



THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

WHITE PAPER

for international security and defence





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White Paper: Objectives, Criteria, Lines of Action

Armed Forces: from a joint vision to a joint reality

In entering the new millennium Italy lagged behind on many fronts. Three main areas of concern characterized the sector of international security and defence: political and institutional participation in the defence debate, the structure and functioning of the administration and the relationship between Italian citizens and Defence. A country that pays no attention to Defence themes makes it difficult to intervene on its military to improve it. A political system that steers clear from these problems hampers the establishment of a strong relationship between the people and the Armed Forces, a relationship able to strengthen their sense of be-



longing to the national community and their trust in the institutions. So far, these weaknesses have prevented our country from timely and effectively tackling both the modernization of the Defence system and the many challenges we have been confronting for a long time. The requirement for a State more capable of protecting our national interests stems from the changes we are witnessing in an ever more complex world. The new millennium, in fact, is especially characterized by two historical changes: globalization and the digital revolution, which nurture an ever stronger interconnection and interdependence between geographical areas, countries, economic sectors, markets and cultures. A farsighted, pragmatic international security and defence policy is of fundamental importance to provide our country with a military able to safeguard our most important achievement, accomplished at the cost of great



sacrifices: our freedom. It can, moreover, protect us from risks and possible threats and allow us to tackle our responsibilities within the international community. In the last few years the relevance of those responsibilities has increased in the face of an international scenario where crisis areas have widened, have become more complex and are approaching the European borders.

New threats - terrorism in the first place, with attacks being now carried out also in our continent- cast their shadow over our freedoms. The Mediterranean area - where our country is historically, politically and economically located- is again attracting international attention because of its many crises and conflicts, to which there seems to be no easy or quick solution. The world has deeply changed and so have many aspects of security that we had taken for granted. Within the framework of the international institutions that Italy regards as its points of reference -the UN, NATO, the EU- those challenges require a coordinated response from all our national capabilities as well as the availability of effective tools, not least a modern and capable defence system. We must all be aware that the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces are important parts of the country and of its public service, especially for the role they play as guarantors of our freedom and strongholds of our national independence.

Upgrading our capabilities to meet current requirements, improving effectiveness in actions and operations and ensuring overall cost-efficiency are the priority goals to be met by the Ministry of Defence and by the Armed Forces within the framework of the reform process of the State bodies, i.e. the objective identified by this Government since its inception.

In this perspective, the White Paper submitted by the Government to the other Institutions and to the national and international public opinion intends to set short-to-medium term objectives, criteria and actions, thus providing our country with an updated defence capacity able to safeguard our interests in cooperation with all the other national instruments. Nevertheless, in Western democratic countries the growing level of insecurity has gone side by side with a decrease in defence investments - due to the financial and economic crisis- and a reduced sensitivity toward defence themes compared with other economic and social issues. This trend, which requires a reflection and an adjustment of our Armed Forces, has become evident also in Italy.

The Armed Forces are a very valuable asset and a capable and effective reality that

must be preserved over time and prepared in time. From the very beginning of my mandate, in order to safeguard this valuable asset, I saw the necessity of a White Paper for International Security and Defence that could serve as a guide to adapt the Armed Forces to the new requirements, and to foster greater awareness in our country about security and defence being common assets and indispensable conditions for the development of our society. This was also the reason why I decided that the drafting of the White Paper should be open to the contributions of all the parties interested in our defence system and to the public opinion.

Many innovations have been introduced over the last fifteen years. As a consequence, the Armed Forces have changed by adopting a professional model that is more agile, fully gender-equal and increasingly integrated at the international level, evolving toward the joint organizational structure provided for in the Defence reform started by former Defence Minister Andreatta.

The Government intends to finalize the Defence reform process while removing unnecessary bureaucratic structures and unproductive duplications, and changing all organizational or managerial solutions that do not appropriately justify their cost. On the other hand, it's worth underscoring that in the last few years the Defence has already done a great deal in terms of expenditure cuts and rationalization. It suffices to note that the Ministry has been the "first contributor" in reducing current expenditures, has already introduced various organizational simplifications and finally, based on Law n° 244/2012, has, of its own initiative, cut its personnel by about 25%, lowering the number of the military from 190,000 to 150,000 and that of civilian employees from 30,000 to 20,000.

The transformation process, however, is not over, since our future defence requires the Armed Forces to think and operate as a single instrument, where their individual traditions, specificities and different capabilities become the strongpoint of their unity, rather than a weakness resulting in their separation. In brief, we must move from a "joint vision" to a fully joint "reality". Thus, we will be able to employ and integrate new technologies and make our decisional processes, so effective and efficient in our out-of-area operations, as effective and efficient across the whole spectrum of our activities and sectors of intervention, from procurement to infrastructures, doctrine, recruitment, logistics and training.



This new, more effective military must be employed carefully, on the basis of our strategic priorities. Italy is a country with an exceptionally rich experience and great abilities that have allowed it to work hard and well at international level. Moreover, our geopolitical position, at the centre of the Mediterranean basin, offers many opportunities, but also unavoidable obligations. Italy is able and willing to cover a recognized position of responsibility in its area of interest and, according to its means and resources and in harmony with the International Community, to contribute to peace-establishment and regional development.

In this perspective, the Defence will put its multiple abilities at the service of the Country, in order to understand, prevent, tackle and solve crises, and to develop a network of relationships able to foster the stabilization process in the Mediterranean area.

As an asset of the country, the Armed Forces are and will always be at the service of the community, when performing both their institutional and support tasks, tackling all kinds of emergency situations.

Together with the priority lines of action illustrated above, we must also provide new policies aimed at supporting innovation and scientific and technological research. An effective security and defence policy, in fact, must maintain appropriate technological and industrial capabilities, able to meet at least part of our requirements. To achieve this objective, close cooperation between the Defence and industry, as well as universities and research centres, will be the keystone of future action, hopefully also in view of the European integration process.

The establishment of a virtuous relationship between the conversion of military requirements into specific technologies and products and the final users will strengthen the competitiveness of the “national system” ensuring jobs, technological innovation and industrial development that will benefit the whole community. Our future Armed Forces will therefore have to be young, well trained, motivated and appropriately remunerated. Our military, our defence professionals, will ensure the country the best possible defence framework, implementing their tasks by using modern tools within a functional and essential operational structure, working effectively, with a spirit of sacrifice.

As citizens who, to comply with the oath they took when they joined the Armed Forces, cope with a difficult life, sacrificing their affections and their rights, our men and women in uniform, as well as their families, will never lack respect, support and a fair

social treatment.

This perspective and this spirit are the basis of the White Paper's strategic analysis and design synthesis.

The strategic guidelines illustrated in this foreword are therefore the political guidance needed to develop implementation solutions. In particular, since strategies are worth nothing without the tools needed to implement them, this White Paper is to be followed by concrete legislative and regulatory proposals and a Defence strategic review which will outline how the future Armed Forces will be shaped and equipped to effectively tackle possible risks and current and medium-term threats.

Finally, let me thank all the military and civilian experts who have worked with me for more than a year: their commitment has been crucial to drafting and publishing this White Paper.

I hope that this paper will now foster renewed attention toward the Defence, and the necessary support for the ambitious review project outlined in it.

Minister of Defence
Sen. Roberta Pinotti





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Why a white paper?

1. Today we are all living in a global environment that has become extraordinarily complex, difficult to understand and uncertain in its development. The 80's of the last century ended with the conclusion of the historic period known as “bipolar confrontation” and with a new



hope in the beginning of a global process toward peaceful coexistence, in which the international crises would have been resolved through the masterly use of diplomacy, economy and international organizations.

2. However, the following twenty years demonstrated that this was an optimistic forecast. In a very short space of time, stable areas of the world became the scene of horrendous atrocities and crimes against humanity, we believed had been buried forever. At the same time, crisis situations existing before the “Cold War” were rekindled and intensified, generating effects in neighbouring areas. The start of the process of globalization has brought wealth and development in many areas, but it has also created strong social disparities, transfers of wealth and productive tools. Aspirations towards democratic and participatory social models have shaped a new generation of people, who have thus become aware of their traditions, rights and values, but it has started at the same time the resurgence of nationalism and conflicts based on intolerance, religion and competition for primary resources. The revolution started with IT and new technologies seemed to offer mankind the chance to obtain more from the planet, but it also has had to face a growing awareness of the difficulties involved in sustaining



such models requiring the intensive exploitation of resources, the control of which provokes new situations of crisis and conflict.

3. It is not possible to predict what effects will result from these premises in the future, but a tendency towards widespread instability certainly looks set to remain at least in the near future. The dynamics of this instability, on the contrary, seem to be more and more violent and less confined to the places where they were generated. Phenomena such as the Caliphate and the destabilization of important neighbouring regions for social, economic, health or religious reasons, as well as the more traditional politics of power, require us to look at these events with concern. Concern that arises from the knowledge that we must ensure in the long term, with our allies, a condition of sufficient deterrence, functional in preventing future conflicts in the Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Mediterranean regions. We must take the responsibility for forecasting, preventing and, if necessary, managing events generated by situations of instability in terms of threats and attacks on our national integrity, our sovereignty and our vital interests, without excluding the risks generated by mass migration, pandemics, terrorism and crime.



4. In this perspective, the “defence function” and its operational component represented by the military, is an essential element of the national system which protects and guarantees our freedom. Freedom obtained from the sacrifice of past generations, which is an essential and necessary condition to safeguard free institutions and citizens’ rights.

5. Therefore faced with a situation of increasing international instability and insecurity, there is now a great need for Italy to deal rationally and methodically with the problem of national security and defence, as well as with foresight, not just by mana-

ging sudden events appropriately, but by developing a broader comprehensive strategy involving all the capabilities of our society. The defence of the State, in fact, cannot and should not be limited exclusively to the indispensable action of the Armed Forces. It must be a unicum in which every segment of society, according to aptitude and ability, contributes to the creation of the broad and coordinated security framework that is a real guarantee of freedom for our nation.

6. This challenge requires the Government and Parliament to examine major national security and defence issues, in order to define a structured National Security Strategy that is able to cope with and manage the security problems Italy will have to face in the future, in a coordinated and synergistic way.

7. In addition, the intense activity carried out by the Defence in theatres of intervention means that renewed attention needs to be given to the “command of the armed forces”, in particular during military operations and especially in the light of the many tasks undertaken in support of the international stability in recent decades. Leaving aside the functions of the constitutional authorities, it seems useful to reflect on the adequacy of the governing bodies and their related support structures, developed over the years to deal with situations of crisis or emergency. Their functioning, in fact, is strongly influenced by both the limited scope given to them at the time of their foundation, and the absence of specific primary legislation outlining their powers and configuration. It is, therefore, appropriate to study new solutions in order to ensure the rightful position of the delicate decision-making process relating to the exercise of military force, in compliance with the mandatory constitutional principles and the inescapable demands of timeliness and effectiveness.

8. The strategic analysis and design of this White Paper within this context and from this perspective has the threefold purpose of:

- indicating, in the medium-term, which military component can best address the challenges and opportunities that are relevant to the Ministry of Defence in terms of international security and defence;
- identifying which model of governance and consequent organization can best gua-



rantee the Ministry its compliance with modern criteria of effectiveness, efficiency and economy, to allow the Defence to successfully face the challenges of today and tomorrow;

- developing cultural and organizational elements that enable the Defence to contribute systematically to the Nation's effort to develop the necessary framework of security previously referred to.

9. The elements contained in this White Paper are the basis for the development of solutions to be implemented and which will have to be refined and developed quickly, according to the indications outlined in the final chapter.

The military, security and defence

10. The Italians of our generation have experienced a long period in which it was possible to take advantage of a wide security framework and during which the participation in international efforts for peace and stability was a question of "choice". Under In the current situation it is important not to underestimate the fact that direct involvement in some of the current or potential crises could become an unavoidable commitment. It is therefore necessary to prevent the occurrence of such situations and take appropriate action in the event of failure, in order to contain them - before they become too big to be faced with only limited sacrifice.

11. The financial and economic crisis and the need to contain the public debt, however, do not allow the country to provide in the short term, all the resources that would be needed to address these challenges with all the right tools and in all situations. Through a wise choice and use of the tools that are available, we need to identify the correct priorities for action and the most appropriate ways of intervening to ensure the achievement of the strategic objectives that are being pursued.

12. Secondly, it is necessary to summarize two requirements: the preparations necessary to deal with an immediate crisis involving the nation and the preservation,

in a broader perspective and in the long-term, of the ability to deal with situations of traditional conflict. The latter case, is perceived as less likely today, but cannot be neglected because it can affect vital national interests, including the very survival of the State, more than any other circumstance.



13. Finally, we need to understand in what way and to what extent the different international organizations of which Italy is a member, contribute to international security and the defence of the nation. Membership of the Atlantic Alliance is vital for the organisation's strategic function and is also useful in reducing the overall impact of the defence function on the national budget. From this viewpoint it is necessary to assess the way in which this participation deals with the fair division of responsibilities, in proportion to the overall potentiality of the country. Participation in the process of European integration in the field of defence, on the other hand, means that it is necessary to think about the question of what legal and political instruments must be developed in order to produce more security. The need to contribute to the peace initiatives of the United Nations, makes it necessary to provide all those activities which can render the role of the nation credible within the organisation.

Internal reform in the Ministry of Defence

14. The ministry of Defence is facing an historic moment characterized by complex and pressing needs, which require fast, effective action in order to preserve, and in the longer term to strengthen, the fundamental function that it expresses. At the same time, the government is aiming at a broad reform of the public administration, in order to provide the State with modern tools for the development of the activities. In order to respect the specific features associated with the functions to be performed, it is therefore in the interest of the country that the Defence is included in this period of reform.



15. Furthermore, it should be noted how the military has undergone various changes in the last twenty years in order to respond to multiple contingent needs. The recent law No. 244, 2015, however, has significantly decreased the numbers of the armed forces to about 25 % of the original size, and introduced new organisational changes. It is therefore evident that a more systematic and comprehensive review of the governance of the Defence is needed, which, in the spirit and full implementation of 1997 Andreatta reform, can lead to a truly integrated structure distinguished by greater efficiency and effectiveness and especially by economy of operation.

16. Personnel is one of the most important issues for Defence. Over the last two decades important reforms have been carried out, such as the suspension of compulsory military service and the introduction of a “professional model”, as well as the introduction of military service for women. Today, on the basis of this experience and partial legislative adaptations, it has become clear that systematic revision is necessary in order to renew, balance and simplify, both the legislation which regulates the enlistment process and career progression, as well as the measures that define the general legal framework of reference for staff.

17. Finally, the need for a more coordinated and transparent leadership requires some changes in decision-making and internal operations, to ensure a more effective political management of the ministry and better interconnection with other ministries, as part of a united action by the government and conducted by the presidency of the council of ministers. With regards to cooperation between the institutions, it also appears necessary to investigate how to improve communication with regional and local authorities. Using Defence not only for military action and intervention, but also in the case of major catastrophes, for example, means that it is necessary to think about the need for integration and coordination with local authorities and public functions located in the autonomous system that will be developed.

Defence and the State

18. The function performed by the Defence is part of the constitution and it is fundamental to the State for its preservation and creates the security framework that is indispensable for the development of the nation. During periods of crisis and transition, like the one we are experiencing, it is nevertheless necessary to further strengthen the vital links that should always exist between the ministry of Defence and the other ministries, between the armed forces and other State capabilities and between the military and the rest of the citizens, to achieve that interdependency between the different parts of the same organism which is essential to the life of our community.

19. It is essential for our nation to better understand the duties, functions and features of the Defence and of the “citizens in uniform” who serve their country, in order to ensure full knowledge of the facts, the requirements, advantages and the possible correlated risks. On this basis the citizens and their elected representatives will be able to make rational and well-informed decisions and fully accept responsibility in the critical sector of Defence. Communication between the government and parliament is essential to this process and new ways of providing information and communicating will need to be developed in accordance with their constitutional powers.

