

*Thematic Evaluation of European Commission
Support to Conflict Prevention
and Peace Building*

Final Report

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Evaluation for the European Commission





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Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building

Final Report

October 2011

This report was prepared by



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The author accepts sole responsibility for this report, drawn up on behalf of the Commission of the European Union. The report does not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission.

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EUROPEAN COMMISSION
EuropeAid Co-operation Office

Evaluation

**THEMATIC EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION SUPPORT TO CONFLICT
PREVENTION AND PEACE BUILDING**

TERMS OF REFERENCE

final

MANDATE AND objectives

Systematic and timely evaluation of its expenditure programmes is a priority of the Commission of the European Union (CEU). It is key to account for the management of the allocated funds and for promoting a lesson-learning culture throughout the organisation. The focus is on the **impact** (effects) of these programmes against a background of greater concentration of external co-operation and increasing emphasis on **result-oriented approaches**, particularly in the context of the programmes of the Relex Family of Directorates-General¹.

The evaluation of the Commission's support to conflict prevention (including crisis resolution) and peace building (including demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration) is part of the 2008 evaluation programme as approved by the External Relations and Development Commissioners.

The main objectives of the evaluation are:

- to provide the relevant external co-operation services of the EC and the wider public with an overall independent assessment of the Commission's past and current cooperation support to Conflict Prevention (including crisis resolution) and Peace Building (including demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration) .
- To identify key lessons in order to improve the current and future strategies and programmes of the Commission.

1. BACKGROUND

2.1 Policy background

In the 1990's there was growing concern that many developing countries were failing to achieve sustainable development owing to conflicts and insecurity.

1992 the Maastricht Treaty on European Union establishing the EU created a distinct 'second' pillar of the EU, namely the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The scope of the CFSP is comprehensively defined as covering 'all areas of foreign and security policy', including 'to preserve peace and strengthen international security,..'. The 1992 Report² to the European Council in Lisbon on the likely development of the CFSP stated "the CFSP should contribute to ensuring that the Union's external action is less reactive to events in the outside world and more active in [...] the creation of a more favourable international environment. This will enable the European Union to have an improved capacity to tackle problems at their roots in order to anticipate the outbreak of crises."

Before 2001, conflict prevention was considered essentially in terms of political and military activities. The consciousness of the international community of the need for an integrated approach treating the root causes of conflict grew gradually, based on a number of successes and failures. Concerning the Balkans, for instance, the Commission considered

¹ Directorates General of External Relations, (RELEX), Development (DEV) and the EuropeAid Co-operation Office (AIDCO).

² By the Ministers of Foreign Affairs: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lisbon/default_en.htm

that the integrated Community strategy, based on a transparent and clearly structured process providing concrete benefits in return for commitment to peace and regional stability, would eventually lead to long-expected stabilisation. El Salvador and Guatemala were also considered good examples of such an integrated approach. A reconfiguration of ideas has taken place in the development policy of the EU since the mid-1990s; greater attention has been paid in development cooperation to civilian crisis prevention and to the socio-economic and political root causes of conflicts. Guidelines for tackling aspects of conflict prevention have appeared in a number of documents, initially focusing on African countries. This paved the way for the Commission's ambitious 2001 Communication on Conflict Prevention, which represented the first comprehensive Commission strategy in this field.

COM(2001) 211 on Conflict Prevention and the Göteborg Council

The central document for the Commission's intervention in the field of CPPB is the **Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, COM(2001) 211 final**, issued on 11 April 2001 during the Swedish presidency of the Council. In this Communication, the Commission postulated the need to address the root causes of conflict throughout the world in an integrated manner. It stated that development policy and other co-operation programmes provided the most powerful instruments at the Community's disposal for treating the root causes of conflict. It stressed the importance of a genuinely long-term and integrated approach, in co-ordination with EU Member States (EU MS) and with international organisations. It identified thereby roles, objectives, tools, and co-operation needs with other organisations; this Communication is further detailed in Chapter 3, as it forms the core of the Commission's intervention logic over the evaluation period.

In the same effort, the **Göteborg European Council** of 15-16 June 2001, ending the Swedish Presidency, gave rise to two important documents relating to conflict prevention: (i) the Presidency Conclusions; (ii) the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts. Moreover, a first Presidency report on European Security and Defence Policy, addressed to this Göteborg European Council, stated that the Commission had an essential role to play in helping to ensure coherence of the EU's external policies, including the Common Foreign & Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (*see below*), and to strengthen co-operation with international organisations. The Commission was to contribute to the development of common political approaches, through proposing activities to the Council as well as through managing instruments relevant to crisis management and conflict prevention within its areas of competence. It also stated that the ongoing reform of external aid and financial management rules would make possible more effective delivery of Community support to EU crisis management operations.

Certain aspects, notably the security dimension have been further outlined in subsequent documents, notably concerning Security sector reform, (SSR; COM 2006-658), demilitarization, demobilization and reintegration (DDR; EU concept 2006 and Commission Staff Working Paper); processes, and actions to curb the proliferation of anti-personnel mines (APL; Regulation (EC) N°1724/2001, Regulation (EC) N°1725) and small arms and light weapons (SALW; EU strategy 2005).

The European Consensus on Development (Joint Statement 14820/05) further reiterates the importance of support to conflict prevention, stating " The EU will strengthen its efforts in

conflict prevention work" and explicitly refers to the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts³ in this context.

Between 2002 and 2006, the Rapid Reaction Mechanism was designed to allow the Community to respond urgently to the needs of countries threatened with or undergoing severe political instability or suffering from the effects of a technological or natural disaster.

The Instrument for Stability (IfS) replaced, on 1 January 2007, both the Rapid Reaction Mechanism, and several instruments in the fields of drugs, mines, uprooted people, crisis management, rehabilitation and reconstruction, and allowed support to the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo and the office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on 1 December 2009. It provides the EU with modern institutions and optimised working methods to tackle both efficiently and effectively today's challenges in today's world. One of the main aims of the treaty is to enhance Europe's role in the world.

- Europe as an actor on the global stage will be achieved by bringing together Europe's external policy tools, both when developing and deciding new policies. The Treaty of Lisbon gives Europe a clear voice in relations with its partners worldwide. The treaty foresees a High Representative for the Union in Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, also Vice-President of the Commission, increasing the impact, the coherence and the visibility of the EU's external action. A new European External Action Service will provide back up and support to the High Representative. The Union will have a single legal personality and progress in European Security and Defence Policy will preserve special decision-making arrangements but also pave the way towards reinforced cooperation amongst a smaller group of Member States.

2.2 The Communication on Conflict Prevention sets out 4 main objectives:

1. Make more systematic and co-ordinated use of EU instruments to reach the root causes of conflict.
2. Improve the efficiency of actions targeting specific causes of conflict (so-called "cross-cutting issues", such as trafficking in drugs or human beings, illicit trade in diamonds and small arms, competition over scarce water resources etc).
3. Improve EU capacity to react quickly to nascent conflicts.
4. Promote international co-operation with all EU partners (partner countries, NGOs, international organisations such as UN, G8, OSCE, and ICRC as well as other regional organisations).

In terms of building post-conflict peace, the Commission subscribes to the conflict-sensitive or 'do no harm' approach. This means ensuring that its activities are always carried out sensitively so as not to worsen the conflict dynamics.

³ "EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts" Göteborg Summit June 2001

The very notion of integrated approach refers to the need to make the concept of conflict prevention a horizontal issue in all common or sectoral policies of the Union. Due respect for the existing pillar structure of the EU still allows for coherent and co-ordinated interaction of European Union instruments. This point was made in the Communication of the Commission and also endorsed by the European Council in Göteborg. The debate within Europe on 'global governance' has focused attention on the direct impact of a whole range of EU policies on the stability of partner countries (e.g. debt relief, economic adjustment and transition, administrative efficiency, reform of International Financial Institutions, free trade agreements etc). Building on this Communication and on its own experience and views in this field, the Swedish Presidency launched, during its Presidency, the initiative of developing an EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts. This Programme was adopted by the General Affairs Council on 11-12 June 2001 and endorsed by European Council at Göteborg.

2.3 other EU Policies

Other policies such as the 'European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights' also include support for conflict prevention and resolution projects under the overall theme of democratisation, good governance and the rule of law. As well as funds earmarked for conflict prevention specific projects it is important to note that other areas (e.g. addressing impunity through strengthening civil society, International Tribunals and the International Criminal Court, human rights training for relevant officials) all contribute to tackling the root causes of conflict.

The Commission also supports the Kimberley Process to stem the flow of so called 'blood diamonds' – rough diamonds used by rebel movements to finance wars against legitimate governments. The 'Kimberley Process certification scheme' (KPCS) has been in operation since 2003. It imposes extensive requirements on all Participants to certify the conflict-free origin of all exports of rough diamonds and put in place rigorous domestic controls over diamond production and trade to prevent conflict diamonds entering the diamond pipeline. The European Community (EC) is a Participant in the KPCS, implemented by a Council Regulation, adopted on 20 December 2002. The Regulation lays down the procedures and criteria to be followed in the import and export of rough diamonds into and from the EC, and creates a uniform EC Kimberley Process certificate which is used for all shipments.

2.4 Other international initiatives

The OECD/DAC work in the area of conflict prevention and peace-building is carried out primarily through its subsidiary body, the Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC). The European Commission participates actively in this group and uses fully the produced guidelines.

Effective co-ordination with international partners is important in achieving that goal. In accordance with the commitment of the European Union to promoting an effective multilateral system with the United Nations at its core, the EU has devoted particular attention to the activity of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. The Commission continues holding "desk-to-desk" dialogues with integrated UN teams as well as regular contact with the UN Frame Work Team in the area of conflict prevention. A strategic partnership between the Commission and UNDP was signed in 2004, where conflict prevention is one area for closer cooperation.

In 2005/2006 the Commission supported a pilot project to establish a Conflict Prevention Network on the basis of the European Parliament decision. The end result has been the

implementation of the Conflict Prevention Partnership (CPP) headed by the International Crisis Group (ICG) in conjunction with three other NGOs working in the conflict prevention and peace building fields: namely International Alert, The European Policy Centre (EPC) and the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO). In particular, the Partnership aims to strengthen the capacities of the European Union and its Member States in conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding.

2.5 Definition of Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building

The available Commission descriptions of the scope of possible interventions are given in the Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention /* COM/2001/0211. It has to be underlined that subsequent papers, mentioned earlier, also bring additional aspects into the picture.

In order to clearly define the boundaries of the evaluation (the subject and scope) a preliminary study (mapping and scoping) has been conducted and approved.

The results of the preliminary study are fully integrated into the present terms of reference and into the ensuing evaluation.

The departing point for the thematic scope of the evaluation had been agreed as being Commission support to Conflict prevention (including crisis resolution) and peace building (including demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration) as defined by the Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention COM (2001) 211 and related subsequent documents. This was further clarified and detailed by the preliminary study which is the thematic basis for this (phase of the) evaluation.

The evaluation will cover only activities for which the Commission has the full responsibility, namely those covered under the first pillar but also coordination and coherence issues with activities and policies under other pillars. It has been decided to put the accent of the 'integrated approach' stipulated by the Communication.

3. SCOPE

3.1 Temporal and legal scope

The evaluation shall cover aid programming and implementation over the period 2001-2010. It is reiterated that the departing point for the evaluation has been interpreted and agreed as being Commission support to Conflict prevention as defined by the Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention COM (2001) 211. The evaluation is preceded by the a preliminary study to scope and map the theme, as well as by a conceptual phase. The conceptual phase did also formulate the evaluations questions , with Judgement criteria and Indicators and proceeded to a preparation of three country case studies in a desk review. The evaluation will fully integrate the results of the two proceeding studies. The evaluation will proceed to an update of the mapping done during the preliminary study including data until at least ugust 2010. The evaluation will cover only activities for which the Commission has the full responsibility, namely those covered under

the first pillar but also coordination and coherence issues with activities and policies under other pillars.

The evaluators may also be requested to produce a brief note (maximum 20 pages) on their experiences on the possible use of the draft guidelines produced by the OECD DAC on the evaluation of conflict prevention activities. This note would be in view of the preparation of a high level conference planned in Autumn 2010.

The **purpose** of the evaluation is to assess to what extent the Commission assistance has been relevant, efficient, effective⁴ and sustainable in providing the expected impacts in Conflict Prevention and Peace building.

It should also assess the coordination and complementarity with other donors and actors, the coherence with the relevant EC policies and the partner Governments' priorities and activities as well as with relevant international legal commitments.

The evaluation will also relate to the overall EU support to this domain and particularly in this context to the added value the EC can generate in supporting countries.

The evaluation should come to a **general overall judgement** of the extent to which Commission policies, strategies, sectoral programmes have contributed to the achievement of the objectives and intended impacts, based on the answers to the agreed **evaluation questions**.

The evaluation should cover activities that fall within the theme, financed from thematic and geographical budget lines/instruments, EDF and other financial instruments.

The evaluation shall lead to **conclusions** based on objective, credible, reliable and valid findings and provide the EC with a set of operational and useful **recommendations**.

The evaluation shall be **forward looking and take into account the most recent policy and programming decisions**, providing lessons and recommendations for the continued support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building within the present context and relevant political commitments (such as the European consensus and the Paris Declaration⁵), as well as taking into account the current processes in application of the Lisbon treaty notably the changing institutional landscape in external relations.

All regions where EC co-operation is implemented⁶ (with the exception of regions and countries under the mandate of DG Enlargement) are included in the scope of this evaluation.

⁴ The aid effectiveness agenda entailing many actions that the COM had already engaged e.g.: SPSP guidelines, increased use of GBS, devolution, sectoral concentration in programming, result orientation, etc.

⁵ OECD 2 March 2005

⁶ ACP, ALA, ENP (former TACIS and MEDA)

The evaluation will include a comprehensive desk phase including **country case studies** to be carried out for 8 different and representative countries. Four of these country case studies will be deepened during the field phase through field visits. The evaluators shall gather information and test hypotheses through country case studies, with a view to answer to the evaluations questions at a general (non country specific) level and addressing the issues of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of aid delivery. The first case studies have been selected during the concept phase, the selection will be completed at the beginning of this evaluation in consultation with the Reference group, taking into account different experiences in the area of support to the policy as well as different country/regional contexts.

3.2 The evaluation users

The evaluation should serve policy decision-making and project management purposes. DGs DEV, Relex, the EuropeAid Office and the EC Delegations in the countries covered by this exercise will be the main users of the evaluation.

Other EC services like ECHO and DG Elarg may also benefit from the results of this evaluation.

The evaluation should also generate results of interest to a broader audience, including governments of partner countries, Member States, civil society and others.

4. KEY DELIVERABLES

The overall methodological guidance to be used is available on the web page of the EuropeAid evaluation unit under the following address:

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/methodology/index_en.htm

Within 14 days after the reception of the ToR, the Consultants will present a **launch note**⁷ which should contain:

- their understanding of the ToR;
- a methodological note including the implementation of the quality control;
- the provisional composition of the evaluation team with CVs⁸;
- a proposed budget⁹.

Following the launch note, the main key deliverables¹⁰ are:

- The desk report;
- The final reports;

⁷ In the case of a tender procedure, the launch note will be replaced by the financial and technical proposal of the tender

⁸ All birthday dates must be written in the following Format: dd/mm/yyyy

⁹ In the frame of a "framework contract"

¹⁰ The inception meeting as well as The inception report have already been covered in the conceptual phase;

- The dissemination seminar in Brussels.

4.1 Desk report

Upon approval of the launch note by the Evaluation Unit, and on the basis of the work done in the two earlier studies, the Consultant proceeds to the final stage of the desk phase. At the end of this phase, the Consultants will present a desk report setting out the results of this phase of the evaluation including all the following listed elements (the major part of the inception report will be in the annex of the desk phase report):

- the evaluation questions with the agreed judgement criteria and its quantitative and qualitative indicators;
- the first findings related to the evaluation questions when available and the hypotheses to be tested in the field;
- Progress in the gathering of data. The complementary data needed for the analysis and to be collected in the field have to be identified;
- methodological design, including evaluation tools ready to be applied in the field phase: (i) suitable methods of data collection within the country indicating any limitations, describing how the data should be cross-checked and specifying the sources, (ii) appropriate methods for data collection and to analyse the information, again indicating any limitations of those methods;
- an exhaustive list of all the activities covered during the period (see the preliminary report) and an exhaustive list of all activities examined during the desk phase, bearing in mind that activities analysed in the desk phase and the field phase (including ROM) have to be as representative as possible;
- A work plan for the field phase: a list with brief descriptions of activities, projects and programmes for in-depth analysis in the field. The consultants must explain the value added of the visits.

The field missions cannot start before the evaluation manager has approved the desk report.

4.2 Field reporting

The fieldwork shall be undertaken on the basis set out in the desk report and approved by the reference group (which includes the relevant Delegations as soon as countries or regions have been chosen). The work plan and schedule of the mission are agreed in advance with the Delegation concerned. If during the course of the fieldwork it appears necessary to deviate from the agreed approach and/or schedule, the Consultants must ask the approval of the Evaluation Unit before any changes may be applied. At the conclusion of the field study the Consultants present the preliminary findings of the evaluation:

- (1) Presentation during a de-briefing meeting with the respective Delegations;

- (2) Presentation to the reference group shortly after their return from the field.

4.3 Final reports and seminar

4.3.1. The Draft Final Report

The Consultants will submit the draft final report in conformity with the structure set out in annex 2. Comments received during de-briefing meetings with the Delegation and the reference group must be taken into consideration.

The Consultants may either accept or reject the comments but in case of rejection they must justify (in writing) the reasons for rejection (the comments and the Consultants' responses are annexed to the report). If the Consultants don't want to take them in the report, they must explain in a separate document the reasons why.

If the evaluation manager considers the report to be of sufficient quality (cf. annex 3), he/she will circulate it for comments to the reference group. The reference group will convene to discuss it in the presence of the evaluation team.

4.3.2. The Final Report

The Consultants will prepare the final report based on of further comments from the reference group, the Delegations and/or the evaluation manager. The final report will be in English, the executive summary (5 pages) will be translated into French and Spanish.

110 copies of the **Final Main Report** (including the executive summary in the three linguistic versions) must be sent to the Evaluation Unit with an additional 10 reports with all printed annexes. A CD-Rom with the Final Main Report and annexes has to be added to each printed report.

The evaluators have to hand over on an appropriate support (electronic or paper) all relevant data gathered during the evaluation.

The contractor shall submit a methodological note explaining how the quality control and the capitalisation of lessons learned have been addressed.

The Evaluation Unit makes a formal judgement on the quality of the evaluation (cf. annex 3).

4.3.3. The Seminar

The final report will be presented at a seminar in Brussels. The purpose of the seminar is to present the results, the conclusions and the recommendations of the evaluation to all main stakeholders concerned (EC services, Member States, Members of the European Parliament, representatives of the partner countries and civil society organisations and other donors).

The Consultants shall prepare a presentation (*Power point*) for the seminar. This presentation shall be considered as a product of the evaluation in the same way as the reports and the data basis. For the **seminar** 60 copies of the report (including the executive summary in the three linguistic versions) and 10 reports with full printed annexes (see annex 2 of the ToR) have to be produced.

The Final **presentation** will include slides for:

- Context of the evaluation;
- Intervention logic and focus of questions

- Answers to the evaluation questions (1);
- Conclusions and
- Recommendations

(1) For every question 4-5 slides will present

- The theory of action (part of the intervention logic concerned) with the localisation of the EQ
- One table with Judgement criteria and indicators
- Findings (related to JC and Indicators) and their limits.
- Conclusions and recommendations

The Evaluation Unit makes a formal judgement on the quality of the evaluation (cf. annex 3).

5. EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The evaluation will be based on the seven evaluation criteria: relevance, impact, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, coherence and the EC value added. The first five correspond to the traditional practice of evaluation of development aid and have been formalised by the OECD (DAC). The following two apply to all EC policies. The criteria will be given different weightings based on the priority accorded to the evaluation questions.

In general, questions (to a maximum of 10) will refer to the following main areas:

- ***Relevance of the strategy/programme:*** this includes both relevance to the general objectives of the EC and relevance to commitments on an international level the EC has itself committed to.
- ***Design and consistency¹¹ of the intervention strategy/programme:*** this mainly concerns the extent to which the resources foreseen were adequate in relation to the objectives set out in the programming documents.
- ***Consistency of the implementation in relation to the strategy:*** the Consultants shall verify the extent to which the work plan, schedule and implementation of the activities (all types of interventions, geographical and sectoral distribution, instruments, and aid delivery channels included) were consistent with the strategy. They shall demonstrate who were the real beneficiaries, direct or indirect, of the intervention and compare them to the target population(s) in the programming documents.

The Consultants will also verify the extent to which the intervention modalities (instruments, aid delivery channels, etc.) were appropriate to the objectives.

¹¹. The notion of consistency should be understood here as follows: (i) correspondence between the different objectives of a strategy, implying that there is a hierarchy of objectives (with lower level objectives logically contributing to the higher level ones); (ii) extent to which the resources foreseen are adequate in relation to the objectives set out in the strategy

- **Achievement of main impacts/effects:** the Consultants shall identify all recorded results and impacts, including any unintended ones, and compare these to the intended results and/or impacts. The Consultants will also identify the changes, which occurred in the areas in which EC programmes were supposed to produce an impact.
- **Efficiency of the implementation:** for the activities which were effective, it will be necessary to question to what extent funding, human resources, regulatory and/or administrative resources contributed to, or hindered the achievement of the objectives and results.
- **Sustainability of the effects:** an analysis of the extent to which the results and impacts are being, or are likely to be maintained over time.
- **Key cross-cutting issues:** for example gender, environment and climate change, human rights, HIV/AIDS, institutional capacity building, etc. Verification should be undertaken, on the one hand, of the extent to which account has been taken of these priorities in the programming documents and, on the other hand, to what extent these issues have been reflected in the implementation modalities and in the effects of the intervention. **The 3Cs (co-ordination, complementarity and coherence):** co-ordination / complementarity with EU Members States and other donors; coherence with EU policies (including the Member States' own policies and eventual interventions of the EIB).

Value added of the EC interventions: The criterion is closely related to the principle of subsidiarity and relates to the extra-benefit the activity/operation generates due to the fact that it was financed/implemented through the EC.

There may be three practical elements to illustrate possible aspects of the criterion:

- 1) The EC has a particular capacity for example experience in regional integration, above those of the Member States;
- 2) The EC has a particular mandate in the framework of the '3Cs' and can draw member states to a greater effort together;
- 3) EC cooperation is guided by a common political agenda embracing all Member States.

6. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND THE MONITORING OF THE EVALUATION

The Evaluation Unit (AIDCO 03) is responsible for the management and monitoring of the evaluation with the assistance of the reference group.

Information will be given to the Consultants after the signature of the contract concerning the documents referred in Annex 1.

7. THE EVALUATION TEAM

The evaluation team should possess a sound knowledge and experience in:

- evaluation methods and techniques in general and, if possible, of evaluation in the field of development cooperation;

- in all fields pertaining to the topic of the evaluation : conflict prevention (including crisis resolution) and peace building (including demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration. Ancillary fields are (list not exhaustive): Security sector reform, (SSR), demilitarisation, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); anti-personnel mines (APL) and small arms and light weapons (SALW).
- Particular institutional structure and relationship of responsibilities between the European Commission and the European Council.
- The following language(s): the main language of the work and the report will be English, but for the country case studies other working languages may be necessary.

The Evaluation Unit strongly recommends that the evaluation team should include consultants from the country or the region (notably, but not only, during the field phase) with in-depth knowledge of key areas of the evaluation.

Consultants must be strictly neutral. Conflicts of interests must be avoided.

It is highly recommended at least for the team leader to be fully familiar with the methodological approach set by the EC.

8. TIMING

After the approval of the launch note and the signature of the contract, the timing of activities will be set according to the following indicative work plan. The work should start at the signature of the contract by all parties. The work should not take longer than 14 months. Main results must be available in time for the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the Göteborg programme which was approved during the **Göteborg European Council** of 15-16 June 2001.

The dates mentioned in the following section may be changed with the agreement of all concerned.

<i>Evaluation Phases and Stages</i>	<i>Notes and Reports</i>	<i>Dates</i>	<i>Meetings/Communications</i>
Desk Phase			
Desk Study	Draft Desk Report		RG Meeting
	Final Desk Report		
Field Phase			De-briefing meeting with the Delegation.
	Presentation		RG Meeting
Synthesis phase (seminar in Brussels)			
	1st draft Final report		RG Meeting
	Final Main Report		110 copies of the Final Main Report must be sent to the Evaluation Unit. Additional 10 reports with all printed annexes must be sent to the Evaluation Unit as well.
			Seminar in Brussels 60 copies of the report and 10 reports with full printed annexes.

9. COST OF THE EVALUATION

The overall costs include:

- The **evaluation** as such;
- 2.5% of the total budget excluding the costs of the seminar are to be used for **quality control**;
- A **seminar**.

The total of these 3 elements must not exceed 380 000 Euros

NB: The budget for the seminar (fees, per diems and travel) will be presented separately in the launch note.

10. PAYMENTS MODALITIES

The payments modalities shall be as follows:

- 30% on acceptance of the Desk Report, plus 2.5% of the agreed budget to be used for quality control;
- 50% on acceptance of the Draft Final Report;
- The balance on acceptance of the final report.

Seminar related costs are to be invoiced and paid separately.

ANNEX 1: INDICATIVE DOCUMENTATION FOR THE EVALUATION

General documentation

- Communications of the Commission;
- Various regulations.

Reference documents

1. European Security Strategy: A secure Europe in a better world, adopted by the European Council in December 2003
2. European Union's Development Policy Statement, "the European Consensus" on development, adopted by the Council on 22 November 2005, published in the Official Journal n° C 46 of 24/02/2006
3. The EU strategy 'The EU and Africa: Towards a strategic partnership' (doc. 15702/1/05 REV 1)
4. Cotonou Agreement, 2000
5. EU Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform (SSR) (Council doc. 12566/4/05)
6. Commission's Communication *A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform* SEC(2006) 658
7. Communication from the Commission to the European Council of June 2006, Europe in the World – Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility
8. EU Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict (2003)
9. EU Checklist for the Integration of the Protection of Children Affected by Armed Conflict into ESDP Operations (2006)
10. EU Checklist to Ensure the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the Context of ESDP Operations (2005)
11. European Union's Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition, adopted by the European Council in December 2005.
12. Mid Term Evaluation of the African Peace Facility (9ACP RPR 22) Final Report (ECORYS)

Country Case study

- CRIS¹² (information on the projects and annual ROM¹³) and other databases concerning the financed projects, engagements, payments, etc.;
- Cooperation strategies;
- Conclusions of the Mid-term and End-of-Term Reviews;
- Key government documents of planning and policy;
- Evaluation reports of the projects;
- Relevant documentation provided by the local authorities and other local partners, and financial backers, etc.

The three following documents are to be handed to the Consultants:

- 1- On access to the information contained by the ROM system for an evaluation;

¹² Common Relex Information System

¹³ Results Oriented Monitoring

2- Methodological note from Eureval concerning North-South approach to country level evaluations;

3- Template for Cover page.

4- internal note for the file on EC value-added

In addition, the consultant will have to consult the documentation available on Internet (DAC/OCDE and EU Inventory websites in particular) as well as the documentation listed or available within the Evaluation Unit (AIDCO/0/3 Library).

ANNEX 2: OVERALL STRUCTURE OF THE FINAL REPORT

The overall layout of the report is:

• Final report

- Summary
- Context of the evaluation
- Answers to the evaluation questions
- Conclusions (1)
- Recommendations (2)

Length: the final report must be kept short (70 pages maximum excluding annexes). Additional information regarding the context, the programme and the comprehensive aspects of the methodology and of the analysis will be put in the annexes .

(1) Conclusions

- The conclusions have to be assembled by homogeneous "clusters" (groups). It is not required to set out the conclusions according to the 5 DAC criteria;
- The chapter on "Conclusions" has to contain a paragraph or a sub-chapter with the 3 to 4 principal conclusions presented in order of importance;
- The chapter on "Conclusions" must also make it possible to identify subjects, for which there are good practices and the subjects, for which it is necessary to think about modifications or re-orientations ;

(2) Recommendations

- Recommendations have to be linked to the conclusions without being a direct copy of them;
- Recommendations have to be treated on a hierarchical basis and prioritised within the various clusters (groups) of presentation selected;

- Recommendations have to be realistic, operational and feasible. As far as it is practicable, the possible conditions of implementation have to be specified;
- The chapter on "Recommendations" has to contain a sub-chapter or a specific paragraph corresponding to the paragraph with the 3 to 4 principal conclusions. Therefore, for each conclusion, options for action and the conditions linked to each action as well as the likely consequences should be set out.

- **Annexes (non exhaustive)**

- National background country case
- Methodological approach
- Information matrix
- Monograph, case studies
- List of institutions and persons met
- List of documents consulted

NOTE ON THE EDITING OF REPORTS

- The final report must:
 - § be consistent, concise and clear;
 - § be well balanced between argumentation, tables and graphs;
 - § be free of linguistic errors;
 - § include a table of contents indicating the page number of all the chapters listed therein, a list of annexes (whose page numbering shall continue from that in the report) and a complete list in alphabetical order of any abbreviations in the text;
 - § contain one (or several) summaries presenting the main ideas. For example, the answers to the evaluation questions and the main conclusions could be summarised and presented in a box.
- The executive summary has to be very short (max. 5 pages);
- The final version of the report shall be typed in single spacing and printed double sided, in DIN-A-4 format;
- The font shall be easy to read (indicative size of the font: Times New Roman 12);
- The presentation shall be well spaced (the use of graphs, tables and small paragraphs is strongly recommended). The graphs must be clear (shades of grey produce better contrasts on a black and white printout);
- The main report shall not exceed 70 pages including the cover page, the table of content, the lists of annexes and abbreviations. The annexes shall not be too long;
- The content must have a good balance between main report and annexes;
- Reports shall be glued or stapled; plastic spirals are not acceptable due to storage problems.

For the Cover page, please use the template mentioned in Annex 1.

Please, note that:

- The Consultants are responsible for the quality of translations and their conformity with the original;
- All data produced in the evaluation are property of the Commission.

ANNEX 3 - QUALITY ASSESSMENT GRID

Concerning these criteria, the evaluation report is:	Unacceptable	Poor	Good	Very good	Excellent
1. Meeting needs: Does the evaluation adequately address the information needs of the commissioning body and fit the terms of reference?					
2. Relevant scope: Is the rationale of the policy examined and its set of outputs, results and outcomes/impacts examined fully, including both intended and unexpected policy interactions and consequences?					
3. Defensible design: Is the evaluation design appropriate and adequate to ensure that the full set of findings, along with methodological limitations, is made accessible for answering the main evaluation questions?					
4. Reliable data: To what extent are the primary and secondary data selected adequate. Are they sufficiently reliable for their intended use?					
5. Sound analysis: Is quantitative information appropriately and systematically analysed according to the state of the art so that evaluation questions are answered in a valid way?					
6. Credible findings: Do findings follow logically from, and are they justified by, the data analysis and interpretations based on carefully described assumptions and rationale?					
7. Validity of the conclusions: Does the report provide clear conclusions? Are conclusions based on credible results?					
8. Usefulness of the recommendations: Are recommendations fair, unbiased by personnel or shareholders' views, and sufficiently detailed to be operationally applicable?					
9. Clearly reported: Does the report clearly describe the policy being evaluated, including its context and purpose, together with the procedures and findings of the evaluation, so that information provided can easily be understood?					
Taking into account the contextual constraints on the evaluation, the overall quality rating of the report is considered.					

Annex 2: Tools and Sources for the Structured Evaluation Questions

*Thematic Evaluation of the European
Commission Support to Conflict Prevention
and Peace Building*

**Launch Note:
Technical and Financial proposal**

July 2010

Evaluation for the European Commission






PARTICIP GmbH
Germany



Belgium



Development
Researchers'
Network
Italy



Deutsches Institut für
Entwicklungspolitik
German Development
Institute
Deutsches Institut für
Entwicklungspolitik
Germany



European Centre for
Development Policy
Management
Belgium



Overseas
Development Institute,
United Kingdom

Framework contract for
**Multi-country thematic and regional/country-level strategy
evaluation studies and synthesis in the area of external co-
operation**

LOT 5:
**Evaluation of EC main policies and strategies in the areas of
external cooperation**

Ref.: EuropeAid/122888/C/SER/Multi
Request for Service: 2010/245112

Thematic Evaluation of the European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building

Launch Note:
Technical and Financial proposal

July 2010

This report was prepared by



A consortium of
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The evaluation has been managed by the Joint Evaluation Unit in DEVCO.

The author accepts sole responsibility for this proposal, drawn up on behalf of the Commission of the European Communities. This proposal does not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission.

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1. Introduction

This Launch Note contains the technical and financial proposal for the “Thematic evaluation of the European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building”, in response to the Terms of Reference (ToR) received on 2 July 2010.

This evaluation is being commissioned under the “framework contract for multi-country thematic and regional/country-level strategy evaluation studies and synthesis in the area of external co-operation” by the Joint Evaluation Unit (JEU) common to the Directorates General (DG) External Relations, Development and EuropeAid. This contract was signed between the European Commission (hereafter referred to as “the Commission”) and a consortium led by PARTICIP (Germany), and further composed of ADE-Analysis for Economic Decisions (Belgium), DRN-Development Researchers Network (Italy), ECDPM-European Centre for Development Policy Management (The Netherlands), ODI-Overseas Development Institute (United Kingdom), and DIE-German Development Institute (Germany). This evaluation is part of the 2008 evaluation programme approved by the External Relations and Development Commissioners.

In addition to this introduction, the Launch Note contains three chapters:

- Chapter 2 describes the team’s **understanding of the Terms of Reference** ;
- Chapter 3 presents the **methodological approach** for the study as well as the **work plan**. It also highlights the main challenges for implementing this evaluation and suggested responses ;
- Chapter 4 presents the proposed **team** and the **budget**.

The CVs of the proposed experts and the ToR are included in annex.

2. Understanding of the Terms of Reference

2.1 Context of the evaluation

Before starting the evaluation as such, the Joint Evaluation Unit successively commissioned **two preparatory studies**: a preliminary study (finalised in July 2009) and a concept study (to be finalised in September 2010)¹.

The **preliminary study** provided an **inventory and typology of Commission funding** in the field of conflict prevention and peace building (CPPB) and suggested a definition of the scope for the evaluation. It also provided an overview of the evolution of the **regulatory framework**, over the evaluation period and identified the **intervention logic** of the Commission's support in this field. Finally, it suggested **focusing the evaluation on the examination of the Commission's "integrated approach" (IA) towards CPPB**, which was precisely at the heart of the Commission's strategy, as shown in its April 2001 Communication on Conflict Prevention.

In order to determine what an evaluation focusing on the integrated approach would precisely examine, the **concept study** provided a **clarification of the concept of the "integrated approach"**. Following a review of CPPB concepts and policies, it provided a thorough understanding of the meaning of the concept of an "integrated approach" (the **"what"**) and illuminated which means were provided to facilitate the implementation of this approach (the **"how"**) by examining the practices of the Commission and other major donors and actors in this field.

Additionally, a **set of 8 Evaluation Questions (EQ)** were proposed in this study on the basis of the reconstructed intervention logic, the mapping of funds and the clusters of the "what" and the "how" of the IA. A **specific evaluation approach** was then developed to **structure the EQs** in judgement criteria and indicators. The structuring of the EQs was a specific challenge as there is an information gap at the "meso level" between high level commitments in the field of CPPB and how to implement these commitments. To answer this information gap, the evaluation approach developed was thus made pragmatic: a conceptual and analytical background with key definitions and elements to be analysed has been presented for each EQ and used to derive a set of appropriate Judgement Criteria (JC) and Indicators (I). Finally, this study proposed **the methodology for the evaluation** as well as a **selection of countries** and included, along the methodological lines suggested, four pilot country case studies based on a desk review.

¹ The draft final report of this study was approved in June 2010.

2.2 Overall objectives, mandate and scope

The **subject** of this evaluation, as agreed in the course of the preliminary study, is the Commission's support to conflict prevention, as defined by the Commission 2001 Communication on Conflict Prevention (COM(2001)211). The evaluation will only cover activities for which the Commission has full responsibility, namely those covered under the first EU pillar, while activities under the second EU pillar will be examined through by looking at coordination and coherence issues.

The **objectives** for this evaluation can be summarised as follows:

- To provide an **overall independent assessment** of the Commission's past and current cooperation support to conflict prevention and peace building at a general level based on the answers to the agreed evaluation questions which cover relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, as well as coherence, coordination and complementarity and the Commission's value added; *and*
- To **identify key lessons** to improve current and future strategies and programmes of Commission strategies and programmes. Lessons learnt will take into account recent developments (e.g the European Consensus, the Paris Declaration, and the EU Lisbon Treaty).

The **temporal scope** covers the period 2001-2010. In that respect, the mapping of funds realised in the preliminary study, which covered the period 2001-2008, will be updated to include data until August 2010 at least.

The **geographical scope** covers all regions where EC cooperation is implemented (e.g ACP, ALA, and ENP) with the exception of regions and countries under the mandate of DG Enlargement.

The **funds** to be covered include Community thematic and geographical budget lines, the European Development Fund (EDF) and other financial instruments with the exception of humanitarian relief under the responsibility of DG ECHO.

3. Approach and work plan

3.1 Overall approach


The evaluation will be in line with the methodology published on the website of the Joint Evaluation Unit.

The overall evaluation is structured in four main **phases** as summarised in Figure 3.1 below. This technical and financial proposal covers the activities to be carried out in the desk and field phases, as well as for the dissemination seminar but does not cover the ones conducted in the structuring stage. The latter has indeed already been carried out, together with other tasks, within the framework of two specific contracts and final deliverables (the preliminary study and the concept study) (*see section 2.1 above*).

The figure presents the **activities** to be undertaken in the different phases; the Reference Group (RG) **meetings** and the dissemination seminar (DS) to be held; and the various **deliverables** (draft and final versions) to be produced at the different stages. Each phase starts upon approval of the deliverable of the previous phase.

In addition to the information provided in the figure, the key data collection activities (for desk and field phases) are described hereafter, followed by a description of the deliverables.

Figure 3.1 : Evaluation process



Key data collection activities

- **Country case studies:** In the structuring phase of the evaluation, it was suggested and later agreed upon with the RG to **build the evaluation around country case studies** with a view to assess the vault key of the Commission's support in the field of CPPB: the integrated approach. Indeed, an assessment of the integrated approach implies by definition an analysis of its different dimensions that can only be evaluated by lifting the investigation up to a strategic level.

Country case studies will therefore have a specific weight in this evaluation as further explained below:

- The country case studies **require by definition in-depth study**. It is necessary to acquire a thorough understanding of national contexts with respect to conflict, as well as of the extent to which the Commission's strategy responded to this situation. This also includes the wider context of collaboration with other actors (e.g. with the Council, international organisations, NGOs) and interaction with the political and diplomatic roles of the international community.
- The country case studies **will also have a broad coverage**. This owes to the almost all-encompassing scope of the Commission's strategy with respect to CPPB. These case studies indeed do not aim at verifying how interventions in a well defined sector have been applied in a specific country (e.g. private sector development interventions in one country), but at verifying to what extent the overall support strategy and interventions in a country were built around a multi-sector, integrated approach towards CPPB.
- These country case studies **will thus be of much more weight than case studies in "classical" thematic evaluations, both in the sense of their contribution in terms of information sources for the evaluation and in terms of time and resources dedicated to them**. The substantial work required for every country case study in this evaluation distinguishes them from an approach characterised by 'usual' case studies or even more so by the analysis of a 'selection of interventions' followed by country visits as in most thematic evaluations.
- These country case studies **should nevertheless be distinguished from country or regional evaluations as such**, notably because:
 - The country/regional strategies will only be examined from the perspective of CPPB;
 - Only interventions (directly or indirectly) relevant to CPPB will be examined. Within those, a selection of a limited number of specific interventions will be made;
 - The EQs will be those of the overall evaluation and will not be country-specific;
 - There will be no country-specific answers to the EQs, conclusions or recommendations. The country or regional studies should remain case studies with a view to substantiating findings together with information drawn from other sources to answer the EQs and formulate conclusions and recommendations on Commission support to CPPB in general.

It is proposed to conduct eight country case studies in the desk study and to cover four out of these eight country case studies during the field visits. Four of these eight country studies are covered under the concept study contract.

Country case studies will involve the following key data collection activities:

- Examination of strategic documents and evaluations relating to selected countries/regions;
- Extraction of lists of Commission interventions in the selected countries/regions;
- Examination of intervention-specific documents, for up to three interventions for each country case study;
- Interviews with Commission HQ staff in charge of the countries/regions (maximum three interviews per country);
- Examination of relevant ROM reports in countries/regions selected;
- Conduct of interviews in the field for countries/regions to be visited during the field phase.

The country case studies will be complemented by additional information sources:

- **Survey to Commission representatives (Headquarters and Delegations):** A survey will be conducted amongst Commission representatives. It will be launched at the beginning of the field phase. This survey will aim mainly at uncovering issues that are transversal but also issues that can easily be checked for the different countries. Issues to be investigated are, for instance, the existence of conflict analyses, of local/regional/global capitalisation mechanisms, of CPPB-related trainings, the level of coordination with other donors, etc.;
- **Review of country and regional evaluations:** Reviewing existing Evaluation reports of Commission support to partner countries or regions is expected to provide information on the Commission's support to CPPB (the absence of information in this respect might also be relevant). Examples include Evaluations for Chad (2009), Jordan (2007), Rwanda (2006), West-Africa (2008) or the ACP-Pacific region (2007). Such examination will rely exclusively on these evaluation reports; they will not have the weight and importance of case studies and will be conducted for a limited selection of countries/regions;
- **Examination of general documents:** the analysis of strategic or general-level policies, reports, studies, mechanisms, and so on is a proven source of valuable information particularly for thematic evaluations;
- **Interviews at Headquarters,** with Commission staff and possibly also with Brussels-based representatives of EU MS, international or multilateral donors. Only a limited number of additional general (not country specific) interviews are foreseen given that a substantial number of interviews have already been conducted during the Preliminary Study and the Concept Study.

The combination of in-depth country case studies, transversal information sources and the examination of existing country and regional evaluations will provide the necessary triangulation to provide overall responses to the EQs, and Conclusions and Recommendations at general level.

Deliverables

A list of the deliverables for this evaluation is provided herewith:

- **Desk Report:** this report will be produced, first in **draft** version, at the end of the desk phase. It will provide the findings and information gaps resulting from the desk phase per evaluation question, a proposal of survey to be launched at the end of the desk phase, and the methodology for the field visits. The **final** version will be an update of the draft which takes of RG comments into account.
- **Field Phase Presentation:** upon completion of the four focused country visits, the evaluation team will present a single PowerPoint presentation to the RG. It will provide an overview of the findings from the desk and field phases, in addition to a brief overview of the countries and projects visited and persons met. RG comments on the presentation will be taken into account when drafting the Draft Final Report.
- **Draft Final Report:** the Draft Final Report (DFR)² will essentially present the answers to the evaluation questions, and the conclusions and recommendations from the evaluation. It will include an Executive Summary. The assessment presented will take place at a general level and neither answers evaluation questions nor conclusions and recommendations will be drawn for specific countries.
- **Final Report:** this will be an update of the Draft Final Report, taking account of RG comments. Upon approval of the Final Report, the evaluators will proceed to the translation of the Executive Summary into French and English. The hard copies to be delivered will be 110 copies of the main report in colour (excluding annexes) and an additional 10 copies of the report with full annexes. A CD-Rom with the full report (main report and annexes) will be added to each printed copy.
- **Dissemination Seminar:** the evaluators will present a PowerPoint presentation in Brussels to all main stakeholders concerned (Commission services, European Union Member States, Members of the European Parliament, representatives of the partner countries and civil society organizations and other donors) in the premises of the Commission (possibly equipped with telephone or video conference facilities). At least three experts will participate in the dissemination seminar. For the seminar, 60 copies of the main report (including the Executive Summary in French and English) and an additional 10 copies with full annexes will be delivered.

² The structure of the Draft Final Report will follow the structure proposed in the Terms of Reference (see Annexe 2).

3.2 Quality Control

There will be three key elements in quality control. Firstly, there is the team in charge of the study, which has been selected with a view to ensuring that the final deliverable and the entire process meet quality standards. The proposed team is presented in Section 4.1. The team leader will have a crucial role in quality monitoring and will be responsible for applying the appropriate methodology; for distributing work within the team; for interacting with the Task Manager, the Reference Group and key stakeholders for all deliverables; and for ensuring that deadlines are respected.

Although quality is in the first instance the responsibility of the team and the team leader, a quality control system external to the team is also planned. This will be undertaken by a peer reviewer who is not part of the team and has been chosen on the basis of his thorough knowledge of evaluation and other complex study methodologies and his overall thematic background. This peer reviewer will be Mr Jean-Marie Wathelet, the Managing Director of ADE. He will:

- review the deliverables (draft and final) prior to their submission to the RG and provide feedback to the team leader, ensuring that the deliverables are amended where necessary; that each deliverable contains the information required, and that other aspects such as readability, user-friendliness and so on are to an adequate standard;
- be accessible throughout the process, especially to ensure that the process proceeds as planned and that experience from previous studies is correctly integrated into the present one;
- thereby ensure that the study is conducted under optimal conditions and that the required level of quality is maintained. Should major quality problems occur it will be his duty to ensure that that ADE takes corrective action (for instance, the replacement of a team member).

The company in charge of the study (ADE) and the leader of the consortium (PARTICIP) will also play an important role in quality control, first in the sense that they will ensure that the quality system is operational, and second as they will, as mentioned above, intervene and take corrective action should disagreements occur between the Team Leader and Quality Controller or if major quality problems arise.

Finally, each deliverable will be subject to professional English proof-reading. The persons in charge of English proof-reading have experience both in evaluation and in European Commission wording and procedures.

3.3 Challenges and proposed responses

- Access to data:
 - Information on the earliest part of the evaluation period might be difficult to retrieve (e.g due to limits in the information management systems of the Commission, staff turnover, etc.). To the extent possible and as already done during the preparatory studies to the evaluation, the team might consider to interview former Commission representatives, either in Brussels or over the phone.

- The preparatory studies to the evaluation also highlighted that in the field of CPPB information is not always documented (e.g. conflict sensitivity analysis) or easily accessible for reasons of confidentiality/security. The evaluators will retrieve existing relevant documents but also rely on more qualitative assessments through interviews. In that respect, the support of Commission representatives for access to data will be crucial;
- **Answering the EQs:** the team is aware of the evolving character of the integrated approach towards CPPB. Therefore it will be cautious when answering the EQs, notably by avoiding assessment of the past on the basis of norms set by more recent developments or assessing the Commission's achievements on the basis of other donors' policies. It will also take into account possible constraints (e.g. current institutional set-up) to implementing an integrated approach and seek the identification of these potential constraints. Finally, it will take into account the ongoing and expected evolutions in the area of CPPB and the institutional organisation of the EU to make sure conclusions are useful in the current context.
- **Conflict sensitivity:** CPPB is per se a delicate and sensitive subject, at national level but often also within the EU and the international community. The DAC Guidance on Evaluating CPPB activities³ mentions a number of good practices in CPPB evaluations, and in particular consideration for conflict sensitivity. In addition to evaluating conflict sensitivity, the evaluation should be conflict-sensitive itself, i.e. avoid negative effects of the evaluation process on conflict ("do no harm"), and where possible make a positive contribution to CPPB. The evaluators will therefore aim at consulting Commission staff in charge of support to selected case study countries or regions at HQ or Delegation level, on conflict-sensitive timing and approach for country visits and in drafting the case studies. The DAC Guidance also recommends planning sufficient time for validation of all deliverables throughout the process.
- **Security:** Security might become a serious issue in this specific CPPB evaluation, in particular for the country visits. The level of insecurity in a country/region will be considered in the decision of travelling to a particular country/region/zone. Evaluators (and accompanying staff) will in any case not travel to zones where they might be exposed to serious security threats, such as zones where the Commission takes particular security measures for its staff. Evaluators should be kept closely updated by the Commission on its security information. The present budget does not include any specific costs coverage for possible additional costs linked to security issues.

3.4 Calendar

The calendar (*see figure below*) aims at staying as close as possible to the indicative work plan in the ToR, while taking into account the challenges mentioned above. It is based on the hypothesis that the work starts at the beginning of the week of 16 August 2010. The calendar includes the deadlines for submission by the evaluation team of (draft and final) deliverables, for RG meetings and comments, and for validation of (draft and final) deliverables.

³ *Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities, Working draft for application period*, OECD-DAC, 2008 (from page 39 onwards)

4. The evaluation team

The proposed team is composed of experienced professionals. Their selection takes ToR requirements into consideration.

Most team members have been involved in the two preparatory studies conducted prior to this evaluation: they are already very much acquainted with the subject of the evaluation and familiar with the evaluation approach developed. This will ensure continuity and quality in the work to be carried out.

Moreover, several team members are part of the team conducting the Evaluation of the European Commission Support to Justice and Security System Reform. This will ensure consistency and cross-feeding between the two evaluations.

The team provides a unique combination of thorough understanding of CPPB related matters both on theoretical and practical aspects, and of the Commission evaluation methodological approach, particularly of the Joint Evaluation Unit. All team members possess excellent drafting skills in English and speak English, among other languages, fluently.

The proposed experts and their positions are the following:

- **Dr Edwin Clerckx** (Team Leader)
- **Ms Eleanor O’Gorman** (Senior Expert)
- **Mr Andrew Sheriff** (Senior Expert)
- **Ms Virginie Morillon** (Medium Expert)
- **Ms Laura Eid** (Junior Expert)
- **Mr Antoine Hanin** (Junior Expert)

The **Team Leader**, Dr. Edwin Clerckx, has an extended experience as team leader of complex sector evaluations. He was also team leader for the preliminary study and concept study carried out prior to this evaluation. As Team Leader for the present evaluation he will have the overall responsibility over the evaluation process and deliverables, design of the methodological approach, coordination and verification of the team outputs, and representation of the team to the Reference Group.

The **Medium Expert**, Ms Virginie Morillon, has solid experience of complex evaluations commissioned by the Joint Evaluation Unit. She will assist the team throughout the entire evaluation process, and contribute actively to drafting and presenting all intermediary and final deliverables. She will mainly be involved in the following tasks: (i) ensuring the application of the appropriate methodological approach, (ii) study of documents and gathering of indicators; (iii) contribution to the drafting of all deliverables; (iv) participation in field visits, (v) preparation of and participation in the RG meetings.

The **Junior experts**, Ms Laura Eid and Mr Antoine Hanin, will assist the team throughout the evaluation process in collecting information and also in maintaining an overall view of

the entire evaluation as well as in participation in the drafting of all intermediary and final deliverables. They will have a key role in the design of the survey. This will mainly involve the following tasks: (i) update of the inventory of funds; (ii) study of documents and gathering of indicators; (iii) contribution to the preparation of and participation in field visits; and (v) contribution to the preparation of and participation in the RG meetings.

The **sector experts** Ms Eleanor O’Gorman and Mr Andrew Sheriff will strengthen the team by providing sector analyses related in particular to CPPB issues. Their main tasks will be: (i) study of documents and gathering of indicators, (ii) identification of hypotheses to be tested during the field, (iii) participation in the field mission, and (iv) contributions to answers to the Evaluation Questions as well as to the formulation of conclusions and recommendations. The senior experts will also participate to the RG meetings.

All the experts of the core team will be involved throughout the whole process of the study. The experts are fully convinced of the added value accruing from working as a team compared to the inputs from a collection of individuals, not only in terms of complementarity of skills and experience, but also in terms of creating a dynamic interchange of ideas.

