(FRA) Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrines and Experimentations

Comprehensive Approach (CA) to External Crisis Management (CM) (Military Contribution)

Joint Doctrine Note (FRA) JDN-2011/001_CA-CM

Entitled *Comprehensive Approach (CA) to External Crisis Management (CM) - Military Contribution,* the French (FRA) Joint Doctrine Note JDN --2011/001 respects the graphic standards defined in the French joint publication *PIA-7.2.4_RDRIA(2010),* no. 161/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 18 June 2010. The aforementioned graphics standards are themselves in compliance with the prescriptions of the Allied Administrative Publication AAP-47 (entitled *Allied Joint Doctrine Development).* The front cover of this document was created by the Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrines and Experimentations (*CICDE*)[1]. The printing was realized by the Parisian Service of the Central Administration (*SPAC*) / Graphics Pole of Paris (*PGP*).

Please note: **the only official reference of this document is the electronic French version** which is available on the Internet and/or Intradef website of the *CICDE* (http://www.cicde.defense. gouv.fr).

---

[1] Copyright (FRA) Ministry of Defence (MoD).

(FRA) JDN-2011/001_CA-CM

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH (CA)
TO EXTERNAL
CRISIS MANAGEMENT (CM)
MILITARY CONTRIBUTION

No. 024/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 24 January 2011

Translated by Miss Cécile BOUTELOUP
Translation Service of the *CICDE*

General Pierre de VILLIERS
Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff
(*MGA*)

1. The French White Paper on Defence and National Security (ref. a) underlines the need for a Comprehensive Approach (CA) to the management of current external crises, noting that *"the complexity of international crises requires the establishment of strategies combining diplomatic, financial, civil, cultural and military means, during prevention and crises management phases, as well as during stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction sequences."*

2. Preservation or restoration of stability should be reached by acting in the fields of security, governance and development, which cannot be achieved by the French or international armed forces only. Military intervention – when necessary – is systematically part of a complex environment involving a great number of civil and military actors.

3. This note on the comprehensive approach to external crises management provides guidelines to the armed forces so that they can bring their contribution in order to optimize the committed action, should it be national or, as often, multinational.

4. This document is intended for all military staff likely to be engaged on external theatres of operations in order to specify in which state of mind they must fulfil their mission.

5. It must also be communicated to the principal institutional actors with whom the armed forces are brought to coordinate their actions within the framework of external crisis management.

6. This note is likely to evolve to integrate the inter-ministerial works on external crisis management as well as the doctrinal reflections of the Atlantic Alliance and European Union.

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

1. This table constitutes the collection of all the amendments proposed by readers, regardless of their origin or rank, as submitted to the Assistant Director for Doctrinal Synergy (AD-DS) of the *CICDE* and detailed in Annex E (see p. 41).

2. The amendments validated by the director of the *CICDE* are written in **red** in the table below in chronological order.

3. The amendments are shown in **purple** in the body of the text of the new version.

4. The front cover of this document and the first page will be annotated to show the existence of a new version. The official registration number must thus be amended in **red** with the following mention: *"amended Day / Month / Year"*.

5. The amended version of the text to be used as a joint reference document replaces the previous version in all electronic databases.

No.	Amendment	Source	Effective date
1	**Reorganization of the doctrinal corpus CICDE**	**CICDE**	**01st december 2012**
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
7			
8			
9			
10			
11			
12			
13			
14			
15			

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

References

a.   ***French White Paper on Defence and National Security,*** Odile Jacob, La Documentation française – June 2008, foreword from the President of the French Republic, Nicolas Sarkozy. By commodity, this document is described in the rest of the text as the White Paper.

b.   ***Stratégie interministérielle pour la gestion civilo-militaire des crises extérieures*** (interministerial strategy on civil-military external crisis management),
no. 692/MAEE/SG as of 23 October 2009.

c.   **(FRA) JC-01_CCEAF(2010),** ***Capstone Concept on the Employment of Armed Forces,***
no. 004/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 11 January 2010.

d.   ***Towards a Comprehensive Approach. The Operating Implications,***
no. 9830/10 EMUE as of 17 May 2010.

e.   ***Approche globale (AG)*** (comprehensive approach), key document,
no. 550/DEF/EMA/EMP.1/NP as of 9 June 2010.

f.   ***Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,***
as of 20 November 2010.

Foreword

1.   External crises referred to in this document are defined as serious ruptures of balance[2] in the evolution of a society where forces of opposite interests may lead to the appearance of armed violence. Such ruptures occur in particular within unstable states confronted with structural difficulties regarding **safety**, **governance** and **development**. Natural disasters or humanitarian dramas can also provoke such ruptures[3].

2.   Preservation or restoration of stability requires operating in these three fields[4], which cannot be achieved by armed forces only. From now on, military intervention is part of an environment involving a great number of civil and military agents, international and non-governmental organizations, as well as private companies. Relations between these actors must be formalized on the politico-military level as well as on the theatre of operations level in order to reinforce the effectiveness and credibility of the intervention.

3.   The White Paper thus recommends developing *"strategies embracing all of the different instruments—diplomatic, financial, social, cultural and military—not only in the crisis prevention and management phases proper, but also in the stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction phases*[5]*."*

---

[2]   Beyond the tolerance level of society, in particular regarding violence.
[3]   The military contribution to crises caused by natural disasters is guided by the *DIA-3.4.3, Interventions extérieures de secours d'urgence (IESU)* (FRA) Joint doctrine on external emergency rescue interventions, no. 217/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 16 September 2008.
[4]   Security, governance and development, as developed by French marshal Lyautey in "*Letters from Tonkin Madagascar*, chapter VI, *'Campaign of colonel Vallière in Upper-Tonkin'*, Librairie Armand Colin, p. 267: "*The execution of this program (…) will really be effective only if roads, telegraph communications, the development of waterways, the work of the organization and peace work together in parallel to the military occupation*".
[5]   White Paper, chapter 2, *'Consequences for France and Europe'*, p. 56.

4. The *Capstone Concept on the Employment of Armed Forces (CCEAF)*[6] specifies that *"the management of current crises shows that resolution is not only military but multifaceted, requiring a comprehensive approach based on adequate use of diplomatic, economic and military resources."* It also points out the necessity of "*legitimacy*"[7] and *"coherence of objectives"* from which the military action is based on.

5. Consequently, the ***"comprehensive approach to external crisis management"*** must facilitate a better civil and military synergy thereby leading to a fast and lasting settlement to the crisis.

6. The *Inter-ministerial strategy for civil-military external crises management* (ref. b.) recommends:

   a. *"The restoration of public authorities, in particular justice, law enforcement, and defence, able to handle the law and security of its citizen in the everyday life"*.

   b. *"To take into account the stakes of governance and fast reinstatement of the access to vital services and basic economic functions*".

7. One of the principal difficulties of a comprehensive approach resides in the nature and degree of commitment in the relations between the armed forces and other actors. From a simple participation to answer security needs to a total commitment in all fields (governance and development included), the role of the armies must be clearly defined within the *"multifacetedness of the approach"*.

8. This note is based on the orientations defined in the Chief of Defence Staff's letter (ref. e). It aims at specifying the military contribution[8] to a comprehensive approach to external crisis management as well as at determining the nature and degree of commitment in the relations armies and other involved actors must maintain.

9. The comprehensive approach to external crisis management aims at the prevention or lasting, and as soon as possible settlement to the crisis by a synergy of actions carried out by various agents in the fields of governance, security, and economic and social development.

10. It combines collaboration between actors sharing the same vision and coordination with other actors present on the theatre of operations. It requires an appropriation of the required solution as soon as possible by the host nation or local representatives. It supports conditions making it possible to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the population as fast as possible. Lastly, it seeks the association of regional actors to this effort.