20. Addressing the problem of national security and defence from a modern perspective requires a comprehensive and multi-disciplinary approach. It is necessary to think about how the various capabilities which make the country safer can be developed and if the concept of “defence” can evolve, become broader, including all the different perspectives and skills involved in it. This concept, moreover, integrates well with the innovations launched by the government for the reforming the so-called “third sector”, in particular with regards to the role and functions of National Civil Service. In this effort, the underlying connecting element of the evolution is represented by the shared values which permeate the very existence of our nation.

21. A real sharing of the same framework of values between citizens and their armed forces requires constant communication and assiduous interaction between the parties,




who make transparency, public interest and constructive criticism the basis of the trusting relationship which should always exist between institutions and citizens.

22. With the intention of contributing to the effort made by the entire national community, this paper intends to give a precise and decisive impetus to the transformation of the military in terms of greater efficiency, effectiveness and economy of management. This is both the starting point for a complex reform and adaptation of our armed forces, and the basis for initiating a broad and mature reflection on the issues of international security and defence. The historical period in which we are living demands all that. Also the citizens who daily observe serious international events are requesting it. As a government it is our duty as a government to make every effort to address these problems with determination and give the best possible answers in the interest of the nation.

Strategic Framework

The evolution of the strategic scenario



23. International relations are highly complex due to the interconnection of a number of factors and actors. This means that the system as a whole is both dynamic and strong, but it is also vulnerable because disruption and crisis spread easily and quickly. Italy is deeply rooted in the international system from every point of view with advantages and benefits gained from this strong interconnection. Italy also provides a lot of support, in fact nation could be considered as a substantial actor in terms of technology and commerce as well as in terms of knowledge and culture.

24. Moreover, Italy has developed awareness due to the increasing interaction and interdependence with the rest of the world, considering also its geographical position and the dependence on foreign countries for the supply of resources. As a consequence, the effects on Italy are almost social, cultural, and economic or it may give the rise to political phenomena altering the existing global and regional balance.

25. Italy's general policy and particularly its defence policy, cannot therefore be separated from a broad and diverse vision of ongoing problems and global dynamics, with multiple dimensions.. The option represented by a defence policy focused entirely on some specific geographic areas or on some defined risk factors does not appear consistent with the strategic needs of a nation so deeply integrated in global dynamics. On the other hand, given the actual size of the nation and its overall interests, strict



realism in setting priorities and in choosing intervention tools is required. Choices reflecting a “non- realistic” approach to the problems of international security would result in a significant waste of resources with the consequence of less protecting national interests.

26. Therefore, this White Paper had to evolve from a preliminary identification of the most significant factors characterizing the current international environment with major trends influencing its evolution. This effort was necessary not only to propose a predictive and deterministic model of future threats or risks to national security, but rather to reduce the level of unpredictability and uncertainty of the analysis, identifying a more precise reference environment within which different choices can be made.

27. The guidelines to this document stated that the current period is distinguished by two and concomitant geopolitical phenomena: a progressive globalization of phenomena and problems, which tends to turn the world into a highly interconnected and interdependent “global village” at least for that part of the world with a high level of interdependence, and a parallel process of fragmentation, which causes structural weakening and destabilisation especially in weaker or newly constituted states.

28. The current international situation is characterized by frequently widespread instability overshadowed by conflicts not always restrained, which are triggered by political, social, economic, environmental or religious factors. This is more likely in areas suffering from socio-economic problems or areas deprived of traditional references, leadership and stability due to the post-Cold War process of global transformation. Several factors influence the future international security scenario and to encourage new situations of instability in addition to those ones still unresolved from the last century. Some of the most relevant are the following.

29. Variation of the global balance of power. The gradual formation of a new world equilibrium on a poly-centric basis, or according to some, on an a-centric and regional basis, resulting from the affirmation of new emerging powers, could lead, even in the medium term, to new political, economic or military challenges. Hence the possible

rising of new conflicts, maybe localized carrying a potential significant impact for our nation, Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. In a global context, traditional wars between states over control of resources or due to the resurgence of unresolved situations could cause a domino effect of widening the crisis. At the regional level, changes in the balance of power, such as those produced by conflict in the Euro-Atlantic region, the weakening or ineffectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance and the imbalance between the defence resources and the security challenges, may mean that new conflict are more probable.

30. Changes in political structures. These changes seem to slow down the process which has characterised last decade that is the gradual transition from autocratic or illiberal regimes to forms of government with greater democracy. However, even though many populations are now aware that they can aspire to democracy, the real possibility of attaining a democratic system is not always guaranteed in a growing number of cases. This situation, exacerbated by economic and social crises, can lead to internal instability and civil wars in countries apparently stable today.

31. Increased influence and widespread technologies. The current speed of research and use of technologies, together with the innovation process resulting from the integrated use of existing and emerging technologies, will lead to a faster rate of change. Likewise, the traditional margin of technological superiority held by the military has been eroded in favour of technologies for civilian use. The latter are often available at a lower cost resulting in wider access to even the most sophisticated technology. This will increase the possibility of technology being used by non-state actors to offend enemies or opponents, thus significantly decreasing state control and prevention.

32. The centrality of computer networks. The world is becoming increasingly connected and integrated making possible a universal access to knowledge and information. The West is particularly dependent on information network systems, so that it is essential that these systems are functional, secure and resilient and this results in the emergence of a new operational domain, the cybernetic domain, which must be protected and defended. The effects of cyber-attacks on networks or computer services



are particularly destructive for Western countries producing the same impact as those resulting from the war fought with conventional weapons.

33. Demographic changes. Demographic evolution will produce a variety of effects on our society regarding the economy, the social environment and security. With regard to international security and defence issues, widespread poverty, high unemployment rates and a relatively low level of education in many countries produce social tension and migratory pressure, which may cause difficulties even in the countries objective of such exoduses. In Europe reduced birth rates and ageing populations could lead to tensions between generations as well as having an impact on the availability of young, qualified personnel for building security and defence structures.

34. Urbanization. It is estimated that in 2040, 65% of the world population will live in large built up areas and that 95 % of the increase in urban population will occur in the mega-cities of the developing countries. This process will have a significant impact on the dynamics of security management in those states. Because of the inability to ensure the basic needs of the population in these areas, the possibility of conflicts will be increased. It will also be more difficult for military or police distinguish between combatants and armless citizens.

35. Scarcity of natural resources. Nations in the developing world need ever increasing levels of energy and raw materials to sustain their growth. Competition for these resources could produce a higher level of international tension leading to possible conflicts. However, the increasing scarcity of vital resources such as water and food due to population growth, climate change and an irrational use of territories is a much more serious problem. It is the cause of the migration phenomena and could pave the way to strong competition, even armed, for the possession of such resources.

36. Climate change. Changes in the global climate have a growing impact on our increasingly urbanized societies dependent on territories where human intervention has profoundly altered the existing natural balance. In this situation, the results of natural phenomena such as disasters will have devastating effects. In addition, disasters

of a large magnitude could allow opportunistic actors to gain political, financial and economic advantages in the international arena, resulting in weakening our societies.

37. The globalisation of financial resources. Financial systems, which handle the most important resources of the planet, tend to be increasingly interconnected and not related to specific states, sometimes resulting in a decrease of sovereignty in many countries when having some difficulties managing a home crisis through traditional means and in the increase number of actors involved in each specific crisis situation.

38. Local Identities. The progressive birth of local different groups or organisations causes an increasing weakening and fragmentation of existing states, which are unable to centrally manage the twenty-first century complex phenomenon. In some cases, this weakness opens the way to non-state transnational religious or criminal organisations. The violence and diffusion rate of such organisations have a significant impact on the condition of regional or global security. The effects of such conflicts could lead to attacks on critical infrastructures, to forced changes in the political equilibrium and could jeopardise the flow of trade and energy. The consequences arising from the possession of chemical, bacteriological, radiological or nuclear offensive tools are particularly serious in these territories. Even the threat of using these kinds of weapons could have serious political, social and economic consequences.

39. Decrease in defence investment. This phenomenon is common in the western world while the opposite is true in the rest of the world, particularly in relation to regional powers. For Western countries, the reduction in military spending is the result of a widespread diminished awareness regarding the importance of the defence issues compared to other economic and social problems. If this trend continues, the capacity to prevent and deter will diminish in western countries, while the level of possible risks and threats to security will increase, and the overall ability to defend both vital and strategic interests and the values on which our democratic structures are based, will be compromised.



Security of the Euro-Atlantic region

40. The Euro-Atlantic region is defined by the common values and democratic beliefs of the states of the community and not by geographical boundaries. Since the end of World War II the relationship between European nations and North American nations has been one of the most solid and enduring pillars of the global equilibrium. It has also taken the shape of a military alliance - the Atlantic Pact - but since the beginning it has in fact been, a much broader and deeper relationship.

41. The relationship is based on shared values on both sides of the Atlantic, irrespective of language. It is the result of the mingling the respective economies that has no equal in any other sphere of relations between nations. It was one of the driving factors behind European integration unifying a group of nations while leaving behind the divisions of the past and seeking together the realization of fundamental western values: freedom, peace, prosperity and development. From an economic point of view the Euro-Atlantic area is vital for Italy: 68% of imports and 75% of national trade exports are in this area that is without mentioning the high level of industrial interdependence that already exists and the strategic network of joint technological research activities and professional training.

42. It is therefore clear that the Euro-Atlantic region security, being the focus of national interests, is top priority for the nation. According with our Constitution, the defence of the nation is a fundamental duty of every citizen, and it is therefore also obtained through the defence of peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. Within this framework, full national commitment to the Atlantic Alliance for the development of a gradual integration process of the European Union nations defences are the cornerstones for the protection, even in the future, of security and national defence and involve not only benefits but also specific obligations and expenses.

Security of the Euro-Mediterranean region

43. The geographical location, economic-trade flows and also the interconnection of cultural history, place our nation at the centre of a large and complex geopolitical area, with its own clearly defined characteristics known as the Euro-Mediterranean area. It is made up of very different political, social, economic, cultural and religious systems. The area is unified through the sharing of the Mediterranean basin.



44. The Mediterranean basin joins five areas each bearing different characteristics: the European Union countries, the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean area of the Middle East and the Maghreb. In some of these areas, fundamental economic, political and social unrest gave rise to new and violent criminality as well as bloody civil wars. Terrorism and transnational uprisings have taken root: illegal immigration and militant proselytizing are seen as a potential means of expansion into Europe. These issues and the dependence on some of these countries for energy, make the stability of the Euro-Mediterranean region of vital national interest.

45. It is precisely in the Euro-Mediterranean region that traditional state structures are weakening and social and cultural models in alternative to democracy are being pursued. In recent times, this phenomenon has been exacerbated by the birth of some groups, taking control over entire areas exercising civil, military, economic and judicial power. Moreover, the use of globalized information allows these groups to successfully export their own model, with consequent spreading rapidly of their belief, easily replicated even at great geographical distance.

46. The evolution of terrorism aiming only at undermining the solidity of existing institutions to fully and officially replace them is particularly alarming. Terrorism which can rely on state-type support, albeit unrecognised by the international com-



munity, has then evolved from a condition in which concealment is necessary, to one which openly challenges the institutions as well as the local, regional and global equilibrium.

47. The threat posed by actors capable of successfully combining transnational terrorist, criminal, military and media actions, means that the traditional concepts of “security” and “defence” are outdated and leads to a progressive development of the tools necessary to address the problems of internal security and external defence. This transformation creates a need for broader integrated intergovernmental response capabilities, of which the military is still an essential element.

48. The complexity of the situations and the diversity of the actors in this area mean that a stable and effective regional security system is not feasible at the moment. At the same time, the geographical proximity and the direct influence on Italy of the events developing in this area, make it impossible to ignore the way various situations of crisis and conflict are evolving. These situations, if not properly addressed and settled, could further jeopardize the regional and already fragile security.

49. In this context, it is therefore vital for our national interest to work towards ensuring the Euro-Mediterranean region development of greater stability, economic progress and respect for fundamental human rights, within which the process of democratic competition can replace that of confrontational opposition. However, the current situation demonstrates how these conditions are still well out of reach. It is therefore necessary for the nation to assume more responsibility and a role of active participation in the efforts of the international community to resolve these crises.

50. In short, it is not possible for Italy to separate the safety of the Euro-Mediterranean region from that of the Euro-Atlantic, as they are both essential and complementary elements in the framework of national security and defence. Whilst in the Euro-Atlantic context the participation in established mechanisms of prevention, deterrence and collective defence (Atlantic Alliance and the European Union) ensures that the Nation’s security conditions are adequate, it is

only possible to create similar conditions in the Euro-Mediterranean region if an intervention in this area is given national priority.

51. The Euro-Mediterranean region, however, is not a closed system and it is influenced by the dynamics occurring particularly in adjacent areas. . It is not possible to deal with crisis situations developing in areas of direct interest without a broader understanding of their causes. It is fundamental the involvement in initiatives aimed at their resolution. In order to protect national interests and to strengthen the framework of security and defence, areas of particular interest are the Mashreq, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and the countries of the Persian Gulf:

a. The Mashreq

The term Mashreq, is understood to be synonymous with “non-Maghreb”, it generally identifies all the Arab countries that lie east of Cairo. It is therefore the eastern macro-region of the Arab Muslim world. Its instability has been increased over the past two decades due to widespread conflict both internally in some countries, and transnationally, due to economic, political, social and religious factors. The possibility that significant phenomena of a terrorist nature could destabilize the regions closest to us, if not even hit national territory, clearly indicates that it is necessary to participate in the international community efforts for better conditions of peace and regional stability in this area, through the wise use of all the tools available and in accordance with the legitimate governments wishes of the nations involved.



b. The Sahel

The Sahel is a strip of land in sub-Saharan Africa that stretches from the Sahara desert to the north and the savannah of the Sudan to the south, and between the Atlantic Ocean to the west and the Red Sea to the east. It is an area of limited economic development with areas of extreme poverty continuously affected by religious and tribal conflicts. In these countries, the lack of state structures able to guarantee internal security leads to the possible causes of instability in the Mediterranean



area, such as mass migration, illegal trafficking and international terrorism. There is also concern about the development and spread of pandemics, even if the current national system of prevention and control has proven to be effective. In this case the active involvement of Italy in international humanitarian missions or missions which contribute to stabilising the area could also be necessary.

c. The Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa is traditionally an area of national presence, being facilitated and stimulated by the cultural proximity of local populations with our country. Also the strategic position of the area is a crossroads for maritime trade flows to and from the Mediterranean region. The political and social stability of the area and the creation of better living conditions for the population are of significant relevance, albeit indirectly, for the security of the Mediterranean region, preventing the resurgence of phenomena such as piracy, reducing emigration to Europe and preventing the area from becoming fertile ground for the expansion of extremist religious terrorist groups. In the same way as the Sahel, this is an area in which Italy could be actively involved for humanitarian missions or missions contributing to the stabilization of the area.



d. The Persian Gulf region

The region of the countries on the Persian Gulf is of particular strategic importance, since a significant part of world production and trade of oil products still occurs in this area. Furthermore, some countries are also active and important actors in the dynamics that could affect the stability of the Mediterranean region and are important partners for our country. For these reasons there is national and international interest in the stability of the area and in maintaining the trade flows that are developed within it.



Global security

52. As an important member of the international community, Italy with its global economic perspective and global political interests is both capable and eager to play internationally a role of responsibility, acting to help ensure peace and development, according to its resources. In this endeavour, Italy attaches fundamental importance to the role of the wider international community, with the United Nations as the global organization of reference providing the possibility of developing joint actions with existing multinational organizations. Italy is fully aware that only joint action with other nations can realistically lead to the desired goals. As a result, over the years, Italy has developed a deep interconnection and, in some cases, interdependence with many countries, maintaining an extensive network of economic, political, cultural and military relations, even outside our regional area.