Table 4.1 : The Evaluation team

Name and Position	CV summary
<p>Edwin Clerckx <i>Team Leader</i></p>	<p>Dr Edwin Clerckx is a Director of ADE and manager responsible for its Evaluation Area. He holds a PhD in Philosophy and a complementary degree in Economics. Since joining the company in 2001, he has worked nearly exclusively on evaluations – as expert and as team leader – in the fields of development cooperation, rural development and agriculture, and structural funds. With respect to development cooperation he has participated in several sector/thematic evaluations. He was recently Team Leader of the Evaluation of EC aid delivery through Development Banks and the EIB, but has also worked on other sector evaluations (micro-projects, private sector development and transport). He has also participated in country evaluations such as the joint evaluation of the cooperation of the European Commission and France with Mali. In 2009 he was team leader of the Preliminary study (scoping and mapping) of the Thematic Evaluation of the European Commission support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building. He also intervenes as methodological advisor and/or peer reviewer for several country and sector evaluations. He regularly strengthens his knowledge in the field of evaluation through specialised training courses, conferences (including as speaker) and seminars on the subject. This knowledge has also been valorised and developed through work on evaluation methodologies, notably by participation in the development of Evaluation Guidelines for the Joint Evaluation Unit located in the EuropeAid Co-operation Office.</p>
<p>Eleanor O’Gorman <i>Senior Expert</i></p>	<p>With a PhD in International Politics, Eleanor O’Gorman has over fifteen years of progressively senior experience in the field of international conflict and development policies and strategies, peacebuilding and post-conflict programming, complex peace operations, and conflict analysis methodologies. Her practical experience includes the UN, EU, the UK Government, the Irish</p>

Name and Position	CV summary
	<p>Government, the OECD/DAC, NGOs and academic institutions. Field experience includes Sri Lanka, Israel/Palestine, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Somalia, Guinea-Bissau, Timor Leste, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. From 2003 to 2006 she was Senior Policy Adviser at the UN Office in Brussels and advised on UN-EU cooperation strategies in the areas of crisis management and conflict prevention. From 2000 to 2006 she worked on conflict-related policies and programmes with the UNDP including several field support missions to design and evaluate programmes. She is currently engaged with the Conflict Prevention Pool Secretariat of the UK Government to advise and support the monitoring and evaluation strategies and indicators for impact.</p>
<p>Andrew Sherriff <i>Senior Expert</i></p>	<p>Andrew Sherriff is currently a Senior Programme Officer at the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). He has 15 years of professional experience working on aid, conflict and development issues and is an acknowledged expert on the EU and conflict prevention. Most recently he has consulted on “The EU and Children Affected by Armed Conflict” and “EU, Women and Armed Conflict” for major policy initiatives during the Slovenian EU Presidency. From 1994 to 2004 he worked for the leading peacebuilding organisation International Alert. Prior to that he was an academic researcher on aid and conflict at universities in Canada and Ireland in addition to undertaking field research in conflict zones. He has consulted and/or undertaken evaluations on conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes for DFID, Austrian ADA, Belgian DGDC, SNV-Netherlands Development Organisation, East West Institute, Oxfam, World Vision, UK Global Conflict Prevention Pool, Saferworld, and DCAF. He has over 20 publications on conflict prevention themes (many with a specific EU focus) on Security Sector Reform (SSR), Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), conflict analysis, conflict sensitive approaches, strategic peacebuilding and EU conflict prevention capacity and policy. Recently he has undertaken conflict prevention assignments in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Georgia, Kenya, Kosovo, Macedonia, Rwanda, and Serbia.</p>
<p>Virginie Morillon <i>Medium Expert</i></p>	<p>Virginie Morillon is a permanent consultant in Evaluation at ADE. She holds a BA in Economics and a Masters Degree in Development Economics. She has actively participated in complex evaluations for the Joint Evaluation Unit in which she has acquired experience on evaluation methodologies and in post-conflict countries: her experience includes <i>inter alia</i> the preliminary and concept studies prior to the thematic evaluation of the Commission support in the field of CPPB as well as an evaluation of the Commission’s support for the Mediterranean Partner Countries with a field mission in Lebanon. She gained further experience on country evaluations, e.g. an evaluation of the Commission’s support to Egypt and Guyana. Prior to joining ADE she worked for one year in Benin for the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs where she was seconded to a Beninese consultancy to carry out a study on the impact of illegal oil trading between Benin and Nigeria on the Beninese economy. She also carried out an internship at the Development Directorate-General of the European Commission where she was following the 9th EDF Mid-Term Review for Central African countries and the Demobilisation, Demilitarisation and Reintegration process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.</p>

<p>Laura Eid <i>Junior Expert</i></p>	<p>Laura Eid joined ADE in March 2010. She is currently working on the thematic evaluation of the European commission support to Justice and Security System Reform (JSSR) and on the thematic evaluation of the European Commission's support to agricultural commodities in ACP countries. Before joining ADE she gained experience in evaluation in a public management consultancy where she worked on the evaluation of French and European programmes in various policy fields and was also a stagiaire at DG TREN. As Franco-British national, she holds an MSc from the London School of Economics and an MA from Sciences Po Paris in European Public Policy, as well as a BA in Politics with International studies from the University of Warwick where she covered conflict prevention issues. In the course of her studies, she interned at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris and at the French embassy in Berlin. She is fluent in French and English and has a strong knowledge of German.</p>
<p>Antoine Hanin <i>Junior Expert</i></p>	<p>Antoine Hanin is a permanent consultant in Evaluation at ADE. He holds a B.Sc in Economics and a Masters Degree in International Relations and Conflict Management. During his Masters Degree he gained good knowledge of the theoretical concepts of conflict prevention. He has also analysed case studies/best practices of management and resolution of conflicts in African countries. He has worked on various evaluations for the EuropeAid Joint Evaluation Unit including two "channel" evaluations, i.e. the Commission's external cooperation with partner countries through the UN family; and the Commission's aid delivery through Development Banks and EIB. He has also participated in the evaluation of Commission support for statistics in third countries and in the evaluation of Commission support to Mali. Through these working experiences he has been able to fully develop his understanding and use of the EC information systems and databases for evaluation purposes.</p>
<p>Jean-Marie Wathelet <i>Quality control</i></p>	<p>Jean-Marie Wathelet is an agro-economic engineer. He has been a Director of ADE since its creation in 1990 and has been Managing Director since 2007. He has carried out some 30 advisory and evaluation missions of which several pertained to rural development and support for SMEs. These assignments and studies were financed by various donors, mainly the European Commission and the World Bank. He has acquired a sound knowledge of the management tools of project cycles as well as the application of evaluation methods of the logical framework and participative approach types. He is a director and founding member of the SWEP (Wallonia Evaluation Bureau). He has recently conducted an evaluation of EC support to the rural development sector in partner countries. He also conducted mid-term evaluations of the RDPs in Wallonia and the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg. In 2003 he was the team leader for the <i>ex post</i> evaluation (at EU level) of the Objective 5b programmes 1994-1999. He has further conducted evaluations of Objective 2, Objective 5b, Leader II and Interreg programmes and has been involved in numerous international evaluations and missions.</p>

EQ1 To what extent were CP and PB mainstreamed into the Commission's financial and non financial support?														
	Information collection approach	Sources of information	Quantitative analysis on inventory	Deskwork	Interviews with							Case studies		Questionnaire
					Commission officials	Council officials	EU MS officials	Partner Governments / Regional organisations	Final beneficiaries	Other donors	CSOs/NGOs/Think-tanks	Selected interventions	Selected countries/regions	
J.1.1 (Elements of) conflict analyses have been carried by the Commission or the Commission used existing (elements of) conflict analyses commonly agreed upon														
I.1.1.1	Existence of documented (elements of) conflict analyses (produced by the Commission or other instances)	(elements of) conflict analyses, CSPs/RSPs, Interviews		x	x							x	x	
I.1.1.2	Type of content of these (elements of) conflict analyses (the conflict profile, the conflict causes, the analysis of actors and conflict dynamics)	(elements of) conflict analyses, CSPs/RSPs, Interviews		x	x							x	x	
I.1.1.3	Stakeholders' views on the relevance and quality of these (elements of) conflict analyses	Interviews		x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	
J.1.2 The financial and non financial support provided by the Commission is informed by (elements of) conflict analyses														
I.1.2.1	Within the Commission there were explicit mechanisms to ensure that (elements of) conflict analyses are used in the design of specific country/regional strategies	iQSG reports, Interviews		x	x							x		
I.1.2.2	The Commission's needs assessments, strategy and programming documents explicitly refer to these (elements of) conflict analyses at the level of the overall strategy, and at the level of the programming, both for programmes addressing directly CPPB and for the others	CSPs/RSPs, NIPs/RIPs, identification and formulation reports, FAs		x							x	x	x	
I.1.2.3	The Commission's strategy and programming documents presented an analysis of the conflict related risks for the interventions (or elements of it)	CSPs/RSPs, NIPs/RIPs		x								x		
I.1.2.4	The Commission's political dialogue focused on the conflict dynamics with the main actors of conflict and has been reflected in Commission's strategy documents	CSPs/RSPs, NIPs/RIPs and interviews		x	x	x		x				x		
I.1.2.5	Stakeholders considered that the financial and non financial support took into account the (elements of) conflict analysis	Interviews			x	x	x	x	x	x		x		

	Information collection approach Sources of information	Quantitative analysis on inventory	Deskwork	Interviews with							Case studies		Questionnaire
				Commission officials	Council officials	EU MS officials	Partner Governments / Regional organisations	Final beneficiaries	Other donors	CSOs/NGOs/Think-tanks	Selected interventions	Selected countries/regions	
J.1.3 <i>The Commission took measures to ensure that during implementation and evaluation its interventions - either directly or indirectly addressing the conflict- did not inadvertently increase the likelihood of conflict</i>													
I.1.3.1 Conflict and interaction indicators have been used to respectively follow the evolution of conflict factors and monitor the interaction between the intervention and the conflict factors	(elements of) conflict analyses, CSPs/RSPs, conflict impact assessments, ROM and evaluation reports		x	x							x	x	x
I.1.3.2 The (elements of) conflict analyses have been regularly updated	(elements of) conflict analyses, CSPs/RSPs, ROM		x	x							x	x	x
I.1.3.3 Commission activities have been adjusted in response to unforeseen changes of circumstance during implementation	Addendum to RSPs/CSPs and NIPs/RIPs, ROM and evaluation reports, Interviews		x	x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
I.1.3.4 The Commission adapted the timing of the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of its interventions to the local context	ROM and evaluation reports, Interviews		x	x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
I.1.3.5 The Commission devoted specific attention to security power considerations in its interactions with stakeholders during the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of its interventions	CSPs/RSPs, NIPs/RIPs, identification and formulation reports, FAs, ROM and evaluation reports, Interviews		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
J.1.4 <i>The Commission took CPPB into account in its development cooperation support, including in a transversal manner</i>													
I.1.4.1 Commission's strategy documents explicitly mentioned that CPPB needed to be taken into account in a transversal manner	CSPs/RSPs, NIPs/RIP		x									x	x
I.1.4.2 Commission's strategy and programming documents in each sector included specific CPPB measures	CSPs/RSPs, NIPs/RIPs, identification and formulation reports, FAs		x								x	x	x
I.1.4.3 Stakeholders' views on the extent to which the Commission's support incorporated CPPB	ROM and evaluation reports, Interviews			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

EQ2 To what extent has the Commission support contributed to tackling the root causes of conflicts ?														
	Information collection approach	Sources of information	Quantitative analysis on inventory	Deskwork	Interviews with							Case studies		Questionnaire
					Commission officials	Council officials	EU MS officials	Partner Governments / Regional organisations	Final beneficiaries	Other donors	COSOs/NGOs/Think-tanks	Selected interventions	Selected countries/regions	
J.2.1 The Commission's support to CPPB aimed at tackling the root causes of conflict to ensure that conflicts did not arise or reappear														
I.2.1.1	(Elements of) conflict analyses or other Commission reference documents at strategy or intervention specific levels took into account the "root causes of conflicts" or equivalent and identified them (cf. EQ 1)	(elements of) conflict analyses, CSPs/RSPs, NIPs/RIPs		x								x	x	
I.2.1.2	The Commission's strategy documents aimed at tackling the root causes of conflicts or equivalent	CSPs/RSPs, NIPs/RIPs		x									x	x
I.2.1.3	The Commission addressed the root causes of conflicts through its political dialogue	Interviews			x	x		x					x	
I.2.1.4	The Commission took specific initiatives at a general level to tackle the cross-cutting factors of conflicts	Commission's policy docs		x										
I.2.1.5	Stakeholders considered that the Commission's strategy was geared towards tackling of the root causes of conflict	Interviews			x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	
J.2.2 The Commission's support has contributed to mitigate the impact of root causes of conflict														
I.2.2.1	The Commission's interventions which aimed at tackling the root causes of conflict included indicators to monitor their results	FAs		x								x		
I.2.2.2	These interventions have been monitored and corresponding monitoring reports evidenced positive results, which have been maintained over time without further Commission's support	ROM and evaluation reports		x								x		
I.2.2.3	For interventions that have not been monitored, stakeholders' reported positive results which have been maintained over time without further Commission support	Interviews			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x
I.1.2.4	Extent to which observed improvements in specific conflict situations can be linked to the Commission's support	International reports and studies, Interviews		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x

EQ3 To what extent has the Commission support helped enhancing short-term prevention of conflicts, while ensuring the linkage with long-term prevention and peace building?														
	Information collection approach	Sources of information	Quantitative analysis on inventory	Deskwork	Interviews with							Case studies		Questionnaire
					Commission officials	Council officials	EU MS officials	Partner Governments / Regional organisations	Final beneficiaries	Other donors	CSOs/NGOs/Think-tanks	Selected interventions	Selected countries/regions	
J.3.1	Commission's mechanisms and instruments for rapid reaction were operational, have improved the detection of deteriorating situations and the capacity to deal with them													
I.3.1.1	Regular regional and country reviews occurred to monitor closely potential conflict zones	Regional and country reviews		x	x	x	x						x	
I.3.1.2	Early warning mechanisms to alert EU decision-making have been set up	Reports and studies, Interviews		x	x	x	x	x			x		x	
I.3.1.3	Political dialogue with partner countries included discussions on early-warning systems and regular monitoring of conflict zones	Interviews			x	x	x	x					x	
I.3.1.4	Stakeholders' views on the extent to which these mechanisms enhanced the Commission's capacity to deal with nascent conflicts	Interviews			x	x	x	x						
I.3.1.5	Traditional Commission's instruments have been used in a timely-fashion to intervene in deteriorating situations (e.g deployment of trained EU election observers, emergency economic assistance)	ROM and evaluation reports, Interviews		x	x		x	x		x	x	x	x	
I.3.1.6	Non-financial instruments (such as mediation) have been used in a timely fashion	ROM and evaluation reports, Interviews		x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x	x	x
I.3.1.7	Short-term actions have been undertaken through simplified procedures	Council Regulations of specific instruments using simplified procedures, Inventory, Interviews	x	x	x			x				x	x	x
I.3.1.8	Monitoring and evaluation reports evidenced a positive contribution of these interventions to CP	ROM and evaluation reports			x							x		
I.3.1.9	Stakeholders' views on the extent to which Commission's instruments enhanced its capacity to deal rapidly with nascent conflicts	Interviews			x	x	x	x		x	x			

	Information collection approach Sources of information	Inventory	Quantitative analysis on Deskwork	Interviews with							Case studies		Questionnaire
				Commission officials	Council officials	EU MS officials	Partner Governments / Regional organisations	Final beneficiaries	Other donors	CSOs/NGOs/Think-tanks	Selected interventions	Selected countries/regions	
J.3.2 <i>The Commission's strategy and interventions contributed to prevent the recurrence of crises and consolidated peace</i>													
I.3.2.1 The Commission's strategy documents included support to the immediate consolidation of peace (e.g through political dialogue or specific interventions)	CSPs/RSPs, NIPs/RIPs, Interviews		x	x	x		x				x	x	x
I.3.2.2 The Commission had a strategy at country level to sequence its peace building activities	CSPs/RSPs, NIPs/RIPs, Interviews		x	x	x		x				x	x	x
I.3.2.3 Stakeholders considered that the Commission's strategy was geared towards tackling the immediate consolidation of peace	Interviews			x	x	x	x	x	x				
I.3.2.4 The Commission's interventions which aimed at immediately consolidating peace included indicators to monitor their results	FAs		x								x		
I.3.2.5 These interventions have been monitored and corresponding monitoring reports evidenced positive results, which have been maintained over time without further Commission's support	CSPs/RSPs, NIPs/RIPs, identification and formulation reports, FAs, ROM and evaluation reports, Interviews		x								x		
I.3.2.6 For interventions that have not been monitored, stakeholders considered that they immediately contributed to ease tensions and/or to consolidate peace agreements	CSPs/RSPs, NIPs/RIPs, identification and formulation reports, FAs, ROM and evaluation reports, Interviews		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		

	Information collection approach Sources of information	Quantitative analysis on inventory	Deskwork	Interviews with							Case studies		Questionnaire
				Commission officials	Council officials	EU MS officials	Partner Governments / Regional organisations	Final beneficiaries	Other donors	CSOs/NGOs/Think-tanks	Selected interventions	Selected countries/regions	
J.3.3 <i>The Commission's strategy and interventions have been designed and implemented so as to ensure the transition to long term prevention</i>	Interviews												
I.3.3.1 In countries prone to conflicts, the Commission's strategy explicitly referred to linkages between crisis management and conflict prevention	CSPs/RSPs, NIPs/RIP		x									x	x
I.3.3.2 Short-term interventions were designed on the basis of identified and prioritised needs	CSPs/RSPs, NIPs/RIPs, identification and formulation reports, FAs		x								x	x	x
I.3.3.3 Short-term interventions were designed in the full knowledge of the Commission's support to structural stability and with due consideration of their potential impact on longer-term interventions	Formulation and identification reports, FAs, ROM reports, Interviews		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
I.3.3.4 Short-term interventions have not negatively impacted on the longer-term interventions	ROM and evaluation reports, Interviews		x	x			x	x	x	x		x	
I.3.3.5 An exit strategy was envisaged from the outset of short-term interventions to ensure a continuum with long-term prevention	Formulation and identification reports, FAs, ROM reports, Interviews		x	x			x	x	x	x			
I.3.3.6 Short-term interventions were gradually phased out when appropriate (i.e were not extended beyond reasonable limits)	Evaluation reports, Interviews		x	x			x	x	x	x			

EQ4 To what extent has the Commission's support to CPPB been designed and implemented to take into account different geographical dimensions of (potential) conflicts (international, region, country and local levels) and to what extent has the support provided at different geographical levels been articulated to foster synergies?		Information collection approach	Quantitative analysis on inventory	Deskwork	Interviews with							Case studies		Questionnaire
Sources of information	Commission officials				Council officials	EU MS officials	Partner Governments / Regional organisations	Final beneficiaries	Other donors	CSOs/NGOs/Think-tanks	Selected interventions	Selected countries/regions		
J.4.1 The Commission's support to CPPB intervened at the appropriate geographical level														
I.4.1.1	(Elements of) conflict analyses included political and socio-economic analyses of regional, national and local situations	(Elements of) conflict analysis, Interviews		X	X							X		
I.4.1.2	The Commission's strategies and interventions have been built upon these analyses and presented a justification of the geographical level at which they intervene	CSPs/RSPs, NIPs/RIPs, Interviews		X								X	X	
I.4.1.3	Stakeholders considered that the Commission's support was tackling the appropriate geographical level	Interviews			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
J.4.2 The Commission's support to CPPB addressed local and national needs														
I.4.2.1	Vulnerable populations have been included in local development initiatives	Formulation and identification reports, FAs, ROM and evaluation reports, Interviews		X	X				X		X	X		
I.4.2.2	National and local authorities or groups, including representatives of the parties in conflict, have participated in the formulation of the interventions	Formulation and identification reports, FAs, ROM and evaluation reports, Interviews		X	X				X		X	X		
I.4.2.3	Areas selected for programme implementation were those where the peace process was most fragile and social exclusion most acute	CSPs/NIPs, RSPs/RIPs, Formulation and identification reports, FAs, ROM and evaluation reports, Interviews		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
I.4.2.4	The Commission ensured that the local initiatives it supported (in particular in the area of good governance) were accompanied by national-level efforts	CSPs/NIPs, RSPs/RIPs, Formulation and identification reports, FAs, ROM and evaluation reports, Interviews		X	X				X		X	X		

	Sources of information	Information collection approach	Quantitative analysis on inventory	Deskwork	Interviews with							Case studies		Questionnaire
					Commission officials	Council officials	EU MS officials	Partner Governments / Regional organisations	Final beneficiaries	Other donors	CSOs/NGOs/Think-tanks	Selected interventions	Selected countries/regions	
J.4.3 The Commission devoted a specific attention to the regional dynamics of conflicts														
I.4.3.1	The Commission supported regional networks between community groups and civil society engaged in peace activities to stimulate mutual learning	CSPs/NIPs, RSPs/RIPs, FAs, ROM and evaluation reports, Interviews		x	x		x	x		x	x	x		
I.4.3.2	The Commission promoted the role of regional mechanisms/bodies in specific areas (e.g human rights, cross-border issues, etc.)	CSPs/NIPs, RSPs/RIPs, FAs, ROM and evaluation reports, Interviews		x	x		x			x	x	x		
I.4.3.3	The Commission supported regional and sub-regional capacities for early warning	CSPs/NIPs, RSPs/RIPs, FAs, ROM and evaluation reports, Interviews		x	x		x			x	x	x		
I.4.3.4	The Commission financed programmes for peace and post-conflict reconstruction among countries of sub-regional groupings emerging from conflict situations	CSPs/NIPs, RSPs/RIPs, FAs, ROM and evaluation reports		x	x		x			x	x	x		
I.4.3.5	The Commission supported cross-border cooperation (e.g capacities for technical training and research) with a view to address issues associated with the causes of conflict	CSPs/NIPs, RSPs/RIPs, FAs, ROM and evaluation reports, Interviews		x	x		x			x	x	x		
I.4.3.6	The Commission supported a comprehensive settlement integrating political negotiations, aid engagement and refugee protection and repatriation under a common international strategy	CSPs/RSPs, NIPs/RIPs, identification and formulation reports, FAs, ROM and evaluation reports, Interviews		x	x	x	x		x	x	x	x		
J.4.4 The Commission support has been articulated at the different geographical levels of intervention with a view to foostering synergies														
I.4.4.1	The Commission's strategies and interventions at international, regional, country and local levels have been designed and implemented with appropriate reference to each other	CSPs/RSPs, NIPs/RIP		x									x	
I.4.4.2	The Commission's strategies and interventions at international, regional, country and local levels addressed either the same sectors or different sectors with a view to addressing the same overall objectives	CSPs/RSPs, NIPs/RIPs, identification and formulation reports, FAs		x							x	x		
I.4.4.3	Monitoring and evaluation reports as well as stakeholders evidence that Commission's strategies and interventions at international, regional, country and local levels mutually reinforced each other	ROM and evaluation reports, Interviews			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		

EQ5 To what extent and with what effect has the Commission's support to CPPB been designed and implemented in coordination and complementarity at different levels both within the EU and with other donors and partners?		Information collection approach	Sources of information	Quantitative analysis on inventory	Deskwork	Interviews with							Case studies		Questionnaire
						Commission officials	Council officials	EU MS officials	Partner Governments / Regional organisations	Final beneficiaries	Other donors	CSOs/NGOs/Think-tanks	Selected interventions	Selected countries/regions	
J.5.1	<i>Policies and formal and/or informal mechanisms existed and were implemented in order to ensure a "whole-of-government approach" between and within the Commission's DGs and Directions</i>														
I.5.1.1	Existence of joint political overall frameworks with the rationale, the aim and actions for coordination within the Commission's DGs	COMs and official statements/policies; interviews			x	x								x	
I.5.1.2	Involvement of relevant Commission DGs is the drafting of Commission country/regional strategies	CSP/RSP; interviews			x	x							x	x	
I.5.1.3	Existence of joint training in the field of CPPB carried out between the Commission's DGs	training schedules/reports; interviews			x	x								x	
I.5.1.4	Existence of joint missions/needs or conflict assessments carried out by several Commission's DGs	missions' reports; interviews			x	x							x	x	
I.5.1.5	Existence of financing instruments involving different Commission's DGs in terms of the decision process and/or implementation	Commission's financial regulations, interviews			x	x							x	x	
I.5.1.6	Existence of working groups/committees exchanging information related to CPPB at HQ and in the field gathering different Commission's DGs	working groups/committees meeting notes; interviews			x	x							x	x	
I.5.1.7	Specific benefits of these practices for the partner countries and the donor community	Progress reports and M&E reports; interviews			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
J.5.2	<i>Policies and formal and/or informal mechanisms existed and were implemented in order to ensure coordination and complementarity between the Commission and the General Secretariat of the EU Council, the European Union Special Representative and with EU Member States ("whole-of-EU approach")</i>														
I.5.2.1	Existence of joint political overall frameworks with the rationale, the aim and actions for coordination within the EU	COMs and official statements/policies; interviews			x	x	x	x						x	
I.5.2.2	At country level, clear political guidance and leadership to provide a clear sequencing of the different actors engagements, keeping flexibility and allowing parallel involvement (between development, diplomatic and military actions)	Country/regional strategies; Country report; interviews			x	x	x	x					x	x	

	Information collection approach	Sources of information	Quantitative analysis on inventory	Deskwork	Interviews with							Case studies		Questionnaire
					Commission officials	Council officials	EU MS officials	Partner Governments / Regional organisations	Final beneficiaries	Other donors	CSOs/NGOs/Think-tanks	Selected interventions	Selected countries/regions	
I.5.2.3	Existence of joint training in the field of CPPB carried out between the Commission and other EU institutions	training schedules/reports; interviews		x	x	x	x						x	x
I.5.2.4	Existence of joint missions/needs or conflict assessments carried out between the Commission and other EU institutions	missions' reports; interviews		x	x	x	x						x	x
I.5.2.5	Crisis management and long term instruments led by different EU actors were mapped and gaps were identified before intervening in a country	Country/regional strategies; Country report; interviews		x	x	x	x						x	x
I.5.2.6	Existence of working groups/committees exchanging information related to CPPB at HQ and in the field common to the Commission and other EU institutions	working groups/committees meeting notes; interviews		x	x	x	x						x	x
I.5.2.7	Specific benefits of these practices for the partner countries and the donor community	CSPs/RSPs, NIPs/RIPs, identification and formulation reports, FAs, ROM and evaluation reports, Interviews		x	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x
J.5.3	<i>Commission's support was coordinated with and complementary to other non-EU donors, international and regional organisations</i>													
I.5.3.1	Existence of common strategic framework between the Commission and other donors/international/regional organisations for intervening in CPPB	COMs and official statements/policies; interviews		x	x	x	x		x				x	x
I.5.3.2	At country level, clear leadership from one international/regional actor and clear division of labour between donors	Country/regional strategies; Country report; interviews		x	x	x	x		x				x	x
I.5.3.3	Existence of joint missions/needs or conflict assessments in the field of CPPB carried out between Commission and other donors and partners	missions' reports; interviews		x	x	x	x		x				x	x
I.5.3.4	Participations of the Commission to multi-donors pooled funds/trust funds	inventory; interviews	x	x	x				x				x	x
I.5.3.5	Existence of working groups/committees exchanging information related to CPPB at HQ and in the field gathering the Commission and other donors and partners	working groups/committees meeting notes; interviews		x	x	x	x		x				x	x
I.5.3.6	Specific benefits of these practices for the partner countries and the donor community	Progress reports and M&E reports; interviews		x	x	x	x		x				x	x
I.5.3.7	Specific role of the Commission in leading or supporting these actions	interviews		x	x	x	x		x				x	x
J.5.4	<i>Commission's support was coordinated with and complementary to partner countries governing bodies and with non-state actors</i>													
I.5.4.1	Commission's country strategies take into account partner government strategies and needs	CSP/RSP, interviews		x	x		x		x	x			x	x
I.5.4.2	Commission's country strategies take into account the civil society's needs	CSP/RSP, interviews		x	x		x		x	x			x	x
I.5.4.3	Views of national partners on donors' interventions as a complement to their actions or needs	interviews		x	x		x		x	x			x	x
I.5.4.4	Views of non-governmental implementing partners and other informed observers at the global, regional and national level	interviews		x	x		x		x	x			x	x
I.5.4.5	Specific role of the Commission in supporting coordinated actions with the partner government and non-state actors	interviews		x	x		x		x	x			x	x

EQ6 What has been the value added of the Commission's support in terms of reducing tensions and preventing the outbreak, recurrence or continuation of violent conflict?													
	Sources of information	Information collection approach	Quantitative analysis on inventory	Deskwork	Interviews with						Case studies		Questionnaire
					Commission officials	Council officials	EU MS officials	Partner Governments / Regional organisations	Final beneficiaries	Other donors	CSOs/NGOs/Think-tanks	Selected interventions	
J.6.1 The Commission had a specific role in promoting the integrated approach													
I.6.1.1	The Commission had a leading role in the elaboration of strategies promoting the IA to address CPPB	International reports and studies, Commission's communications, Interviews		x	x	x	x	x		x		x	x
I.6.1.2	Other donors built on the experience of the Commission in terms of implementation of an IA to design and implement their assistance and, as a result, articulated their assistance to CPPB around an integrated approach	International reports and studies, Commission's communications, Interviews		x	x	x	x	x		x		x	x
I.6.1.3	Other elements of VA of the Commission with respect to the implementation of an integrated approach	International reports and studies, Commission's communications, Interviews		x	x	x	x	x		x		x	x

	Sources of information	Quantitative analysis on inventory	Deskwork	Interviews with							Case studies		Questionnaire
				Commission officials	Council officials	EU MS officials	Partner Governments / Regional organisations	Final beneficiaries	Other donors	CSOs/NGOs/Think-tanks	Selected interventions	Selected countries/regions	
J.6.2 <i>In the countries where it has provided support, the Commission has had a specific added value with respect to reducing tensions and/or preventing the outbreak, recurrence or continuation of violent conflict</i>													
I.6.2.1 The Commission had a long standing proven positive experience in the field of CPPB or in related fields of significance to contribute to the reduction of violent conflict (e.g security sector, good governance, etc.)	International reports and studies, Commission's communications, Interviews		x	x	x	x	x		x	x		x	x
I.6.2.2 EU MS gave a mandate to the Commission to tackle CPPB	Commission's communications, EU official statements, Interviews		x	x	x	x							
I.6.2.3 The Commission's financial and non-financial support was of significant importance compared to the one provided by other donors	Data on aid provided by other donors in the field of CPPB, Inventory, Interviews	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x		x	x
I.6.2.4 The Commission's financial and non-financial support was more predictable and longer-term compared to the one provided by other donors	International reports and studies, Interviews		x	x	x	x	x		x	x		x	x
I.6.2.5 The Commission's financial and non-financial support was more flexible compared to the one provided by other donors	International reports and studies, Interviews		x	x	x	x	x		x	x		x	x
I.6.2.6 The Commission had a specific VA to work in, on and/or around conflict	International reports and studies, ROM and evaluation reports, Interviews		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
I.6.2.7 The Commission's support rapidly complemented EU MS' bilateral contributions in response to crisis	ROM and evaluation reports, Interviews		x	x	x	x					x	x	x
I.6.2.8 The Commission was the only European actor in the conflict and took over, upon request of EU MS, tasks of the MS	ROM and evaluation reports, Interviews		x	x	x	x			x	x	x	x	x
I.6.2.9 Other types of VA	ROM and evaluation reports, Interviews		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

EQ7 To what extent have the means of the Commission facilitated the implementation of an integrated approach to CPPB ?														
	Sources of information	Information collection approach	Quantitative analysis on inventory	Deskwork	Interviews with							Case studies		Questionnaire
					Commission officials	Council officials	EU MS officials	Partner Governments / Regional organisations	Final beneficiaries	Other donors	CSOs/NGOs/Think-tanks	Selected interventions	Selected countries/regions	
JC 7.1 The institutional set-up was conducive to an integrated approach towards CPPB														
I.7.1.1	Existence of a Commission strategy with respect to the implication in terms of institutional set-up of the need to implement an integrated approach towards CPPB	Commission's policies, Interviews		x	x									
I.7.1.2	CPPB is high on the organizational agenda (i.e regularly discussed during staff meetings, on the agenda of high level officials, Heads of Delegation)	Interviews			x	x	x							
I.7.1.3	Stakeholders' views on the extent to which these institutional commitments favoured the implementation of an integrated approach to CPPB	Interviews			x	x	x							
I.7.1.4	Existence within the Commission of specialised units with a CPPB focus	Commission's organisational chart, Interviews		x	x									
I.7.1.5	Stakeholders' views on the extent to which these units/networks facilitated the mainstreaming of CPPB	Interviews			x	x	x	x	x	x		x		x
JC 7.2 An appropriate HR policy was designed and set-up to facilitate the implementation of an integrated approach														
I.7.2.1	Existence of a policy which requires that staff working on CPPB activities have the required knowledge and or expertise in conflict prevention and peace building	Commission's policies, Interviews		x	x									
I.7.2.2	Existence of dedicated staff (conflict advisors, pool of EC experts on CPPB, etc.)	Commission's organisational chart, Interviews		x	x	x						x		x
I.7.2.3	Existence of regular training in HQ and Delegations aiming at developing the conflict analysis skills of the staff	Training material, interviews		x	x							x		
I.7.2.4	Existence of training programmes in related CPPB fields such as rule of law, women and armed conflict, SALW, transitional justice and civilian administration for staff to be deployed in civilian crisis missions	Training material, interviews		x	x	x								
I.7.2.5	Existence of initiatives (reward mechanisms) for units or individuals to adopt a conflict sensitivity lens	Documents on specific initiatives, Interviews		x	x									x
I.7.2.6	Existence of policies/guidelines and incentives/disincentives ensuring that various practitioners (e.g development, security and conflict experts) will work together	Commission's policies, Interviews		x	x									
I.7.2.7	Existence of communities of practices in CPPB field where Commission staff participates (headquarters and field)	International studies, Interviews		x	x	x			x	x				
I.7.2.8	Stakeholders' views on the extent to which HR means favoured the implementation of an integrated approach	Interviews			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	

	Sources of information	Quantitative analysis on inventory	Deskwork	Interviews with							Case studies		Questionnaire
				Commission officials	Council officials	EU MS officials	Partner Governments / Regional organisations	Final beneficiaries	Other donors	CSOs/NGOs/Think-tanks	Selected interventions	Selected countries/regions	
JC 7.3	Specific tools and guidance were provided within headquarters and to delegations and facilitated the implementation of an integrated approach												
I.7.3.1	Existence and use of tools for conflict analysis (e.g EC check list for root causes of conflicts, (elements of conflict analyses included in CSPs, conflict impact assessments carried out at intervention-specific level)		x	x	x								x
I.7.3.2	Existence and flexible use of early warning tools (e.g EC check list for root causes of conflicts, "watch list")		x	x	x	x	x						
I.7.3.3	Existence of sector guidelines in related sectors (e.g governance, SSR, DDR, SALW, reconciliation, resource conflict) that provide specific guidance on how to mainstream CPPB in these fields		x										
I.7.3.4	Stakeholders' views on the extent to which these tools facilitated the implementation of an IA			x	x	x	x	x	x	x			x
JC 7.4	Commission's financial instruments facilitated the implementation of an integrated approach												
I.7.4.1	The Commission designed specific instruments to favour the undertaking of both ST and LT actions in CPPB		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x
I.7.4.2	Stakeholders' views on the extent to which the combination of both long-term geographical assistance and specialised sectoral instruments facilitated the implementation of an IA			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x
I.7.4.3	Commission's financial instruments have been used in support of ESDP crisis management tools and Council political-led activities		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x
JC 7.5	Commission's non financial instruments were geared at the facilitation of an integrated approach												
I.7.5.1	Existence of a specific approach which promotes an IA to conduct the political dialogue		x	x	x								
I.7.5.2	The Commission conducted a political dialogue with the partners that covered both ST and LT prevention aspects		x	x	x		x						
I.7.5.3	Stakeholders' views on the extent to which non-financial tools (political dialogue, mediation, sanctions) facilitated the implementation of an IA			x			x		x	x			

EQ8 To what extent did the pursuing of an integrated approach towards CPPB allow results to be achieved in a timely manner and at a reasonable cost?														
	Information collection approach	Sources of information	Quantitative analysis on inventory	Deskwork	Interviews with							Case studies		Questionnaire
					Commission officials	Council officials	EU MS officials	Partner Governments / Regional organisations	Final beneficiaries	Other donors	CSOs/NGOs/Think-tanks	Selected interventions	Selected countries/regions	
JC 8.1 The Commission's interventions remained in line with planning and were cost-effective														
I.8.1.1	Comparison of planning of operations and effective implementation in terms of timing and costs	Progress, ROM and evaluation reports, Interviews		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
I.8.1.2	Specific patterns in observed delays, if any, and factors explaining them	Progress, ROM and evaluation reports, Interviews		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
I.8.1.3	Planned schedule of activities adapted during implementation following monitoring and evaluation results	Progress, ROM and evaluation reports, Interviews		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
J.8.2 The regulatory and institutional set-up for the Commission's support in the field of CPPB enhanced timeliness and cost-effectiveness														
I.8.2.1	Internal guidelines explicitly mentioned the importance of timeliness and cost-effectiveness	Commission's guidelines		x										
I.8.2.2	Clear responsibilities and decision-making procedures in the field of CPPB between the Commission and the EU Council and within the Commission have been defined and enhanced timeliness and cost-effectiveness	Commission's organisational chart, Interviews		x	x	x	x							x
I.8.2.3	Specific instruments have been designed to quickly mobilise resources and enhanced timeliness and cost-effectiveness	Regulations of instruments, Interviews		x	x	x	x							
I.8.2.4	Decision-making procedures at the level of instruments enhanced timeliness and cost-effectiveness	Regulations of instruments, Interviews		x	x	x	x							

	Information collection approach	Sources of information	Quantitative analysis on inventory	Deskwork	Interviews with							Case studies		Questionnaire
					Commission officials	Council officials	EU MS officials	Partner Governments / Regional organisations	Final beneficiaries	Other donors	CSOs/NGOs/Think-tanks	Selected interventions	Selected countries/regions	
J.8.3	<i>The Commission's human resources were sufficient and skilled enough to ensure timely and cost-effective support</i>													
I.8.3.1	The findings of EQ 7 – JC 7.2 point to the existence of an internal policy intended to ensure sufficiently skilled staff in HQ and in the field	Commission's guidelines and policies, Interviews		x	x								x	x
I.8.3.2	The findings of EQ 7 – JC 7.2 point to the existence of skilled staff in CPPB	Training material, Interviews												
I.8.3.3	Stakeholders' views on the extent to which HR are sufficient and sufficiently skilled to fulfil the mandate	Interviews			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		
J.8.4	<i>The implementation of an integrated approach has not been hampered by requirements in terms of timeliness and cost-effectiveness</i>													
I.8.4.1	Stakeholders considered that mainstreaming CPPB in the Commission's support has not increased transaction costs (both for the Commission and partners) nor implied delays	Interviews			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
I.8.4.2	Stakeholders considered that conducting both short-term and long-term prevention has not increased transaction costs (both for the Commission and partners) nor implied delays	Interviews			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
I.8.4.3	Stakeholders considered that intervening at different geographical levels has not increased transaction costs (both for the Commission and partners) nor implied delays	Interviews			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
I.8.4.4	Stakeholders considered that ensuring coordination and cooperation within the EU and with other actors has not increased transaction costs (both for the Commission and partners) nor implied delays	Interviews			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
I.8.4.5	Specific measures have been taken to ensure a timely and cost-effective support while implementing an IA (e.g such as channeling through international organizations, NGOs, etc.)	Interviews Progress, ROM and evaluation reports, Interviews		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	

Annex 3: Country Case Studies

This annex presents the eight country case studies realized within the framework of this evaluation for the following countries: Bolivia, Central African Republic, Georgia, the Ivory Coast, the Kyrgyz Republic, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, and West Bank & Gaza Strip.

The desk work realized for these country case studies follows the methodological lines presented in section 3.2 of the main report.

Field visits were conducted in the following four countries: Bolivia, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, West Bank & Gaza Strip.

Each country case study is structured as follows:

- Section 1: Country and conflict context;
- Section 2: The Commission's response strategy and its implementation
- Section 3: Evaluation findings.

A country-specific Bibliography has also been annexed to each country case study.

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Country case study - Bolivia

1. Country and conflict context

1.1 Map and Key data



Key country data ¹			
Surface area	1.098.581km ²		
Population (in 2008, estimated)	9.7 million		
Population density in 2008	8.8 per km ²		
Population growth rate (for 2005-2010)	1.8 %, avg. annual		
GDP per capita	2000 1009.8 current US\$	2005 1040.0 current US\$	2008 1722.8 current US\$
Unemployment (% of labour force)	2000 4.8% (Age group 10 years and over)	2005 5.4% (Age group 10 years and over)	2008 5.2% (Age group 10 years and over)
HDI trends ²	2005 0.723	2006 0.726	2007 0.729

1.2 Key Dynamics and Events³

The types of conflict in Bolivia are different from the violent conflicts and civil wars that have taken place in other Latin American countries. The country has faced a number of political and social conflicts in the past, but it has not suffered from the harsh violence and severe human rights violations as in Guatemala, Colombia, or Chile.

Bolivia has been marked by a series of social, economic and political conflicts, related in particular to:

- political institutional matters;
- problems of economic development;
- social inequalities and exclusion, with women and Bolivia's indigenous and rural populations being historically marginalised;
- issues related to natural resources, in particular land, hydrocarbons and water;
- issues related to coca and the cocaine industry.

Although the country is not in the same extensiveness affected by **drug production and trafficking** as some of its neighbour countries, there has been an increase in illicit drug trade over the last years.⁴ Despite the efforts of the government to fight illegal cultivation

¹ Unless otherwise specified, from UN statistical division
<http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Bolivia%20%28Plurinational%20State%20of%29>

² UNDP *Human Development Report* 2009, <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/79.html>

³ Sources: Florida International University, Latin America and Caribbean Center, *Conflict vulnerability Assessment Bolivia*, 2003; European Commission, *Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013*, 2007; International Crisis Group, *Bolivia Conflict History*, December 2009, unless otherwise specified.

⁴ UNODC: *Report of the Secretariat on statistics on drug trafficking trends in the Americas and worldwide*, 31 August 2010, p. 7ff.

and trafficking of coca, the difficult situation to effectively control the country's borders has increased conflict potentials. In 2008, violence in the remote Pando region near the border with Brazil has caused the local population to flee across to Brazil. The conflict was caused by local drug cartels that battled over the control of export routes. Bolivia also became a transit country for cocaine transport from Peru to Brazil.⁵ Additionally, sophisticated production methods as the use of small mobile laboratories for processing the coca into drugs spread all over the country and had a direct impact on the security of communities in border regions and remote areas.

Land conflicts have been a traditional area of tension, due to the fact that there is no rural land register (cadastre). The missing registration system not only produced conflicts at local level, tensions have also risen between different communities and districts about administrative borders, in particular in cases where the exploitation of natural resources forms part of the dispute. This is notably the case of the country's hydrocarbon resources which affect the political stability between the central government and the provincial governments.⁶

The **water sector** has been categorized as a historical conflict field in Bolivia with a substantial impact on social and political stability. The most significant events took place in 2000 as result of the efforts to privatize Cochabamba's municipal water supply company. After the Bolivian congress passed the Drinking Water and Sanitation Law in October 1999, the water services in the city were taken over by the US-company International Water, with an immediate increase in prices for the water bills.⁷ In response to this situation, the citizens of Cochabamba founded in January 2000 the "Coalition in Defence of Water and Life", mobilizing the masses and shutting down the city for four days.⁸ Millions of Bolivians joined the protest. In April 2000, the government declared martial law to silence the protests, with outbreaks of violence between protesters and security forces. The so-called "Water Wars" were one of the most prominent cases of the high conflict potentials of the water sector in the country.

⁵ "Bolivia is not only a drug producer but also a transit country; especially for Peruvian cocaine, precursors from Argentina, Chile and Brazil and cannabis from Paraguay." Council of the European Union, *Note from the Spanish Regional Chair of the Dublin Group, Regional Report on South America*, Brussels, 15 October 2010, p.3.

⁶ Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR), "The distribution of Bolivia's most important natural resources and the autonomy conflicts", *CEPR Issue Brief*, Washington, July 2008, p. 12: "While there are many factors that play a role in this conflict – including race and ethnicity, centralism versus federalism and local control, the conflict over where the nation's capital should be located – it is clear that the distribution of Bolivia's land and hydrocarbon revenue occupies an important and possibly central role in the dispute. While there is room for compromise and give-and-take on many issues with regard to autonomy and the powers of provincial and local governments, it may be difficult or impossible for the government to deliver on its promises without significantly altering the distribution of land. Also, to cede even more control over hydrocarbons resources to the provincial governments, where it is already very unequally distributed, would make governing even more difficult."

⁷ Boelens, Rutgerd, *Water Rights Arenas in the Andes: Upscaling networks to strengthen water controls. Water Alternatives 1(1): 48-65*, 2008, p.53.

⁸ Chan, Amy/Kahn, Victoria/Scott, Cherish/Vetere, Peter, *Bolivian Water Wars, the Creation of political opportunity for adaptive governance*. 30 April 2007, p.4f. "The history of bureaucratic inefficiencies and irresponsible institutional system to deficient services demonstrates a need for an alternative - more stable - system to distribute water services. ... Bolivia's water wars resulted from an oversimplification of institutional options for management and distribution. ... However, the lack of inclusion in decision-making processes abased the legitimacy of the institutional structure, which induced public hostility towards the institutional structure." *ibid.*, p.5 (<http://www.docstoc.com/docs/68220847/Bolivian-Water-Wars>).

Bolivia's recent history has been marked by both political instability and civil unrest. Over the period 2001-2005, both the traditional political system and social and political forces have been deeply divided. Successive governments proved unable to meet the demands of a range of popular movements, particularly those led by the indigenous population. This culminated in a profound political and governance crisis in 2003 that lasted until the organisation of general elections at the end of 2005. The clear victory of Evo Morales in these elections marked a turning point in the country's political situation. Indeed, Evo Morales, Bolivia's first indigenous President, proposed a deep transformation of the political and social situation, in particular nationalisation of the hydrocarbon sector, institutional reform, and inclusion of the mostly rural and indigenous poor. However, the political situation remained highly polarised until the end of 2009, with major controversy over the Constituent Assembly and regional autonomy.

The following **major events** characterise the 2001-2010 period:

- Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada was elected President for the second time in 2002. The announcement of the new income tax perceived as unfair to the poor led to subsequent violence in La Paz in February 2003.
- The announced proposal to sell gas through Chile and the wide economic discontent led to a general strike in September 2003 and blockade of La Paz. As a result, the President fell in October 2003 and Vice-president Carlos Mesa was appointed President.
- Early in 2005 demonstrations demanding a Constituent Assembly, increased regional autonomy and nationalisation of the gas industry led to the resignation of Mesa in June 2005.
- Evo Morales, indigenous leader of the leftist Movement towards Socialism (MAS), was elected in December 2005. This changed profoundly the Bolivian political context.
- Morales established the Constituent Assembly in July 2006 with a view to increasing indigenous influence and reforming the State through the creation of a new Constitution; eastern lowlands departments voted for greater autonomy.
- Deep disagreements over the drafting of the Constitution led to prolongation of the Constituent Assembly until December 2007.
- In December 2007 the Constituent Assembly approved a proposal for a new Constitution but the opposition rejected the new text as illegal and illegitimate.
- In mid-2008 the departments of Santa Cruz, Tarija, Pando and Beni went ahead with referenda on specific statutes for departmental autonomy. These referenda were organised by the Departmental Electoral Courts (CDEs) despite the fact the National Electoral Court (CNE) and the Government declared them illegal. In all four departments the turn-out was around 60% and some 80% of those who turned out voted in favour of the autonomy statutes.
- A recall referendum for president, vice-president and departmental prefects was held on 10 August 2008. This resulted in the President and the Vice President being supported by 67% of voters while in the Departments all Prefects won their elections except for two. It deepened the conflict between the Government and the so-called *Media Luna*, representing the eastern part of the country. The weeks following the recall referenda were marked by political controversy and violent demonstrations.

- Political discussions between the Government and the opposition took place in September 2008, in the presence of international observers including the European Union. The Congress approved in October a revised text of the proposed CPE for submission to the electorate. Scepticism soon arose, starting in regional opposition strongholds. The referendum on 25 January was held in an environment of significant distrust between the Government and the main opposition. The new Charter was approved in 25 January 2009 referendum with 60% of vote, although four opposition departments voted overwhelmingly against. The political situation has remained highly polarised since, with controversy focused on the new electoral law and on alleged corruption within the MAS and the State oil and gas company.

A key factor for the repeated outbreak of violence was the weaknesses of institutional capacities (in state institutions, the public administration, and the civil society) to deal with social or political conflict potentials.⁹ Whereas in other Latin American countries the topic has become an important field for investigation and policy implementation, Bolivia has only recently begun to integrate CPPB-related issues into the approaches of private and public institutions. Although conflicts in Bolivia have mainly been regulated through dialogue - even though violence was part of the conflict dynamics - the weak institutional structure for a permanent balance of interests has inhibited a longer-term inclusive strategy on how to deal with social or political tension. The government recently began to install specific units for conflict prevention in each ministry with the aim to collect information on the local situation, thus being able to give a contemporary response to potential hotspots for violence.¹⁰

The various types of conflicts in Bolivia not only have an impact on the national situation, but influence the regional stability likewise. This is in particular the case for drug trafficking and counter-narcotic activities, which are often coordinated at a regional level with Bolivia's neighbour countries. The exploitation of natural resources (water) and the contamination of the environment (mining) can lead to regional tensions and conflicts. Additionally, Bolivia is repeatedly demanding access to the Pacific Ocean, an issue that is cause for regional political tensions since the country has been landlocked after the 1879-1883 War of the Pacific.

⁹ See: USAID: *Conflict Vulnerability Assessment Bolivia*, without date, p.3 «... [T]he culture of mobilization that exists in Bolivia makes for a peculiar set of interactions between state and society. The culture of mobilization has contributed to the consolidation of a pattern in which social actors avoid weak or undeveloped institutional channels to redress grievances and search for more direct action to extract concessions from the government. The fifth and final assumption has to do with the overwhelming weakness of the Bolivia state, which is reflected not only in the institutional structures but its inability to control national territory, collect taxes and fees from the citizenry, and simply to enact policy." (http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADF145.pdf).

¹⁰ Interviews of the evaluation team with representatives of the National Institute for Agrarian Reform, the Ministry of Governance, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ombudsman for Human Rights (Defensoría del Pueblo).

1.3 Key Actors

Key Political actors¹¹

Over recent years the **Movimiento al Socialismo** (MAS), led by Evo Morales, has experienced a spectacular rise. MAS is a hybrid of an alliance of social movements and a political party. It has reached levels of popular support never experienced by any political group in Bolivia.

Traditional political parties that mostly controlled the State institutions in past decades have entered a period of serious crisis and loss of popular support. While the populist Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR) maintains popular support, the other two (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) and the right-wing Accion Democratica Nacionalista (ADN)) disappeared from the electoral map. Some of the cadres of ADN have become active in the right-wing political alliance Poder Democratico y Ciudadano (PODEMOS) formed in November 2005. This party became the second most important political group in the country but since then has gradually lost much of its political power over the issue of the proposed CPE. The other recent important political group is Unidad Nacional (UN), a centrist alternative to both MAS and PODEMOS.

Key social organisations¹²

The historical strength of social organisations partially explains the fact that social conflict has been an integral part of the political and economic life of Bolivia. They mainly group together:

- **unions**, including the *Confederacion de Trabajadores en Salud*, the *Central Obrera Boliviana*, the *Confederacion Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia* (CSUTCB), la *Confederacion de Pueblos Indigenas de Bolivia* (CIDOB);
- **business groups**, such as the *Confederacion de Empresarios Privados de Bolivia* (CEPB), the nine departmental *Federaciones*, and the regionally-oriented *Camara de Industria, Comercio, Servicios y Turismo* de Santa Cruz (CAINCO);
- **city or regional associations** which have been important independent actors in policy determination (e.g. Cochabamba, Tarija, Chuquisaca, Beni, Potosi and other regions or cities organised civic associations capable of mobilising their constituents for demonstrations, strikes and road blockades);
- **civic groups and associations** also played prominent roles in the staking of positions and political manoeuvring;

¹¹ European Union, *Election Observation Mission Bolivia 2006* and European Union, *Final report, Election Observation Mission Bolivia 2009*.

¹² Evia Jose Luis (Catholic University of Bolivia and Andean University of Bolivia), Laserna Roberto (CERES, Bolivia), Skaperdas Stergios (University of California), *Socio-political conflict and economic performance in Bolivia*, 2007.

1.4 Support from the international donor community¹³

International support from donors has been affected by the frequent changes of government that were a feature of the country's history **between 2001 and 2005**. Political instability and underlying social tensions affected the implementation of the country's first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper adopted in 2001. For two years (2003-05) Bolivia's relations with its donors were conducted without even a formal agreement on medium-term policy directions.

Following the election of Evo Morales, Bolivia has a long-term **National Development Plan**, subtitled *Bolivia Digna, Soberana, Productiva y Democrática para Vivir Bien*, based on Morales' election platform. The general objectives set out in the plan are strongly owned by the MAS and differ from previous government plans in that they command quite a broad social consensus. The NDP is the national reference document for the actions of donors although it remains short of clear statements of operational mechanisms, institutional framework, performance indicators or medium-term budgets.

Bolivia is a major recipient of Official Development Assistance (ODA), from both bilateral and multilateral donors. The main actors, as reported by the 2007-2013 CSP, are:

- the World Bank and the IDB, which allocate their funds to 12 different sectors, of which education, health, basic sanitation and transport are the most important;
- the UN, in particular nine of its agencies, including UNDP, UNICEF, WFP and UNODC;
- nine of the EU Member States (MS), headed by Germany, the Netherlands and recently Spain, with particular attention to the governance, rural development, education and water and sanitation sectors; the EU, including the MS and the Commission, contributes to one third of total cooperation funds;
- other major bilateral donors which include USAID, followed by Japan, Canada and Switzerland.

¹³ OECD, 2006 *Survey on monitoring the Paris Declaration, Bolivia*, 2007; European Commission, *Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013*, 2007.

2. The Commission's Response Strategy

2.1 Overall Commission strategy

2.1.1 *Key strategic lines of the Commission's strategy in Bolivia (2001-2010)*

Relations between the European Commission and Bolivia are conducted within both a regional and a bilateral framework.

At **regional level**, relations between the EU and Bolivia are carried out within a number of **political dialogue frameworks and regional agreements**. In the early period they were framed in the spirit of the Rio Summit of 28-29 June 1999 when common objectives in the political, economic and human domains were agreed upon. Relations were further strengthened during subsequent summits of Heads of State and Government of the EU, Latin America and the Caribbean. In May 2004 in Guadalajara, EU and Latin American leaders declared their common objective to conclude an Association Agreement, including a Free Trade Agreement, between the two regions. During the fourth summit held in Vienna in May 2006, three priority areas were set: multilateralism, social cohesion and regional integration. Moreover, Bolivia participates at both ministerial and technical level in the EU-Andean countries "specialised drugs dialogue" initiated in 1995. In addition, the Commission presented several communications proposing guidelines for regional relations¹⁴.

At **bilateral level** the Commission's support for Bolivia **takes into account the country's development strategy** as presented in the 2001 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and 2006-2010 National Development Plan. Over the period 2001-2010 it is enshrined in **three major strategy documents**:

- Memorandum of Understanding between the European Community and the Republic of Bolivia signed on 26 October 2001;
- Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 of 17 May 2002;
- Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 of 12 July 2007.

These strategy documents present the main priority cooperation areas of the Commission in Bolivia together with indicative budget allocations (see table below). During the period 2001-2006 the cooperation strategy was articulated around the following priorities: (i) improved access to services and sustainable livelihoods, (ii) economic cooperation, and (iii) regional integration. Reflecting a shift in the National Development Plan towards stimulation of the SME sector, the CSP 2007-2013 includes generation of sustainable economic opportunities for decent work in MSMEs as one of its strategic areas. Together with the second focal area "Support to Bolivia's fight against illicit drug production", the Commission aims at promoting social cohesion.

¹⁴ COM(2000)670 "Follow-up to the First Summit between Latin America, the Caribbean and the European Union" and COM(2005)636 "Stronger Partnership between the European Union and Latin America".

Table 1 – Main priority cooperation areas and budget allocations (2001-2010)

	Main priority cooperation areas	Indicative budget allocations	
MoU 2001- 2006	Priority: Supply of drinking water and access to the basic sanitation systems	€44m	Total of €126m ¹⁵
	Priority: Support for regional physical integration	€56m	
	Priority: Alternative development	€19m	
	Priority: Economic cooperation – development of investment and trade	€6m	
CSP 2002- 2006	Priority: Improved access to services and sustainable livelihoods (including promotion of equitable access to social services, food security and sustainable rural development)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Equitable access to social services : €40-45m ▪ Food security and sustainable rural development : €18-20m 	Total of €126m ¹⁶
	Priority: Economic growth (including economic cooperation and the link between trade and development)	Economic cooperation: €6m	
	Priority: Regional integration and cooperation (including transport infrastructure and the strengthening of regional networks)	Transport infrastructure : €50-55m	
CSP 2007- 2013 & NIP 2007- 2010	Priority: Generating economic opportunities for decent work in micro-enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs)	€55m	Total of €134m ¹⁷
	Priority: Supporting Bolivia's fight against illicit drug production and trafficking through comprehensive development and rationalisation of coca production through social control mechanisms	€45m	
	Priority: Sustainable management of natural resources, in particular through support for the integrated management of international river basins	€34m	

Sources: MoU 2001, CSP 2002-2006, CSP 2007-2013, NIP 2007-2010

2.1.2 Commission's strategy with respect to CPPB

Conflict Prevention and Peace Building (CPPB) is not a priority area of cooperation for the Commission in its support to Bolivia. It is tackled rather indirectly in the CSP 2002-2006 while the CSP 2007-2013 explicitly aims at addressing the sources of conflict.

¹⁵ The amounts provided for under the MoU 2001-2006 and CSP 2002-2006 do not sum up as they cover the same period of time: 2001-2006.

¹⁶ The amounts provided for under the MoU 2001-2006 and CSP 2002-2006 do not sum up as they cover the same period of time: 2001-2006.

¹⁷ Amounts concern the period 2007-2010.

- In the CSP 2002-2006, CPPB is not explicitly tackled. However, the Commission’s strategy aims at tackling CPPB through focal sectors chosen to address the country’s identified political, economic and social challenges (see table below).

Table 2 – Main identified conflict-related challenges and Commission’s response (2002-2006)

	Main identified conflict-related challenges	Commission’s response to these challenges
CSP 2002-2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Social exclusion, which has two major dimensions: ethnicity and gender. ▪ Food insecurity, which is the prime cause of poverty. ▪ Migration into drug producing areas following the decline in the mining sector. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Promotion of equitable access to social services (health, education and water and sanitation). ▪ Food security and sustainable rural development, particularly in the coca producing areas.

Source: CSP 2002-2006

- In the 2007-2013 CSP the Commission devotes specific attention to conflict prevention and proposes priority sectors for intervention with a view to impacting directly or indirectly on conflict. Through the first focal area, generating economic opportunities for decent work in micro-enterprises and SMEs, the Commission aims at tackling “one of the sources of conflict in Bolivia: the inequitable access to, and lack of, economic opportunities”. Similarly, the second focal area, supporting Bolivia’s fight against illicit drug production and trafficking, aims at mitigating “the devastating influence of illicit drug production and trafficking which contribute to social instability and conflicts”.

2.2 Implementation of Commission strategy

Actual implementation of the Commission’s strategy can be described through analysis of data extracted from the Common Relex Information System (CRIS), the database which provides information on all interventions financed by the Commission in partner countries. The following data for Bolivia were extracted by the evaluation team in September 2010. It provides financial and operational information on all interventions contracted by the Commission over the period from 2001 to September 2010. However, it should be noted that data do not include interventions financed through the Rapid Reaction Mechanism as these interventions have not been encoded in CRIS. The 2007-2013 CSP mentions that several interventions were financed through the RRM in Bolivia over the period 2003-2006¹⁸. Financial data presented in the figures below are contracted amounts for national level interventions financed from the general budget of the Commission.


All interventions financed in Bolivia have been classified by the evaluation team according to their relevance to CPPB in light of the 2001 Commission Communication on Conflict

¹⁸ Interventions funded through the RRM as mentioned in the 2007-2013 CSP include: (i) 2003 conflict assessment mission, (ii) 2004 funding to the Organisation of American States to improve CP and management capacities of the Ministry of Labour, trade unions and employers’ organisations, (iii) 2005 funding to support the Club of Madrid (high-level advice and mediation missions to support the strengthening of political leadership and constitutional development), (iv) 2005-2006 funding to support the process of political and constitutional transition.

Prevention. This classification has made according to the methodology developed in the main inventory of the Commission's support to CPPB carried out in the Preliminary study of this evaluation¹⁹. For further explanations on the methodology and its limitations, please refer to this study.

Over the period 2001 to September 2010, the Commission contracted a total of €365m for national-level interventions implemented in Bolivia. The trend in these amounts over the period is presented in the figure below. The figure shows an irregular trend in the amounts contracted with a peak in 2003 corresponding mainly to contracts in support of the health sector and the Santa Cruz - Puerto Suarez road. 2004 and 2008 also show peaks: in 2004, around €50m was contracted for a BS intervention while in 2008 €24m was contracted for support for comprehensive development in coca-producing areas.


Figure 1 - Trend in amounts contracted (€m) by the Commission to Bolivia between 2001 and Sept 2010



¹⁹ Source: European Commission, *Preliminary study for the thematic evaluation of the Commission's support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building*, July 2009.
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/2009/1266_docs_en.htm


Most of the Commission’s assistance (81%) was not explicitly linked to CPPB (see figure 2). 13% of the total contracted amount was directly linked to CPPB: it concerned interventions in the field of anti-drug actions and democracy, rule of law and civil society. The Commission also implemented interventions not explicitly aiming at CPPB but qualified as “*playing an important role in conflict prevention and mitigation*” in the 2007-2013 CSP. As such these have been classified by the evaluation team as being indirectly CPPB-related. These interventions are: PRAEDAC, interventions aiming at supporting alternative development (including PRODEVAT, APEMIN II, FONADAL – Yungas) and interventions supporting employment generation in the mining areas (e.g. APEMIN III).

Figure 2 - CPPB categories breakdown, (€m contracted, 2001 - Sept.2010)




Regarding the breakdown of funds per instrument (see figure 3), the Commission mostly used the Latin America geographical instrument to finance its interventions in Bolivia, whether or not these were linked to CPPB. For interventions aiming at CPPB, the Commission then mostly used, in decreasing order, the Rapid Reaction Mechanism Instrument for Stability, the EIDHR, the budget line supporting NGOs and NSAs, and other thematic budget lines.

Figure 3 - Breakdown of Commission financial instruments used in Bolivia, (€m contracted, 2001-September 2010)



As regards the breakdown by delivery channel, the partner government has been the preferred channel with 68% of total aid passing through government channels (see figure 4). For its assistance linked to CPPB, the Commission then favoured international organisations (9% of total CPPB related aid), private companies (9%), NGOs and CSOs (8%), and development agencies (2%).

Figure 4 - Breakdown of channels of delivery used to implement Commission assistance to Bolivia (€m contracted, 2001 - Sept. 2010)



3. Summary of evaluation findings

For each EQ this section presents in bullet points, by JC, evaluation findings at country level. These findings are based on the analysis emerging from the desk and field phases of the evaluation and from the analysis of the results of the survey sent to EUD (see Annex 7).

EQ1 on Mainstreaming

- JC 1.1: (Elements of) conflict analyses carried out or used by the Commission**
- Conflict analyses have been carried out for Bolivia (USAID 2003 Conflict Vulnerability Assessment, 2003 Commission conflict assessment funded through the RRM, Catholic University of Bolivia-CERES-University of California 2007 study of socio-political conflict and economic performance in Bolivia), all of which presented an analysis of the political and socio-economic situation, of the conflict actors, and of the conflict factors;
 - The Commission's strategy documents (CSPs and RSPs) present elements of conflict analyses (conflict profile and conflict causes);
 - At intervention-specific level:
 - Formal programme-related conflict assessments have generally not been carried out. The lack of time and resources at EUD level has been

reported by interviewees as the main explanatory factor. An exception was the PRAEDAC programme for which such assessment was reported as having been made;

- But the EUD has generally consulted key stakeholders (e.g. experts), civil society and government representatives to be informed on conflict dynamics prior to the design of its programmes. These consultations enabled the EUD to identify the root causes of conflict.

JC 1.2: Informing financial and non-financial Commission support by (elements of) conflict analyses

- Commission's strategy documents, at country and intervention-specific level, did not refer to the conflict analyses carried out;
- The choice of the focal sectors of the 2007-2013 CSP was not informed by the 2003 Commission conflict assessment which recommended inclusion of support for good governance;
- There were no formal mechanisms put in place to ensure that elements of conflict analyses were used in the design of interventions. But the EUD knowledge of elements of conflict analyses has implicitly informed the design of interventions. Additionally, the EUD has supported measures to align the common understanding of the conflict environment in Bolivia amongst EU member states and between EU MS and the EUD through meetings and discussions.
- The interviews conducted during the field mission evidenced that the EUD political dialogue focused on political dynamics linked to the conflict: for instance the accompaniment of the 2006 elections by the HoD, EU and Latin American ambassadors at a time where Bolivia was facing an important political crisis and the dialogue held by the EUD in 2008 for the 2009 constitutional referendum.

JC 1.3: Do no harm approaches

- A general risk assessment was usually part of project design but there was no specific do no harm analysis;
- Conflict-related risks for interventions were generally not explicitly identified in the programmes/projects documentation. There were exceptions in the 2007-2013 CSP and for the 2006 EU EOM Bolivia.
- Programmes have generally not included specific conflict indicators at design stage;
- Conflict related aspects have generally not been monitored during implementation;
- During the field visit, the evaluation team has not come across of Commission interventions having done harm;
- Specific interventions have been adjusted to changes of the country situation, hereby considering do no harm. For instance:
 - the duration of the coca leaf study has been extended: if it would not have been extended and simply closed, interviewees reported that this project would probably have done harm;
 - the design of the Carter Centre project which focused on media took into account the evolving political situation of the country implied by the new anti-discrimination law launched by the GoB. In particular, exchanges with media actors were held to decide on how best to consider the political situation.