11. To date, this note complies with the works on comprehensive approach developed by NATO (ref. f) and the EU (ref. d).

12. This document defines the bases of a comprehensive approach to external crisis management (chapter 1), the principles of its implementation (chapter 2) and the military contribution to this comprehensive approach (chapter 3).

[6] (FRA) JC-01_CCEAF(2010), ref. c, chapter 1, section III, p. 17.
[7] (FRA) JC-01_CCEAF(2010), ref. c, chapter 2, section II, p. 27-28.
[8] Military contribution is based on the (FRA) JC-01_CCEAF(2010), ref. c.

Visions politiques

Stratégie européenne de sécurité 2003

Concept stratégique de l'OTAN 2010

LIVRE BLANC

Livre Blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale (LBDSN-2013)

Concept interarmées

MC 0400/3 2012 — *NATO CONFIDENTIAL*

CIA-01 CEF — English — Concept d'emploi des forces

Cliquez sur le document choisi pour le faire apparaître à l'écran !

Doctrines interarmées

AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine

DIA-01 DEF — English — Doctrine d'emploi des forces

☆ La *DIA-3.10.3 CIMIC* est située dans le sous-domaine *Actions Interarmées* (cliquez)

AJP-3 Operations

DIA-3 Cdt des engagements Ops — English

AJP-3.4 Non ART 5 CROs

AJP-3.4.1 Peace Support Operations

AJP-3.4.2 Non-combatant Evacuation OPs

DIA-3.4.2 RESÉVAC — English

AJP-3.4.3 Support to civil authorities

DIA-3.4.3.1 Intervention ext. secours d'urg.

AJP-3.4.4 Couter-Insurgency

DIA-3.4.4 Contre-insurrection — English

AJP-3.4.5 Stabilization & Reconstruction

DIA-3.4.5 STABilisation — English

DIA-3.4.5.1 Assistance Militaire Opérationnelle — English

DIA-3.4.7 RECAMP

AJP-3.4.9 CIMIC ☆

Publications interarmées

Réflexions Doctrinales & Concepts Exploratoires

RDIA 2011/001 Approche globale — English

RDIA 2011/002 Intervention en GDC

RDIA 2011/004 Les ops contre un adversaire irrégulier

RDIA 2012/007 Intimidation stratégique

RDIA 2013/002 Exactions en opérations — English

Publications de l'EMUE

5684/09 MIL Rapid Response

010688 /08 MIL C2

11

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Table of contents

Chapter 1
Bases of the comprehensive approach to external crisis management

101.   The comprehensive approach to external crisis management aims at taking into account all of the actors, institutional or not, and at combining civil and military actions for the sake of a **common vision** (collaboration) or if not, as most common as possible (coordination) uniting all of the actors. This vision must particularly answer to the legitimate aspirations of the population and host nation for local authorities to appropriate it.

Section I – External crises management: implementation of the comprehensive approach framework

102.   The comprehensive approach can respond to any type of external crisis. A significant military contribution is more particularly required for those where armed violence emerges, leading to a level of insecurity that interferes with the ongoing of the majority of daily activities within a society.

Crisis management in an unstable state

103.   The stability of an official system is based on three closely interdependent pillars:

    a.   Security, including public security and defence.

    b.   Governance.

    c.   Economic and social development.

104.   Unstable states (fragile or failed) have structural problems in these three fields. They are then likely to quickly turn to violence due to their vulnerability to internal tensions and all types of external threats.

105.   **Unstable states** are characterized by:

    a.   An incapability to ensure the security of the population, resulting from the loss of the monopoly of legitimate violence to the profit of substate actors, referred to as *"disturbers*[9]*".*

    b.   The population's loss of trust in its political and administrative elites, as well as ideological, religious, ethnical, etc. divergences leading to the deterioration of social bonds.

    c.   A lack of development worsened by the absence of a good governance and security, both necessary for fundamental economic and social activities to go well.

106.   The degradation of one of the pillars of a state's stability might weaken the others, which may trigger a spiral of crisis[10] likely to lead to the collapse of the central authority and bankruptcy of the state.

107.   Consequently, a concerted, coherent, multidimensional and simultaneous action carried out on these three pillars within an inter-ministerial and multinational framework should be considered in order to insufflate a new dynamic so as to break the spiral of crisis which threatens, in the long term, the existence of a state.

---

[9] Raoul Castex, *Théories stratégiques*, volume V, Economica, p. 108-109. This term is used in particular to designate ideological groups, dealers, terrorists, etc.
[10] Cf. analysis of *"multidimensional"* crises in Annex A.

108. Within the comprehensive approach framework, each pillar is reinforced in a simultaneous way, as opposed to a sequential way (one after the other), as early as the beginning of the strategic reflection phase. Throughout the comprehensive approach process, the relative importance of each pillar varies depending on the evolution of the situation.

109. The principles stated below can also be applied to non-intentional catastrophes and may thus be subject to some adaptations.

Case of humanitarian crisis and natural disaster

110. Except particular cases, security in these types of crisis is not the main issue. As a result, the armies' contribution to the management of these crises is conceived especially when civil means are non-existent, insufficient, non-adapted and/or unavailable.

111. For as much, special attention should be paid to the areas damaged by these catastrophes as they may lead to the weakening, even to the bankruptcy of a state, and may quickly require an armed intervention to maintain or restore security.

Reasons for a comprehensive approach

112. In their current configuration, the armed forces have neither the vocation, nor responsibility, nor capabilities to act directly in the fields of governance, and economic and social development of a state. They cannot take all of the responsibility of crisis management by themselves. On the other hand, civil actors cannot act without a sufficient level of security.

113. The analysis of past and current military engagements reveals the need for a comprehensive approach in crisis management:

   a. The military action intervenes within a multinational framework where civil (international, governmental and non-governmental organizations, private companies, etc.) and military agents cohabit. Synergy between multinational actors is necessary to optimize the collective effectiveness of the action.

   b. Local populations as well as public opinions can discredit the whole of the actors present on the theatre of operations if their coordination is insufficient.

   c. Some actions are sometimes carried out without proper appropriation by the population and local authorities who, to some extent, receive them reluctantly.

   d. Once security is restored, the local population expects a quick, tangible and durable improvement of its living conditions.

   e. A too long military intervention can give the impression of an occupying force. This could lead, over the long term, to the rejection of the led actions, even to a noticeable hostility.

114. Thus, the comprehensive approach aims at increasing the effectiveness of crisis management by seeking coherence and efficiency between civil and military actions.

Common vision

115. The comprehensive approach aims at gathering actors from different entities around the same project[11] and, if not possible, at avoiding interferences. For this purpose, common points must be found for the convergence of their actions. To do so, mutual knowledge and recognition are pre-required for a common vision.

116. A **common vision** corresponds to the description in general terms of a desired future situation. Its shaping helps reducing cultural divergences by encouraging actors to share their objectives as early as the planning phase at strategic level. It must be in compliance with the United Nations Security Council and take into account the population's expectations.

---

[11] Defined in a more or less precise way depending on the need and degree of interaction.

117. The common vision is initially elaborated at a national level and consequently answers **national political objectives** aligned with the nation's concerns or own interests. It is then developed with France's partners within a **multinational coalition** framework. In both cases, this vision should be formalized by a political document[12].

118. **Strategic objectives** included within the description of the Desired end state (DES) must be:

   a. Consensual, so as to federate the contribution of all actors, civil or military, while taking into account the host nation's legitimate aspirations as much as possible.

   b. Realistic, so as to be achieved within the given time.

   c. Sufficiently detailed, so as to assess its scope.

119. The elaboration of the common vision must be based on the definition of **criteria** and **milestones** facilitating the assessment of success of the crisis management: imperative conditions for success, success criteria, intermediary steps, disengagement conditions, etc. **Political will** is one of the fundamental conditions to succeed.

Definition of *comprehensive approach*

120. A comprehensive approach to external crisis management aims at the prevention or lasting, and as soon as possible settlement to the crisis by a synergy of actions carried out by various agents in the fields of governance, security, and economic and social development.