53. The wider security of national interests therefore requires Italy to actively share the responsibility of the process initiated by the international community aiming to create better living conditions, peace and development for all the populations of the world. Therefore, as part of a multidimensional approach and in accordance with the opportunities and priorities, the nation will operate, not only for the protection of national interests, but also for the protection and defence of populations in crisis areas and for the development and promotion of higher levels of security and global stability.





DIFESA

International Security and Defence Policy



National interests and objectives

54. The ultimate goal of the national policy of international security and defence is the protection of Italy's vital and strategic interests. To reach this objective the defence of the State and its sovereignty must be ensured, the construction of a stable framework of regional security must be pursued and efforts must be made to facilitate the creation of a favourable international environment. Although a multitude of Intergovernmental Action can be implemented by the government to achieve these objectives, the ability of the armed forces to defend Italy and its interests remains central.

55. In the last twenty years, in fact, the participation of the Defence in multinational military operations has reinforced Italy's international role. This allowed us to strengthen our relations within the alliances and develop new ones, also with emerging actors. Italy has provided considerable commitment in terms of human and material resources



and such commitment has also been paid for with a high tribute in blood. The armed forces have demonstrated that they can work effectively even in harsh environments. In line with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, the action of the armed forces has thus helped to strengthen, the role of Defence as the primary actor in the context of international security to the benefit of the “national system”.

56. As set out in the Guidelines to this document, Italy’s role in the world is determined by our vital and strategic interests as a nation and as a prominent member of the international community. In fact, these two factors are closely linked, because national interests also have an international dimension. These roles and interests must also be seen in relation to the fact that the country is an integral part of the global system both in terms of contributing to and being on the receiving end of the limits and constraints of the system itself.



57. Italy is one of the largest, leading European countries and one of the founding members of the European Union. Our social, political and economic future is certainly anchored to Europe and its future. Our security interests largely coincide with those of other European partners and it is therefore vital for Italy to preserve the security and stability of the European continent and the transatlantic spaces. This goal can be pursued by ensuring the effectiveness of the European Union and Atlantic Alliance as collective political and military tools, able to protect that interest.

58. Italy values the strengthening of EU Common Security and Defence Policy strategic and for this reason actively promotes the development of the role of Europe in a way that requires more integration of resources and capabilities among member countries. For example government action for further development of incentives and innovative approaches to defence cooperation, which also involves studying tax me-

asures that do not distort the market and includes consideration of the idea that some of Defence investments could be excluded from the thresholds of the Stability and Growth Pact. Transatlantic relations will be infused with new energy due to a closer understanding between European defence and NATO, overcoming the influences that still lead to a preference for bilateral relations over multilateral ones.

59. National interests, however, are not confined to Europe, which has mainly a transformation economy. Much of the possibility for a national development depends on the ability to attract foreign investment and international trade. We are reliant on international trade for many primary natural resources without which the possibility of sustaining national and economic development would be severely compromised.

60. Our economic interests, our particularly rich and complex history and our geopolitical position provide other responsibilities and opportunities. Italy is a member of several international organizations and has developed multiple and important bonds of friendship and cooperation with many countries. Lastly, Italy, as an open society, influences and is also influenced by global events and trends.

61. Ensuring the defence of the homeland, maritime and air space, our freedom, the safety of our citizens and the future well-being of our country are not neglected. But this is dependent on widespread global stability, on the existence of an international system that safeguards respect for the freedom and fundamental rights of people and on global economic development. These conditions cannot be separated from the willingness and the national capacity to know how to fit into this system with credibility and authority, and from actively participating in the preservation and strengthening of the system. This network of international, political, economic, technological and cultural relations is part of the Nation's heritage and it cannot be taken for granted, but rather must be constantly reinforced with long-term choices, which are consistent over time.

62. Our ability and willingness to invest in international security, however, must take into account the real overall possibilities of the nation, the economic and financial



circumstances and the need to have a military component which is able to meet the priority needs of national defence. Clear priorities must therefore guide our choices in terms of allocation of resources for the acquisition, preparation, readiness and deployment of forces.

63. The nation has traditionally managed this situation of geopolitical uncertainty by providing a balanced military component, with multiple and valuable capabilities. It is obvious that financial resources are now an unavoidable constraint and that Italy will no longer be able to respond autonomously to all future security and defence needs.

64. This White Paper outlines new and realistic objectives for international security and defence which guide the action of the Ministry in an innovative way and facilitate the integration of the resources potentially provided by all the institutional actors. As was mentioned in Guidelines to this document, the new structure for national security and defence will be based on three points:

European integration. National defence will be combined in primis with other EU partners. Although this involves a progressive and marked interdependence as well as a sharing of sovereignty, these nations are a rational choice and a political priority both for greater integration in the field of security and defence, and for the development of more structured and stronger but not exclusive cooperation with countries closer to us in terms of interests, historical and cultural ties and reference values.

Transatlantic cohesion. The transatlantic community is the second and biggest guarantee for the defence of the nation. NATO, which has guaranteed peace in the Euro-Atlantic area for nearly sixty years, remains the reference organization for this community. NATO has evolved over time, taking on a different, larger role, but it remains central to the context of collective defence. To date, only the Alliance between North America and Europe is able to dissuade, deter and provide military defence against any kind of threat.

Global relations. Italy is an active member of the international community and participates in the inter-relational dynamics that are developed in this area both bilaterally and multilaterally. It recognizes the UN as the main and unavoidable reference for legitimacy, in particular with regards to issues of international security.

65. The following paragraphs contain precise guidelines to define roles and operating modes, as well as the quantity and quality the country intends to provide in order to implement international security and defence policies in the defined domains of action. As illustrated throughout the document, this definition will be part of a “Strategic Review” in preparation for the start of a new cycle of planning by technical and operational bodies that will lead to a new 15 year programme.

A more secure nation

66. The priority objective for the protection of Italy’s vital interests is defence against an armed attack directed at national territory, its people and its assets. This includes potential hybrid attacks by non-state actors who possess substantial offensive capabilities, including weapons of mass destruction.

67. This will be prevented by two lines of action. The first, at an intergovernmental level, consists of developing the ability to use all the available tools to create an international situation to prevent this risk. The second consists of preserving multi-faceted capabilities of conventional deterrence, proportionate to the size of the real threat, and capable of deterring potential hostile entities. This last capability will be developed within the framework of NATO’s integrated defence policy and in the context of the Common European Security and Defence Policy. Deficiencies in collective defence capabilities, identified by the European Union and NATO, will therefore be national priorities, as will the availability of a capacity for independent first response intervention and for the defence of national territory, areas of maritime access to the territory and air defence.

68. In addition to these more traditional capabilities, the Defence in accordance with the national policy on information security will develop defence against cyber-attacks that may exceed the capabilities prepared by civilian agencies. Similarly, it will contribute more effectively to safeguarding freedom of access to space and the depths of the sea.



A more secure Euro-Atlantic region

69. The size of the Euro-Atlantic security system is vital to the defence of Italy and the protection of its national interests. Only the Atlantic Alliance has the capabilities to deter and defend the Euro-Atlantic territory from conventional military threats. Although this type of threat is not currently considered likely, it is not to be excluded. The only strategy that can maximize the security framework and mitigate the risks is that of active participation in NATO.

70. In this context, Italy will have to be a net contributor to security, maximizing the operational capacity that it offers and focusing on making a high-quality professional contribution with appropriate means and materials. In this way Italy's participation in the Alliance's response reaction forces will be more efficient, within the framework of the current review of NATO forces.

A more secure Euro-Mediterranean region

71. The Euro-Mediterranean area is the main area of national intervention. The achievement of a high degree of stability and democratic development in the countries that affect the Mediterranean is therefore a priority for our country. The Defence will contribute to the development of government policies designed to ensure this objective by ensuring targeted military cooperation with all nations in the area, by striving for better and deeper cooperation in order to build a broader context of security and stability over time. If specific circumstances make it necessary, the Defence must be prepared to take direct responsibility, in response to crisis situations and be prepared to intervene for peace and stability in accordance with the decisions of the international community. In some cases, Italy may also have to take on the responsibility of leading these operations, especially in those areas where Italy's direct knowledge of the situations is greater due to historical, social or cultural proximity.

72. As part of the European Union Common Security and Defence Policy and NATO activities related to the “Mediterranean Dialogue” the Defence will develop policies that are more attentive to the size of the Euro-Mediterranean security capabilities. In accordance with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs it will also offers as a reference actor for initiatives to be undertaken and continuing those already in progress in central Europe and the Balkans.

A more secure and stable global system

73. As previously stated, Italy has a sizeable economy with global perspectives and interests; it has multiple interests in all the continents and is an important partner in the “international system”. Being a member of this system is of fundamental importance for Italy it necessary be an “active member”.

74. Outside the regions of priority action, the contribution of the Defence to building a more stable and secure international system will be guaranteed by two concurrent lines of action coordinated with the other ministries. The first is to develop all the existing military consultation and cooperation skills, in order to increase them and encourage the processes of interrelation with shared interest nations. The second is the selection and use of capabilities for use in military intervention within a limited time frame and with a limited purpose in order to contribute - with the other countries of the world community - to the protection of international security.

International security and defence strategy and the necessary capabilities

75. The objectives and priorities outlined below summarise the main elements needed to define the medium-term strategy for international security and the defence of Italy: **Sharing the security and defence.** The multidisciplinary nature and complexity of the challenges of today’s world, as well as the size of the challenges, which is too much for a single nation to handle alone, require Italy to find the best conditions of



security and defence as part of a shared multinational framework. This framework will be developed both within the nation, through a strengthened global intergovernmental approach to issues, and in the international arena, through military cooperation and integration with the collective defence structures.

Active participation in security and defence. The strategy of sharing security and defence requires the nation to be, within its means, an active net contributor. This requires the nation to be involved both in the definition and implementation of capabilities (military and otherwise) for the prevention, deterrence and elimination of potential threats to stability and security, as well as in the international effort to ensure the best conditions for peace and development.

Multiple fields of action. The creation of a solid and lasting framework of international security and defence requires a diversified multidisciplinary approach, with different degrees of effort depending on the severity of the national interests at risk and the use of all the tools at the State's tools disposal, including the military.

76. In accordance with this objective, the Defence will aim to create an integrated and modern military component, able to acquire, develop and sustain over time the skills best suited for:

- **understanding** the causes of modern conflict and the needs arising from the evolution of the international situation;
- **preventing** the emergence and consolidation of situations of risk or threats to the country;
- **intervene** quickly, precisely and effectively to handle crisis situations and to eliminate any threats to the security and interests of the country.

The three main aspects of the military component to consider are: quantity, quality and capability.

77. The quantitative aspect of the military component will remain substantially unchanged with respect to the levels required by current legislation. The Ministry of Defence has already started reducing personnel, with Law No. 244, 2012, going from 190,000 military and 30,000 civilians to 150,000 military and 20,000 civilians. The Ministry of Defence, however, aims to create a younger, more streamlined and flexi-

ble personnel structure, with more modern recruitment criteria and career progression and supported by legislation closer to the needs of a professional model of defence. Moreover, to mitigate the possible risks associated with a reduced force structure, it will study the creation of a reserve force that is able to contribute to the overall needs of national security and defence.

78. Quality will be given priority, in particular with regards to training and instruction, with specific attention paid to the forces with the highest level of operational readiness. A better balance between quality and cost will be created to ensure that quantitative requirements are not excessively penalised.

79. Capability will be enhanced by a better balance of quantity and quality and a new governance structure that will lead to more effective political management of the important choices. It will allow the armed forces to work together as single synergistic unit. The goal is to achieve a more streamlined and efficient overall structure, with fewer management levels, to make it less expensive and to give priority to operational effectiveness.

Tasks and missions of the armed forces

80. The tasks assigned to the armed forces are written in our constitution, which states that the defence of the homeland is the sacred duty of every citizen (Art. 52). These tasks are explained and updated in article 89 of Legislative Decree no. 66, 2010 (“Military Code - COM”). This decree states that the defence of the state is priority, as is the task of working towards the realisation of peace and security, in accordance with international law and the decisions of the international organizations of which Italy is a member (article 11 of the Constitution). The armed forces are also involved in safeguarding institutions and have specific tasks in the event of a public calamity, as well as in other extraordinary situations of great urgency. Finally, under Article 92 of the Military Code, the Armed Forces, in addition to their institutional responsibilities, contribute on request, to situations which are in the interests of the general public and to environmental protection.



81. In keeping with the overall tasks dictated by law, this White Paper identifies specific missions for the Armed Forces. These are guidelines for the subsequent review of the military component and for military development and planning in general. They are:

FIRST MISSION: *Defence of the State.* Consists of defending the State against all types of aggression in order to safeguard:

national territory;

the vital interests of the Nation;

the security of areas of national sovereignty and of Italian citizens abroad;

the security of lines of access to the nation.

SECOND MISSION: *Defence of the Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Mediterranean area.* It consists of contributing to NATO's collective defence and to maintaining stability in areas on the Mediterranean Sea, in order to protect the vital and strategic interests of the Nation.

THIRD MISSION: *Contributing to the development of peace and international security.* In the context of international crisis management, consists of participating in operations to prevent and manage crises outside priority intervention areas, in order to ensure peace, security, stability and international law, as well as fundamental human rights according to the UN Charter.

FOURTH MISSION: *Specific tasks and joint operations.* It consists of contributing to the protection of the institutions and of carrying out specific tasks in the event of public calamities and other cases of extraordinary need and urgency.

Lessons learned and implication for the armed forces



Lessons learned from operations

82. The analysis of general trends and operations conducted over the last twenty years has validated many principles and guidelines for the development of the armed forces, already established in technical publications such as the Long-term Planning Document and the Strategic Concept of the Defence Staff in 2005. In general terms, the positive results achieved by the military in operations over the last twenty years, demonstrate both the validity of the transformation process undertaken in the past by the military component and the need to build and rapidly optimize the military, in line with the economic reality of the country and with the changes, which are taking place or are foreseeable in security scenarios in the interest of the nation. In particular:

a. Conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, such as the operations in Bosnia and the Lebanon, have been successful not only thanks to the quality of the work done by the armed forces and their military professionalism, but



also thanks to the ability of the military component to pool resources and perform joint force and joint ministry operations.

b. The contribution of the armed forces to the management and resolution of international crises and conflicts, such as the operations in Kosovo, was decisive and strengthened the image and position of the nation the international arena.

c. Military operations conducted to protect defenceless populations and to establish fundamental human rights, such as those under way in Iraq, have demonstrated the ability of the military to conduct specific tasks within limited time-frame, efficiently and effectively.

d. In the fight against international terrorism, the Defence has made an important contribution not only working outside national territory, but also supporting the action of the police force within the nation both with specialist contributions and by overseeing important metropolitan areas. In their contribution to humanitarian and rescue operations in the case of catastrophic events, the armed forces have demonstrated a versatile capability, fast action and intervention capability even in the critical early stages, allowing the nation to prove its willingness and ability to act globally.

83. The need to put in place rapid and unplanned conventional operations in the Balkans to implement the UN resolutions regarding Kosovo, or more recently, the need to reassure Allies in Eastern Europe by demonstrating the ability to act jointly and quickly, have confirmed the need to maintain a capability able to provide a conventional response and deterrence.

84. The transformation of the military in order to improve its capability to send and support forces outside national territory has proved to be a valid concept, and it has been the key to achieving significant operational success. The ability to provide this capability quickly has been successful not only in managing typical military operations, but also in support operations in the event of severe natural disasters, such as the earthquakes in Pakistan and Haiti.

85. Joint operations have become standard procedure. The progressive development of the national capability to integrate ground, sea, air and space activities, as well as logistics and communications, has produced more effective and efficient operational results.

86. The progressive “network-centred” integration of command and control sensors and weapon systems has “multiplied the forces” which can increase the overall operational effectiveness of the capabilities and raise the level of knowledge and skill in developing operational situations.

87. The Special Forces have shown their growing operational value, taking part in multiple, complex operations in support of conventional forces or high profile operations in a broad spectrum of situations that include, but are not limited to, the release of hostages, anti-terrorism and uprisings.

