

USAID Engagement With DOD in Support of National Security **White Paper, October 2007**

Purpose of Paper

This paper presents the way ahead for USAID engagement with DOD in support of national security. The strategic opportunity that USAID is now presented with and a proposed way forward in assuming our role in the Defense-Diplomacy-Development (3-D) paradigm are further described below.

Strategic Opportunity

Rationale

- In his State of the Union speech, President Bush affirmed the need for a “whole-of-government” approach to support U.S. national security objectives.
- These sentiments were echoed in Senate testimony provided on February 6, 2007 by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in Senate testimony provided on February 8, 2007 by the Secretary of State.
- State fragility, regional conflict and local insurgency make countries vulnerable to terrorist presence and activity.
- Many countries in which USAID is providing assistance are in varying levels of instability, fragility and conflict, and are facing threats of internal violence, insurgency, terrorism, and regional external pressures. Countries range from those at-risk of conflict, to those in conflict, to those engaged in post conflict reconciliation and reconstruction efforts.
- An integrated approach that includes the military, development assistance and diplomacy is required to support stabilization, basic needs, reconstruction and governance and development in unstable country and regional environments.
- DOD is proposing significant new budget authorities to improve the operational capacity of USG agencies with non-military core competencies of vital importance to counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency and stabilization objectives.
- USAID has the opportunity to support DOD and DOS by communicating USAID’s intent to partner with the DOD and DOS in obtaining Congressional approval for new legislation and funding, and by developing the operational capacity to more fully and effectively engage with the U.S. military in direct support of national security objectives in selected countries.
- The Foreign Assistance Framework provides a strategic context for USAID to articulate where it would use these additional resources as a counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency response, particularly in those countries and regions most affected by fragility, conflict, instability and violent extremist movements.

Pending DOD Legislation

As part of the 2008 Defense Authorization Act, DOD is proposing new budget authorities to improve the operational capacity of USG agencies with non-military core competencies of vital importance to winning the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Among these new budgetary authorities are the following:

- **Building Global Partnership Capacity Act:** Legislation is proposed by the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (DOS) to augment the capacity of countries to defeat terrorism and increase stability, helping them overcome problems within their borders and eliminate terrorist safe havens. This legislation would extend and expand currently enacted Sections 1206, 1207 and 1208 authorities for “educating, training, and equipping foreign forces for counter-terrorism and stability operations; for enabling host countries to provide good governance; and for enabling the success of integrated foreign assistance.”¹ At present, \$1billion is proposed.
- **National Security Investment Fund :** Legislation proposed by the DOD and the DOS to invest in counter-terrorism capacity building with partner countries. Fund would be managed jointly by the DOD and DOS and will harness resources across agencies to address changed circumstances and policies, and will complement congressionally granted transfer authority and emergency supplemental appropriation.² The President may allocate or transfer from the Fund to any agency of the USG. At present, \$750 million is proposed for programming under this Fund.

The Way Ahead

To achieve the vision of an institutionalized relationship with the DOD, USAID must be prepared to engage with the US military across a broad spectrum of activities. These will include, but not be limited to, proactive and integrated joint planning (both deliberative and crisis-action), synchronized/collaborative field operations, institutionalized training and education, and exchange of officers to enhance mutual understanding. We should consider accepting DOD’s generous and continuous offers to help “sell” this new vision to Congress through joint testimony and outreach to relevant senior staffers. By definition, this new vision will entail some realignment within Bureaus to gain efficiencies and capacities that are needed to achieve our goals, the most important of which are highlighted below:

- **Congressional Campaign Plan:** The DOD is preparing to support substantial increases in resources for civilian agencies in the Quadrennial Defense Review

¹ Department of Defense, “Building Partnership Capacity,” QDR Execution Roadmap, May 2006.

² Security Investment Fund: The U.S. Treasury established the Security Investment Fund “to provide assistance to threatened countries in order to enhance or restore a country’s national or internal security, promote economic or political stability, encourage the development of democratic institutions, assist in the reconstruction of basic infrastructure, or meet a country’s urgent humanitarian needs.”

