



**(FRA) Joint Centre
for Concepts,
Doctrine and
Experimentation**

STUDY

Contribution of the Armed Forces to the Prevention of External Crises

**Joint Doctrine Note
(FRA) JDN-2014/001_PREVENTION(2014)**

No. 016 DEF/CICDE/NP as of 27 January 2014



This French Joint Doctrine Note (FRA) JDN-2014/001 *Contribution of the Armed Forces to the Prevention of External Crises* is in compliance with the prescriptions of the Allied Administrative Publication AAP-47(A) *Allied Joint Doctrine Development* (2011). The front cover of this document was created by the French Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrine and Experimentation (CICDE).

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(FRA) JDN-2014/001
PREVENTION(2014)

**CONTRIBUTION OF THE ARMED FORCES
TO THE PREVENTION OF EXTERNAL CRISES**

No. 016/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 27 January 2014

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Letter of Promulgation

Paris, 27 January 2014

No. 016/DEF/CICDE/NP

Object: Promulgation of joint doctrine note *Contribution of the Armed Forces to the Prevention of External Crises* ([FRA] JDN-2014/001).

References:

- Ministerial order of 21 April 2005 on the creation of the *Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d'expérimentations (CICDE)*.
- Instruction no. 1239 DEF/EMA/GRH/OR of 20 June 2006 concerning the organization and operation of the *Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d'expérimentations (CICDE)*.

The joint doctrine note (FRA) JDN-2014/001 *Contribution of the Armed Forces to the Prevention of External Crises* is hereby promulgated.

Vice-amiral Arnaud de TARLÉ
Directeur du Centre interarmées de concepts,
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References

- a. **French White Paper on Defence and National Security**, Odile Jacob, La documentation française, 2013, foreword by François HOLLANDE, President of the Republic. For ease of reading, this document will hereinafter be referred to as LBDSN-2013.
- b. **(FRA) JC-01_CCMO(2013) Capstone Concept for Military Operations**, no. 130/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 12 September 2013.
- c. **(FRA) JDN-3.4_CA(2011) Comprehensive Approach to External Crisis Management and Military Contribution**, no. 024/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 24 January 2011.

Foreword

The management of crises is mainly part of three of the five strategic priorities described in LBDSN-2013:

- Stabilize Europe's near environment, with our partners and allies;
- Contribute to the stability of the Middle East and the Arabo-Persian Gulf;
- Contribute to peace in the world.

The European Union does not have a doctrine on prevention but it develops a concept called Military Support to EU Conflict Prevention and Stabilisation activities (including Capacity Building).

NATO does not consider prevention as one of its military missions. Indeed, *"the Alliance's contribution to conflict prevention is fundamentally political and, by definition, pre-operations. For these reasons it was determined to be beyond the authority of the Nation Military Authorities and therefore out of scope of Alliance AJP's."* Nonetheless, NATO develops a Security Forces Assistance concept which contributes to prevention.

The *CICDE* does not develop doctrines by strategic functions. The present joint doctrine note focuses on the contribution of the Armed Forces to the prevention of external crises. Forward-looking and innovatory aspects are shown in green in the body of the document.

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This study is both a doctrine note and a prospective analysis. It focuses on the idea that the contribution of the armed forces to the prevention of external crises can be considered for all the spectrum of action, including targeted and limited coercion and show of power.

The function "prevention" mainly aims to prevent a conflict or the escalation of a crisis which would impact the interests of the Nation in a more or less long term. Therefore, crises and conflicts should be maintained to the lowest level as long as possible, while ensuring the protection of the interests directly threatened by a conflict or possibility of a conflict (nationals, flows, etc.) at a minimum. In this framework, courses of action based on **intimidation** or targeted **coercion** may be considered in addition to traditional actions of influence (force prepositioning, cooperation, etc.).

In other words, this broad approach on prevention:

- is interrelated with the strategic functions "knowledge and anticipation, prevention and intervention" as part of the crisis management continuum;
- provides a greater freedom of manoeuvre to the decision-maker by delaying as much as possible the time of direct intervention since a conflict may be long, costly and covered by the media;
- contributes to the economy of resources;
- and encourages to value the watch and early warning network, especially abroad.

Prevention is even more efficient and credible when it is part of an **influence strategy**, which does not exclude the deployment or engagement of armed forces.