88. The operational activities of the last two decades have increased the importance of some operational capabilities, particularly deployment logistics, in the C4ISTAR sector and in precision engagement, which have become increasingly useful in ensuring that intervention is carried out effectively.

89. The constant, careful and pragmatic use of Military Diplomacy has consolidated or created new and lasting relationships with many nations, thus facilitating the process of international stabilization and the development of profitable, economic, cultural and social relations.

90. The ability to operate successfully in an integrated international system has been essential, but at the same time complex and difficult. In particular, it was critical to develop better staff training, communication, “strategic enabling” and operational coordination skills, as well as being able to arrange and organise the forces.

91. A global approach to crisis management and to achieving objectives has required more active non-military participation. This has highlighted the increasing need for better coordination and integration at the “national system” level. In this context, the armed forces have shown that they are able to provide the human and organizational capability to develop this integration, thus increasing the credibility of the “national system” in the international arena.



92. The identification of lessons learned and the preparation of suitable doctrinal and operational responses, as well as the subsequent adaptation of means and systems, has not been as rapid, effective and precise as expected. Improvement of these activities is essential to make operations even more successful.

Constants and changes in the characteristics of conflicts

93. The experience gained from operations over the last two decades and academic research has highlighted a substantial change in the type and characteristics of both asymmetric and conventional conflicts.

In the case of asymmetric conflict, access to modern technology to strategic communication techniques and to extensive financial resources has allowed terrorist organisations to expand their methods and the scope of possible actions and damage.

In the case of conventional conflict, changes in the modes and tools being used are emerging, with particular regard to the extension of operations into the domain of cybernetics and into space. Less time elapses between making a decision and acting on it. This aims to change the actual situation on the ground making it more dynamic by alternating diplomacy and rapid military operations carried out by perfectly integrated limited forces.

94. The results of the studies conducted in cooperation with friendly countries and allies, all highlight that in the future risks and threats will develop in extended and fragmented areas, often characterized by situations of institutional anarchy. Subsequent operations will be characterized by a variety of operational difficulties due to the need to ensure:

a. access to the areas of operations and freedom of movement inside them. This requi-



res the ability to acquire and retain control of the territory and guarantee the freedom of maritime navigation, the full availability of airspace and the ability to access and use space and the cybernetic domain;

b. suitable support of the population through involvement, legality and transparency according to needs arising from the effectiveness and safety of the operations;

c. the ability to operate in congested areas, such as urban areas, coastal waters and lower airspace.

d. the security of tangible and intangible communication lines which will be increasingly vulnerable in the future, especially the latter.

e. the identification and understanding of all the actors involved in the area of operations, discriminating between enemies and passive population, between friendly military forces and civilian organizations.

95. There is a high risk that in the future, even in conventional conflicts, enemy forces will use unconventional or asymmetric forms of fighting more frequently (hybrid threats). The exploitation of our vulnerability, unpredictable actions which may be carried out in non-operational areas, the direct involvement - often passive, but sometimes active - of civilian populations are all forms of conflict in which maximum security for our forces and our territories must be guaranteed whilst, at the same time, ensuring consolidation of local realities for which we are providing support.

96. Therefore our armed forces will be asked to work towards increasingly complex and sophisticated goals, and the defeat or the deterrence of possible enemies will only be part of the tasks required. Adopting a global intergovernmental approach to security and defence issues, the armed forces will act to protect and safeguard populations, to develop and support the authorities and local security forces and increase security and stability levels, working closely both with diplomatic personnel and other ministries personnel as well as from international governmental and non-governmental organizations.

97. Although the possibility of a traditional military threat on the national territory appears to have decreased in the short term, a balanced and integrated deterrent force,



consisting of conventional land, sea and aerospace capabilities, will ensure the defence of the nation in the future and contribute to the joint defence of NATO territories, in accordance with on-going agreements.

98. The support of Italian citizens for the armed forces and the awareness of international commitments will be increasingly decisive for the success of the delicate tasks that Italy will be required to carry out in the future. Much has already been done with regards to this issue, and there is a growing awareness in the nation of the role of the armed forces and the professionalism of the Italian soldiers. However, it is still necessary to improve communication with the general public by sharing the aims, the scope and the actions of the armed forces, thus ensuring transparency and control.

Implications for the armed forces

99. Some of the lessons learned and observed trends are definitely of value and should be used as a starting point for improvement. The armed forces must take the following concepts into consideration, regardless of whether or not they are able to perform their assigned duties.

100. The need to respond more quickly to changing needs means that activities have to be adapted in order to identify and purchase new equipment, to define how capabilities will be used, and to develop doctrine and operating procedures. The process of transformation and adaptation of the armed forces requires more effort in order to speed up analytical and procedural changes, as well as changes in attitude and predisposition, at all levels and in all sectors.

101. Actions to prevent crisis and conflict must be anchored to a better information collection and analysis capability, to the study of phenomena and to knowledge of the situations in which the armed forces will have to play an active role along with the other organisms of the State. In situations of crisis or conflict, the action of the military component will be effective only if it has superior command and control, surveillance,

reconnaissance and information analysis capabilities, as well as an excellent understanding of the situation, which will therefore be strengthened.

102. Integration and interoperability with the Allied Forces are the main factors which will ensure a significant and effective national contribution. In times of peace to achieve this objective, forces should be organised, prepared, educated and trained to operate in multinational environments and as part of a larger deployment.

103. The extension of the domains of action into the cybernetic domain and space means that specific defensive operational capabilities must be dedicated to these areas, in order to preserve the safety of the “national system” and increase the solidity of the political, economic and social structures.

104. The rapid and intense development of technology requires the military component to promote the knowledge of the possibilities and effects of the availability of new military and dual equipment and invest accordingly. Innovative concepts, such as “soft air defence”, will require intense inter-ministerial cooperation for the management of large quantities of data and the preparation of the capabilities necessary to manage it.

105. The human element will remain central to the action of the military component, and it is essential to maintain this high level of professionalism over time. The ability to interact in multicultural and complex environments, the ability to understand situations as well as a spirit of invention and adaptability to different environments, will be the main human characteristics in which to invest. The ability to use modern equipment to its full potential and the ability to train and motivate soldiers, as well as the staff of friendly nations and allies, are the main objectives of the training and education process.

106. Equipment for the armed forces will have to be cost-effective and consistent in terms of quality and technological level. The main objective is to achieve the “expressible capability”, this should be achieved as the result of several balanced factors, and not only by purchasing systems of excellence, which are not adequately supported by the other factors within the capability, and by the structure of the force that uses them.



107. The balance of the capabilities in the various domains of action will guarantee flexibility and efficient employment. The idea of having a comprehensive capability in every sector, however, will have to be rethought in favour of the strengthening those areas where deployment is more likely and effective. Enhancing capabilities will also lead to excellence while necessary operational capabilities, and not only at national level, will be pursued through international cooperation.

108. The expressed capability of the “special forces” and “special operation forces” will be reinforced and further integrated in order to work synergistically with conventional forces. The support systems for these forces must be strengthened in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and size. The process of “institution building” and “stabilisation” by Defence must be robust, especially in regards to equipping and training the security forces in the country where they operate.

Preparation & readiness of the armed forces



109. The “posture” of the armed forces is the provision and deployment of forces and the level of preparation and readiness at which they are maintained. This is one of the most important strategic management tools available to balance the capabilities that are available to counter any presumed threat. Operational capabilities are essential to performance, therefore, must be considered in a developmental context and not merely as costs.

110. As previously stated, the geopolitical scenario is characterized by a high level of strategic uncertainty and situation volatility. In the short-term financial perspective, and taking into account international instability, only a fully integrated capability specific for the armed forces that is carefully planned, can provide the nation with the assets it needs to respond appropriately to risks and threats. This will allow the armed forces to play an active role in redefining the security conditions and stability in key geographic areas of interest.



111. Adjustments in the level of preparation of the armed forces and, consequently, the parameters of usability, sustainability and projectability, may be obtained more quickly than changes in the structure and unit composition. The preparation and the readiness of the forces are, therefore, the most effective tools to respond rapidly to changes in the current security environment.

What does Defence have to be ready for?

112. In addition of its primary task i.e. to ensure adequate defence of the State and in a NATO context, collective defence, the defence forces will have to be ready to contribute to the European Union to carry out a series of activities and operations that include:

- rapid operations aimed to protect vital national interests, either independently or as part of a broader coalition;
- peace operations and stabilization in response to international crises;
- specialist support activities and a training, both nationally and abroad;
- the safeguarding of free institutions in case of necessity or urgency;
- humanitarian assistance and support in case of disasters, both nationally and abroad;
- evacuation of overseas compatriots in case of emergency.

113. Defence will continue to regularly check how best to adapt their levels of preparation and readiness that will allow it to better manage the challenges and opportunities presented by strategic changes in the regional area. This will also allow for efficient political decision-making, resource allocation and outcome monitoring. The Defence will implement a new management system focused on the levels of readiness and preparation of the forces. The progressive reduction of the national effort in many large operations that has characterized the past decade, and offers the opportunity to find a new balance in the forces, allowing it to better support the security policies of the Euro - Mediterranean region.

Required levels of readiness and preparation

114. Adequate levels of preparation and readiness of the forces ensure that they have the military capabilities to carry out any intervention if approved by the government. These parameters are important indicators for assessing the actual output of operational potential of the military and the effectiveness of the investments made in it. Over the last twenty years, the Italian Defence Force has made a substantial contribution to international military action abroad. Functional to this objective, was the possibility of using the forces in a variety of military missions and multinational operations, which was possible thanks to adequate preparation levels and readiness.

115. Planning the correct levels of readiness and operational preparation is a sophisticated and complex exercise. It requires the right balance between available resources and the level of risk that the nation is willing to take. Keeping a large part of the forces in a high state of readiness and preparation reduces the level of strategic risk for the nation. However, it also involves high costs and pressure on military staff, resources, systems and operational infrastructure. In contrast, low levels of readiness and preparedness are unacceptable, because it will result in the inability of the military forces to perform the tasks and missions it is assigned, while putting military personnel at high risk, therefore, a pointless exercise.

116. As part of NATO, Italy helped develop three benchmarks by which it is possible to objectively evaluate the level of

“employability” of the armed forces and their performance to operate in today’s scenarios and the foreseeable future. They consist of:

the usability of forces, or the percentage of forces readily employable in the terms of required certificates and professional qualifications, availability of systems, and training levels;



deployment of the forces, or the percentages of forces able to be used effectively off station and the capabilities necessary for mobility and logistical support;
sustainability of the forces, or the percentage of forces able to be used for long operating cycles off station, prepared therefore with technical resources, logistical support and the need for unit rotation time.

117. The values for these benchmarks, collectively identified by NATO countries, are an essential minimum target for the military forces, which need to be achieved and maintained over time. The allocation of adequate resources to achieve these results is, therefore, a key priority. Compatibly, the financial framework that is now available has seen a reversal in the trend of spending in the area of maintenance operations, in adherence to what was agreed by NATO.

118. When identifying and implementing the correct levels of force readiness and preparation for the medium and long term, it should be pointed out that there is time delay between immediate intervention and an optimal military response. Defence is well aware that this involves handling new and unpredictable circumstances with existing assets. To mitigate these risks, strategy identified plans, act along three lines:

- to provide an adequate flow of information and an effective capability for analysis and strategic assessment, to better appreciate the evolution of the situation and needs to facilitate any preparation for what is necessary;
- identify, preserve and enhance the traditional operational capabilities, the level of capability reached and quality of adopted systems, in the areas of excellence that concerns the “National System.” These capabilities form the backbone of the national contribution to any international coalition of operations outside the priority areas of intervention, but also the priority areas aimed towards the gradual process of European integration;
- when managing less likely high intensity operational scenarios, focus is put on maintaining a significant deterrent capability that is constituted by an integrated modern, combat force, perfectly integrated with multinational forces, and for a limited period. In the same spirit, Defence looks to maintain, wherever possible, a sufficiently broad base of embryonic operational capabilities, which are operationally employable, and can eventually be expanded to address changing scenarios.

Military installations, live ranges and military property

119. To carry out assigned tasks, the armed forces need military installations where they can work and be accommodated in. This includes training areas, munition deposits, storage of materials and areas devoted to the defence of the territory. The national arrangement of the armed forces is planned as a result of specific military requirements and with it come economic advantages. Although sometimes these installations can result in different levels of costs there are benefits for the local population. Despite this, military installations are unavoidable and essential in guaranteeing the safety of all citizens.



120. The State's military property includes installations that are engaged in national defence. These installations include ports, airports, fortifications, barracks, administrative and logistic facilities of various types and deposits. State property provides a logistical element critical to the proper functioning of the armed forces, which must be effective and beneficial when in use. For these reasons, the Defence has started a process of assessing the actual needs of those areas that are no longer considered necessary, returning them to the community for their full use. In addition to this activity, the Defence will start a census of the limitations, established by Legislative Decree n.66 / 2010, which are subject to areas adjacent to military property and examine every possibility to keep restrictions to a minimum.



121. The integration process of logistic and territorial bodies, together with the reorganization of forces and high commands, will reduce the needs of state property and embark on the modernization of the remaining infrastructure. This concept includes relatively few large multifunctional infrastructures. This process will make it more convenient and synergistic, for economies of scale, with the establishment and use of staff support services and general operations of the forces.

122. Of particular importance is the need to develop a new and modern housing policy to ensure the availability of onsite service staff in a high mobility context that is inherent to military life. The current demand for housing is much greater than availability and is geographically unbalanced due to the changed operating conditions linked to the reorganization of the defence forces. The difficulty in finding the necessary financial resources for housing, require that the issue be addressed by a number of innovative solutions.

123. The land, sea and air training areas, are an essential element to maintain the operational effectiveness of the armed forces. Italy is a densely populated country, with complex terrain and has an extensive tourist industry, therefore, there needs to be a sensitive approach when using public areas for military training activities. Defence recognizes this need and over the past twenty years has worked to reduce the impact of its activities in terms of time dedicated to exercises. As a result, Italy today, is among the first European countries, which has the lowest percentage of its territory set aside for military exercises. However, Defence efforts to minimize this impact are incomplete, and provide temporary use of alternate areas for the military and civilians, with particular attention to areas of natural beauty and landscape. Bearing in mind these objectives, there is a need to use training areas outside the national territory. In the light of these experiences, the use of these external areas is a major factor when fully preparing, effective and realistic units.

124. Notwithstanding the need to maintain a minimum but adequate number of training areas for real assets in the coming years, the Defence will strive to increase the portion of its activities carried out in simulated mode or through the use of information

systems and simulators. Priority will be given to minimize the environmental impact of activities and to make the training areas risk free to the public and technologically developed for dual use, i.e. for purposes related to civil protection and security. Finally, the use of these areas will promote the economic development and growth of industrial communities.

Reserve Forces

125. Reserve Forces are an integral part of a professional military organisation and the Atlantic Alliance requires smaller armed forces to be maintained at lower costs. Typically, the Reserve Forces provide operational capabilities with less expertise which require more time to be reactivated or specialised capabilities from civilian professions not included in the armed forces, as well as capabilities which require training that is not cost effective for the armed forces.



126. The uncertainty of international situations and the possibility that some operational situations might not be adequately addressed in the future, require different forms of capability integration by the military. The goal is to create an “operational reserve” readily usable and effective, that is a force composed of trained officers, non-commissioned officers and troops to be used for military purposes and as a civil emergency response force.

127. In terms of operational capabilities, the reserve force component should include the following:

- *Specialist Capability* that are not normally part of the permanent forces or are insufficient. For example, professional medical or nursing personnel, engineering or



communications experts and contract workers. These forces may be required from the outset of crisis and therefore should be readily available.

- *Complementary Capability* is generally used in lower risk scenarios and conflicts and does not require the entire range of operational capabilities and training. They allow for an increase in the number of available forces that remain in a high state of readiness for the most demanding tasks. This also avoids the situation where they might be used in less demanding roles.