JC 1.4: Extent to which the Commission took CPPB into account in its development cooperation support in a transversal manner

- The Commission did not have a mainstreaming strategy for CPPB in Bolivia.

- The Commission strategy put increasing attention to CPPB over the evaluation period with elements of conflict taken into account in the various focal sectors of CSP 2007-2013:
 - Commission support for the early period was not targeted on conflict;
 - Commission support for the 2007-2013 period was more articulated around the conflict: it explicitly aimed at mitigating conflict in one of its three focal areas (supporting Bolivia's fight against illicit drug production) and recognised the link between the two other focal areas and conflict. It should be noted that initially education should have been one of the focal sectors of the Commission strategy but that, at the request of the GoB and before the finalisation of the CSP, this has been changed to drug trafficking.
- CPPB was considered as a cross-cutting issue in the Commission strategy: explicit mention has been made in the CSPs on the importance of incorporating specific conflict prevention measures in the various Commission programmes;
- However, Commission strategy and programming documents did not include specific CPPB measures in those sectors not targeting CPPB and specific CPPB measures were generally not included in programmes not directly targeting CPPB.

EQ2 on Root Causes

JC 2.1: Tackling the root causes of conflict

- The Commission strategy puts stronger attention to conflict issues over the evaluation period. While the first CSP was not explicitly targeting conflict, the 2007-2013 CSP was to some extent geared to tackle the root causes:
 - It explicitly identified the root causes of conflict,
 - It aimed at targeting the causes of conflict with one focal sector addressing drug trafficking to prevent and mitigate conflict and the two other focal areas being linked to conflict issues and recognising the impact they have on conflict ((i) social exclusion and lack of economic opportunities, (ii) and water management).
- Interventions linked to CPPB have not been explicitly designed to address the root causes (e.g. coca leaf study, alternative rural development programmes -PRAEDAC, APEMIN I and II, PRODEVAT, FONADAL-) but they targeted sectors commonly considered as being linked to the "root causes".
- There was also an implicit understanding and taking into account of the root causes by the staff of the EUD in the design of the programmes;
- Beneficiaries also pointed out that to a certain degree specific programmes aimed at targeting the root causes of conflict (e.g. EOM, Water programme, Alternative rural development programmes, Coca leaf study)

JC 2.2: Contribution to mitigating the impact of the root causes of conflict

- The selected interventions (2006 EU EOM and coca leaf study) did not include indicators to monitor their results on conflict, respectively on tackling the root causes of conflict in Bolivia;
- There has generally been no evidence of overall impact on the root causes from documents reviewed and interviews held in Brussels and in Bolivia. It should be noted that EUD staff interviewed pointed out the low weight of the Commission financial and non-financial support for CPPB in Bolivia compared to other Latin American countries.
- Nevertheless, the Commission support in counternarcotics and in land tenure issues reduced - to a certain degree - conflict potentials:

- The EU has supported efforts to implement a system of registering land titles in combination with the introduction of a biometric registration system (padrón biométrico) in the context of the so-called programme for Social Control (Programa de Promoción de la Participación y del Control Social). The registration and entitling of land property reduced conflict potentials.
- In the same sense, the support of the EU for the implementation of the anti-narcotics law 1008 on Coca and Controlled Substances has enhanced the efforts for limiting the cultivation zones and the entitlement of legalized coca production areas. As counternarcotics enforcement and the topic of coca cultivation is a highly sensitive political area, where different interests and perception of the cultivation and use of the coca plant have a historical, social and cultural dimension, the EU support has been perceived as sensitive and adapted to the political complexity of this issue. In that respect, the specific support to the coca leaf study has not yet represented a contribution to the mitigation of the impact of the root causes because the two most important studies (the household survey on legal coca leaf consumption and the study on the coca productivity) out of the eight planned have not yet been finalised.
- Stakeholders met in Bolivia also stressed that Commission interventions in several conflict-related areas had positive and sustainable results on institutional strengthening. For instance:
 - in the area of drug trafficking, a wide range of stakeholders pointed to the reinforcement of the “Consejo Nacional de Lucha contra el Tráfico Ilícito de Drogas” (Conaltid) further to the Commission support;
 - in the area of human rights, various human rights projects financed by the Commission contributed to the establishment of a culture of a political dialogue on democracy and civility.

EQ3 on Short Term Prevention

JC 3.1: Mechanisms for the detection of deteriorating situations and for rapid reaction

- Early warning mechanisms have not been set-up;
- There has not been any specific monitoring by the EUD of conflict zones but the EUD was aware of existing national efforts in this respect;
- The Commission followed the evolution of the political situation of the country through the EU Delegation;
- The Commission was able to deploy its assistance quite rapidly through specific traditional instruments (EIDHR) and through instruments designed to undertake short-term actions (RRM-IfS);
- Commission staff interviewed reported that the long-term geographical assistance was not adapted to facilitate quick reaction. They also reported that the EIDHR has been appropriate to intervene in a conflict situation.

JC 3.2: Preventing recurrence of crises and consolidating peace

- Commission strategy documents did not include specific support for immediate crisis and conflict mitigation;
- With a view to respond to the evolving political situation of the country, the Commission financed a package of short-term actions through the RRM-IfS and through the EIDHR (while these were not part of the initial programming):

- The approach to short-term prevention of conflict was not strategic ; it was more ad hoc;
 - Short-term interventions were based on identified needs;
 - The short-term actions financed were not specifically aiming at short-term prevention and were actually aiming more at longer-term prevention. For instance, support in the area of human rights aiming at building a constructive dialogue between the civil society and the Government of Bolivia has been financed with short-term instruments.
 - Instruments designed to finance short-term prevention have been used because they allowed a quicker mobilization of funds than the geographical assistance instruments but not to finance short-term prevention as such.
 - Political dialogue on good governance related aspects has also been used to mitigate conflict situation on the short-term;
 - Commission's interviewees indicated that flexible procedures for short-term actions were used: direct grants and full financing;
 - The selected short-term interventions did not include indicators to monitor their results;
 - The EU played an increasing role in the accompaniment of the election processes in Bolivia as a result of the political evolutions in the country. During the period 2000-2005, public institutions (such as the Iglesia Catolica, the Defensor del Pueblo, etc.) were the actors in mediation and in conflict prevention. The political changes of 2005 induced a politicisation in the country and left a vacuum for the international community to be active in these areas. As of 2005, the GoB explicitly asked for the support of the EU as observer for the elections. Several EU EOM missions have accordingly been deployed over the period 2005-2010 (2006, 2008 and 2009) and the EUD has also been active through political dialogue.
 - Stakeholders met stressed a positive contribution to conflict prevention (electoral process) of the EU EOM and of the EUD political dialogue (e.g. the EUD presence in the 2008 Cochabamba "Diálogo Media Luna" jointly with other international stakeholders).
- JC 3.3: Transition between short-term and long-term prevention**
- Commission's support to ST prevention has not been explicitly articulated to LT prevention but the coherence between the two supports has been implicitly ensured by the EUD who put attention to ensure coherence between ST and LT assistance in an ad hoc way.
 - Additionally, the fact that the Commission's support to short-term prevention was more aiming at longer-term prevention somehow implicitly favoured an adequate transition to LT prevention. Indeed, the RRM-IfS has been used to finance several programmes that were aiming at CPPB in the longer-term (e.g. coca leaf study), hereby already addressing longer-term CPPB aspects.
 - The evaluation team has not found evidence of negative impact of ST interventions on LT ones.

EQ4 on Geographical dimensions

- JC 4.1: Appropriateness of the geographical level of intervention**
- The elements of conflict analyses presented in Commission's strategy documents at country and regional levels included country and regional socio-economic analyses;
 - Commission support at country and regional level was built around these analyses but did not explicitly justify the geographical level of intervention;
 - The selected interventions were targeted at the appropriate geographical level

(national and regional) although without specific justification of the geographical level at which they were directed;

JC 4.2: Addressing local and national needs

- Commission's support aimed at addressing national needs and responded to national priorities, including expressed at a high political level (e.g. national electoral process with the EOM, national coca leaf study to support authorities in the framing of a national anti-drug policy);
- Stakeholders and national authorities generally reported that they have been implicated in the design of the interventions ;
- Part of the Commission support targeted poor or disadvantaged communities (e.g. Rural population in coca producing areas, indigenous populations) or specific vulnerable geographical areas (e.g. rural areas, in particular coca production areas)

JC 4.3: Regional dynamics of conflicts

- A permanent political dialogue at regional level was introduced in 1990 (Rio Group), topics having included political stability, rule of law, respect for human rights, fight against drugs, etc.
- Regional Commission strategy and programming documents envisaged support to CPPB-related areas at regional level:
 - for regional institutions involved in drug trafficking;
 - for cross-border cooperation in the area of drug trafficking;
 - COPOLAD - Cooperation Programme between Latin America and the European Union on Anti-Drugs Policies which aims to strengthen capacities and encourage the process of elaborating anti-drugs policies (approved in 2009 with a budget of €6m€);
 - for (non-CPPB related) civil society regional networks;
- The Commission's strategy and programming at country level has taken into account the regional dynamics of conflict in a limited way. One of the explanatory factors lied in the fact that the GoB was not willing that the international community worked with specific regions over the period 2006-2009;
- The coca leaf study programme targeted the national scale but impacted at regional level because the anti-drug policy has a regional focus;
- EUD staff interviewed reported a lack of instruments to establish regional call for proposals at EUD level.

JC 4.4: Articulating support at different geographical levels with a view to fostering synergies

- Commission strategies at country and regional levels were designed with reference to each other, although not systematically. Cross-references particularly concerned the trade area but not specifically CPPB. Strategy documents also mentioned the importance of addressing challenges, of searching for synergies and of ensuring consistency at the different geographical levels;
- The selected interventions have not been designed with explicit mention of other Commission interventions targeting other geographical levels;
- The EUD has knowledge of the programmes implemented at regional level. It reported that efforts were made to search for complementarities and not to duplicate support at national and regional levels. But no evidence of concrete synergies between both supports could be observed.

EQ5 on Coordination and Complementarity

JC 5.1: “Whole-of-government approach” between and within the Commission’s DGs and Directions

- Formal mechanisms of coordination within the Commission to prepare country strategies and to design interventions existed:
 - Commission strategy documents at country level were prepared by the EU Delegation and DG Relex, in consultation with EuropeAid;
 - at intervention-specific level the EU Delegation and the Government of Bolivia identified the interventions; then DG Relex, DG Budget and other relevant technical DGs were consulted;
- The field mission further evidenced that communication and information exchange between the EUD and the HQ was generally more informal and that the EUD did not receive specific support from HQ to address conflict issues. EUD staff also reported good communication and coordination with the EuropeAid EIDHR unit on themes related to conflicts;
- There was no evidence of joint missions/needs conflict assessments carried out by several Commission DGs apart from the 2003 conflict assessment involving both the EU Delegation and DG Relex;
- There was no evidence of working groups exchanging CPPB-related information involving several Commission DGs.

JC 5.2: Coordination and complementarities between the Commission and the General Secretariat of the EU Council, the European Union Special Representative and with EU Member States (“whole-of-EU approach”)

- Formal mechanisms promoting coordination within the EU existed:
 - the Commission’s country strategy documents were a basis for promoting complementarities; EU MS were consulted on the CSP;
 - at intervention-specific level EU MS provided comments on the action fiches;
- EUD and EU MS interviewees reported that there was a shared vision on conflict between EUD and EU MS at Heads of Mission level. In particular, there was a common understanding of the root causes of conflicts and of the key factors that influenced the conflict dynamics. But this common vision has not yet trickled down to operational staff level. Some EU MS have indeed different understandings of the level of conflictivity.
- Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EUD has the Presidency of several EU coordination groups, including on CPPB issues: (i) security, (ii) human rights and (iii) drugs.
 - The Working Group on Human Rights has been created in 2006 with the impulsion of the EUD; it gathers 9 EU MS and the meetings are held two times per month;
- There was no other specific established mechanism to strengthen the coherence and coordination between EUD and EU MS in Bolivia;
- In the field of election observation, a joint EU support (EU EOM) has been positively assessed by a wide range of stakeholders;
- EUD staff highlighted that the EEAS may favour exchange of information and cooperation on CPPB issues at country level through the staffing of the EUD by EU officials –as contract agent- considering that several EU MS are active in CPPB.

JC 5.3: Coordination and complementarities with other non-EU donors, international and regional organisations

- The Commission's strategy documents (CSPs/RSPs) explicitly seek coordination with other donors and describe the support provided by other donors;
- Commission interviewees stressed that coordination between donors in a conflict context was particularly important because of the importance of having a shared analysis and a shared message to the outside;
- There was no evidence of a common strategic framework between donors to intervene in CPPB in Bolivia;
- But coordination was formalised in working groups within the framework of the "Grupo de Socios para el Desarrollo de Bolivia" (GruS) established in 2006. Specific roundtables have a CPPB focus: (i) conflict and (ii) governance, justice and decentralisation;
- The GruS facilitated exchange of information but was not perceived as an effective coordination mechanism by EU MS and EUD representatives;
- There was no evidence of joint conflict assessment carried out by several donors;
- Since 2008, there has been reinforced communication and work with the UNDP. The UNDP implemented specific Commission programmes and a monthly dialogue took place between the EUD and the UNDP;
- The UNODC has been charged by the international community to lead a dialogue on drug trafficking. So far, two Round Tables were held. They gathered Ambassadors (from the EU MS, the United States, Latin American countries), GoB officials, the Commission as well as potential emerging donors (e.g. Korea). They served as a forum of discussion for exchange of information on drugs and counter-narcotics.

JC 5.4: Coordination and complementarities with partner countries governing bodies and with non-state actors

- The Commission's country strategies present an analysis of the policy agenda of the Bolivian Government and explicitly anchor their support in partner government strategies, in particular the 2001 PRSP and the 2006 National Development Plan;
- The GoB expressed a demand of accompaniment to the design and implementation of its national policies. Officials stressed that the Commission responded positively to that demand;
- A wide range of stakeholders pointed to the alignment of the Commission's support to national priorities;
- Bi-annual meetings with GoB (Vice-Ministerio de financiamiento exterior) were organised to follow the implementation of programmes;
- There is no specific analysis of the needs of the civil society in the Commission's strategy documents but civil society representatives stressed the involvement of EUD representatives in their activities (conferences, workshops, although EUD not involved in the first "*Congreso de Cultura de Paz y Resolución de Conflictos*", Bolivia, Nov. 2010).

EQ6 on Commission's Value Added on CPPB

JC6.1: The Commission's role in promoting the integrated approach

- The Commission has not played a leading role in terms of promoting an integrated approach.

JC 6.2: The Commission's specific value added with respect to reducing tensions and/or preventing the outbreak, recurrence or continuation of violent conflict

- A wide range of stakeholders stressed that the Commission was not a leading actor in CPPB. Other actors (e.g. UNDP, Germany, The Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden) were perceived as having been more active and benefiting from a stronger visibility in this field;
- However:
 - The Commission has long-standing experience in fields impacting on conflict prevention such as alternative development and food security;
 - And the EUD is recently entering in a dialogue on CPPB issues with the GoB and the civil society, in particular since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The lack of human resources in the EUD (both in quantity and also skilled on CPPB) to conduct dialogue on these issues has been reported as one of the factors constraining the implication of the EUD in the dialogue on CPPB;
- Several types of Commission's value added have been evidenced:
 - The neutrality of the Commission support has been appreciated by the beneficiaries. Indeed, the Commission support has been valued by beneficiaries as substantial accompaniment to Bolivian policies without imposing views and values;
 - The Commission provided increased funding while the US is reducing its support since 2008. This allowed continued support to CPPB-related fields (e.g. area of drug trafficking - financing of the UNODC office);
 - Beneficiaries generally valued the institutional strengthening provided by the Commission and the way they provided the support, in particular the fact that the Commission respected existing structures (e.g. reinforcement of CONALTIL).
 - Some beneficiaries also stressed that the magnitude of the Commission financial resources constituted a value added.
- A wide range of beneficiaries also stressed several types of EU's added value:
 - The EU was perceived as neutral, impartial and transparent donor / actor. This was in particular stressed for the support against drug trafficking and to the elections. The importance of the EU's presence was based on the impartiality and indirect role that the EU Ambassadors and the EU Delegation have played, mostly during the conflict between the government and the opposition in the context of the Constitutional Referendum in 2008 (*Diálogo de Media Luna*). In the area of drug trafficking, the fact that the EU was not supporting a strong repression policy was very much appreciated.
 - The EU was viewed as a positive example of democracy, regional integration and cooperation;
 - The EU was an important interlocutor to the GoB (e.g. access to decision makers).

EQ7 on Means to facilitate IA

JC 7.1: The institutional set-up for intervening in CPPB

Institutional set-up

- Responsibilities were divided between DG Relex for strategy aspects and EuropeAid for implementation aspects. With the set-up of the EEAS and DEVCO further to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, changes will be brought but these are not as yet (May 2011) defined;
- Commission's interviewees reported that the approach within DG Relex tended to focus more on CPPB than within EuropeAid. Within the latter, the approach was viewed as more oriented to long-term development aspects;
- A few Commission's interviewees reported that the Commission's development-oriented approach was not adapted to supporting CPPB;
- A specific unit dealt with CPPB aspects within DG Relex (Relex A2) but Commission's interviewees reported that it was not adequately staffed;
- The management of the IfS by the EEAS and not by DEVCO was not perceived as facilitating a collaborative work by the EUD staff.

Relations/Communication:

- EUD staff mentioned that the working relations with the HQ tended to focus more on administrative aspects than on content-related aspects. For instance, they reported a lack of exchanges with HQ on strategy aspects;
- There was no established information-sharing between the various Delegations implementing IfS programmes in the region;
- There was no established strong working relationship as yet with the CPPB regional expert (based in Nicaragua);

JC 7.2: Human resources policy for intervening in CPPB

- Commission's interviewees reported a lack of resources dedicated to building in-house CPPB capacity (recruitment, training):
 - Within HQ, Commission's interviewees reported that there were not enough dedicated staff;
 - Within the EUD:
 - The Political, Trade, Press and Information Section contained very few staff and CPPB related projects fell under the responsibility of the Economics and NGO co-financing and Thematic actions Section;
 - At the end of the evaluation period, there was one dedicated staff for CPPB: he was financed through the IfS since September 2010 for a contract of two years. He was in charge of the portfolio of CPPB-related projects (migration, human rights and IfS projects) while previously this portfolio was spread among several EUD staff;
 - EUD staff has not participated to specific CPPB training: there was no specific incentive on the part of the hierarchy to attend this type of trainings and a lack of time/availability of the EUD staff;
 - Commission's interviewees in HQ also reported that the EU Delegation was also inadequately staffed, especially considering that managing CPPB interventions required more time than managing a "classical" project.
- The lack of skilled CPPB staff in the EUD constrained the capacity of the EUD to conduct a political dialogue on CPPB issues;

- Knowledge Management in the EUD was reported as being less well-advanced for CPPB than for other sectors. In that respect, the lack of sufficient human resources also constrained the capacity to realise proper stock-taking exercises in the various fields of support of the Commission ;
- It was also stressed by EUD staff interviewed that the Commission lacked a proper system to ensure a systematic monitoring of its information.

JC 7.3: Tools and guidance for intervening in CPPB

- At EUD level, there was no knowledge or use of specific tools and guidance for CPPB. For instance, the EC Checklist on the root causes of conflict was not known by EUD staff or annexed to the CSPs for Bolivia;
- EUD staff interviewed stressed that they would be interested in having access to useful and flexible tools but not to tools that would increase the administrative burden;
- Conflict impact assessments have generally not been carried out prior to the design of programmes;
- A few Commissions' interviewees reported that the CSPs were not an instrument that facilitated support for CPPB when CPPB was not identified as a focal sector (e.g. lack of flexibility in changing focal sectors).

JC 7.4: Financial instruments for intervening in CPPB

- The Commission had instruments for undertaking both short-term and long-term action: through its bilateral cooperation, the Commission could address directly or indirectly long-term CPPB needs. The Commission also designed specific tools for reacting quickly to conflicts, in particular the RRM-IfS;
- A few beneficiaries stressed that the EU procedures were more complex and lengthy than the ones of the EU MS;
- EUD staff interviewed reported that the IfS allowed a quick mobilisation of funds but that it was not flexible enough: in particular, the instrument had administrative requirements that implicated a loss of time in the start-up phase of the project and could be extended up till 24 months hereby not always allowing the completion of the project (e.g. coca leaf study);
- EUD staff reported that the human rights/democracy budget line (EIDHR) and the IfS were used in complementarity;
- The complementarity between the LT geographical assistance and CPPB dedicated instruments was ensured in an ad-hoc way by the EUD;
- EUD staff interviewed reported a lack of a quick and easy financial instrument to mobilise small amounts of funds at the level of the EUD;

JC 7.5: Non-financial instruments for intervening in CPPB

- The EU political dialogue, including with the active participation of the Head of Delegation, was reported by a wide range of beneficiaries interviewed as effective for support to constitutional transition and for support to counter-narcotics.
 - For the constitutional transition, the 2008 involvement was informal in 2008;
 - For the counter-narcotics, the support was indirect through alternative development programmes at first and direct at the end of the evaluation period through supporting the fight against drug trafficking.

EQ8 on Timeliness and Cost-Effectiveness

JC 8.1: Timeliness and cost-effectiveness of Commission interventions

- There were mixed views on delays of programmes (e.g. delays for coca leaf study & support to INRA / EU EOM logistics put in place in time);
- The delays were linked to “classical” constraints, but amplified by the country situation (e.g. weakened governance and capacities of local institutions);
- Bureaucratic procedures within the country were also stressed by GoB officials as a factor reducing timeliness.

JC 8.2: Impact of the regulatory and institutional set-up for the Commission’s support in the field of CPPB on timeliness and cost-effectiveness

- Specific instruments (RRM-IfS) have been designed to mobilise resources quickly. These instruments indeed allowed the Commission to mobilise funds quickly (e.g. coca leaf study) although interviewees reported that more flexibility was still needed (administrative procedures still constrained timeliness);
- Through traditional instruments (EIDHR), the Commission could also quickly mobilise assistance (e.g. 2006 EU EOM);
- Commission's administrative and financial requirements for funding excluded smaller potential partner NGOs;
- The EUD organised annual meetings to explain the mechanism of call for proposals to CSOs.

JC 8.3: Extent to which Commission’s human resources were sufficient and skilled enough to ensure timely and cost-effective support

- Two aspects related to human resources affected the cost-effectiveness of CPPB programmes:
 - The fact that the number of skilled CPPB staff was insufficient;
 - The fact that there was no internal policy at EUD level to ensure that the staff was sufficiently skilled in the field;

JC 8.4: Impact of the requirements in terms of timeliness and cost-effectiveness on the implementation of an integrated approach

- Interviews conducted in the field have not pointed towards specific delays or transaction costs induced by the fact that:
 - the Commission conducted both ST and LT prevention in Bolivia;
 - the Commission intervened at different geographical levels.

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Etude de cas - République centrafricaine

1. Contexte national et contexte du conflit



La République centrafricaine est un pays de 623 000 km², comptant (en 2008) 4,3 millions d'habitants, soit une densité moyenne de 6,9 habitants/km². Ce pays continental, dépourvu d'ouverture sur la mer, est bordé au sud par le Congo et la République du Congo Démocratique, à l'Est par le Soudan, au nord par le Tchad et à l'Ouest par le Cameroun.

Environ 70% de la population vit en dessous du seuil de pauvreté. Avec un indice de développement humain de 0,355 en 2005, qui se dégrade depuis plusieurs années, la RCA se classe au 171^e rang sur les 177 pays pour lesquels des données sont disponibles. En 2010, la RCA est classé 159^{ème} sur 169 pays selon l'IDH.

Depuis son indépendance en 1960, la RCA a connu une période d'instabilité, ponctuée par des épisodes de conflit armé. Au début des années 1990, des mouvements d'opposition de

divers horizon se retrouvent en une coalition ayant pour but la démocratisation du pays. Cette opposition est en mesure de réintroduire un système multiparti en 1991. Les premières élections libres sont organisées en 1993. S'en suivent trois années d'agitation sociale et politique qui débouchent, en 1996, sur le remplacement du gouvernement par la formation d'un gouvernement de coalition avec à sa tête le président nouvellement élu Ange-Félix Patassé. Malgré des engagements pour mener à bien la réforme démocratique, le pays est le théâtre d'affrontement sociaux et politique violents en 1996 et 1997. Entre avril et novembre 1996 trois mutineries orchestrées par les Forces Armées Centrafricaines (FACA) ont lieu. Des négociations mènent à la participation de l'opposition et la société civile dans le gouvernement et au déploiement de la Mission interafricaine de surveillance des accords de Bangui (MISAB). En 2000, lors de nouvelles élections, Patassé est réélu de justesse. En 2001, dans un contexte où notamment les paiements des fonctionnaires affichent un retard de 30 mois et dans un climat de mécontentement social, de nouvelles éruptions de violence ont lieu en 2001, durant lesquelles des parties de l'armée attaquent le palais présidentiel. Avec l'aide de notamment l'armée Libyenne, Patassé est en mesure d'éviter le coup d'Etat. Lors des efforts fournis pour poursuivre les cerveaux derrière cette tentative de putsch, François Bozizé, à la tête de l'armée, est également suspect. Il peut éviter l'arrestation pour s'enfuir vers le Tchad. A cette époque, en plus d'arrangements avec le Mouvement pour la libération du Congo (MLC), Patassé est en mesure, avec de l'aide Libyenne, de mettre en place une « Force de maintien de la Paix » de la Communauté des Etats Sahélo-Sahariens (CEN-SAD). Celle-ci est remplacée en octobre 2002 par une mission de la Commission de la Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale (CEMAC) opérant sous le nom FOMUC (Force multinationale en Centrafrique) en octobre 2002.

A cette époque, Patassé organise également une offensive dirigé contre les partisans de Bozizé, basés dans le Nord, pour les pousser, une fois de plus avec l'aide du MLC, vers le Tchad. Le 14 mars 2003 cependant, Bozizé, avec l'aide de mercenaires étrangers, entre à Bangui et reprend les rennes, rencontrant peu de résistance. En 2005, Bozizé gagne les élections présidentielles, considérées comme légitimes. Toutefois, à peine six mois après les élections, une résistance armée voit le jour dans la partie Nord-Ouest du pays, ainsi qu'un autre groupe de résistance armée dans le Nord-est au printemps 2006, déplacent des milliers de personnes.

Le 25 septembre 2007, le Conseil de sécurité autorise le déploiement d'une force de maintien de la paix ONU/UE afin d'assurer la protection des civils et des réfugiés à la frontière entre la RCA et le Tchad et de faciliter l'acheminement de l'aide humanitaire. La force UE "EUFOR Chad/CAR" est déployée en février 2008 et est remplacée par les troupes de la MINURCAT le 15 mars 2009.

Un Accord de Paix Global (APG), signé le 21 juin 2008 à Libreville entre le gouvernement et les deux principaux groupes - l'Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la Démocratie (APRD) et l'Union des Forces démocratiques pour le Rassemblement (UFDR). D'autres groupes ont ensuite adhéré à cet accord (MLCJ) qui reste une référence. En découle également un dialogue politique inclusif et un processus de désarmement, démobilisation et réintégration (DDR) appuyé par l'UE à hauteur de €2,25m à travers un programme FAO de €10m.

Aujourd'hui, bien que Bangui, la capitale, et de nombreuses villes du pays soient largement sous le contrôle des autorités centrafricaines, la situation au plan de la sécurité reste fragile. L'arrière-pays de la RCA, en particulier le nord-ouest et le nord-est du pays, n'est pas entièrement contrôlé par les forces armées centrafricaine et l'Etat n'y a qu'une présence très limitée. Dans ces régions on note l'émergence depuis fin 2005 de mouvements rebelles qui contribuent à l'atmosphère d'insécurité et d'instabilité. Quelque 212.000 déplacés internes ont été dénombrés dans ces régions. 162.000 centrafricains ont fui vers le Tchad, le Cameroun et le Sud Darfour selon les derniers chiffres disponibles de l'UNHCR (janvier 2011).

Différents acteurs jouent un rôle dans la situation d'insécurité:

- Plusieurs mouvements rebelles sévissent dans la région :
 - Des anciens mercenaires de Bozizé, autoproclamés les libérateurs, sévissent également dans le Nord-Ouest. Dans certains cas ceux-ci se sont alliés au Zaraguina (voir plus bas).
 - La rébellion de l'APRD (Armée pour la restauration de la République et de la démocratie) a été lancée immédiatement après l'élection de Bozizé en 2005. L'APRD est menée principalement par des anciens membres de la Garde Présidentielle de Patassé. Selon un rapport de *Human Rights Watch* de 2007, l'APRD compte environ 1000 membres équipés, dont 200 avec des armes automatiques et 600 avec de armes fabriqués. Selon le même rapport, l'incapacité de la RCA à sécuriser la région et défendre les populations contre les Zaraguinas a joué un rôle dans le développement de l'APRD. Le mouvement affirme se battre pour la sécurité dans la région.
 - L'UFDR (Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement) opère dans le nord-est de la RCA. Entre octobre et décembre 2006 le mouvement a pris le contrôle dans diverses villes de cette partie du pays. L'UFDR est composé du groupe ethnique des Gula et d'anciens mercenaires de Bozizé.
 - Un autre groupe rebelle est le FDPC. Il s'agit du plus petit groupe et il était dormant jusqu'en 2008.
 - La Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix (CPJP) qui a récemment signé un accord de cessez-le-feu avec le gouvernement mais peine à adhérer à l'APG et a continué ses affrontements avec l'UFDR
 - Le Front populaire pour le redressement (FPR) du rebelle tchadien Baba Laddé est une menace pour les populations civiles et, son retour au Tchad est essentiel pour la poursuite du processus de consolidation de la paix en RCA et du DDR.
- Les régions susmentionnées (notamment le Nord-Ouest) sont en outre confrontées depuis toujours à la présence de « coupeurs de route » ou *Zaraguinas*. Ces groupes transnationaux de criminels sévissent dans les régions frontalières et sont actifs en RCA, au Cameroun et au Tchad. Ils disposent d'armes modernes, de véhicules motorisés et de moyens modernes de télécommunication. Certains sont originaires du Tchad, du Cameroun, du Niger et du Nigeria.

- Egalement des soldats de la FACA, ont commencé à entrer dans la région du Nord-est, après 2005. Selon *Human Rights Watch*, les FACA sont également responsables d'atrocités et abus envers les populations.
- Une partie important de la violence est également commise par des étrangers.
 - La Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) est toujours présente et ponctuellement active en RCA, entraînant la présence de soldats ougandais chargés de la traque de certains de ses éléments.
 - Chaque année, de grands groupes de braconniers, lourdement armés, pénètrent en provenance du Soudan en RCA pour y piller la faune. Du Tchad et du Soudan, des bandes armées d'éleveurs traversent les frontières du pays pour y faire paître leurs troupeaux. Ils se sont heurtés à plusieurs reprises à la population locale.

2. Stratégie de réponse de la Commission

2.1 Stratégie de la coopération de la Commission

2.1.1 *Les orientation stratégiques de la stratégie de la Commission en RCA (2001-2010)*

Participer au **désenclavement** de la république centrafricaine a traditionnellement été au centre de la coopération de la Commission européenne. La coopération s'est ainsi caractérisée par un soutien continu à **l'amélioration de l'accessibilité du pays** couplé à la réforme et à la consolidation des **fondations macroéconomiques**. Fournir l'infrastructure nécessaire pour relier des centres économiques et renforcer les institutions publiques dans la gestion de ce processus ont été considérés essentiel à la fourniture des conditions préliminaires à la croissance. Ainsi, ce sont le **transport et les infrastructures** qui ont été les secteurs de concentration habituels du soutien de la Commission en RCA. En parallèle, les pré-conditions identifiées à la durabilité de telles interventions sectorielles ont été une assistance continue à la gestion saine des finances publiques et à la stabilité macroéconomique.

La programmation du 9^e FED (2001-2007)

Le **transport** était **l'unique secteur de concentration** du PIN du **9^e FED**. Il a représenté à ce titre 70% de ce PIN et €75m de soutien avaient été prévus. Son objectif a été de renforcer l'entretien de l'infrastructure routière et de relancer le transport fluvial notamment en reliant les voies fluviales aux ports de l'Atlantique et aux points de connexion urbains

La **stabilité macroéconomique** et des **finances publiques saines** ayant été identifiées comme pré-conditions à la croissance, le soutien à ces problématiques a été l'objet du domaine non-prioritaire de la coopération. Intitulé "appui macro-économique et renforcement de la bonne gouvernance", ce domaine a reçu 25% des fonds alloués au PIN du 9^e FED qui furent acheminés par plusieurs appuis budgétaires.

Des besoins plus immédiats dans le **secteur de la santé** ont également été la cible d'un **secteur-non-prioritaire** de la coopération (€9.5m). Visant l'amélioration de la couverture et de l'accès aux soins de santé, l'accent a été mis sur (1) le renforcement des capacités (humaines, équipement et infrastructure) et sur le (2) renforcement des autorités publiques compétentes. Le programme multi-annuel de microréalisations fut également identifié comme secteur non-prioritaire de la coopération. De tels programmes sont mis en œuvre par les acteurs de la société civile et visent à renforcer les initiatives locales.

Cependant la mise en œuvre de la programmation du 9^e FED a été troublée par la tentative de coup d'état en 2001 par l'ancien Président Kolingba qui a déclenché une nouvelle période de lutte pour le pouvoir soldée par le coup réussi du Général François Bozizé en 2003. L'aide communautaire fut partiellement suspendue jusqu'aux élections de 2005 et le retour à la stabilité. Ces événements ont retardé le déboursement des fonds et au final, les programmes les plus importants du 9^e FED furent lancés à la fin de la période de programmation et devaient être mis en œuvre sur la période couverte par le 10^e FED. Durant la période 2001-2005, la Commission a cependant maintenu son soutien aux projets à finalité sociale et s'est également engagée dans des interventions visant le retour à la stabilité constitutionnelle (elles seront développées dans la section 2.1.2 qui suit).

La programmation du 10^e FED (2008-2013)

A la lumière des événements de la période 2001-2005, la Commission a recentré les orientations stratégiques de sa coopération vers le soutien de retour aux conditions à la paix en renforçant la démocratisation de l'Etat et son contrôle, sa présence sur le territoire et en mettant au second plan le soutien au désenclavement. L'objectif visé étant la restauration de sa crédibilité auprès de la population ainsi que sa capacité à fournir des services sociaux de base ainsi que de désamorcer les conflits sociaux. Le DSP du 10^e FED mentionne à ce titre clairement qu'un environnement sûr est la pré-condition au développement et que sa stratégie de coopération était destinée à être systémique.

La "**gouvernance démocratique et la réhabilitation**" est ainsi le premier des deux secteurs de concentration de la coopération pour la période 2008-2013. Concrètement, les interventions identifiées dans le PIN à être soutenues comprennent (1) la réhabilitation ou la construction d'infrastructures socio-économiques et d'équipement pour assurer la fourniture des services d'éducation, de santé et d'eau de base ainsi que dans l'effort de la reconstruction du tissu économique (2) le soutien au secteur de la justice avec l'accent sur les forces de police et de sécurité (3) the redéploiement de l'économie rurale à travers un programme de microréalisations de €7m destiné notamment aux filières agricoles tels que le coton, le café, l'huile de palme, les biocarburants et (4) la réhabilitation de l'autorité de l'état en fournissant notamment de l'assistance technique.

Le soutien 'traditionnel' aux **infrastructures et au désenclavement** fut l'objet du deuxième secteur de concentration du PIN du 10^e FED. Les montants prévus baissèrent cependant sensiblement avec une enveloppe prévue de €19.5m. En continuité avec le PIN du 9^e FED, les institutions compétentes pour l'entretien du réseau routier, du transport aérien, la réhabilitation physique de l'infrastructure routière et urbaine et du secteur fluvial furent identifiés comme cibles.

De la même façon, un appui budgétaire d'un montant de €34m pour un programme national de **stabilisation et de réforme macroéconomique** a été prévu. Enfin dans les domaines non-prioritaires de la coopération, €11m ont été prévus pour le renforcement des structures de l'état. A ce titre des soutiens à une assistance à l'ordonnateur national, pour une Facilité de coopération technique et pour sensibiliser les agents de l'état aux problématiques environnementales et au braconnage furent identifiés.

Table 1 – Priorités de la stratégie et budget alloué sur la période 2002-2013

	Priorités de la stratégie de coopération	Budget indicatif alloué
DSP 2002- 2006	<p>Secteur de concentration :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ secteur transport : appui institutionnel et investissements/réhabilitation infrastructures, entretien réseaux transport routiers et fluvial <p>Secteur-non-prioritaires :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ appui macro-économique pour consolider les bases économiques et financières de l'Etat ▪ secteur santé: VIH-SIDA, accès aux soins, couverture du territoire, surtout soins primaires en milieu rural, 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Secteur de concentration unique: les transports (71% du PIN) ▪ Appui macroéconomique et renforcement de la bonne gouvernance (25% du PIN – montant de €27.5 m prévu. ▪ Interventions hors-concentration : microréalisations (4% du PIN – montant de €4m prévu pour 2001-2004) <p>Enveloppe A du 9e FED (€ 86m) et reliquats des 6e, 7e et 8e FED (€20,5m). Total de €106.5m.</p> <p>Enveloppe B du 9e FED : €21m.</p>
DSP 2008- 2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 1er secteur de concentration: gouvernance démocratique et réhabilitation : restaurer les services sociaux, restaurer des conditions de sécurité, restaurer l'autorité de l'état, restaurer la production économique ▪ 2nd secteur de concentration : infrastructures et désenclavement : maintenir et réhabiliter les infrastructures existantes en particulier à l'intérieur de la RCA, développer le transport fluvial, réhabiliter les infrastructures collectives urbaines ▪ Appui budgétaire ▪ Domaines hors-concentration : appui à l'intégration régionale, répondre à des besoins environnementaux spécifiques. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 1er secteur de concentration: gouvernance démocratique et réhabilitation : 52.92% soit €72.5m ▪ 2nd secteur de concentration : infrastructures et désenclavement : 14.23% soit €19.5m ▪ Appui budgétaire: 24.5% du PIN - €34m ▪ Domaines hors-concentration: 8.03% - €11m. <p>Enveloppe A : €137m.</p> <p>Enveloppe B: €5.8m.</p>

2.1.2 *La stratégie de la Commission en matière de prévention des conflits et de construction de la paix*

Dans le DSP du 9^e FED pour la période 2002-2007, l'instabilité politique en RCA, dans un contexte régionale de conflits, a été identifiée comme **barrière au développement**, les cycles de cessation et de reprise d'armes détruisant les facteurs de production et de ce fait retardant le processus de développement et rendant les investisseurs hésitant à s'implanter en RCA. Ainsi l'instabilité a été considérée surtout comme un élément de contexte. A ce titre, les cadres logiques d'interventions du DSP font mention quasi-systématiquement de la sécurité et de la paix comme hypothèses pour leurs réussites. L'instabilité politique n'a cependant pas été l'objet d'un secteur de concentration ou même d'un programme spécifique dans le DSP du 9^e FED. Cependant, une référence fut faite aux actions qui pourraient être financées dans les domaines de l'état de droit, de la démocratie, de la justice et des droits de l'homme dans le cadre du secteur non-prioritaire de la coopération "appui macro-économique et renforcement de la bonne gouvernance". La prévention des conflits fut également directement mentionnée dans la section du DSP sur la cohérence de l'action de la Commission : l'engagement fort de la Commission envers la consolidation de la paix civile à travers son soutien au renforcement des ressources humaines, à la bonne gouvernance, à l'état de droit et à la bonne performance macroéconomique y fut déclaré. Enfin, le DSP établit que le "projet d'appui aux enfants en difficulté" de 2006 financé sous l'enveloppe B a visé à prendre en charge l'éducation de jeunes désœuvrés et ce de réduire leur potentielle participation aux troubles civils et à l'instabilité politique.


A l'inverse, les préoccupations sécuritaires ont été présentes dans l'agenda de la coopération régionale de la Commission avec la région de l'Afrique Centrale sur la période de programmation 2002-2007. L'architecture des conflits dans la région (entre la RCA et le Tchad, en RDC, la rébellion au Tchad, les coups d'état en RCA) indiquant que les vecteurs de l'instabilité opéraient dans plusieurs pays et participaient à la contagion des conflits, les solutions devaient être envisagées au niveau régional. Le PIR du 9^e FED pour la région de l'Afrique centrale a ainsi inclus le PAPS "Programme d'appui à la paix et à la sécurité" d'un montant de €4m (un des quatre programmes régionaux principaux). Géré par la CEEAC, il a visé à (1) renforcer la structure institutionnelle régionale dans le domaine de la paix et de la sécurité, (2) soutenir les mécanismes de réaction rapide, (3) la prévention des conflits et (4) les capacités de médiation politique. Le DSR et le PIR du 10^e FED a continué ce soutien en ayant identifié "l'intégration politique" parmi ses secteurs prioritaires et pour laquelle €15m furent budgétés. Enfin, la Commission a apporté des financements du 10^e FED, dès 2004, à la Facilité pour la Paix en Afrique qui, en RCA a soutenu les opérations de maintien de la paix FOMUC puis MICOPAX dont le mandat a été de rétablir la sécurité et les conditions à une paix durable, notamment en vue des élections en 2005. En 2008, la CEEAC a pris la relève de la gestion de la mission multinationale et à ce titre, celle-ci fut rebaptisée MICOPAX. La CEEAC ayant reçu en 2007 un mandat par ses états-membres pour développer les capacités régionales en matière de sécurité et stabilité, cette organisation africaine est devenue le partenaire régional clé pour la construction de la paix.

2.2 Mise en oeuvre de la stratégie de la Commission

La description de la mise en œuvre de la stratégie de la Commission en RCA est basée sur des données financières et opérationnelles extraites en Septembre 2010 de la base de données de la Commission : CRIS. Ces données permettent d'analyser les montants contractés par la Commission pour mettre en œuvre des projets de coopération en RCA.

Une classification de toutes les interventions en RCA selon leur lien ou non à la PCCP a été effectuée par l'équipe d'évaluation selon une méthodologie systématique et rigoureuse qui avait été développée lors de l'étude préliminaire à cette évaluation (voir Annexe 8). Ceci permet de tirer des enseignements sur le soutien effectif de la Commission en RCA sur la période 2001-2010 (septembre).

Figure 1 – Evolution des montants contractés (€m) par le Commission européenne en RCA pour la période 2001-sept. 2010



Les enseignements suivants peuvent être tirés du graphique ci-dessus :

- La croissance de l'aide, tant dans son ensemble qu'en appui à la PCCP a été constante de 2002 à 2009¹.
- Sur la période couverte par l'évaluation (2001-2010), les montants financiers contractés en RCA liés à la prévention des conflits et à la construction de la paix (PCCP) ont représenté 28% du total des montants de la coopération de la Commission avec la RCA. A ce titre, il est intéressant de noter que l'assistance classée par les évaluateurs comme liée à la PCCP ne débute qu'en 2003, année du coup d'état de Bozizé.


¹ Le pic en 2001 tient à 3 conventions pour le Programme appui ajustement structurel 2000/2001 d'un montant de plus de €5m chacune.

- Une hausse sensible dans l'assistance à la PCCP a eu lieu durant l'année 2008. Elle s'explique par le versement des subventions à la CEMAC (€10m) et ensuite à la CEEAC (€19.5m) en soutien à leurs missions de maintien de la paix, respectivement pour la FOMUC et la MICOPAX.

Par ailleurs, en 2009 €10m ont également été mobilisés à travers la Facilité Alimentaire, dont €2,25m en appui au processus de DDR².

Il faut également signaler que de nombreux décaissements et de signatures de conventions de financement ont eu lieu en fin d'année 2010 alors que les données financières et opérationnelles ont été extraites en septembre 2010.


Figure 2 – Distribution de l'assistance financière de la Commission européenne (CE) à la RCA par instruments financiers employés, contrats €m (2001-Sept. 2010)



Les programmes géographiques sont dominants tant pour le soutien de la Commission dans son ensemble que pour le soutien à la PCCP. Dans les deux cas, plus de trois quart des montants contractés l'ont été à travers le Fonds européen de développement (FED). L'Instrument de Stabilité et le Mécanisme de Réaction Rapide ont quant à eux financé 10% des montants liés à la PCCP, tous contractés à partir de 2008.

² Ces montants ne sont pas inclus dans les graphs car l'intervention fait parti d'une enveloppe globale financé par la Commission pour la FAO dans le cadre de la facilité alimentaire débloquée en 2008 lors de la crise des prix des produits agricoles. CRIS ne référence donc pas directement cette intervention mais donne uniquement le montant global qui finance de nombreux projets mis en œuvre par la FAO dont l'appui au processus de DDR.

Figure 3 – Distribution de l'assistance financière de la Commission européenne par catégories PCCP, contrats €m (2001-sept. 2010)



En ce qui concerne l'assistance hors-PCCP, la Commission a financé principalement :


- un projet de réforme des autorités de l'entretien des routes et des autorités de transport fluvial, la rénovation du réseau routier de Bangui, la construction d'une partie de la section RCA-Cameroun et le remplacement des équipements de transport fluviaux ont également été financés.
- Des appuis budgétaires dans le cadre de la stabilisation macroéconomique qui ont été principalement employés à couvrir les arriérés dans le paiement des salaires de fonctionnaires et dans des paiements aux producteurs de coton afin de prévenir des tensions sociales. Ils ont aussi servi à fournir de l'assistance technique au Ministère des finances, pour un recensement de la population et à l'ordonnateur national. L'aide fournie au titre de ce domaine a également contribué à la réduction de retard dans le remboursement de la date extérieure de la RCA.

Les montants financiers contractés en RCA liés à la prévention des conflits et à la construction de la paix (PCCP) ont représenté environ 28% du total de l'assistance financière de la Commission en RCA et concerne :

- Des projets classés dans la catégorie « consolidation de la paix et prévention des conflits futurs ». Les subventions à la CEMAC et à la CEEAC pour leurs missions de maintien de la paix FOMUC et MICOPAX y sont affectées et représentent 94% des montants sous cette catégorie.
- Des projets de « démocratie, état de droit et société civile » (€11m) dont environ 80% ont été destinés à deux projets d'appui aux élections contractés avec le PNUD, respectivement en 2004-2005 et en 2010.

- des projets dans le « secteur de la sécurité » (€7m) dont un Programme de soutien à des mesures visant à atténuer les effets sociaux de la restructuration des forces armées en République centrafricaine d'un montant global de €5m.

Figure 4 – Distribution par canaux d'acheminement employés pour la mise en oeuvre du soutien financier de la Commission européenne, contrats €m (2001-sept. 2010)



En termes de canaux d'acheminement employés par la Commission européenne pour fournir son assistance à la PCCP en RCA, les organisations régionales sont en tête. Les montants concernés sont tous liés aux missions de maintien de la paix FOMUC et MICOPAX de la CEMAC et de la CEEAC. Les montants transmis par des organisations internationales concernent les deux projets d'appui aux élections contractés avec le PNUD, respectivement en 2004-2005 et en 2010 ainsi qu' un projet en 2008 d'appui à l'Assemblée nationale mis en œuvre par le PNUD de €450.000. Deux larges programmes, respectivement d'éducation aux enfants en difficulté et d'appui au processus de réconciliation nationale à travers le soutien à une institution de médiation / ombudsman ont été financés au travers des ONG.

3. Résumé des constats de l'évaluation

Cette section présente par points-clés les constats de l'évaluation au niveau du pays étudié par question d'évaluation et par critère de jugement. Ces constats sont issus de l'analyse tirée des phases documentaire et terrain de l'évaluation, ainsi que des résultats du questionnaire envoyé aux délégations de l'UE (voir annexe 7).

EQ1 Sur le « mainstreaming »

JC 1.1: Analyse(s) de conflit (ou éléments d'analyse) élaborée(s) ou utilisée(s) par la Commission

- Ni la Commission ni d'autres bailleurs n'ont produit un document d'analyse de conflit au sens strict du terme.
- Le DSP 2002-2007 s'est référé sommairement au conflit, tandis que le DSP 2008-2013 y fait explicitement référence et propose une stratégie visant à contribuer à la PCCP. Des personnes interviewées font état d'une analyse approfondie (rôle des différents acteurs, revendications, causes profondes) bien que non formalisée menée par la DCE. D'autres instances ont produit des documents d'analyse de conflit pour la RCA, mais les documents stratégiques de la Commission ne s'y sont pas référés ni à des documents similaires.
- Sachant que les compétences thématiques en PCCP étaient concentrées chez les experts thématiques de l'Unité E ('quality of operations') d'AIDCO, le croisement des compétences techniques et géographiques entre l'unité E et les personnes compétentes pour la RCA des DG AIDCO et DEV devait se faire lors des discussions et de la validation de projets au sein du Quality support group. Cependant, surtout jusqu'en 2008, les considérations PCCP n'ont pas systématiquement été intégrées au sein du Quality support group, lors des processus de validation des fiches d'identification et de formulation de projets de la coopération de la Commission..

JC 1.2: La définition du soutien financier et non-financier de la Commission basée sur l'information fournie par les analyses de conflit

- Il faut bien distinguer les périodes de programmation de l'aide pour évaluer l'assistance de la Commission à la PCCP en RCA
 - Des interlocuteurs rencontrés, mais aussi l'évaluation pays 2009, notent que sur la période de programmation 2002-2007 - période où les troubles se sont aggravés (2003-2005), la Commission n'a pas suffisamment anticipé la dégradation de la situation et la stratégie de coopération est restée axée sur la réduction de la pauvreté sans prendre en compte suffisamment les nouveaux besoins qui ont émergés suite à la crise.
 - A partir de la période de programmation 2008-2013 (10^e FED), la stratégie de coopération de la Commission a été réorientée vers une prise en compte accrue de la crise politico-militaire. Les différentes interventions analysées se réfèrent avec plus ou moins de détail à la situation de crise.
- Suite au coup d'état réussi du Bozizé en 2003, la Commission a mené un dialogue de politique, centré entre autres sur la PCCP, y compris sur des points très précis comme la préparation des élections, le processus DDR, la mise en œuvre d'accords de paix etc. Un rôle d'autant plus important que, suite au retrait de la plupart des Etats-membres et de bailleurs au cœur des troubles politico-militaires pendant la période 2003-2005, la Commission était le seul bailleur à maintenir ce dialogue. Dans le cas de la FOMUC/MICOPAX, l'appui des DCE, « acteurs de proximité », a été souligné à plusieurs reprises. La régularité des missions de suivi comme levier de conseil et assistance, de concertation mais aussi de « pression » a été identifié comme un outil d'ajustement des interventions de la Commission.

JC 1.3: Les approches « do no harm » ou les mesures prises par la Commission afin d'assurer que ses interventions n'aient un impact négatif sur les conflits

- Le “do no harm” n’a pas été un principe pris en compte systématiquement dans l’action de la Commission
- L’évaluation pays 2009 estime que la Commission n’est pas suffisamment parvenue à s’adapter à la situation changeante en termes de conflit avant le 10^{ème} FED.
- Un ajustement important a été la prolongation du soutien financier à la force de paix régionale FOMUC/CEMAC, et ce compte-tenu de la persistance de l’incapacité des Forces de Défenses et de Sécurité Centrafricaines à avancer dans leur réforme et dans leur reprise du contrôle du territoire.

JC 1.4: Mesure dans laquelle la Commission a pris la PCCP de manière transversale dans son aide au développement

- C’est uniquement à partir du 10^e FED (2008-2013) que la stratégie de la coopération de la Commission en RCA a pris en compte la problématique de la PCCP et ce de manière transversale : appui à des « pôles de développement » selon l’approche LRRD, appui aux processus RSS et DDR, soutien aux enfants en difficulté (mesure de prévention de prise d’armes chez des jeunes désœuvrés). Cette prise en compte a manqué significativement dans la stratégie de la Commission en RCA sur la période de programmation du 9^e FED (2002-2007) qui n’a pas apporté de réponse à la recrudescence de l’instabilité et la violence en 2002-2005.

EQ2 sur les racines du conflit

JC 2.1: Traitement des racines / cause fondamentales du conflit

- Deux périodes doivent être distinguées :
 - Pendant la période 2002-2007 (y compris avant), la stratégie de la Commission s’inscrivait principalement dans une logique de réduction de la pauvreté et les références aux problématiques de PCCP étaient sommaires.
 - Pendant la période 2008-2013, à partir du 10^e FED, la PCCP a été prise en compte de manière transversale dans la plupart des interventions de la Commission : pôles de développement, appui au processus RSS et DDR, soutien aux enfants en difficulté (mesure de prévention de prise d’armes chez des jeunes désœuvrés).
- Certaines des interventions sélectionnées ont visé à agir sur les causes fondamentales de la crise politico-militaire mais cela n’a pas toujours été explicité tel quel dans les conventions de financement. La FOMUC/MICOPAX a visé à pallier à la faiblesse des FACA et par extension à la faiblesse de l’état et son manque d’emprise sur l’ensemble du territoire, identifiée tant comme une cause fondamentale du conflit qu’un résultat du conflit. Similairement, l’intervention en appui au Conseil national de la Médiation a identifié le manque de partages de la richesse, la faillite de l’Etat de droit et la concentration du pouvoir au sein d’un seul groupe ethnique comme causes de l’instabilité mais a également précisé que les causes fondamentales du conflit restaient floues et que le médiateur devait contribuer à les mettre en lumière. Enfin, le manque d’opportunité économique et les dégâts des crises politiques précédentes (orphelins) ont clairement été identifiés comme facteur de désœuvrement, marginalisation et de prise d’armes des jeunes centrafricains dans l’intervention « Appui aux enfants en difficulté dans un contexte post-conflit ».

JC 2.2: Contribution à l’atténuation de l’impact des causes fondamentales du conflit

- L’absence d’une stratégie axée sur le PCCP sous la période de programmation du 9^e FED n’a pas permis à la Commission de traiter les causes du conflit avant le 10^{ème} FED

- Il manque des éléments pour déterminer la contribution des interventions sélectionnées au traitement des causes fondamentales du conflit. En ce qui concerne le soutien financier de la Commission à la FOMUC et MICOPAX, celui-ci a contribué à une action stabilisatrice plutôt que contribuant au traitement des causes du conflit. L'intervention « Appui aux enfants en difficulté dans un contexte post-conflit » a eu un effet important sur la réinsertion sociale et économique des jeunes pris en charge (en termes d'enfants scolarisés, de réduction d'enfants vulnérables, de nombre de réhabilitation et construction) bien que l'on puisse déplorer le manque de participation de deux des trois diocèses initialement identifiés comme zones bénéficiaires. Enfin les premiers éléments de résultats du soutien au CNM ont indiqué que sa contribution de l'intervention au traitement des causes fondamentales du conflit fut sommaire.

EQ3 sur la prévention à court terme

JC 3.1: Mécanismes de détection des situations qui se détérioraient et de réaction rapide

- L'évaluation n'a pas trouvé de trace de mécanismes de détection rapide formels et structurés.
- Durant le 8^{ème} et le 9^{ème} FED, la Commission n'a pas anticipé la dégradation de la situation.
- Les représentants de la Commission rencontrés mettent en avant la programmation multi-annuelle du FED et ses procédures internes longues comme obstacles à une réaction rapide.
- La flexibilité de l'Instrument pour la stabilité a également été remise en question par certains, considérant que la durée des procédures pour débloquer une demande financière (2 à 3 mois) était trop longue pour une situation sur le terrain qui peut évoluer soudainement.

JC 3.2: Prévention de la récurrence des crises et consolidation de la paix

- D'après les personnes rencontrées et les rapports de mission, le soutien financier de la Commission à la FOMUC et MICOPAX a eu une action stabilisatrice salutaire dans le maintien de l'équilibre précaire du pays, permettant la création de conditions de sécurité suffisantes dans les zones de déploiement pour que la population puisse occuper ses activités économiques et sociales relativement sans entraves.
- Les rapports de monitoring ont indiqué que l'intervention « Appui aux enfants en difficulté dans un contexte post-conflit » a eu un effet sur la prévention de la marginalisation de jeunes et de la prise d'armes.

JC 3.3: Transition entre la prévention à court-terme et celle à long terme

- Durant le 8^{ème} et le 9^{ème} FED, la Commission n'a pas été en mesure de s'adapter à la dégradation de la situation. Aucun projet n'intégrait la dimension LRRD.
- La programmation sous le 10^e FED visait une approche LRRD, en mettant en œuvre plusieurs actions considérées comme complémentaires pour assurer la transition vers le long terme :
 - la complémentarité avec l'action d'ECHO
 - l'approche nouvelle des « pôles de développement » qui a visé à la réhabilitation socio-économique des centres urbains secondaires soit les zones les plus touchées par les rebellions ou par le déclin économique, et la réintégration d'anciens combattants dans ces zones. Ce ciblage géographique visait également l'élargissement de la couverture de l'aide de la CE au-delà de Bangui, c'est-à-dire aux régions les plus fragiles sur les plans économiques et sécuritaires.

- Le soutien au processus DDR qui devait aider des ex-combattants à réintégrer les pôles de développement
 - le soutien à la réforme du système de sécurité visant à briser le cycle de cessation et de reprise d'armes et donner le contrôle du territoire à des forces réformées.
- Il est trop tôt pour juger des résultats de ces actions mais la capacité limitée de la RCA de reprendre ces interventions à son compte a posé question en termes de durabilité de leurs effets.
 - D'après les rapports de mission de la Commission, les forces de sécurité centrafricaines n'étaient pas encore en mesure de reprendre ce rôle, mettant ainsi en question la pérennité des effets de la FOMUC/MICOPAX en l'absence du soutien de la Commission. Enfin, d'après les rapports de mission de la Commission, il a semblé également que cette organisation n'était pas encore suffisamment autonome pour mener à bien de manière indépendante de telles missions. En visant l'intégration socio-économique de jeunes désœuvrés à travers l'alphabétisation, l'accès à la santé et la formation. L'intervention « Appui aux enfants en difficulté dans un contexte post-conflit » a visé à agir sur le développement de compétences sur le long terme.