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Chapter 1

Elements for Understanding Crises

Section I – Definition of Crisis (man-made)

Several definitions are given in reference documents. For instance, reference c. (FRA) JDN-3.4 on comprehensive approach defines a crisis as follow:

101. **"[...] a crisis is a serious phase in the evolution of events within a society, beyond the tolerance level of the population, particularly regarding violence." ¹ The foundations of a state's stability are deteriorated. The resulting crisis involves multiple actors over a long period and may spread.**

In the French joint glossary on operational terminology², crises and the management of a deteriorated situation are closely linked. Their definition introduces a strong interrelation between "crisis" and "armed conflict", hence the use of both the prevention and intervention functions:

102. **"A crisis is the disruption of the existing balance within a state or between several states, which results in tensions likely to lead to severe unrest or conflict." Crisis management requires the implementation of "coordinated measures to prevent the escalation of a crisis to an armed conflict, or to contain the resulting hostilities."**

103. Crises often occur in fragile states not possessing all the sovereignty assets or enable to ensure their sovereign functions, i.e. ensure the security of the territory and population, and meet its basic needs.³ "France therefore considers it a priority to assist fragile States located in regions likely to affect its security."⁴

104. In those countries, the lack of stability of the government institutions and the corruption of the political and administrative leaders are factors leading to the rejection of politicians and to a flow of demands. Those factors hinder the economical and financial development of a country, and cause poverty and an uneven distribution of wealth which all contribute to the disruption of balances and to an increase in tensions.

105. The weakness of the armed forces and police, or the loss of authority over a military machine becoming autonomous, deny the state of any efficient capability to implement legitimate force. Consequently, military groups, para-military forces or private military societies and armed criminals may use violence without restriction. Since the protection of the population cannot be ensured, the social contract between the state and the citizens is broken.

106. Fragile states are favourable grounds to the emergence of no-go areas (or sanctuaries) and make the settlement of crises more complex.

Section II – Diversity of Disruptive Actors

107. Some states are regional disturbers. Access to dual technologies (GPS, communication via satellites) and new capabilities (vectors) facilitates their ability to cause trouble and the increasing cross-border nature of crises. Therefore, the possibility of crises becoming interstate conflicts should not be discarded.

108. The definition of the actors of a crisis is not confined to state boundaries. Extremist motives, cultural and ethnic affiliations, economical interests and cyber threats all favour the emergence of powerful transnational actors, regardless of the governmental framework.

¹ Ref. c., Annex A.

² PIA-7.2.6-3 *Glossaire interarmées de terminologie opérationnelle*, édition 2012.

³ Study on the characterisation of failed states, *CICDE*.

⁴ LBDSN-2013, p. 77.

109. Such context implies the identification or characterisation of adversaries (especially non-governmental adversaries) of different nature.⁵ Since communication with them is difficult due to the lack of official channels, it is hard to assess their perception and calculations.
110. The plethora of partnerships may include unusual alliances: the disturbers of yesterday may become the allies of tomorrow.⁶

Section III – Diversity of Courses of Action

111. The coexistence of several courses of action and the simultaneous involvement of actors of different nature may develop during crises. This can result in the simultaneous existence of conventional and non-conventional actions carried out on a same theatre, in diverse military and non directly military fields. Those courses of action are often far removed from the standards of our armed forces. This is an advantage our adversaries know how to exploit.
112. The criminal use of cyberspace makes the development of rebel movements easier within states and feed intrastate conflicts. Fragile states are defenceless or often powerless when confronted to those new courses of action.

⁵ Conf. ref. b, p. 10: *"Our forces may be engaged against state, non-state, military or non-military adversaries, or even, with regard to cyber threat, unidentified adversaries."*

⁶ e.g. the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad during the recent conflict in Mali.

Section I – Definition

Prevention Strategic Function

201. LBDSN-2013⁷ defines prevention as follow: *"Prevention concerns both the national territory and France's action outside its borders. Implementation takes in formulation of national and international norms as well as the combat against trafficking, disarmament and peace-building. [...] Prevention calls for a capacity of anticipation grounded in accurate knowledge of the risks and threats that enables the State to identify risks before they become threats."*
202. Prevention ensures the safeguard of peace and security. It requires surveillance, the identification of causes of conflicts and the implementation of measures in due course to prevent the development, escalation or recurrence of hostilities. Countries where France's interests may be at stake are particularly monitored.
203. Pre-conflict management usually places diplomatic manoeuvre as the priority action of the state. However, it is essential that the interministerial analysis is shared at the soonest so that defence diplomacy actions and activities in support to the internal security of states are coordinated, continuous and coherent. It is one of the tasks of the interministerial Task Force for the management of external crises and crisis cells.⁸
204. Finally, in parallel to the pursuit of its objectives, **prevention is an ongoing process:**
- a. upstream, its role is to prevent a crisis from occurring;
 - b. if a crisis erupts nonetheless, and if we decide to intervene, prevention aims to prevent the spreading or deterioration of the problem;
 - c. once a crisis is settled, **prevention aims to avoid its re-emergence or to stem new tensions which could result from the post-crisis situation.**

The decision to intervene or, on the contrary, to disengage, does not mean a renunciation to prevent but rather to redirect prevention to another objective.