121. It combines collaboration between actors sharing the same vision, and coordination with other actors present on the theatre of operations. It requires, as soon as possible, an appropriation of the required solution by the host nation or local representatives. It supports conditions making it possible to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the population as fast as possible. Lastly, it seeks the association of regional actors to this effort.

Section II – Purposes and guiding principles of the commitment

122. The French White Paper[13] specifies the purposes of the commitment.

123. *"Our [French] intervention capability should be such as to guarantee our strategic interests and enable us to shoulder our international responsibilities."*

124. *"In all other cases, France's intervention strategy will be pursued within a multinational framework, either the United Nations, the European Union, the Atlantic Alliance, or another appropriate grouping legitimised by international law."*

125. *"In all the other cases, the strategy of intervention of France will lie within a multinational scope, which it is about that of the United Nations, the European Union, Atlantic Alliance, or an adapted unit, profiting from the legitimacy conferred by the international law."*

126. The French forces are committed to seven **guiding principles**[14].

   a. Serious nature of a threat against national security or peace, and international security.

   b. Prior to the employment of armed forces, assessment of other possible measures, without holding prejudice to a matter of urgency on grounds of legitimate defence, or to the responsibility to protect.

   c. Respect of international legality.

   d. Sovereign appreciation of the French political authority, freedom of action and capability to permanently assess the situation.

---

[12] Ref. *Multinational Interagency Strategic Planning Guide* developed within the framework of the Multinational Experiment (MNE) 5.
[13] White Paper, chapter 3, *'The National Security Strategy'*, p. 63.
[14] White Paper, chapter 3, *'The National Security Strategy'*, p. 68-69.

e. Democratic legitimacy.

f. Capability to commit at a sufficient level, national control of the deployment of French forces and political strategy seeking to achieve a lasting settlement of crisis.

g. Definition of the engagement in space and time, and evaluation of its cost.

Implementation principles of the comprehensive approach to external crisis management

Section I – Relations between actors

201. The analysis of the spiral of crisis affecting the stability of states highlights the need for a multidimensional answer, based on both civil and military actors, for the development of comprehensive dynamics within the host nation.

202. The comprehensive approach resides in the more or less concerted synergy between military (national, multinational and local forces) and civil actors (institutional, regional and international organizations, non-governmental organizations and private companies). This diversity provides the necessary expertise to assess and conduct security, governance and development actions.

Typology of involved actors in crisis management

203. **Host Nation (HN).**

   a. **Local** institutional actors: representatives of a host nation, local institutions and security forces.

   b. Civil population.

   c. Local private actors (business, companies, etc.).

204. **Foreign institutional actors.**

   a. International participants: international organizations (EU, NATO, UN, OSCE, African Union, etc.) and contributing states (including the armed forces as well as agencies in charge of development actions).

   b. Regional institutional actors: states of the area of crisis and regional organizations.

205. **Foreign private actors.**

   a. Non-Governmental Organizations[15] (NGOs).

   b. Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs).

   c. Other economic actors.

206. All of the actors do not operate on the same mission and neither have the same influence on its success, hence the importance of identifying those who are absolutely necessary or advantageous to the crisis resolution, and determining work priorities.

Relation with the host nation and its population

207. **The relation between a state[16]—from which a military force comes under—and another state[17]—on the territory of which this military force is—is governed by international law agreements. The latter can be bilateral[18] or multilateral[19]. However, a UN resolution may authorize the intervention without prior agreement of the host nation.**

---

[15] Humanitarian assistance does not constitute a crisis management tool.
[16] Called *"state of origin"*.
[17] Called *"host nation"*.
[18] For example, the agreements on the forces' statute on the host nation's territory.

208.   Relations with the host nation are declined on three—usually successive—modes of participation:

a.   **Adhesion** of the host nation to the strategic objectives of the common vision. It will be easier if this vision takes into account local cultural specificities from the start and answers to local political aspirations.

b.   **Association** of the host nation to the efforts of the international community. It implies the restoration of legitimate governance[20] and the build up of its local security forces, in collaboration with international forces.

c.   **Appropriation** by the host nation of security, governance and development actions undertaken during the stabilization and reconstruction process. Regarding security matter, the appropriation is reached when coalition security forces are disengaged, facilitating the return to normality.

209.   Relation with the local population plays a key role in crisis resolution. The local population must perceive positive repercussions of the international presence, in particular regarding security, in order to sustain the credibility of the intervention. These benefits must be highlighted through influence actions[21].

A civil and military structure on each level

210.   The comprehensive approach is based on a structure implemented at each level between civil and military actors:

a.   **At the national level**, an inter-ministerial approach of crisis management or comprehensive approach at the national level should associate involved ministries to the development of a national common vision and to the definition of the means each ministry can invest. This alignment should be made prior to any international coordination. It must be maintained throughout the crisis. The *"duplication"* on the theatre of operations of central national structures and their local coordination may contribute to the coherence and effectiveness of France's action[22].

b.   **At the strategic international level**, a synergy between the various contributing countries must be implemented in order to seek an international vision of the DES. This synergy should also be founded on a shared knowledge[23] generated by all of the coalition countries. The contribution of each nation to the crisis resolution should be determined so as to plan civil and military actions accordingly. On this level, political guidance of the crisis will be carried out throughout the various phases of its management.

c.   **Countries neighbour to the host nation** probably share a common interest in containing regional instability. Under these conditions, they must be associated to the comprehensive approach process, for example by a coordinated monitoring of borders. Should these countries be part of the crisis, the host nation must be isolated from external influences while reinforcing the permeability of borders.

d.   **At the theatre of operations level**, interactions between actors must be considered within the framework of adapted civil-military structures. This latter must facilitate the management of frictions and encourage the exchange of information between actors present on the theatre of operations. Ideally, a guiding structure covering military and civil means must be implemented to coherently plan and lead security, governance and development actions, and to interact with local authorities.

e.   Beyond this structure, the **Force** itself must integrate the comprehensive approach spirit while operating on the entire spectrum (military and influence actions on the

---

[19]   For example, the convention between member states to the North Atlantic Treaty.
[20]   Local government, administration, representatives.
[21]   Information operations, operational military assistance, civil-military cooperation, etc.
[22]   In Afghanistan, a reinforced civil device, called *"pole of stability"*, has been set up in 2010 in the zones under the La Fayette Task Force's responsibility. Directed by a high ranked civilian, and gathering civil experts in the fields for governance and socio-economic development, the La Fayette TF acts under the authority of the ambassador of France in Afghanistan. It is also in charge of aligning civil efforts with the tempo of French military operations in Kapisa/Surobi.
[23]   This shared knowledge also implies a maximum exchange of information.

environment). Its **campaign**[24] should be integrated into the overall action—when action there is—and should at least be defined by taking into account other actors, particularly the population.

Interaction principles between actors

211. **Principal modes of interaction between actors**.

    a.   Interactions between actors within the comprehensive approach framework vary between two principal modes: **collaboration,** when a precise common vision is possible, and **coordination,** when objectives are not all shared. Only a true anticipation of crisis at the political level will facilitate the implementation of a collaboration. On the theatre of operations, the conduct of a comprehensive approach will always combine these two modes according to the nature, needs and possibilities of each actor. Thus, collaboration may be established between some actors while different forms of coordination may be established with others.

    b.   **Collaboration.**

> (1)   **Collaboration**[25] consists of a genuine union of civil and military efforts. It implies the development of an inter-ministerial strategy at the national level, and associates states and organizations at the international level starting at the strategic politico-military level. It must result in a well-detailed and inviting common vision.
>
> (2)   Collaboration emerges from a civil-military structure at the strategic level and is implemented at the operational level. The existence of a common authority recognized by all[26] helps in the deconfliction between actors within the collaboration framework.

    c.   Taking into account the field reality (for example, existence of various missions led by actors of different interests), and if collaboration cannot be reached, it will be necessary to consider a more limited interaction, called *"coordination"*. This mode of interaction is a less engaging common vision. It can be declined in three levels:

> (1)   **Mutual knowledge** of the various participants founded on an understanding of their objectives, operating courses and respective cultures. It must seek to reduce counter-productive interferences or effects. It is the lowest coordination level.
>
> (2)   **Consultation**, *i.e.* the exchange of information between actors as well as the consideration of various opinions to obtain a stronger coherence of initiatives and save available means. It can lead to mutual support or complementary actions.
>
> (3)   **Cooperation**, *i.e.* the recognition of similar objectives between various actors. Cooperation facilitates an increased exchange of information, the search of complementarities and mutual supports. It also facilitates a better management of frictions and conduct of common actions.