EQ4 sur les dimensions géographiques

JC 4.1: Adéquation du niveau géographique du soutien de la Commission

- Le DSP 2002-2007 s'inscrivait dans une démarche de réduction de la pauvreté avant tout et les justifications du niveau géographique d'intervention s'inscrivaient davantage dans cette logique.
- Le DSP 2008-2013 par contre a visé explicitement la PCCP et a mis en avant la dimension géographique dans sa démarche stratégique en la centrant sur des pôles de développement concentrant les efforts sur les centres urbains secondaires soient les zones les plus touchées par les rebellions ou par le déclin économique, permettant ainsi à la Commission d'élargir la couverture de son aide au-delà de Bangui, aux régions les plus fragiles sur les plans économiques et sécuritaires.
- Au niveau des projets, plusieurs éléments ont permis d'affirmer que la Commission avait pris des mesures pour intervenir au niveau géographique appropriée :
 - La MICOPAX qui s'est à un certain moment re-concentrée dans les zones les plus sensibles, lieux où se déploient les processus de DDR et les projets de pôle de développement et ce, puisque la stabilité avait été identifiée comme condition de possibilité des autres projets.
 - Aussi, la zone géographique couverte par la FOMUC/MICOPAX a été pertinente par rapport à celle déjà couverte par l'EUFOR, soit la zone des 3 frontières au nord-est du pays. Le choix des zones de couverture de l'intervention « Appui aux enfants en difficulté dans un contexte post-conflit » s'est quant à lui basé sur une approche-besoins (leur fragilité, à l'extérieur de Bangui) mais également sur l'ancrage du réseau Caritas et le soutien de l'évêché, facteurs de succès de l'intervention.

JC 4.2: Prise en compte des besoins locaux et nationaux

- La stratégie centrée sur les pôles de développement et le choix de la zone de déploiement de la FOMUC/MICOPAX et de l'intervention « Appui aux enfants en difficulté dans un contexte post-conflit » ont visé précisément à prendre en compte les besoins locaux (et par ce biais les besoins nationaux).

JC 4.3: Dynamiques régionales des conflits

- Le DSP 2008-2013 s'est référé explicitement à l'impact sur la RCA des conflits dans la région (Tchad et Soudan).

- D'après les personnes rencontrées, en finançant les forces de maintien de la paix de la CEMAC et de la CEEAC, la Commission a promu le rôle de ces deux organisations régionales dans leur rôle de consolidation de la paix, et ce dans une logique d'appui à l'appropriation de la gestion de crise par les Africains.

JC 4.4: Articulation du soutien à différents niveaux géographiques afin de créer des synergies

- L'évaluation pays 2009 a considéré qu'entre 1996-2007, la Commission n'a pas été en mesure d'adapter la stratégie régionale aux Etats en situation de fragilité.
- Le suivi de la MICOPAX effectué par les services de la Commission a indiqué que les implications du retrait de la MINURCAT prévu en décembre 2010 pour le pays et la région (Tchad et Soudan) avaient été prises en compte. La possibilité pour la CEEAC d'étendre le mandat géographique de la MICOPAX pour couvrir la zone actuellement couverte par la MINURCAT a notamment été discutée.

EQ5 sur la coordination et la complémentarité

JC 5.1: Approche intégrée et coordination entre les différentes DG de la Commission

- Le lien entre le développement de la stratégie, de la responsabilité de la DG DEV et sa mise en œuvre opérationnelle, de la responsabilité de la DG AIDCO et de la DUE a été signalé comme quelque fois éloigné l'un de l'autre, tout en soulignant par ailleurs la très bonne coopération entre les services. Les écueils suivants à éviter ont été soulignés :
 - le manque de 'réalisme' de la stratégie pour éviter que la mise en œuvre ne soit pas satisfaisante ;
 - les déficits dans la compréhension des gestionnaires opérationnels sur les intentions formulées dans la stratégie.
- La dimension PCCP n'a pas été systématiquement intégrée dans le processus de validation des fiches d'identification et de formulation de projets correspondant au secteur de concentration de la coopération de la Commission au sein du *Quality support group*. Les compétences thématiques étaient concentrées chez les experts thématiques de l'Unité E (*'quality of operations'*) d'AIDCO. Le croisement des compétences techniques et géographiques des services de la Commission aurait dû cependant se faire systématiquement lors de la validation des projets au sein du *Quality support group*.

JC 5.2: Coordination et complémentarités entre la Commission, le Secrétariat Général du Conseil de l'UE, les Représentants Spéciaux de l'UE et les Etats-membres de l'UE (« approche UE intégrée »)

- La Commission européenne a été fortement sollicitée par les Etats membres pour jouer le rôle d'animateur privilégié de la RSS en RCA, et ce à la lumière du manque de volonté politique pour une opération PESD (autre que EUFOR Tchad-RCA) et d'autre part de l'annonce par la France de son souhait de ne pas prendre le leadership du dossier RSS.

JC 5.3: Coordination et complémentarités avec les bailleurs non-UE, les organisations régionales et internationales

- La Commission était sur la période évaluée le premier bailleur dans le pays, où relativement peu de bailleurs sont actifs.
- L'Evaluation pays 2009 a souligné qu'elle a joué un rôle déterminant suite à la suspension de la coopération des états-membres au cœur de la crise (2003-2005) :

« la Commission a maintenu une coordination efficace avec les Etats membres de l'UE, ainsi qu'avec les institutions financières internationales. Elle a assumé pendant la crise une permanence qui lui a conféré une position de leadership qui a contribué au retour de plusieurs partenaires au développement ». La Commission européenne s'est depuis lors engagée conjointement avec des représentants français et américains dans un dialogue politique avec le gouvernement centrafricain sur les droits de l'homme, lutte contre la corruption ainsi que la bonne gouvernance économique.

JC 5.4: Coordination et complémentarités avec les instances gouvernementales et les acteurs non-étatiques des pays bénéficiaires

- La Commission était sur la période évaluée le seul partenaire de la RCA à avoir toujours maintenu le dialogue politique avec la RCA, y compris pendant la période 2003-2005 de prise de pouvoir par Bozizé.
- La FOMUC/MICOPAX visait à soutenir le processus de réconciliation nationale ainsi que le processus RSS initiés par les autorités centrafricaines. Son désengagement doit dépendre de la reconstruction et la réforme des FACA.
- Dans le cas de l'intervention « Appui aux enfants en difficulté dans un contexte post-conflit », la coordination avec le ministère de l'économie, du plan et de la coopération internationale ON du FED a été difficile au démarrage du projet mais s'est améliorée par la suite.

EQ6 sur la valeur ajoutée de la Commission en matière de PCCP

JC 6.1: Le rôle de la Commission dans la promotion de l'approche intégrée

- La Commission européenne a promu une approche intégrée à la consolidation de la paix, basée sur l'initiative « pôles de développement », sur le soutien au processus politique de réconciliation nationale appuyé par l'intervention en faveur de l'institution de médiation, au soutien à la démobilisation et réinsertion d'anciens combattants et à la réforme des forces armées (processus RSS).
- L'appui à la FOMUC et à la MICOPAX a fait partie d'une approche intégrée à la consolidation de la paix de la Commission européenne. Ces deux missions visaient à assurer des conditions de sécurité nécessaires à l'initiative pôles de développement et au processus politique de réconciliation nationale, lui-même appuyé par l'intervention en faveur de l'institution de médiation, par le processus de DDR et par la réforme des forces armées (processus RSS).

JC 6.2: Le rôle de la Commission dans la promotion de l'approche intégrée

- Sur la période de programmation du 9^e FED, l'aide de la Commission, mise à part son aide budgétaire qui a permis de mitiger l'impact social de la crise politico-militaire, s'est montrée limitée jusqu'en 2007 en termes de flexibilité.
- La Commission était avec la France le principal bailleur en RCA sur la période évaluée et a assuré une présence continue dans le pays. Cela lui a permis *de facto* de jouer un rôle de leader dans la PCCP, notamment face à l'absence de la grande majorité des autres bailleurs. Compte-tenu de ce positionnement avantageux, il est regrettable que la Commission n'ait pas adaptée plus tôt sa stratégie de coopération vers la PCCP. Cela a été rectifié sous la période du 10^e FED.
- La Commission n'a pas mis à profit de la situation en RCA son expérience communautaire dans d'autres Etats en situation de fragilité.
- La Commission a été perçue comme un acteur neutre ce qui a favorisé le dialogue avec les autorités.
- En ce qui concerne le soutien à la FOMUC/MICOPAX, en l'absence d'un soutien de la Commission européenne, une force de maintien de la paix n'aurait sans doute pas vu le jour.

EQ7 sur les moyens pour faciliter l'approche intégrée

JC 7.1: Organisation institutionnelle pour intervenir dans la PCCP

- Pas d'information spécifique.

JC 7.2: La politique des ressources humaines pour intervenir dans la PCCP

- Au niveau du siège de la Commission, les compétences thématiques en matière de PCCP étaient concentrées chez les experts thématiques de l'Unité E (*'quality of operations'*) d'AIDCO. Le croisement des compétences techniques et géographiques auraient cependant dû se faire systématiquement lors de la validation des projets au sein du *Quality support group*.
- Cependant, le recrutement, en 2008, d'un expert national détaché travaillant sur la thématique des états fragiles au sein de l'unité géographique pour l'Afrique centrale et de l'ouest (AIDCO C2) a contribué à une meilleure prise en compte de la PCCP.
- Plusieurs interlocuteurs ont souligné que les compétences en PCCP au sein de la délégation ont manqué car les profils étaient fortement orientés « développement ». Ainsi la Délégation a surtout fait appel à une expertise externe en matière de PCCP bien que cela ait évolué depuis.
- L'insuffisance du personnel à la DUE avec une formation ou expérience en PCCP ou dans des pays fragiles a été soulignée ainsi que son utilité et sa pertinence pour le futur.
- Dans le cas du soutien à la FOMUC/MICOPAX, les personnes rencontrées ont indiqué que, *de facto*, l'effet de triangulation des compétences émanant de la Commission, du Conseil de l'UE, des organisations sous-régionales (CEMAC et CEEAC) et de la délégation a compensé le manque de compétences en PCCP au sein même de la Commission.
- Il a été signalé que l'ensemble des unités de la direction géographique d'AIDCO ont participé à un échange de bonnes pratiques sur la stratégie à mener dans les états fragiles et sur les problèmes d'assistance technique dans ces pays.

JC 7.3: Les outils et consignes pour intervenir dans la PCCP

- Selon l'évaluation pays de 2009, des mécanismes de détection rapide formels et structurés ont sévèrement manqué.
- Pas d'autres mécanismes identifiés.

JC 7.4: Les instruments financiers pour intervenir dans la PCCP

- Les procédures flexibles, dites de crise, ont été enclenchées pour faciliter la mise en œuvre de l'aide de la Commission.
- La Commission a mobilisé un large éventail d'instruments pour intervenir dans la PCCP : les programmes de développement sur enveloppe A du FED, les actions d'urgence sur enveloppe B du FED, l'aide humanitaire financée par ECHO, la contribution à la Facilité de la Paix pour l'Afrique ainsi que des fonds provenant du budget général. Le niveau d'optimisation et de mise en cohérence de ces différents outils pour la contribution à la PCCP n'a cependant pas pu être déterminé.
- L'Instrument de la stabilité (IfS) a également été utilisé pour appuyer le CNM, un des projets analysés pour cette évaluation, entre d'autres projets financés par l'IfS.

JC 7.5: Les instruments non-financiers pour intervenir dans la PCCP

- La Commission a mené un dialogue de politique, centré, entre autres, sur la PCCP, y compris sur des points très précis comme la préparation des élections, le processus DDR, la mise en œuvre d'accords de paix etc. Un rôle d'autant plus important que suite au retrait de la plupart des Etats-membres et de bailleurs au cœur des troubles politico-militaires pendant la période 2003-2005, la Commission était le seul bailleur à maintenir ce dialogue.

EQ8 sur l'efficience

JC 8.1: Respect du calendrier et efficience des coûts des interventions de la Commission

- Au niveau stratégique, sur la période de programmation du 9^e EFD, l'évaluation pays 2009 a noté que « *La CE a donc été particulièrement lente à réagir, sauf par des appuis budgétaires ciblés qui visaient l'atténuation de tensions sociales autour des arriérés de salaires ou de rémunération d'un groupe social particulièrement fragilisé (cotonculteurs). (...). Les appuis budgétaires ciblés, seule réponse mise en place pendant la période sous revue, ont été bien estimés et adaptés aux besoins d'urgence nés de la situation de la crise* ».
- En ce qui concerne le soutien à la MICOPAX, les rapports de mission ont fait état des carences de la CEEAC dans son rôle de gestionnaire de la MICOPAX : déficit de préparation du transfert de responsabilité de la CEMAC, manque de concertation avec les partenaires financiers, déficit initial de dialogue entre la CEEAC et les autorités centrafricaines, manque de définition de la chaîne de commandement. Ces difficultés ont pris moins d'ampleur l'intervention avançant et n'ont pas impacté l'effet global de la force de paix qui a un rôle déterminant dans l'équilibre précaire de la RCA.
- En ce qui concerne l'appui au CNM, cette mesure devait initialement être adoptée fin 2007. Cependant, les contraintes budgétaires en fin d'année et le manque d'avancées dans le dialogue politique en RCA ont retardé l'adoption de cette mesure jusqu'en 2008 qui fut reformulée au début de 2008 afin d'être cohérent avec l'évolution de la situation sécuritaire en RCA. Sur la mise en œuvre, en plus de certains problèmes de gestion de projet, le Conseil National de la Médiation a eu des difficultés à trouver sa place dans le contexte politique. L'absence répétée et de longue durée du Médiateur au cours du processus de réconciliation nationale a été également été considérée comme pénalisante.

JC 8.2: L'impact du cadre institutionnel et réglementaire des interventions de la Commission dans la PCCP sur l'efficience en termes de respect du calendrier et de coût

- Pas d'information spécifique.

JC 8.3: Mesure dans laquelle la politique des ressources humaines a favorisé l'efficience en termes de calendrier et de coût

- Le manque de personnel au sein de la DUE, sa rotation importante ainsi que la difficulté à l'attirer, a eu un impact négatif sur le suivi et la mise en œuvre des projets.
- On peut mentionner le fait que la nécessité de faire appel à des assistance techniques par des experts spécialisés en matière de PCCP faute d'expertise interne a pu être préjudiciable à l'efficience.

JC 8.4: Impact des exigences en matière d'efficience sur la mise en œuvre d'une approche intégrée.

- On peut mentionner que la stabilisation des zones les plus fragiles permise par la présence de la FOMUC/MICOPAX a été une condition sine qua non au déploiement des autres interventions de consolidation de la paix.
- Dans le cas de la FOMUC/MICOPAX l'acheminement de l'aide via la CEMAC et la CEEAC qui a également nécessité une assistance à ces deux organisations régionales avait moins un objectif d'efficience que de permettre aux organisations régionales africaines de planifier et de conduire leurs propres opérations de soutien à la paix.

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Country case study - Georgia

1. Country and conflict context



Key country data ¹			
Surface area	69 700 km ²		
Population (in 2008, estimated)	4.3 million		
Population density in 2008	61.8 per km ²		
Population growth rate (for 2005-2010)	-1.1 %, avg. annual		
GDP per capita	2000 647.9 current US\$	2005 1 433.1 current US\$	2008 2 970.0 current US\$
Unemployment (% of labour force)	2000 10.8 %	2005 13.8 %	2008 13.3 %
HDI trends ² . (2009 rank: 89th out of 182 countries)	2005 0.765	2006 0.768	2007 0.778

¹ From UN statistical division:
<http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Occupied%20Palestinian%20Territory>

² UNDP, *Human Development Report 2009*, <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/79.html>

1.1 Profile of Conflict and Actors

This conflict profile and overview is put together exclusively from official EC and EU sanctioned sources.

As is noted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG)³ the conflict in Georgia continues to be a threat to peace in the Caucasus, causing destabilising effects in the region and beyond. Three separate but interconnected levels play a crucial role in this conflict:

- Level I Unresolved issues regarding the status of and relationship between Georgian authorities and the different minorities living within its borders;
- Level II The strained and ambiguous relationship between Georgia and its powerful northern neighbour, the Russian Federation; *and*
- Level III The geostrategic interests of major international players, both regional and non-regional, competing for political influence, access to energy supplies and other strategic interests⁴.

The principle actors to the first level are the Georgian government authorities and the current de facto authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia who have since declared independence, yet there are other minorities in Georgia who are also in conflict with the central authorities. The Abkhaz and South Ossetian secessionist conflicts are closely linked to the conflicts' second level: Georgia's relations to its Russian neighbour. This second level, then, is further connected to the geostrategic interests of regional and non-regional actors such as the European Union, the United States and Turkey and other countries and entities of the Caucasus.

Despite a number of incidents with significant humanitarian and political consequences – some of which turned violent between 1993 and 2008 – the context was characterised as one of “frozen conflicts” during this period⁵. These conflicts became active in August 2008 when what first started as a conflict between Georgian and South Ossetian forces escalated into one where Russian troops became involved. The IIFFMCG released its report in September 2009 on the events that led to the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, outlining that the war was avoidable⁶. These conflicts within Georgia and between Georgia and its neighbours have been on-going for a number of years with certain key dynamics and events that important to understanding the context.

³ This Fact Finding-Mission was set up by the Council of the European Union in 2009 by Council Decision 2008/901/CFSP.

⁴ Report Commissioned by the Council of the European Union, *Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG)*, Report. Vol II. 2009, p. 33.

⁵ i.e. while the underlying dynamics remained unresolved there was no open armed conflict.

⁶ European Commission (b), *Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Communication from The Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Taking stock of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP): Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2009: Progress Report Georgia*, 2010, p. 8.

1.2 Key Dynamics and Events

Georgia was among the first republics of the former Soviet Union to declare its independence in 1991. A number of armed internal conflicts broke out after independence precipitated by secessionist movements in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The economy collapsed under the impact of the open combat and the loss of both preferential access to the markets of the former Soviet Union and large budget transfers from Moscow⁷. One of the most challenging aspects of the heritage of the Soviet period – also in terms of Georgian-Russian relations – remained the country’s territorial structure with its three autonomous entities (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Adjara) and their populations. During the transition period to post-Soviet sovereignty under the leadership of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the Georgian national movement did much to alienate these three entities and other national minorities from the Georgian independence project, branding ethnocentric slogans such as “Georgia for Georgians”⁸.

In this context, Georgia’s conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia became more polarised. For the Georgians, the territorial integrity of their country and the integration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were a matter of unquestionable national consensus⁹. The Russian side, however, considered the majority of non-Georgian residents of both [Abkhazia and South Ossetian] territories - with their anti-Georgian and pro-Russian mood and with Russian passports distributed to them by the Kremlin on a massive scale – as in need to be protected as “Russian citizens” against possible “Georgian aggressions”¹⁰. Those identifying themselves as Abkhaz and South Ossetians also want to protect themselves against “Georgian aggression” and see Russia as providing that security guarantee.

A key matter of the conflicts has been the cause and consequence of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) which have been created by the conflict. These are predominately ‘ethnic’ Georgian IDPs from Abkhazia and South Ossetia now residing in the rest of Georgia. The UNHCHR estimates the number of IDPs living in protracted displacement since 1991 as approximately 220,000 while the number of those displaced since August 2008 is estimated as circa 133,000¹¹ even though precise data remains difficult to establish. While peace efforts until the mid 1990s focused on the return of refugees in Abkhazia a return of Georgian IDPs to Abkhazia en masse would have had affected the composition and thus power structures in the territory and thus remained a highly contested issue¹². Due to these political implications main impediments to the return of long-term and the more recent IDPs remains the lack of security for the returnees, and of the rule of law as well as “violations of property rights, limited livelihood prospects and broader political developments affecting reconciliation”¹³.

⁷ European Commission, (a), *European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, Georgia, Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013*: p.12.

⁸ Report Commissioned by the Council of the European Union, *Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG) Report*. Vol II. : p.4f.

⁹ IIFFMCG, *op cit.*, p.8.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ IIFFMCG, *op cit.*, pp. 379ff.

¹² IIFFMCG, *op cit.*, pp. 90f.

¹³ IIFFMCG, *op cit.*, pp 396ff.

The government of Georgia has always put the recovery of its territorial integrity high on its political agenda, by means of the solution of conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and has intensified efforts to accelerate Georgia's integration in EU and Euro-Atlantic structures¹⁴. Since the 2003 'Rose revolution' Georgian President Saakashvili has undertaken substantial efforts towards building a more democratic and better governed society. This process is still ongoing and there is a need to further bolster Georgia's democracy and to encourage a culture of democratic and good governance to take root within Georgia's institutional and social fabric¹⁵. This is because Georgia is a multi-ethnic society faced with the challenge of fully integrating its minorities into the mainstream of Georgian political, economic and cultural life¹⁶. As a side effect, the economic aftermath of the August 2008 war combined with the international economic downturn increased pressure on the Government to address long-standing socio- economic challenges¹⁷. Indeed the challenges of economy, rule of law, democracy also are a part of the conflict dynamics.

Beyond the issue of identity there is also a strong geostrategic aspect to the conflict: "Georgia is an important transit country for gas and oil flows from the Caspian basin", for example¹⁸. In the late 1990s, Georgia, moreover, began to tighten its relations with the West. In 1999 it joined the Council of Europe, intensified its relations with NATO and left the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty¹⁹. Russia, or at least certain forces proceeding from the territory of the Russian Federation (primarily the Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus), had intervened in Georgia's conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia from the beginning of the 1990s²⁰. In 2004 Georgia was, moreover, the first country to start an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO. Significant progress in implementing reforms required under IPAP led NATO to upgrading Georgia's IPAP into an Intensified Dialogue on Membership issues. This represents a qualitatively new stage in the NATO integration process, aimed at preparing Georgia for a NATO Membership Action Plan. In addition EU integration is a top priority in the Georgian government's foreign policy agenda, too. For example throughout the consultations on the ENP AP, Georgia has stressed its European choice and aspirations²¹.

Georgian relations with Russia, which have been constantly deteriorating since early 2004, are currently at their lowest, following the breakdown imposed by Russia of all trade, communication and diplomatic links with Georgia and the expulsion of hundreds of Georgian citizens living in Russia. Georgia claims that the root cause for the deterioration of bilateral relations lies with Russian objections to Georgia European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Georgia blames Russia for providing economic and political support for the breakaway regimes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia²². Links made by Russia between Kosovo final status and secessionist aspirations in the two breakaway regions have also

¹⁴ European Commission (a), *European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, Georgia, Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013*:p.8.

¹⁵ European Commission (b), *op. Cit.*, p.5.

¹⁶ European Commission (a), *op. Cit.*, p.13f.

¹⁷ European Commission (b), *op. Cit.*,:p.3.

¹⁸ European Union (b), *op. Cit.*, p.9.

¹⁹ IIFFMCG, *op cit.*, p.6.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ European Commission (a), *op. Cit.*, p.11.

²² *Ibid.*

contributed to increased tensions between Tbilisi and Moscow²³. More recently after the 2008 conflict involving Russian forces and the recognition of South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence further contributed to the deterioration of relations.

The US became involved in Georgia in the 1990s as part of its regional energy interests. After the events of 11 September 2001 and the war in Iraq, Georgia's geopolitical location became an additional interest. Georgia was one of the biggest per-capita providers of allied troops for the Iraqi war. The US has made available substantial military aid and advice to the Georgian government and given political backing for Georgia's territorial integrity and NATO aspirations²⁴.

1.3 International and Local Responses

Since the conflicts first broke out following Georgian independence there have been a variety of international and local efforts to resolve them. In June 1992 the first Joint Peacekeeping Force for South Ossetia was established by the Georgian and Russian leaders. A peacekeeping force for Abkhazia was part of a ceasefire agreement concluded in 1994 which was later supported by the UN Security Council although the force was drawn from Russia. A separate unarmed United Nations Observer Mission for Georgia (UNOMIG) was established in 1993 with responsibilities for Abkhazia it closed in July 2009 following no agreement on the continuation of its mandate. At first the UN appointed a special Envoy in 1993 that became a Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN in 1997 and nominal head of the UN peacekeeping mission.

In addition to the peacekeeping missions there were a number of international diplomatic ventures. There was the Group of Friends of Georgia (which became the Friends of the UN-Secretary General) in which the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and Germany cooperated on the Abkhaz issue. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has been particularly active in Georgia, beginning its work there in 1992, and having had a particular mandate for a focus on the South Ossetia situation in 1994. The OSCE Mission's mandate expired as of 31 December 2008 after the OSCE Permanent Council failed to reach consensus on its renewal in the wake of the hostilities in South Ossetia in August as did the mandate for the police observers which had expired on 30 June 2009.

The EU appointed a Special Representative for the South Caucasus in 2003, whose mandate included assisting with the settlements of conflicts. To complement the diplomatic and political activity of the EU Special Representative (EUSR), the EU intends to provide support for rehabilitation and reconstruction in conflict zones as a means of improving the climate of confidence between the parties to the conflict and of improving the living conditions of the affected populations and of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)²⁵.

Georgia has always had a significant amount of donor support. Georgia received large

²³ European Commission (a), *op. Cit.*, p.11.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ European Commission (a), *op. Cit.*, p. 20.

amounts of donor support to address needs following the armed conflict in 2008²⁶. The EU provided substantial political, financial and practical post-conflict support to Georgia, including a post-conflict assistance package of up to EUR 500 million from the EU budget for 2008-2010. The projects have been aiming at improving the living conditions of people affected by the conflict, notably the needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs), both from 1992 and 2008, and where possible, the local population living inside the conflict affected areas. The confidence building measures which continue to be supported by the EU aim at creating conditions for the return of IDPs and facilitating progress in a constructive dialogue between opposing social groups²⁷. In addition a number of INGOs and local NGOs have also been involved in confidence building and conflict resolution measures – some for over a decade.

After playing a key role in the ceasefire agreements of 12 August and 8 September 2008, the European Union has spearheaded the efforts of the international community aimed at the stabilisation and normalisation of the post-conflict situation in Georgia. On 15 September 2008, the Council launched the European Monitoring Mission in Georgia and appointed an EUSR for the crisis in Georgia²⁸. An EU civilian monitoring mission (EUMM) with 340 observers was set up in 2008 to monitor and analyse the stabilisation process. In August 2010, the EUMM's mandate was extended for another year, until September 2011. However, refusal of access to the breakaway regions for the EUMM results in asymmetrical implementation of the Mission's mandate²⁹. Yet as the UN, OSCE no longer had any missions in the country the EUMM is now the only crisis management mission present within Georgia.

The EU (represented by Pierre Morel, EU special representative for Georgia), has also been taking an active role as a co-chair, together with the UN and the OSCE, of the “Geneva talks”, set up in 2008 as a forum for dialogue and the only platform allowing for an on-going political conflict resolution process. It has met numerous times since 2008 and has had some successes; notably, the establishment of the Incident Prevention and Reporting Mechanism, restoring water and gas supply to the South Ossetian region, and discussions on a comprehensive set of Agreed Undertakings focusing on humanitarian issues related to conflicts, which show that the process is beneficial, albeit slow³⁰. However, the process has also suffered frequent from walk-outs by the conflict parties and politically has not yielded any major steps forward yet.

In January 2010, the Georgian Government adopted the new *State strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement through Cooperation*. This strategy envisages a policy of engagement to complement the Government's efforts towards the peaceful resolution of conflicts. This is generally in line with the EU's non-recognition and engagement policy and Confidence Building approach and was welcomed by the international community as a positive development. In line with the aims of this strategy and the Venice Commission's opinion,

²⁶ European Union (c), Annex: *Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument: ENPI Regional East Programme: Strategy Paper 2010-2013 & Indicative Programme 2010-2013*, p.9.

²⁷ European Commission (b), *op. Cit.*, p.7.

²⁸ Council of the European Union, Press Release: *Presentation of the report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia*, 2009, p.2.

²⁹ European Commission (b), *op. Cit.*, p.8.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

the authorities announced their intention to amend the Law on Occupied Territories in the course of 2010³¹. The EU has committed to “remain fully engaged in conflict resolution efforts, using the variety of tools at our disposal³²,” and stressed that it considers the EU Monitoring Mission, for example, an indispensable factor for stability.

2. The Commission’s response strategy

2.1. Overall Commission strategy

2.1.1 *Key strategic lines of the Commission’s Strategy in Georgia (2001-2010)*

The EU has cooperated with Georgia since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. The main overarching legal document for cooperation between the EU and Georgia is the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) which entered into force in July 1999. It provides the main policy orientations for the cooperation programme. This agreement was updated by the endorsement of the European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan (ENP AP) in November 2006. This AP commits the EU and Georgia to deeper socio-economic and political cooperation (including that on foreign and security policy) and sets out the main priorities to guide the cooperation, namely:

- strengthen the rule of law, democratic institutions and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms;
- improve the business and environment climate and fight against corruption;
- encourage economic development and enhance poverty reduction efforts;
- enhance cooperation in the field of justice, freedom and security, including border management;
- strengthen regional cooperation;
- promote peaceful resolution of internal conflict;
- cooperate on foreign and security policy;
- cooperate on transport and energy.

The Country Strategy Papers (CSP) and National Indicative Programmes (NIP), which provides the strategic framework for the Commission’s assistance to Georgia, are based on these overarching political documents and cover the main objectives of the PCA and ENP AP. They also take into account the Georgian Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Programme (EDPRP) adopted in 2003.

The following table provides a global overview of the main CSP priorities over the period 2002-2013 and the budget allocation from the NIP for the same period. The text after the table explains the evolution of the Commission’s cooperation with Georgia in more detail.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Ashton, Catherine (2010), *Speech at the launching of Association Agreement negotiations*, Batumi, 15 July, p.3.

Table 1 – Main priority cooperation areas and budget allocations (2001-2010)

	Main priority cooperation areas	Indicative budget allocations
CSP 2002-2006	<p>Priority 1: Support for institutional, legal and administrative reform (EU-Georgia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement; food security; health; border)</p> <p>Priority 2: Support in addressing the social consequences of transition (mainly primary healthcare)</p> <p>Priority 3: Development of transport infrastructure networks</p>	<p><u>NIP 2002-2003:</u> €14m (under TACIS) + additional funds from ECHO (€4.2m) and EIDHR (€2m) + CFSP actions for border guards (between Georgia and Chechnya) (€2m)</p> <p>Total: €22.2m</p>
CSP 2003-2006 (early revision of CSP further to security problems in 2002)	<p>Priority 1: Promoting rule of law, good governance and respect for human rights and democratic institutions, including the strengthening of civil society and the promotion of active participation of non-governmental organisations in further transition to democracy</p> <p>Priority 2: Specific measures to support the fight against poverty (health and social safety nets)</p> <p>Priority 3: Promoting conflict prevention, resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation</p>	<p><u>NIP 2004-2006:</u> €25m, + €20m (under TACIS) for priority 1 and 2. Additional funds from CFSP (€5m), Rehabilitation (€6m) and EIDHR (€6m) for priority 3.</p> <p>Other funds from ECHO (€4m + €2m + €2m), food security programme (€12m + €10m + €10m), macro-financial assistance (€7m + €33m), civil society (€2m + €1m + €2m)</p> <p>Total: €147m</p>
CSP 2007-2013	<p>Priority 1: Support for democratic development, the rule of law and governance</p> <p>Priority 2: Support for economic development and ENP AP (ENP Action Plan) implementation</p> <p>Priority 3: Support for poverty reduction and social reforms</p> <p>Priority 4: Support for peaceful settlement of Georgia's internal conflicts</p>	<p><u>NIP 2007-2010:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - €80.2m ENPI “regular” - €103m ENPI “conflict related” - €31m IFS - €4.4m EIDHR - €5m Food Security - €46m macro-assistance - €12m ECHO - €55.4m EUMM (Council) - €2m nuclear safety - €10.4m thematic programme - €8m Investment Facility (EIB) <p>Total: €357.4</p> <p><u>NIP 2011-2013:</u> €180.29m (under ENPI) No information found on funding under other instruments</p>

A first CSP was adopted in December 2001 for the period 2002-2006. It includes a NIP for the period 2002-2003 with total commitments of €22m. The main priority areas of cooperation for this CSP are listed in the table above. However, because of the deterioration of internal security in 2001 and 2002, the Commission decided to revise its priorities and redrafted a new CSP covering the period 2003-2006 and a new NIP for the period 2004-2006. The main changes of strategic orientations are on:

- promotion of rule of law, good governance, human rights and civil society instead of only supporting institutional, legal and administrative reform; *and*

- **inclusion of a priority for promoting conflict prevention, resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation.** The Commission had already supported some activities in this area prior to 2003 but it became one of the main priorities or focal sectors of cooperation for the period 2003-2006.

For the 2003-2006 CSP and 2004-2006 NIP, the main foci were:

- under **priority 1 on rule of law, good governance and respect of human rights:** (i) support for reform of the criminal justice, (ii) support for good governance in the area of public finance management and public expenditure, and (iii) strengthening of civil society to ensure rule of law and good governance, in a balanced-approach;
- under **priority 2 on the fight against poverty:** (i) health, (ii) social safety nets and (iii) food security (all a continuation of activities included in the previous CSP);
- under **priority 3 on conflict prevention and resolution**, the Commission planned to use a combination of aid instruments and political dialogue to support efforts in conflict prevention and resolution as well as post-conflict rehabilitation, that is the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Joint Actions (in support of the border guards on the Chechnya-Georgia border, and in South Ossetia), the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Right (EIDHR) and the Rehabilitation instrument.

TACIS was the main instrument the Commission used to implement its strategy for the 2002-2006 period. The allocated amounts under the 2002-2003 and 2004-2006 NIPs are shown in the table above. Between these two periods the allocated amount increased from €22.2m (for 2002 and 2003) to €147m (for 2004, 2005 and 2006). TACIS funds were allocated to priorities 1 and 2 whereas for priority 3 on conflict prevention and resolution funds mainly came from other instruments such as EIDHR, Rehabilitation and CFSP.

In 2007 the Commission drafted a new CSP for the period 2007-2013 and introduced new financial instruments for cooperation with Georgia. The new overarching policy document is the ENP AP (adopted in 2006) and the new main financial instrument is the ENPI which takes over from TACIS. The overarching objective of the ENP and of the ENPI is *“to promote the development of an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness between the European Union and the partner countries covered by the ENP”* (i.e. the Mediterranean region, Eastern Europe and Central Asia).

The main goal of the 2007-2013 CSP is to support Georgia in the fulfilment of its commitments under the ENP AP and to contribute to attainment of the MDGs. To achieve these aims the Commission and Georgia identifies in the CSP four main cooperation priorities (cf. the table above). Three of the four are continuations of previous CSP priorities. The additional priority is support for Georgian economic development and implementation of the ENP AP.

The 2007-2010 NIP, which provides greater details of the focus of operations financed under the ENPI, is centred on the four CSP priorities:

- mainly continuation of the 2004-2006 NIP for **priority 1** on democratic development, rule of law and governance, and for **priority 3** on support for poverty reduction and social reform;

- the additional priority (**priority 2**) on economic development and implementation of the ENP AP focuses on promoting external trade and improving the investment climate; on support for PCA/ENP AP implementation and regulatory reforms; and on education (vocational education, science and people-to-people contacts);
- **Priority 4 on support for peaceful resolution of Georgia's internal conflict** takes on a larger dimension compared to the 2003-2006 CSP. This priority is now funded through the ENPI instrument in addition to the other Commission thematic instruments (e.g. EIDHR). On the political and diplomatic side, the EU has appointed an EU Special Representative (EUSR). The NIP also provides for the possibility of supporting the elimination of illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW).

Although the provisional budget allocation under ENPI for 2007-2010 was €120.4m, the actual financial allocation to Georgia from the EU budget was €357.4m for the years 2007, 2008 and 2009. The increased budget was in response to the outbreak of armed conflict with Russia in August 2008, namely €103m from the ENPI, €31m from the Instrument for Stability (IfS), €4.4m from EIDHR, €12m from ECHO and €55.4m for the EU/Council Monitoring Mission (EUMM).

The 2011-2013 NIP was drafted after the Mid-Term Review of the 2007-2013 CSP. The conclusion was that even if the political, economic and social developments in Georgia between 2007 and 2009 (thus including the 2008 war) and the development of new EU policies have moved on, the main priorities of the CSP remain largely valid. The ENPI provisional budget of €180.4m is thus allocated between the same four priorities. No information has yet come to light on funding from the other Commission and EU instruments relating to conflict prevention and resolution for the period 2011-2013.

2.1.2 *The Commission's Strategy with respect to CPPB*

CPPB has been one of the main priorities for cooperation between the Commission and Georgia since the 2003-2006 CSP. Before the "exceptional" review of the 2002-2006 CSP due to the 2002 security issues that led to the drafting of the 2003-2006 CSP, CPPB was being addressed by the Commission, but not as a main priority. It was, rather, addressed under support for institutional, legal and administrative reform through socio-economic rehabilitation interventions in the conflict zone and through support to the Georgian Border Guards (GBG) by the CFSP Joint Action.

There is no reference in the CSP-NIP to the mainstreaming of CPPB under the other main cooperation priorities. CPPB is one of the major issues addressed and described by the Commission in its Strategy documents but, apart from the priority on conflict prevention, resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation, the other priorities do not mention CPPB as a key issue for mainstreaming or for taking into account during the programming and design of interventions in support of poverty reduction and social reforms, or in support of democratic development, rule of law and governance. It could be argued that democracy and rule of law (including criminal justice reform) are thematically related to CPPB but there is no explicit indication that these reforms or interventions are related to

the internal conflict in Georgia or that they tackle the root causes and cross-cutting factors of the conflict.

There is no specific allocation of budget under the TACIS instrument (in the NIP 2004-2006) for the CPPB priority, whereas for the two other priorities an initial budget was allocated along with a description of activities to be carried out, objectives, risks, assumptions, expected results, and so forth. It is only indicated under the CPPB priority that: “In the Georgian context therefore, to pursue this objective, a combination of EC aid instruments will be used to advance the conflict resolution processes as appropriate. Building on past experience and lessons learned, CFSP Joint Actions, EIDHR and Rehabilitation are envisaged to be the main instruments.” There is only “A provisional TACIS allocation of €4 million for Rehabilitation projects has been foreseen over the strategy period for such activities”.

An indicative budget of €19m (out of a total of €120.4m) is allocated to the CPPB priority under the ENPI (NIP 2007-2010). It is the smallest budget when compared to the other main priorities of the Commission’s cooperation with Georgia. It is nevertheless indicated that: “certain measures, in particular in the area of conflict prevention and crisis management and resolution, may also be supported under the Stability Instrument.” The NIP is relatively vague on the action and interventions envisaged under the CPPB priority area, whereas the other priorities have rather more detail in respect of background justification, sub-priorities, long-term impact, specific objects, expected results, and so on.

Following the August 2008 war and the revision of the CSP for the new 2011-2013 NIP, an indicative budget of between €9m to €18m (out of €180.29m) is allocated to CPPB priority under the ENPI. It is again the smallest budget when compared to the other main priorities. Even though the security situation in Georgia after the war had deteriorated, the Mid-Term Review concluded that “the political, economic and social developments in Georgia between 2007 and 2009 (including the August 2008 war) and the development of new EU policies have changed the dimensions but not the substance of the main challenges identified in the CSP (...) the CSP 2007-2013 for Georgia remains largely valid.” It is envisaged that other financial instruments such as the IfS and EIDHR will be used under this priority, along with EU action such as the EUMM and EUSR. It is worth noting that in the NIP annexes a number of assessments have been carried out on environmental issues, public finance management and macro-economics, but not on the conflict.

2.2 Implementation of the Commission’s Strategy

Actual implementation of the Commission’s Strategy, in terms of funds effectively contracted for projects, differs somewhat from the amounts allocated for the NIP and its priorities. This can be traced through an analysis of data extracted from the Common Relex Information System (CRIS), the database which provides information on all interventions financed by the Commission in partner countries. The following data for Georgia were extracted by the evaluation team in September 2010. It provides financial and operational information on all interventions contracted by the Commission over the period from 2001


to September 2010. The financial data presented below are contracted amounts for national-level interventions financed from the general budget of the Commission.

All interventions financed in Georgia have been classified by the evaluation team according to their relevance to CPPB in the light of the 2001 Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention. This classification has been made in accordance with the methodology developed in the main inventory of the Commission's support to CPPB as included in the preliminary study for this evaluation³³. For further explanation of the methodology and its limitations, please refer to this study.

Over the period 2001 to September 2010, the Commission contracted a total of €346m for national-level interventions implemented in Georgia (this does not include CFSP funds or ECHO, EUMM, EIB activities). In terms of the budget allocations under the Commission instruments as indicated in the NIPs over the same period, a total of €432m was allocated, that is to say **80% of the allocated amounts was contracted for implementation of interventions.**

The trend in the amounts contracted over the period is shown in the figure below. It also presents an interesting distribution of CPPB-related and non-CPPB-related funds.

Figure 1 - Evolution of amounts contracted (€m) by the Commission to Georgia between 2001 and September 2010



³³ European Commission, *Preliminary study for the thematic evaluation of the Commission's support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building*, July 2009. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/2009/1266_docs_en.htm


The figure shows clearly that over the period 2001-2007 the total amount contracted in Georgia for CPPB-related activities is relatively low compared to non-CPPB-related interventions. It then increased substantially in 2008 and 2009 following the outbreak of violence in August 2008.

In mid-December 2008 the first funds for the support to IDPs were contracted under the IfS. In 2009 the amount contracted for CPPB overtook non-CPPB-related funds for the first time since 2001. During that year the Commission contracted:

- €50m to the Georgian Government for the “Support to Georgia IDPs Action Plan: 2008, Part II”;
- €15m to the Georgian Government for the “Support to Criminal Justice Reform in Georgia”; *and*
- €14m under the IfS for the “Support confidence building measures and de-conflicting after the armed conflict in Georgia in August 2008”.

The evolution of CPPB-related and non-CPPB-related funds shows clearly that the Commission responded to the crisis with substantial CPPB-related interventions using a mix of instruments, mainly IfS and ENPI, but also EIDHR and remaining TACIS funds (see figure below).


Figure 2 - Breakdown of Commission financial instruments used in Georgia, (€m contracted, 2001-September 2010)



Through an analysis of the trend in the use of the different instruments for CPPB-related interventions it is interesting to note that in 2008 IFS funding (€16.7m) was greater than ENPI funding (€10.1m). In contrast, in 2009 large amounts were contracted under ENPI (€70.7m) and smaller amounts through the IfS (€13.7m). The uptake of IfS funds was indeed more rapid for early recovery and stabilisation of IDPs' conditions after the war (e.g. interventions such as: "Support to Early Recovery Efforts in Georgia" and "Stabilisation of the IDP Living Conditions in Georgia"). Subsequently ENPI funds took over the rapid reaction activities with large amounts for support for Georgian IDPs Action Plan (part 1 and 2).

In terms of CPPB-related thematic activities supported by the Commission over the entire period, the figure below provides an overview of CPPB categories against non-CPPB-related support.

Figure 3 - CPPB categories breakdown (€m contracted, 2001 - September 2010)



Overall a smaller percentage of funding was contracted for CPPB-related activities (46%) than for non-CPPB-related interventions (54%). Of the CPPB-related activities:


- 24% of the amounts contracted was targeted on support for IDPs (classified in the generic CPPB category "population flows and human trafficking"); these funds were mainly contracted after August 2008;
- the Commission also supported interventions classified under "democracy, rule of law and civil society" (11% of amounts contracted), this support mainly covering assistance for criminal justice reform, electoral processes, and a large number of projects through civil society and NGOs;

- 6% was targeted on peace consolidation and prevention of future conflict; large amounts were contracted after the 2008 war for early recovery efforts but also during the 2004-2007 period for rehabilitation programmes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
- 3% for the security sector, mainly for the reform of the penitentiary system of Georgia.

The non-CPPB-related interventions were in the following main sectors: education (vocational education), public financial management, food security, energy and health.

The Commission uses different channels of delivery to implement its development aid to Georgia. They are presented in the figure below, showing the relationship between overall Commission support and that for CPPB-related interventions.

Figure 4 - Breakdown of channels of delivery used to implement Commission assistance to Georgia (€m contracted, 2001 - September 2010)



This figure shows that the Commission works mainly with the partner government even on CPPB-related interventions. This is mainly due to extensive sector budget support for criminal justice and large amounts in support of the government action plan for IDPs after the war (€60.5m).

Other actors involved with the Commission in CPPB-related activities are the international organisations (mainly the UN), private companies, NGOs and civil society, regional organisations (mainly the Council of Europe) and EU MS development agencies.

3. Evaluation findings

For each EQ this section presents in bullet points, by JC³⁴, evaluation findings at country level. These findings are based on the analysis emerging from the desk and field phases of the evaluation and from the analysis of the results of the survey sent to EUD (see Annex 7).

EQ1 on Mainstreaming

JC 1.1: (Elements of) conflict analyses carried out or used by the Commission

- The Commission did not carry out a formal and structured conflict analysis but other donors did, such as DFID and USAID. These analysis are considered by the Commission as important.
- The analysis of the conflict is carried out by the Commission on an *ad hoc* but continuous basis through various means:
 - Information coming from HQ;
 - Analysis carried out by the EUD political section
 - Information gathered from NGO, civil society organisation and political dialogue with national authorities;
 - Information from other donors; *and*
 - After the war, through **conflict analysis workshops** and a **conflict matrix** which looked at different aspects of the conflict and actors involved with the aim of reviewing changes in the situation, achievements and scoping ways forward.

JC 1.2: Informing financial and non-financial Commission support by (elements of) conflict analyses

- In the very short aftermath of the war, a joint needs assessment (WB, UN and EU) was carried out to support international donors in designing their post-conflict recovery interventions.
- Elements covering aspects of the conflict were then included in strategy and programming documents but they did not constitute a formal conflict analysis.
- But as such, no formal conflict analysis was mainstreamed into programming documents such as CSPs and NIPs.
- An exploration of basic conflict risks informed part of Commission programming; yet the Commission focused a significant amount of its non-financial and financial activities on conflict prevention and peace-building.
- Implicit “none”-written basic analysis of conflict factors was deemed sufficient to underpin financial and non-financial support from the Commission.

JC 1.3: Do no harm approaches

- The Commission reacted to ongoing and changing conflict dynamics but most obviously adapted its approach after the August 2008 war; since 2008 support to IDPs has been the Commission’s most important portfolio in Georgia.
- The Commission adapted its strategy and programming in 2002 (as shown by the new CSP), and 2008 (as shown by funds spent) following major developments in the

³⁴ Some Judgment Criteria have not been included in the summary boxes because either they were not relevant at country-specific level or because too little information was available to substantiate them.

conflict dynamics – further prioritising conflict prevention and peace-building. Prior to the 2008 war, ECHO was providing humanitarian support to IDPs (approx. 230 000 IDPs before 2008) but Commission funds increased substantially after the 2008 war (additional 50 000 IDPs).

- There was evidence that attention to do-no-harm has been specific to CPPB projects. It has been reported as being applied as follows:
 - Attention paid to making activities designed under IFS complementary geographically (between conflict-affected areas or IDP areas and the rest).
 - Interventions were negotiated with the government, the endorsement of which was required.
 - Very close cooperation with the UN, the other leading donor on CPPB issues in Georgia.

JC 1.4: Extent to which the Commission took CPPB into account in its development cooperation support in a transversal manner

- The Commission adapted its strategy in 2003, outside the normal CSP review process, to tackle CPPB explicitly as one of its focal sectors of cooperation; CPPB has been retained as a focal sector since then.
- CPPB was not tackled has a transversal issue in the other focal sectors.

EQ2 on Root Causes

JC 2.1: Tackling the root causes of conflict

- The Commission did not make reference to the “root causes of conflict” in its strategy or programming documents yet had targeted a significant amount of its funding on CPPB.
- Many of its activities and strategy were focused on “root causes of conflict” as identified by others (DFID, USAID).
- Strategic planning of Commission action from 2003 had conflict prevention as a main priority area.

JC 2.2: Contribution to mitigating the impact of the root causes of conflict

- Despite the lack of an explicit reference to the root causes of conflict or a conflict analysis, the Commission support did tackle factors identified by others (and implicitly by itself) as the “root causes of conflict” in its strategy, programming and implementation (IDPs, dialogue, rule of law).
- There was evidence that Commission support sought to mitigate the impact of conflict (i.e. IDPs’ living conditions).

EQ3 on Short-term – Long-Term

JC 3.1: Mechanisms for the detection of deteriorating situations and for rapid reaction

- The international community’s immediate response in the aftermath of the 2008 war (within 3 weeks of the conflict) was the joint needs assessment (WB, UN and EU) to support international donors in designing their post-conflict recovery interventions.
- In parallel, the Commission mobilised the IfS for the first time in Georgia, to

support (1) the media and (2) semi-humanitarian assistance to IDPs (housing and rehabilitation of basic infrastructure).

- It was considered however that IfS interventions, which took six months to operationalise, were not sufficiently quick to mobilise.
- In 2008, the Commission also signed two budget support programmes to support IDPs.
- The Commission drew on the early warning mechanisms of other actors to keep up to date with the ongoing situation.
- The Commission funded through Council/CFSP the EU Monitor Mission, an autonomous civilian mission monitoring the situation in and around conflict zones, which was rapidly deployed after the outbreak of conflict in August 2008. Information exchanges between the EUD and EUMM were slowly established overcoming initial restraints to access due to the confidential status of the EUMM's documents.

JC 3.2: Preventing recurrence of crises and consolidating peace

- Commission activities did not explicitly relate to consolidation of peace but some funded programmes tackled emerging conflict risks (IDPs) that were identified by others as undermining peace in the aftermath of the August 2008 conflict.

JC 3.3: Transition between short-term and long-term prevention

- Programming documents for short-term interventions did not explicitly mention the link with longer-term Commission actions.
- IfS interventions in support to IDPs were nevertheless followed by larger contributions financed by longer-term instruments such as the ENPI.
- LRRD policy was applied on income generation activities initially supported by ECHO and taken over by other instruments such as EIDHR and was foreseen to be continued through a ENPI project.
- Shortcomings of geographical budget lines and IfS in a conflict-situation were however highlighted:
 - geographical budget lines (TACIS and ENPI) were considered lengthy and more restrictive; not appropriate for intervening in the separatist regions.
 - IfS was considered as more adapted to conflict situations but still not ideal: set-up of the Confidence Building Early Response Mechanism (COBERM), mechanism financed by the IfS funds for rapid short-term projects; difficulties encountered for linking ECHO funds, IfS and longer geographical budget lines.

EQ4 on Geographical dimensions

JC 4.1: Appropriateness of the geographical level of intervention

- The Commission has not carried out a conflict analysis as such but included in its CSPs and RSPs regional and national level analysis of the political and socio-economic issues.

JC 4.2: Addressing local and national needs

- At the strategic design and planning stages, vulnerable populations, mainly IDPs from conflict zones, were well targeted by Commission assistance.
- The Commission was one of the only donors with projects in the separatist regions: two projects in South Ossetia and several projects in Abkhazia.

- Justification for the needs of specific communities or socio-economic groups (but not conflict grounds) *was* given in all programme documents reviewed.
- It was also reported that the Commission sought to involve representatives from all Georgian minorities in specific projects.

JC 4.3: Regional dynamics of conflicts

- The Commission supported cross-border issues (border guards) and joint action with the Council of Europe with a regional dimension; these were relatively small scale initiatives.
- The EU Delegation housed staff from the EUSR representative for the South Caucasus and there was an informal flow of information on regional conflict dynamics.
- Through engagement in the Geneva talks the Commission (through the EUSR) was involved in a resolution process involving the most important regional powers.
- On Russia's involvement, there was evidence that the Commission:
 - included Russia as interlocutor in their confidence-building projects despite considering the conflict as a civil/separatist one;
 - supported a Georgian-Russian dialogue which brought in academics and high level personalities together despite reluctance on both sides.

JC 4.4: Articulating support at different geographical levels with a view to fostering synergies

- There were examples where synergy between different regional, national and local levels was explored and exploited (IDP programming).

EQ5 on Coordination and complementarity

JC 5.1: "Whole-of-government approach" between and within the Commission's DGs and Directions

- At HQ level, coordination on Georgia between DG RELEX and AIDCO took place mainly through informal contacts rather than formal guidance.
- At country level, the Commission has a single overall country strategy for Georgia, drafted and shared between DG RELEX and AIDCO.
- The interaction between EUD staff and the RELEX's geo-coordinator has also been reported as positive however, there has also been some evidence of some lack of coordination at the higher level between HQ and EUD, notably in the lack of involvement of the EUD in HQs' approval of projects suggested by the EUSR.

JC 5.2: Coordination and complementarities between the Commission and the General Secretariat of the EU Council, the European Union Special Representative and with EU Member States ("whole-of-EU approach")

- At country level there was no overall policy framework to ensure coordination between EU bodies in Georgia; and no formal mechanism existed to sequence the actions of EU bodies in the area of CPPB.
- Despite the lack of structure, it was reported that the EU had taken, with UNDP, a leadership role on IDPs and Human Rights issues in Georgia. Notably in Abkhazia, the Commission was the only donor present until early 2011. Since then it was reported that EU MS have come in to complement and continue the activities the Commission had started.
- Coordination between EU Delegation, EUMS, and EUMM (EU Council) took

place through formal meetings or working groups related to CPPB activities, held at the EU Delegation (chair) and through informal contacts.

- On collaboration and information exchange between the **EUD and the EUMM** on IDPs and HR issues: despite initial information sharing restrictions due to the confidential status of EUMM documents, information exchange has been close. More precisely, the EUD used the EUMM's presence locally and information on IDPs movements to inform the Commission's programmes.
- On collaboration and information exchange between the **EUD and the two EUSR** (one for Georgia and one for South Caucasus (SC)): EUSRs generally reverted to the EUD for information as EUSRs were not based full-time on the ground. No overlaps or competition between the EUD's work and EUSR's mandate. Notwithstanding the above, political discussions led by the EUSR impacted the operational level as the Commission funded projects put forwarded by the EUSR.
- Questions were raised by some interviewees on the ability of the EU to speak with one voice on account of the high number of EU bodies involved in Georgia (EU Delegation, EUSR (2), EUMM and EUMS). Specifically on the two EUSRs, there has been some evidence that complementarity and coordination of their actions could have been better.
- However, on the support to criminal justice, the sequencing of Council (ESDP mission and EUSR) and Commission support was reported as successful. Indeed criminal justice was first supported by TACIS programme then RRM, then ESDP mission and EUSR. It was then followed by another TACIS and ENPI SBS.

JC 5.3: Coordination and complementarities with other non-EU donors, international and regional organisations

- In Georgia donors have followed the same political line on the separatist conflict issues.
- Several coordination fora existed, hosted by the EUD or the UN.
- The Commission coordinated its actions with other donors at the programming and intervention levels.
- Joint needs assessments (following the August 2008 war) were carried out jointly between donors involved in Georgia; and donor interventions based on needs assessments complemented each other.
- The Commission played a leading role in the post-conflict joint needs assessment with the UN and World Bank.

JC 5.4: Coordination and complementarities with partner countries governing bodies and with non-state actors

- At political level coordination and consultation with the Georgian authorities as well as with the other relevant stakeholders (UN, WB, USA, Russia, Abkhazia and South-Ossetia authorities) took place in the Geneva talks: high level political meetings have been held since the August 2008 war.
- At programming level, the Georgian authorities and Non-State Actors were consulted prior to the drafting of the CSP and NIP, which also took account of the Georgian Government's policies and development programme.
- At intervention level the Commission took into account Georgian Government requests and civilian needs in planning post-conflict activities.
- It was reported that the Commission has largely been aligned on Georgian government's positions on the separatist issues and on IDPs.

EQ6 on Commission's Value Added on CPPB

JC6.1: The Commission's role in promoting the integrated approach

- No evidence found for this JC

JC 6.2: The Commission's specific value added with respect to reducing tensions and/or preventing the outbreak, recurrence or continuation of violent conflict

- The Commission's added value in Georgia for CPPB is reflected by
 - its longstanding experience in IDPs issues first with ECHO support;
 - its pioneer and longstanding involvement in separatist regions (Abkhazia and to a lesser extent in South-Ossetia);
 - its critical mass of funding compared to other EU bodies and donors.
- Innovative mechanisms were created to respond to needs and urgent priorities – for example potential triggers of conflict (cf. COBERM).

EQ7 on Means to facilitate IA

JC 7.1: The institutional set-up for intervening in CPPB

- The set-up of the EU Delegation favoured centralisation of information on CPPB-related activities from other EU bodies.
- The main mission for CPPB-related activities was the EUMM established by the EU Council.

JC 7.2: Human resources policy for intervening in CPPB

- At HQ level within the Commission, interviewees reported a lack of expertise and training in CPPB-related activities for staff working on Georgia.
- At the EUD there has been evidence of participation in trainings in conflict sensitivity but the limits of its applicability was reported.

JC 7.3: Tools and guidance for intervening in CPPB

- No evidence for this JC

JC 7.4: Financial instruments for intervening in CPPB

- Short-term financial support through the IfS and long-term support through the ENPI ensured continued support for IDPs' post-conflict rehabilitation.
- IfS funds were used in support of EUMM and EUSR activities (cf. COBERM).
- Long and complicated decision-making procedures and financial rules hampered quick reaction and flexibility in funding of interventions, even with special instruments such as the IfS.

JC 7.4: Non-financial instruments for intervening in CPPB

- Mediation through EUSR at the Geneva talks was carried out by with some success, notably, the establishment of the Incident Prevention and Reporting Mechanism, restoring water and gas supply to the South Ossetian region and discussions on a comprehensive set of Agreed Undertakings focusing on humanitarian issues related to conflicts.

EQ8 on Timeliness and cost-effectiveness

JC 8.1: Timeliness and cost-effectiveness of Commission interventions

- Delays between project identification and implementation or during implementation occurred for various reasons:
 - conflict circumstances
 - poor planning
 - changing needs of beneficiaries and limited capacity to respond adequately under TACIS
- The difficulties in engaging with counterparts in the separatist regions were highlighted as having impacted planning and timing.

JC 8.2: Impact of the regulatory and institutional set-up for the Commission's support in the field of CPPB on timeliness and cost-effectiveness

- The IfS allowed rapid support for IDPs following the August 2008 war, yet even this took six months to operationalise, which was considered too long.
- A new mechanism to support even faster smaller projects had to be developed in response to need which were identified as potential conflict triggers (cf. COBERM).

JC 8.3: Extent to which Commission's human resources were sufficient and skilled enough to ensure timely and cost-effective support

- Because there was no formal requirement to undertake conflict analysis, those analyses that were carried out were undertaken purely on the individual initiative of staff on an *ad hoc* basis.

JC 8.4: Impact of the requirements in terms of timeliness and cost-effectiveness on the implementation of an integrated approach

- International Organisations and NGOs were used to implement rapid interventions financed through the IfS.