Defence Diplomacy

205. Defence diplomacy is one of the levers to the prevention of crises. It is the participation of the armed forces to bilateral or multilateral governmental actions. It is based on the following courses of action:
- a. bilateral and multilateral strategic dialogue;
 - b. support for the diplomatic activity within international organizations;
 - c. arms control and the confidence that goes with it;
 - d. defence cooperation and support for the Security Sector Reform (SSR).

⁷ Chapter 6, p. 77.

⁸ Two organizations within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs including representatives from the Ministry of Defence.

Coordinated (or Comprehensive) Approach in Managing Crises

206. *"Consolidating fragile states or restoring their stability requires implementing a set of complementary and consistent actions in every field. Greater coordination is necessary in the framework of a global inter-ministerial and multilateral approach with the aim of optimising the use of limited resources."*⁹ In this set of actions, military contribution is naturally included in complement to the operating of regional and global institutions, preventive diplomacy, jurisdictional dispute settlement and adapted development aid policy.

Section II – Definition of the Scope of Prevention and Interactions with Other Strategic Functions

207. **The capstone concept for military operations introduces the principle of a "dynamic synergy of efforts, involving greater interaction between strategic functions". Indeed, avoiding the emergence of conflictual situations is tied to the objectives of the knowledge–anticipation function. Moreover, there is a real interaction between the prevention and intervention function, or at least a strong link between them.**

Time Limit

208. Prevention is traditionally carried out prior the onset of crises. However, the field of prevention activities may also apply to post-conflict stabilization situations once the intervention phase is over (restoration of defence cooperation in Ivory Coast and Mali). The stake is not in the prevention of the emergence of violent conflicts but rather in the prevention of their recurrence.

In the end, the prevention function helps in building security and defence tools prior to crises but also after crises, during the phase of crisis exit.

Interaction of the Knowledge–Anticipation and Prevention Functions

209. The knowledge–anticipation function is at the base of any action in terms of national security. It also enables to provide a panorama as precise as possible of the risks, threats and opportunities in the most varied fields. It enables the anticipation of crises and covers the ability to ensure a horizon-scanning on a large spectrum, as well as the ability to use the assessment elements necessary to prevention. Prior to crises and conflicts, the knowledge–anticipation and prevention functions are therefore closely linked.

Interaction of the Prevention and Intervention Strategic Functions

210. Intervention cannot be dissociated from the prevention function. The first steps of the intervention of an armed force (projection, creation of a buffer zone, indirect action against disturbers) are even more related to prevention. Some situations do not call for a large scale military intervention. However, they may require military to act so as to deter an adversary from initiating or developing an aggressive action. This has been illustrated in recent conflict, e.g. in Syria with the use of chemical weapons.
211. The United States' defence policy has illustrated during these last years, under another form and with very different objectives from ours, all the difficulty in defining the boundary between prevention and intervention. For as much, France has not adopted the principle of pre-emption.

⁹ LBDSN-2013, p. 93.

Section III – Challenges or Difficulties

Prevention Legal Framework

212. Preventive force actions are part of a legal framework that is very different from intervention actions. Although France excludes any preventive coercive intervention, it does not exclude, under certain circumstances of precise and impending threats, to take the initiative of point military actions. However, Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nation establishes a principle prohibiting the use of force between states. If France were to take the initiative of a military pre-deployment, as prevention, it would have to be on the condition of an adversary unquestionably threatening "international peace and security"¹⁰.
213. Prevention actions sometimes have a significant bilateral dimension referring to interstate agreements relative to common strategic interests. However, and like the intervention function, the reference to UN international settlements remains the favoured context of actions of our armed forces (e.g. Gulf of Guinea and Ivory Coast).

Uneasy Assessment

214. The assessment of the effects of military contributions to prevention is uneasy since their result is acquired only in the lack of a real threat. In other words, it is hard to surely establish a link between the avoidance of a crisis or violent conflict and the preventive military actions, which could have been conducted as part of other strategic functions.
215. Therefore, several military activities more or less include a prevention dimension: it is the case of the "presence" of transits or visits of military ships to harbours, and more broadly, area control and shows of force. For example, Operation *Prométhée* in the Arabo-Persian Gulf, in 1987, was to prevent the spreading of the interstate conflict (Iran-Iraq war).

¹⁰ Charter of the United Nation, Art. 2.