212.   The implementation of a **coordination authority**[27], or guidance, on the theatre of operations would facilitate a lasting settlement to the crisis. For as much, some actors, because of their action principles[28] or own interests[29], can be reticent or even refuse any coordinated action with the armed forces. Consequently, any coordination should be considered, at the very best, at the operational level only and in a pragmatic way.

---

[24]   It comes under the Force Commander's responsibility, at the operational level.
[25]   See Annex B, relating to the collaboration and coordination between actors.
[26]   For example, the Special Representative of the United Nations.
[27]   The nature of this authority can vary depending on the crisis' phases of evolution and the level of insecurity on the field.
[28]   NGOs are based on the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence.
[29]   Some actors are not likely to adhere to the common vision's strategic objectives.

213. A **strong political will**[30] is essential to implement this authority and grant it the necessary means to act on the whole of the contributing nations' deployed capacities.

Section II – Operational modalities

214. The implementation of a comprehensive approach should enable to federate varied contributions of multiple and heterogeneous actors around common objectives.

215. Conformed to the framework of an inter-ministerial campaign plan of strategic level, crisis management follows **three operational modalities**, depending on the advance and evolution of the crisis:

   a. **Monitoring.**

   b. **Containment of an emergent crisis.**

   c. **Intervention in a crisis.**

216. These operational modalities can combine on the same theatre of operations according to three lines of operations: security, governance, and economic and social development.


Figure 1 - *Lines of operations*

Monitoring

217. Through the monitoring of potential zones of crisis, the objective is to develop a national inter-ministerial analysis used as a reference during international discussions. This analysis should lead to the development of a common vision in the event of an intervention, and to the delineation of civil and/or military capabilities that will serve it.

218. This analysis, initially conducted at the national level, should then, or in parallel, be presented at the multinational level depending on the responsibilities allotted, in the crisis, to the various international organizations to which France belongs.

219. Within the framework of the *"knowledge-anticipation"* strategic function[31], the *"anticipation"* modality enables to follow the evolution of unstable zones, including the four zones of crisis defined in the White Paper[32], to avoid or limit *"strategic surprises"*, and to prepare the

---

[30] To agree or convince to agree on the reductions of power of some actors and act as an arbitrator.
[31] White Paper, chapter 3, '*The National Security Strategy*', p. 61: national security strategy is based upon five combined strategic functions: knowledge & anticipation, prevention, protection, deterrence and intervention.
[32] White Paper, chapter 2, '*Consequences for France and Europe*', p. 41.

identification of measures to be taken, by an assessment prior to the appearance of a crisis. It implies:

a. The development of a shared knowledge made of any type of information (political, military, economical, etc.) collected by all useful and exploitable sources (intelligence services, diplomatic network, private companies or NGOs, etc.). Its processing enables to develop a thorough knowledge of the fundamental characteristics of potential zones of crisis. This shared knowledge must be available to the political decision-makers and actors in charge of the crisis management as soon as possible.

b. The processing of this shared knowledge facilitates the analysis and synthesis, at the strategic level, of factors likely to start a crisis within a country or zone. This analysis work must be used to assess French's interests, prepare scenarios of possible evolution, study the impact of a possible French commitment, and finally, determine the possible answers in the event of a break-out crisis.

220. When a crisis is most likely to emerge, the following steps are necessary:

a. Confirm major stakes, in particular national interests.

b. Determine intermediate and final objectives to reach in the event of an intervention.

c. Evaluate possible consequences on other French external engagements and anticipate the implications of this intervention on the national security.

d. Define the level of hostility of the environment in which to engage.

e. Determine the human and financial resources needed and assess the duration of the intervention.

f. Contact countries and organizations that can objectively be concerned and willing to cooperate.

g. Consider the possible commitment framework (UN, NATO, EU, *ad hoc* coalition) as well as possible partners within the comprehensive approach framework.

h. Conduct an advance planning (known as *"cold planning"*), if not available.

221. These actions can lead to the adaptation of early priorities and anticipation, implying a reorientation of all type of sensors in a given area.

Containment of an emergent crisis

222. The objective is to prevent a crisis from breaking-out and to avoid a substantial engagement. It is thus recommended to act at the roots of the emerging crisis within an inter-ministerial and/or international framework, based on the pillars of governance, security and development. This preventive action, undoubtedly the most innovative, constitutes one of the *"à la française"* key points of the comprehensive approach.

223. This operational modality combines two strategic functions: "*prevention*" and "*protection*". It must be supported by an influence strategy.

224. The **prevention**[33] of crisis aims at *"avoiding the emergence or aggravation of threats to our national security"*. It must be implemented *"at the international, European and national levels"* by **the** convergent action of several international nations or organizations.

225. Prevention actions in the field of security require a specific military pillar in compliance with diplomatic, economic, etc. pillars. It can take various forms: military assistance, support to the disarmament of militias, support to the Security Sector Reform (SSR), reinforcement of intelligence sensors, etc.

---

[33]   White Paper, chapter 9, *'Prevention'*, p. 143.

226. The **strategy of influence** is intended to win the *"battle of perceptions"*[34] and can contribute in preventing the degradation of stability. It is implemented on several pillars adapted to each target: national and international public opinion, local population, opponents. This strategy takes particularly into account actions of communication, information operations on the theatre of operations, defence diplomacy and military assistance.

227. In response to our commitment in theatres of crisis, *"disturbers"* are likely to lead subversive, in particular terrorist acts against our national interests. It is thus recommended to take consequent measures to ensure the security of our nationals, namely by adapting the national security alert system to the potential terrorist threat.

228. If the action undertaken does not maintain stability, this phase should be used to prepare a Force intervention.

Intervention in a crisis

229. The intervention aims at restoring a sufficient level of security on the theatre of operations by the deliberate use of legitimate force, particularly in order to enable civil actors to lead their governance and development actions as soon as possible. The comprehensive approach underlines the need for an inter-ministerial and international dialog within this framework in order to coordinate military and civil contributions on the field until the normalization of the situation.

230. The intervention is based on the stages defined in the intervention concepts[35] of crises management and stabilization: anticipation – initial answer – stabilization – normalization – strategic monitoring.

231. The **initial intervention of the Force** aims in priority at reducing the level of violence. It may carry on civil actions where zones are secure enough. The end of the intervention must be accompanied by the build up of local security forces (defence – law enforcement force – justice – intelligence) and the beginning of reconstruction actions.

232. **Stabilization** aims at restoring the minimal conditions of viability of the state by the impulse of an overall dynamic in terms of security, governance and development. During this phase, civil actions gradually return to being predominant. Stabilization is successfully reached when the monitoring of security is handed over to local security forces once they are able to ensure the maintenance of law and order.

233. The **normalization** or **return to stability** implies the disengagement of intervention forces and the continuation of efforts of the international community to consolidate the economy, reinforce the social bond and restore a governance accepted by the population.