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Etude de cas - Côte d'Ivoire

1. Contexte national et contexte du conflit¹



¹ Sources : Commission européenne, *Document de stratégie pays (DSP) et Programme Indicatif National (PIN) pour la période 2004-2007* et *Document stratégie pays (DSP) et Programme Indicatif National (PIN) pour la période 2008-2013*; Human Rights Watch *“Country on a Precipice”*, March 2005; International Crisis Group *“Côte d'Ivoire: What's Needed to End the Crisis”*, *Africa Briefing*, July 2009; Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie française en Côte d'Ivoire : <http://www.ccfcf.org/approcher-la-cote-divoire/presentation-du-pays/histoire.html>

Données clés pour le pays ²			
Superficie (en 2008)	322.463 km ²		
Population (estimation en 2008)	20.591.000		
Densité de population en 2008	63.9 par km ²		
Taux de croissance de la population (pour 2005-2010)	2,3% moyenne annuelle		
Réfugiés ³ (2007)	22.200		
PIB par tête	2000 626.5(current US\$)	2005 880 (current US\$)	2008 1136.7 (current US\$)
Tendance de l'IDH ⁴	2005 0,480	2006 0,482	2007 0,484

1.1 Profil du conflit et acteurs

Profil du pays:

La République de Côte d'Ivoire, est un pays d'Afrique occidentale, membre de l'Union africaine. D'une superficie de 322.462 km², elle est limitée au nord par le Mali et le Burkina Faso, à l'ouest par le Liberia et la Guinée, à l'est par le Ghana et au sud par l'océan Atlantique. La Côte d'Ivoire a pour capitale politique et administrative Yamoussoukro (Abidjan demeurant capitale économique), pour langue officielle le français et pour monnaie, le franc CFA. Le pays fait partie de la Communauté Economique des Etats d'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEDEAO).

Profil démographique :

La Côte d'Ivoire a connu une croissance démographique continue depuis l'indépendance avec une population estimée à 21.506.017 en 2010. Cet accroissement rapide est en partie imputable à l'immigration des populations étrangères de la région⁵.

² Source: Division des statistiques des Nations Unies, <http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Côte%20d'Ivoire>

³ UNDP, *Human development report*, <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/40.html>

⁴ UNDP, *Human development report 2009*, <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/79.html>

⁵ Le pays compte encore en 2008 de nombreux étrangers originaires de la CEDEAO dont des Burkinabés, de loin les plus nombreux (environ 2 millions), des Maliens, des Guinéens, des Sénégalais, des Libériens, des Ghanéens.



La population ivoirienne est en outre multiethnique. Cinq grands groupes ethniques, comprenant environ une soixantaine d'ethnies, constituent les nationaux d'origine et sont localisés dans les régions suivantes :

- au nord, le groupe voltaïque (Gur) ;
- A l'ouest, le groupe mandé ou malinké
- au sud-ouest et au centre-ouest, le groupe krous ;
- au centre et à l'est, le groupe akans (plus important groupe ethnique).

La société ivoirienne est également partagée sur le plan religieux avec 65% de chrétiens, 30% de musulmans et 5% de croyances africaines.

Causes générales du conflit⁶ :

- Un colonialisme déstructurant pour l'organisation traditionnelle.
- La crise économique apparue à partir du milieu des années 1980 suite à la dégradation des termes de l'échange (fluctuation des prix du cacao dont la Côte d'Ivoire est le premier exportateur mondial).
- Une transition démocratique difficile suite au décès du père fondateur de la nation (Félix Houphouët-Boigny) en 1993.
- La corruption qui s'est aggravée à partir des années 1990.

Causes particulières du conflit⁷ :

- Emergence de tensions ethniques et de concepts xénophobes (ivoirité) relayés à travers certains médias.
- Fracture géographique, voire ethnique et religieuse, entre le nord et le sud du pays.
- Imbroglie juridique par rapport à l'éligibilité pour la candidature à la présidence de la République. L'article 35 de la Constitution disposait que pour être candidat à la présidence il fallait être ivoirien de père et de mère et ne jamais s'être valu d'une autre nationalité. Cette question a alimenté, depuis 1993, mais surtout depuis 2000, le débat et les crispations politiques.
- Problèmes foncier : La loi sur le foncier rural du 23 décembre 1998, votée à l'unanimité par l'Assemblée nationale, visait à résoudre les nombreux litiges existant entre les autochtones et les allogènes ivoiriens ou étrangers.

⁶ Synthèse réalisée à partir des différentes sources consultées pour l'analyse du contexte.

⁷ Synthèse réalisée à partir des différentes sources consultées pour l'analyse du contexte et notamment les DSP 2004-2007 et DSP 2008-2013.

Acteurs :

- Les forces armées gouvernementales.
- Les militaires mutins responsables du putsch de 1999 qui ont porté le général Robert Guéi à la tête du pays.
- Les anciennes factions rebelles (Mouvement patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI), Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix (MJP) et le Mouvement Populaire ivoirien du Grand Ouest (MPIGO) qui se rassembleront à partir de 2004 au sein du mouvement des Forces nouvelles (FN) avec sa force armée (Force Armée des Forces Nouvelles).

1.2 Dynamiques et événements clés⁸

Après son accession à l'indépendance en 1960, la Côte d'Ivoire a connu une **forte croissance économique**, soutenue essentiellement par l'exportation de produits agricoles à haute valeur ajoutée (cacao, café, les fruits tropicaux, bois).

La **politique du président Houphouët-Boigny** fut paternaliste⁹, soutenue par une constitution qui concentrait tous les pouvoirs dans la personne du président, par un système de parti unique et par une gestion opaque des ressources économiques. Cependant, le président assurait une certaine redistribution des ressources économiques vers les secteurs sociaux, les infrastructures et la diversification économique.

Vers la fin des années 1980, le début d'une **crise économique** due à une dégradation des termes d'échange internationaux, a exaspéré les tensions liées à l'opposition croissante au président. Le système multipartite fut introduit en 1990 (suite au discours de La Baule du président Mitterrand), mais le président restait *de facto* le seul à contrôler l'économie, les forces armées et la magistrature.

Suite à la mort du président Houphouët-Boigny en décembre 1993, Henri Konan Bédié arrive au pouvoir. Celui-ci est réélu au cours du scrutin électoral de 1995 contre une opposition politique fragmentée et désorganisée qui appelle au boycott du scrutin. Les nouveaux dirigeants politiques introduisent le **concept « d'ivoirité »** dans le débat politique. Ce concept est instrumentalisé pour exclure certains prétendants au pouvoir en même temps qu'il provoque une remise en cause de l'identité d'une partie importante de la population et de l'intégration entre Ivoiriens « de souche » et d'origine étrangère.

En outre, différents faits, notamment : des problèmes de gouvernance¹⁰, l'exacerbation des tensions politiques et sociales par la presse, les actes de défiance à l'autorité de l'État posés par des opposants, l'incarcération de plusieurs leaders de l'opposition politique, instaurent un climat délétère qui conduit en **décembre 1999 au renversement d'Henri Konan Bédié** par des soldats mécontents. Ceux-ci placent à la tête de leur groupe le général Robert Guéi qui devient par ce fait, chef de l'État de Côte d'Ivoire.

⁸ Cette section est une synthèse des différentes sources consultées et notamment l'analyse de la situation politique et institutionnelle réalisée dans le DSP 2008-2013.

⁹ Commission européenne, *Document de stratégie pays et Programme Indicatif National pour la période 2008-2013*, p.4.

¹⁰ L'audit des appuis budgétaires de la CE effectué en 1998/99 a fait apparaître que plus de 25% du total des appuis, soit 18 milliards de FCFA, avaient été détournés, voir Commission européenne, *DSP 2004-2007*, p.27.

Le régime militaire fait procéder à la rédaction d'une nouvelle constitution par les partis politiques et la société civile et organise, en octobre 2000, l'élection présidentielle. De nombreuses candidatures à la présidence de la République dont celles d'Henri Konan Bédié et d' Alassane Dramane Ouattara sont déclarées inéligibles par la Cour suprême. Le général Robert Guéï se proclame vainqueur du scrutin mais il est chassé par des manifestations de rues. De violents affrontements éclatent entre différentes factions politiques¹¹. Ces troubles se soldent par plusieurs morts. La Cour suprême proclame les résultats et déclare vainqueur, Laurent Gbagbo. Celui-ci initie un forum de réconciliation nationale puis nomme un gouvernement d'union nationale. Mais le 19 septembre 2002, des soldats rebelles tentent de prendre le contrôle des villes d'Abidjan, Bouaké et Korhogo. Ils échouent dans leur tentative en ce qui concerne Abidjan mais sont victorieux dans les deux autres villes, situées respectivement dans le centre et le nord du pays. Robert Guéï est assassiné dans des circonstances non encore élucidées. La rébellion qui se présente sous le nom « Mouvement patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire » (MPCI) crée plus tard le « Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix » (MJP) et le « Mouvement Populaire ivoirien du Grand Ouest » (MPIGO) qui se rassembleront à partir de 2004 au sein du mouvement des Forces nouvelles (FN). La rébellion occupe progressivement une large zone au centre, nord et ouest du pays (CNO), scindant ainsi le territoire en deux zones géographiques distinctes : le sud tenu par les Forces armées nationales de Côte d'Ivoire (FANCI) et le CNO tenu par les Forces armées des forces nouvelles (FAFN).

La partition du pays a eu des conséquences néfastes, notamment aux plans social, humanitaire et sécuritaire (i) des déplacements de populations à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur du pays ; (ii) des exactions localisées et des violations des droits de l'homme sur l'ensemble du territoire ; (iii) de nombreuses victimes civiles et militaires ; (iv) des interruptions du fonctionnement des administrations publiques et en particulier des services sociaux de base dans la zone CNO ; (v) la perturbation des services d'aide et d'assistance humanitaires et sanitaires ; et (vi) l'extension et l'aggravation des pandémies (VIH/SIDA, paludisme).

¹¹ Notamment entre Le Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) de Laurent Gbagbo et le Rassemblement des Républicains de Côte d'Ivoire (RDR) d'Alassane Dramane Ouattara.

1.3 Réponses internationales et locales

Face à la gravité de la crise et aux risques de plus en plus élevés d'extension du conflit armés dans la sous région, des efforts diplomatiques et des initiatives diverses ont été déployées, tant au plan régional qu'au plan international, en vue de mettre fin au conflit armé, de désarmer les combattants et de réunifier le pays.

Des **pourparlers entamés à Lomé**, sous l'égide du président Togolais, permettent d'obtenir un accord de cessez-le-feu qui ouvre la voie à des négociations sur un accord politique entre le Gouvernement et le MPC. Ces négociations échouent cependant sur les mesures politiques à prendre, en dépit de réunions entre les dirigeants de la CEDEAO à Kara (Togo), puis à Abidjan et à Dakar¹².

Dans une nouvelle initiative, la France abrite du 15 au 23 janvier 2003, une table ronde avec les forces politiques ivoiriennes et obtient la signature de **l'accord de Linas-Marcoussis**, entériné par la Communauté internationale lors de la réunion de Kléber. La mise en œuvre de cet accord s'est cependant heurtée à de nombreux blocages dus aux acteurs de la crise¹³, si bien qu'il a fallu recourir à de nouvelles concertations¹⁴ pour surmonter les divergences et harmoniser le cadre d'application de l'accord de Linas Marcoussis¹⁵.

Par après, un dialogue direct inter-ivoirien mené sous la facilitation du président burkinabé Blaise Compaore a abouti à la signature de **l'accord de Ouagadougou** le 4 mars 2007 entre le président ivoirien Laurent Gbagbo et le leader des Forces Nouvelles, Guillaume Soro. Ce dernier est nommé Premier Ministre à la tête d'un gouvernement d'union nationale¹⁶.

A ces accords, il faut ajouter l'adoption de plusieurs **résolutions du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies** dont :

- La résolution 1464 de février 2003, qui autorise le déploiement de la Mission de la CEDEAO en Côte d'Ivoire (MICECI) et de la France (opération Licorne) pour faire appliquer les accords Kléber issus de la réunion, en janvier 2003, des belligérants à Linas-Marcoussis.

¹² Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie française en Côte d'Ivoire, <http://www.ccifci.org/approcher-la-cote-divoire/presentation-du-pays/histoire.html>

¹³ Commission européenne, *Document de stratégie pays et Programme Indicatif National pour la période 2008-2013*, p.5.

¹⁴ (i) l'accord d'Accra II, les 6 et 7 mars 2003 ; (ii) l'accord d'Accra III, les 29 et 30 juillet 2004 ; et (iii) l'accord de Pretoria signé le 06 avril 2005 et réajusté les 28 et 29 juin 2005.

¹⁵ Commission européenne, *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Concrètement, outre la gestion des affaires relevant de ses compétences traditionnelles, le gouvernement coordonne la mise en œuvre du processus de sortie de crise au moyen de programmes spécifiques. Il s'agit d'un dispositif technique comprenant notamment le Centre de commandement intégré (désarmement des combattants), le Programme national de réinsertion et de réhabilitation communautaire, le Comité national de pilotage du redéploiement de l'Administration (restauration de l'autorité de l'État sur l'ensemble du territoire et reprise du fonctionnement des services publics), l'Office national d'identification (identification des populations et des électeurs) et la Commission électorale indépendante (organisation des élections).

- La résolution 1528 du 27 février 2004 qui instaure l'Opération des Nations unies en Côte d'Ivoire (ONUCI)
- La résolution 1633 du 21 octobre 2005 et la résolution 1721 du 1er novembre 2006 prolongeant la période de transition étant donné la persistance de la crise et l'impossibilité d'organiser les élections générales.

Le processus électoral a finalement été repoussé six fois sur cinq ans (à partir de 2005). Finalement, l'**élection présidentielle ivoirienne** s'est déroulée les 31 octobre et 28 novembre 2010. A l'issue du deuxième tour, Laurent Gbagbo et Alassane Ouattara ont revendiqué chacun la victoire, entraînant ainsi une nouvelle crise politique de plusieurs mois. Alassane Ouattara, soutenu par la communauté internationale comme réel vainqueur est proclamé président de la République suite à l'arrestation de Laurent Gbagbo le 11 avril 2011.

2. Stratégie de réponse de la Commission

2.1 Stratégie de la coopération de la Commission

2.1.1 *Les orientations stratégiques de la coopération au développement de la Commission en Côte d'Ivoire sur la période 2001-2010.*

La période 2001-2010 a été caractérisée par (1) la crise politique provoquée par la tentative manquée de coup d'état du 19 septembre 2002 et (2) par la partition du pays qui s'en est suivie, entre le mouvement des Forces nouvelles (FN) qui occupe le centre, nord et ouest du pays, et le sud contrôlé par le gouvernement de Laurent Gbagbo.

La stratégie de la coopération de la Commission européenne a évolué au fur et à mesure que le conflit s'est prolongé et que la compréhension de la Commission du conflit s'est affinée¹⁷. Ainsi le DSP a été substantiellement mis en jour à l'été 2003 selon les nouvelles priorités nationales telles qu'identifiées dans les Accords de paix de Marcoussis¹⁸. Bien que l'aide ait initialement été programmée, compte-tenu du manque de visibilité sur l'évolution de la situation, il fut décidé en 2004 de ne pas signer le PIN du 9^e FED, c'est-à-dire de ne pas programmer l'aide, mais plutôt de transférer les fonds de l'enveloppe A vers l'enveloppe B, réservée à l'aide d'urgence.

La section ci-dessous présentant les orientations stratégiques du 9^e FED reprend donc celles présentées dans le DSP renégocié du 9^e FED mais qui n'a cependant pas été appliqué puisque le PIN a été transformé en une série de programmes d'urgence de réhabilitation.

¹⁷ MN510.

¹⁸ Commission européenne, *Convention de financement de l'« Appui au maintien de la paix en Côte d'Ivoire »* Annexe II, DTAs, 2004, p. 2.

Le DSP et PIN 2004-2007

Le DSP indique que la stratégie de coopération Commission-Côte d'Ivoire serait articulée autour du **développement rural durable** et de la **bonne gouvernance**, les **deux secteurs de concentration**.

- **Développement rural durable:** soutien à la sécurisation de l'accès à la terre (droits fonciers), amélioration des infrastructures de transport en milieu rural, accès à l'eau potable, renforcement de la représentation d'intérêts dans le contexte économique de la libéralisation des filières.
- **Bonne gouvernance :** soutien à la réforme du système judiciaire, notamment par le renforcement substantiel de la justice administrative, et aussi le renforcement de la représentation des intérêts du secteur privé et de la société civile.

L'**appui budgétaire** était prévu pour contribuer aux dépenses sociales de l'après-crise et à l'assainissement du cadre macro-économique afin que la Côte d'Ivoire accède au bénéfice de l'initiative de désendettement du FMI et de la BM. Enfin l'**intégration régionale** visant l'appui à l'adaptation des opérateurs ivoiriens aux exigences du commerce mondial dans le cadre des négociations de l'APE, a formé l'**unique secteur hors concentration**. Dans ce secteur, d'**autres programmes** étaient, en outre, prévus, dont des appuis à la consolidation post-crise, avec en priorité un appui à la tenue d'élections crédibles et d'autres actions de promotion de la démocratie, un appui institutionnel au Ministère de la Santé et le renforcement des structures sanitaires.

Le DSP et PIN 2008-2013

Le DSP indique que la programmation du 10^e FED répond à une logique faisant le lien entre l'aide d'urgence, la réhabilitation et le développement (soit l'approche LRRD), selon l'hypothèse émise lors de sa rédaction, que, sur la période de programmation, la Côte d'Ivoire aurait réussi à sortir de la crise et que « les élections présidentielles et législatives auront été organisées avec succès et un certain nombre de réformes essentielles auraient été entamées »¹⁹. Ainsi le DSP précise qu'il fut décidé, lors de réunion bilatérale entre le Premier ministre ivoirien Charles Konan Barmy et le Commissaire européen Louis Michel en 2006, que la programmation du 10^e FED serait conditionnée à la sortie de crise. Le DSP indique également que, selon le niveau des autres partenaires internationaux et la reprise de leurs activités, le nombre des interventions programmées pourrait être diminué.

Le premier des **deux domaines de concentration** est la **consolidation de la paix et la bonne gouvernance**. Le DSP indique que l'amélioration de la normalisation de la vie socio-économique et politique et le renforcement de la bonne gouvernance et de l'état de droit sont identifiés comme déterminante pour la normalisation de la situation politique et le futur développement de la Côte d'Ivoire. A cette fin, les domaines d'action identifiés pour l'appui de la Commission sont :

- Le processus de décentralisation de la gestion des affaires publiques par la décentralisation financière et la formation des élus, administrations et populations locales.
- La réforme du système judiciaire et sécuritaire pour garantir l'Etat de droit.

¹⁹ Commission européenne, *Document de stratégie pays et Programme Indicatif National pour la période 2008-2013*, p. 28.

- L'appui à la réconciliation nationale au travers d'initiatives d'intermédiation sociale dans les zones où subsistent de fortes tensions ethniques.
- L'amélioration de la gouvernance économique par le renforcement de contrôle et de l'audit et par l'amélioration du système statistique national.
- L'amélioration de la transparence et de l'efficacité du secteur de l'énergie.
- La réforme du domaine foncier rural pour sécuriser les droits relatifs à la terre et à ses usages: renforcement des textes juridiques, de la capacité des administrations et information envers la population.
- La bonne gouvernance environnementale.

Le deuxième domaine de concentration porte sur **la cohésion sociale et la réhabilitation d'infrastructures sociales et économiques**. La cohésion sociale et l'insertion sont identifiées comme les facteurs d'une stabilité durable. Ainsi **les leviers de l'insertion** tels que l'emploi, la formation, l'éducation civique et l'accès aux services sociaux de base seront appuyés par l'aide de la Commission. **La réhabilitation des infrastructures sanitaires et économiques** est soutenue en complément à ces actions et aussi face au manque d'investissement et d'entretien depuis la crise de 2002. L'amélioration de l'accès à l'eau potable, à l'hygiène et à l'assainissement devait être un axe central d'intervention et ce afin de mieux répondre aux besoins de la population. L'amélioration de l'état des réseaux routiers et énergétiques qui se répercutent directement sur le prix des biens commercialisés et donc sur l'économie ivoirienne, devait également être appuyée par la Commission.

Les **secteurs hors concentration** qui devaient être appuyés sont:

- l'amélioration de la compétitivité des filières agricole, en vue de l'importance de l'agriculture dans l'économie ivoirienne
- l'intégration régionale en ciblant principalement l'application des dispositions législatives et la mise à niveau du secteur productif induites par la mise en œuvre de l'APE
- L'appui à la coopération technique
- L'appui aux acteurs non étatiques afin de renforcer leurs capacités à participer aux processus décisionnels

Sur le dialogue politique qui vient en appui aux soutiens financiers, le DSP 2008-2013 indique qu'il fut décidé de formaliser le dialogue Article 8 par des rencontres trimestrielles pour discuter de toutes les questions d'intérêt mutuel lors de réunion bilatérale en 2006.

Table 1 – Priorités des stratégies de coopération et budgets alloués sur la période 2004-2013¹

	Priorités de la stratégie de coopération	Budget indicatif alloué²⁰
DSP 2004-2007¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Développement rural durable ▪ Bonne gouvernance ▪ Appui macro-économique ▪ Autres programmes : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • soutien à l'intégration régionale; appuis à la consolidation post-crise ; • appui institutionnel au Ministère de la Santé et renforcement des structures sanitaires ; • appuis à l'adaptation des opérateurs ivoiriens aux exigences du commerce mondial dans le cadre de l'APE 	<p><i>Tel que présenté dans le DSP 2004-2007 car en raison de la persistance de la crise et de l'imprévisibilité de la situation politique et économique, le PIN 9e FED n'a pas été signé et les fonds de l'enveloppe A ont été transférés à l'enveloppe B :</i></p> <p><i>Secteur de concentration :</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Développement rural durable : montant de €75m réservés, soit 35% du PIN – ○ Bonne gouvernance : montant de €34 m réservés, soit 16% du PIN <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Appui macroéconomique : montant de €50m réservés, soit 23% du PIN ▪ Autres programmes : montant de €57m réservés, soit 26% du PIN <p>Enveloppe A du 9e FED (€ 182m) et reliquats des FED antérieurs (€34m). Total de €216m.</p> <p>Enveloppe B du 9e FED : €82m.</p>
DSP 2008-2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Consolidation de la paix et bonne gouvernance ▪ Cohésion sociale et réhabilitations ▪ Autres programmes dont : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • appui a l'amélioration de la compétitivité des filières agricoles • appui à l'intégration régionale - appui a la coopération technique • appui aux acteurs non étatiques 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 1^e secteur de concentration: Consolidation de la paix et bonne gouvernance: €55m réservés soit 25% du PIN ▪ 2^e secteur de concentration : infrastructures et désenclavement : €125m soit 57.5% du PIN ▪ Autres programmes – €38m réservés soit 17.5% du PIN <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ appui a l'amélioration de la compétitivité des filières agricoles ○ appui à l'intégration régionale ○ appui à la coopération technique ○ appui aux acteurs non étatiques <p>Enveloppe A : €218m.</p> <p>Enveloppe B: €36.7m.</p>

²⁰ Pour la période 2004-2007 : tel que présenté dans le DSP 2004-2007 car en raison de la persistance de la crise et de l'imprévisibilité de la situation politique et économique, le PIN 9e FED n'a pas été signé et les fonds de l'enveloppe A ont été reversés dans l'enveloppe B.

2.1.2 *La stratégie de prévention du conflit et de construction de la paix de la Commission européenne en Côte d'Ivoire*

La crise politico-militaire n'était pas au cœur du DSP du 9^e FED puisque les appuis à la consolidation post-crise étaient prévus sous le secteur hors-concentration du DSP au titres des « autres programmes » et sous l'appui budgétaire prévu entre autres pour contribuer aux dépenses sociales de l'après-crise. Cependant bien que négociées, les orientations stratégiques de la coopération de la Commission-Côte d'Ivoire pour la période 2004-2007 telles que présentées dans le DSP du 9^e FED ne furent pas suivies puisqu'au regard de l'aggravation de la crise, le PIN du 9^e FED fut quasi entièrement transformé en aide d'urgence.

La stratégie de coopération pour la période 2008-2013 fut quant à elle fortement orientée vers le soutien au retour à la normale, puisque les deux domaines de concentration, soit (1) la consolidation de la paix et la bonne gouvernance et (2) la cohésion sociale et la réhabilitation d'infrastructures sociales et économiques agissaient sur des leviers de résolution du conflit.

Sur l'ensemble de la période évaluée, et selon la maturation de la stratégie de prévention du conflit et de construction de la paix de la Commission européenne en Côte d'Ivoire, celle-ci peut être décliner en deux volets : d'une part (1) le soutien à la reconstruction et au maintien des infrastructures et services de base (éducation, eau etc.) et l'assistance aux populations affectées par la crise, et d'autre part, (2) les interventions à caractère politique appuyant la résolution de la crise, la réunification du pays et l'organisation d'élections transparentes. Bien que la première catégorie relève plus de l'urgence et de la gestion de crise, la seconde porte sur le long terme traitant des composantes de sortie de crise du conflit telles qu'elles furent identifiées dans les accords de paix successifs.

Sous la première catégorie peuvent être classés les Programme d'Urgence de Réhabilitation post crise (PUR) qui visaient à faciliter « la transition de la phase d'urgence à la phase de reprise du développement ainsi que la réintégration socio-économique des groupes de populations affectées (y compris les ex-combattants) et renforceront les capacités du nouveau gouvernement à mettre en œuvre les points clés de l'Accord de Marcoussis »²¹. Sous le deuxième volet, les actions suivantes peuvent y être classés : (1) le redéploiement de l'administration nationale dans les zones soustraites à son autorité, (2) la démobilisation, le désarmement et la réinsertion des anciens combattants, (3) le processus électoral - allant de l'identification et du recensement des électeurs aux opérations de vote en tant que telles et (4) la réforme des médias vers sa responsabilisation dans le suivi du conflit et de sa résolution et (5) des actions de promotion des droits de l'homme et du processus démocratique.

²¹ Commission européenne, *Convention de financement du PUR I*, Annexe II, DTA, p.1, mai 2003.

2.2 Mise en oeuvre de la stratégie de la Commission


La description de la mise en œuvre de la stratégie de la Commission en Côte d'Ivoire est basée sur des données financières et opérationnelles extraites en Septembre 2010 de la base de données de la Commission : CRIS. Ces données permettent d'analyser les montants contractés par la Commission pour mettre en œuvre des projets de coopération en Côte d'Ivoire.

Une classification de toutes les interventions en Côte d'Ivoire selon leur lien ou non à la PCCP a été effectuée par l'équipe d'évaluation selon une méthodologie systématique et rigoureuse qui avait été développée lors de l'étude préliminaire à cette évaluation²². Ceci permet de tirer des enseignements sur le soutien effectif de la Commission en Côte d'Ivoire sur la période 2001-2010 (septembre).

Au préalable de l'analyse des graphiques ci-dessous, il faut rappeler deux particularités de la coopération de la Commission en Côte d'Ivoire sur la période évaluée:

- Comme expliqué précédemment, compte-tenu du manque de visibilité sur l'évolution de la crise, il fut décidé, en 2004, de ne pas signer le PIN 9^e FED, c'est-à-dire de ne pas programmer l'aide et de transférer les fonds de l'enveloppe A vers l'enveloppe B, réservée à l'aide d'urgence.
- Alors que la coopération bilatérale de l'ensemble des Etats-membres a progressivement été suspendue, la crise s'aggravant, la Commission a maintenu sa coopération.

Figure 1 – Evolution des montants contractés (€m) par le Commission européenne en Côte d'Ivoire pour la période 2001-sept. 2010




²² European Commission, *Preliminary study for the thematic evaluation of the Commission's support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building*, July 2009. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/2009/1266_docs_en.htm

Sur la période évaluée, de 2001 à 2010, le volume de l'assistance de la Commission (en montants contractés) s'est élevé à €438m dont plus de la moitié (52%) est liée à la prévention des conflits et à la construction de la paix (PCCP). Les montants contractés ont crû de manière continue. De 2002 à 2010, elle passe de €6m à €28m ; sachant que (1) le niveau de l'aide en 2001 est anormalement élevé compte-tenu du transfert de 2 fonds STABEX et (2) de l'existence de pics importants en 2004, 2006, 2008 et 2009 qui sont détaillés plus-bas. L'aide à la PCCP, telle qu'identifiée par l'équipe d'évaluation, a quant à elle débuté en 2003, notamment avec les premières signatures de contrats sous le premier Programme d'Urgence de réhabilitation post crise (PUR). Elle augmente sensiblement sur la période évaluée, débutant à €6m en 2003 pour atteindre €72 m en 2009.

Les pics dans les montants contractés s'expliquent par la contribution à la PCCP, principalement sous la forme des quatre Programmes d'Urgence de réhabilitation post crise :

- la contribution de €3m de la Commission à la Mission de la CEDEAO en Côte d'Ivoire (MICECI), et les €13m contractés sous les Programmes d'Urgence de réhabilitation post crise 1 et 2 en 2004.
- Les €32m contractés en 2006 sous les Programmes d'Urgence de réhabilitation post crise 1, 2 et 3 en 2006.
- Les €14,4m contractés sous le programme « Appui à la sortie de crise » en 2008, les €8,4m contractés sous les PUR 1, 2 et 3, les €5.5m contractés sous le programme « Appui aux élections » en 2008.
- Les €67m contractés sous le quatrième Programme d'Urgence de réhabilitation post crise (PUR) en 2009.

Figure 2 – Distribution de l'assistance financière de la Commission en Côte d'Ivoire par instruments financiers employés, contrats €m (2001-Sept. 2010)




Le FED est dominant tant pour le soutien de la Commission dans son ensemble que pour le soutien à la PCCP. Dans les deux cas, la quasi-totalité des montants contractés l'ont été sur ce programme géographique.

Le PIN du 9^e FED n'ayant pas été signé, selon le DSP 2008-2013²³, les principaux instruments utilisés pour la mise en œuvre de la stratégie de coopération de la Commission sous le 9^e FED ont été (i) les reliquats du PIN 8^e FED ; (ii) le STABEX au titre du 8^e FED; et (iii) l'enveloppe B du 9^e FED grossie par des transferts des fonds de l'enveloppe A. Selon le DSP 2008-2013 « la totalité des ressources disponibles au titre de l'enveloppe B du 9^e FED ont été mobilisées dans deux grands secteurs (réhabilitation des infrastructures sociales et appui à la sortie de crise) dans le cadre de quatre programmes d'urgence et de réhabilitation annuels (2003-2006) »²⁴.

Les instruments financiers DDH-EIDHR et ONG-NSA ont quant à eux financé les 3% restants des montants liés à la PCCP.

Figure 3 – Distribution de l'assistance financière de la Commission par catégories, contrats €m (2001-sept. 2010)



En ce qui concerne l'assistance hors-PCCP, soit 48% du total des montants contractés sur la période évaluée, la Commission a financé principalement :

²³ Commission européenne, *Document de stratégie pays et Programme Indicatif National pour la période 2008-2013*, p.19.

²⁴ *op. cit.*, p.20.


- Les transferts STABEX, €82m au total
- Le programme de Soutien à la décentralisation & l'aménagement du territoire (€44m contractés de 2001 à 2010) qui fut reconverti en un programme de reconstruction²⁵
- Des programmes d'appui à l'intégration régionale (Programme d'Appui au Commerce et à l'Intégration Régionale (PACIR), Programme d'appui régional à l'intégration (PARI)).
- Des appuis au secteur agricole (soutien aux filières bananes, café, sucre)
- Des assistance techniques (Facilité de coopération technique, Appui a l'ordonnateur national).

Les interventions liées à la PCCP ont représenté environ 52% du total de l'assistance financière de la Commission en Côte d'Ivoire de 2001 à 2010. Elles ont été classées sous les catégories suivantes:

- « Multisectorielle » (44% du total): elle est composée entièrement des interventions contractées sous les quatre Programmes d'Urgence de réhabilitation post-crise (PUR) qui ont soutenu des mesures hétéroclites, tant des opérations d'identification de la population, des audiences foraines pour délivrer des jugements supplétifs d'identité, des activités de préparation du processus électoral, que des activités DDR.
- « Démocratie, état de droit et société civile » (7% du total) qui regroupe les programmes de soutien au processus électoral soit le programme « Appui à la sortie de crise » et le programme « Appui aux élections en 2005 » ainsi que des actions de formations aux droits de l'homme et à la démocratie chez des groupes clés (étudiants, femmes, milieu rural), de responsabilisation des médias et des projets de réinsertion sociale.
- « Consolidation de la paix et prévention des conflits futurs » (2% du total) qui regroupe les programmes de DDR et le soutien à la MICECI, la force de paix de la CEDEAO en Côte d'Ivoire.

²⁵ MN510.

Figure 4 – Distribution par canaux d’acheminement employés pour la mise en oeuvre du soutien financier de la Commission européenne, contrats €m (2001-sept. 2010)



Les sociétés privées forment le premier canal d’acheminement de l’assistance de la Commission et ce également pour l’aide liée à la prévention des conflits et à la construction de la paix (PCCP). 25% des montants contractés l’ont été avec des organisations internationales, avec les agences de l’ONU dans 95% des cas (le programme « Appui à la sortie de crise » et le programme « Appui aux élections en 2005 » et aussi des contrats sous les PUR). De nombreux contrats sous les PUR ont été également financés au travers des ONG, ainsi que des projets de formations aux droits de l’homme et à la démocratie, de responsabilisation des médias et des projets de réinsertion sociale.

3. Résumé des constats de l'évaluation

Cette section présente par points-clés les constats de l'évaluation au niveau du pays étudié par question d'évaluation et par critère de jugement. Ces constats sont issus de l'analyse tirée des phases documentaire et terrain de l'évaluation, ainsi que des résultats du questionnaire envoyé aux délégations de l'UE (voir annexe 7).

EQ1 Sur le « mainstreaming »

JC 1.1: Analyse(s) de conflit (ou éléments d'analyse) élaborée(s) ou utilisée(s) par la Commission

- Pas de référence à des études/analyses approfondies du conflit par la Commission dans les DSP. Les DSP ont plutôt fait référence aux éléments de conflit présents dans les accords de paix (Linass-Marcoussis).
- Le DSP 2004-2007 a fait une analyse générale du contexte du conflit et a repris les points importants de l'accord de Linass-Marcoussis. Le DSP 2008-2013 a réalisé une analyse plus approfondie du contexte et de l'évolution du conflit.
- L'inventaire projets renseigne que plusieurs études ont été financées par la Commission (profil migratoire, médias, corruption, droits humains...). Il n'est toutefois pas fait mention de ces études dans les DSP ni dans les conventions de financement des projets.
- Sur le terrain, une analyse du conflit a été menée partiellement avec la Banque Mondiale lors des Accords de Marcoussis en 2003.
- Les Accords de Marcoussis de 2003 ayant quant à eux identifiés les problèmes sous-jacents au conflit ont été repris par la Commission comme document d'analyse.
- En 2009, un *Policy paper* interne à la Commission a analysé le conflit. Il est actuellement en cours de révision au siège et pourrait être utilisé pour élaborer la stratégie future à mener dans le nouveau contexte ivoirien.

JC 1.2: La définition du soutien financier et non-financier de la Commission basée sur l'information fournie par les analyses de conflit

- Certaines personnes interviewées ont considéré qu'il n'y a pas eu d'instructions spécifiques pour réaliser une analyse du conflit dans la préparation des interventions.
- Les conventions de financement ont inclus une analyse du contexte plus ou moins approfondie selon les conventions. Il n'y a cependant pas de référence à des études sur le conflit.
- Les conventions ont inclus une analyse des risques liés au conflit et à l'évolution de la situation politique.

JC 1.3: Les approches « do no harm » ou les mesures prises par la Commission afin d'assurer que ses interventions n'aient un impact négatif sur les conflits

- Toutes les interventions ont inclus des indicateurs ou des "benchmarks" permettant de mesurer l'évolution de la situation politique (notamment du contexte électoral) et l'interaction avec l'intervention.
- L'atteinte de certains indicateurs était prévue comme condition pour le versement des tranches successives de financement, par exemple les interventions de soutien aux élections prévoient des tranches de financement en fonction de l'avancement des étapes du processus électoral.
- Les projets ont connu des changements importants en cours d'exécution afin de

s'adapter aux changements de circonstances (retards dans le processus électoral, blocage au niveau du DDR) importants et réguliers sur la période évaluée. Ainsi sur la période 2006-2010 par exemple, la DUE a repris en main le fonds 'processus électoral' alloués au PNUD lui permettant ainsi d'effectuer le suivi de l'organisation opérationnelle des élections et ainsi d'appréhender la situation en détail. La Commission a également arrêté son soutien au processus DDR considérant que celui-ci étant inexistant.

JC 1.4: Mesure dans laquelle la Commission a pris la PCCP de manière transversale dans son aide au développement

- La première version du DSP 9^{ème} FED négociée avant 2002 ne prenait pas en compte le conflit.
- Suite au coup d'Etat de 2002, une nouvelle version du DSP 9^{ème} FED a été préparée pour la période 2004-2007. Cette version prévoyait des actions *ad hoc* d'appui à la sortie de crise mais la stratégie de PUE restait principalement basée sur le développement à long terme.
- Etant donné l'enlèvement de la crise le DSP 2004-2007 n'a finalement pas été signé et il a été décidé de transférer l'aide programmable (enveloppe A) vers l'enveloppe B (aide d'urgence) pour aider le pays à sortir de la situation de crise.
- Dans le DSP 2008-2013, les deux premiers secteurs de concentration (consolidation de la paix et bonne gouvernance ; et cohésion sociale et réhabilitation) ont concerné la PCCP. Il n'y a pas eu de référence à une démarche « *conflict sensitive* » dans les deux secteurs hors concentration.

EQ2 sur les racines du conflit

JC 2.1: Traitement des racines / cause fondamentales du conflit

- L'aide de la Commission a visé à appuyer la mise en œuvre des accords de paix (Linass-Marcoussis et puis Ouagadougou) qui devaient traiter les causes du conflit.
- Vers la fin de la période évaluée, l'aide de la Commission s'est orientée vers le soutien au processus électoral, considéré par la communauté internationale comme condition à la sortie de crise.

JC 2.2: Contribution à l'atténuation de l'impact des causes fondamentales du conflit

- D'après les personnes rencontrées, bien que la crise électorale de 2010-2011 ait été résolue, les questions fondamentales liées aux conflits doivent être traitées ou bien resteront des facteurs de crises futures (question de l'identité ivoirienne/nationalité, la question de l'armée qui est un facteur de crise depuis les années 1990, la question de la concentration du pouvoir et du manque de transparence dans la gestion finances publiques, la situation de la gestion des terres de l'ouest du pays où les titres de propriété sont restés vagues et créée des vagues de violence entre la population locale et la population transfrontalière).

EQ3 sur la prévention à court terme

JC 3.1: Mécanismes de détection des situations qui se détérioraient et de réaction rapide

- La Commission n'a pas disposé d'outils nécessaires pour anticiper la crise de 2002-2003.

- Malgré plusieurs signes de dégénérescence de la situation politique et sociale en Côte d'Ivoire dès la fin des années 90' (premier coup d'Etat en 1999, apparition du concept « d'ivoirité » dans le débat politique, problèmes des élections en 2000, nouveau coup d'Etat en 2002), l'aide de la Commission restait basée sur le développement à long terme. Ce n'est que suite à l'éclatement de la crise que la stratégie de la Commission a été orientée vers une aide d'urgence massive à la sortie de crise (transfert de l'enveloppe A du 9^{ème} FED vers l'enveloppe B à partir de 2004).
- D'après certains interlocuteurs la fonction « veille politique » de la Commission s'est renforcée depuis 2005/6 grâce à la création des sections politiques postes au sein des Délégations.

JC 3.2: Prévention de la récurrence des crises et consolidation de la paix

- La stratégie de la Commission n'a été orientée de manière prioritaire vers la PCCP qu'à partir de 2004 suite à la prise de conscience de l'enlisement de la crise (difficultés de l'application des accords de Marcoussis).
- Depuis lors, la Commission a visé à appliquer les accords de paix et à garder le processus de paix vivant.
- Une priorité a été donnée au soutien au processus électoral comme première étape vers la sortie de crise.
- Lors des élections présidentielles de 2010, le soutien de la Commission européenne a eu un rôle important et déterminant dans la résolution de l'imbroglio électoral. Effectivement son implication étroite dans le suivi du processus électoral lui a permis de rendre compte de la transparence des résultats.

JC 3.3: Transition entre la prévention à court-terme et celle à long terme

- Bien que l'aide immédiate de la Commission ait financé des mesures d'urgence visant à maintenir l'existant et à soutenir la population, la Commission a également financé des actions plus politiques agissant sur le long terme et sur les facteurs du conflit (état civil en lien avec la question de la nationalité etc.) tels qu'identifiés dans les Accords de Marcoussis de 2003.
- Des actions d'urgence étaient prévues et devaient être liées à des actions à plus long terme (justice, décentralisation, renforcement des institutions,...). Toutefois, étant donné la persistance de la période de transition (retards dans les élections) les liens entre les actions d'urgence et les actions de long terme ont été difficilement identifiables.
- D'après les personnes rencontrées, bien que la crise électorale de 2010-2011 ait été résolue, les questions fondamentales liées aux conflits doivent être traitées ou bien resteront des facteurs profondément déstabilisateurs (voir EQ2).

EQ4 sur les dimensions géographiques

JC 4.1: Adéquation du niveau géographique du soutien de la Commission

- La dimension géographique a été importante dans le conflit puisque la Côte d'Ivoire a été scindée *de facto* en deux zones : une zone Centre-Nord-Ouest (CNO) sous contrôle des Forces nouvelles (ex-rebelles) et une zone Nord sous contrôle gouvernementale.
- Cette dimension géographique a été prise en compte dans la stratégie de la Commission : l'aide humanitaire a été affectée en priorité vers les zones CNO

dépourvues des services publics élémentaires ; une plus grande attention à la préparation du processus électoral a été portée dans les zones Nord.

JC 4.2: Prise en compte des besoins locaux et nationaux

- Au niveau local, l'intervention de la Commission a été davantage concentrée dans les zones CNO où la population n'avait plus accès aux services publics élémentaires.
- Au niveau national, l'intervention de la Commission s'est focalisée sur le soutien au gouvernement pour la mise en œuvre des accords de paix.

JC 4.3: Dynamiques régionales des conflits

- En matière de prévention des conflits, la Commission a soutenu la CEDEAO en Afrique de l'Ouest. Cet appui a globalement été apprécié de manière positive.
- La Commission a fourni des appuis spécifiques à la CEDEAO pour intervenir dans la crise en Côte d'Ivoire (financement d'une mission de médiation, financement de la MICECI). Ces appuis étaient toutefois limités dans le temps (une mission de médiation et un soutien de trois mois à la mission de la CEDEAO suite au transfert d'autorité vers les Nations unies).

JC 4.4: Articulation du soutien à différents niveaux géographiques afin de créer des synergies

- Il y a peu d'informations sur les synergies qui ont pu être créées par l'action de la Commission aux différents niveaux géographiques.

EQ5 sur la coordination et la complémentarité

JC 5.1: Approche intégrée et coordination entre les différentes DG de la Commission

- Au QG une « task force interservices » pour faire le point sur l'évolution du conflit et tirer des conclusions fut créée suite à l'éclatement de la crise. Les services impliqués étaient notamment la DG RELEX, DEV, TRADE, ECHO, et le secrétariat général. Ces task-forces ont été créées pour d'autres pays en crise en sont à présent appelées « plateformes/cellules de crise ».

JC 5.2: Coordination et complémentarités entre la Commission, le Secrétariat Général du Conseil de l'UE, les Représentants Spéciaux de l'UE et les Etats-membres de l'UE (« approche UE intégrée »)

- Suite à l'éclatement de la crise, tous les états-membres (EM) présents en Côte d'Ivoire ont décidé de suspendre leur coopération. Les EM ont toutefois souhaité que la Commission continue sa coopération avec la Côte d'Ivoire.
- Sur demande des Etats-membres (principalement la France), la Commission a financé une mission de maintien de la paix de la CEDEAO (MICECI) qui est venue en complément de la mission financée par la France (opération Licorne).
- L'évaluation de la stratégie régionale de la Commission en Afrique de l'Ouest de 2008 a conclu que les délégations « *n'ont pas de leviers performants pour assurer une approche « européenne » et coordonnée entre les Délégations, les diverses organisations de la CE et les Pays Membres de l'UE* ». Les personnes rencontrées indiquent également que les rapports des chefs de mission des états-membres étaient préparés par la Présidence tournante de l'UE et que la DUE n'était que peu consultée dans cet exercice.
- En Côte d'Ivoire les états-membres ne sont pas arrivés à un consensus sur l'application de l'article 96 de Cotonou (sanction en cas de violation des droits de

l'homme).

- La DUE s'est cependant progressivement imposée au sein la communauté des acteurs internationaux sur la période évaluée puisque, lors de la crise électorale de 2010, il a été rapporté que la DUE, identifiée comme (1) une source d'information importante, (2) représentante du bailleur présent le plus important et (3) comme partenaire clé dans le processus des élections, a agit comme le point central vers lequel les autres missions diplomatiques se sont regroupées.
- Enfin, l'application du Traité de Lisbonne entré en vigueur en 2009 a changé la donne : la tenue par la DUE de la Présidence permanente de l'UE lui a permis d'assurer la coordination et l'intensification des échanges entre EM, lui donnant *de facto* le leadership politique, confortée également par ses connaissances du terrain et par la taille de la DUE par rapports aux missions des quelques EM qui étaient restés sur place.

JC 5.3: Coordination et complémentarités avec les bailleurs non-UE, les organisations régionales et internationales

- Au niveau diplomatique l'UE était membre du comité de suivi des accords de Linas-Marcoussis avec l'UA, la CEDEAO, le représentant spécial du SG des NU, l'OIF, le FMI et la BM, un représentant du G8 et la France.
- À l'instar des EM les principaux bailleurs internationaux ont stoppé leur coopération avec la Côte d'Ivoire pendant la période de crise (2002-2005) et jusqu' à 2008-9. La Commission européenne fut l'un des seuls bailleurs (avec la France et ONU et les E.U) à être restée.
- La Commission a apporté une contribution importante au *trust fund* géré par le PNUD en matière d'appui aux élections.
D'après les personnes rencontrées l'alignement des positions des bailleurs sur le conflit électorale de 2010 a été clé dans la légitimisation de la position de la Commission/UE. Ainsi en Côte d'Ivoire, les positions de la CEDEAO et l'UA sur le résultat des élections ont agit dans ce sens.

JC 5.4: Coordination et complémentarités avec les instances gouvernementales et les acteurs non-étatiques des pays bénéficiaires

- L'information n'est pas suffisante pour tirer des constats.

EQ6 sur la valeur ajoutée de la Commission en matière de PCCP

JC 6.1: Le rôle de la Commission dans la promotion de l'approche intégrée

- Alors que la plupart des bailleurs arrêtaient leur coopération suite à l'éclatement de la crise, la Commission est restée présente en Côte d'Ivoire et ce également à la demande des Etats-membres.
- Pour la période 2006-2010, la Commission est devenue le principal bailleur présent sur place, lui accordant un rôle de chef de file au sein de la communauté des acteurs internationaux encore présents.

JC 6.2: Le rôle de la Commission dans la promotion de l'approche intégrée

- D'après plusieurs interlocuteurs, les principales plus-values par rapport à d'autres acteurs et dans son rôle dans la PCCP répertoriées ont été :
 - Le fait d'être resté en Côte d'Ivoire alors que la plupart des bailleurs sont partis.
 - Le montant important de l'aide (masse critique).
 - La neutralité de la Commission (telle que considérée tant par les Ivoiriens que par la communauté des bailleurs) et le dialogue mené avec toutes les parties.
 - Une certaine flexibilité à partir du moment où les fonds de l'enveloppe A du 9^{ème} FED ont été transférés vers l'enveloppe B (urgence).

EQ7 sur les moyens pour faciliter l'approche intégrée

JC 7.1: Organisation institutionnelle pour intervenir dans la PCCP

- Afin d'assurer le suivi de la crise en Côte d'Ivoire et de développer les réponses appropriées, une task-force interservices regroupant notamment la DG RELEX, DEV, TRADE, ECHO, et le Secrétariat Général fut constituée. D'après les personnes rencontrées, ces taskforces sont à présent nommées plateformes/cellules de crise. La DUE semble cependant ne pas avoir été étroitement consultée lors de cet exercice et ne pas avoir utilisé les résultats de l'exercice dans l'action qu'elle a menée sur le terrain.
- De manière générale, il y a des indications pour dire que le siège et la DUE ont agi de manière relativement autonomes l'un de l'autre de l'éclatement de la crise en 2002-3 jusqu'à la réorganisation des services de la Commission issue de l'application du Traité de Lisbonne à partir de 2009. Les échanges ont été depuis conséquents et le siège agit comme chef de file.
- Au sein même des services extérieurs de la Commission, les entretiens ont mis en lumière le manque de personnel spécialisé dans la prévention des conflits et dans la construction de la paix.
- Le fait que la section politique mettait également en œuvre des projets (soit une exception dans l'organisation institutionnelle d'une DUE) a été considérée comme facteur de succès et une plus-value pour la mise en œuvre de sa coopération. Coupler les aspects opérationnels et politiques a permis une continuité entre l'élaboration des projets et le développement de la stratégie et a doté la DUE d'un levier supplémentaire.
- Avec l'instauration du SEAE, la section politique n'est plus impliquée dans gestion opérationnelle des projets bien qu'une coopération entre la section politique et opérationnelle est prévue.
- La DUE n'a pas eu recours aux unités spécialisées du Directeurat A de la DG RELEX ni aux ressources du Conseil (*Crisis Management Planning Directorate* par ex.).

JC 7.2: La politique des ressources humaines pour intervenir dans la PCCP

- Plusieurs personnes interviewées ont souligné le manque d'expérience du personnel en matière de PCCP ; ils ont invoqué à ce sujet la nouveauté du domaine pour la Commission. Cependant d'après les personnes rencontrées, le manque de personnel au sein de la DUE plutôt que le manque d'expertise PCCP a constitué l'obstacle le plus important.
- Les entretiens ont indiqué que dans les premières années de la crise en Côte d'Ivoire il n'y a pas eu de politique de recrutement de profils spécialisés en prévention des conflits et dans la construction de la paix au sein des délégations de pays identifiés comme fragiles. La considération première était d'attirer et de retenir du personnel, spécialisé ou pas, dans les délégations dans les pays fragiles/en crise où la rotation était importante.
- Le personnel de la DUE s'est ainsi appuyé sur les spécialistes conflit d'autres organisations internationales ancrées en Côte d'Ivoire et connaissant en profondeur les enjeux du conflit, notamment la Banque Mondiale (présente depuis 2002) et le PNUD à défaut de pouvoir mobiliser les spécialistes thématiques du siège trop peu nombreux ou disponibles.
- Les entretiens ont indiqué que le personnel envoyé en Délégation au début de la crise n'avait pas reçu de formations sur les situations de crise, et ce compte-tenu du positionnement traditionnellement axé sur le développement économique et social, mais que depuis lors, des formations pertinentes – aux mécanismes LRRD, sur les questions de corruption, sur la méthodologie d'assistance électorale, et sur la gestion des frontières - avaient été proposées et suivies par le personnel de la Commission.
- Il n'y a pas eu de procédure formelle de capitalisation de l'expérience du personnel ayant travaillé en Côte d'Ivoire durant la crise.

JC 7.3: Les outils et consignes pour intervenir dans la PCCP

- L'évaluation de la stratégie régionale de la Commission en Afrique de l'Ouest de 2008 a souligné le manque d'instruments et de systèmes d'analyse de prévention, gestion et résolution des conflits au sein des délégations.
- Une analyse du contexte politique a été systématiquement requise pour comprendre la situation dans laquelle l'intervention s'intégrerait, mais, il a été souligné que lors de la validation d'une proposition d'intervention par AIDCO, la liste de contrôle n'a pas compris de critère lié aux situations de pays en crise/à la prévention des conflits et à la construction de la paix.
- La révision en cours du *Policy paper* interne à la Commission de 2009 qui a analysé le conflit s'appuie sur le manuel SSR de l'OCDE.

JC 7.4: Les instruments financiers pour intervenir dans la PCCP

- Au vu du manque de visibilité sur l'évolution du conflit, il fut décidé de verser l'ensemble des fonds de l'enveloppe A du FED qui avait été programmé, vers l'enveloppe B qui est réservée à l'aide d'urgence (non-programmable). Cela a permis de financer des programmes liés à la sortie de crise qui, jusqu'alors, n'avaient pas été prévus.
- Plusieurs interlocuteurs rencontrés ont indiqué que le soutien de la Commission a surtout eu un rôle de facilitateur dans la sortie de crise puisque ce n'est qu'à partir des Accords de Ouagadougou de 2007, issus d'une négociation bilatérale directe entre le gouvernement ivoirien et les Forces Nouvelles, que la sortie de crise s'est

amorcée.

- Le soutien de la Commission au processus électoral de 2010 a cependant été déterminant dans la résolution de la crise bien que les causes fondamentales persistent.

JC 7.5: Les instruments non-financiers pour intervenir dans la PCCP

- A partir du moment où l'appui à la sortie de la crise est devenu une priorité de la coopération de la Commission, le dialogue politique s'est intensifié.
- L'utilisation de l'article 96 de l'Article Cotonou qui permet de sanctionner le pays partenaire en cas de violation des droits de l'homme, bien qu'examinée sérieusement au cœur de la crise, n'a pas été décidé et ce, suite au manque de consensus entre Etats-membres.
- Le dialogue politique n'a pas été structuré selon l'article 8 de l'Accord de Cotonou mais les services de la Commission indiquent que le positionnement de l'Ordonnateur national au niveau de la Primature a permis des échanges efficaces dans la période de sortie de crise.
- Suite aux résultats des élections présidentielles de 2010, l'UE a mis en œuvre rapidement une politique de sanction (gels des avoirs, interdictions de visa) contre des dirigeants ivoiriens. Cela a été rendu possible par l'implication étroite de la DUE dans le suivi du processus électoral lui permettant de rendre compte de la transparence des résultats.
- Les personnes rencontrées ont cependant indiquées que la Commission aurait gagné à être plus exigeante sur certaines questions notamment sur la réforme et le manque d'indépendance de la Commission Electorale Indépendante (CEI) et du Conseil constitutionnel.

EQ8 sur l'efficacité

JC 8.1: Respect du calendrier et efficacité des coûts des interventions de la Commission

- Les interventions de la Commission en appui à la sortie de crise ont dans l'ensemble été tributaires de l'avancée du processus de réconciliation nationale et de la volonté des parties au conflit. Elles ont donc été caractérisées par des retards et de réajustements dans leur mise en œuvre. La démobilisation des combattants étant bloquée, le soutien à la DDR a été suspendu, l'appui aux élections présidentielles et législatives a été réajusté à de nombreuses reprises en réponse aux reports successifs des élections de 2005 jusqu'à octobre-novembre 2010. La situation s'est nettement améliorée suite aux Accords de Ouagadougou de 2007.
- En l'absence d'une mission PESC ou PESD, la Commission a financé sur un très court terme, la MICECI, une force de paix déjà déployée, et gérée par l'organisation régionale de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, la CEDEAO.
- La Délégation a joué un rôle proactif dans l'adaptation des interventions en fonction de l'évolution du contexte politique.

JC 8.2: L'impact du cadre institutionnel et réglementaire des interventions de la Commission dans la PCCP sur l'efficacité en termes de respect du calendrier et de coût

- Au niveau du Conseil de l'UE il n'y a pas eu de consensus sur l'utilisation de sanctions à l'encontre de la Côte d'Ivoire selon l'article 96 des Accords Cotonou. La Commission a quant à elle joué un rôle de facilitateur de la sortie de crise, finançant

les chantiers de sortie de crise identifiés dans les Accords de Marcoussis de 2003. On peut aussi souligner que les Etats-membres ayant tous, sur une partie de la période évaluée, suspendu leur coopération, ont appuyé la présence continue de la Commission sur place.

- Le transfert des fonds programmés dans le PIN du 9^e FED sous l'enveloppe A vers l'enveloppe B, réservée à l'aide d'urgence et non-programmée, a permis à l'aide de la Commission de se soustraire aux lourdeurs de l'instrument DSP, inadapté aux situations de crise, par définition imprévisibles. Cette solution est cependant exceptionnelle.

JC 8.3: Mesure dans laquelle la politique des ressources humaines a favorisé l'efficacité en termes de calendrier et de coût

- D'après certaines des personnes rencontrées, bien que certains ajustements aux interventions auraient pu être évités, la plupart des adaptations a été faite à la lumière des développements au niveau national sur lesquels la Commission n'avait que peu d'emprise.

JC 8.4: Impact des exigences en matière d'efficacité sur la mise en œuvre d'une approche intégrée.

- L'information n'est pas suffisante pour tirer des constats.

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Commission européenne	Addendum au document de stratégie de coopération et au programme indicatif régional 2002-2007 Communauté européenne et région Afrique de l'Ouest	2006
Commission européenne	Côte d'Ivoire et Communauté européenne-Document de stratégie de coopération et Programme Indicatif National pour la période 2004-2007	No date
Commission européenne	Communauté européenne et République de Côte d'Ivoire- Document de stratégie pays et Programme Indicatif National pour la période 2008-2013	No date
Commission européenne	Côte d'Ivoire – Commission européenne 2003-2009 – Un partenariat pour la sortie de crise	No date
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Kyrgyz Republic - Country case study

1. Country and conflict context

1.1 Map and Key data



Key country data ¹			
Surface area	199 951 km ²		
Population (in 2008, estimated)	5.4 million		
Population density in 2008	27.1 per km ²		
Population growth rate (for 2005-2010)	1.2 %, avg. annual		
GDP per capita	2000 277 current US\$	2005 472.8 current US\$	2008 934.4 current US\$
Unemployment (% of labour force)	2000 12.5%	2005 8.1%	2008 8.2%
HDI trends ²	2005 0.702	2006 0.705	2007 0.71

1.2 Profile of Conflict and Actors³

As an independent country since 1991 in the context of the break-up of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan, now known as the Kyrgyz Republic, remains in a process of state-building and democratisation. In many respects its potential for both insecurity and prosperity arises from its geo-strategic location at the heart of Central Asia. Conflict-risk and instability factors can be found at national, regional, local and global levels.

1.2.1 National

The country has been affected by internal instability, repression, corruption and poverty and inter-ethnic tension. The south of Kyrgyz Republic remains particularly affected by the risk of conflict with civil unrest and ethnic conflict breaking out earlier in 2010. The area is near the border with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan where the arbitrary border lines of post-Soviet states had left a legacy of disruption, tension, illegal trade and security risks. This is compounded by chronic food insecurity and poverty and a reliance on aid and migrant remittances.

At the national level political and economic reforms have simply not taken root, Institutional weakness and democratisation processes have been beset by political instability, corruption, and violent rule. Successive parliamentary and presidential elections have been deemed by OSCE to not reflect international standards of free and fair

¹ Unless otherwise specified, from UN statistical division <http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Kyrgyzstan>

² UNDP, *Human Development Report 2009*, <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/79.html>

³ Sources: European Commission, *Strategy Paper 2002-2006 & Indicative Programme for Central Asia 2002-2004*, 2002; European Commission, *Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia 2007-2013*, 2007; Council of the European Union, *European Union and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership*, 2007; European Commission, *Central Asia Indicative Programme 2007-2010*, 2007; Vaux T. & Goodhand J. (for UK DFID), *Disturbing Connections: aid and conflict in Kyrgyzstan*, 2001; Swanström N. et al. (for SIDA), *A Strategic Conflict Analysis of Central Asia*, 2005; Choudhury B. et al., *Kyrgyzstan: A Risk Assessment Brief*, 2002; International Crisis Group, *Reports 2000-2010*; OSCE *Elections Observation Reports (Parliamentary and Presidential Elections and Referendum) 2000-2010*, UNIFEM, 2005.

processes. Reports from 2000-2010 raise a number of persistent constitutional and political weakness and risks – intimidation of civil society, lack of free media, human rights abuses, ethnic discrimination and political exclusion.