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Section I – Anticipating Crises

Detecting Signs

301. Strategic monitoring consists in searching for relevant clues among the significant and evolving mass of information. In this context, it is important to have the ability to identify the nature of possible crises at the soonest, assess their imminence and search basic intelligence on the area¹¹ and on the actors, as well as their intentions and operational readiness. The objective is to assess a level of threat, provide political and military authorities warning signs and the means to interpret them.
302. The surveillance of the failure of some states¹² considered at risk, especially weaknesses in their governance, of the cohesion level of their society or of their development through a regional observation, is an essential aspect contributing to the detection of signs of crisis.

Understanding the Local Security Context

303. In case of a crisis, the deep knowledge of the physical and human environment, or the psychology of the possible disturbers or adversaries, is a key dimension. The behaviour of neutral and third actors also requires examination.
304. Indeed, the possible actors of crises, which are at the centre of the anticipation process, have transnational networks of material, human or financial support. Consequently, it is important to understand the operating of interconnected organizations able to operate as a system.

Section II – Continuity and Duration of the Action

Continuity of the Action

305. The prevention effort is necessarily carried out in the continuity to reach success. The complexity of crises requires the deployment of sustained efforts in the long term to acquire knowledge of the environment, of the men and their motives, and to create and maintain trust and credibility next to partners.
305. On the opposite, disruption in the continuity of the prevention effort undermines the ability to understand situations. It often results in the loss of influence. Any disruption forces to rebuild networks later on and to start over at the lowest level the actions carried out before, which usually implies the mobilization of new assets and delays.

Long-Term Investment

306. Prevention measures are more efficient and less costly when they are carried out upstream, when the threat is still low or not materialized. Investment in human, technical and financial fields is less important and is more spread over time. In addition, it provides deeper knowledge of the context.
307. Training, high-level advice and actions such as the fight against illegal traffics or counter-piracy at sea, all contribute to a preventive effect in the long term. They must adapt to very different political and international contexts which require prevention actions adapted to each situation¹³.
308. Point measures may be carried out (direct support, logistic support) but at a significantly lower cost than for military stabilization or contribution operations to the reconstruction of a state.

¹¹ Basic intelligence complements military-oriented intelligence, which focuses on the living force of the adversary and its environment.

¹² Study on the characterisation of failed states, *CICDE*.

¹³ For instance, response to the piracy of a non-existent state such as Somalia is fundamentally different from the response necessary to fight against maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea.

309. A multilateral approach, the development of combined actions in a third country with partner states and international organizations¹⁴, and the seeking of external funding are likely to share prevention efforts while enabling a better distribution of the costs induced. This partnership approach also enables to gain the international legitimacy of our actions in favour of third countries, and is necessarily carried out in the long term.

Section III – Coordinated (or Comprehensive) Approach

Comprehensive Nature of Prevention

310. A military force cannot provide sustainable solutions to crises by itself. It must be part of a coherent set of actions to reach settlement. Prevention is no exception to this fundamental rule of comprehensive approach, which associates all the possible actors by gathering, but without confounding them, fields relative to internal and external security.
311. The comprehensive consideration of the stakes of security and defence is a major foundation of prevention, the efficiency of which is greatly dependent on the coherence of all the measures taken. Those measures require interministerial coordination to which the military dimension is closely dependent.

Diversity of the Domains Concerned

313. The implementation of a comprehensive approach in PMESII¹⁵ domains implies to take action on the following levers:
- a. diplomatic: bilateral and multilateral relations, treaties of friendship and agreements;
 - b. legal: functioning of the rule of law, internal security;
 - c. sociological: activities for the populations and parties in all areas (family, religions, cultures, traditions, etc.);
 - d. military: defence diplomacy, strategic monitoring, arms control, defence cooperation, pre-positioning, deployments;
 - e. economical: cooperation, international loans, direct investments.

Section IV – Credibility

Transparency and Communication

314. The visibility of preventive actions is a key to their credibility and efficiency in several ways:
- b. it shows the determination of their author to oppose the bursting of a violent confrontation or the extension of a conflict; hence, it enables pressure to be exerted on the disturber(s); it contributes to reassure third parties and regional neighbours on the will to contain the conflict;
 - c. the visibility of preventive actions with a clearly expressed determination reinforces credibility, hence the ability to gain the acceptance of international organizations or partners;
 - d. it guides the parties' perceptions and ways of functioning of the skills and know-how of the French Armed Forces. Thereafter, the similarity of the concepts and standards proposed to partners ensures the efficiency of common measures;
 - e. however, the efficiency of some measures, should they be diplomatic (mediation, negotiation) or military (clause of assistance in case of an aggression, intelligence collection, special operations), may also require some level of discretion, as decided by the political and military authority.