234. Within the intervention framework, **duration** is a **paramount factor.** Constant crisis management dynamics enable to take advantage of the *"Golden Hour"* and prevent forces from staying too long in the theatre of operations, which could lead to their comparison with occupation units over time. It also obstructs the *"disturbers'"* reconfiguration. For this reason, the conditions of crisis or disengagement exit constitutes a key element for both the Force, and international and local actors, and must thus be defined as early as the beginning of the commitment.

235. At the operational level, the **influence campaign** must lead local populations to adhere to the intervention's objectives, or at least highlight their benefits, particularly in term of security. It must also seek to convince whole or part of the opponents of the inefficiency in the long term of their opposition.

---

[34] An irregular adversary, who knows how to exploit communication means for his benefit, should be countered.

[35] *CIA-3.4.3_GdC(2008), Intervention en gestion de crises*, (FRA) Joint concept on crisis response operations, no. 033/DEF/CICDE/NP of 10 January 2008 and (FRA) JC-3.4.5_STAB(2010), *Contribution of the Armed Forces to Stabilisation*, no. 022/DEF/CICDE/NP of 2 February 2010.

Military contribution to the comprehensive approach to external crisis management

301. The military contribution to the comprehensive approach is illustrated by the *"monitoring – containment – intervention"* operational modalities on three levels: national, international and of the theatre of operations.

302. The *Capstone Concept on the Employment of Armed Forces (CCEAF)* points out the specificity of the military action.

303. *"The employment of armed forces remains subordinate to a decision by the political authority that selects the ultimate method to demonstrate, unequivocally and without weakness, the Nation's determination to confront the risks and threats that may affect the population in the context of a general safeguard, defend its interests, and demonstrate its solidarity with other nations. The resources committed and the courses of action adopted must result successful by gaining the upper-hand over the adversary.*

304. *By authorising the use of force and, consequently, accepting the risk of human loss, the political authority changes the nature of its response to a crisis situation. This is where the specific nature of military action resides. Its purpose is to fight to defend the Nation's fundamental interests, should they be vital or strategic, which nowadays are expressed within the context of shared goals among Allies.*

305. *Given that violence remains a reality and the possibility of a major confrontation cannot be excluded, this implies retaining the capability to compel through the use of force, which can result in destruction and death. The effective use—or threat to use—force must shift the will of opponents and, in the process, change the course of events. A soldier is a guardian of the state's armed forces. His role, in this field, is different in nature to that of other actors in the security arena: he uses weapons to fight to protect and defend that which, as a nation, France refuses to renounce."*

Section I – Bases

Specificities of the use of the military structure

306. Army is the instrument of legitimate violence that states can use to defend their interests.

307. The armed forces are instruments available to intervening governments. They are characterized by their capability to intervene in the most difficult environments.

308. They constitute an adapted tool to counter collective violence, whether generated by organized armed forces or *"disturbers"* endangering a state's stability or threatening France's interests.

309. The armed force cannot reduce by itself other modes of violence preventing the return to the Rule of Law.

310. Within the framework of collaboration with other actors, contributions requested from the armed forces are to be expressed in terms of effects to obtain and not in means to engage[36].

311. The specificity of military operations requires from the decision chain[37] to respect the permanent principles of military command. In particular, each operational level, from the tactical to the strategic level, should come under only one hierarchical operational authority.

---

[36] As an operational commander of the armed forces, the Chief of Defence Staff is the only one to have a complete vision of the national military capabilities committed on the various theatres of operations. For this reason, it is his responsibility to choose the modalities and means needed to obtain the requested effects as part of a mission.

[37] *DIA-3a_CEO(2010), Commandement des engagements opérationnels or CEO* (French joint doctrine on the command of operational engagements), no. 217/DEF/CICDE/DR as of 30 July 2010, booklet 1, p. 26.

312. The armies have the capability to plan and support complex operations over the long term.

313. Thus:

> a. The first role of the armed forces is to reduce armed violence and ensure security until the implementation of forces dedicated to this function.
>
> b. The chain of command of military operations should not be reconsidered for the necessity of coordinating civil and military actions.
>
> c. On the other hand, it must develop structures facilitating the coordination with civil actions.
>
> d. All military personnel, on active-duty and reserve, as well as available means to the armed forces on theatres of operations, depend on this chain of command.
>
> e. All units, including those of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), support the Force's action. Units' actions converge towards the achievement of the military DES defined as an integral part of the *"common vision"* mentioned above.

Complementarity of civil and military means

314. The armed forces have neither the mandate nor the means to restore stability in all its dimensions. They require the action of civil actors in terms of governance and development. Complementary civil and military actions are thus more beneficial.

315. The combination of actions from various actors reinforces the coherence of the international action, facilitates a general sparring of means and reduces the risks of friction between actors. It can take the form of a common plan on civil and military actions.

316. The comprehensive approach can also save on means while taking into account the availability of military capabilities, the priorities of the moment and the principle of reversibility. It must integrate an evolution of the balance of relations between actors during the crisis, depending on the prevalence of civil or military actions and on the situation on the field[38].

317. Military forces can **place at the disposal** of civil actors:

a. Their **planning capabilities** in order to facilitate the coordination of civil and military actions on the field.

b. **Dual communication capabilities** in compliance with security regulations.

318. In terms of **logistics**, the sharing of civil and military means is possible under certain conditions.

a. Military logistics can provide means in certain fields of speciality (electricity, transport and repair supply, etc.), should they not reconsider the achievement of the Force's assigned objectives.

b. The co-localization with other logistic cells of a state or private organizations must be privileged whenever possible. It will facilitate a civil-military coordination of logistic flows on a theatre of crisis.

c. The sharing of medical support can make the most of local installations and create a true synergy of the deployed medical means.

---

[38]   (FRA) JC-3.4.5_STAB(2010), *Contribution of the Armed Forces to Stabilisation*, no. 22 DEF/CICDE/NP as of 22 February 2010.

Developing bonds prior to crisis

319.   *"Alleviated moments"* should be used to develop a mutual knowledge and build trust between civil and military actors[39].

A realistic and coherent DES for the common vision

320.   The military DES fits into the common vision of the corresponding level[40] from which it is declined. To be credible, it must be accessible, considering the context of the crisis, and based on prepared ground in order to enable the assessment of its evolution. If the DES is too ambitious, it is likely to generate unrealistic expectations, which can cause delay and frustration.

Section II – Principles

Coordination of the security, governance and development lines of operations

321.   In order to quickly reach the objectives and benefit from the crisis management dynamics, civil and military actions should start as early as possible and be coordinated in parallel, in particular in case of the deployment of the Force.

Monitoring

322.   Military contribution lies within the framework of the "*knowledge and anticipation[41]*" strategic function.

323.   Prepositioned or deployed forces on mission, the network of Defence attachés, exchanges of military personnel, and bilateral and multinational cooperation take part in the collection of information contributing to the development of the military interest intelligence.

324.   Information is collected thanks to human sources as well as all available sensors in the armies' possession, particularly satellite capabilities. The French Directorate for Military Intelligence (*DRM*) is the principal national actor.

Containment of emergent crisis

325.   Military contribution lies within the framework of the strategic *"prevention"* and *"protection"* functions. It covers:

   a.   Exploitation of military expertise through a specific contribution within a bilateral or multilateral framework. This contribution can fall under a policy of Security Sector Reform (SSR), of Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR), or within the framework of application of mutual trust measures, armaments control, etc.

   b.   Information operations, operational military assistance, and the military pillar of the defence agreements within the framework of a civil and military influence strategy.

   c.   **Protection of French and European nationals[42].** The mandate can extend this protection to a third country's nationals, even to local population in some circumstances.

   d.   **Protection of critical institutions and infrastructures** (harbours, airports, industries, etc.) in the zone of crisis. This mission can possibly extend to other fields of application, such as transportation routes or the cyberspace.