- *Additional Capability*, which aims to support and strengthen the regular forces and normally require more preparation time, so their role during long term operations is preferable.

- *Mobility Capability*, where the reserve forces offer a basis for expanding the regular force in case of mobilization when dealing with emergencies.

128. In terms of organisational solutions, Defence will present operational proposals for the creation of a new voluntary reserve force structure that:

- is consistent with the new conceptual framework of enlistment and career progression;

- takes advantage of training activities but also organisational ones, support structures and existing armed associations, especially in relation to the fact that the reserve forces could be recruited into state institutions in the event of extraordinary events ;

- is regional or macro-regional, to minimize costs and link the reserve force structure to the region that it is based in;

-be financed in the context of specific regulatory measures decreed by government when necessary to implement specific national needs, such as situations of crisis or emergency;

-provides for different forms of reserve force , such as the youngest and operational, to be used on frequent cycles, or for part-time and specially trained personnel which would be used in less frequent cycles;

- is open to civilians with the suitable skills and degrees.

129. The key to success for the establishment of an effective Reserve is to fully integrate it into the capability structure of the armed forces and to use it in regularly in tasks and training cycles. All of this in a system which is able to routinely use, according to requirements, Regular Forces and Reservists to cover a broader spectrum of national security and defence needs.

The transformation of the armed forces



Future operational model of the armed forces and development of capabilities

130. The challenge that the nation has to face and solve, concerns the creation of a military force that is able to meet the needs of international security and defence. In the short term, this means mitigating any risks that could result from limited resources, and in the medium and long term, developing a synergistic capability to prevent and manage situations of instability and international uncertainty.

131. Obtaining the correct balance between quantity, quality and capability is the main task of Defence in the immediate future, and will be implemented through the publication of the “strategic review of defence”, which will end with the definition of a new fifteen year plan. It seems clear that this task will not be a mere exercise in



analysis and technical assessment, but rather a work of ongoing political orientation and supervision. The points stated below show the general concepts and principles that will underpin the revision of the operational structure of the armed forces, so that they can continue to serve and guarantee the defence of the State and of free institutions.

General concepts and principles for the review of the force structure

132. In order to ensure the fulfilment of tasks, there is a need to define the set of policy tools that the nation is able and willing to achieve and maintain effectively. This means providing the necessary level of resources, but also being able to organise them according to key priorities. These two factors are both essential and strongly interconnected. The development strategy of military capabilities would be incomplete in the absence of a clear definition of priorities to be activated.

133. The complexity of the global system in which we live, requires the adoption of multiple instruments that can operate at any moment and in different contexts. For some of these, the Ministry of Defence assists and supports the government:

- the current intelligence system so that it can effectively collect, analyse and report information, anticipate any national threats, work to reduce the risk of uncertainty, and provide better risk management;
- effective and persuasive diplomacy, that has the authority to encourage the development of cooperation, thus reducing the potential of conflict. Effective diplomacy can contribute to crisis management and facilitate the return to social and political stability after conflicts;
- effective instruments able to properly orientate national and international companies, that result in more favourable investment conditions and allow for the strengthening of political relations;
- strategic communication tools to create and share knowledge with the target audience and designed for institutional purposes to protect national interests.

134. It is the direct responsibility of Defence and fundamental to the framework of national security, to ensure a military that has a complete range of capabilities which can be activated by the nation to protect its interests, and can operate effectively at all stages of crises and conflicts. The military must therefore be sufficient to allow a proper balance between the various operational components, flexible enough to meet changing needs over time, and able to deploy at short notice.

135. Such flexibility and expansion, do not however, need the availability of the entire range of capabilities, but rather a combination of what it is possible to generate and sustain, focusing on areas of consolidated experience, above all on areas of investment and areas in which the real prospects of greater operational focus will allow development in areas of excellence. In fact, the real guarantee of the Nation's defence lies in participation in a system of collective defence, where a significant and effective contribution to the whole force, resides not so much in the generation of a large residual capability, but rather in ensuring a significant contribution in advanced capabilities. This necessitates the need to develop a complex force that is truly integrated in terms of military assets that can be used in different theatres and provide a real increase in the operational effectiveness. As a consequence, there is a need for conceptually unified instruments of action which are fully operational and sustainable over time, based on a careful balance between theoretical requirements, acquired systems and the areas of capability in which to invest resources.

136. Therefore, the current general planning system will be transformed into a system based on "expressed capability". When preparing for the future, the system will place emphasis not so much on the centrality of specific weapons systems or levels of forces necessary to counter a defined threat, but rather on the tasks that the armed forces will have to perform and the skills that they will require to be able to carry out their tasks. This will mean accepting a number of operating risks, which include the less likely, but more dangerous threat to national security. These risks must be clearly defined for the political and institutional authorities and exposed to public opinion.



137. The second factor to be considered in the conceptual development and the subsequent general planning of the armed forces, relates to the probability and way in which the military component is used, based on the proper distribution of available resources to obtain the desired results. In principle, planning and preparation of the military based on the potential expressible operating capabilities will allow politicians wider discretion when electing to use the military. This will depend on the situation, which is conditioned only by structural and dimensional limits of an unavoidable nature. In the presence of limited resources, however, the definition of an area of geopolitical interest will allow for the optimization in the number and quality of available assets that offer more options in certain areas rather than others. In this context, and in addition to homeland defence, the government believes that the Mediterranean region remains a priority area when protecting national interests. This will allow the military to verify threats and then project its power quickly and clearly abroad and throughout the Nation.



138. To operate in this geostrategic situation, the military must be calibrated so as to offer the best capability during intervention and to ensure that Italy is also capable of leading any multinational operations which may include crisis management, restoring peace and international security. This means the availability of adequate resources for the military command of multinational forces, operating in a coalition, as well as a significant intervention capability in the entire theatre of operations, in order to contribute significantly to the success of the operations.

139. Outside of this priority area, Italy will be able to generate its military intervention capabilities, limited in time and purpose to compete with other countries in the international community; to preserve peace and international stability. In such cases, the armed forces will be required to prepare packages of capabilities with a high level of

specialization that can be fully integrated with multinational forces. This also means ensuring a suitable command and control system.

140. The choice of capabilities to be used for intervention in support of operations outside priority areas of action will be made in a context of increasing cooperation amongst EU nations on the topic of defence. Italy will have to help strengthen this cooperation, when the process of integration makes it possible, in order to ensure that the national military capability is specialised and efficient enough, thanks to experience gained from numerous international missions, to be deployed in the context of the Common Policy on Security and Defence.

The Review of governance

141. The transformation of Defence into a system that combines operational effectiveness and process efficiency and in the light of economic restraints requires suitable operating procedures to be successful. An in-depth survey has shown that over the last twenty years, the quantitative reduction and creation of a professional military, has not always been accompanied by modernization and adequate administration inside the organisation.

142. With regards to the political management of Defence, the incomplete implementation of the principles underpinning Act No. 25 of 1997 has not made it possible to fully complete the effective policy tools available to the political authority for the management of the department. At the same time, the actions of government bodies request an adjustment of direct support to the political authority as part of a process aimed at increasing the efficiency of public administration and reducing costs. Therefore, a thorough and essential review of the conceptual structure to support the political management of the ministry for better economic management, more effective action and full compliance with the Act, is necessary.



143. The technical-operational and technical-administrative areas, and the existing organizational structures have been subject to revision in recent years to adapt to the new requirements. However, they are still characterized by an excessive number of hierarchical levels, due to a high fragmentation of skills and unnecessary duplication. This situation is the result of the solutions adopted in the past to manage a larger armed force, whose units were scattered throughout the nation and consisted primarily of enlisted personnel. The identified needs, the professional requirements of a reduced armed force and the need to contain costs now require a different model of governance, a model which is lighter, more linear, and resilient, characterized by lower levels of hierarchical and organizational complexity.

144. Awareness of the fact that in the future the military component will be increasingly integrated with those of other European countries and NATO, leads to the pursuit of more multinational integration. This includes functions like command and control, training and logistical support and mainly those less critical than protecting national sovereignty.

General concepts & principles

145. The review of Defence governance is a priority for the government in terms of policies related to international security and defence. In the short term, it is necessary to manage the risks that arise from the erosion of the armed force capability, which affects national security, and to act in order to maximize results with what is available. Also, it is essential to ensure that resources which have been allocated to Defence, however limited, are used in the most effective and efficient way, after the reorganization of the military.

146. Defence, therefore, will act in accordance to two guidelines:

- the first is aimed at restoring the minimum level of resources needed to ensure that the operation of the military component is solid and better managed, in line with economic trends related to the situation and European standards. This makes it easier

to renew the operational model and improves the transparency and effectiveness of choices. It also centralizes the role of the government and parliament when making decisions related to defence, optimizing the use of available resources and finally, facilitating the efficiency of policy towards the national defence industry.

- the second guideline is aimed at the revision of governance, with the goal of reducing the level of human and financial resources necessary for management and support, whilst maintaining the same operational capabilities. In this context, the organization and function of Defence will be reviewed to allow for more effective management policies. This includes an action plan designed to synergise all of the different components of the military, completing the reform initiated in 1997 by Defence Minister Andreatta. The objective is to ensure that strategic choices are made in unison, controlling management costs, and strengthening effective action at every level.

147. The first guiding principle of this review relates to the organization of strategic functions. Those that have been identified are: “*political management*”, “*strategic and military management*”, “*generation and preparation of forces*”, the “*use of force*” and “*support to forces.*” Central and local institutions, as well as command units, will be reorganized by eliminating any unnecessary duplication i.e. by combining units that perform the same roles, while avoiding fragmentation of resources and eliminating economic inefficiencies.

148. The second guiding principle is “unified command”, in conjunction with “centralized management but decentralized execution.” The goal is to achieve more effective political, military and strategic-military Defence management and unified planning, management, acquisition, use of capabilities and integrated support. Organizational choices and improved working methods will also help to identify inefficiency and resolve issues at the lowest possible level in each operating environment. At the apex of this reorganisation there will be institutionalized “decision-making committees” to ensure, (in accordance with roles and hierarchies), the widest range of choices, and the identification of various issues creating an effective link between policy guidelines and technical requirements.



149. The third guiding principle relates to the efficiency and economic viability of operations, which are the main reasons for government reform. There is a need to develop and measure the quality of the operation processes with precise criteria, in particular those areas that oversee the management of allocated resources over time. This will make it possible to inform parliament and the public about the choices and actions of the government and Defence, allowing for more transparency that is essential in creating awareness and broader involvement.

150. These guidelines will therefore strengthen the operational instruments and methods of action in order to make the processes of choice more transparent while at the same time identifying solutions to problems. This also involves setting up effective internal evaluation instruments that regard the process of reaching objectives. In addition, new systems will be introduced to strengthen planning procedures, management and reporting of resources, and services provided in order to correctly correlate them to the tasks assigned to the armed forces.

Political management

151. “Political management” is the first identified function that will be subject to change and strengthening. The powers of the Minister of Defence are defined by law. The Military Code, art. 10, paragraph 1, states that the Minister of Defence, who is in charge of military administration, civil defence and heads the highest hierarchical and disciplinary body:



- implements the resolutions related to defence and security adopted by the government, that are submitted to the Supreme Defence Council and approved by Parliament;

- issues directives on military policy, for information activities, security and technical and administrative activities;
- participates directly or through a delegate in all international and European organizations in the field of defence and security or whose decisions directly impact national defence;
- approves overall planning and joint-operation programs, at a technical and financial level, as well as planning for public and private industry, that is of interest to Defence.

152. In addition to implementing government decisions and approving planning activities, the Minister of Defence, has a range of responsibilities that are precisely defined. These constitute the “function of political orientation”. They include (but are not limited to) military policy, development policy, employment policies for personnel, industrial policies and international relations.

153. The existing instruments for direct cooperation with the political authority, as well as those that oversee management and control, have not yet met the new requirements. Firstly, it is essential to overcome the difference of information that inevitably penalizes political institutions when compared to the permanent joint administration activities. Secondly, in order to strengthen political management and control, the Defence Minister must have full autonomy, with an adequate means of action, for both political and administrative functions, and be able to assess administration and management activities.

154. Therefore, the offices that directly cooperate with the Ministry will be strengthened in areas that are connected to high level politics, giving them tasks and functions normally delegated to other branches of administration. In contrast, administrative bodies or structures supporting these activities, which are not strictly associated with political management and control will be rationalized. This reorganization will lead to a reduction in staff of these offices.

155. In order to protect department autonomy in the execution of its functions, the Minister and Under Secretaries of Defence will be guaranteed in their right to choose



the staff for these offices, according to the general rules that regard the organization of employment by the public authorities. It will therefore be possible to draw on specific skills outside of the Ministry of Defence, according to strict professional requirements and experience. Maximum autonomy and the best working conditions for military and civilian personnel must be guaranteed, even by adopting specific institutions and changing existing regulations for personnel who are temporarily employed in a role outside of Administration.

The Defence administration

156. The Defence administration differs in many respects from that of other ministries due to the task of defending the country. Within the Defence structure, in fact, there is a need to find an appropriate balance between the routine functions of public administration, and the need to prepare, support and employ commands and military units in Italy and abroad. The current organization is the result of progressive and significant adaptation due to the continuous downsizing of the military. In just thirty years, personnel have been halved including the number of operational Army Brigades and the number of squadrons in the Air Force.

157. The fundamental Defence reform initiated by former Defence Minister Andreatta and incorporated in the provisions of Law No. 25 of 1997, outlined the evolution of the joint force structure towards a more streamlined and efficient integrated solution, anticipating the changes that were subsequently made by many European countries. While acknowledging that much has already been done, there are still many areas where reform is necessary to overcome the traditional organizational constraints of the armed force.

158. Moving quickly and effectively towards a new integrated military is the best solution to ensure savings in the areas of human resources, infrastructure and finance that are now necessary to operate effectively. Therefore, the elimination of all organizational duplication that is not strictly necessary, the consolidation, reduction and

simplification of hierarchical organizational levels, and reduction of any bureaucratic superstructure to a minimum, are the qualitative elements that must inspire future restructuring in the military.

159. The main reference for the governance review and the consequent organisational structure will be function-based, and the review will be developed around those functions previously identified. The management model also has to be made more effective by the introduction in some sectors of modern working methods, similar to those of private companies, especially in the field of acquisition, logistics and general support. Finally regulations will be introduced to improve the transparency and stability of resource investment and for major maintenance programs and upgrades.

160. Acquiring specific assets and then not guaranteeing their “operational capability” through the appropriate training of staff and proper logistical support, puts the investment at risk and clearly damages the nation. Since the stability of resources over time is essential to ensure the correct planning for their use, this has led to legislation (every six years), which is updated every three years for Defence investment, to provide stability and political supervision (government and parliament) of the most important choices. The duration of six years will allow alignment with the stability laws.

161. The governance review must also include a reform related to recruitment methods, career progression and tasks of the military and civilian management, and finally, it must ensure that military leaders are younger and better prepared. The new rules for the appointment and removal of the top military leaders, ensures an adequate mechanism for continuing the activities of planning, programming and use of the armed forces.

162. At the same time there will be improved involvement and institutional communication between parliament and citizens. The current form of information, resulting from progressive layering of laws and regulations, will be simplified and made clearer, allowing for a unified vision and perspective, eliminating unnecessary duplication, and producing documents that are better understood.



Productivity of resources and expenditure control

163. In order to ensure a new governance structure with appropriate governing mechanisms, new administration tools and methods will be introduced to make activities transparent, participatory and provide effective processes of choice. In parallel, tools will be developed to ensure effective internal evaluation when achieving objectives. In particular, the Defence will have to move towards the following priority areas of action, which constitute new regulations that will be prepared as a result of this White Paper.