¹⁴ EU concept on the military contribution to the Security System Reform (SSR).

¹⁵ PMESII: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information.

Section V – Involvement of Local Actors

316. It is always recommended to help local actors in ensuring the security of their own state and control of the regional context by themselves. Strategic dialogue, interoperability improvement, communication of information, all contribute to build local military capabilities which provide a pool of forces available for peacekeeping operations mandated by the United Nations¹⁶, European Union, NATO or other regional organizations (African Union).
317. In this spirit, advice and assistance are a priority, providing to have the necessary time to train men and to set up strong institutions. This dimension of prevention organizes the transmission of skills to the beneficiary state until acquired. This reduces the risk of a direct intervention and its consequences in terms of human and material costs.

¹⁶ *RECAMP (Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix)*: Reinforcement of African Peace-keeping Capacities. The *RECAMP* program has been initiated, developed and led by France since 1994 in favour of African countries expressing the will to progressively ensure themselves the security of the continent, under the aegis of the UN and in agreement with the African Union.

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Chapter 4

Military Contribution to Prevention

401. **Contribution of the Armed Forces to prevention is part of defence diplomacy. It is based on the coherence of the influence policy France conducts to preserve its interests and those of its friendly states, as well as on the concept of progressiveness of the measures to take in the event of a risky situation. The Armed Forces have a large range of courses of action and the capabilities associated with it (standing or deployable), in support of the diplomatic action.**

Section I – Ongoing Contribution

Ongoing Strategic Watch and Early Warning

402. Prevention is based on standing postures deployed in France and abroad. They are organized to analyse and understand local situations, anticipate their evolution, assess the risks and stakes, and give the warning if needed.
403. Abroad, they benefit from a widespread network of specialized or contingency sensors: defence and armament attachés, French military representatives, cooperating actors, military deployed for missions of short duration, military permanently stationed or exchanges of military with allied armed forces, and participants to exercises. The exploitation of all those specialized or contingency sources of information must be systematic, especially through the review of the periodic reports and debriefings.
404. On the national territory, actors of the prevention mission have two roles: on one hand, they guide the collection of intelligence and signs of alert (quantitative approach), especially in areas of strategic interest defined by the political authority. In this regard, coordination results from the decisions of the *CEMA* via the *GAS*¹⁷. On the other hand, they analyse (qualitative approach) information and draw syntheses for the political authorities and the military in the view of the reinforcement of surveillance or of the planning of active measures. To this end, the *DRM*¹⁸ is responsible of the production of military-oriented intelligence.

Multilateral Approach / Contribution to Arms Control

405. The ongoing contribution of the armed forces to prevention is usually carried out within a multinational framework, the main objective of which is to gain legitimacy of action. Armed forces representatives participate at their level in the definition of the objectives NATO, the EU, UN and OSCE desire to reach. In the EU, a regular examination process enables the updating of a list of countries likely to relieve UN prevention means.
406. A multilateral approach and the development of combined actions with partner states and international organizations, as well as the seeking of partners in the private sector, are systematically enhanced, with the view of exchanging relevant data and, in the best scenario, sharing and pooling efforts.
407. Arms control has an objective complementary to these measures. It aims to maintain peace and security through transparency and trust. It is based on the active and voluntary participation of states to the mechanisms aiming to limit the military potential and to the regular exchange of data on their development. Arms control is carried out within specialized international bodies and contributes to stability by preventing the accumulation of weapons or technologies which could announce a disruption in regional balances.

¹⁷ *GAS: Groupe d'anticipation stratégique / Strategic Anticipation Group. Coordination of intelligence services is the responsibility of the CNR (Conseil national du renseignement / National Intelligence Council).*

¹⁸ *DRM: Direction du renseignement militaire / Directorate for Military Intelligence.*

408. In this context, the Armed Forces' military and technical expertise supports the control of the compliance with arms restriction or prohibition of conventional weapons or Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) agreements.¹⁹ It is directly associated to the surveillance of trade movements likely to provide for the dissemination of sensitive weapons and technologies, proliferation of WMD or CBRN material associated to them, or illegal activities (small arms and light weapons). It reinforces the economy weakening strategies which aim to hold back the industrial development of suspect countries from proliferation.