1.2.2 *Regional*

At the regional level Kyrgyz Republic is one of the 5 countries that make up the region of Central Asia - Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz Republic, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. All of these land-locked countries are in transition with varying degrees of wealth and natural resources. The wider hinterland provides a neighbourhood that includes China, Russia and Afghanistan. The flows and force of issues affecting the region include: a growing anti-terrorist agenda in the post 9/11 context and war in Afghanistan with increased focus on potential for Islamic militant groups to take root; growth of criminal networks across the region related in part to the illegal drugs trade and trafficking routes through Central Asia; border demarcation and security; historic ethnic and group identities that have been caught up with the border restrictions and compounded by political mobilisation of fear and anger; energy competition though for Kyrgyz Republic the issues concern more water access and water quality for agriculture with upstream and downstream countries in intense competition for this resource.

Within this regional set-up, Kyrgyz Republic forms part of the sub-regional configuration of the Ferghana Valley covering the border areas of Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan with resultant tensions and issues of water access and management, borderlines and cross-border security, economic and social relations, poverty and food insecurity, and inter-ethnic tensions and political exclusion.

1.2.3 *Local*

Southern Kyrgyz Republic has consistently been the more impoverished part of the country with a mix of poor socio-economic conditions, multi-ethnic communities and disputed and tense border that separated communities in the formation of the new post-Soviet states. Osh is the hot point of this focus and it is here that the troubles flare up again in 2010. Issues of language, education, access to land, and political mobilisation of both hard line nationalists and Muslim communities typify these risks.

1.2.4 *Global*

Particularly since the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 by US-led forces in retaliation for the 9/11 attacks in New York, the hinterland of Kyrgyz Republic has become even more politicised and militarised by global events and actors. This on the back of a decade of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979-1989). Russia-China-US rivalry for military influence and security in Central Asia give a global dimension to Kyrgyz Republic's internal insecurity and cross-border issues and fuel the hard security anti-terrorism and drugs-control agendas.

A Conflict Assessment by DFID back in 2001 had cautioned about the need to balance and sequence the international community strategies of containment (focused on anti-

terrorism and drugs trafficking with likely risk of enabling autocracy) versus addressing the structural causes of conflict in the region in terms of democratisation and political reform. The latter it is argued requires greater coherence among donors and a deliberate conflict-sensitive approach to supporting policies of economic and political reform in Kyrgyz Republic. The assessment was critical of donor tendencies to pick and choose factors or issues of conflict and stability to work on when in fact the levels (global, national regional, cross-border) and factors (political, economic, military and social) are inter-related and require alignment by international actors to address the range of issues. Democratisation and good governance was identified as the main objective around which other elements including poverty alleviation should be organised to ensure all development efforts contributed to the overarching objective.

The **cross-cutting issues of conflict** are drugs routes, organised crime, HIV Aids, and indications of vulnerability to Islamic militant mobilisation and manipulation in recent years.

1.3 Key Dynamics and Events

President Bakiev dominated the political landscape, leading a corrupt regime that was overthrown by violent public protests in April 2010. A new constitution was voted on in June 2010 and parliamentary elections took place in October. It is in this context that the inter-ethnic violence between Uzbek and Kyrgyz communities occurred in Osh and Jalal-Abad in the south of the country in June. The emergence of a forceful form of Kyrgyz nationalism and exclusionary politics in the south is raising international concern. The political uncertainty of the October 2010 elections and prospects of the provisional government mean the situation at present remains very tense.

In May/June 2010, violence re-erupted in the South of Kyrgyz Republic (mainly Osh and Jalalabad) and the border areas with Uzbekistan. There were inter-ethnic clashes between majority Kyrgyz and minority Ethnic Uzbeks (15% of population). Media reports attribute UN sources in reporting that inter-ethnic clashes may not have been spontaneous but may have been orchestrated and targeted⁴. The attacks resulting in hundreds of people killed, thousands of homes destroyed and pillaged, and reports of sexual violence. With some observers labelling them as Pogroms: "The criterion that guided looters in all the districts attacked was ethnic, not economic (ICG 2010). Uzbek communities were particularly badly affected and thousands fled to the border area. International investigations are ongoing to establish the exact process of events the role of external and internal actors in the violence. There are concerns that the lack of central government control of the south leaves the forces of nationalism and organised crime space to gain more control. There has been an historic neglect of South, lack of economic and social development and significant population of unemployed, lowly educated young men who are at risk of mobilisation and inducement to participate in ethnically-motivated violence.

⁴ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/16/kyrgyzstan-violence-un-accuses-outsiders>; accessed Feb 21, 2011; <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/16/world/asia/16kyrgyz.html>, accessed Feb 21, 2011; and International Crisis Group Report, August 2010.

This political instability allied with poverty, inequality and the power of regional, cross-border issues and actors to affect the country has been a feature of Kyrgyz Republic over the past 20 years. The reform process of transition in building up the institutions of government has been afflicted by the emergence of strong autocratic leaders who have harnessed the state as a source of power. Civil society has been stifled and intimidated, and the media has been state-controlled. In summary the strengthening of the Kyrgyz Republic as an independent democratic state with effective and trusted parliamentary system, rule of law and socio-economic development for all citizens remains an ongoing need and challenge since 1991.

1.4 International and Local Responses⁵

As mentioned above, the Kyrgyz Republic sits among powerful regional interests including Russia and China. The EU has strategic interest in terms of regional stability and the impact of transnational issues such as drugs, terrorism and energy sources that inform the 2007 'new partnership' adopted by the Council. The war in Afghanistan has brought the US more into the region with its air base arrangement at Manas near Bishkek international airport as a transit point for US and other ISAF forces fighting in Afghanistan. This has raised tensions for influence with Russia which set up an air base nearby at Kant. With the prominence of Iran and Afghanistan in international peace and security concerns, Central Asia and Kyrgyz Republic is likely to remain a focus of many interests and interventions. These interests vary and include regional security and stability; criminal networks and drug trafficking; access to energy sources; water access and management and poverty reduction and economic development.

One consequence of the renewed interest in the country since 2001 is the increased flows of aid from international donors including the EU and other DAC donors but also increasing bilateral support from Russia and China. In 2008 Kyrgyz Republic received 360m USD in net ODA from OECD DAC donors. The top contributors are Turkey and the US. The European Commission ranks 5 among the donors⁶.

Kyrgyz Republic was admitted to the OSCE in 1992. The OSCE is an important regional actor with a long presence in Central Asia, including offices in Bishkek and Osh in Kyrgyz Republic. It has a strong reputation for election observation and support to the strengthening of democracy and human rights as well as border security and management. In Kyrgyz Republic its strategic and programmatic focus is in the areas of: Rule of law; Good governance; Legislation; Environmental protection; and, regional co-operation.

The UN has been actively engaged in Central Asia at political, economic and development levels since independence with a range of national and regional initiatives directed at conflict prevention. In 2007, the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy was

⁵ Sources include European Commission CSPs and RSPs; Council of European Union strategy of 2007; ICG reports; OSCE reports; Security Council update report January 2010; UN, OSCE and EU *Special Envoys Joint Statement on the Situation in Kyrgyzstan*, November 2010, *Mission Statement* of the EUSR (see bibliography).

⁶ OECD website, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/59/24418103.gif>

established in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan with a Special Envoy. The Centre works on a range of issues including drug trafficking, international terrorism, organised crime and environmental degradation. One of its objectives is ‘providing a political framework and leadership for the preventive activities of the UN country team and supporting efforts to promote an integrated approach to preventive development and humanitarian assistance’.

The EU Special Representative Pierre Morel was appointed in October 2006 with a remit to conduct political dialogue with the Governments of the region and to facilitate an EU strategy and framework. *The EU Strategy for new Partnership with Central Asia* was adopted in June 2007 and focuses on: common security threats, human rights, the rule of law, economics, energy and transport, environment and water, including climate change, youth and education. The EUSR states as part of the mission statement: ‘My immediate task is to coordinate the efforts of all EU actors in the implementation of the new elements of the EU approach’. The European Commission has supported regional, national and cross-border interventions in Central Asia across humanitarian, crisis response and development instruments. The 2010 crisis has revealed how the Envoys of the UN, OSCE and EU are working closely together on diplomacy and strategy in the country and the region.

Given the troubled and unstable status of government and parliamentary democracy in the Kyrgyz Republic, the presence of a strong national partner has not yet been the case. The continued efforts of international actors to support the strengthening of institutions and the rule of law remain critical to building the EU partnership with the country and the region.

2. The Commission’s Response Strategy

2.1 Overall Commission Strategy

2.1.1 *Key strategic lines of the Commission’s strategy in the Kyrgyz Republic (2001-2010)*

The EU and the Kyrgyz Republic have been partners since the country’s independence in 1991. The EU’s bilateral relations with the Kyrgyz Republic are based on a **Partnership and Cooperation Agreement** (PCA), signed in 1995 and entering into force in 1999. It sets out the areas of cooperation as well as the responsibilities to be fulfilled by both the EU and the Kyrgyz Republic. It aims at harmonising the Kyrgyz legislation with European legislative norms and standards as well as promoting bilateral trade and investment.

At regional level, the Kyrgyz Republic is one of the five Central Asian countries that benefit from the **Commission’s assistance within the framework of two main Regional Strategy documents**: “Strategy paper 2002-2006” and “Regional Strategy Paper for assistance to Central Asia for the period 2007-2013”.

The first strategy paper was drafted in a context of reviewed EU political and foreign policy priorities in Central Asia following the events of 11 September 2001 and subsequent events in Afghanistan, which have had a significant impact on Central Asia. The second strategy

paper was prepared in the wake of the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements which necessitated a geographical, political and economic rapprochement of the EU with Central Asia. Moreover in June 2007 the EU reinforced its regional political framework with Central Asia through the EU Council document “EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership”. This strategy aims at strengthening relations in all areas of cooperation, through reinforcement of EU-Central Asia political dialogue by means of regular meetings between EU and Central Asian Foreign Ministers; through reinforcement of dialogue on human rights; and through cooperation in the areas of education, rule of law, energy and transport, environment and water, common threats and challenges (including border management and combating drug trafficking), and trade and economic relations. The strategy is underpinned by an increase in EU assistance to the region.

The Commission’s assistance is programmed at regional level (there are no dedicated country strategy papers) and is delivered in priority areas through both regional cooperation programmes and programmes implemented at national level (see table 1 below). Over the 2002-2006 period TACIS was the main instrument, while for the 2007-2013 period assistance is mainly being delivered through the DCI. As for bilateral assistance, the Kyrgyz Republic was allocated the following amounts: €13m under Track 2 for the period 2002-2004 and €55m under Priority Area 2 for the period 2007-2010⁷.

Table 1 – Main priority cooperation areas and budget allocations (2002-2013)

	Main priority cooperation areas (RSP)	Indicative budget allocations (RIP)	
RSP 2002- 2006	Track 1: Regional cooperation programme: transport infrastructure, energy (gas, electricity), environment (water and land desertification), border management, drug trafficking	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Transport: €7m ▪ Energy: €9m ▪ JHA/fight against drugs : €5m ▪ Border management : €12m ▪ Environment : €7m 	Total RIP 2002-2004 : €150m
	Track 2: Regional support for programmes implemented at national level: regulatory, legal, administrative and institutional reform for implementation of PCA, trade facilitation, border management, reforms in education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ PCA implementation: €39m ▪ Customs: €13m ▪ Education reform/TEMPUS: €21m ▪ EIDHR (<i>funded from another budget line</i>) ▪ Bistro: €7m 	
	Track 3: Pilot poverty reduction scheme targeted at the most vulnerable groups: capacity building for local community-based associations, rehabilitation of small-scale infrastructure and services, local business climate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ FSP (<i>funded from another budget line</i>) 	

⁷ Source : EUROPEAN COMMISSION, *Strategy Paper for 2002-2006* and *Indicative Programme for Central Asia 2002-2004*, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, *Central Asia Indicative programme, 2007-2010*

RSP 2007- 2013	<p>Promote Central Asia regional cooperation and good relations with neighbouring countries:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ networks and market integration; ▪ environment; ▪ border and migration management, Customs, and the fight against organised crime; ▪ people-to-people activities. 	<p>Priority area 1: Promotion of Central Asia regional cooperation and good relations with neighbouring countries:</p> <p><u>Focal priorities:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ networks: transport, energy and SME regional cooperation, with a focus on energy: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Energy: €22m ○ Transport: €15m ▪ environment, with focus on water: €16.2m ▪ border and migration management, Customs, and the fight against transnational and organised crime: €16m ▪ promotion of educational exchanges: €25m 	Total RIP 2007-2010 : €314m (€94.2m for regional assistance and €219.8 million for bilateral assistance)
	<p>Reduce poverty and increase living standards in the context of the Millennium Development Goals:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ community development and targeted rural development schemes; ▪ national sector reform policies, in agriculture and social protection; ▪ addressing infrastructure constraints (roads and energy). 	<p>Priority area 2 (for bilateral assistance): Poverty reduction and increasing living standards:</p> <p><u>Focal priorities:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ regional and local community development; ▪ support for sector reform in rural development and social sectors. 	
	<p>Promote good governance and economic reform:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ democratic development and good governance; ▪ trade, market and regulatory reform. 	<p>Priority area 3 (for bilateral assistance): Support for good governance and economic reform:</p> <p><u>Focal priorities:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ democratic development and good governance; ▪ trade and market regulatory reforms and administrative capacity building. 	

Sources: RSP 2002-2006 and RIP 2002-2004, RSP 2007-2013 and RIP 2007-2010

2.1.2 Commission's strategy with respect to CPPB

The Commission's strategy for the 2002-2006 Regional Strategy Paper aimed explicitly at conflict prevention among its objectives. But the translation of this objective into assistance was unclear as the three tracks of support did not take CPPB into account. The first RSP aims to "promote the stability and security of the countries of Central Asia and to assist in their pursuit of sustainable economic development and poverty reduction. TACIS will work along three tracks whose common objectives will be: (i) to promote security and conflict prevention, (ii) eliminate sources of political and social tension, and (iii) improve the climate for trade and investment." The three tracks concerned (i) a regional cooperation programme with a focus on transport and energy

networks, management of natural resources, and border management and Customs issues; (ii) regional support for programmes implemented at national level with a focus on sustainable economic development and poverty reduction (support for PCA and TCA implementation, policy and legal advice, including statistics, Customs, and higher education); and (iii) pilot poverty reduction schemes in 2-3 selected target areas with a long-term approach to the social and economic development of rural areas where the majority of the poor are found. They did not explicitly aim at, nor did they mainstream, CPPB. The indicative programme did however mention specific expected results for Tracks 1 and 3 that were linked to the conflict potential of water and natural resources.

During the period **2007-2013** the **Commission's Strategy put a stronger accent on security-related issues**, with the influence of the 2003 European Security Strategy and of the EU Special representative for Central Asia. **While CPPB is not an explicit objective of the Strategy, two of its main priority areas concern tackling of CPPB-related issues:** the Strategy aims at providing support under its first priority area in the fields of border and migration management, Customs and the fight against organised crime; and under its third priority area in the fields of democratisation, human rights, and good governance.

2.2 Implementation of the Commission's Strategy

Actual implementation of the Commission's strategy can be traced through an analysis of data extracted from the Common Relex Information System (CRIS), the database which provides information on all interventions financed by the Commission in partner countries. The following data for the Kyrgyz Republic were extracted by the evaluation team in September 2010. It provides financial and operational information on all interventions contracted by the Commission over the period from 2001 to September 2010. Financial data presented in the figures below are contracted amounts for national-level interventions financed from the general budget of the Commission.

All interventions financed in the Kyrgyz Republic were classified by the evaluation team according to their relevance to CPPB in light of the 2001 Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention. This classification was made in accordance with the methodology developed in the main inventory of the Commission's support to CPPB, as included in the preliminary study for this evaluation⁸. For further explanations on the methodology and its limitations, please refer to that study.

In the case of the Kyrgyz Republic the following **caveat** must be added. EC officials met during the study explained that some interventions, whilst aimed at political stabilisation, conflict prevention or peace-building, do not include explicit reference to these objectives in their title⁹. It was, and still is, considered that reference to conflict prevention or peace-building would be too sensitive in an unstable context. This practice could slightly distort the accuracy of our classification which was mostly based on intervention titles and


⁸ European Commission, *Preliminary study for the thematic evaluation of the Commission's support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building*, July 2009. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/2009/1266_docs_en.htm

⁹ MN612 and MN611.

therefore could slightly underestimate EC support for CPPB in the Kyrgyz Republic. Therefore this caveat must be borne in mind when interpreting the following results.

The trend in the amounts contracted over the period 2001 to September 2010 is presented in the figure below. It also presents an interesting distribution of CPPB-related and non-CPPB-related funds.


Figure 1 - Evolution of amounts contracted (€m) by the Commission to the Kyrgyz Republic between 2001 and Sept 2010



Over the evaluation period the level of the Commission's aid to the Kyrgyz Republic amounted to €122m. One-tenth of the total amount was explicitly related to conflict prevention and peace building (CPPB). Support for CPPB started in 2003. It should be noted that in 2003 there took place the referendum on constitutional change redistributing power between the Parliament and the Presidency.

In terms of its evolution over the evaluation period, Commission support to the Kyrgyz Republic has been characterised by several increases which were not explicitly related to CPPB. Explicit support for CPPB has been relatively constant between 2003 and September 2010.


Figure 2 - Breakdown of Commission financial instruments used in the Kyrgyz Republic, (€m contracted, 2001 - September 2010)



Over the evaluation period, the pattern of financial instruments used for the Commission’s overall assistance to the Kyrgyz Republic and CPPB-specific assistance differed slightly:

- the RRM-IFS (the IFS successively replaced the RRM) financial instruments were predominant in the support for CPPB – they funded support for the rule of law and for institutional capacity-building and democratisation projects such as the €2m “Support to Judiciary reform in the Kyrgyz Republic” project with the German GTZ, and the €1.5m “Support to the Constitutional Reform in the Kyrgyz Republic” project with UNDP;
- the geographical financial instruments TACIS and ASIA/DCI-ASIA were respectively the second and third most used financial instruments for both CPPB and overall assistance to the Kyrgyz Republic;
- the other thematic budget lines used for CPPB assistance were ONG-NSA and DDH-EIHDR.


Figure 3 - CPPB categories breakdown (€m contracted, 2001 - Sept. 2010)



Explicit CPPB support contracted during the course of the evaluation period, which represents 11% of total contracted support to the Kyrgyz Republic, has been categorised and classified by the evaluation team as follows:

- 54% to “democracy, rule of law and civil society”, including projects in support of the rule of law, institutional capacity-building and democratisation, legislation reform, and electoral reform;
- 25% for multi-sector support including the two poverty reduction and stabilisation programmes in the Ferghana valley – the €2.2m “Addressing Social Consequences of Transition in the Ferghana Valley (Kyrgyz Republic)” programme and the €1.2m “Rural Development and Cross-Border Cooperation - towards a peaceful and dynamic environment in the Ferghana Valley (Tajikistan, Kyrgyz republic, Uzbekistan)” programme;
- 18% to the “security sector”, including two projects aimed at prison reform and at respect for human rights amongst the military;
- 3% to “peace consolidation and prevention of future conflict” including two projects, respectively the €260,000 “Mine risk education and minefield marking in Batken oblast of Kyrgyzstan” project and the €170,000 “Addressing the water-originated conflicts in Kyrgyzstan” project.

Figure 4 - Breakdown of channels of delivery used to implement Commission assistance to the Kyrgyz Republic, (€m contracted, 2001 - Sept. 2010)



It should be noted that, while for non-CPPB-related assistance the Commission used the Government as its major channel of delivery, the bulk of CPPB assistance was channelled through the UNDP. More generally on the channels of delivery of the Commission's assistance to CPPB in the Kyrgyz Republic:

- the UNDP channelled the largest amount;
- NGOs and Civil Society Organisations were the next most important; interestingly, most were local or regional organisations, and projects were mainly related to human rights, elections and youth involvement;
- the 'Development Agencies' category is represented by the single GTZ-managed "Support to Judiciary reform in the Kyrgyz Republic" intervention;
- finally there were Private Companies, including consultancy firms as well as equipment suppliers.

3. Evaluation findings

For each EQ this section presents in bullet points, by JC¹⁰, evaluation findings at country level. These findings are based on the analysis emerging from the desk and field phases of the evaluation and from the analysis of the results of the survey sent to EUD (see Annex 7).

EQ1 on Mainstreaming

JC 1.1: (Elements of) conflict analyses carried out or used by the Commission

- No formal conflict analysis was carried out by the Commission in planning strategy and programming in the Kyrgyz Republic and no reference is made to any external analyses;
- Full conflict assessments were carried out by DFID (2001) and SIDA (2005) and there are regular ICG and OSCE reports as well as a number of academic research articles which all pertain to conflict issues in Kyrgyz Republic and Central Asia;
- Elements of context analysis and references to conflict prevention or risk factors could be found in Commission Strategy and programming documents but these did not constitute formal conflict analysis as such;
- Some Commission's interviewees pointed out that the Commission was preparing in 2011 a comprehensive conflict assessment report.

JC 1.2: Informing financial and non-financial Commission support by (elements of) conflict analyses

- There was no formal conflict analysis (internal or external) informing the prioritisation of Commission support or the design of interventions;
- Significant Commission support went to areas identified by external conflict analyses as important for CPPB, notably governance, institution-building and rule of law;
- While mention was made of risks to stability or references to conflict context in the strategy and programming documents, it was not evident that the support was planned or implemented in a conflict-sensitive manner;
- Interviews have revealed a working assumption that conflict risk was seen as an issue of political stability rather than conflict prevention *per se*; conflict was seen as less relevant for DCI and more an issue for IfS;
- Other interview findings highlighted the political sensitivity of using 'conflict' terminology;
- Selected projects reviewed contained elements of conflict analysis in terms of context, but there was no formal or systematic analysis as such for informing project design and implementation;
- IfS interventions have been informed by data from the Crisis Room edited into a briefing note, formal conflict analyses having been regarded as involving too lengthy a process;
- The cross-border rural development project (2003) in particular was well informed by an understanding of conflict dynamics in border areas and the project was directed explicitly to addressing them.

¹⁰ Some Judgment Criteria have not been included in the summary boxes because either they were not relevant at country-specific level or because too little information was available to substantiate them

JC 1.3: Do no harm approaches

- While the intention of working on conflict dynamics or generating conflict-related outcomes was evident in some project documents (rural development 2003) and that there was reporting evidence of change in the context (judicial reform 2008), no formal indicators for conflict-sensitivity were included in the Strategy documents or overall programmes;
- Updates of political context were found in the Strategy documents and in the reporting of the 2008 IfS project but did not constitute formal analyses as such;
- There has been no evident change in strategy in response to conflict events or issues. Specific interventions (IfS) have been designed in response to the 2010 crisis;
- Some Commission interviewees reported that they paid attention to the need to avoid any fuelling of conflict when identifying interventions (e.g attention to geographical and ethnic distribution of support).

JC 1.4: Extent to which the Commission took CPPB into account in its development cooperation support in a transversal manner

- Overall the Commission Strategy did not aim at CPPB. However:
 - the second RSP (2007-2013) targeted CPPB-related issues (border and migration management, promotion of democratisation, human rights and governance);
 - specific projects (notably cross-border rural development 2003) were focused on CPPB; and elements of CPPB can also be found in other projects in terms of selection of implementation sites (social consequences of transition 2005) and focus on stability (judicial support with IfS 2008);
- There was no explicit commitment to or mechanism for mainstreaming CPPB in the strategy or programmes;
- There was no consideration of CPPB in non-CPPB-related interventions.

EQ2 on Root causes

JC 2.1: Tackling the root causes of conflict

- Commission Strategy documents did not make explicit reference to 'root causes' but outlined an understanding of shared challenges in the Central Asian region including issues such as political and economic reform linked to democratic transition, inequality and poverty, and security;
- Interventions reviewed did not explicitly address 'root causes' but did work on issues identified by external conflict analyses (DFID and SIDA) as 'root causes'; these included strengthening rule of law, addressing poverty reduction, and improving cross-border cooperation and relations at community level, including land and water issues;
- Interview findings suggested that, in long-term development under DCI, CPPB was not addressed and was instead left to short-term efforts under IfS.

JC 2.2: Contribution to mitigating the impact of the root causes of conflict

- There were no specific indicators - nor any monitoring of impact - with respect to mitigation of 'root causes' or to addressing them directly in the overall Strategy or in individual interventions;
- Evidence on conflict-related impact of interventions was weak in terms of M&E reporting and documentation.

EQ3 on Short term prevention

JC 3.1: Mechanisms for the detection of deteriorating situations and for rapid reaction

- The IfS was deployed in 2006, 2008 and 2010 during sensitive periods of political instability. Interview findings revealed that:
 - IfS was seen as a political instrument with some flexibility to respond quickly;
 - Rapid reaction under the IfS was quite slow: instead of 3 months, the procedure took 9 to 11 months for contract signature;
 - IfS may be more suited to reactive rather than preventative measures: indeed the IfS has been used in post-crisis situations and not to emerging crisis. The difficulty to justify the necessity of the IfS when the situation was still apparently calm was given as an explanatory factor.
- Some Commission interviewees pointed out that EIDHR and NSA were useful as CP tools but that they could not be deployed when a crisis erupted;
- Some Commission interviewees highlighted that geographic instruments were too slow to impact on erupting crises contexts;
- Commission's interviewees indicated that flexible procedures for short-term actions were used: direct award/negotiated procedures under joint management, retroactivity clause, and full financing;
- There was little evidence of early warning information and response, or use of political dialogue or other means of detecting deteriorating situations. EUD staff interviewed stressed that the fact that until 2008 the HoD was based in Kazakhstan and that there was no political section during the period 2001-2010 constrained the use of the political dialogue for short-term prevention.

JC 3.2: Preventing recurrence of crises and consolidating peace

- There was no explicit commitment to peace consolidation in the Strategy or programming documents and no indicators for measure it at Strategy or programme level;
- Some Commission interviewees indicated that short-term needs were identified on the basis of political consultations with Government, other development partners and civil society;
- The IfS intervention in 2008 in support of the judiciary did not explicitly state peace consolidation as its objective but could be considered to have contributed to stability.

JC 3.3: Transition between short-term and long-term prevention

- There was no explicit linkage between IfS and longer-term instruments in overall strategy documents;
- The evidence base for the sequencing and mix of instruments at intervention level was weak but there were specific examples of linkages between IfS and DCI interventions (2009 DCI Support to Prison Reform and 2008 IfS Support to judiciary reform);
- Some Commission interviewees indicated that planners of short-term interventions did take account of longer-term ones;

EQ4 on Geographical dimensions

JC 4.1: Appropriateness of the geographical level of intervention

- The RSPs focused on regional and national level analysis;
- Interventions were well targeted at national, regional and cross-border levels although an explicit link to conflict factors was not present in all cases.

JC 4.2: Addressing local and national needs

- Commission support targeted both national and local levels including cross-border focus;
- Part of Commission support (pilot poverty reduction schemes over the 2002-2006 period and Priority Area 2: poverty reduction) targeted vulnerable areas and groups (poorest areas and communities affected by poverty and conflict); this was also the case for two of the three interventions reviewed;
- Partnership with Government was evident in all programmes and linked to national strategies and consultations (e.g IFS Judiciary Reform identified on basis of political consultations with Government).

JC 4.3: Regional dynamics of conflicts

- There was a strong focus on support for regional issues, particularly support for regional mechanisms and bodies on border management, migration, organised crime and drugs trafficking;
- There was a strong cross-border theme in the pilot poverty reduction schemes;
- Early warning mechanisms were not mentioned in the regional support strategies and interventions.

JC 4.4: Articulating support at different geographical levels with a view to fostering synergies

- The Commission support came under a regional strategy. This included regional and national level entry points but there were no country-specific strategy papers;
- There was a strategy commitment to ensure that the three tracks (regional, national and cross-border) were linked, but the M&E evidence to establish whether this happened was weak.

EQ5 on Coordination and Complementarity

JC 5.1: “Whole-of-government approach” between and within the Commission’s DGs and Directions

- Joint political overall frameworks with the rationale of enhancing coordination within the Commission existed:
 - Commission Strategy documents at regional level;
 - Inter-service consultation (e.g oQSG) between different DGs aiming at ensuring the quality of the Commission’s development interventions at the identification and formulation phases;
 - at intervention-specific level, specific FAs which called for cooperation with DGs RELEX, AIDCO and ECHO (e.g Support to Judiciary Reform);
- Joint identification missions (EUD-RELEX-AIDCO) for IFS interventions took place;
- There was no evidence of working groups, involving several Commission DGs,

exchanging information relating to CPPB;

- Coordination between the geo-desks of AIDCO-RELEX, IFS staff and the EUD were reported as being very close and positive;
- Coordination with ECHO was reported by Commission interviewees as significant at field level, allowing a proper link between relief and development.

JC 5.2: Coordination and complementarities between the Commission and the General Secretariat of the EU Council, the European Union Special Representative and with EU Member States (“whole-of-EU approach”)

- There existed a joint political overall framework with the rationale of enhancing coordination within the EU: the “2007 EU-Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership” which constituted a commitment of the EU to Central Asia and called for the support of EU MS for community programmes to contribute to a more coherent and visible EU policy in the region;
- The immediate task of the EU Special Representative for Central Asia was “to coordinate the efforts of all EU actors in the implementation of the new elements of the EU approach”;
- Interviewees reported a high degree of collaboration between RELEX, the EU Delegation and the Council. In particular, RELEX (HQ RELEX-A2 and EUD) had close contact with the EU SR appointed for Central Asia (meetings, joint missions, etc.);
- On the other hand, EU-Council information exchange was limited by a technical aspect, namely the lack of compatibility of the Council’s and Commission’s encrypted systems which prevented them from sharing written documents;
- Commission interviewees highlighted that few EU MS were active in CPPB. DFID has been reported as being the most active and coordination between the EUD and DFID has been reported as close;
- There were cases of planned complementarity between Commission and EU MS interventions in the same sector (e.g Judiciary reform with GTZ) and of implementation of Commission interventions by EU MS (e.g GTZ with EC Support to Judiciary Reform)

JC 5.3: Coordination and complementarities with other non-EU donors, international and regional organisations

- The need for coordination with other donors has been highlighted in several key official Commission documents;
- Commission interviewees reported that coordination was more challenging in a conflict context since it required more mutual trust and confidence between partners and the need to share planning plans before their approval by HQ;
- Commission interviewees reported that formal government-led coordination was weak (through there was in-country consultative groups);
- Commission interviewees reported that the international community in the Kyrgyz Republic was small and that coordination between donors was close: frequent formal and informal donor meetings for coordination took place;
- There was a division of labour and a leading role for the Commission in PFM, agriculture and social protection;
- Since the 2010 crisis, a specific donor coordination mechanism on CPPB, co-chaired by the troika EU-UN-OSCE, has come into existence;
- At intervention-specific level there has been a mapping of other donors’ activities and efforts to seek coordination with other donors (e.g UNDP and GTZ for the

Transition in Ferghana Valley, and USAID and WB for the Support to Judiciary Reform) and not duplicate interventions (e.g Support to Judiciary Reform).

JC 5.4: Coordination and complementarities with partner countries governing bodies and with non-state actors

- The Commission's Regional Strategies explicitly referred to, and detailed, partner government strategies; reference to civil society's needs was less systematic;
- Commission's interviewees pointed out that national authorities generally agreed on the identification of priorities (e.g education, social protection, the rule of law) but that differences occurred in the human rights field.
- The selected interventions targeting the Government or CSOs generally addressed their needs;

EQ6 on Commission's Value Added on CPPB

JC6.1: The Commission's role in promoting the integrated approach

- At intervention-specific level, the Commission aimed at a comprehensive approach rather than piecemeal actions (e.g Support to Judiciary Reform) and devoted attention to the choice of implementing partners (e.g Rural development programme).

JC 6.2: The Commission's specific value added with respect to reducing tensions and/or preventing the outbreak, recurrence or continuation of violent conflict

- The Commission was a significant donor but not a key player (cf. Russia, China, US);
- Commission interviewees reported the following types of added value:
 - the Commission was perceived as a more neutral player (less controversial agenda);
 - the Commission had the ability to draw on various instruments (regional cooperation, thematic instruments, IfS, EU SR) – (see also EQ7);
 - The Commission had the capacity to mobilise significant resources to reach a critical mass.
- For specific selected interventions, the Commission built its assistance on ongoing support for rural development as an entry point for poverty reduction, food security and reduction of social conflict (e.g rural development programme).

EQ7 on Means to facilitate IA

JC 7.1: The institutional set-up for intervening in CPPB

- Specialised units exist to deal with CPPB within RELEX-Directorate A (Crisis Platform - Policy coordination in Common Foreign Security), in particular Unit A2 (Crisis response and peace-building).
- Commission's interviewees pointed out that :
 - the division of roles between DG DEV, DG RELEX and EuropeAid, and between the Commission and the Council, and between the Commission and the EU SR have not favoured the actions of the Commission in a conflict context;
 - the division of roles between the Commission and the HQ and between the Commission and the EU MS favoured the actions of the Commission in a conflict context;

JC 7.2: Human resources policy for intervening in CPPB

- Dedicated CPPB staff existed but conflict expertise was limited :
 - In HQ: part of the staff of RELEX A2 was specialised in peace and security matters;
 - In the field:
 - A regional crisis response planning officer was funded from IfS based in Kazakhstan;
 - There was no political section in the EUD;
 - The EUD was staffed with an IfS project manager. Commission's interviewees reported that the EUD was not sufficiently staffed in CPPB experts.
- Training courses held in CPPB-related fields:
 - staff from the Crisis Response and Peace Building Unit (RELEX) have generally followed CPPB training courses (conflict prevention, mediation, SSSR, etc.) and were encouraged to do so;
 - staff from geographical units and from the EUD have generally not attended CPPB training courses (lack of time; lack of time and budget to assist to CPPB trainings only offered in HQ; lack of awareness raising to these issues).
- Knowledge management: the design of programmes in the Kyrgyz Republic benefited from the exchanges of experience that took place between the IfS Project Managers based in Georgia and in the Kyrgyz Republic.

JC 7.4: Financial instruments for intervening in CPPB

- A variety of financial instruments existed for intervention on both short-term and long-term bases:
 - ECHO support: for urgent needs this was flexible and paved the way for an EU LRRD approach;
 - IfS: for short-term needs: it provided a timely and flexible response to crisis situations but duration of support (max 1.5 years) was too short to ensure stabilisation and the flexibility of the IfS was questioned by some Commission's interviewees;
 - EIDHR and NSA calls for proposals (to support democratic transition and the development of civil society) have been used to act in a context of crisis because they proved to be more flexible than the DCI. But they have not

- been specifically designed for that purpose.
- TACIS, DCI for the long-term;
- CFSP;
- Commission interviewees stressed that the IfS and the EIDHR enabled it to finance actions even without official alignment to the national counterparts;
- Commission interviewees reported that with the long-term geographical assistance it was difficult to adapt programmes to a changing situation and that there was a lack of flexibility in a crisis;
- Explicit attention was given in Commission Strategy documents to coherence and synergies between the financial instruments.

EQ8 on Timeliness and Cost-Effectiveness

JC 8.1: Timeliness and cost-effectiveness of Commission interventions

- Efficiency: this was not the major issue for CPPB interventions (e.g politically-driven programmes and situations where “no financing” was not an option);
- IfS Judiciary Reform Programme (2008): there was a year-and-a-half lapse between the signature of the FA and the start of the project because (i) IfS was a new instrument with which Commission staff had to become acquainted; (ii) there were technical problems; and (iii) the project was of a sensitive nature.

JC 8.2: Impact of the regulatory and institutional set-up for the Commission’s support in the field of CPPB on timeliness and cost-effectiveness

- Specific instruments were designed to quickly mobilise resources: e.g IfS was chosen to finance the Support for Judiciary Reform in view of its flexibility and timeliness compared to traditional geographical assistance instruments.

JC 8.3: Extent to which Commission’s human resources were sufficient and skilled enough to ensure timely and cost-effective support

- Dedicated staff existed but overall conflict-expertise was limited (see EQ7)

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Country case study - Sierra Leone

1. Country and conflict context

This conflict profile and overview is put together from official Commission's sources and draws extensively on the official Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation Commission report which represents a comprehensive and locally owned and generated conflict assessment.

1.1 Map and Key data



Key country data ¹			
Surface area (in 2008)	71.740 km ²		
Population (in 2008, estimated)	5.6 million		
Population density in 2008	77.5 per km ²		
Population growth rate (for 2005-2010)	2.7 %, avg. annual		
GDP per capita	2000 204.7 current US\$	2005 266.2 current US\$	2008 418 current US\$
Unemployment (% of labour force)	2000 N/A	2005 2.8%	2008 N/A
HDI trends ²	2005 0.35	2006 0.36	2007 0.36

1.2 Profile of Conflict and Actors

The violent conflict in Sierra Leone was primarily between armed groups and the government on one hand, and between armed groups (including government forces) and the population at large on the other. The causes of the conflict were many and diverse. Some historical antecedents to the conflict can be traced back to the colonial period, while others are found by examining the post-independence years, in particular, the years preceding the outbreak of violence in 1991.³ The conflict also had a strong regional dynamic influenced by actors and events within West Africa and the Mano River Union sub-region (particularly Liberia) which still remain unstable⁴. The initial launch of a renewed insurgency by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) against the Government of Liberia in December 1989 was an integral antecedent to the conflict in Sierra Leone.⁵ The role of Charles Taylor who became the President of Liberia was particularly infamous in the Sierra Leone conflict.

While there were many factors, both internal and external, that explain the cause of the civil war, the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SLTRC)⁶ came to the conclusion that it was years of bad governance, endemic corruption and the denial of basic human rights which created conditions that made conflict inevitable. While in 2011 there is no violent conflict in Sierra Leone progress on dealing with these issues remains fragile.

Prior to the open conflict in 1991 successive Government regimes became increasingly impervious to the wishes and needs of the majority. Instead of implementing positive and progressive policies, each regime perpetuated the ills and self-serving machinations left behind by its predecessor⁷. By the start of the conflict, the nation had been stripped of its dignity. Institutional collapse reduced the vast majority of people into a state of

¹ Unless otherwise specified, from UN statistical division
<http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Sierra%20Leone>

² UNDP, *Human Development Report 2009*, <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/79.html>

³ Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *Witness to Truth: Report*, Volume 2, 2004, p 29.

⁴ Sierra Leone – European Community, *Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme 2003-2007*, p 10.

⁵ Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *op.cit.*, p 33.

⁶ For a similar analysis see: Sierra Leone – European Community, *op. cit.*, p 10; 13.

⁷ Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *op.cit.*, Volume 1, p 10.

deprivation. Government accountability was non-existent. Political expression and dissent had been crushed. Democracy and the rule of law were dead. By 1991, the society in Sierra Leone was deeply divided and carried a high potential for violence. It required only the slightest spark for this violence to be ignited. The SLTRC traced the roots of these lapses through the post-independence period and into the colonial period.⁸

The Sierra Leone political elite in successive regimes excluded society-at-large from meaningful participation in decision-making. Key stakeholders in society, including students, youths, and the populace of the Provinces, were marginalised⁹. Ultimately, these marginalised groups played a central role in initiating and fuelling the armed conflict.¹⁰ The role of disaffected youth in particular is highlighted as an important aspect of the conflict and a continued concern for future stability. The majority of the fighting forces were composed of the young, the disgruntled, the unemployed and the poor.¹¹ The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and its supporters were responsible for the greatest number of human rights violations during the conflict period yet as noted by the SLTRC all groups were responsible for violations.¹² The RUF was particularly involved the forced recruitment of children,¹³ their recruitment slogan was, “the total neglect of youth”.¹⁴ The SLTRC found statistical patterns that are consistent with the hypothesis that children between the ages of 10 and 14 were specifically targeted for forced recruitment, rape, and sexual slavery.

The conflict was renowned for being particularly brutal with the overwhelming acts being committed by Sierra Leoneans against Sierra Leoneans. All the fighting factions targeted civilians. The consequences were dire on the economy and society.

The SLTRC found the leadership of the major armed actors involved in the conflict Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) to be responsible for either authorising or instigating human rights violations against civilians; alternatively for failing to stop such practices or to speak out against them.¹⁵

An estimated 3,000 villages and towns were destroyed, and up to two million people, around half of the country’s population, were either internally displaced or became refugees.¹⁶ The effects of the war were clear— the economy and public services stopped, the country’s infrastructure and incapacitated government institutions were destroyed¹⁷ so that on the 2002 UN Human Development Index, Sierra Leone ranked last out of the 173 countries compared.¹⁸ In 2000 82% of the population were living below the poverty line with an average per capita income of US\$ 130 adding up to only one third of the GDP per

⁸ *Ibid*

⁹ Sierra Leone – European Community, *Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme 2003-2007*, p 10

¹⁰ Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *op.cit.*, p 31

¹¹ Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *op.cit.*, Volume 2, p 35-6

¹² Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *op.cit.*, Volume 2, p 40

¹³ Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *op.cit.*, Volume 2, p 43

¹⁴ Bebs, Warp, the George Washington University Groundwork (for USAID), *Mano River Union Conflict Assessment and Peacebuilding Results Framework*, June 2003, p 14.

¹⁵ Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *op.cit.*, Volume 1, p 12.

¹⁶ Sierra Leone – European Community, *Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme 2008-2013*, p 5.

¹⁷ *Ibid*.

¹⁸ Mano River, *op.cit.*, p 10.

capita compared to the peak in 1970.¹⁹ Since then there have been only very moderate improvement to the country's HDI ranking as evidenced by its HDI ranking of 180 out of 182 countries listed in 2009.²⁰ While there has been progress in human rights and in the democratic transition of power since the end of the conflict the low rate of economic development remains a concern in terms of future conflict.

The security forces were a major proximate cause of the conflict. The Sierra Leonean Army (SLA) was unable to defend Sierra Leone and its people from the armed insurrection and the program of terror launched by the RUF and other factions. The leadership of the SLA undermined the war effort through many corrupt practices, which caused dissatisfaction and rebellion to swell among the junior ranks. A large number of soldiers collaborated with the RUF and later the AFRC (The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council).²¹ Instead of serving and protecting the people, the soldiers of the AFRC unconstitutionally seized power and unleashed a reign of lawlessness and violence against civilians. AFRC were responsible for the large-scale loss of life, amputations and destruction of property that swept through Freetown in January 1999.²² The Civil Defence Force (CDF) while at times protecting the people was itself responsible for considerable violations and abuses of human rights. Many of these violations and abuses were carried out with the full knowledge of the leadership of the CDF, which failed or omitted to intervene to stop the violations.²³ The police were largely ineffectual and often directly complicit in human rights violations and crimes during the conflict, and it was at the local and societal level that a lack of security was most keenly felt. Making the security forces responsive and responsible to the people was deemed as a key priority for a sustainable peace.

ECOWAS was the only international body that was willing to intervene in the Sierra Leonean conflict. However, it did not have the resources to properly support its peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone. When British troops did intervene towards the end of the 11-year conflict, they effectively dispatched resistance encountered from rebel forces (mainly the armed group the "West Side Boy"). While the British intervention was seen as decisive in ending the armed conflict the SLTRC found it regrettable that the United Kingdom waited some ten years before it intervened.

¹⁹ Sierra Leone – European Community, *Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme 2003-2007*, p. 13.

²⁰ UNDP, *HUMAN DEVELOPMENT Report 2009 Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development*, New York, 2009, p.170.

²¹ Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *op.cit.*, Volume 2, p. 50.

²² Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *op.cit.*, Volume 2, p. 59.

²³ Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *op.cit.*, Volume 2, p. 76.

1.3 Key Dynamics and Events

On 23 March 1991, armed conflict broke out in Sierra Leone when forces crossed the border from Liberia into Sierra Leone. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) claimed responsibility for the incursion, with the declared objective being to overthrow the corrupt and tyrannical government of Joseph Saidu Momoh and the All People's Congress (APC), which had ruled Sierra Leone since 1968.²⁴ Apart from the APC the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) had dominated post-independent Sierra Leone's political history whose several military coups can be said to have furthered interfered with attempts of introducing multi-party democracy to the country.²⁵

To end the conflict, three attempts to negotiate peace have been pursued (1996, 1998 and 1999), the last culminating in the Lomé Peace Agreement of July 1999.²⁶ Peace in Sierra Leone was brought about only by armed international intervention—first by a Nigerian-led Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)'s Ceasefire Monitoring Group - ECOMOG mission in 1998 that restored the democratically elected president ousted in a military coup in 1997 and then by its replacement, UNAMSIL, a UN peacekeeping mission with 17,500 troops, created as part of the Lomé Peace Agreement in 1999.²⁷ ECOMOG's actions in some quarters remain controversial and there were allegations of numerous human rights violations by ECOMOG.

During the conflict Sierra Leone was systematically plundered and looted by all factions in the conflict.²⁸ While the international community covered extensively the use of illicit resources in the conflict the SLTRC found that “diamonds was not the cause of the conflict in Sierra Leone, but rather fuelled the conflict as diamonds were used by most of the fighting factions to finance and support their war efforts”.²⁹ Yet the control and profiting from mineral resources remain an important proximate cause of conflict.

A key aspect to the conflict, and the achievement consolidation of peace was the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of former combatants of armed groups. This was a difficult process that initially failed. The Abjua II Agreement (2001) enabled the resumption of the Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) that had been stalled.³⁰ Completion of this ambitious disarmament and demobilisation programme was reached in early 2002 and paved the way for relatively peaceful presidential and parliamentary elections held in May 2002, in difficult logistical conditions.³¹

The Lomé Peace Agreement required Sierra Leone to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The Sierra Leone Parliament made provision for such a commission in early 2000 by virtue of the Truth and Reconciliation Act, 2000.³² The SLTRC report in 2004

²⁴ Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *op.cit.*, Volume 2, p. 3.

²⁵ Sierra Leone – European Community, *Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme 2003-2007*, p. 10.

²⁶ Bebs, Warp, the George Washington University Groundwork (for USAID), *op.cit.*, p. 14.

²⁷ Sierra Leone – European Community, *Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme 2008-2013*, p. 6.

²⁸ Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *op.cit.*, Volume 1, 2004, p. 12.

²⁹ Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *op.cit.*, 2004, p. 107.

Sierra Leone – European Community, *Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme 2003-2007*, p. 10.

³⁰ Bebs, Warp, the George Washington University Groundwork (for USAID), *Ibid.*

³¹ Sierra Leone – European Community, *Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme 2003-2007*, p.11.

³² Also cf. Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *op.cit.*, Volume 2, 2004, p. 28.

covered comprehensively the nature and consequences of the conflict and has been widely lauded in Sierra Leone and internationally as a high quality document which relevance is still keenly felt seven years after it was first completed.

As the action and inaction of the security sector was seen also a key factor contributing to conflict and an ambitious programme of security sector reform since 2000 has also been an important factor in addressing the conflict. Yet while there is currently the semblance of stability in Sierra Leone there is concern that many of the underlying causes of the conflict remain.³³ In the 2008-2013 PRSP the government identifies corruption, illicit drugs and youth unemployment as the major risks and notes that peace and security are pre-requisites to sustainable growth and development.

1.4 International and Local Responses

Internally in Sierra Leone there were a number of local and NGO initiatives to support peace-building and a sizeable indigenous humanitarian response to coping with the conflict. Yet these initiatives while valuable could not response to the scale and nature of the conflict alone.

The SLTRC lamented the fact that the international community, apart from the ECOWAS states, declined to intervene in the unfolding human catastrophe in Sierra Leone until at a very late stage.³⁴ ECOWAS was however heavily involved in trying to end the conflict in Sierra Leone, even if some member-states of ECOWAS actively backed rebel groups within Sierra Leone.

The involvement of the United Nations can be traced back to December 1994, when it sent its first exploratory mission to Sierra Leone. However, the subsequent presence of a UN Special Envoy to Sierra Leone did not abate the fighting and the commission of atrocities against civilians. In July 1998, the UN Security Council established the UN Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) to monitor the security situation and to advise on the disarmament and demobilisation of former combatants. On 22 October 1999, the UN Security Council authorised the establishment of the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which contributed significantly to the achievement of stability and rebuilding of the nation following the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement in July 1999.³⁵ The deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission (UNAMSIL) and a UK military intervention all contributed to a sustainable peace agreement in 2002.³⁶

Since 2002 there has been a significant international donor presence in the country and in 2006 Sierra Leone became a focal country of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (UNPC). The UNPC role is to (1) bringing together all of the relevant actors, including international donors, the international financial institutions, national governments, troop contributing countries; (2) marshalling resources and (3) advising on and proposing integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery and where

Sierra Leone – European Community, *op. cit.*, p.10.

³³ Sierra Leone – European Community, *Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme 2008-2013*, p 6.

³⁴ Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *op.cit.*, Volume 1, p. 12.

³⁵ Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *op.cit.*, Volume 2, 2004, p.14.

³⁶ Sierra Leone – European Community, *Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme 2008-2013*, p 6.

appropriate, highlighting any gaps that threaten to undermine peace. Following the withdrawal of UNAMSIL it was replaced by UNIOSIL – UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone) to assist the Government in consolidating peace and national stability building. This has since been followed by in August 2008 the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) led by the Secretary-General's Executive Representative (ERSG), Michael von der Schulenburg. UNIPSIL ensures that Sierra Leone remains on the UN Security Council agenda and also plays a role in coordinating the peacebuilding response of the international community in the country.

2. The Commission's Response Strategy

2.1 Overall Commission's strategy

2.1.1 *Key strategic lines of the Commission's strategy in Sierra Leone (2001-2010)*

The Commission's cooperation with Sierra Leone takes place within the wider framework of Commission-ACP cooperation. Relations have been governed by the successive **Lomé Conventions** (Lomé I – Lomé IV bis) and are now enshrined in the **Cotonou Partnership Agreement**.

Over the evaluation period two major **strategy documents** have presented the main priority cooperation areas of the Commission in Sierra Leone together with indicative budget allocations (see table below): the Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) and National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) for the periods 2003-2007 and 2008-2013.

At the time of the drafting of the 2003-2007 CSP, Sierra Leone was emerging from a decade-long armed conflict (1991-2002). The economy had shrunk over time and basic infrastructure had been destroyed. The CSP was prepared in an emergency situation without operational government structures. Additionally, Sierra Leone's development strategy was based on an Interim PRSP completed in 2001 and on the 2002 National Recovery Strategy. Priorities under these documents were as follows:

- The I-PRSP defined two distinct phases: the post-conflict transitional phase for 2001-2002 and the medium-term phase for 2003-2005. Under the first phase, the priority was to rebuild the war-ravaged economy and address urgent and basic needs, in particular (i) restoration of security, (ii) re-launching of the economy, and (iii) provision of basic social services. Under the medium-term phase, the Government defined three broad programmes that formed the development framework: (i) a governance reform programme to restore public administration and basic services, (ii) a programme for the revival of the economy, and (iii) a social development programme (education and health).
- The NRS set out four priority areas for the 2002-2003 period: (i) restoration of State authority, (ii) rebuilding of communities, (iii) peace building and human rights, and (iv) restoration of the economy.

In early 2005, Sierra Leone's first PRSP was adopted. It represents the critical medium-term policy document issued by the GoSL while Vision 2025 presents the long-term vision. The 2008-2013 CSP is anchored in these two policy documents.

- The first PRSP “A national programme for food security, job creation and good governance (2005-2007)” sets out the priority development challenges and anchors the policies and strategies around three main pillars: (i) promoting good governance, security and peace, (ii) promoting pro-poor sustainable growth for food security and job creation, and (iii) promoting human development.
- Vision 2025 sets out the government’s long-term aspirations for Sierra Leone.

Table 1 – Main priority cooperation areas and budget allocations including Mid-Term Review (MTR) revisions (2001-2013)

	Main priority cooperation areas (CSP)	Indicative budget allocations (NIP)	
CSP and NIP 2003-2007	A-allocation		
	1st Focal sector: Rehabilitation of priority infrastructure: road transport infrastructure, social sector infrastructure (health and education)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Transport infrastructure: €60m ▪ Social infrastructure: €10m Total initial allocation of €70m; €81.7m after 2005 MTR	Total initial alloc. €144m; €164.7m after 2005 MTR
	2nd Focal sector: Good governance and institutional support: addresses the governance reform programme (I-PRSP) to improve governance and financial management in priority areas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Support to NAO's office: €5m ▪ Decentralisation: €7m ▪ Institutional support: €7m Total initial allocation of €19m; €28m after 2005 MTR	
	Macroeconomic support: to contribute to poverty reduction by enabling the GoSL to deliver basic social services.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Budget support for social sector policies: €50m 	
	Non-focal sectors: strengthening of civil society, negotiation process of Regional Economic Partnership Agreements, regional integration process, regional peace process, conflict prevention, human rights, etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ €5m 	
	B-allocation: to cover unforeseen needs: (i) emergency assistance, (ii) contributions to international debt relief initiatives, (iii) mitigation of instability in export earnings.		Total initial alloc. €76m; €62.7m after 2005 MTR
CSP and NIP 2008-2013	A-allocation		
	Governance, peace and security: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reforming state institutions; ▪ Greater transparency and accountability in the use of public funds; ▪ Ensuring responsive government and consolidating democracy; ▪ Maximising revenue collection within government. 	Focal sector 1: Good governance and institutional support: €37m: Measures: consolidation of democracy, decentralisation, reform of the civil service, capacity building within the civil service	Total: €242m
	Promoting pro-poor sustainable growth: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Creation of an enabling policy environment; ▪ Support for private sector development and job creation; ▪ Addressing infrastructure constraints (roads and energy) 	Focal sector 2: Rehabilitation of priority infrastructure: €95m Measures: road maintenance, institutional capacity, rehabilitation of priority roads, river transport, electricity supplies, etc.	
	Promoting basic service delivery and human development (health, education, water)	General budget support to support GoSL macroeconomic reform programme : €90m	
		Other programmes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Agriculture: €12m ▪ Contribution to regional programmes: €2m ▪ EPA support: €3m ▪ Technical Cooperation Facility: €2.5m ▪ Reserve for insurance: €0.5m 	
	B-allocation: to cover unforeseen needs: (i) emergency assistance, (ii) contributions to internationally debt relief initiatives, (iii) mitigation of instability in export earnings		Total: €26.4m

Sources: CSP and NIP 2003-2007, CSP and NIP 2008-2013

2.1.2 *The Commission's strategy with respect to CPPB*

The 2003-2007 CSP is presented as a cooperation response in a country emerging from a decade-long armed conflict. In a context of a post-conflict country with depleted infrastructure and weak public services, it focused on supporting the government's efforts to rehabilitate the country's basic infrastructure and on good governance and institutional strengthening. The two first focal sectors "Rehabilitation of priority infrastructure" and "Good governance and institutional support" indeed aimed at (i) re-launching Sierra Leone's economy and re-establishing basic social services, and (ii) at consolidating democracy and establishing a transparent and accountable system of governance. Macroeconomic support was also envisaged to re-launch the functioning of the administration and the provision of social services. Non-focal sectors also aimed at supporting CPPB. Finally, the B-allocation was also used for CPPB, mainly during the 2000-2005 transition period.

The 2003-2007 CSP also stressed the importance of **establishing a link between short-term relief and rehabilitation efforts and long-term development cooperation.** Indeed, Sierra Leone benefited from humanitarian assistance through Community-financed aid addressing short-term humanitarian problems (EDF 8 Resettlement and Rehabilitation Programme, Health Sector Support Programme). ECHO funding contributed to the transition context and was gradually phased out in 2004 prior to implementation of LRRD programmes funded out of the EDF 9 B-envelope. The strategy was explicitly designed to follow phasing-out of short-term relief with support for more long-term development.

The 2008-2013 CSP presents a more conventional poverty-reduction strategy that is less clearly articulated around CPPB. Several references are made to the conflict in the sections on the country diagnosis and on the overview of past cooperation, but the response strategy more clearly targets poverty reduction than CPPB issues. The first focal sector is CPPB-related ("governance, peace and security"). It highlights the progress made since the end of the conflict in this area as well as the remaining deficiencies in terms of institutional capacity, government accountability and corruption. It envisages support in the following areas: reform of State institutions, transparency and accountability, consolidation of democracy (support to electoral process, support to civil society, access to justice), and maximisation of revenue collection. The two other focal sectors, "Promoting pro-poor sustainable growth" and "Promoting basic service delivery and human development", aim at addressing critical constraints of poor infrastructure (roads, energy, water) across the health and education sectors.

2.2 Implementation of Commission's strategy


Actual implementation of the Commission's strategy in terms of funds effectively contracted for projects can be described by means of an analysis of data extracted from the Common Relex Information System (CRIS), which provides information on all interventions financed by the Commission in partner countries. The following data for Sierra Leone were extracted by the evaluation team in September 2010. It provides financial and operational information on all interventions contracted by the Commission over the period from 2001 to September 2010. Financial data presented below are contracted amounts for national-level interventions financed from the general budget of the Commission.

All interventions financed in Sierra Leone have been classified by the evaluation team according to their relevance to CPPB in the light of the 2001 Commission Communication

on Conflict Prevention. This classification has been made according to the methodology developed in the main inventory of the Commission's support to CPPB carried out in the Preliminary study of this evaluation³⁷. For further explanations on the methodology and its limitations, please refer to this study.

The trend in the amounts contracted over the period 2001 to September 2010 is presented in the figure below. It also presents an interesting distribution of CPPB-related and non-CPPB-related funds.

Figure 1 - Evolution of amounts contracted (€m) by the Commission to Sierra Leone between 2001 and Sept 2010



Over the evaluation period, the Commission's aid to Sierra Leone totalled €469m. One-quarter of the total was related to conflict prevention and peace building (CPPB).

In terms of its evolution over the evaluation period, Commission support to Sierra Leone has been characterised by several significant isolated increases which were not related to CPPB:


- A peak was achieved in 2005 with the release of €59m of poverty-reduction-related budget support to the Sierra Leonean government as well as the signature of several contracts carried out under a €54m Road Infrastructure programme.
- A significant increase in 2009 with the release of €58.4m of general budget support to the Sierra Leonean government.

Specifically in terms of CPPB support, a rise occurred in 2004 on account of the release of €18m of the total of €35m for Post-Conflict Budget Support (PCBS). From 2005 onwards CPPB support declined steadily.