---

[39]   Exchanges between the various organizations present in the zone—WFP, UNHCR, OCHA, etc.—and the Ministry for Foreign and European Affairs (*MAEE*) can lead to visits from the Joint Civil-Military Action Group (*GIACM*) and Centre for the Planning and Conduct of Operations (*CPCO*).

[40]   National level, international strategic level, operational level.

[41]   White Paper, chapter 8, *'Knowledge and anticipation'*, p. 125.

[42]   See (FRA) JD-3.4.2_NEO(2009), *Non-combatant Evacuation Operations*, No 136/DRF/CICDE/NP as of 02 July 2009.

e. **Measures of intimidation** through a preventive deployment of forces and general reinforcement of the defence system. They aim at convincing disturbers in giving up the use of armed violence.

f. **Fight against proliferation** by operating on all the chain (technology, production, armament) and, if needed, by neutralizing potential users of nuclear, bacteriological or chemical means.

g. Continuation of intelligence efforts for a better understanding of the crisis.

Intervention in a crisis

326. Military contribution in the event of an intervention lies within the framework of the crisis management concept. It is led at three military levels[43].

327. At the strategic level, the Operation Commander (OpCdr) is in charge of the elaboration of a coherent and accessible military DES based on the common vision developed at the political level.

328. At the operational level, the Force Commander (FCdr) plans and conducts the **comprehensive operational campaign.**

a. While remaining unique and tending towards only one DES, the comprehensive campaign is based on two types of action: **security actions** and **influence actions**[44]. The FCdr privileges one or the other depending on the objectives and tempo of the operation.

(1) **Security actions** must facilitate other contributors (civil) acting within the comprehensive approach framework to start their action as soon as possible.

(2) **Influence actions** can get support from:

(a) Information operations directed towards various targets (local opinion, local authorities and leaders, adversaries).

(b) Operational military assistance within the civil and military influence strategy framework: support to education; support to local security forces' action in order to facilitate their build up; restoration of the *"military intelligence"* function of the host nation.

(c) CIMIC[45] intended to improve the integration of the Force in its human environment so as to facilitate the achievement of its mission. Its objective is not to substitute private actors of development, but rather prepare, even favour, the work of agencies which will take over the initiated action.

b. The FCdr must **coordinate** the comprehensive campaign with **civil actors** present on the theatre of operations.

329. The *"comprehensive approach"* **spirit** must nurture the forces' action **up to the tactical level**. Also, deployed units on the ground should regularly be reminded of the necessary coherence between military and civil actions.

---

[43] Strategic, operational and tactical.
[44] CIMIC actions included.
[45] Definition from the (FRA) JC-3.4.5_STAB(2010), *Contribution of the Armed Forces to Stabilisation*, no. 022/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 2 February 2010.

Section III – Capabilities

Understanding the environment in order to act

330.   Military capabilities deployed on the theatre of operations contribute to the better understanding of the environment. This enables chiefs to adapt the military action to circumstances. A specific effort is necessary to integrate, as early as the planning strategic phase, the social and cultural characteristics of the country.

Deploying polyvalent and adaptable military capacities

331.   The uncertain and changing nature of interventions in crisis management requires versatile capabilities, giving the Force Commander a real freedom of action and a capacity of adaptation to the evolutions of a situation.

332.   Beyond security or coercion actions, the armed forces also contribute to the build up of local security forces (defence) through training, mentoring and operational military assistance.

333.   Regarding public security, the armies can enforce law and order only temporarily, until the deployment of an international police mission or the handover to local security forces. Actions of police force and justice do not come under the field of competences of the armed forces, except if the Force has an executive mandate. Its capabilities in this field are usually limited to crowd control and depend on the expertise and equipment of deployed units.

334.   At the end of the initial entry phase, the Force can contribute in a limited, temporary and occasional way with actions aiming at restoring vital services to the population[46]. This is particularly true in the case when civil actors do not manage in deploying their actions or when the security level is too low. These actions are based on the principles developed in the (FRA) JC-3.4.5_STAB(2010), *Contribution of the Armed Forces to Stabilisation*[47].

335.   The Force can also accompany or support some actions in the field of governance[48] through the protection of local institutions.

Being able to interact with civil actors

336.   Forces deployed on the theatre of operations must be able to interact with civil actors. This can be achieved by the acquisition of linguistic skills and the capacity of armies' executives to work within the inter-ministerial and international dimension.

337.   To facilitate this interaction on the field, it is recommended to develop and acquire equipment compatible with civil standards and interoperable, at least within the inter-ministerial level (national level), whenever possible.

Section IV – General principles in terms of education and training

338.   Knowledge relations and mutual trust with the principal civil actors should be anticipated[49] so as to favour common action.

339.   At the inter-ministerial level, this can be achieved by the exchange of good practices and methods of situation analysis. This collaboration can lead to the realization of an *"inter-ministerial concept of crisis management"* considering each actor's contribution and role. It is also based on exchanges[50] between military and civil actors in various fields (political, economical, juridical, technical, etc):

   a.   Education (higher military education) and/or group exercises on crisis management, with the participation of civil experts (diplomats, magistrates, etc.).

---

[46]   Cf. Annex D: indicative list, constituted by the Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC), of possible supports of the armed forces to civil actions.

[47]   No. 022/DEF/CICDE/NP of 2 February 2010.

[48]   For example, the armies can guarantee the security of an electoral process.

[49]   Cf. strategic anticipation process developed in the inter-ministerial strategy for external crisis management.

[50]   White Paper, chapter 14, *'Professionals Serving the Nation'*, p. 235.

        b.   Military personnel at the temporary disposal of other administrations or organizations.

340.   A similar approach is taken towards international actors, particularly within the institutional exchanges framework and through diffusion actions.

341.   Prior to external operations deployment, units must improve their knowledge:

        a.   In the functioning, objectives and culture of international organizations, NGOs and PMSCs.

        b.   In the area and its populations so as to better adapt their behaviour and integrate local social-cultural parameters in decision-making processes.

401.   The comprehensive approach is essential to the resolution of current crises. Ideally, it must be developed at the national (inter-ministerial) and international level, at the strategic level as well as at the operational level.

402.   The experience of recent crises shows that the implementation of a comprehensive approach is always difficult.

403.   The solution to set up at the strategic and operational levels may differ for each crisis depending on its specificity (nature and history of the zone, international organization in charge of the intervention, type of contributing nations). Political will mixed to pragmatism is necessary to apply the comprehensive approach principles wherever possible, even if all the conditions are not met.

404.   The comprehensive approach implementation is also a state of mind. It implies the awareness that each actor's action is part of a *"bigger whole"* to which one must join and contribute according to his field of expertise while respecting his own identity.

405.   Necessary keys to the success of a comprehensive approach to external crisis management include:

    a.   A strong political will to solve the crisis by a structured cooperation with the principal concerned actors.

    b.   An inter-ministerial strategy of crisis management at the national level.

    c.   A shared situation analysis to define a common vision.

    d.   The will of the actors, civil and military, national and international, to work together in the respect of the roles, competences and nature of each one.

    e.   An influence strategy combined with a military one.

    f.   The need to conciliate collaboration and coordination to take the facts of the field and each actor's objectives into consideration.

    g.   The appropriation of the international assistance by local representatives as soon as possible, and the re-establishment of institutions.

    h.   The population's satisfaction in meeting its legitimate needs.

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Resolution of multidimensional crises

Section I – Multidimensional crises

A01.   In its whole entity, a crisis is a serious phase in the evolution of events within a society, beyond the tolerance level of the population, particularly regarding violence. This rupture can be caused either by human activities or natural phenomena[51] (drought, earthquake, etc.), which deteriorate the foundations of a state's stability, *i.e.* security, governance, and economic and social development, thus causing a ***"spiral of crisis".***

A02.   Ruptures caused by human activities are attributed to ***"disturbers"***, *i.e.* ideological, rebellious, terrorist or criminal groups. These ruptures can take various forms of armed violence, from the continuation of criminal activities to civil war, including guerrilla or terrorism campaigns. This threat is described as ***"hybrid"*** when it comes from IRregular ADversaries[52] (IRAD) as the level of violence they exert requires the intervention of armed forces on one hand or of public security forces on the other hand.