Section II – Targeted Contribution: Assistance

Structural Cooperation (or TMA: Technical Military Assistance)

409. It is necessary to reduce the existing tensions within a given environment in order to reduce risk factors. This implies, at best, a minimum participation, and at least, a contribution to contain violence. Most of these actions is part of diplomacy or development aid. In support to these efforts, the role of defence diplomacy is axed around defence cooperation and participation to the strategic dialogue.
410. The armed forces exchange and transfer their expertise in the operational area (doctrine, technical training, planning, intelligence) and on organic matters (finances, organization, recruiting, administration). They do not directly intervene; instead, they favour the reinforcement of pre-existing local structures and do not seek to substitute local organizations.
411. In practice, the priority target is the set-up of cooperating actors next to high politico-military authorities to carry out high level audit and advice missions (ministers, state secretaries, chiefs of staff, director of the Gendarmerie or local equivalent, directors of central services). These measures are adapted to peacebuilding situations which ensure a lasting stability.

Education and Training of Military Officers and Local Elites

412. The education and training of service or security personnel is a key aspect of structural cooperation, which is part of long-term prevention. Education mainly focuses on military subjects (peacekeeping, humanitarian de-mining) and on the legal environment (support for the rule of law), public safety, border control (counter-terrorism) and the democratic functioning of armed forces. It is based on a dense network of multinational and multilingual training centres, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.
413. The training provided on site, tailored to the needs of the supported countries, is combined with classes and courses delivered by instruction schools and centres located in France. The latter are at the core of prevention, as much as an influence policy based on the teaching of French, the transmission of the French strategic and military know-how and the promotion of the French Armed Forces' centres of excellence.

Logistic Support and Training

414. The contribution of the Armed Forces may consist in logistic support or in the funding of equipments for the reform and reconstruction of the armed and security forces, especially as part of the prevention of crisis situations, if the circumstances so require. It can also consist in helping a partner to prepare a contingent for a peacekeeping operation.
415. Training in the military or security area and exercises conducted in a bilateral or multinational environment enable to work the procedures and to demonstrate to potential opponents the value in the instructed units, as well as the efficiency of the internal security forces. In this regard, the innovative themes of *AEM*²⁰ (maritime security), counter-terrorism and counter-piracy, provide credible support.

¹⁹ RDIA-2013/044 *Lutte contre la prolifération des ADM : la contribution des forces armées*, no. 154/DEF/CICDE/DR as of 12 September 2013.

²⁰ *AEM: Action de l'État en mer / Government Action at Sea.*

416. In all the countries where French forces are deployed (forces of presence or cooperation focal points), this structural cooperation coordinates as closely as possible with the operational cooperation, which is the responsibility of the French Defence Staff²¹.

Operational Cooperation (or OMA: Operational Military Assistance)

417. Although TMA and OMA have a complementary nature, they differentiate themselves due to their different environment and level of emergency. TMA is usually conducted in a non-hostile environment and over a long period of time. It is one of France's tool for its strategy of influence. On the other hand, OMA meets the needs of a crisis approach, even when its action is preventive.
418. OMA can be considered before operations to prevent crises or after operations to participate to the reconstruction of a national armed force. However, it also often supports the military action in several ways:
- a. training of the host nation's armed force while co-participating to operations²²—training may be provided within a bilateral or multinational framework;
 - b. advice and mentoring;
 - c. buddy system or exchange of units.

Section III – Presence

Pre-Positioned Forces and Defence Agreements

419. Pre-positioned forces participate to ongoing prevention. More modern capabilities are deployed where the French presence must be reinforced, e.g. in Abu Dhabi.
420. Moreover, the objective is to ensure a military presence or to deploy under short notice in areas of strategic interests abroad. Indeed, pre-positioned forces have operational advantages which go beyond the field of the prevention function, by contributing to a deterrent effect or by preparing the ground for protection and intervention actions (support for an ulterior operation). The imperative of responsiveness and the movement of areas of interest may lead to the deployment of immediately efficient but limited light assets.
421. Bilateral agreements aims to create a defence and security partnership. They express France's priority interest for the targeted countries or regions, and have a significant preventive role. *"Defence and security cooperation, operational assistance to foreign armed forces and our pre-positioned forces are all instruments that must contribute to the consistency of our approach to prevention."*²³
422. LBDSN-2013 highlights the need for quick responsiveness to crises: the capstone concept for military operations defines it as the increased flexibility of our forces, should they be standing, sovereignty or deployed forces, in order to be on the crisis areas as soon as possible. The deployment of our forces abroad is part of this prevention approach. **Finally, the downsizing of the French forces requires the development of mobility and intra-theatre step up abilities.**

²¹ RDIA-3.21 *Assistance militaire opérationnelle à une force armée étrangère*, no. 009/DEF/CICDE/DR as of 04January 2011 (English version available).

²² The most illustrative example is that of the participation of the French forces to the operations in Afghanistan next to the Afghan National Army.

²³ LBDSN-2013, p. 93-94.