Figure 2 - Breakdown of Commission financial instruments used in Sierra Leone,

³⁷ European Commission, *Preliminary study for the thematic evaluation of the Commission's support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building*, July 2009. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/2009/1266_docs_en.htm


(€m contracted, 2001-September 2010)



Over the evaluation period the patterns of financial instruments used for the Commission's overall assistance to Sierra Leone and CPPB-specific assistance differed slightly:

- The EDF geographical financial instrument is dominant but less important for CPPB support.
- The Food Security thematic budget line is the second most used financial instrument. In the case of CPPB support, it funded post-crisis LRRD projects focusing on food security.
- ONG-NSA thematic budget lines were not used at all for CPPB support.
- DDH-EIHDR thematic budget lines funded election support, the €2.3m EU Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) to Sierra Leone for the presidential and legislative elections of 2007, and €897,142 of EU support for the Parliamentary and presidential elections in Sierra Leone in 2002; they also funded projects for rehabilitation of conflict victims and measures to assist the Sierra Leone Peace Process, including support to the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
- "Other" budget lines used to support CPPB were exclusively DCI-ENV and ENV in support of a €2.5m trans-boundary peace park project for Sierra Leone and Liberia (2008) and the €3m "Gola Forest" project promoting sustainable protected areas in post-conflict Sierra Leone (2007).
- The IFS and RRM financial instruments supported two projects targeted on the media.


Figure 3 - CPPB categories breakdown, (€m contracted, 2001 - Sept.2010)



CPPB support contracted in the course of the evaluation period, which represents 23% of total contracted support to Sierra Leone, has been categorised by the evaluation team as shown below. Of total CPPB support, the percentages allocated for various the classifications were:

- 34% almost exclusively as support to “Peace consolidation and prevention of future conflict”;
- 19.5% as support to “Population flows and human trafficking” which exclusively covers the €24m Transitional Support to Former IDPs, Returnees, Refugees and Hosting Communities in Sierra Leone programme;
- 18% as support to “Democracy, rule of law and civil society” which includes electoral assistance measures as well as human rights promotion projects;
- 18% as multi-sector support. It covers exclusively post-conflict rehabilitation contracts in the health and education sectors signed under the €35m Post Conflict Budget Support (PCBS) programme;
- 10% as support for rapid intervention which exclusively covers food security measures in accordance with a LRRD approach; *and*
- the remaining 4% as support to “Environment & natural resources” and includes the two above-mentioned ‘peace park’ and ‘Gola forest’ projects.

Figure 4 - Breakdown of channels of delivery used to implement Commission assistance to Sierra Leone (€m contracted, 2001 - Sept. 2010)



As regards the channels of delivery of the Commission's assistance to CPPB in Sierra Leone:

- **NGOs and Civil Society Organisations** channelled the largest amount of EC aid – they were used notably for the €24m programme of Transitional Support to Former IDPs, Returnees, Refugees and Hosting Communities in Sierra Leone programme, for which numerous contracts with European NGOs (International Rescue Committee UK, Stichting Care Nederland, Action Contre laFaim) were signed.
- **Private Companies** represented the second channel of delivery of Commission CPPB aid in financial terms (value of aid channelled): the EC's rehabilitation and resettlement programmes were mostly contracted with private companies.
- Certain interventions were channelled through **International Organisations** as follows: the EU Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) to Sierra Leone for the presidential and legislative elections of 2007 and the "EU support to the Parliamentary and presidential elections in Sierra Leone" in 2002 were both contracted with the International Organisation for Migration; the "Assistance to the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission" was contracted with the UNHCR.
- Budget support was channelled through the **Sierra Leonean Government**.

3. Evaluation findings

For each EQ this section presents in bullet points, by JC³⁸, evaluation findings at country level. These findings are based on the analysis emerging from the desk and field phases of the evaluation and from the analysis of the results of the survey sent to EUD (see Annex 7).

EQ1 on Mainstreaming

JC 1.1: (Elements of) conflict analyses carried out or used by the Commission

- The Commission did not carry out a formal structured conflict analysis. But the Commission uses other documents and resources for their analysis of the post-conflict situation:
 - DFID conflict analysis was shared with the Commission
 - The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is key for the analysis and understanding of the conflict and is considered by all stakeholders as a major achievement and embodied in the Sierra Leone society. Donors, including the Commission, still refer the TRC for their conflict analysis. Most of the issues are still valid.
 - The Agenda for Change/PRSP 2008-2012 identifies, among others, the key risks for the stability of the country. It provides an analysis of the post-conflict situation and is considered by the donors as a reference document for their cooperation with Sierra Leone.
- The absence of a structured formal conflict analysis is not seen as an issue for the Commission because of the existence of documents mentioned above, which are considered as of high quality and owned by the GoSL.
- At strategic level, elements exploring aspects of the conflict were included in Commission strategy. It was more the case in the 2003-2007 CSP than for the 2008-2013 CSP.
- At programme/project level, in general no systematic formal conflict assessment were carried out at the design stage. But:
 - For election support, the fragile situation of the country is nevertheless well taken into account since the identification phase of the programme because election processes in SL can be major factor of instability.
 - For rehabilitation and rural development programmes, the post-conflict situation and instability is taken into account by providing equitable support to all the regions of the country.
 - For macro-economic support, the aim was to support the government in order to provide macro-economic stability and basic services after the civil war. The assessment undertaken before the decision was on PFM measures and not on the post-conflict issues.

JC 1.2: Informing financial and non-financial Commission support by (elements of) conflict analyses

- The Commission support was not systematically informed by a structured conflict analysis. But key aspects of the TRC analysis informed strategy and to a lesser extent individual programme design.
- No formal mechanisms existed to ensure that elements of conflict analyses were used in the design of programmes.

³⁸ Some Judgment Criteria have not been included in the summary boxes because either they were not relevant at country-specific level or because too little information was available to substantiate them

- Commission-GoSL political dialogue covered aspects associated with conflict dynamics and the TRC recommendations. Issues tackled are elections, human rights, corruption and mineral resources.
- Commission staff informed themselves of conflict dynamics and other agencies' conflict analyses on an *ad hoc* but continuous basis for programme design. This has been the case for programmes on election, the general budget support and the civil service reform.

JC 1.3: Do no harm approaches

- There were no formal systems to ensure a “do no harm” approach and apply a “conflict sensitivity” lens in the Commission’s interventions. General risk assessments are carried out at the design stage but this is not a “do no harm” analysis.
- But elements of “do no harm” approach are nevertheless present in the Commission’s interventions:
 - Equitable coverage of all regions in the country (e.g. for rural development and reconstruction and rehabilitation programmes)
 - Strong analysis on conflict related issues for election support done by UNDP (who manages the basket fund for election)
- There is no evidence that conflict and interaction indicators have been used to follow the conflict.
- Commission staff stressed the difficulty of adapting the strategy and the programmes to an evolving situation. This was more the case at the early days after the conflict where more flexibility is needed because of the rapid changes occurring in the country.
- Cases exist of adaptation of projects by the Commission when they were revealed to be causing or exacerbating conflict at the local micro level (e.g. Gola Forest).

JC 1.4: Extent to which the Commission took CPPB into account in its development cooperation support in a transversal manner

- Commission support in the early period (2003-2007) explicitly aimed at supporting GoSL’s rehabilitation efforts while support in the second period (2008-2013) is less clearly articulated around CPPB.
- The Commission’s strategy is not geared towards CPPB. There is no mainstreaming strategy for CPPB but more for cross-cutting issues such as human rights (and as of 2010 an EU human rights strategy in SL with mainstreaming as an aim) and good governance.
- In sectors related to CPPB (e.g. election), the support targeted specific CPPB results; in other sectors this was not the case (e.g. GBS).
- Commission staff stressed that strategy and interventions were designed with due account taken of the conflict context. CPPB is understood as an important indirect goal of activities in non conflict sector (e.g. GBS, Decentralisation process)

EQ2 on Root Causes

JC 2.1: Tackling the root causes of conflict

- Commission strategy documents referred to and identified the root causes (based on the TRC document); the focus on the root causes was more explicit in the first programming period (2003-2007).
- Commission strategy documents aimed at tackling the root causes of conflict (in particular corruption) through support in focal areas “Good governance and institutional building” for 2003-2007 and “Good governance peace and security” for

2008-2013).

- Other donors aimed at tackling the root causes of conflict. DFID tackled more explicitly causes linked directly with conflict issues such as DDR and SSR. Germany and WB have also worked on youth unemployment which is identified as a root cause of conflict.
- Through its political dialogue, the Commission addresses also the root causes of conflict (in particular governance) and the continued support for the implementation of the TRC recommendations.
- The selected interventions assessed have not explicitly aimed at tackling the root causes. But root causes of conflict are taken into consideration in numerous interventions:
 - In the reconstruction and rehabilitation programme (RRP) to provide basic social services in all regions of the country and reduce inequalities
 - Decentralisation to avoid marginalisation of rural areas
 - PFM to support transparency and accountability

JC 2.2: Contribution to mitigating the impact of the root causes of conflict

- The international community as a whole has contributed to an improvement in the post-conflict situation (in particular peace reconciliation and good governance); the Commission contributed together with other donors such as DFID.
- Commission (and international) support had helped stabilise the situation following the war but had not addressed the long term root causes which are still present in the country:
 - Short term action on DDR and SSR supported by DFID had positive impact on the stabilisation.
 - The Commission's reconstruction and rehabilitation programme after the conflict allowed basic social service delivery
 - GBS has contributed to the macro-economic stability of the country
 - But TRC recommendations on addressing root causes have not been systematically implemented: youth unemployment, institutional capacity, justice system, fundamental rights, civil oversight
- Commission support for peace, security and reconciliation has been addressed in the political dialogue with the GoSL at the highest level; it has in the Commission's view contributed to improvements in public financial management and anti-corruption.
- No indicators were developed for assessing impact on conflict dynamics.
- Sustainability of GBS and other programmes remains an issue that could impact upon conflict dynamics.

EQ3 on Short-Term – Long-Term

JC 3.1: Mechanisms for the detection of deteriorating situations and for rapid reaction

- Commission's HQ early warning mechanisms (e.g. Watch List, Crisis Room) have not been used by the EUD. Questions are raised on their usefulness for operational means in the field by both headquarters and EUD staff.
- Early warning systems are put in place by the EUD on an ad hoc basis:
 - Through the review of press, reports (NGOs and others), etc.
 - Through on-going political analysis, which is considered important in post-conflict countries and could be increased because of the mandate of the EEAS and potentially greater capacity in new EEAS political officers forthcoming in the EUD
- But lack of information (intelligence) sharing between:

- Commission and EUMS
- Commission and ECOWAS on the regional dynamics
- ST instruments existed to deal rapidly with conflicts, e.g. RRM, IfS, and the possibility of using BS as a short term support for stabilisation in post-conflict countries, although there was no specific provision for rapid mobilisation of the funds;
- The Commission in SL is not seen as having the ability to react quickly through its programming either by itself or by others.
- IfS was reported to be useful but not flexible and adaptable enough to the changing situation of a post-conflict context.
- The Commission employed certain short term measures funded from RRM/IfS:
 - at the request of the Sierra Leone authorities for electoral mission
 - for supporting NGOs on media

JC 3.2: Preventing recurrence of crises and consolidating peace

- Commission support for the period 2003-2007 was aimed at supporting GoSL efforts at rehabilitation; specific interventions were designed for stabilisation / immediate consolidation of peace (e.g. BS, RRP);
- Parallel involvement from the Commission and DFID since the early days after the civil war:
 - DFID implemented DDR and SSR activities
 - Commission financed a post-conflict BS for legitimisation of the government and macro-economic stability – this at the time was considered a risk and the Commission was commended on taking the risk that was then followed by others (DFID, AfDB, WB).
- In the immediate consolidation-of-peace phase, Commission support did help the GoSL in its efforts towards creating a functioning bureaucracy and macro-economic stability which had a positive impact on peace and rehabilitation.

JC 3.3: Transition between short-term and long-term prevention

- Linkages between short-term (ST) and long-term (LT) support were explicit in the first CSP: the strategy aimed to follow up short-term relief (humanitarian action) with rehabilitation programmes and long-term development objectives.
- ECHO relief was gradually phased out in 2004; two LRRD programmes funded from the EDF B-envelope formed the link to medium-term development; the EDF 9 BS aimed at linking short-term relief and long-term development.

EQ4 on Geographical dimensions

JC 4.1: Appropriateness of the geographical level of intervention

- Independent conflict analyses strongly highlighted the importance of the regional dimension of the conflict.
- Commission Strategy papers included political and socio-economic analyses of both regional and national situations.
- The Commission Regional Strategy Paper for the 2008-2013 period is more clearly articulated around the conflict.
- The Commission supports both national and regional level programmes related to CPPB.
- But limited link between national and regional level. Programmes are implemented in parallel at both levels without sufficient synergies between the two levels being fully exploited. This deficiency is recognised by Commission staff.

JC 4.2: Addressing local and national needs

- Commission's support responded to national priorities as articulated in official documents. The country's needs are identified in the "Agenda for Change" (PRSP) and the TRC and the Commission strongly align its support on those documents (considered as owned by the GoSL).
- Commission support generally targeted national-level needs (e.g. GBS) but some projects covering specific geographical regions outside the capital are meeting identified needs (e.g. rural development, decentralisation process).
- At project level, explicit attempts were made to link local and national needs in the design of specific programmes (e.g. Gola Forest).
- Generally there was specific targeting of vulnerable groups and areas, but not systematically.
- National authorities generally reported that they were involved in the design of programmes. This was much less the case for civil society organisations.

JC 4.3: Regional dynamics of conflicts

- The Commission RSP devoted specific attention to the regional dynamics of conflict.
- The Commission made provision for support to strengthen the rule of law and to engage women and media participation in conflict prevention.
- The Commission recognised the importance of ECOWAS's role in conflict prevention in both RSPs and envisaged support to reinforce it (capacity-building, support for ECOWAS activities and CP mechanism, etc.)
- Commission's regional programmes with ECOWAS do not reach national programmes implemented in Sierra Leone.

JC 4.4: Articulating support at different geographical levels with a view to fostering synergies

- There has been no systematic linking of the Commission's regional and bilateral strategies.
- The importance of ensuring synergies between bilateral and regional support is more strongly acknowledged under EDF 10.
- EDF 10 bilateral and regional strategy documents share a common focal area (good governance): the objectives and activities pursued differ but are not contradictory.
- Specific projects that have a peace-building aspect have a cross-border dimension but this is rather an exception.
- Dialogue between HoD in West African countries, exchange of information

EQ5 on Coordination and complementarity

JC 5.1: "Whole-of-government approach" between and within the Commission's DGs and Directions

- There existed a joint political overall framework with the objective of enhancing coordination within the Commission (CSP);
- DGs DEV and AIDCO agreed to meet and exchange very regularly but still have only limited access to each other's work.
- Part of Community-funded aid to Sierra Leone in the initial phases was implemented by ECHO (ECHO's involvement was gradually phased out until 2004).
- Coordination between EUD and HQ is mainly based on informal communication and exchange of information.

JC 5.2: Coordination and complementarities between the Commission and the General Secretariat of the EU Council, the European Union Special Representative and with EU Member States (“whole-of-EU approach”)

- There existed joint political overall frameworks designed to enhance coordination within the EU, namely:
 - the EU Treaty of Lisbon;
 - Joint DFID-Commission CSP for the period 2008-2013 (the DFID “side” of joint strategy was more CPPB-focused). This document is considered as a useful framework but does not as such enhance coordination at operational level.
 - A new EU Strategy for Human Rights for SL from 2010 – yet limited awareness to date of this
 - A stalled and stillborn process for Sierra Leone to be a pilot country for an all of EU approach to fragility that did not come to fruition.
- Effective coordination between Commission and other EUMS (limited number in SL):
 - At political dialogue with the GoSL. EUD taking a leading role
 - At sectoral policy level with donors involved in the sector. Division of labour between donors according to PRSP priorities. Easier to have because not many donors are present in the country. But more difficult to cover all PRSP priorities.
 - Formal meetings of EU Heads of Missions take place on a monthly basis – new promising possibilities for exploiting this in a post-Lisbon Treaty context that it is too early to make judgements on.
 - Coordination working groups between donors and with the GoSL. CPPB related issues are tackled such as election, mineral resources, etc.
- Benefits for the Commission:
 - More political weight and influence over the government.
 - More confidence for the Commission in the implementation of its activities.
- But:
 - There was a lack of access to more intelligence/military information that would be useful for conflict analysis.
 - A “whole-of-EU” approach is not seen or visible by stakeholders met in SL.

JC 5.3: Coordination and complementarities with other non-EU donors, international and regional organisations

- Existence of common strategic framework for intervening in CPPB, i.e.:
 - the Lomé Peace Agreement (1999), implemented with considerable support from the donor community;
 - setting-up of a UN Peace-Building Commission in July 2006; the GoSL and PBC adopted the Sierra Leone Peace-Building Cooperation Framework (Dec 2007);
 - the “Agenda for Change” (PRSP) of the GoSL, strongly owned by the government and supported by the donors.
- Usefulness of these strategic framework for donor coordination (especially the Agenda for Change) but limited added value of the PBC
- Effective coordination within the international community:
 - Donor coordination was close initially because of the post-conflict situation. Presence of the UN missions (UNIPSIL currently) enhancing coordination with also strong alignment to PRSP;
 - existence of formal and information donor coordination meetings
 - coordination was facilitated by the limited number of donors (of which the

<p>Commission is one of the largest, after UK);</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - coordination with WB was rendered difficult by the absence of locally-based sector expertise from WB; - lead donors existed: WB for DDR and decentralisation; Commission for Rehabilitation under EDF 9; DFID/WB/UNDP for governance; - Commission and DFID cooperate closely with WB and AfDB on BS; yet opportunities for stronger coordination exist, in particular through the monitoring of the BS; - the Commission participated in several CPPB-related multi-donor pooled funds (DDR TF, WB TF in decentralisation, UNDP basket funding for election) - evidence of a EC-UNDP-IAPSO joint formulation mission for the UNDP-managed basket funding (Support to National Electoral Commission); <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Benefits of better coordination in SL <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reducing the risk of doing harm - Less burden on the government (which has little capacity) <p>JC 5.4: Coordination and complementarities with partner countries governing bodies and with non-state actors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The TRC and the “Agenda for Change” (PRSP) are seen as government-owned documents which serve for coordination, alignment and harmonisation of donor’s support in SL. ▪ The Commission strategy documents (CSPs) have been specifically anchored in these documents; ▪ The Commission strategy at regional level also has been clearly anchored in the ECOWAS-WAEMU joint regional strategy; ▪ Coordination mechanisms (for information exchange mainly) are in place between the GoSL and donors at: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Political level; <i>and</i> - individual programmes/projects. ▪ Coordination with NSAs is much less clear. Little involvement of civil society organisations in the dialogue between donors and GoSL.
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EQ6 on Commission’s Value Added on CPPB

<p>JC 6.2: The Commission’s specific value added with respect to reducing tensions and/or preventing the outbreak, recurrence or continuation of violent conflict</p> <p>Pros</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Level of financial resources (mainly through BS), as reported by interviewees but challenged by the Country Evaluation which pointed out that, in view of the huge needs of SL, the limited level of Commission interventions prevented it from achieving a critical mass; ▪ Important physical presence in the country; ▪ Reliable partner, predictability of financial resources, allowing stability in an unstable context; ▪ more neutral player than EU MS: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Less short term politically driven - Less historical colonial heritage (e.g. than UK) ▪ availability of different instruments allowed provision of support without interruption, and of phasing away from humanitarian aid, through support to reconstruction and rehabilitation, to support for social and economic development. ▪ Structured political dialogue since Lisbon Treaty (but still early days)
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Cons

- Slow and not flexible enough for fragile situations in general and in particular for CPPB direct activities such as SSR. Not enough short-term flexible instruments and the level of these instruments resources are low;
- Heavy procedures not adapted in a post-conflict situation
- Commission regional dimension synergies not exploited and not visible at country level
- a lack of analytical instruments and capacity to inform CPPB (also relevant to EQ7).

EQ7 on Means to facilitate IA

JC 7.2: Human resources policy for intervening in CPPB

- Dedicated CPPB relevant staff but specific conflict expertise was limited :
 - some seconded expertise from DFID in AIDCO working on fragility aspects (useful but the experts have now left);
 - staff dedicated to electoral observation missions (AIDCO-F2);
 - more expertise in CPPB was being developed in RELEX but there was limited accessing of this by Commission SL related officials (now EEAS, FPIS);
 - in the West Africa Region the presence of a Regional Crisis Response Planner for the Commission since 2009. But not visible at country level for SL
- Training on CPPB-related fields / cooperation in fragile situation exists and is considered as of critical importance. But lack of it at EUD level because of time constraint, mainly.
- There is no evidence of incentive mechanisms to adopt a conflict-sensitive approach in strategy or programming.
- Not the right incentives in place to attract specialised staff for post-conflict situations (financially and on leave yes and this is seen as generous, but no positive career path orientation).
- Difficulties to rapidly mobilise specialised expertise relevant to CPPB.

JC 7.3: Tools and guidance for intervening in CPPB

- Tools existed to facilitate a flexible response:
 - Article 96 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement provides some tools to allow flexible procedures and there are specific Articles relating to political dialogue and conflict prevention;
 - provision was made for flexible procedures relating to faster procurement in conflict situations. These procedures were used in SL but did not enhance swift implementation.
- there is no programme/project-level documentation or reporting specific to conflict-related issues; nor is there any requirement to carry out a conflict analysis or monitor the impact of programmes/projects on conflict or conflict sensitivity;
- there is no formal requirement for conflict analysis at Strategy level, this being taken on board in a more *ad hoc* manner;
- Guidance on CPPB related support could be interesting for EUD but need to be useful and flexible enough to the fragile situation context.

JC 7.4: Financial instruments for intervening in CPPB

- Different instruments supporting both short-term relief and long-term development were used:
 - in the early period, while EDF-funded interventions slowed down because of

- the conflict, humanitarian and ST relief has been used;
- successful handing over from ECHO to the LRRD instrument; LRRD programmes have been financed through the EDF B-envelope;
- BS (EDF 8) used in the context of stabilisation and rehabilitation (e.g PCBS);
- BS (EDF 9) successful in establishing a link between short-term relief and long-term development;
- Commission staff stressed the lack of:
 - possibilities to adapt the strategy and the programmes to an evolving situation;
 - quick and flexible financial instruments
 - simple instruments to directly support local civil society, which have low capacity

JC 7.5: Non-financial instruments for intervening in CPPB

- Commission political dialogue did cover a range of conflict-related issues including dialogue up to the highest level.
- GBS allows political leverage in addition to being a financing instrument.
- Communication on fragility issues between EUD and HQ and between EUD of West African countries (through mainly the HoD).

EQ8 on Timeliness and Cost-Effectiveness

JC 8.1: Timeliness and cost-effectiveness of Commission interventions

- Early support from the Commission since the end of the civil war. However the post-conflict situation severely hampered or delayed implementation of Commission activities and this adversely affected their cost-effectiveness.
- There were additional constraints on implementation in early days after the war: unclear and sometimes outdated sector policies, lack of ownership or of effective donor coordination, insufficient local capacity to implement donor-funded programmes.
- PCBS did suffer from implementation delays and a negative audit in 2001 but was seen as effective in terms of stabilisation;
- The Gola Forest programme was cost-effective but was not pursued in an integrated manner.
- Timeliness of the set up of the recent UNDP election basket fund, supporting the entire electoral cycle (not only the elections themselves).

JC 8.2: Impact of the regulatory and institutional set-up for the Commission's support in the field of CPPB on timeliness and cost-effectiveness

- Commission's administrative and financial requirements slows down the implementation
- In conflict (prone) or post-conflict context:
 - Rapid intervention is seen as even more important than in other context
 - But procedures are also in place to protect against risks (e.g. making sure that funds do not end up in the wrong hands or used for the wrong purposes) that are often higher in conflict context (weaker capacity of states).

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Country case studies – Timor-Leste

1. Country and conflict context



Key country data ¹			
Surface area	14 874 km ²		
Population (in 2008, estimated)	1.098 million		
Population density in 2008	73.9 per km ²		
Population growth rate (for 2005-2010)	3.3 %, avg. annual		
GDP per capita	2000 386.3 current US\$	2005 327.8 current US\$	2008 518.2 current US\$
HDI trends ² . (2009 rank: 162th out of 182 countries)	2005 0.488	2006 0.484	2007 0.489

¹ Unless otherwise specified, from UN statistical division:
<http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Occupied%20Palestinian%20Territory>

² UNDP, *Human Development Report 2009*, <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/79.html>

1.1 Profile of Conflict and Actors

On 27 September 2002 Timor-Leste became the 191st member of the United Nations and is the world's newest independent state having declared independence on May 20, 2002 following a referendum in 1999 and an interim UN administration from 1999-2002 (UNTAET). Independence marked the end of a long and brutal history of colonialism, occupation, and resistance. Colonised by Portugal, and occupied by Indonesia (1975-1999) a post-independent Timor-Leste state faces significant challenges in forging a national identity, constructing national dialogue, building the capacities of government across the board, and ending the poverty and marginalisation of its people. With a population of just over 1m people, defined by a fast-growing young population and high fertility rate (7.8), Timor-Leste holds many possibilities and risks that are intertwined in its push to build its state, economy and society. Notwithstanding regional factors such as the dominance of Australia and relations with Indonesia, the conflict risks and challenges that Timor-Leste have been largely internal and centre on the following factors.³

- Dominance in the political elite of the leaders of the former resistance with attendant factions and competition for power that retain strong informal power networks and implicate different social groups, youth groups, and security sector actors. This includes tensions between resistance leaders and followers who were in exile during the war and those who remained in the country.
- The lack of a clear security sector governance framework delineating the roles and responsibilities of the different security forces (army, police, border guards, etc.) and enabling a nationally owned and legitimate framework for the functioning, control and oversight of the security forces.
- Persistent socio-economic trends relating to a rural/urban divide (with aid, resources and power seen as 'Dili-centric') and urban migration, resettlement of IDPs and local conflicts of legacies of violence and land disputes, widespread poverty and unemployment, lack of basic services, demographics that reflect an accelerating 'youth bulge', widespread unemployment, and continuing high levels of domestic violence that reflect the systemic nature of gender inequality and gender based violence.
- The long drawn out process of investigations and rhetoric of justice, reparations and truth and reconciliation have not yet resulted in any significant prosecutions. The Chega! (Truth and reconciliation) process finally is moving with legislation now underway for reparations. However, granting of pardons by political leaders and a weak justice system where cases take a long time to be heard continue to reinforce a sense of impunity.
- The weak nature of state-society relations despite elections and institution building, whereby the lack of a sense of national identity and citizenship undermines cohesion and stability.

³ These factors are drawn from a review of the following documents: European Community, *CSP/NIP for Timor-Leste 2008-2013 in the 10th EDF*; CEPAD/*Interpeace*, 2009; ICG Reports 2006-2010; Scanteam (for NORAD/Norway), 2007; UN Security Council, *Reports on missions in Timor-Leste 2005-2010*; UNITED NATIONS, October 2006, *Report of Commission of Enquiry*; UN Security Council visit (2007); World Bank/ADB Brief, 2007 (see bibliography).

- The gaping capacity gap in all sectors and the time lag in arriving at indigenous, sustainable solutions to it, accompanied by a certain backlash against highly-paid short term external experts and advisers.
- The capacities and abilities for Timor-Leste to benefit from the oil reserves in its waters and the extraction agreements it negotiated with Australia and the revenue mechanism for long-term budgetary management of oil funds that has been supported by Norway.
- Language remains a divisive factor with Portuguese as the official language as opposed to Tetum (indigenous language) and Bahasa (Indonesian) as the languages most widely spoken by the population. A largely Anglophone international operating environment adds to this mix.

The most recognised members of the political elite are:

- José Manuel Ramos-Horta who was elected President in May 2007. He acted as interim Prime Minister during the 2006 crisis when PM Mari Alkatiri resigned. In 2002 he was appointed first Foreign Minister of Timor-Leste. He was founder and former member of Fretelin and its spokesperson in exile for many years. He received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996.
- Xanana Gusmão, previously the President of Timor-Leste in the lead up to the 2006 crisis, was appointed Prime Minister in July 2007 following parliamentary elections in which his CNRT party won 24% of the vote. This placed them behind the former PM Mari Alkatiri and his party Fretelin, who won 29% of the vote but were unable to form a government. CNRT joined with other parties post-election to form the Alliance for a Parliamentary Majority (AMP) which formed the current Government. He led the united armed resistance movement in Timor-Leste for 17 years before being jailed in Jakarta in 1992 where he continued to lead the resistance until the referendum for independence in 1999. He has strong links to the armed forces.
- Mari Alkatiri is one of the founders of Fretelin and was the first Prime Minister of the independent state in 2002. He resigned in June 2006 during the crisis. He was a leader-in-exile for Fretelin in Mozambique having been out of the country on a mission when Indonesia invaded in 1975. He returned in 2000 and became Secretary-General of Fretelin. He is credited in his role of Economic Minister in the UNTAET transitional administration of negotiating a good deal with Australia regarding the oil reserves in the Timor Sea.

Civil society is weak but dynamic with a range of national platforms, NGOs and local groups emerging since independence.

1.2 Key Dynamics and Events

A new momentum of international interest in Timor-Leste came in the aftermath of a **crisis in 2006** prompted by splits within the army and between army and police that spilled over into clashes on the streets that resulted in some 42 people being killed, at least 40 being injured, and over 70,000 people displaced.⁴ The violence triggered a wave of attacks across the country including beatings and house-burnings as many grievances erupted, unchecked. **Fresh presidential and parliamentary elections in 2007** were marked by controversy as FRETELIN, the party that grew from the Timorese resistance to Indonesian occupation, was voted out of power and initially resisted accepting the outcome. A period of reflection during 2007 as the implications of coming to the abyss were absorbed by all actors involved. International donors focused on repositioning and rethinking their strategies to learn from the crisis and renew efforts to help the country stay on track to achieve stability and development. **A further flashpoint was the attacks on the President and Prime Minister in February 2008** by renegade army officers. However, these flashpoints in themselves are seen as symptoms of more systemic and historical tensions and unresolved conflicts in Timor-Leste, that threaten to become cleavages for future more violent conflict if they are not fully addressed:

- The proper functioning of police and army in a democratic state;
- A process of national dialogue along with a strengthened and functioning justice system to heal the past and build foundations for a shared future;
- Building the basic capacities and functions of state, economy and society;
- Delivering tangible evidence of peace and development to the people of Timor-Leste almost 10 years after Indonesian occupation has ended.

Common to both the triggers and the underlying causes of the 2006 crisis was the urgent need for mature political leadership within the fractious political elite that is seen by local analysts, observers and activists to contribute to instability.⁵ A United Nations Security Council visit to Timor-Leste in November 2007 (S/2007/711) concluded: “Central to the crisis were issues of governance, the separation of powers and the building of sustainable institutions... Rebuilding the confidence of the population in the institutions of the State and the security situation, reintegrating internally displaced persons and resolving the inevitable disputes over land and property are all very real challenges facing the nation in 2007 and beyond.” (para.22) “It is clear that there remains a need for continued dialogue and conflict resolution activities at the national and community levels to foster greater political consensus and defuse the existing tensions. (Para.23) Justice is also necessary to buttress the ongoing efforts for dialogue and national reconciliation. (Para.24).

Security Sector development is highlighted by many observers and analysts as the highest potential risk for future instability and conflict. During and after the crisis in 2006, “male youth” was also identified as a critical group in terms of potential mobilisation and

⁴ International Crisis Group, October 2006, and UN Reports (Commission of Inquiry, Oct. 2006 and UN Secretary-General Report to the Security Council -S/2006/628) (see bibliography).

⁵ The Findings of the Independent Commission of Inquiry led by Ian Martin to establish the facts of the events of 2006 demonstrate this fact quite clearly. See United Nations, October 2006 (see bibliography).

involvement in violence within the demographic surge that means young people (male and female) aged between 15-29 make up some 25% of the population and that this number was expected to reach 37% by 2010. Youth unemployment is some 43% nationally and 58% in Dili.⁶ There is concern in a number of reports and analyses about the growing disaffection of a younger generation who have no memory or connection to the resistance and feel remote from the leadership of the country. The implications of this lack of civic engagement and national identity are potentially serious when coupled with a real lack of educational and economic opportunities.

The OECD in its 2010 Report on Timor-Leste on the *Monitoring the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations* concludes from its consultations that: “There was a general view that instability could be triggered by a range of factors rather than just one source. Accordingly, participants viewed peacebuilding as requiring an integrated approach – not just the cessation of violence and security – but also improved service delivery, reform of the security and justice sectors, investment in non-oil growth and employment opportunities, and addressing the needs of women and youth [...] An inclusive peace process, together with appropriate conflict resolution mechanism (including both formal and informal justice) were identified as key strategies”. (p.9)

1.3 International and Local Responses

The independence of Timor-Leste has been defined by the shifting mandates of 5 UN missions:

- *The United Nations Mission in East Timor* (UNAMET) (June - October 1999) was a political mission mandated to organise and conduct a popular consultation to ascertain the future status of East Timor.
- *The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor* (UNTAET) (October 1999 - May 2002) was a peacekeeping operation established by the Security Council following rejection by the East Timorese of special autonomy. It exercised administrative authority over East Timor during the transition to independence.
- *The United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor* (UNMISSET) (May 2002 - May 2005), also a peacekeeping mission, was mandated to provide assistance to the newly independent Timor-Leste until all operational responsibilities were fully devolved to the national authorities.
- Once the peacekeeping mission withdrew, a new political mission, the *United Nations Office in Timor-Leste* (UNOTIL) (May 2005 - August 2006), supported the development of critical State institutions and the police and provided training in observance of democratic governance and human rights.
- The UN returned in force following the 2006 crisis, in the form of the ongoing United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). It has an extensive mandate covering *inter alia* policing, capacity building for policing, security sector review, national dialogue, and working through the UN agencies, funds and programmes (UN Country Team) to work with Government on implementing national development plans. This mandate is expected to be reconsidered with possible drawdown of the

⁶ All figures cited are taken from World Bank/ADB Brief (2007).

mission following the 2012 elections. There is pressure for UNMIT to support the Government to put key foundations in place in terms of security and national dialogue before the inevitable drawdown of the mission.

Bilateral aid has been a strong and dominant trend despite a relatively small group of donors with a presence on the ground.⁷ The main bilateral players remain Australia Japan and Portugal who count for 57% of country programmable aid. The European Commission upgraded its presence to full Delegation status in 2008. Non-OECD donors are playing an increasingly important role, most notably China which has announced some \$1.2bn of support to Timor-Leste including the very high-profile infrastructure projects of the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of the President.

A review of donor practices in light of the 2006 crisis was commissioned by NORAD⁸ (Norway) and it **highlights the extent to which development actors had not considered the risk of conflict or violence in the design of their programmes in the 2002-2006 period.** The review presents the extent to which aid policies and spending compounded imbalances that contributed to conflict tensions – an over-emphasis on state-building in the capital and central government, insufficient attention to micro-economic and employment efforts, and a lack of focus on the emergence of political and economic exclusion across the country: ‘The Development Partners correctly anticipated that there were no external threats to Timor-Leste after Independence. However, the Partners have under-estimated the significance of internal conflicts. Collectively, they had a limited understanding of the country during the initial phase: its history, social dynamics, culture and the political intricacies of its people, and had difficulty profiling the Timorese and their relationships. What guided actions was the perception that Timor-Leste was a small homogeneous country, politically unified in its opposition to the Indonesian occupation; a perception that has proven to be incorrect.’

One of the outcomes of the 2006 crisis was to call for greater coordination among donors in supporting a Compact for coherent actions in six priority areas agreed jointly by the new Government and the international community: public safety and security; elections; public sector strengthening with a focus on human resource development, decentralisation and budget execution; youth employment and skills development; justice sector strengthening; and social reinsertion of internally displaced persons, humanitarian assistance, dialogue and reconciliation, healing of societal trauma and support to vulnerable groups. The Compact has been superseded by the new Government’s frameworks of Vision 2020 (2007) and National Priorities Programme (2008 & 2009) and there remain important donor coordination efforts through the annual dialogue managed by Government, twice monthly informal donor meetings chaired by the World Bank, and with the full EU Delegation in Dili there are now regular meetings of the EUMS present on the ground. Donor coordination remains challenging and important for post-conflict development in Timor-Leste and donors are now more self-reflective about the negative aspects of some practices. Key lessons on the focus and implementation of donor support including have been drawn

⁷ See OECD, 2010, and Government of Timor-Leste and Government of Australia, 2008 (see bibliography).

⁸ Scanteam (for the Embassy of Norway (Jakarta)), *Review of Development Cooperation in Timor-Leste*, September 2007, and NORAD, p. 3 (see bibliography).

including the (1) need for shared analysis of context and (2) over-concentration of donor activity in Dili reinforcing the urban/rural divide. The Dili Declaration 2010 which confirms the new focus of the OECD DAC on peacebuilding and state building as the basis of dialogue with fragile states has been endorsed by the Government of Timor-Leste⁹.

2. Commission's response strategy

2.1 Overall Commission's strategy

2.1.1 *Key strategic lines of the Commission's Strategy in Timor-Leste (2001-2010)*

The Commission's support to the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste started after the country became independent from Indonesia in 1999. From 1999 to 2002 the main support from the Commission was humanitarian aid and rehabilitation funds (through UN and WB trust funds as explained in the next section). The first strategic approach by the Commission to supporting Timor-Leste, in the framework of a Country Strategy Paper (CSP), was launched in 2002 for a period of five years up until 2006. Two other CSPs were then drawn up for the period 2006-2007 and 2008-2013 (they are further explained below).

The Commission's cooperation with Timor-Leste from 2002 to 2006 was embodied in the Council **ALA Regulation**¹⁰ and the Council **Regulation on Rehabilitation**¹¹. These two Regulations were the main legal basis within which the Commission articulated its early support. In 2003 the EU Council of Ministers approved the accession of Timor-Leste to the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, the **Cotonou Agreement**. Timor-Leste duly ratified that Agreement on 19 December 2005. This new legal basis allowed Timor-Leste to benefit from EDF 9 for the period 2006-2007 and the country is now benefitting from EDF 10 for the period 2008-2013.

The **main objectives** of the Commission cooperation with Timor-Leste for the period **2002-2006** were (as indicated in the 2002-2006 CSP):

- to complete the rehabilitation programme in Timor-Leste, ending commitments made in 2002 and 2003;
- in parallel, to help launch a long-term development programme, particularly for the health and rural sectors;
- to maintain the Commission's position as a partner of substance for Timor-Leste, ensuring the visibility of Community assistance; *and*
- to help Timor-Leste to develop a strategy for its external trade and economic relations.

⁹ <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/30/44927821.pdf>

¹⁰ Council Regulation (EEC) n°443/92 of 25 February 1992 on financial and technical assistance to, and economic co-operation with, the developing countries in Asia and Latin America.

¹¹ Council Regulation (EEC) n°2258/92 of 22 November 1996 on rehabilitation and reconstruction operations in developing countries.

The **main objective for the periods 2006-2007 and 2008-2013** (since Timor-Leste joined the ACP-EC Partnership) has been to support the GoTL's priorities laid down in its Strategic Plan for Economic Development and more specifically in the following sectors:

- sustainable rural development (for both periods);
- health (for the 2008-2013 period);
- institutional capacity-building (for both periods); *and*
- support to civil society (for the 2008-2013 period).

The following table summarises the main sectors supported by the Commission's cooperation and the indicative budget allocated from 2002 to 2013.

Table 1 – Main cooperation sectors and indicative budget allocations (2002-2013)

	Main priority cooperation sectors	Indicative budget allocations
CSP 2002-2006 (under the ALA and Rehabilitation Regulations)	Priority 1: Health Priority 2: Rural Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ €22m for health (€10m under the rehabilitation budget line and €12m under the ALA budget line) ▪ €33m for rural development (€18m under the rehabilitation budget line and €15m under the ALA budget line) <p>Total: €55m</p>
CSP 2006-2007 ("bridging" CSP for EDF 9)	Focal sector 1: Sustainable rural development Focal sector 2: Institutional capacity building	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ €12m for rural development ▪ €6m for institutional capacity-building (including a technical cooperation facility) <p>Total: €18m (from EDF 9; does not include funds from other Commission budget lines)</p>
CSP 2008-2013 (under EDF 10)	Focal sector 1: Sustainable rural development Focal sector 2: Health Focal sector 3: institutional capacity-building Non-focal sector: support for non-state actors; technical cooperation facility	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ €35m for rural development ▪ €8m for health ▪ €13m for institutional capacity-building ▪ €4m for NSA ▪ €3m for TCF <p>Total: €63m (from the EDF 10 "A" envelope. It does not include funds from other Commission budget lines)</p>

Source: CSP 2002-2006; CSP 2006-2007; CSP 2008-2013

2.1.2 The Commission's strategy with respect to CPPB

The Timor-Leste's post-conflict situation and challenges are well identified in the CSPs. The general context analysis sections provide clear and detailed information on the dynamics, actors and root causes of the conflict. CPPB is an issue that remains predominant in the country as stated in the 2008-2013 CSP: *"the country remains vulnerable to conflicts: the risk of renewed violence is compounded by internal fault lines: declining income, increasing poverty, high unemployment and emerging corruption"*.

However, the Commission's cooperation strategy with Timor-Leste does not focus on CPPB. The main priority of the Commission is to ensure long-term development in rural development, health and institutional capacity building (as shown in the focal sectors described in the above section). CPPB is mentioned from time to time as a cross-cutting theme to be addressed within the focal areas of cooperation, among other cross-cutting themes such as gender, environment, good governance and human rights. When conflict prevention is mentioned, the only planned support relates to elections. No other actions relating to CPPB are planned in the focal or non-focal areas.

2.2 Implementation of the Commission's Strategy

Actual implementation of the Commission's strategy in terms of funds effectively contracted for projects can be traced through an analysis of data extracted from the Common Relex Information System (CRIS), the database which provides information on all interventions financed by the Commission in partner countries. The following data for Timor-Leste were extracted by the evaluation team in September 2010, and provides financial and operational information on all interventions contracted by the Commission over the period from 2001 to September 2010. Financial data presented in the figures below are contracted amounts for national-level interventions financed from the EDF and the general budget of the Commission.

All interventions financed in Timor-Leste were classified by the evaluation team according to their relevance to CPPB in light of the 2001 Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention. This classification has been made in accordance with the methodology developed in the main inventory of the Commission's support to CPPB included in the preliminary study for this evaluation¹². For further explanation of the methodology and its limitations, please refer to that study.

The period analysed below is 2001-2010 (the evaluation's timeframe specified by the ToR). It is however important to note that the Commission started its financial cooperation with Timor-Leste from the early days of independence, with substantive funds for emergency relief and rehabilitation. According to funding details provided in the 2002-2006 CSP, the **Commission's financial contributions from September 1999 to 2001 amounted to €109m**(they are not included in the graphs and figures below) as follows:


¹² ADE (for the European Commission), *Preliminary study for the thematic evaluation of the Commission's support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building*, July 2009.
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/2009/1266_docs_en.htm

- €47.5m to the World Bank Trust Fund for East Timor (TFET), particularly to establish health services and rehabilitate infrastructure;
- €10m to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET);
- €42m from ECHO through contracts with international NGOs, international government organisations and UN agencies, to help with alleviation of emergencies, especially in health and food supply;
- €8.5m for food aid implemented through the World Food Programme;
- €1m for elections, contributing to civic and voter education and constitutional consultation, along with an electoral observation mission for the August 2001 elections to the Constituent Assembly.

Over the period 2001 to September 2010 the Commission contracted a total of €117m for national-level interventions implemented in Timor-Leste (excluding ECHO funds which are not included in CRIS).

The trend in the total amounts contracted over the period is presented in the figure below. It also shows the distribution of CPPB related and non-CPPB related funds.

Figure 1 - Evolution of amounts contracted (€m) by the Commission to Timor-Leste between 2001 and September 2010




During the period 2001-2002 all funds contracted by the Commission in Timor-Leste were related to CPPB. Indeed these funds were mainly **additional contributions to the TFET** (the Commission had already contributed to the TFET in 1999 and 2000 to a total of €47.5m) and **support to the Presidential election**. These activities were mainly financed by the Rehabilitation budget line and the Democracy and Human Rights budget lines.

In 2003 and 2004 the Commission started its support for **rehabilitating the health and rural development** sector in Timor-Leste. These interventions are considered as CPPB-related (according to the inventory methodology developed in the preliminary study for this evaluation).

From 2005 to 2010 the Commission kept financing the **health and rural development** sector and also supported **civil society** (through the NSA budget line) and **elections** (through the EIDHR budget line). In 2006 and 2009 additional funds were contracted for **food aid and food security** (€5.6m in 2006 and €4.6m in 2009). The **Instrument for Stability** (IFS) was also used in 2009 to finance interventions to a total of €2.4m.

A more detailed breakdown of Commission funds contracted by financing instrument or budget line is presented in the figure below.


Figure 2 - Breakdown of Commission financial instruments used in Timor-Leste, (€m contracted, 2001-September 2010)



Most of the funds contracted by the Commission for interventions in Timor-Leste are from the “**Asia**” budget line (under the ALA Regulation) and the “**Rehabilitation**” budget line. These budget lines were used during the early recovery of Timor-Leste after its independence up until 2006. Timor-Leste joined the ACP-EC Partnership in 2005 and benefited from **EDF 9** only from 2007. This explains why only 15% of the total amount contracted in Timor-Leste is financed from the EDF.

The other budget lines and financing instruments used in Timor-Leste are **food security** (9%), **EIDHR** (4%), **NSA** (4%) and the **IFS-RRM** (2%).

In terms of CPPB-related thematic interventions supported by the Commission over the entire period, the figure below provides an overview of CPPB categories against non-CPPB-related support.

Figure 3 - CPPB categories breakdown (€m contracted, 2001 - September 2010)

Following the methodology used in the preliminary study to classify each intervention by CPPB-related thematic category, the figure above shows that **87% of the amounts contracted by the Commission in Timor-Leste were for CPPB-related interventions.**


These CPPB-related interventions fell into the following thematic categories::

- A **multi-sector category**¹³ representing 53% of the total amount contracted by the Commission. The interventions classified under this category are those supporting the health and rural development sectors (the two main focal sectors of the Commission's cooperation with Timor-Leste). They have been placed in this category because they support health and rural development but have components of reconstruction, infrastructure and rehabilitation following the 1999 conflict in Timor-Leste.
- **Reconstruction & infrastructure** (14%); the contributions to the TFET are classified in this category.
- **Rapid intervention** (10%) for food aid and interventions financed through the IFS.
- **Democracy, rule of law and civil society** (mainly support to the elections), **Peace consolidation and prevention of future conflict**, and **Security Sector Reform**

The Commission uses different channels of delivery to implement its development aid in Timor-Leste. They are presented in the figure below.

¹³ The "multi-sector" category is defined in the Preliminary study as "Interventions covering more than one sector and cannot be linked to other thematic categories".

Figure 4 - Breakdown of channels of delivery used to implement Commission assistance to Timor-Leste (€m contracted, 2001 - September 2010)



The figure shows that the **Commission works mainly with international organisations** in Timor-Leste (63% of total amounts contracted). The Commission channels its funds mainly through the **World Bank** (contributions to the TFET but also early health and rural development rehabilitation programmes) and **UNDP** (for election support, rural development and security sector reform). The other partners of the Commission are **civil society**, **private companies** and **EUMS development agencies** (mainly GTZ).

3. Evaluation findings

For each EQ this section presents in bullet points, by JC, evaluation findings at country level. These findings are based on the analysis emerging from the desk and field phases of the evaluation and from the analysis of the results of the survey sent to EUD (see Annex 7).

EQ1 on Mainstreaming

€JC 1.1: (Elements of) conflict analyses carried out or used by the Commission

- The Commission **remained informed of the conflict situation through different channels:**
 - Prior to 2008, information was gathered through the presence of Technical Assistance in the country.
 - As of 2008 and EUD was created, which favoured field knowledge through information gathering on a continuous basis, such as through political dialogue with national authorities, exchanges with other donors and actors.
 - Over the period considered the EUD did not have a political section.
- **In terms of documented structured conflict analysis:**
 - **No formal conflict analysis was carried out by the Commission**, although elements of context analysis related to conflict can be found in the

CSPs, and more in particular in the 2008-2013 CSP, which comprises an analysis of the conflict dynamics and lessons learned from the 2006 crisis and underlines the fact that the country remains vulnerable to conflict. This does not however constitute a formal conflict analysis.

- **Other donors carried out conflict analyses but these remained often internal documents** (USAID, Irish AID, and UNDP) and have not been systematically shared and used as a basis for designing strategies.
- **Some weaknesses in terms of conflict analysis by the donor community have been highlighted:** some reviews of donor cooperation with Timor-Leste mention that there was a lack of shared understanding of the context and appreciation of the risks for conflict. As an example, a Norwegian study of 2007 considered that Development Partners had correctly anticipated that there were no external threats to Timor-Lest after 2007, but had under-estimated the risk of internal conflicts.

JC 1.2: Informing financial and non-financial Commission support by (elements of) conflict analyses

- The design of Commission support took into account the knowledge on the conflict, but this was done in an informal manner rather than through explicit mechanism to link conflict analysis and design:
 - Programming documents examined did not explicitly refer to the conflict. There was no formal conflict analysis (internal or external) informing the prioritisation of support or the design of interventions.
 - Interviews conducted confirmed that conflict analysis existed but was rather “implicit” in the support.
 - The activities undertaken and instruments used however point towards a taking into account of the conflict in the design of strategy and programming. As an example, the Commission used a mix of instruments including IfS and special derogation of EDF rules since 2009 for ‘fragile states’, reflecting a responsiveness to a conflict context.
- Conflict-related risks for implementation were discussed in some interventions (Elections and Rural Development) in terms of the external environment for programming.
- The Commission has provided support in areas considered important by others (OECD, GTZ, NORAD) for addressing conflict risks, for example rural development and focus on youth and IDPs.

JC 1.3: Do no harm approaches

- “Do no harm” is a concern according to interviewees. As an example (see EQ 4), the sensitivity to disparities between different districts is invoked. There is no reporting of Commission interventions “having done harm”.
- This being said, it was, as also confirmed by interviewees, rather a matter of professionalism of individuals than embedded in an explicit and formalised “do no harm” approach:
 - No formal indicators for conflict-sensitivity were established by the strategy or overall programmes;
 - there is no evident change of strategy or interventions in response to conflict events;
 - an exception is the IOM-implemented ‘support to community stabilisation’ as part of the rural development programme in which conflict-related indicators are provided in the logframe but there is no evidence of follow-up or reporting on them in the M&E documents.

JC 1.4: Extent to which the Commission took CPPB into account in its development cooperation support in a transversal manner

- With the exception of specific initiatives or projects such as support to elections, targeting of IDPs in rural development, and capacity-building of women's leadership in local government, there was no systematic perspective or mainstreaming approach to CPPB in the Commission's development cooperation.
- There was no explicit commitment to or mechanism for mainstreaming CPPB in strategy or programmes.

EQ2 on Root causes

JC 2.1: Tackling the root causes of conflict

- There is no explicit analysis or reference to 'root causes' of conflict in the overall strategy or programmes of the Commission. Elements of context analysis, particularly in the 2008-2013 CSP, clearly refer to the importance to issues that have been considered 'root causes' of conflict: governance and nation-building, legacies of justice from the past, land rights and poverty reduction including youth unemployment. Monitoring reports from one initiative do directly identify IDPs, lack of infrastructure and socio-economic opportunities in the rural areas and rural-urban migration as potential triggers for conflict and instability.
- Stakeholders interviewed generally mention a wide range of similar root causes, encompassing issues related to unemployment, impunity, IDPs, former combatants, "martial art groups", land rights, SSR, etc. but they do not refer to or provide a structured analysis of root causes. The checklist on root causes of conflict has not been used. Some stakeholders mentioned that there might be a risk of "*working on the basis of non verified assumptions*" when there is no explicit and structured analysis of root causes.
- Over the years, the support evolved from emergency to rehabilitation to development. More specifically interviewees underlined that:
 - Interventions responded to needs of the country, but needs were very wide.
 - Several interventions were expected to mitigate directly (e.g. elections) or indirectly (e.g. rural development interventions) the root causes.
- Document analysis and interviews do not point towards CPPB as the overarching objective of the cooperation or to a specific approach and prioritisation with a view to *maximise* the contribution to CPPB and to the tackling of root causes.

JC 2.2: Contribution to mitigating the impact of the root causes of conflict

- Root causes are not explicitly addressed in the Commission strategy but elements of programming can be said to be mitigating the impact of certain factors in relation to youth unemployment, rural development, rehabilitation and resettlement of IDPs.
- There are no indicators, or any monitoring of impact of the support, in terms of mitigation of 'root causes' or addressing them directly in the overall strategy or interventions.
- In the IOM-implemented 'support to community stabilisation', explicit indicators for rural-urban migration trends and community stability were put in place but proved difficult to measure, according to the Commission's monitoring reports.

EQ3 on Short term prevention

JC 3.1: Mechanisms for the detection of deteriorating situations and for rapid reaction

- The Commission did not have a formalised and structured approach to detect deteriorating situations, nor were specific early warning mechanisms set-up, but used different sources to remain informed of the evolution of the situation. This encompassed the follow up through the EUD (and the EU representative Office before 2008), but also information provided by other actors.
- Several violent crises, notably in 2006 and 2008 were not really anticipated by the Commission; interviews and document analyses showed however that these crises were also not anticipated by other actors (as also confirmed by several of these actors). Stakeholders met underlined that when confronted to (non anticipated) crises, the Commission has nevertheless been able to react quickly, notably by using a mix of financing instruments to respond to deteriorating situations, notably with the RRM after the 2006 crisis and the IfS following the 2008 crisis. Stakeholders met underlined the usefulness of these instruments to intervene rapidly, despite some limits (see EQ 7). They also underlined the “blocking effect” of the long-term geographical assistance that limits the Commission’s capacity to react to a changing situation.

JC 3.2: Preventing recurrence of crises and consolidating peace

- There is a strategy commitment to sequencing of short-term and long-term instruments including the food security, rehabilitation, ALA and EDF budget lines and use of the crisis mechanisms of RRM and IfS, but this is not explicitly placed in a context of peace-building or peace consolidation.
- There are no relevant indicators, nor has there been any monitoring, of peace consolidation and peace-building.
- The support for elections in 2007 had an explicit objective of contributing to political stability following the political violence of 2006.

JC 3.3: Transition between short-term and long-term prevention

- LRRD is more evident as a framework for moving from humanitarian aid through rehabilitation to long-term development. Exit strategies were not sufficiently considered for the rehabilitation (TFET) project, and other interventions are more stand-alone and so not readily linked to longer-term follow up (IfS).
- In terms of the sequencing of emergency – rehabilitation – development, several stakeholders have underlined the risk of moving to rapidly towards development, as suggested by the Government’s slogan “*Goodbye conflict, welcome development*”. This could indeed lead to ignoring the short conflict risks that are not all solved yet (see also EQ 5).

EQ4 on Geographical dimensions

JC 4.1: Appropriateness of the geographical level of intervention

- There was no conflict analysis guiding the selection of levels of intervention. However CSPs reflect some elements of context analysis, with comment particularly on the national and local levels in Timor-Leste. There was no strategic basis or justification for the levels of intervention.
- A Norad report underlined that after the independence, development partners were focused more on external conflict threat, rather than on internal conflict risk factors. This was also confirmed by several stakeholders met.
- Several elements of the Commission support in the country, indicated however that there was a sensitivity to the geographical features of the conflict, e.g.:
 - Part of the support concentrated on rural zones, with attention devoted to a balanced approach between districts;
 - The attention devoted to the IDPs.

JC 4.2: Addressing local and national needs

- Interventions were aimed at both national and local levels.
- Vulnerable areas and groups (IDPs, women and rural youth) were identified but not necessarily with respect to conflict risk factors.
- Partnership with Government is evident but stakeholders met underline that administrative capacities remain challenging and there also remains scope for greater ownership and involvement.

JC 4.3: Regional dynamics of conflicts

- The regional dimension is rather absent in strategy and programmes. This is partly due to lack of alignment of timing of RSP and CSP development as Timor-Leste signed the Cotonou Agreement in December 2005.
- Relations with Indonesia, Australia and other powerful regional actors were not addressed, neither were informal networks and flows involving Timor-Leste and the region.
- The issue of cross-border tensions and trade with West Timor where an enclave of Oecussi is located, and where the Commission has funded interventions, is not addressed.

JC 4.4: Articulating support at different geographical levels with a view to fostering synergies

- Evidence does not point towards a clear geographical strategy at national, regional and local levels in Timor-Leste or to elements that allow stating that geographic levels were considered in terms of CPPB.

EQ5 on Coordination and Complementarity

JC 5.1: “Whole-of-government approach” between and within the Commission’s DGs and Directions

- Coordination between Commission DGs took place at the drafting stage of the CSP (mainly between AIDCO and DG DEV in consultation with ECHO).
- Issues concerning linking of relief, rehabilitation and development were well coordinated between ECHO and AIDCO/DEV.
- For long-term interventions AIDCO is involved in the design and consults DG DEV, but no compulsory guidelines for coordination exist at the design stage.
- For short-term interventions (e.g. IfS), RELEX coordinated directly with EUD.
- In terms of coordination between the EUD and the HQs, stakeholders met underlined that:
 - The EUD received strong political support from HQs.
 - There was regular exchange of information between the EUD and HQ, although these exchanges were not geared specifically towards CPPB.
 - Some important difficulties remained in terms of interaction. As an example, Timor Leste was at one stage taken off the list of fragile states, without prior consultation of the EUD. It was only upon reaction of the EUD and a visit of the responsible Commissioner to Timor Leste that the country was put back on the list.
 - There were no specific capitalisation exercises on CPPB.

JC 5.2: Coordination and complementarities between the Commission and the General Secretariat of the EU Council, the European Union Special Representative and with EU Member States (“whole-of-EU approach”)

- At country level, there was no overall policy framework to ensure coordination between the Commission and EUMS. This is however in the pipeline and foreseen for 2014.
- Several elements point however to a rather well functioning coordination:
 - Stakeholders met generally consider that EU MS amongst themselves and with the Commission were broadly speaking on the same line. Given its history with the country, Portugal plays a specific role, but there were no real disagreements in this respect.
 - Stakeholders underline that in general in Timor Leste, EU MS are not really tied to specific national interest.
 - EU MS that are smaller donors consider that they are represented through the EUD.
 - Several activities took place in terms of coordination of strategy and programming:
 - *there were regular coordination meetings: these focused however more on the exchange of information than on a specific division of roles, although there are exceptions;
 - *no overlap has been reported but there is also no systematic analysis of gaps to be filled. Some complementarities were reported but they are not part of a systematic approach to enhance complementarities;

JC 5.3: Coordination and complementarities with other non-EU donors, international and regional organisations

- Following the independence of Timor-Leste, coordination of international

community support was led by the UN (through special missions and Trust Funds) and the WB (through administration of Trust Funds). It is reported in intervention evaluations and general lessons learnt from past Commission cooperation for the period 2002-2006 that coordination was “remarkably good”.