164. *Outdated distribution of costs: for personnel, for operations and for investments,* there is in fact, the need to adopt a more modern and better allocation of resources, in accordance with criteria adopted by other European countries, but above all, with the real role that these costs play in the Defence budget. At an initial level and on the understanding that major investment programs will be included in a specific law, the three points of reference should be: “*personnel*”, “*operability of the military component*” (administration, training, rapid response, technology development) and “*operations*” (cooperation and military missions at a national and international level).



165. *Modernization of procedures for planning, management and accountability of resources and services provided* is required in order to synchronize with available resources. This is also linked to the range of assigned tasks, established by political objectives and destined to relevant military branches including the instruments needed to attain them.

166. *Development of a culture of effectiveness and efficiency*, will be established not only in the operating area, but also in the use of resources and by all those responsible, with particular reference to skills of technical planners, planning and control at all levels, and ethical aspects. These capabilities, in fact, cannot be improvised or delegated, but require continuous updating, with verification and assimilation of the concept “for the good of the State”.

167. *Development of accurate assessment tools will be devised to measure costs in relation to results*, while taking into account the systemic interdisciplinary nature of the Defence sector, with the primary task of reducing the level of bureaucratic processes that cannot be converted into simple formal procedures. Existing rules will change, along with procedures and methods of using resources, which will be simplified. Objectives must be realistic, measurable and correlated to available resources.

Enlistment and personnel structures

168. It has emerged in studies relating to the law n. 244 of 2012 that the current staffing structure is not totally adapted to the demands placed on the military, leading to criticism about the ability to address the present and future challenges that relate to international security and national defence. The military in fact:

a. *tend to be characterized by a high average age* due to: a high percentage of staff in permanent service, and the need to standardize military personnel to the applicable rules of civilian service, which are not always appropriate in a military context.

b. *have currently significant imbalances in the distribution of ranks and categories of staff*, due to a sharp decrease in the overall numbers of personnel in the military over the past twenty years. This, over time has not been effectively mitigated, for example, forms of early retirement have departed from the normal dynamics of retirement for personnel. The introduction of the professional model has also not followed a consistent revision in the terms of recruitment and career progression, which has further exacerbated the imbalance mentioned. In this sense, the revision of the terms of recruitment, career progression and permanent service introduced with the professional



model has highlighted problems associated with the use of staff in fixed positions. As a result, the introduction of new reference models has led to an imbalance accounting for higher ranked senior staff at the expense of lower ranked junior staff.

c. *suffer from excessive system rigidity*, due to the rules governing recruitment, career progression and retirement, which are also influenced by underlying government regulations. The final outcome is a decreased ability to adapt to changing needs, an imbalance of staff resources with respect to operational functions and lower overall operational effectiveness.

d. *do not have an effective professional “operational reserve”*. The Atlantic Alliance, however, has repeatedly asked for the creation of a reserve force structure, able to complement active regular forces in case of need.

General concepts and principles

169. With regards to the recruitment of staff, new methods of recruitment and types of service will be introduced to achieve the objectives in terms of overall cost, effectiveness, operational efficiency and level of professionalism that the public administration and especially Defence must reach. In particular, the new system is asked to:

a. *become a single integrated force*, where the civilian and military personnel operate in a unified, synergistic and joint way, to achieve the objectives assigned to the Defence ministry.

b. *be more cost effective*, whilst maintaining a strength of 150,000 units. In order to improve the level of expenditure in favour of operations and efficiency and whenever possible improve remuneration in line with military specifications.

c. *be on average younger than at present, and facilitate the change of management.*

When fully operational, the military will have to ensure the average age of staff in various categories (officers, NCOs, and Troops) making sure it is in line with that of other European armed forces and that this situation will remain unchanged over time to avoid any cyclical re-occurrence of the ageing problem and in order to give the model greater operational effectiveness and efficiency. The younger and “operational” part of the force will be basically equal to about two-thirds of the entire military component.

d. *Be flexible and adaptable*, in order to rapidly adjust the overall size of the armed

forces as needs change. This objective should be achieved through administrative measures that may use maximum decisional powers over the next few years by correlating any increase of expense in personnel to situations that actually require them.

e. *To be strongly oriented towards education and training.* The relatively frequent turnover of staff requires extensive training capabilities in order to quickly bring new recruits to high levels of competency and technical knowledge. In addition, these aspects will contribute to more effective action that regards international stabilization, through better cooperation in the field of education and training.

f. *Pursue internationalisation of military capabilities,* which should be integrated and potentially usable by allied countries and friends. This is aimed at facilitating the process of European unification and our armed forces.

g. *Represent added value for the nation,* resulting from the benefits of training and education that is guaranteed by the professionalism of the Defence staff.

h. *Facilitating the integration of Defence with civilian society.* Today, the armed forces are characterized by approximately 88% of staff in permanent service and only 12% of staff on temporary contracts. The target is to bring the Italian armed forces to percentages similar to those of the armed forces of other European countries. This means reaching, a fully operational, balance between permanent and temporary staff basically equal to about 50%. This will be achieved by identifying mechanisms that facilitate:

- the temporary use of necessary personnel in permanent service in the areas of public administration and/or the civilian working world, in order to put their acquired professional knowledge at the service of the nation. However, at the end of active service, general managers will not be able to work for companies in the defence sector for a certain number of years in order to avoid any conflict of interest;

- the reintegration into the civilian working world at the end of service, for temporary staff, will also facilitate the transfer of skills and values gained during their service to the state.

When fully operational, the armed forces will be kept young and motivated thanks to a continuous cycle that is constantly representative of Italian society and fully integrated with it.





DIFESA

Organization, structure and capabilities of the armed forces

The new organizational structure of the armed forces

170. The need of the armed forces to fulfil their duties effectively and efficiently in complex, multinational, and high risk situations requires the ability to work in unison towards a common goal. That is with complete unity of purpose in an integrated manner and using the available resources in all domains of action. This approach must involve stages of education, training, support, and development towards necessary capabilities. This constitutes a stronger outlook for a joint military that shares a common culture which is key to the future of the armed forces. It is a point of reference in organizational decisions, doctrine and task execution. However, the culture and professionalism of the armed force must be preserved, because only perfect knowledge and immersion in the domains of action will create the required efficacy to deal with complex scenarios in the future.

171. The objective is to summarise and address these two seemingly conflicting requirements, through effective and efficient solutions that do require the establishment of new structures. Therefore a review of management and command structures in the armed forces is necessary. Following is a basic outline, pending a more thorough detailed check for compliance with the expected effectiveness and efficiency criteria.

The review and management of command structures

172. As part of the function of “strategic and military management”, the Chief of Defence Staff (CASMD) will remain the head of the military-technical office in Defence



Administration. He will be solely responsible to the political authority for all aspects related to recruitment, preparation, tasking, general support, and logistics of the armed forces. The organization he is responsible for will ensure the execution of the basic functions fundamental to the military.

173. *The first function is “the employment of forces.”* The Chief of Defence Staff, as “Commander in Chief”, is responsible for the armed forces and for their use. There will be a Vice Commander for Operations (OPS - VCOM), who will be delegated the responsibility for operational planning and for tasking forces in theatre. He will be the head of a Joint Operational Command, and of existing operational commands, that will carry out component command functions while maintaining their specific competence in their respective fields of employment and a functional link with the staff responsible for force generation. They will work under the OPS - VCOM and the Joint Special Operations Command who will make use of existing commands and existing capabilities and the Cybernetic Operations Command. Any type of military operation, therefore, comes under the responsibility of the Joint Command, including cases where the single component is sufficient for their execution.

174. *The second function, referred to as “support to the forces”,* is a logistical one. The National Armaments and Logistics Director (DNAL) will centralize the acquisition of weapon systems, infrastructures and logistics, with the exception of direct support to operational units. This will result in an organization based on two major conceptual pillars:

a. The first will perform the functions now assigned to some departments and technical management offices in the General Defence Secretariat. It will be responsible for technical and administrative activities to ensure the acquisition of weapons systems and the disposal of weapons at the end of their life cycle. To assure the compliance of the activities with the needs of operational units, the head of this structure will make use of key employment offices, which will maintain a working relationship with those responsible for force generation.

b. The second, structured as Logistic Command of Defence (CLD), will ensure the professional management of funds and the “logistics of consumption” that can be

jointly managed in supply activities, efficient maintenance, transport, infrastructure, health, police and technical services.

175. In virtue of the strategic role based on economic and technological planning, both at an industrial and international level, policies regarding the area of: the aerospace industry, defence and security, and the public and private interests of Defence, are strictly the competence of the political head of the ministry. For the implementation of political directives the DNAL depends directly on the Ministry of Defence.

176. *The third function regards the generation and preparation of forces.* The Chiefs of Staff of the armed forces respond to the CASMD. They will, on the basis of the directives received, take responsibility for the generation and preparation of the land, air and naval forces. The Commanding General of the Carabinieri will continue to depend on the Chief of the Defence Staff of the armed forces, while the structure of the General Command will be simplified and some department functions will be integrated into joint forces.

177. In order to exercise its functions, the CASMD will employ staff that will be commanded by the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff. The Ministry of Defence will therefore have a strong new organization, while each General Staff organisation will be made more streamlined, consistent with the duties to be performed. In general, support departments that also provide certain complementary functions, and which are now fragmented, will be reduced to what is essential at all levels. They will be centralized to a single command level on the basis of common competencies. Similarly, no staff organisation will have command functions, or if they do, they will be transferred to the appropriate executive bodies.

178. The technical-administrative functions, with the exception of those associated with activities under CASMD, will be reordered within the General Defence Secretariat, whose management will be entrusted to a civilian Secretary General who ultimately responds to the Ministry of Defence.



The development of unitary capabilities and joint force integration

179. In order to achieve effective results, efficiency and better cost management, the reorganization of the armed forces will develop a new working model that is participatory, goal-oriented and fully integrated. Hence, the need to complete the regulations and general guidelines based on decision-making and management at both the political level, and at Defence Staff level. They should ensure rules and shared methods of building choices by decision-making and control bodies that can ensure the representation of a number of perspectives and needs.

180. Staff is an essential element for the success for this transformation. Therefore, it is essential that they are adequately educated and trained to work in an integrated environment. This demands the revision of professional career development, employment and the criteria for evaluating results. This reform will be initiated and completed within one year after the presentation of this document.

181. Regarding Military Management, the reference points of the review process include:

- a.** the adjustment and modification of the so-called “Normalised Progress” principle, established by the law n ° 1137, 12 November 1955, to introduce a system in which the allocation of general management ranks is derived solely from the need to hold specific national or international posts. These posts will be proposed by CASMD and approved by the Minister of Defence;
- b.** the establishment of a Joint Force Evaluation Commission, chaired by CASMD, for the career advancement of military managers;
- c.** the unsuitability for general management positions without a sufficient minimum amount of experience in staff organizations or joint command;
- d.** the “contractualisation” of the management role, whilst maintaining similar conditions both in defence and security, includes specific goals, as well as objective means of assessing them;
- e.** the establishment of an organizing body for the management and coordination of all human resources destined for joint, international, inter-ministerial assignments, to be placed under the responsibility of the CASMD.

Defence training structure

182. The objectives underlying the transformation require a training structure that is more homogeneous, without redundancies, and characterized by a unified management for development and guidance. The restructured training system will be characterized by three areas for action and guided towards the identification of practical solutions that are effective, efficient and economical.

a. *Continuous training.* The armed forces are constantly evolving and rely more and more on the ability to react rapidly and adapt quickly to changing scenarios and needs. This requires that all military and civilian personnel in defence have a career path with regular training opportunities alongside their professional activities. Training must be adequate for each professional career path, and comparable to that of the other advanced countries with which Italy cooperates. Aspects like the motivation to learn, the ability to view things long-term and the ability to solve problems, are essential qualities to be pursued by the Defence education system.

b. *Maximum organisational synergy.* The education system will have to be rethought in order to provide strong organizational integration of all the activities that are common to the armed forces and civilian personnel. This will leave the armed forces the sole responsibility of finalizing the training of staff that needs the necessary skills in their operating environment.

c. *Standardization and international training courses.* The aim of developing armed forces that have a high level of integration and can be perfectly inserted into multinational forces, requires training courses that are not only standardized at national level, but are also able to meet specific international needs. Therefore, activities and learning experiences abroad, with full appreciation and recognition of national training, will also mean an increase in training opportunities for foreign personnel in Italy, with a view towards progressive European defence integration.

183. The organization of training with a unified command will be directly responsible to the CSMD. The training facility will be a synchronized and synergistic body, which will acquire, over time, its own legal status. It will have the ability to issue loans and legal securities for studies and training that is undertaken. In this context, the Military



Academies will maintain their appearance of initial training to “operating theatres” and will have the responsibility for technical and vocational training while shaping the character of all officers. Schools and existing training centres that deal with educational activities and technical-specialist training missions of a similar type will be merged and streamlined on the basis of available capabilities and subject expertise.

184. The common management structure must safeguard the unique professional training of the individual components. Since education activities also involve the generation and preparation of the forces, it is necessary that each armed forces retains the responsibility of defining the specific training needs and the necessary career paths for technical and professional growth.

185. Defence schools are the heritage of the whole State and they can increase their value by if used for the benefit of the community. Therefore, they will be open to civilian Defence staff to be trained in specific skills. Access will also be given to university students and employees of other administrations, depending on interest and skills. The teaching staff can be civilian also working part-time. Likewise, military personnel with the requested qualifications may also be used in training activities outside of Defence, with particular regard to activities where their professional skills may be of interest to the community.

186. The military training system will therefore ensure ongoing education to staff throughout their career, but also facilitate the reintegration of personnel into civilian life for those who are not destined for permanent service. Its vocation will be international taking shape as a system open to staff of allied countries and friends and prepared to integrate into the wider context of military training in Europe. Teaching activities will be open to professionals from other countries, in order to gain the maximum benefit from their experience and knowledge.

Regional organisation and organisms

187. The modern requirements of simplicity and economy require the evolution process of local bodies and governments to move towards a more integrated status. This process started over ten years ago and must be rapidly completed. The connection with the territory will be preserved, along with local communities to ensure support to citizens in case of need, and to implement the territorial reserve force structure.

188. The new organization of territorial logistical support will be unified under the command of the Logistics Commander of Defence. This will be done to ensure the fulfilment of management policy requirements that favour organizational simplicity and reduce infrastructure to a minimum, along with the full integration of the armed forces.

189. The local authorities, through specific offices, will also be responsible for divulging information about Defence, staff recruitment and facilitating the reintegration of staff into the civilian working world.

Enhancement of values peculiar to each military component

190. As part of their activities, the armed forces constantly refer to the moral and ethical values of the nation they represent. Loyalty, a sense of duty, tradition, the awareness that a mission might pose a threat and to protect the best interests of the nation, are part of a culture that should be emphasized, strengthened and passed on to future generations. These values must permeate all of the Defence staff activities in the belief that preparation, i.e., respect of human life and a sense of justice, remain the pillars of public service.

191. The custodians of these traditions and values are the different components of the armed forces. The Army, Navy, Air Force and Carabinieri, in fact, do not only represent their specialized capabilities in their respective theatres of operations, but they



also provide a wealth of traditions, such as the work ethic, a way of life, values and a passion for their profession. New emphasis must be placed on the discovery and sharing of traditions and specialisations with all citizens, both in their specialised operating areas and through targeted intervention programs in education and training by military institutions and training centres.



192. In this context, particular attention should be paid to preserving the link that exists between those “who are” (active personnel) with those “who were” (staff who have left active service or even belonging to retired personnel associations) and those “who will be” (personnel in education and training). The memories of the past, remind us about the efforts to secure freedom and democracy, and the core values of our society that must guide the actions and form the spirit, of those who will continue to defend these achievements on a daily basis.

193. The choice to serve in a particular force or specialisation, acts to consolidate the spirit and strengthen the union between professional life and passion. This is decisive when it comes to the performance of an individual who is assigned missions in conditions of extreme difficulty and high risk. For this reason, the nature and the characteristics of each Armed Force will be retained and enhanced.