Section IV – Intimidation²⁴

Preventive action aims to convince possible disturbers to not carry out their intentions, via appropriate signs. The gradation of these measures may lead to choose from intimidating disturbers with more coercive limited actions or with a show of force or power, the effects of which could have a strategic impact.

Force Projection and Reinforcement of Pre-Positioning Forces at the Closest to Hazard Areas

423. In terms of prevention, the Armed Forces must project forces or limited military assets until the beginning of the intervention in a strategic area of interest abroad.
424. If threat increases in spite of the sent signals, the obligation of prevention responds to the need of high responsiveness or emergency. Diplomatic action is therefore mainly based on defence diplomacy and on the direct contribution of the Armed Forces in order to contain violence and protect national interests, and first and foremost the security and safety of French nationals. **It is possible to send strong signals to disruptive actors through the reinforcement of pre-positioned forces, and by clearly addressing them the risks to which they are exposed of they persist in their intentions.**
425. Those deployments show without ambiguity the determination to contribute to stability within the priority areas identified by the national political authority. They enable to prevent risks on the security of supplies and accesses to strategic resources.
426. Deployments can be on the three physical environments, i.e. at sea or through land and air forces of presence. High seas are a favoured manoeuvre space since legal constraints in these areas are weak. However, the flexibility of a deployment in such space is counterbalanced by its relative discretion, which may lead to choose the movement of assets on the ground, which is more visible and complementary.

Intimidation Manoeuvre Through Power Projection

427. There are several ways for the Armed Forces to participate to this type of action, whether prevention is addressed to a state or to transnational criminal groups. In the case of a disruptive state, the use of military assets combines with economic sanctions, embargo measures on arms trade, and the implementation of no-fly zones. Special operations may be carried out on the territory of a state where signs of a crisis emerge²⁵, with or without a show of power, which implies significant resources (see examples of concrete cases next page).
428. **Through the gradation of its action, strategic intimidation must constantly leave a way out to the potential opponent so that the military action is deeply intertwined with the diplomatic action. Indeed, its progressiveness illustrates the will not to directly choose extreme solutions but rather to delay the launch of a large scale military operation as much as possible.**

429. Contributions of the Armed Forces to the prevention function are not the prerogative of a particular component. They combine semi-permanent elements operating in the long term in more or less important deployments, which are adapted to rapid geopolitical evolutions. They are characterized by the reversibility of their action, which can be adjusted, from the support provided to a partner to strategic intimidation against an identified disturber which can be carried out through a limited coercive action.

²⁴ CICDE preparation sheet for LBDSN-2013 (09/10/2012) on increased prevention: current prevention, which certainly does not exclude action, would extend to intimidation actions, based on advanced courses of action (drones, use of social networks, special forces, etc.).

²⁵ RDIA-006 *Intimidation stratégique*, no. 026/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 26 January 2012, sub-section 4.3.2.: "Special forces are [...] a tool to be favoured due to their specific qualities: ability to reach targets hardly accessible otherwise, flexibility of use, limitation of collateral effects, discrimination capability, reversibility, etc."

TWO CONCRETE CASES OF STRATEGIC INTIMIDATION

Example of a preventive action: Operation Saphir II and independence of Djibouti

France recognized to the French Territory of Afars and Issas the right of independence in spring 1975. In the view of the organization of a self-determination referendum, the Ministry of the Armed Forces was preparing in great secrecy a naval deployment since 1976, which appeared unavoidable to maintain peace and security in the area (...).

On 04 March, the *Clemenceau* received a notice of mission of a secret nature, until revealed on the 17th. The aircraft carrier received the order to sail on 05 April and complement the anti-submarine frigate *Tourville* and fleet tanker *Saône* to form Task Group 423.1. This first force was reinforced by detached elements of the Mediterranean wing, which was already on site. This powerful force counted up to seventeen ships in the Gulf of Aden. It was the most important force France deployed in this area since World War II.



*The Clemenceau
coming back from mission Saphir II*

The great number of ships and the deployment of the aircraft carrier battle group is a significant signal to coastal countries and the great powers. More than a mere show of power, France can use it for more coercive goals. Whoever does not respect the integrity of the new territory risks significant reprisal (...).