Roadmap, Building Partnership Capacity. The Building Partnership Capacity Act and the National Security Investment Fund are key components of this initiative. DOD is actively engaged with key Congressional staffers to socialize these initiatives and has requested USAID assistance. We must define our proper role in this critical activity that may ultimately increase resources for USAID. (Lead: LPA, with support from DCHA)

- Posture Statement: Every year, the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) and the Service Chiefs testify before Congress on their respective roles, responsibilities, missions, accomplishments, plans, and programs. Each of these entities has identified non-military activities as key to mission success. USAID should take seriously, the offer to contribute to these statements and, where appropriate, accompany the 4-star commanders during their testimony. (Lead: LPA with support from DCHA)
- Key Congressional Staffers: Various entities in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff regularly provide briefings to relevant Congressional staffers on the status of the above initiatives. At various times, USAID has been asked to accompany them and we should strongly consider doing so. (Lead: LPA with support from DCHA)
- Increasing expeditionary capability and capacity: USAID will continue to play a critical role in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief but will need to significantly expand its operational capability and capacity, in both personnel and materiel, to truly realize the effects of 3-D synchronization. This will entail a review of current operational concepts and expeditionary requirements to support and/or execute stabilization and reconstruction operations, counter-terrorism operations, and counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. Importantly, development's role in these activities is currently ill/undefined and hence must be clearly articulated to ensure that we achieve the proper personnel-to-task ratio. (Lead: DCHA and HR)
 - Civilian Reserve Corps: In addition to defining requirements for an expanded professional corps, USAID will need to work with the DOD and the DOS to define the requirements for a Civilian Reserve Corps, as requested by the President in his State of the Union address. While S/CRS clearly has the mandate to coordinate US Government (USG) response, we feel strongly that USAID be delegated the operational component of that response. (Lead: DCHA and HR)
 - Family Support and Casualty Assistance: As we increase our mission profile in hostile and uncertain environments, we necessarily assume risks that are not part of our current construct. USAID will have to develop and institutionalize a Family Support and Casualty Assistance process to support the families and the Agency personnel engaged in these activities.
- Professional Training and Education: Arguably the biggest challenge in achieving this new vision is the lack of a professional training and education program for our officers focused on preparing them to operate in this new environment. Recognizing that success can only be achieved with a whole-of-government approach, we cannot

and should not do develop this program unilaterally. Partnering with the DOD to leverage their expansive training and education base is not only prudent but mutually beneficial. We will continue to foster our relationship with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to develop a long-term and institutionalized training program. The short-term focus of this engagement will continue to be the interagency pre-deployment training program for officers being sent to Missions and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq, Afghanistan and other hostile or uncertain environments. (Lead: DCHA and HR)

- Exercises: The DOD has myriad exercises that focus on preparing units to succeed in their respective operational environments. Although USAID has been participating in selective events, we need to establish a formal system of exercise selection and participation to ensure our requirements are being met. (Lead: HR with assistance from DCHA)
 - Experiments: DOD experiments focus on future trends and missions. For example, Unified Action will focus on a potential conflict in the Gulf of Guinea. Where it makes sense, USAID should be prepared to participate in these experiments to ensure development equities are addressed properly. (Lead: HR with assistance from DCHA)
 - Formal Schools: Historically, USAID sends Foreign Service Officers to DOD higher-level schooling (War College or equivalent). Conversely, many DOD personnel have attended the OFDA-run Joint Humanitarian Assistance Operations Course. We need to expand these educational opportunities at all levels to foster a closer working relationship. (Lead: HR with assistance from DCHA)
 - Fellowships/Exchange Program: Fellowships and Exchange programs will increase USAID-DOD knowledge, trust, and operational compatibility. We need to institutionalize the program to ensure sustainability as well as proper utilization of the officers who have completed the program. (Lead: HR with assistance from DCHA)
- Improve Joint USAID-DOD Planning and Operations: In response to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, DOD has re-vamped its planning and operational construct moving from a 4-phase to a 6-phase framework. Phase 0, *Shape*, Phase 5, *Stabilize*, and Phase 6, *Enable Civil Authority* are key phases with heavy USAID equities that include development, conflict prevention and/or mitigation, and humanitarian assistance activities. The requirements developed in the implementation analysis of this planning framework directly informed the Building Partnership Capacity Act and the National Security Investment Fund. It is imperative that we stay engage in the implementation planning of this initiative.
 - USAID will need to approve, recruit and assign Senior Development Advisors (SDAs) to each Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs). Where it makes sense, we must consider placing SDAs in critical standing Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), for example, CJTF-Horn of Africa and CJTF-Philippines, to ensure development priorities are being addressed. We must