Capabilities to be generated for an integrated national force

194. According to what was mentioned in Chapter 5, i.e. regarding the lessons learned and implications for the armed forces with the need to operate effectively during assigned tasks, the military will have to prepare a number of forces and capabilities. The range of these capabilities must be sufficient enough to allow the right balance

between the various operational needs and flexible enough to cope with the changing requirements and to act on short notice.

195. The armed forces will have to have adequate joint operational capability:

- *integrated into all the NATO forces* to counter any military aggression against Italy and its vital interests, operating in the three physical dimensions, the human factor and cybernetics;
- *interoperable with allied forces*, to conduct military operations aimed at defending the alliance system of which Italy is a part, as well as safeguarding peace and international security.

196. In terms of priorities for action, the military must be calibrated in order to offer a range of capabilities to intervene primarily in the Euro-Mediterranean region and, in accordance with NATO commitments, in the Euro-Atlantic area. Italy must also eventually be able to lead, a multinational operation in crisis management and the restoration of peace and security. Outside of priority actions, existing capabilities will have to be improved so there are more resources available for deliberate short term military intervention. This is in order to compete with other countries in the international community for the protection of international security.

197. Italy therefore, will have to have balanced and diversified ground forces. The nation and the priority areas of intervention include, in fact, different types of terrain. In possible crisis situations, it may also be required to carry out rapid troop deployments to deal with high-conflict situations. For these reasons, the ground forces will maintain a proper balance of light, medium and heavy forces, deployable and up-to-date equipped. Units will be appropriately structured in line with their different skills with the criteria of modular training, ensuring adequate capacity for logistic and tactical support. Some forces will be available for stabilization measures and longer-term reconstruction, for which they will have to be supported by additional forces and the reserves. They will be equipped appropriately to operate effectively in complex theatres of operation.



198. As part of the possible actions that involve conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilization, specialized Carabinieri units are very useful and effective alongside units of civilian and military police. Their availability must be guaranteed as a possible choice.

199. With regards to naval forces in the areas of priority interest and where potential threats to the freedom of maritime trade and access to resources exist, Italy will have to have a naval force able to operate in environments that are characterized by high risks and carry out prolonged surveillance and patrols in areas of lesser risk.

200. A modern navy will be preserved albeit consistent with the available resources, and national capabilities, for force deployment from the sea and able to intervene at short notice in areas also with limited availability of infrastructure.

201. With regards to the air force, it should be equipped with adequate defence capabilities and air superiority, which includes ground support and precision engagement capability. In expected areas of priority action, the air force will be called upon to conduct high-risk missions from the early stages of a crisis situation and will be up against modern defences, for example when enforcing “no-fly zone” areas. For these reasons it will be essential to have equipment and systems designed for high survival and provide effective protection for personnel, as well as the capability to neutralize hostile anti-access defences and communication links in command and control centres.

202. The ability to move people, equipment and materials quickly in areas of crisis will remain an essential factor to contain any crisis before it can develop into prolonged conflict. Sufficient capability with multiple means of transport i.e. by land, air or sea, must be achieved through the development of national military capabilities, through agreements with civilian carriers, and through multinational participation and resource sharing initiatives.

203. As noted before, the availability of substantial special force capability will remain essential for special force operations and their support units. This capability will

be strengthened and enhanced. It will be necessary to acquire and maintain state-of-the-art equipment and effectively manage information with command and control, in order to conduct joint or combined complex military campaigns, including traditional combat operations and new forms of asymmetric and hybrid conflict.

Major development programmes

204. One of the Defence's priorities will be the development of a "Strategic Defence Review" (SDR), which includes a new edition of the Long-term Planning. This work, developed under the supervision and management of the political authority, remains in line with this document, and aimed at the correct identification of technical and operational solutions for the future evolution of the military. This will be in terms of transport, weapon systems and force structure.

205. This comprehensive review appreciates what has been completed to date, in order not to waste investments and acquired capabilities. The Strategic Defence Review may lead to a reduction or rethinking of certain capabilities, as ongoing choices, but will represent progressive change, that also acknowledges those already made in the armed forces.

206. Finally, the contents of the Strategic Review will act as reference for formulating long term legislation that regards Defence investment which the Government will submit to Parliament for consideration and approval.





DIFESA

Human resources



Personnel as a strategic resource

207. Human resources play a key role in all complex organizations, and are all the more vital to Defence which places huge demands on individuals in terms of sense of duty, self-sacrifice, and professionalism. Therefore, personnel are central in guaranteeing the nation an armed force capable of ensuring the defence of the State, and contributing effectively to the achievement of international security.

208. The characteristics of personnel, their technical and specialist skills, and the leadership skills of commanders, training, and professionalism have made it possible to ensure in the long term the defence capabilities of the nation guaranteeing a leading role in the international arena. In the future, the quality and effectiveness of the military and civilian personnel of the Ministry of Defence will be decisive factors in ensuring the capabilities required of our armed forces.



209. The significant quota of the Defence budget allocated to personnel and their training reflects the desire to provide the Defence with a professional, flexible, and highly-qualified workforce. This investment is particularly important in times like these when technical equipment is increasingly complex and continuously changing scenarios require diverse professional qualities, different operational capabilities, and absolute dedication.

210. Our society is rich in human qualities, diversity, initiative and adaptability, and our armed forces reflect these general qualities. The human skills and professional expertise asked of our Defence, however, must be made sufficiently attractive, and motivate personnel adequately, to encourage them to serve with undiminished energy and dedication over long periods of time. In this context, the government recognizes that the Defence's approach to personnel must be flexible and attentive if promoting the idea that serving your country in arms is a worthy profession and life choice. Only by attracting and retaining personnel who are motivated, and who possess the qualities and skills required, will the Defence accomplish its assigned tasks.

Recruitment and personnel structure

211. A professional model will characterize the armed forces of the next two decades by a more contained size and by the need to operate often far from home or in deployment military bases in areas of conflict or complexity. The requirement is for a youthful force that is numerically flexible, professionally prepared and with a streamlined, well-proportioned staff structure based on rank, role, and specialisation. This force structure should also have a high degree of "operational usability", that is, it should be able to operate in complex environments, far from fixed bases for long periods and therefore personnel should be able to accept minor constraints on their personal life, be physically fit, and prepared for self-sacrifice.

212. It thereby follows that personnel to be recruited must be carefully selected, educated and trained, and must represent an image of our country in the multipli-

city of professional qualities, origins, and social status. The armed forces should not, in fact, be perceived as a “separate body” apart from society but, on the contrary, as the highest form of public service capable of guaranteeing the defence and security of the nation, like all the security sector forces. Every effort will be made to ensure that there is integration between military personnel and citizens, in order to maintain the balance and vital bonds between the armed forces, institutions, and citizens.



213. In order to satisfy the key structural requirement for personnel to have a relatively low average age, being a member of the “military profession” cannot constitute the entire working life for every member of the force. For remaining personnel, serving one’s country shall represent only a part, albeit a highly-qualified part, of one’s curriculum vitae.

214. Personnel must be adequately supported by a range of provisions conducive to the exercise of his or her profession and must be facilitated in his or her reintegration into the civilian work environment. Personnel must be motivated by work environments that are characterized by professional competence and respect for role and position; and must receive a fair salary in proportion not only to rank and responsibility, but also to risk, professionalism, and length of service.

215. With regard to personnel recruitment, the suspension of conscription will continue. On the other hand, we shall see the introduction of new methods of recruitment and voluntary service, and professionals in permanent service, necessary to achieve desired goals of efficiency, effectiveness and operation in line with resources available. In such a scenario, it is appropriate to place special emphasis on the complete success of women’s voluntary military service. Today, fifteen years after its introduction into



our organisation, the practice must be considered fully positive: female personnel not only provide a significant contribution in many fields, but also, like in other advanced nations, enjoy broad access to all the employment opportunities that the Defence can offer. Achieving complete equality, however, will necessitate continuing attention to developing the participation of female Defence personnel with particular reference to the issue of career advancement.

216. It will therefore be necessary to study, test and introduce a new “Professional Model” that combines different needs. In particular:

- increase the percentage of relatively young personnel in the armed forces to maintain the efficiency of the operational component which will grow in proportion to the overall size of the structure;
- recruit the required number of young, highly-qualified men and women offering adequate pay, incentives, attractive and dynamic work proposals, and a credible system of reintegration into the civilian workforce, ensuring full equal employment opportunities and career advancement;
- place more value on the professionalism and experience gained during periods of operational activity;
- programme the coordinated insertion of the recruitment model, status and progress into the Defence and Security Sector;
- introduce specific regulations on the reintegration into civilian employment of personnel who serve only for a limited number of years.

217. New recruitment, enlistment, advancement and career development methods should aim to achieve the indicated goals, bearing in mind, however, the following:

- the career path and system of recruitment for troops, graduates and NCOs will be broadly similar, therefore it will be possible to reach the rank and the functions programmed for graduates, sergeants and warrant officers after an initial period of service in the troops;
- warrant officers will be allocated the tasks and responsibilities of top positions among the non-commissioned officers in line with Security Sector provisions;
- in the case of officers, with some exceptions, there will be two forms of entry into the

armed forces: one for normal roles and one for complementary and supportive roles. At the end of the latter's enlistment period, personnel destined to continue their career shall be selected via competitive exam;

- in order to achieve the objectives and the anticipated savings within credible time limits, an assessment of the possibility of complementary measures and retirement schemes for permanent staff will need to be made.

218. New regulations on recruitment and career development are to be implemented soon, in line with adjustments to the selection, education and training processes of the armed forces. Special regulations will outline the period of transition to the new regime.

Education and training

219. One of the requirements identified as a priority for the armed forces of the future, is the need for higher quality in terms of education and training. The evolution of future geopolitical scenarios, in fact, requires that the technological-cognitive dimension becomes more prominent and more prevalent than other dimensions. Only personnel with superior knowledge and skills, and perfect knowledge and mastery of equipment supplied will, in fact, guarantee full operability. Furthermore, the expected relatively high turnover of personnel will require a significant ever-growing ability to educate and train new recruits quickly and to high standards, to bring them quickly to suitable levels of efficiency and effectiveness.

220. It is also necessary to expand national capabilities dedicated to the education and training of the armed forces of allies and partners who need to rebuild and strengthen their capability for autonomous self-defence. These modes of support in crisis situations have now become particularly important to future scenarios. They are functional in the process of stabilization and essential for security and stability without having to employ large contingents abroad.



221. As representatives of Defence and the nation abroad, personnel in the international arena must exemplify the highest possible moral and professional qualities. For these reasons, and especially for positions of greater prominence, personnel shall be carefully selected and trained. Finally, with a view to greater integration, a project to ensure the placement of military and diplomatic representatives shall be launched.

222. We should not forget the additional role the Defence can play for younger citizens in terms of increasing their level of technical and specialised knowledge useful for the world of work. In the past when still based on the conscription model, the armed forces had not only the role of consolidating moral values thereby strengthening national unity - establishing for everyone that the highest form of duty was that of defending the nation - but also played a very important social function. The armed forces have, in fact, given millions of young people the opportunity to get to know their own country and the citizens of other countries, to improve their command of the spoken and written language, and to learn useful skills to increase their employment prospects.

223. Today, in a profoundly different reality, the armed forces can still play a similar role: to serve one's own country, therefore, can be not only a source of pride and a lifestyle choice, but also a useful opportunity to train for a job, to improve skills in or learn a profession by developing, at the same time, foreign language, leadership, and teamwork skills.

224. The characteristics of educational and training excellence which shall be strengthened by the armed forces will ultimately result in an added value for the nation. The latter can take advantage of the unique capabilities possessed by the Defence in many specialist fields, their training facilities, and training missions resulting in a close correlation between the "Social System" and the "Defence System".

225. Both reaching and maintaining high-quality personnel training levels is a condition that multiplies capabilities and allows full interoperability with allied nations. Achievement of the agreed minimum training standards within NATO and the EU is therefore a non-negotiable objective that will ensure the armed forces has the ability to

operate safely and effectively in the spectrum of assigned tasks. Reaching this objective demands that existing training paths be integrated, optimized and maintained over time to ensure full exploitation of existing national capabilities but also looking for the best solution in international cooperation should the national response fail to be cost-effective due to economies of scale or high unit costs. Similarly, national training areas and related structures shall be preserved to permit required activities.

226. In order to achieve the objectives required in terms of operational readiness, adaptability and efficiency of use, the future Training Model should possess the following characteristics:

a. *Realism and training intensity.* Every training period must place a high level of importance on creating realistic situations, that is, allow personnel to experience practical operational situations, not limited to those which occur most commonly, but also hypothetical or less frequent ones. The use of technologies for virtual experiences should be extended to as much equipment as possible, as well as to procedures for command and control. The use of such systems should allow an increase in situational training for personnel, minimize the risk of operational surprises and increase the safety of staff, also reducing the impact of training activities on the community to a minimum;

b. *Joint Training Structure.* The use of the armed forces as a synergetic unit requires the development of operating procedures that are as standardized as possible in terms of work concepts and operating procedures. Although it is necessary for each component to train individually in order to operate safely and effectively in specific operational contexts, the armed forces must achieve a high level of integration in terms of facilities and participate in joint training exercises with common goals. The rationalization of organization and infrastructures will be achieved with an approach that exploits operational expertise possessed in the operating environment, and takes into account an objective evaluation of the excellent infrastructures and training systems possessed by each component;

c. *Multi-nationalization of training.* The objectives of wider integration at European level and a high degree of operational interoperability with allied nations require that staff work jointly, effectively, and safely. Such requirements necessarily require



that most training activities, in particular more complex ones, are conducted at an international level and according to procedures and protocols uniformly shared. For these reasons, the Defence will support the execution of training activities at complex multinational level, seeking all possible forms of international integration for those that traditionally were held nationwide;

d. Evaluation of training. Careful evaluation of training activities is essential for learning and for the improvement of the military organisation in times of peace.

Personnel structure and careers

227. As in any complex structure, in the armed forces career progression is based on the correct execution of managerial activities and execution of tasks. Over time, the structure and composition of the so-called hierarchical pyramid has changed, and is influenced by four main factors. The first is technological development of the equipment whose full and correct use requires not only higher technical, but also analytical and leadership, capabilities. The second consists of the progressive multi-nationalization of operations and command structures: the participation of the European Union, NATO and the UN requires the presence in common structures of permanent, highly-qualified military and civilian personnel. The third factor is the increasing complexity of operational scenarios, which require levels of professionalism, responsibility and leadership skills of the highest nature. The last factor, finally, is related to the transformation of society itself towards one that is strongly characterized by the value of “knowledge”. The combination of these factors leads to growth in personnel’s role and functions providing the highest levels of professionalism and responsibility, leading to the need for a ranking structure different from what seemed necessary in the past.



228. However, parallel to this development, greater operational levels remain fundamental. Although the requirement for more extensive and sophisticated technical knowledge is, also in this case, clear, the need remains unchanged to have professionally trained and motivated personnel of an appropriate age for intense operational tasks. They must also possess unique physical qualities and moral character, and be aware that the period of employment will be marked by a very dynamic life experience. To meet this need, the armed forces must provide a personnel structure with a broad operational base, a well-balanced, diversified middle management, and a relatively small leadership, especially those occupying senior positions.

229. For each category, the career paths of personnel will develop from the lower ranks according to career progression that will necessarily involve a significant portion of time spent performing operational tasks. Within each category and according to the number of permanent staff, the ability to reach top ranks must be guaranteed, in theory, to all personnel. Even more than today, career progression will be selective on the basis of indisputable and proven ability, professionalism, qualifications held including degrees, and experience. Furthermore, it will develop according to transparent evaluation criteria that are as objective as possible based on the measurable achievement of objectives. In order to promote this objective, the Defence will introduce a new uniform evaluation system covering these requisites.