A03.   Although these phenomena are not new, the end of the Cold War favoured the emergence of new substate or transnational actors on the international scene able to compete and defy the states.

A04.   The complexity of contemporary crises is accentuated by the **globalization** phenomenon. This provokes an increasing interconnection of stakes and societies, as well as of dependence bonds in terms of international common spaces (air lanes, sea routes, cyberspace, space) necessary to the development of societies. Opportunities brought by the globalization in terms of communication, worldwide diffusion of information, monitoring and transport, can thus be exploited by the intervention forces' adversaries within the framework of a crisis.

A05.   The international community sought to bring to these crises, sometimes qualified as *"societal"*, a comprehensive response implying the use of resources at its disposal, *i.e.* diplomacy, strategy of influence and of information, financial, economic and development means, as well as military force.

A06.   The comprehensive approach aims at coordinating these resources in order to preserve the overall crisis dynamics and to create civil and military synergies. The organization of the relations and interactions between the various agents is necessary in order to give a **coherent response** to the crisis while saving in means and time.

A07.   The resolution of current crises implies a military contribution for its role in terms of security, its capacity to operate in irregular contexts and its highly specific expertise. This resolution also implies a civil pillar, rather it be prior to the breaking-out of a crisis, during its treatment or after the forces' intervention.

Section II – Crisis process within the framework of unstable states

A08.   Unstable states (fragile or failed) result mainly from intrastate conflicts, external economic shocks in marginalized areas of the world economy or excessive dependence to conventional energies resources[53]. Disturbing phenomena such as rebellious, ideological, terrorist or criminal groups also contribute to the weakening of a state's bases.

---

[51]   Some natural disasters of major strength can weaken a state on the long run, such as in Indonesia, touched by the *tsunami* of 2004, or in Haiti, after the earthquake of 2010.

[52]   (FRA) JC-3.4.4_IRAD(2008), *Operations against an Irregular Adversary*, no. 131/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 22 May 2008.

[53]   Adapted definition of *'States in a situation of fragility'* of the European Commission, *Communication of the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions*, COM (2007) 643, Brussels, 25 October 2007.

A09.   States that are in such a situation of fragility suffer from weak, failing, even corrupted administrative and security structures. Criminal or substate armed groups take the states' monopoly of legitimate violence. The law is no more enforced and the population is *de facto* no more protected. This results in a crisis of trust between the state and its citizens. As the state is enable to ensure its own security, its vulnerability to the spectrum of threats increases, at the internal and external level.

A10.   Within the framework of unstable states, public institutions, political processes and local systems have lost their efficiency, inclusive or democratic legitimacy nature, thus opening the door to corruption of political and administrative elites. This lack of good governance leads to a rejection of the political community. It may generate frustration among the population and lead to the sometimes violent build up of social, economic, religious or territorial claims.

A11.   The lack of a well-structured governance blocks the economic, financial and social development of the country in which authorities are not able to ensure the maintenance of vital services to the population any more. This generates a deep poverty and an unequal distribution of wealth. These development inequalities also constitute sources of important tensions which could quickly lead to a **spiral of crisis**.

A12.   If this spiral is not contained in time, it is likely to cause, within unstable states, a complete collapse of the central authority, leading *de facto* to their bankruptcy, even disappearance. This can thus have dramatic consequences on the regional and world stability.


Figure 2 – *Interdependence circle*

Civil and military interactions within the framework of a comprehensive approach to external crises management

Independance	Exchanges	Consultation	Cooperation	Collaboration
	• Exchange of objectives, organizations… • Exchange of methods and activities **Deconfliction**	• Exchange of information **Economy of resources**	• Sharing of some objectives • High exchange of information **Coherent objectives**	• Common objectives • Integrated planning phase • Coordinated actions **Unity of effort**
Cohabitation	**Coherence**	**Support**	**Synergy**	**Unity of effort**

Autonomy ← → ← **Coordinated actions** → Integrated actions ←→

← **Different interests** → ← **Shared interests** → Common Interests ←→

← **Different missions** → Similar missions ←→

← **Coordination** → ← **Collaboration (integration)** →

0 ———————————————— + ———————— ++

Figure 3 – *Integration degree between actors*

B01.   Depending on the interaction degree between actors, civil and military actions can be coordinated as follow:

a.   A *"directorate"* type of structure, placed under the authority of a leader named at the political level and in relation with the strategic level. It may facilitate a joint planning of the actions led on the field, a common assessment process of the objectives and needs, as well as a strong coherence of the actions undertaken within the three pillars framework.

b.   A *"Board"* type of structure, bringing together the main willing civil and military actors of equal level and without a common authority. It must promote dialog between actors, consultation on the various initiatives as well as mutual support in a spirit of partnership.

c.   A *"forum"* type of structure, which may include the whole of the actors eager to exchange information in a non-formal manner and improve their mutual knowledge. Besides from increasing mutual knowledge, this forum will facilitate the identification of contacts and deconfliction. This structure must be located on the theatre.

Process implemented in external crisis management

C01. The inter-ministerial strategy for civil-military external crises management[54] defines four processes of crisis management:


Figure 4 – *Detailing of the implementing process*

C02. These four phases can be detailed as follows:

a. The *"monitoring-anticipation"* process is intended to carry out the assessment of a shared situation, fix the strategic priorities, and direct the collecting of information and the adequate prevention actions.

b. The *"planning"* process aims at the joint identification of the strategic objectives and necessary intermediate results, as well as the means to devote by each ministry.

c. The *"conduct"* process mobilizes then coordinates, assesses and possibly adjusts the means during the mission. The planning must include the development of a projected exit of crisis calendar[55].

d. The *"lessons learned"* process facilitates the identification of the lessons drawn from the intervention and their integration to the civil-military planning process. The implementation of an audit system[56] as early as the operation planning phase will ease this process.

---

[54] *Stratégie interministérielle pour la gestion civilo-militaire des crises extérieures*, no. 692/MAEE/SG of 23 October 2009, p. 4.
[55] The existence of a projected calendar sends a positive signal to the population.
[56] The audit contributes to a better follow-up of invested budgets, in particular for reconstruction.

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Potential tasks possibly coming within the competence of the armed forces

D01.   The Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC)[57] proposes[58] the following typology of the possible tasks coming under the responsibility of the forces within the comprehensive approach framework:

Allocation and control of equipment and infrastructure
Assistance in selection for a new security service
Buffer zones
Cease fire lines
Clear Unexploded Ordnance
Control of the movement of populations; refugees, displaced persons.
Convoy escort
Cordon and Search
Crowd Control
Curfew
Demarcation lines
Disarmament of security forces, militias and /or illegally armed groups
Enforcement of Restricted Areas
Establishment and maintaining protected areas
Evacuation of threatened persons
Fostering Sustainability
Guarding
Training, mentoring and transfer of responsibility to indigenous military and, in short term, other security forces such as police and border guards
Interposition
Monitoring
Observation
Protection, escort and transportation of demobilised personnel
Protection of: *- persons* *- organizations* *- properties* *- minorities* *- borders, areas*
Patrolling
Rebuilding Programs
Route Control
Selection and recruitment of future security force personnel
Separation of Hostile Forces
Support Agricultural Development Programs
Support Anti-Corruption Initiatives
Support border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement
Support Corrections Reform

---

[57]   The MIC has been created in October 1996 with the view of promoting interworking and of facilitating the creation of an *ad hoc* coalition. The member states are: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.
[58]   *Understanding Approach handbook*, MIC.