- continue to refine our working relationship with GCCs with a specific emphasis on conflict prevention. (Lead: DCHA)
- USAID, in collaboration with S/CRS and military planners, will participate in the design of a comprehensive Crisis Management planning process for field operations. (Lead: DCHA)
 - The field testing of the Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework (TCAF) tool has been completed in Afghanistan. We are in the process of preparing lessons learned that will be shared with the Agency and DOD. We will continue to refine this product that should be included in any DOD or USAID pre-deployment training. (Lead: DCHA with HR and ANE)
 - Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP): Still in a nascent stage, USAID must sustain and formalize the current collaborative engagement with DOD vis-à-vis the TSCTP and begin implementation of joint programs in four TSCTP countries: Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and Chad. (Lead: AFR and DCHA)
 - Support for USAFRICOM and USSOUTHCOM: DOD has directed that USSOUTHCOM, based in Miami, Florida transform itself into an interagency entity NLT 2008. Concurrently, the President has directed the stand-up of USAFRICOM with a completely integrated civilian and military staff. USAID must continue to provide civilian staffing to USAFRICOM during the planning phase this year, and significantly more when AFRICOM actually stands up. We must also be prepared to provide USAID staff to USSOUTHCOM in FY07 and beyond. (Lead: AFR, LAC with DCHA)
- Global Synchronization Efforts for the GWOT: USAID must improve the synchronization of its Operational Plans with the Theater Security Cooperation Program (TSCP). To be effective, this process must occur at all levels. At the strategic level, DOS Foreign Assistance guidance must be synchronized with DOD TSCP guidance. At the operational level, DOS regional objectives must be synchronized with the GCC regional objectives and at the tactical level, Country Plans must be synchronized with GCC country plans. At a minimum, this would de-conflict activities that are counterproductive and ultimately would lead to mutually supportive programs that enhance the whole-of-government approach.
 - At a minimum, Mission Directors and Ambassadors should be required to collaborate with the military in the development of Operations Plans. USAID can provide guidelines to the field for this. (Lead: Military Policy Board).
 - Design a pilot program (maybe using Mali as a case study) for integrated and synchronized civilian-military operations planning and programming. (Lead: DCHA with respective Regional Bureau)
 - Section 1207 funds: Decide on criteria for use of 1207 funds and communicate these criteria to the field. Provide detailed operational proposals and plans for the use of Section 1207 funds. These plans should include use of remaining FY 2007 funds, and any new funding to be provided. (Lead: DCHA)

- Designing activities in support of the GWOT National Implementation Plan (NIP). The National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) includes a major pillar for countering Violent Ideological Extremism (CVIE). The current NCTC Strategic Review will establish priorities over the course of the next year and CVIE activities will likely be given a high priority.
 - USAID is expected to play an important role in CVIE but requires additional program resources to do so. (Lead: DCHA)
 - USAID should consider placing staff members at the NCTC to participate in assessments and strategic planning which will contribute to placing the appropriate priority on CVIE and GWOT efforts. (Lead: DCHA and HR)
 - Doctrine: Articulate how our foreign assistance mandate contributes directly and indirectly to winning the Global War on Terror. Primary audience is U.S. military. (Lead: DHCA)

Overarching Issues:

- Legal issues: Current regulatory and policy realities challenge the USAID-DOD partnership. We must identify the impediments to collaboration and/or synchronization and petition Congress for relieve or changes to those laws (Lead: GC with LPA and assisted by DCHA)
- Operational Guidelines to the Field: USAID should prepare guidance to Washington and field operating units in order to disseminate best practices and respond to issues that have arisen in connection with past and potential future engagement with DOD. (Lead: DCHA)
- Acquisition and budget processes: The current budget and acquisition process is outdated and non-responsive to the current crisis-driven environment. Reform of these processes to more effectively respond to “wartime” needs is an imperative. (Lead: OAA)
- Communications: The DOD conducts most of its communications in a classified environment (Secure Internet Protocol Router – SIPR). At a minimum, DCHA/OMA must acquire access to the military SIPR system if we are to communicate in an effective and efficient manner, especially in times of crisis. (Lead: IRM with assistance from DCHA)