	Number(s)
p.	Page(s)
Ref.	Reference(s)

Part II – Terms and definitions

Action of influence

Actions of influence indicate the whole of intentional activities to obtain an effect on perceptions in order to modify attitudes and/or behaviours (provisional definition).

Irregular action

An “*irregular*” action is defined by the use or threat of use of force by irregular forces, groups or individuals, often moved by ideological causes or criminal objectives, in order to cause (or prevent) a change by defying the political power and authority.

Key Leaders Engagement (KLE)

Key Leaders Engagement (KLE) is the planned and coordinated use of various levels of command to operate on civilian and military actions of influence within the operations zone in order to establish durable and close relationship in support of the objectives of the Force’s military strategy of influence (provisional definition).

Counter-insurgency

Counter-insurgency (COIN) is the whole of political, economical, social, military, legal, and psychological activities, institutional or not, necessary to neutralize an insurgency and answer to the principal reasons for dissatisfaction of the population.

Human Terrain Initiative

Human Terrain Initiative (HTI) is defined as the sum of interactions between individual or collective actors, constituted in systems which can affect the employment of forces in a given zone. Its analysis aims at bringing the knowledge and understanding of the HTI in order to contribute to the politico-military decision, the preparation and conduct of operations, the steering of the choice of courses of action, and to update the behaviour and skills of the deployed force. It contributes to evaluate the effects of the strategy carried out on the human environment of an open theatre or upcoming theatre of operations.

Informational environment

Informational environment is defined as a virtual and physical space in which information is received, processed, and disseminated. The concept of information includes information itself as well as information systems. Informational space includes cyberspace (cf. *DIA-3.10*).

Guerrilla

Military or paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces (AAP-6 – 2010).

Insurgency

An insurgency is defined as the set of activities of an organized group or movement, often ideologically motivated, seeking to provoke a political change of the current authority of a country or area. These activities aim at persuading or constraining the population through violence and subversion.

Host-Nation (Host- State, Host-Country)

State that receives in its territory forces or means of other States or international organizations for their settlement, conduct of operation or transfer needs.

Propaganda

Propaganda is the set of actions conducted in the informational environment in order to deteriorate, force, and control perceptions, attitudes, and behaviours. It is used to deliberately undermine the individual or collective free-will by the degradation and/or falsification of information. It disseminates a voluntarily distorted comprehension of a fact and manipulates emotions to better affect faculties of reasoning and judgment. It resorts to threat, violence, terror, and lie, amongst other things. It can use methods aiming at subjecting, recruiting, and indoctrinating. Of coercive nature, propaganda has a malevolent effect on the population, which places it out of the acceptable field of influence (provisional definition).

Stabilisation

Stabilisation is one of the processes of crisis management which aims at restoring the minimal conditions of viability of a State (or a region) while putting an end to violence as a mean of contestation. Stabilisation also provides the foundations of a return to a normal life by launching a reconstruction civil process.

The stabilisation phase is the period of crisis management during which this process is dominant.

Communication strategy

Communication strategy is the development of actions of communication and key messages in support of a military campaign, and elaborated according to the objectives and topics established by civilian and military high authorities. It is formalized by a communication plan (provisional definition).

Strategy of influence

Strategy of influence is the art of organizing and using diplomatic, economic, informational, military, and cultural capacities in order to serve the interests of a State, group of States or international community while operating on psychological and cognitive fields (provisional definition).

Military strategy of influence

Military strategy of influence is permanently exerted by the armed forces in order to obtain effects on the psychological and cognitive fields, and to lead an individual or group – favourable, neutral or hostile – to act in the direction of the Nation's interests, coalition or international community's objectives (provisional definition).

Subversion

Action designed to weaken the military, economic or political strength of a nation by undermining the morale, loyalty or reliability of its citizens (see AAP-6).

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Summary

JD-3.4.4 COIN

1. Counter-insurgency (COIN) is a specific case of stabilisation of fragile or failed States. It aims at the national reconciliation of a Host-Nation. It has a prominently political dimension from which the local population, usually partisan of a wait-and-see policy, is its major stake.
2. Current insurgencies are often composite and are particularly complex and difficult to apprehend. Propaganda is vital for insurgents and they disseminate it via the use of new technologies of information and communication.
3. Even though operational contexts are always specific, current commitments in COIN are characterized by the fact that they intervene in a sovereign Host-Nation, within a multinational framework and under the pressure of public opinions. Constrained by time factor, intervention forces must act in conjunction with local security forces, Host Nation's elites and numerous civilian external agents.
4. The main role of intervention forces is to reinstate security in close conjunction with local forces, which ones must contribute in developing operational capabilities. In the framework of a comprehensive approach in crisis management, intervention forces participate in supporting other pillars of COIN in the fields of governance and development. Their operational approach rotates around four axes: Secure, Clear, Hold and Build.
5. The operational level plays a decisive role in COIN by acting on the opponents, field and population while implementing a comprehensive approach at the level of the theatre of operation. An agile operational campaign must allow a sparing of optimal forces so as to enlarge controlled zones and hand them over to local security forces as soon as possible.
6. COIN requires particular operational capabilities, namely in terms of operational preparation, command, observation and influence.
7. Entitled *Counter-insurgency (COM)*, the Joint Doctrine (JD) 3.4.4 constitutes the pending of the Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.4.4: *Counter-insurgency*.
8. Derived from *Crisis Management, Contribution of the Armed Forces to STABlisation (STAB)*, and *Operations against Irregular Adversary (IRAO)* concepts, this document constitutes the national reference for the management of current operations in counter-insurgency.

This document has been developed by the Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrines and Experimentations (CICDE), a joint agency working on behalf of the Defence Staff or *État-major des armées (EMA)*. For any information, please contact the CICDE at



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