- But recent reports (2008-2010) on reviews of development cooperation identified poor donor coordination as compounding the challenges of disbursing and implementing aid in Timor-Leste.
- Joint donor needs assessment missions were carried out (led by UN and WB); joint working groups or committees existed at country level for the interventions reviewed.
- Donor reports identified benefits of coordination such as standardisation of procedures, mobilisation of substantial funds, and avoidance of duplication or reporting burden.
- Several stakeholders underlined that in general coordination was more about exchanging information, although examples of division of labour and leadership by sector existed. Some specific cases of lack of coordination have also been highlighted, such as the very high number of donors’ advisors in the Ministry of Finance.

JC 5.4: Coordination and complementarities with partner countries governing bodies and with non-state actors

- The GoTL was involved in the drafting of the 2006-2007 and 2008-2013 CSPs but not the 2002-2006 CSP because a fully-fledged government was not in place at the time.
- There is a donor coordination forum with national government and line ministries, but not a real mechanism for coordination.
- In terms of alignment, the partner country’s strategic development plans and needs are taken into account in strategic documents and at intervention level, but stakeholders expressed different critical views in this respect:
 - Some stakeholders raised questions about the capacities of the national counterparts and the huge task ahead (everything needed to be rebuild from scratch).
 - There were also diverging views between donors and the national counterparts:
 - *several donors underlined the importance of capacity building while the national counterparts considered that more efforts should be dedicated to infrastructure;
 - *a motto of the Timor Leste Government is “*Goodbye conflict, welcome development*”. Some stakeholders explained that this expresses of a voluntaristic attitude to aim for the future and leave the conflict behind, but also a political message to underline the merits of the work that has been done so far. Such statement has impacted the Government and donors Headquarters willingness to continue supporting CPPB activities, despite, in the view of several stakeholders, remaining needs in this respect.
- Stakeholders mentioned the Commission’s ability in Timor Leste to convey messages to the national authorities.
- Civil society involvement at strategic and intervention levels existed but is still weak.

EQ6 on Commission's Value Added on CPPB

JC6.1: The Commission's role in promoting the integrated approach

- The Commission does not mention an integrated approach to CPPB. It does not address CPPB as such in its strategic documents for its cooperation with Timor-Leste.

JC 6.2: The Commission's specific value added with respect to reducing tensions and/or preventing the outbreak, recurrence or continuation of violent conflict

- The Commission is a significant donor in Timor-Leste (fourth largest in terms of funding) and in the projects it supports (which were analysed in this phase):
 - Reconstruction and rehabilitation (TFET)
 - Elections in 2007
 - Rural development
- Stakeholders met have underlined several other aspects of the Commission's value added, relevant for support to CPPB:
 - The Commission is considered as a transparent, consistent, and neutral (with no specific geostrategic interests) donor;
 - National authorities and other donors met have underlined the EU values regarding human rights and democracy, and the importance of having linkages with Europe;
 - The importance of the presence of an EUD was also underlined: stakeholders (notably national authorities) underlined that it was important to have a big entity like the EU represented in a country like Timor Leste, which is caught between two powerful players such as Indonesia and Australia;
 - EU MS with a smaller representation in Timor Leste, underlined they benefitted from being represented by the EUD;
 - The use of certain instruments such as the IfS, which could be mobilised quite swiftly.
- On the down side, the Commission is being seen as having heavy procedures compared to other donors and as being slow.

EQ7 on Means to facilitate IA

JC 7.1: The institutional set-up for intervening in CPPB

- The above mentioned issue (see EQ 5) concerning the manner in which it has been decided to include or not Timor Leste on the list of fragile countries, and in particular the involvement of the EUD in this respect, posed some questions in terms of organisation set-up and division of roles.
- Representatives of the EUD underlined that the HQ Units working on CPPB are known and consulted (this concerns mainly the IfS).
- Several EUD representatives shared the perception that in terms of level of priority, Timor Leste was treated by HQs as one among other developing countries, with little attention to the fragility situation.

JC 7.2: Human resources policy for intervening in CPPB

- Before 2008, there was already substantial activity in the country, but only one representative present in the country.
- EUD staff was in general more geared towards development, but the EUD counts

also three staff members with dedicated CPPB knowledge.

- Training on CPPB-related issues existed at HQ level but was not compulsory for Commission staff working on these issues. It was also not really used by EUD staff for reasons of lack of budget and time to travel to Brussels.
- The recruitment strategy was not set-up in such a way that it took formally into account the conflict (prone) situation.

JC 7.3: Tools and guidance for intervening in CPPB

- Flexible procedures were used in Timor-Leste (considered as a Fragile State according to the Commission classification) for the implementation of EDF interventions.
- Operational guidelines for the implementation of electoral assistance projects in general were drafted by the Commission and UNDP, and were used in Timor-Leste.
- EUD representatives underlined that they were not aware of or used specific tools and guidance, but that they would be interested in such tools, on conditions they were manageable and flexible.
- Concerning the iQSG, it was noted that they provided sometimes very “academic” opinion, which were far from the reality of the field.

JC 7.4: Financial instruments for intervening in CPPB

- The Commission used a mix of instruments to respond to the post-conflict situation in Timor-Leste: humanitarian aid, rehabilitation, long-term development and short-term crisis management instruments (e.g. RRM and IfS). Commission representatives underlined that these instrument allowed a quick mobilisation of funds but were still not flexible enough (procedures were still considered heavy; it appeared also difficult to extend the period).
- In terms of EDF funds, it was noted that:
 - EDF flexible procedures in fragile states were useful but not adapted to a post-conflict country such as Timor Leste.
 - Except for rural development, EDF funds and IfS funds were used quite separately and not in a complementary manner.

JC 7.5: Non-financial instruments for intervening in CPPB

- Political dialogue is being used only since 2008, after the EUD has been put in place. This being said according to Commission representatives, an informal network and contacts were maintained intensively since the beginning of Commission support.

EQ8 on Timeliness and cost-effectiveness

JC 8.1: Timeliness and cost-effectiveness of Commission interventions

- The reconstruction and rehabilitation activities carried out by the TFET (administered by the WB) after independence were brisk and cost-effective but failed to enhance local capacity-building and ownership.
- The electoral assistance through the UN MDTF was implemented well and in line with schedule, but the budget allocation between the main stakeholders (UNDP, UNMIT and GoTL) was unclear.
- Some rural development components were implemented by UNDP, WB and IOM to enable swift and efficient mobilisation of funding and accelerate the implementation of activities.

JC 8.2: Impact of the regulatory and institutional set-up for the Commission's support in the field of CPPB on timeliness and cost-effectiveness

- The regulatory framework allowing and regulating the channelling of funds through international organisations allowed the Commission to intervene swiftly in Timor-Leste despite not having a full permanent Delegation in the field (from independence up until 2008).
- Stakeholders (notably EUD representatives) underlined that in a conflict (pone) or post-conflict context:
 - The ability to intervene rapidly is even more important;
 - Procedures are also there to protect against risks (e.g. making sure that funds do not end up in the wrong hands or are used for the wrong purposes). These risks are often higher in a conflict context, given the weaker capacity and the fact that the potential beneficiaries are often not conflict neutral.

JC 8.3: Extent to which Commission's human resources were sufficient and skilled enough to ensure timely and cost-effective support

- No evidence because up to 2008 the Commission only had a small Representative office in Dili.

JC 8.4: Impact of the requirements in terms of timeliness and cost-effectiveness on the implementation of an integrated approach

- The Commission decision to channel its funds to international organisations ensured rapid mobilisation of substantial funds after independence, coordination between donors (for reconstruction and rehabilitation and the electoral process) and use of the international organisations' previous specific expertise in post-conflict situations, electoral processes and community stabilisation programmes in rural areas.

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Scanteam	Review of Development Cooperation in Timor-Leste, on behalf of the Embassy of Norway (Jakarta) and Norad	2007
The Center for International Conflict Resolution (CICR) at Columbia University / USAID	Timor Leste Conflict Assessment	2004

Author	Title	Year
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UN	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 9 August 2006 to 26 January 2007), S/2007/50. New York.	2007
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UN Security Council	Report of the Security Council Mission to Timor-Leste, 24-30 November 2007, (S/2007/711, 6 Dec 2007)	2007
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Country case study - West Bank and Gaza Strip

1. Country and conflict context¹

1.1 Map and Key data



Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, February 2011

¹ Sources: International Crisis Group, Webpage on Israel/Palestine Conflict History, updated September 2006, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/key-issues/research-resources/conflict-histories/israel-palestine.aspx>, accessed 9 September 2010; World Bank Group, *Country brief on West Bank & Gaza strip*, March 2010, p.1, <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/0,,menuPK:3030988~pagePK:180619~piPK:3001866~theSitePK:136917,00.html#s>, accessed 9 September 2010.

Key country data			
Surface area (in 2008)	6 020 km ²		
Population (in 2008, estimated)	4.15 million		
Population density in 2008	688.8 per km ²		
Population growth rate (for 2005-2010)	3.2 %, avg. annual		
Refugees (Dec. 2007)	4.6 million (including 1.8 million in the WB&GS and 2.8 million in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan ²)		
GDP per capita	2000 1331.9 current US\$	2005 1190.8 current US\$	2008 1485.3 current US\$
Unemployment (% of labour force)	2000 14,1% (Age group 15 years and over)	2005 23.3% (Age group 10 years and over)	2008 25.7% (Age group 10 years and over)
HDI trends	2005 0.736	2006 0.737	2008 0.737

Sources: UN Statistical Division³; UNDP Human Development Report 2009⁴, UNRWA

1.2 Key Dynamics and Events and International and Local Responses

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has a long, protracted and contested history and has been the subject of a long and variable peace process referred to as the 'Middle East Peace Process'. Some aspects of the conflict are outlined here and are intended to highlight key events in relation to the geographic area of West Bank and Gaza Strip rather than be a comprehensive summary of the overall conflict.

At the end of the Ottoman Empire rule in Palestine, the British governed Palestine between 1917 and 1948. In 1947, the UN General Assembly recommended the partition of the British Mandatory territory of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states. In 1948, the Israeli Declaration of Independence was made and the British decided to terminate their Mandate. Arab-Israeli tensions and conflict emerged after the assertion of Israeli independence and statehood with Arab rejections of the UN-framed territorial partition of 1947. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians fled to Jordan, Lebanon and Syria putting pressure on Arab neighbours who supported Palestinian rejection of partition. Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan and Syria entered the former borders of Palestine. At the end of the ensuing 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Egypt ruled over Gaza Strip and Jordan over West Bank (including East Jerusalem) from 1950. Three additional conflicts involving neighbouring countries ensued and successively modified the borders of the Palestinian territory:

² UNRWA figures as of 31 December 2007, <http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=253>

³ <http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Occupied%20Palestinian%20Territory>

⁴ <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/79.html>

1. The 1967 Arab-Israeli **Six-Day War** ended with Israel gaining control of Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. From then onwards, those territories have also been referred to as the Israeli-occupied territories and in the case of the West Bank and the Gaza strip, as the occupied Palestinian territory. In response to this development, the UN Security Council resolution 242 (1967) laid the basis for “land for peace” formula.

In parallel, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was founded by the Arab League in 1964. From 1969 the PLO has been led by the leader of the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah).

2. The **1968-1970 War of Attrition** initiated by Egypt to force a full Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai ended with a ceasefire. Israeli control over the Sinai remained.
3. Another attempt to regain territories under Israeli control since the 1967 Six-Day War was led by Egypt and Syria in 1973. It launched the **1973 Arab-Israeli War** (also known as the **Fourth Arab-Israeli War** or as **the Yom Kippur/Ramadan War**). A disengagement agreement was reached in 1974 and launched the first Arab-Israeli peace discussions which culminated in the U.S-sponsored Camp David accords in 1978 and in the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt leading to Israeli withdrawal from occupied Sinai in 1982 in exchange of normal relations.

Amid continued Israeli military occupation in WB&GS, the stalemate in the peace process and rising unemployment amongst the Palestinians, frustration rose and culminated in an uprising (intifada) against Israeli rule between 1987 and 1993. In response, a new cycle of negotiations between Israel and Arabs (including Palestinians), namely the 1991 Madrid Middle East Peace Conference and the Oslo negotiations, led to the signing of the 1993 Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles at the White House (the “Oslo Accords”). The Accords (1) provided for the creation of a Palestinian National Authority (PA) which would have responsibility for the administration of the territory under its control and (2) called for the withdrawal of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) from parts of the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Final status negotiations on Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, Israeli settlements, security and borders were deliberately left to be decided at a later stage. They began after 1999 Israeli elections which brought Ehud Barak to power but failed at the 2000 US-led Camp David summit.

Administration of the Palestinian territory as defined in the 1995 Oslo interim agreement

The 1995 Oslo interim agreement split the West Bank and Gaza into three Areas A, B, and C, with different security and administrative arrangements and authorities (...). The land area controlled by the Palestinians (Area A corresponding to all major population centres and Area B encompassing most rural centres) is fragmented into a multitude of enclaves, with a regime of movement restrictions between them. These enclaves are surrounded by Area C, which covers the entire remaining area and is the only contiguous area of the West Bank. Area C is under full control of the Israeli military for both security and civilian affairs related to territory, including land administration and planning. It is sparsely populated and underutilized (except by Israeli settlements and reserves), and holds the majority of the land (approximately 59%). East Jerusalem was not classified as Area A, B or C in the Oslo interim agreement and its status was to be resolved in final status negotiations.

Source: The World Bank, West Bank and Gaza, The Economic Effects of Restricted Access to Land in the West Bank, 2008 p. 1v.

The September 2000 Palestinian uprising referred to as the Al-Aqsa or second intifada, and the Sharon-government's response triggered new levels of violence on both sides. Armoured incursions in Palestinian cities and Palestinian suicide bombings in Israel culminated in the reoccupation of West Bank cities in April 2002 and in the construction of a separation barrier, largely within occupied West Bank and enclosing East Jerusalem, which was condemned as illegal by the International Court of Justice in 2004. Withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and dismantlement of all Gaza settlements ensued in August 2005 but Israel retained control over airspace, territorial waters, and all boundaries except border with Egypt which was partially supervised by the EU CFDP border assistance mission EUBAM Rafah (goods passed through separate, Israeli-controlled crossings), which was later suspended.

In 2006 Hamas, the proclaimed Islamic resistance movement to Israeli occupation which has been listed by the EU as a terrorist organization, won a majority at the Palestinian parliamentary elections. Hamas refusal to recognise Israel, renounce violence, and endorse existing agreements led to international boycott of the PA and to aid suspension. In addition to this, Israel's freeze on clearance revenues, aid suspension to Palestinians and loan service deductions by local banks⁵ resulted in the PA's near bankruptcy. By May 2006, power struggle between Fatah and Hamas supporters reached the streets and raised fears of civil war. A Unity government by Hamas and Fatah was formed in June 2007 but as Hamas took control over the Gaza strip, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas appointed a new Caretaker Government and declared the Hamas authority in Gaza illegal. Hamas' coming to power in Gaza has thus given a new internal dimension to the conflict in WB&GS.

In response to this and to reverse the impacts of previous aid sanctions on Palestinian institutions, the international community channelled substantial financial and technical

⁵ The World Bank, *Country brief on West Bank & Gaza strip*, March 2010, p.1, <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/0,,menuPK:3030988~pagePK:180619~piPK:3001866~theSitePK:136917,00.html#s>, accessed 6 September 2010.

assistance to the PA, Israel resumed the transfer of Palestinian clearance revenues⁶ and discussions towards a peace agreement were re-launched at the end of 2008. However as Hamas gained control over the Gaza strip, the Israeli response in the shape of the December 2008-January 2009 Israeli ‘Cast Lead’ operation in Gaza destroyed substantial industrial and civil infrastructure and resulted in important human loss and displacement. Additionally, the continuing, embargo on Gaza has severely worsened the living conditions of the population, creating a humanitarian challenge.

The Annapolis conference in 2007 however re-launched the peace negotiations and for the first time presented a two-state solution as the framework for a Palestinian–Israeli peace agreement. In 2010 the Israeli and Palestinian leaders, Binyamin Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas, began direct talks in Washington in September 2010 after US president Barack Obama launched his initiative to forge a Middle East peace agreement intended to resolve, within a year, all final status issues.

2. The Commission’s response strategy

2.1 The Commission’s strategy in West Bank and Gaza Strip (2001-2010)

2.1.1 *The institutional framework*

The EU’s relations with the Palestinians are governed by the 1997 **Interim Association Agreement on Trade and Cooperation** (signed with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation). It aimed at establishing “the conditions for an increased liberalisation of trade and provide an appropriate framework for a comprehensive dialogue between the EU and the PA”⁷. Those measures also aimed to integrate the Palestinians in the Barcelona Process also known as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership which sought to create a Mediterranean region of peace, security and shared prosperity and which was re-launched in 2008 as the Union for the Mediterranean⁸.

Since 2004 and the EU’s enlargement, the **European Neighbourhood Policy** (ENP) has become the new framework for the EU’s partnership with the PA. A Country Report assessing the bilateral relations was released in 2004. This was followed by the 2005 **EU-PA Action Plan** agreed on by both parties and which sets out particular reforms and actions to be supported by EU aid. The joint **EU-PA Action Plan** concluded that “in light of the fulfilment of [the] Action Plan and of the overall evolution of the EU/PA relations, consideration will be given to the possibility of a new contractual relationship [which] could take the form of a European Neighbourhood Agreement”⁹.

⁶ The World Bank, West Bank and Gaza, *op.cit.*, March 2010, p.1.

⁷ http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/westbank/eu_westbank/political_relations/legal_framework/index_en.htm, accessed on 31 August 2010.

⁸ http://ceas.europa.eu/euromed/barcelona_en.htm, accessed on 31 August 2010.

⁹ European Commission, *European Union/Palestinian Authority Action Plan*, 2005, p.2.

Officials reported that, in view of WB&GS's particular situation as an occupied territory, the programming for the Commission's cooperation in WB&GS has been annual rather than multi-annual. There are therefore no CSPs or NIPs for WBGS.

At the **diplomatic level**, the EU has been a member of the Middle East Quartet alongside the United States, Russia and the United Nations. Over the evaluation period, the Commissioner for External Affairs was one of the three EU representatives (with the High Representative for European Common Foreign and Security Policy and a foreign affairs representative of an EU member state). The Quartet supports the implementation of a two-state solution based on the 2003 Roadmap for Peace..

2.1.2 *Key strategic lines of the Commission's strategy in West Bank and Gaza Strip (2001-2010)*

The **2004 Country Report**¹⁰ identified the partnership's following key areas of interest:

1. the development of political institutions based on the values – democracy, the rule of law, human rights - underlined in the Agreement;
2. structural and fiscal reforms that will create new opportunities for WB&GS' development and modernisation, for further liberalisation of trade and for gradual participation in the EU's Internal Market.

The 2004 National Financing Plan for the West Bank and Gaza Strip did however clearly indicate that the Commission maintained its commitment to making a longer-term contribution towards supporting the development of "a future democratic, independent and viable Palestinian State living side-by-side with Israel in peace and security"¹¹. This general objective was later substantiated with the joint **EU-PA Action Plan** concluded in **2005** which, since the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004, has taken on the role of the "working and guiding tool" setting the agenda for political and economic cooperation in order to fulfil the Commission's cooperation objectives¹². Specifically it has set the cooperation objectives to be achieved and suggested actions to reach them (presented in the table follow).

¹⁰ European Commission, *Commission Staff Working Paper*, COM(2004)373 final, April 2004, p.3.

¹¹ http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/westbank/eu_westbank/political_relations/index_en.htm , accessed on 31 August 2010.

¹² http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/westbank/eu_westbank/political_relations/political_framework/index_en.htm

Table 1 – The 2005 EU/PA Action Plan’s cooperation objectives, areas and actions

	Cooperation objectives	Cooperation area	Cooperation actions to be undertaken
EU/PA Action Plan 2005	1. Political dialogue and reform – building the institutions of an independent, democratic and viable Palestinian State	1. Political dialogue and cooperation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strengthen political dialogue and cooperation including on foreign and security policy issues 2. Intensify co-operation in the areas of combating terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and illegal arms trade
		2. Democracy and rule of law	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Establishment of an independent, impartial and fully functioning judiciary and strengthen the separation of powers 2. Organisation of transparent general and local elections 3. Acceleration of constitutional and legislative reform 4. Public administration and civil service reform
		3. Human rights and fundamental freedoms	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strengthen legal guarantees for freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly and of association 2. Ensure the respect of human rights and basic civil liberties and foster a culture of non-violence, tolerance and mutual understanding.
		4. Financial Accountability and Sound Management of Public Finances	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Continue efforts to establish a modern and well-functioning system of financial control 2. Continue work to improve transparency of the PA finances and to take concerted action to tackle corruption within public institutions and to fight against fraud. 3. Ensure transparency of public procurement operations 4. Put a modern and financially sustainable pension system into place.
	2. Economic reform and development		Improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of a market economy
	3. Trade-related issues, market and regulatory reform		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Develop trade relations between the European Community and the PA 2. Strengthen regional cooperation with neighbouring countries 3. Develop the regulatory framework for a modern taxation system and institutions based on international best practices 4. Revitalise the private sector 5. Further develop the statistics system based on international best practices

	4. Energy, Environment, Transport and Science and Technology		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Take steps to promote good environmental governance, to aim for prevention of deterioration of the environment, and to enhance co-operation on environmental issues 2. Enhance cooperation on energy and transport issues Science and technology, research and development 3. Science and technology, research and development
	5. People-to-people contacts, education, and public health	1. Education, training, and youth	Develop a modern education system based on peace, tolerance and mutual understanding
		2. Public health	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Upgrade the Palestinian Public health system 2. Strengthen the administrative capacity of the Ministry of Health 3. Strengthen coordination with relevant international organisations and health service providers, including NGOs.
6. European Community-Palestinian Authority Cooperation		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Take concrete measures to implement the Interim Association Agreement on Trade and Cooperation 2. Support the implementation of PA reform programme, focused on the priorities set out in the Action Plan. 	

In parallel to these institutional developments and to the establishment of a common strategy for cooperation, developments in the conflict have spurred new levels of violence which, in turn, have severely deteriorated the socio-economic situation of the Palestinian population as well as the PA's public finances.

As a result, whilst the Commission's support to the West Bank and Gaza Strip can broadly be characterized as two-pronged – **addressing both urgent humanitarian support and strategic institutional and development assistance**¹³, in light of the worsening context over the evaluation period and the near-to-bankruptcy of the Palestinian Authority, the Commission's cooperation in the Palestinian territory was re-orientated towards addressing immediate, humanitarian needs¹⁴ and providing **more direct support to the Palestinian population**.

Humanitarian aid, in the areas of food aid, emergency job creation, health, psycho-social support, water and sanitation and protection has been addressed by the Commission through its support to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) as well as through the European Commission's Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO). The European Union's contribution to UNRWA

¹³ European Commission, *National Financing Plan (NFP) 2004 for the West Bank and Gaza Strip under articles 19 08 02 and 19 08 03*, p. 1.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

which supports some 4.7 million registered Palestine refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the occupied Palestinian territory to meet their basic needs amounted to over €1,026 million in the period from 2000 to 2009¹⁵. From 2000 to 2009, ECHO allocated €476 million for humanitarian programmes targeting Palestinian refugees (the aid does not go to the PA, but is channelled through implementing partners such as UN agencies, the Red Cross/Crescent movement and international NGOs)¹⁶.

2.1.3 Commission's strategy with respect to CPPB

Notwithstanding developments in the conflict over time, the Commission supports the resolution of the 60 years old Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on a “two-state solution with an independent, democratic, viable Palestinian state living side-by-side with Israel and its other neighbours”¹⁷. This solution is in line with EU policy and participation in the Quartet peace processes initiative.

In terms of the evolution in the Commission's CPPB strategy in the WB&GS, the following can be said. The 2005 EU/PA Action Plan already highlighted the EU and the PA's “shared responsibility in conflict prevention and conflict resolution”¹⁸. Over the evaluation period, as official peace negotiations broke down and public confidence in a two-State solution wavered, the Commission's support to CPPB in WB&GS consistently followed the objective of building the institutions of a Palestinian state living in peace and security with Israel¹⁹ in line with the priorities of the 2005 Action Plan.

Several levers were activated:

- Financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority to improve its ability to deliver public goods to the Palestinian population. This support has broadly been distinguished between:
 - Support to the PA's treasury to cover recurrent expenditures: contribution to payment of salaries and social allowances and until recently to fuel distribution
 - Institution-building expenditures, in support of the reform of Palestinian institutions “to establish rule of law, to halt incitement, to respect human rights and to prepare for free and democratic elections”²⁰.

Two successive mechanisms were set up accordingly:

- The 2006-2008 **Temporary International Mechanism** was established at the request of the Quartet and the European Council to directly support the Palestinian population (without passing through the newly elected Hamas government) in view of the looming

¹⁵ For its core programmes in education, food assistance, health and relief and social services: http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/westbank/documents/eu_westbank/unrwa_en.pdf, accessed 31 August 2010

¹⁶ http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/westbank/eu_westbank/humanitarian_aid/index_en.htm, accessed on 31 August 2010.

¹⁷ http://www.eeas.europa.eu/mepp/index_en.htm, accessed 7 September 2010.

¹⁸ European Union, *European Union/Palestinian Authority Action Plan 2005*, p.1.

¹⁹ European Union, *European Union/Palestinian Authority Action Plan 2005* and *website of the Office of the European Union Representative*, http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/westbank/eu_westbank/political_relations/index_en.htm

²⁰ European Commission, *Commission Staff Working Paper*, COM(2004)373 final, p.6.

severe socio-economic crisis in WB&GS following Israeli and international sanctions against the Hamas-led government which rejected Quartet principles²¹. It sought to ensure the continued provision of essential public services in health, education and social services. It attracted contributions from 19 international donors, of which 15 EU Member States, for a total of approximately **€190 million**²². Initially established for a period of three months, its mandate was extended six times up to March 2008²³.

- **The PEGASE mechanism** was launched in 2008 as a follow-up to TIM and specifically to support the PA's three-year "Palestinian Reform and Development Plan" (PRDP). PEGASE consists of two types of support, namely the Direct Financial Assistance (DFS) and project support. The DFS supports the following areas: (i) Assistance to Vulnerable Palestinian Families (VPF); (ii) Support to Essential Public Services (SEPS); (iii) Support to Civil Servants and Pensioners (CSP); and (iv) Payment of arrears owed to private sector companies whose services have been used by the PA. The second type of assistance, project support, covers infrastructure, governance, social sector and economy. *"PEGASE DFS alone contributed 37% of the external financial resources of the PA, while the share of Arab donors was about 21% and of all other donors together 42%. The EC has financed 74% of PEGASE DFS operations while the contribution of EU MSs reached 26%".*²⁴.

²¹ In 2006 the Commission made available a total of €107.5 million to the three TIM windows. In 2007, the Commission allocated an additional €348 million to the TIM.

- Window I – €15 million for essential supplies and running costs of hospitals and health care centers;
- Window II – €131 million for the uninterrupted supply of essential public **services** including energy utilities;
- Window III – €309.5 million in support of vulnerable Palestinians, through the payment of social allowances to public service providers and the poor.

In addition to its support to the TIM, €12 million were allocated by the Commission for technical assistance and capacity building to the Office of the President. Source:

http://www.ceas.europa.eu/occupied_palestinian_territory/tim/index_en.htm, accessed 31 August 2010

²² http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_7681_en.htm, accessed on 31 August 2010.

²³ http://www.ceas.europa.eu/occupied_palestinian_territory/tim/index_en.htm, accessed on 31 August 2010.

²⁴ HTSPE Limited (for the European Commission), *Interim Evaluation of the PEGASE, Final Report*, Autumn 2009, p. iv.

An additional component of the Commission's CPPB support in the WB&GS has been its actions on **public opinion** in view of strengthening the base of **public support for the Middle East Peace Process** and curbing **extremism** on both Israeli and Palestinian sides²⁵. This took the form of the 2004 "Partnership for Peace Programme" which sought to promote a culture of tolerance and mutual understanding and to strengthen democratic principles and respect for human rights between Palestinians, Israelis and neighbouring countries²⁶.

Finally the Commission's CPPB support is also active at the **diplomatic level**: The EU forms with the United States, Russia and the United Nations the Middle East Quartet which supports the implementation of a two-state solution based on the 2003 Roadmap for Peace. At EU-level, the Quartet included, over the evaluation period, the European Commissioner for External Affairs as well as the High Representative for European Common Foreign and Security Policy and a foreign affairs representative of an EU member state. As such, the Commission supported political negotiations under the Roadmap for Peace framework. Here below are the EU's official positions on the peace process' "final status issues".

Table 2 - The EU's position on "final status issues"²⁷

The EU's positions on "final status issues"	
Borders	<i>"The EU considers that the future Palestinian state will require secure and recognised borders. These should be based on a withdrawal from the territory occupied in 1967 with minor modifications mutually agreed, if necessary, in accordance with UNSC Resolutions 242, 338, 1397, 1402 and 1515 and the principles of the Madrid Process."</i>
Israeli settlements in the oPts	<i>"On 8 December 2008 the EU confirmed its deep concern about recent accelerated settlement expansion. This expansion prejudices the outcome of final status negotiations and threatens the viability of an agreed two-state solution. The EU considers that settlement building anywhere in the occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, is illegal under international law."</i>
Jerusalem	<i>"The EU considers that the peace negotiations should include the resolution of all issues surrounding the status of Jerusalem. The EU supports institution building work in East Jerusalem, notably in the areas of health, education and the judiciary."</i>
Palestinian refugees	<i>"The EU supports a just, viable and agreed solution on this question. [It] will respect an agreement reached between the two Parties on this point. Since 1971 the EU has been providing significant support to the work of agencies providing vital services to the Palestinian refugees (UNRWA). It is committed to adapting this support as appropriate, in pursuit of a just and equitable solution to the refugee issue."</i>
Security	<i>"The EU condemns all acts of violence which cannot be allowed to impede progress towards peace. The EU recognises Israel's right to protect its citizens from attacks, but emphasizes that the Israeli Government, in exercising this right, should act within international law. Since 2005, the EU has been involved in supporting the development of a democratic and professional Palestinian police force."</i>

Source: the EU's position on the Middle East peace process

²⁵ European Commission, *National Financing Plan (NFP) 2004 for the West Bank and Gaza Strip under articles 19 08 02 and 19 08 03 2004*, p. 7-8.

²⁶ European Commission, *Commission Staff Working Paper, COM (2004)373 final*, p.5.

²⁷ EU positions on the Middle East peace process, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/mecpp/eu-positions/eu_positions_en.htm, accessed 13 September 2010


2.2 Implementation of Commission's strategy

This section describes the actual implementation of the Commission's strategy in terms of funds effectively contracted for projects based on the data extracted from the Common Relex Information System (CRIS). Indeed, CRIS provides information on all interventions financed by the Commission in partner countries. The following data for WB&GS have been extracted by the evaluation team in September 2010. It provides financial and operational information on all interventions contracted by the Commission over the period 2001-2010 (Sept.). Financial data presented in the figures below are contracted amount for national level interventions (not regional-level interventions) financed by the general budget of the Commission.

All interventions financed in WB&GS have been classified by the evaluation team according to their relevance to CPPB in light of the 2001 Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention. This classification has been done according to the methodology developed in the main inventory of the Commission's support to CPPB carried out in the Preliminary study of this evaluation²⁸. For further explanations on the methodology and its limitations, please refer to this study.

The evolution of amounts contracted over the period 2001-2010 (Sept.) is presented in the figure below.

Figure 1 – Trend in amounts contracted (€m) by the Commission to WB&GS between 2001 and Sept 2010



²⁸ ADE (for the European Commission), *Preliminary study for the thematic evaluation of the Commission's support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building*, July 2009.
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/2009/1266_docs_en.htm


The EU is the most important multilateral donor of financial assistance to the Palestinians, providing humanitarian assistance, support to refugees, development assistance and support to the Palestinian Authority²⁹. This is reflected in the amounts contracted by the Commission in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: over the evaluation period, approximately €2.6bn of financial assistance was contracted.

Aside from this substantial figure, the fact that 98% (€2.5bn) of total Commission assistance has been identified by the evaluation team as CPPB-related is another striking feature. Non-CPPB related assistance includes projects in the cultural or education sectors which address non-CPPB needs.

In terms of the evolution of the Commission's aid:

- A €98m “Direct Budgetary Assistance to the PA” and a €30m “Emergency Municipal Support Programme (EMSP)” were contracted in 2002, thus explaining the 2002 peak.
- Similarly a €63m “Interim Emergency Relief Contribution” and a €38m “TIM Window 3 - Social allowances” account for the rise in 2007 and a €108m for “Supporting Palestinian administration and services” account for the increase over 2008.

Figure 2 - Commission financial instruments breakdown used in WB&GS, contracts €m (2001-Sept. 2010)




²⁹ European Commission, *Commission Staff Working Paper*, COM(2004)373 final, p.4.

The patterns of financial instruments used for the Commission’s overall assistance to WB&GS and CPPB-specific assistance, mirror each other, notably:

- Geographical programmes (ENPI, MEDA) were dominant. They notably funded the several annual “Individual Commitment for payments of allowances to CSP Component 1 of recurrent Expenditures Projects in support of the Palestinian administration and services”, contributions to UNRWA, and “Commitments for regularisation of Allowances TIM” and later to PEGASE
- Thematic budget lines used were in order of ranking:
 - Food security which supported UNRWA Food aid programmes and food security and agricultural development projects,
 - DDH-EIHDR funded election observation missions and various human rights, anti-torture and democracy promotion projects,
 - ONG-NSA funded various education and health projects targeted at women, children and the disabled, contracted with local and international NGOs.
- Finally, IFS-RRM supported a large, early recovery programme in 2009 contracted with the UN and a 2008 “Support to the Palestinian Civil Police” intervention contracted with the UN.

Figure 3 - CPPB categories breakdown, contracts €m (2001-Sept.2010)




Support to UNRWA food security programmes, to TIM and PEGASE and to reconstruction and food security projects funded under the Food budget line have been classified under the **Rapid intervention category**.

The category **Population flows and human trafficking category** regroups support to refugees via UNRWA and programmes in the field of customs, immigration and border management.

Non-CPPB assistance, as mentioned earlier, includes projects in the cultural, health or education sectors which address reconstruction or non-CPPB needs.

The **economic support and trade cooperation** includes projects aimed at boosting the Palestinian economy in its efforts towards self-sustenance.

Figure 4 - Channel of delivery breakdown used to implement Commission assistance to WBGS, contracts €m (2001-Sept.2010)



Very large programmes were contracted directly with **the PA** and account for its importance in the channels of delivery used by the Commission to implement its assistance. They were for instance individual Commitment for payments of “Recurrent Expenditures Projects: Supporting Palestinian administration and services”, “of payment arrears”, of “financial assistance to beneficiaries of the Private Sector Reconstruction Programme in Gaza”, direct budgetary assistances and financial support to the electoral process.

In the **international organizations** category, UNRWA represents 75% of total contracted amounts (€748m contracted). The World Bank, other UN agencies and the IOM are the other international organizations through which Commission aid has been channelled.

3. Evaluation findings

For each EQ this section presents in bullet points, by JC, evaluation findings at country level. These findings are based on the analysis emerging from the desk and field phases of the evaluation and from the analysis of the results of the survey sent to EUD (see Annex 7).

EQ1 on Mainstreaming

JC 1.1: (Elements of) conflict analyses carried out or used by the Commission

- **No structured and formalised conflict analysis has been conducted by the Commission.**
- **There has been a continuous flow of abundant information on the conflict situation and the Commission has informed itself continuously on the causes, actors and dynamics of the conflict through a variety of channels:**
 - The EUREP which has provided regular reports on the situation in particularly vulnerable areas such as East-Jerusalem or Area C. Interviewees have reported a particularly close and regular collaboration with Headquarters with a notable increase in political discussions since the set-up of the EEAS.
 - Information provided from the political dialogue with National authorities was considered as critical.
 - Information from other donors was reported as important.
 - The EUBAM mission has been a source of information on the situation in Gaza. Since the suspension of EUBAM, its continued albeit much reduced presence close to Gaza has evolved into monitoring the situation in Gaza (humanitarian and political situation, within and between Palestinian factions) also with a view to cross-checking the official information provided by COGAT (the Coordinator of Israeli Government Activities in the Territories).

JC 1.2: Informing financial and non-financial Commission support by (elements of) conflict analyses

- The Commission has had a very good knowledge of the conflict situation and has designed its whole support from that perspective.
- Despite the lack of a single structured and formalised conflict analysis:
 - Commission strategy documents have contained annual overviews of the evolution of the political situation and of the conflict and presented how the Commission's support has sought to respond to those.
 - The Commission's strategy or parts have in some cases been re-designed further to changes in the conflict situation. Several Commission strategy documents made repeated references to changes in the Israeli/Palestinian political landscape which have affected the orientation and implementation of Commission assistance. Notably, Commission strategy documents have been adapted to reflect conflict developments (e.g. after the 2006 election results which brought Hamas to power and Israeli ground incursion) so that over the evaluation period, the assistance to Palestinians has swayed between institution-building support and more direct emergency financial support.
- At project level several elements have indicated that the Commission's support has been informed by sound and thorough knowledge of the conflict but not by using specific formalised mechanisms to feed the conflict analysis into the program design. For instance, the Commission has not systematically conducted detailed conflict risk assessments or analysis of alternative conflict scenarios in program

design. Changes and risks in the implementation context were anticipated in the formal identification documents (Action fiches and identification fiches which included risks assessments).

- Other donors however reported the use of such mechanisms: GIZ, Norway and the World Bank.

JC 1.3: Do no harm approaches

- Several elements indicated that a “do not harm approach” had been systematic and at the heart of the support:
 - No cases were reported where there had been a lack of “do no harm”.
 - Specific examples: over the evaluation period, there was evidence that the Commission has adjusted its interventions in response to unforeseen changes in order not to exacerbate the conflict or to give unintended leverage to conflict parties.
 - Overall stakeholders met underlined the sensitivity of the Commission’s approach, finding a balance in politically sensitive situations.
 - The Commission has been sensitive to Palestinians’ lack of control over several factors, controlled by Israeli authorities, although exceptions were mentioned.
- But no specific, formalized guidance or a structured approach.

JC 1.4: Extent to which the Commission took CPPB into account in its development cooperation support in a transversal manner

- The entire strategy has been build with a view to contributing to the overarching objective of contributing to CPPB and a two-state solution.
- Within this perspective a multi sector and comprehensive approach (support to justice sector (infrastructure, legislation, policymaking), security sector (civil police, civil defence, prison system)), support to democratization (support to Palestinian Legislative Council) to support to public finance management) has been build around the same objective.
- Commission strategy documents repeatedly mentioned clearly that progress in achieving reforms is to be assessed in light of Palestinians’ occupation and lack of control over several factors, and that political developments in Israel and WB&GS condition the success of Commission funded interventions.
- Stakeholders interviewed (Commission, donors, PA, civil society) confirmed that CPPB was mainstreamed in non-directly CPPB related Commission, for instance in support to rural development or in the water sector.

EQ2 on root causes

JC 2.1 Tackling the root causes of conflict

- No Commission reference documents at strategic or intervention-specific levels identified or mentioned “root causes of the conflict” or equivalent. There were no references to the Commission seeking to address the root causes of the conflict or equivalent either.

JC 2.2 Contribution to mitigating the impact of the root causes of conflict

- There was an overall agreement that the Commission had been working more on mitigating the impact of the root causes of conflict rather than tackling them directly. It has supported the conditions for a political settlement without being a decisive player in its definition. A key form of support which has mitigated the impact of the conflict has been the direct delivery of assistance to Palestinians via the Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) as well as the direct financial support (through PEGASE) to the Palestinian Authority. TIM and PEGASE were considered as instrumental in offsetting the collapse of Palestinian political, social and economic structures.
- The Commission’s support has addressed conflict issues general considered critical by stakeholders met, such as Palestinian refugees (the Commission has been a major donor to UNRWA), access to water, and Palestinians’ security obligations as set out in the 2002 Roadmap for peace. On the latter, the reform of the Palestinian justice and security sector has been supported since 2005 with the launch of the Council’s ESDP mission EU COPPS. Despite some shortcomings, the Commission’s support has been appreciated, targeting real needs.
- Some Palestinian NGOs have argued however that without tackling the root causes of the conflict and the 1948 events, the real conflict issues were left untreated. Some Palestinian stakeholders considered that critical conflict issues had not been sufficiently supported by the Commission namely support to legal consultation for prisoners, against Israeli illegal settlements, against the destruction of homes and Palestinian identity issues.
- Finally several stakeholders met underlined that the overall contribution of the Commission’s support to mitigating the impact of the root causes of the conflict was challenged by lack of progress at the diplomatic level as well as destructions from military operations by Israel Defence Forces.

EQ3 on Short-term prevention

JC 3.1 Mechanisms for the detection of deteriorating situations and for rapid reaction

- On the timeliness of the Commission's deployment of both traditional but also innovative instruments to intervene in deteriorating situations: all stakeholders met highlighted the timeliness and crucial relief provided by TIM and PEGASE in a time where other donors were less quick to be mobilized.
- On the use of simplified procedures to undertake actions: the EUREP has highlighted the flexible, "crisis situation" mechanisms foreseen under the European Commission General Budget (and also EDF) as essential to intervene timely in an unstable conflict environment. This was the only specific mechanism or procedure used reported by the EUD.
- On the positive contribution of these interventions to CP
 - Stakeholders met have highlighted the key and timely relief provided by the Commission in times of rapidly deteriorating situations. The timing, priorities given as well as the predictability of the support were highlighted.
 - The comprehensiveness of the Commission's portfolio of assistance, including to UNRWA, was also considered as a key contributing factor.

JC 3.2 Preventing recurrence of crises and consolidating peace

- The stated Commission's strategy in WB&GS was to address urgent needs while at the same time making a contribution to the creation of a viable and democratic Palestinian state.
- Insofar that Commission support has contributed to the economic development and to the state-building process, it has sought to address the socio-economic fuel of the conflict and provide essential conditions for long term peace.
- The 2001-2010 period has been particularly turbulent, with a number of peaks in the conflict situation so that the linking and sequencing of short-term and long-term support and arbitrating and allocating resources between both priorities had been an important challenge for donors. Overall, the Commission's support has fluctuated between from emergency relief, following the second Intifada in September 2000 and other crises, and longer-term development objectives and the support to the preparation for the establishment of a Palestinian State.
- The Commission's commitment to providing assistance to Palestinian refugees via UNRWA had been continuous since the creation of the UN agency in 1949.
- Some stakeholders met also expressed the view that considering that the EU's financial support to Palestinian state-building was intended also to give Israel guarantees to withdraw from WB&GS and that peace process negotiations had been slow to advance, the EU's aid was sometimes criticized as having effectively sustained the occupation.

JC.3.3 Transition between short-term and long-term prevention

- The Commission's assistance to WB&GS has been varied (humanitarian assistance, support to refugees, development assistance and support to the Palestinian Authority) and has addressed long term and short term needs and as such addressed both crisis management and conflict prevention. The Commission has been less present in conflict resolution, which implies involvement in the peace resolution track at the diplomatic level which is beyond the Commission's mandate.

- At the level of selected interventions:
 - PEGASE was intended to directly contribute to the realisation of the government's PRDP reform and development multi-annual and state-building programme.
 - The Commission's support to the reform of the Palestinian Civil Police fitted into longer term law and order sector reform and contributed to Palestinians' 2003 Roadmap obligations in the area of security. Some informants considered that the Commission hadn't considered SSR comprehensively in the design of their programme.
- At the level of impact,
 - Informants reported that economic growth could be attributed to improvements in the security situation and the professionalization of the police force to which the Commission had contributed.
 - As already mentioned above, the sustainability and impact of donors' substantial support to CPPB in WB&GS has been questioned by some stakeholders in light of the absence of a peace agreement. Similarly the lack of predictability of the evolution of the situation prevented donors from being able to assess their contribution to Palestinian's long term development. Support to Palestinian refugees via UNRWA is illustrative of the above: the need to support Palestinian refugees will exist until the refugee question is addressed sustainably.

EQ4 on Geographical dimensions

JC 4.1: Appropriateness of the geographical level of intervention

- The geography of the Commission's support takes the division of the WB&GS in Areas A, B and C and the division of control between Israeli and Palestinian authorities following the Oslo Interim Agreement into consideration.
- The Commission has targeted geographically vulnerable areas - East Jerusalem, Gaza, zone C – "*orphan areas*" where needs were particularly acute and where less donors were present. Assistance in Area C was considered essential to improve the political and economic living conditions of the local population and prevent migration of Palestinians towards Area A. It also prevented the concentration of external aid into Area A and the resulting further fragmentation of the Palestinian territory.
- Some informants argued that providing support in Area C, in East Jerusalem and Gaza which other donors do not necessarily cover has given a political signal of outreach and by improving political and economic conditions has prevented the migration of Palestinians towards Area A.
- On support in the security sector: it was reported that the Commission had been the only donor providing security infrastructure funding in certain areas (Naplous and Jenin). The choice of the location has been based on several criteria agreed on jointly: zone (A, B or C), population, crime rate, internal security evaluation (presence of Hamas, or liberal local political forces).
- Another European donor has developed a comprehensive system of mapping of the entirety of their support, geographically, by sector and also by types of channels (NGOs, PA) to determine precisely the allocation of prospective support. This was not shared with the Commission.

JC 4.2: Addressing local and national needs

- The Commission addressed needs as identified in national development plans, as well as more local projects.

- The Commission's initiatives supported national-level efforts:
 - PEGASE was intended to directly contribute to the realisation of the government's PRDP reform and development multi-annual and state-building programme.
 - In the case of the support to the Palestinian Civil Police, the Commission's funding to EUPOL COPPS contributed to longer term law and order sector reform and to Palestinians Roadmap obligations in the area of security.
- Initially, the Commission's support to NGOs was concentrated in Ramallah so that NGOs in marginalised areas weren't aware of funding opportunities or lacked the capacity to apply. Workshops on PCM, writing proposals and EU procedures were offered by the EUD across the West Bank to address their mobility needs and capacity shortcomings. This improved the Commission's coverage of its support to NGOs.

JC 4.3: Regional dynamics of conflicts

- The Commission has addressed Israeli-Arab relations between Israelis, Palestinians living in Israel, the WB&GS and neighbouring countries and other Arab states, notably through the following initiatives:
 - The 2007 "Partnership for Peace" programme which aimed to "*support local and international civil society initiatives that promote peace, tolerance and non violence in the Middle East*". The Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme whilst initially a cross-border cooperation programme, it has been amended into a cross-community programme which the aim of ensuring territorial cohesion in the WB&GS. The evaluation of the PfP found that the main and essential contribution of the Programme has been to sustain grassroots civil society organisations on both sides dedicated to peace, which have been shrinking over time, and "building up a space for dialogue" between both communities.
 - The Commission, as a major donor to UNRWA, has contributed to the mitigation of the impact of the 4.7 million registered Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the WB&GS, by supporting it as the main provider of basic education, health, relief and social services.

JC 4.4 Articulating support at different geographical levels with a view to fostering synergies

- There has been little evidence of the articulation of support at different geographical levels or of synergies created.

EQ5 on Coordination and Complementarity

JC 5.1 "Whole-of-government approach" between and within the Commission's DGs and Directions

- Regular coordination meetings at Commission Headquarters and daily contacts between ECHO, RELEX, and the EUREP in East-Jerusalem have been reported. Specifically on UNRWA, coordination meetings have also included ECHO.
- The EUREP was established in 1994, in the context of the Oslo Accords, to develop EU assistance to the Palestinians and contribute to building institutions for a future Palestinian State. The status of the EUREP has been atypical; it has not been an EU Delegation and as such has had a lesser status. This lesser status was reported to have caused problems in the implementation of its support. The EUREP has also coordinated some of its actions with the EUD to Israel, it being a partner in facilitating contacts with Israeli authorities on Palestinian matters.

JC 5.2 Coordination and complementarities between the Commission and the General Secretariat of the EU Council, the European Union Special Representative and with EU Member States (“whole-of-EU approach”)

On coordination between EU institutions:

- At HQs, systematic coordination between the Council and the Commission has been reported, prior to the release of a briefing on WB&GS/the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for example.
- On coordination between Commission support and Council missions:
 - Some overlapping between Council and Commission support in the field of security sector reform and competition for EU MS funding was reported to have occurred. Some stakeholders considered that operational guidelines on coordination of Council and Commission activities on the ground would have been necessary.
 - Some stakeholders considered that Council missions have increased the EU’s visibility as a CPPB actor, to the benefit of the Commission’s assistance.

On coordination between EC/EU and EU Member States:

- **At the diplomatic level:**
 - The EU’s (incl. Commission) position on final status issues and on a two-state solution has been the official political framework for the EU’s engagement strategy with the parties to the conflict.
 - However divergences have existed amongst Member States on the strategy to adopt to achieve it.
- **At the operational level:**
 - The systemization of the coordination of EU engagement has been recent with the release in 2009 by the EUREP of a *Vademecum on EU Local Aid Co-operation in the oPt*. It drew up a detailed division of labour between the Commission, EU MS and the PA giving them responsibility for co-ordination in specific priority sectors. Prior to the 2009 Vademecum, member states intervening individually were not always fully coordinated. However whilst some overlaps existed, the strategies followed were not incompatible with the Commission’s.
 - Formal EU coordination between the Commission and EU MS present in WB&GS have recently been structured at three levels: (1) weekly meetings of Heads of missions (Head of EUREP and MS) to discuss Peace process issues mainly (2) weekly meetings between Heads of political sections (Head of EUREP Political Section and MS) to discuss political issues, (3) bi-weekly meetings between Heads of cooperation (EUREP Head of operations and MS embassies) to discuss share of cooperation with PA.
 - The output of the coordination process of has been the definition of the EU local strategy in sector fiches. Improved integration of the Commission and EUMS’ operational and political support has occurred. On UNRWA for instance, the Commission has had a leading role in developing an EU position towards UNRWA, heading UNRWA’s reform programme on budgetary questions, on transparency etc.

JC 5.3 Coordination and complementarities with other non-EU donors, international and regional organisations

- The EU has been a member of the Quartet on the Middle East. Until the creation of the post of the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy in December 2009 under the Lisbon Treaty, presence was assured by the

Commissioner for External Affairs, with the High Representative for European Common Foreign and Security Policy and a foreign affairs representative of an EU member state. Within this fora, it coordinated its position on the peace process in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the US, UN and Russia.

- The work of Quartet representative Tony Blair has been supported by the Commission via the IfS. Aside from financial support, there has been **no evidence of coordination at the level of activities run by the Quartet and by the Commission.**
- At country level, international donor coordination has evolved as follows:
 - The **Ad-hoc liaison committee international donor** (AHLC) mechanism created by the Oslo accords in 1993 was the formal international donor mechanism until 2005 after which it met on a bi-annual basis.
 - In 2005, **Local aid coordination structures** were defined to improve the effectiveness of aid coordination structures
- The **Commission has been an important member of the Local coordination structure.**
- **On the effectiveness of local donor coordination:** The Local aid donor coordination sector working groups and strategy groups have been reported as a heavy but a valuable forum for (1) information-sharing on donor support to Palestinians and (2) to avoid duplication.

JC 5.4 Coordination and complementarities with partner countries governing bodies and with non-state actors

On coordination with the PA:

- Donors' planning, coordination and targeting of aid in WB&GS has improved over the evaluation period. Until the development of the 2005 EU-PA Action Plan, support had been fragmented and discussions with Palestinian ministries conducted on a bilateral basis.
- The development of national strategy development plans (PRDP for ex.) enabled donors to allocate and prioritize their support based on those plans.
- Since the structuring of donor coordination (the 2005 Action Plan and creation of coordination mechanisms), the Palestinian Ministry of Planning has kept an overview of donor involvement by sector and ownership of the donor coordination process substantially improved.

On coordination with Israel:

- The Joint Liaison Committee has been the local tripartite cooperation between Palestinians, Israelis and international donors
- Coordination with Israeli authorities on Palestinian issues has been conducted by EUREP with COGAT (the Coordinator of Israeli Government Activities in the Territories) which has been responsible for the WB&GS
- On other relations with Israeli authorities, coordination was conducted by the EUD to Israel.
- Whilst the Commission's dialogue with Israelis has been essential, it was difficult to say whether it had been sufficiently effective. At the level of the practical implementation of the Commission's support, restriction in movement of material into WB&GS has hampered the Commission's cooperation, especially in Area C.

EQ6 on Commission's value added on CPPB

JC 6.1 The Commission's role in promoting the integrated approach

- The size/critical mass as well as the coverage (several sectors) of the Commission's support in the WB&GS have contributed to the implementation of an integrated approach to CPPB and have provided added value in comparison to other donors.
- A number of stakeholders considered there was a discrepancy between political and financial clout.

JC 6.2 The Commission's specific value added with respect to reducing tensions and/or preventing the outbreak, recurrence or continuation of violent conflict

- The Commission's support has distinguished itself from other donors' support, and had important results in terms of reducing tensions:
 - The PA would have not been sustained without the Commission's support. The Commission was the first donor to have provided direct financial support to the PA (followed by the WB)
 - The Commission's presence in East Jerusalem where few other donors have been active
 - The EUREP took the lead in the coordination of the damage and needs assessment after Gaza war
 - EU norms and principles (human rights, gender) which underpinned its development projects have been perceived by Palestinians as more prevalent or credible than other donors'.
- Palestinians highlighted the swiftness of the Commission's support in crisis periods (creation of TIM and PEGASE) as well as its timeliness and predictability in comparison to other donors.
- Most informants also underlined the balanced position of the Commission on the conflict, compared to other donors, as well as the consistency of its position (Israel security, two-State solution) and its high-level involvement in the conflict (regular Commissioners visits etc).

EQ7 on Means to facilitate IA

JC 7.1 The institutional set-up for intervening in CPPB

- As noted under EQ5, coordination within the Commission worked well, with strong cooperation in overcoming difficulties and sharing information from the ground, but coordination with Council missions was not fully optimal due to the lack of clarity on the division of labour.
- It was reported that political discussions had increased with the creation of the EEAS.

JC 7.2 Human resources policy for intervening in CPPB

- The quality of the EUREP staff as well as its expertise in certain areas (on UNRWA) was highlighted by several informants. Notwithstanding the above, staff shortages were also reported.
- In terms of dedicated staff working on CPPB, it is worth noting that similarly to the general institutional evolutions in delegations, the EUD's Political Section was only created in 2006. Some officials' background in conflict countries were reported to have been taken into account in recruitment processes.
- Trainings in the field of CPPB were reported but considered either as insufficient in the offer or not possible to attend due to staff lack of time.

JC 7.3 Tools and guidance for intervening in CPPB

- No use of conflict sensitive tools was reported for either strategy development or aid planning and programming.
- A recommendation of the Partnership for Peace evaluation pointed to the need to produce a *“Peace and Conflict Assessment (PCA)³⁰ for the Programme, according to the most recent views of conflict transformation / resolution could be a useful step to improve the impact of the programme on the conflict dynamics or peace building processes”*.

JC 7.4 Financial instruments for intervening in CPPB

- The implementation of assistance in the WB&GS has been conducted exclusively through centralized management (as opposed to decentralized management; ex-ante controls and payments are centralized at EUREP). Whilst this has been more burdensome it was decided for oversight and control purposes.
- As already mentioned under EQ3, the flexible, “crisis situation” mechanisms were reported as essential in enabling the EUD to intervene in a fast-moving environment.
- TIM and PEGASE have supported several sectors of the economy and different populations and as such have contributed to the implementation of an IA to CPPB.
- The IfS, when used, supported the work of other institutions, namely of Quartet Representative Tony Blair and of the Council, via its support to the Palestinian civil police in the frame of EUPOL COPPS.

JC 7.5 Non-financial instruments for intervening in CPPB

- On the one hand the Commission’s substantial role in programming assistance and supporting state-building has been political but the Commission has not been the lead player in the peace process. The discrepancy between the Commission’s financial and political weight in the conflict was identified and deplored by several stakeholders.
- Informants highlighted the importance of negotiations with the Israeli Ministry of Defence’s unit - Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (or COGAT) for the smooth implementation of the assistance throughout WB&GS, notably to ensure that technical support reached the WB&GS.
- At the higher diplomatic level, both European and Palestinian stakeholders underlined the steps taken by Javier Solana, the European Union's former High Representative for CFSP (Council not Commission) as well as Catherine Ashton, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as well as their contributions in facilitating the Commission’s mandate – the provision of development cooperation. However some stakeholders considered that there were some differences among EU member states on the conflict and that this constrained the EU’s role in the peace process negotiations.

EQ8 on Timeliness and cost-effectiveness

JC 8.1 Timeliness and cost-effectiveness of Commission interventions

- The efficiency of the Commission’s interventions in WB&GS has been mixed.
- An important factor has been transport and border control restrictions and the minute screening carried out by Israeli authorities. Government of Israel’s decisions which have considerably affected implementation time schedules, and have been out of Palestinians’ and donors’ control.
- Some interventions have been efficient such as the TIM and PEGASE

³⁰ "Conflict analysis" should be understood here as *"a systematic study of the political, economic, social, historical and cultural factors that directly influence the shape, dynamics and direction of existing or potential conflicts. It includes an analysis of conflict causes and dynamics as well as assessments of the profiles, motivations, objectives and resources of conflict protagonists"*. OECD-DAC, *Guidance on evaluating conflict prevention and peace building activities*, 2008.

JC 8.2 Impact of the regulatory and institutional set-up for the Commission's support in the field of CPPB on timeliness and cost-effectiveness

- There have been mixed responses on the heaviness of Commission procedures and delivery modalities. For example, the D+3 rule which requires that programmed assistance be implemented within 3 years - was considered as over-constraining and centralized management as burdensome. On the other hand, some interviewees mentioned that the Commission's regulatory set-up had been less burdensome than other donors'.
- In addition, the annual rather than multi-annual programming of the Commission's cooperation in view of WB&GS' particular situation as an occupied territory and the volatility of the situation was reported as having improved the flexibility and reactivity of the programming which could be modified in light of changes in the conflict situation.
- Other requirements than efficiency have informed the provision of the Commission's support to Palestinians. The heaviness of procedures has been the flip side of accountability, control and transparency requirements Commission assistance has had to comply with due to the sensitivity of the allocation of funds and risks of misallocation. Centralized management of assistance has for instance permitted the EUREP to remain the owner of the implementation and control and audit of the assistance. Similarly TIM and PEGASE were approved also because they have been entirely controlled and audited via the Commission. The elaborate audit and verification mechanism setup has ensured that earmarking for funds to specific programmes has been respected thus increasing control over payments and preventing fraud.
- On the impact of the institutional set-up: there was no evidence of coordination shortcomings impacting efficiency within the Commission. On coordination between the two Council missions in WB&GS and Commission support, some overlapping and competition for EU MS funding has occurred and impacted efficiency.

JC 8.3 Extent to which Commission's human resources were sufficient and skilled enough to ensure timely and cost-effective support

- Evidence has been mixed: Generally the Commission's staff was praised by counterparts and beneficiaries as efficient, notably their level of follow-up as well as their flexibility in projects' implementation. Other informants however reported some staff shortages at EUREP and resulting delays in the follow-up of interventions.

JC 8.4 Impact of the requirements in terms of timeliness and cost-effectiveness on the implementation of an integrated approach

- No information.

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