Support Economic Generation
Support Education Programs
Support Elections
Support Establishment and Development of Local Governance
Support Establishment of Civil Control
Support Establishment of Public Order and Safety
Support Establishment of Interim Criminal Justice System
Support Famine Prevention and Emergency Food Relief Programs
Support General Infrastructure Reconstruction Programs
Support Humanitarian De-mining
Support Human Rights Initiatives
Support Identification Programs
Support Judicial Reform
Support Legal System Reform
Support Property Dispute Resolution Processes
Support Private Sector Development
Support Public Health Programs
Support Public Outreach and Community
Support Public Sector Investment Programs
Support Restoration of Essential Civil Services
Support Restoration of Transportation Infrastructure
Support Restoration of Telecommunications Infrastructure
Support Shelter and Non-Food Relief Programs
Support to Initial Restoration of Interim Governance
Support to Initial Restoration of Services
Support to Security Sector Reform
Support Transitional Administrations
Support War Crimes Courts and Tribunals
Surveillance
Weapons collecting and accounting
Weapons destruction

1. Readers of this document are invited to report any errors, misprints or mistakes, as well as any remark or suggestion for improvement. Those should be listed in the table below and sent to the *CICDE* at the following address:

    Sous-directeur Synergie doctrinale
    CICDE
    École Militaire
    21, Place JOFFRE
    75700 PARIS SP 07

    They also can be sent by email after contacting the **(+33) 1 44 42 83 38** to obtain the current email address.

No.	Source	Paragraph	Sub-paragraph	Line	Comment
1					
2					
3					
4					
5					
6					
7					
8					
9					
10					
11					
12					
13					
14					
15					

2. The amendments validated by the director of the *CICDE* will be highlighted in red in the *"Summary of amendments"* featured on page 7 of the electronic version of the document.

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Part I – Initialisms, acronyms and abbreviations

Initialisms

F01.   Each letter of an initialism is pronounced separately as though separated by periods.

Acronyms

F02.   Acronyms are made up of several syllables which can be pronounced as a single word.

Chart

F03.   In this section, the characters which constitute an initialism, acronym or abbreviation are written in capitals so that the reader can memorize their meaning.

F04.   French initialisms, acronyms and abbreviations are written in ***bold, italic, Arial font, size 9, in red Roman characters***. Anglo-Saxon initialisms, acronyms and abbreviations are written in **bold Arial font, size 9, in blue Roman characters**.

List of the initialisms, acronyms and abbreviations used in this document

AAP	Allied Administrative Publication
AD-DS	Assistant Director for Doctrinal Synergy (*CICDE*)
AJP	Allied Joint Publication
CA / *AG*	Comprehensive Approach / *Approche globale*
CCEAF / *CEF*	Capstone Concept on the Employment of Armed Forces / *Concept d'emploi des forces*
CEMA	*Chef d'État-Major des Armées /* Chief of Defence Staff
cf.	*Confer*, see, refer to, etc.
CHOS	Chief of Defence
CICDE	*Centre interarmées de concepts, doctrines et d'expérimentations* / Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrines and Experimentations
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CM	Crisis Management
CPCO	*Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Opération*s / Centre for the Planning and Conduct of Operations
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration
DEF	*Défense* / Defence
DES	Desired End State
DRM	*Direction du renseignement militaire* / Directorate for Military Intelligence
EMA	*Etat-major des armées* / Defence Staff
EU	European Union
FCdr	Force Commander
FRA	France/French (NATO country code)
GIACM	*Groupement Interarmées des Actions Civilo-Militaires* / Joint Civil-Military Action Group
HN	Host Nation
i.e.	*Id est*: that's to say
IESU	*Intervention Extérieure de Secours d'Urgence /* External Emergency Rescue Intervention
IRAD	IRregular ADversary
ISBN	International Standard Book Number
JC / *CIA*	Joint Concept / *Concept interarmées*

JD / *DIA*	Joint Doctrine / *Doctrine interarmées*
JP / *PIA*	Joint Publication / *Publication interarmées*
LL	Lessons Learned
LBDSN-2008	*Livre Blanc sur la Défense et la Sécurité Nationale /* White Paper on Defence and National Security
MAEE	*Ministère des Affaires Étrangères et Européennes /* Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs
MGA	*Major Général des Armées* / Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff
MIC	Multinational Interoperability Council
MNE	Multinational Experiment
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental organization
no.	Number(s)
NP	*Non protégé* / Unclassified
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OpCdr	Operation Commander
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
p.	Page(s)
PGP	*Pôle Graphique de Paris* / Graphic Pole of Paris
PMSC	Private Military and Security Company
Ref.	Reference(s)
SPAC	*Service Parisien d'Administration Centrale /* Parisian central administration service
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TF	Task Force
UN	United Nations
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WFP	World Food Programme
STAB	Stabilization

Part II - Terms and definitions

Unstable states

Unstable states (fragile or failed) result mainly from intrastate conflicts, external economic shocks in marginalized areas of the world economy, or an excessive dependence to conventional energy resources[59].

Failed state

A failed state is a state which does not manage to ensure its essential missions, in particular the respect of the Rule of Law. A definition for failed state is proposed by the Fund for Peace, which has created a *"Failed State Index"* based upon 12 indicators.

The contested concept of *"failed state"* first appeared in early 90's when, after the fall of the USSR and its rapid dissolution, theorists of international geopolitics noted that since 1945, states have are more often been confronted to civil wars rather than conventional wars. At the first-rank of the thinkers of the new world order, the Israeli historian Martin Van Creveld postulates in his *The Transformation of War* (1991) work that the *"non-Clausewitzian"* war is from now on the dominating type of conflict.


| ■ Alert | ■ Warning | ■ No Information / Dependent Territory | ■ Moderate | ■ Sustainable |

Figure 5 – *Failed states Index of the Foreign Policy magazine, 2010*

Initially applied to the Somali example, the concept of *"failed state"* has quickly extended to zones of intense humanitarian crisis (Haiti, Liberia, Rwanda, etc.), then to old Soviet republics having lost control of significant parts of their territory (Georgia, Moldavia, etc.).

Host nation (HN)

Country which accommodates the forces and/or the support of allied nations, members of a coalition, and/or NATO organizations called to station, operate on or transit from its territory.

---

[59]   Adapted definition of 'States in a situation of fragility' of the European Commission, *Communication of the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions*, COM (2007) 643, Brussels, 25 October 2007.

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Summary

(FRA) JDN-2011/001_CA-CM

1,   Current crises occur mainly within fragile or failed states confronted with structural difficulties as regards to security, governance and development, therein negatively affecting their stability. It is necessary to act in those three fields to maintain or restore stability. This cannot be done by French armed forces or multinational forces alone.

2.   Military contribution to Crises Management (CM) comes under the framework of *"inter-ministerial strategy for civil-military external crises management"* with the view of:

   a.   Re-establishing public authorities, in particular justice, police and defence forces, capable of ensuring the population's rights and security on a daily basis.

   b.   Taking into account the stakes of governance, the fast re-establishment of the access to vital services and elementary economic functions.

3.   In this process, the first role of the armed forces is to reduce armed violence and temporarily ensure the security until the handover to local forces dedicated to this function. It aims at establishing the necessary conditions to the crisis settlement.

4.   Interactions between the various actors involved in this settlement vary between two principal modes: collaboration (common interests facilitating a unity of effort) and coordination (coherence of actions). Crisis anticipation at the political level will facilitate the implementation of a real collaboration at the multinational level. On the theatre of operations, the conduct of a comprehensive approach will have to adapt to the nature of each actor. The setting-up of a coordination authority is necessary; it must adapt to the evolution phases of the crisis and to the level of insecurity on the field.

5.   The comprehensive approach implementation must enable the federation of the varied contributions from multiple and heterogeneous actors around common objectives. The armed forces thus distinguish three operational modalities, depending on the advance and development of the crisis: anticipation, prevention of an emergent crisis and intervention in a crisis situation.