Deterrence (sic) can be achieved in three ways. The mere increase of ships, and consequently of the naval potential, in the Gulf of Aden, represents in itself a serious warning against any foreign intervention. Then, the unusual high concentration in the port of Djibouti (6 to 10 ships) has very strong symbolic value for the coastal countries, which is accentuated with the exceptional presence of aircraft carriers. Finally, beyond the mere balance of power, they have an **indisputable psychological impact** on the public opinions of the area. Operation Saphir II reached its objective. The referendum of 08 May 1977 and the festivities following the proclamation of independence, on 27 June, took place without incident. The naval situation in the Gulf of Aden also remained calm, considering the high increase of the French potential. Somalian and Ethiopian forces have made no move since the balance of power is significantly against them. Sovietic ships have particularly been discreet in the area (...). **Saphir II was before all a preventive action.**

(ref. *La diplomatie navale au service du maintien de la paix : l'opération SAPHIR II et l'indépendance de Djibouti – avril-juin 1977*, by Laurent SUTEAU.)

**Example of a preventive land deployment:
intervention of the Italian forces to the Brenner pass in 1934**

The formation of a Reich gathering all the German-speaking populations is an old nationalist idea going back to the dismantlement of the Holy Roman Germanic Empire in 1806. Hitler put this pangerman project as one of the pillars of his policy when he came to power in Berlin in January 1933, and defended the idea of unification (*Anschluss*) of Austria to Germany.

In Vienna, opinions were quite divided on this matter. Federal Chancellor Dollfuss, defending Austrian independency, took the lead of both an anti-communist and anti-nazi totalitarian regime, similar in some points to Mussolini's fascist regime in Italy. This was followed by a period of unrest, exacerbated by an economical crisis. In early 1934, Hitler asked the League of Nations (LN) for the *Anschluss* of Austria. Dollfuss and Mussolini, then France and the United Kingdom disagreed.

On 25 July 1934, Dollfuss was assassinated by Austrian Nazis in a failed coup. Hitler considered a military intervention to support putschists. Mussolini, who guaranteed Austrian independency, immediately mobilized four Alpine Divisions and sent them to the Brenner Pass (mountain pass through the Alps along the border between Italy and Austria) to be ready to enter in Austria if the German armed forces were to intervene. Since Hitler was aware of the weaknesses of his own armed force, he chose to renounce and sealed the failure of the coup. Afterwards, he verbally and publicly ensured conciliation.



FIG 3 – Italian area of interest in the Northern Alps.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

501. It is hard to separate military contributions directly linked to the "prevention" strategic function since it is sometimes interrelated to adjacent functions, especially knowledge–anticipation and intervention, as part of the continuum of the management of external crises.
502. This difficulty is amplified by a certain degree of uncertainty regarding the assessment of the results of the action: by definition, when prevention is successful, the maintenance of the status quo or the avoidance of a conflict are less spectacular than an intervention. Prevention effects are not directly visible nor attributable to a well identified single actor.
503. Nonetheless, prevention is mainly conducted in the particular field of long-term assistance provided to France's partners and friends. Far from being a prerequisite for a direct military intervention, it first aims to provide to the supported the means to ensure by themselves their security and defence.
504. However, the contribution of the armed forces to the prevention of external crises may cover part of the spectrum of low and high intensity since it does not exclude targeted and limited coercive actions up to a show of power.
505. Nonetheless, it significantly contributes to the economy of means, especially since its cost is lower to that of a direct intervention in a conflict or stabilization/reconstruction mission which is often carried out in the long term.
506. It is therefore important to value the watch and early warning network, especially abroad, so as to deploy without delay active prevention military forces which can adapt to the rapid evolutions of the geopolitical situations and to France's strategic interests.
507. In conclusion, prevention is even more efficient and credible when it is part of an **influence strategy** carried out prior to a deployment or engagement of forces.

Summary

(FRA) JDN-2014/001_PREVENTION(2014)

1. This joint doctrine note illustrates the notion of dynamic synergy of efforts developed in the French *Capstone Concept on Military Operation (CCMO)* and which implies a larger operation doctrinal field for lighter and more flexible new organizations. It results in a greater interaction between strategic functions.
2. Through the study of the engagement of the Armed Forces to the prevention of external crises, this document suggests changes in the usual joint relations and roles in order to acquire greater flexibility in operations. Prevention covers limited or intimidation actions so as to delay military intervention as the ultimate solution while offering a way out to potential opponents at all times.
3. The present document defines the notion of crisis as well as some elements of context such as actors and their courses of action, then it frames the scope of the prevention function compared to other functions, and finally, it lists factors of success.
4. It also lists the principles of prevention, which implies a long-term investment and a gradation of adapted measures, up to the threshold of a possible launch of a coercive military intervention.
5. Finally, this document exposes the contributions of the Armed Forces to the implementation of the prevention function, i.e. a wide range of varied measures, from early warning (standing contribution) to intimidation.



This French version of this document was developed by the (FRA) Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrine and Experimentation (*CICDE*), a joint agency working on behalf of the Defence Staff (*EMA*). For any information, please contact the *CICDE* at:

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