230. The overall number of top ranks of troops, sergeants and warrant officers will be limited and related to the number of positions provided. The achievement of these ranks, therefore, does not represent the normal culmination of career advancement, but the recognition of the achievement of excellence and special merits acquired on the career path. Similarly, higher managerial ranks will be attributed only when precise positions need to be filled, providing a progression system that allows continual exchange. No promotions will be granted on the basis of length of service or current rank: all progress will require a specific classification based on an assessment of moral qualities, professional aptitude and achievements. Finally, no promotions shall be made on discharge from service.



Civilian Defence personnel

231. With the aim of creating a synergistic system, the Defence will pay particular attention to integration processes, development and full use of the expertise possessed by non-military personnel. The civilian component of the Defence will be an increasingly valuable pool of technical, administrative and managerial skills that will assume a role of greater responsibility in many activities for which the specific condition of the military and its professionalism are an essential added value.



232. The configuration and mode of recruitment of civilian personnel shall be reviewed in the reform policies of the Public service carried out by the government to solve problems of reduced mobility, lesser flexibility and higher average age, as well as homogeneous remuneration. If indispensable for obvious reasons of parity, provision will be included with regard to civilians, in the case of the same operational employment abroad, for salaries equivalent to those paid to military personnel.

233. As is the case in many European countries and along with reform policies of the Public service carried out by the Government, research will be carried out on forms of employment for the civilian personnel of the Defence that shall allow, for the future and over time, a rebalancing of the numbers of temporary and permanent staff providing forms of support for the delicate time of transition to other business sectors.

234. Measures will be implemented to finally overcome those “barriers” that have traditionally limited civilians working for the Defence to prescribed duties and functions, excluding them from others which are appropriate to their skills but which have traditionally been carried out by military personnel. In order to fulfil specific requirements, flexible career paths and part-time forms of work, both for temporary and permanent employment, will ultimately be designed.

235. In addition, in order to promote job placements and the creation of experience and professionalism, research shall also be made into the possibility of offering short-term work placements in favour of:

- *university students* (working with university departments for agreement on the proper evaluation of periods of service in the context of training);
- *specialized technicians*, involving private companies and research centres to ensure that training translates into real possibilities of future employment that will prove stable over time.

236. This transformation will be supported ensuring civilian access to Defence training and instruction, to provide steady and progressive training throughout careers, to develop professional skills, and to define career paths that are in line with the new and more complex responsibilities to be taken on.

Health and safety at work

237. For the organization of Defence, which normally operates with risk margins higher than those of other professional activities, health and safety at work are issues of great importance and priority, and are subject to the specific nature of the conditions of military training and operations. Ensuring employment conditions that prevent potential risks to



personnel, reducing as far as possible, the consequences of ill health that could arise from operating in harsh and complex environments, is a moral duty towards those who perform public service for the community, even before due respect is paid to existing regulations. Equally essential is to ensure that citizens have full knowledge of the rules with which the Defence works and the possible impact on the territory of such activities.



238. In this context, risk prevention activities, training, and information for citizens and personnel will be reinforced, acting along main lines of action, in full agreement with both local and national prevention and control agencies.

a. First, the Ministry will continue working on the collection, analysis, evaluation and dissemination of all statistical data on infirmity and mortality of civilian and military Defence personnel, by cooperating actively in the search for causes of the onset of certain diseases, in accordance with scientific and methodological rigour.

b. The detection and monitoring of chemical and radiological elements potentially generated by the activities of Defence in some specific sites will be enhanced, and centralized database also accessible to supervisory bodies will be created.

c. Training courses, retraining and information courses will be gradually increased and made widely available to staff and managers, for the protection of health, safety in the workplace, food hygiene, environmental protection, and technical-specialist courses for the safety of facilities and equipment.

d. Employers will be asked to put in place a number of positive actions aimed at ensuring that the value of health and safety in the workplace is assimilated by the workers themselves so that it becomes, in practice, ordinary working practice.

Financial remuneration

239. The philosophy that will underlie the evolution of salaries in the future armed forces will be based both on professional development and rank. The personnel structure of the armed forces, in fact, will be characterised by a hierarchical pyramid that will offer progression of rank related to performance and commitment, to merit and diverse opportunities for professional growth and specialization.

240. The structure of recruitment and career progression outlined also highlights how the military profession will represent, for some of the personnel, only a part, albeit significant, of their overall work experience.

241. Finally, as in every professional system, personnel will be encouraged to join the organization, motivated to remain and stimulated to operate over time with undiminished enthusiasm. This requires that the salary structure be competitive and that it rewards not only professionalism and experience, but also the complexities of the activity and the specific role, on a competitive basis as in other sectors of society.

242. All these requirements, however, require research into salary dynamics different from the current ones, but still compatible with the public service. Fair remuneration should be made for the increased responsibility that accompanies higher ranks, the risk, professionalism and seniority, as well as the specific condition imposed by being a military employee, all subject to remaining part of the Defence-Security Sector regarding legal and economic order.

243. The success of the future military, therefore, requires that also from the point of view of salary, provisions are implemented so that the choice of serving one's country does not penalise staff, thereby discouraging enlistment or decreasing motivation. In full compatibility with available resources three reforms to overcome these problems will be progressively implemented:

- the first aims to modify the current structure of remuneration, in order to come to a salary settlement in which the base parameter has more value than accessory parameters;
- the second regards the need for greater recognition of responsibilities, professionalism, and length of service;
- the third concerns the introduction, at the end of temporary active service in the armed forces without demerit;
- of an allowance that is meaningful and proportionate to the period of service performed. This allowance will act, together with other provisions that will be implemented, as a further instrument of remuneration for service and support in the process of reintegration into the civilian world.



Reintegration into the civilian work environment and the value of professionalism

244. All the elements presented depict a military component in which the human element plays a central role with professionalism being essential for its success. The possibility that such a model can be developed fully correlates to the level of professional enhancement obtainable for military and civilian personnel and that, in turn, will serve to determine not only the operational effectiveness of the armed forces, but also the attractiveness of the profession, the motivation and the real possibility of reintegration into employment of excess personnel.



245. Defence staff act in many professional fields, manage equipment with a high level of technological sophistication and operate in national and international environments characterized by considerable levels of complexity. These factors have always involved the development of different professionals at all levels, which, however, have not always found the correct recognition in the context of the civilian working world except in very limited cases.

246. The success of the work of modernization, the possibility for temporary staff to more easily find a position in the job market, and the need to render public sector personnel more flexible, resides not only in the ability to properly recognise their qualifications and skills, but also in the ability to match the supply of skills with the needs of the national production system. In order to facilitate this process, the Defence will introduce two specific initiatives: the “*Youth Project*” and the “*Future Work Project*”.

247. The “*Youth Project*” will enhance the ability of the armed forces to create strong values and a sense of solidarity, as well as promoting social, cultural and professional growth. The existing training structures and training missions of the armed forces are able to offer professional training suitable for institutional positions, particularly for younger staff doing fixed-term military service and civilian and military personnel who need to retrain and find another job. However, it also facilitates the reintegration into the civilian world at the end of the period of service. Therefore the Defence has “dual” training and education capabilities.

248. There are many areas where this initiative will find real application: from basic training to professional practice, where direct experience of working in the military world is considered solid experience and is also valuable in the civilian world. The project also provides for the recognition of qualifications obtained during service, making them equivalent to corresponding civilian qualifications, and endorsing the experience gained working with the military with the creation of a military “*professional curriculum vitae*” certified by the administration. The latter will be used to attest to specific work experience at the time of placement in the job market. The new Training structure will be responsible for the implementation and updating of the project, as well as for the certification of professional qualifications and curricula.

249. The “*Future Work Project*” represents the effort that the government will make in order to support the reintegration of personnel into the civilian world - by matching supply and demand. The Ministry of Defence interacts with other government departments, with international organizations and with many economic and social bodies, which are useful to facilitate the reintegration of staff into the civilian world.

250. The project involves the creation of a database of skills possessed by personnel, the signing of agreements by employers who value the skills, discipline and work ethics that the experience of military service can offer and the creation of a structure dedicated to supporting personnel who need assistance.



Citizens and the armed forces

251. For the Defence and Security Sector, Article 19 of Law 4, November 2010, no. 183 introduced the concept of “specificity” because of the specific tasks assigned to military personnel, and the obligations imposed by their fulfilment. It is recognition of a “special status” and must be taken into account in the regulations of key aspects of the working relationship with the Public Administration. In this context, for example, we have the complex theme of Military Representation, which will not be addressed here as it is the prerogative parliament.

252. With regard to the administration of the military criminal justice system, the government intends to continue its efforts to improve the efficiency of the system, streamlining it and also studying the possibility of a legally evolved system based on the principle of the uniqueness of criminal jurisdiction, proposing the adoption in peacetime, of bodies specialised in military criminal matters, incorporated within the ordinary justice system.

253. Regarding general aspects of the care of personnel, the government intends to fulfil an obligation, first of all moral, towards members of the Defence, securing respect, support and fair treatment for those who, sacrificed themselves and their personal rights, and faced danger in order to be faithful to their oath. The most natural way to progress in this new perspective is to recognise a real “pact” between the entire nation, the government and the armed forces that recognizes the support, the concrete expression of gratitude towards those belonging to the armed forces and their families. Among the issues to consider there are the conditions of service, fair salary, health care, education, mobility at home and abroad, retraining for the civilian job market, and pension schemes.

254. Obviously, it is a non-exhaustive list of areas of life, typical of armed forces personnel, devolved mostly to non-Military organisations, but also to the state whose involvement is indispensable. Hence the need for a government commitment to facilitate, in practical terms, the bridge between the military sphere and civilian life. From

this pact it is necessary to identify those institutions whose competences are in specific policy areas: in addition local authorities must be the ministries of reference for all that concerns health matters, education and vocational training in preparation for re-entry into the job market.

255. Regions, provinces and municipalities will be able to become privileged partners of their ex-Military citizens even in the search for synergy in areas like housing and local taxation. The military community, often highly cohesive, will be available to participate in joint initiatives of direct interest in the area. The services involved can be calibrated on the basis of the objective to be achieved and would go from sharing legislative initiatives, to signing the simplest and most flexible agreements or contracts, to manifestations of the most basic social life. In this framework, initiatives of “friendship”, exchanges between the military community and local communities may reveal themselves of fundamental importance. The contribution of military personnel in the projects concerning the redevelopment of public spaces, or in volunteer initiatives undertaken in support of the most vulnerable sections of the population (the elderly, disabled, etc.) would, in fact, be further tangible example of the real partnership of ex-Military citizens in the social life of the nation and a new opportunity for appreciation and gratitude towards them.





DIFESA

Industrial policies for science and innovation



General scenario

256. In addition to a Military component capable of expressing the correct and necessary capabilities, our defence system cannot exist without a certain level of industrial and technological independence so that it can meet at least part of our needs at the national level or through participation in multinational initiatives for development and acquisition. Also putting ourselves in a perspective of strong international cooperation, the need to develop and maintain a strong technological and industrial base is a security factor for the protection of national interests. It enables the mastery of certain technologies, the use of full potential, and the tailoring of applications to specific national needs, keeping them up to date in a situation characterized by their rapid obsolescence.



257. Advanced technologies and adequate industrial capabilities are also necessary for developing new products on an equal footing collaboratively, for strengthening integration with our European partners, and for forging links with other friendly countries. Finally, contributing to the overall growth of the nation, considering that security and defence represent one of the few areas of advanced national technology still presided over by our nation. This requires attention to be paid to the activities of acquisition and modernization of the equipment of the armed forces, but also to those designed to ensure the maintenance of adequate national technological and manufacturing capability to support, at least in part and bearing in mind potential interdependence with our main partners, and national needs.

258. In the last twenty years, the market for Defence equipment has been profoundly transformed by the emergence of new trends. While, for example, “platforms” tend to extend their life cycle, technological innovation, and in particular the pervasive spread of electronics in terms of products and industrial processes, leads to



premature ageing of “equipment”. This implies, in principle, the need for a continuous system adjustment and/or the need to shorten the development time of the programmes. Technological innovation in civilian markets also makes technologies, spare parts and equipment used for military needs available lowering the entrance barriers for new suppliers. It is more difficult, therefore, but also more important, to monitor overall technological development even beyond that which is strictly military and to consider “civil” needs to become potentially associated with military ones. The Armed Forces must therefore maintain adequate technological skills to identify and define their needs.

259. The reduction in demand of Western countries and the search for new markets in a global international market, have led to a process of concentration and globalisation of large industrial groups destined to grow. Parallel to this, the size of large industrial groups

destabilise, especially in Europe, the relationship between domestic demand and global supply weakening the traditional control capabilities of States and their defences. Although the European and international dimension prevails now in all European countries over the national and despite increases in bilateral or multilateral programmes of European collaboration, military acquisitions are still set on the national dimension. Hence, the need for greater impetus towards European co-operation in the development, acquisition and logistic support of a military nature.

The security and defence industry

260. The industry of Defence and Security is a pillar of technology, manufacturing, employment, and economic growth and is unmatched in the “national system”, which contributes mainly through three elements:

- it provides the development of platforms and systems for the armed forces, both for defence and national security, and for missions abroad. The capability of the armed forces allows Italy to be a respected member of the international community and to play a leading role in the scenarios of national interest. The pairing “military industry- national industry “ increases the “level of ambition” of the “National System” to the level of international relations;
- it contributes to technological development through programmes and investments in research and development and, more generally, to economic growth through the direct, indirect and induced effects on GDP and the creation of skilled jobs;
- it contributes, through exports, to the balancing of trade balances and the promotion of products of domestic industry in sectors with high remuneration, fostering our relationships with other countries.

Technological competence

261. A comprehensive system of Defence and Security also requires a wealth of scientific-technological and industrial knowledge which allows the development of



products and systems based on distinct technological competence that is as autonomous as it is collaborative, so as to create a strategic competitive advantage for the nation. The gradual development of such distinctive technological skills in a competitive industrial base internationally, is essential to have autonomous powers that can meet the specific needs of the armed forces. In addition, the identification of distinctive technological competencies enables participation in programmes of collaboration with international partners in any given role and with qualified personnel and supports international relations through projects transferring technology or cooperation with other countries.



262. By sovereign competence is meant critical technological capabilities, those key enablers, including dual-use technologies, which the country is in possession of or needs to acquire. Of these competencies it is necessary to maintain a degree of national sovereignty, irrespective of international cooperation, since they are essential and indispensable in order to meet the needs of:

- national defence, through the supply of military equipment to the armed forces to ensure basic operational capability and safety of supply;
- national interest, through the international influence, including economic, that the features of these technologies provide globally.

263. To ensure the security of the supply chain and to sustain growth in the “national system”, the design, development and production of technologies important to sovereign skills will be maintained on national territory, regardless of ownership. The identification of sovereign competencies, in which the country must be autonomous and associated and constantly changing technologies will be defined identifying the needs of medium and long term capability, and the actual technological and industrial capabilities in the Nation.

264. Necessary autonomy, however, must be matched by economic sustainability, and must be pursued by combining, to supply national demand, the ability to cooperate internationally with selected partners, and through export opportunities in international markets.

265. Collaborative skills are necessary in order to work together with partners in the division of labour at the European level, deriving from the desired specialization and technological interdependence. The Defence shall identify which technologies and systems need to be pursued through partnerships, especially European, in order to maintain and strengthen national capabilities. In those areas where excellence in technological knowledge is present, but is not the immediate needs of the national armed forces, possible export markets of interest should be identified in order to ensure the maintenance of technological and industrial capabilities.

266. Exports represent important resources useful in intergovernmental relations important to military cooperation. With these, partnership policies and technology transfer can be developed, focusing on “inter-governmental” agreements. In this perspective, the Defence will continue to provide its support to domestic industry, also in coordination with other competent administrations.

267. In this context, it is necessary to provide for the identification of strategic industrial and technological activities in the field of Defence and Security through a specific “plan” to be kept regularly updated. On the one hand, this evaluation must consider the needs of the armed forces, and, on the other, the effective technological and industrial capabilities. The latter should be selected taking into account the judgement of the armed forces, capability of export, and participation in international collaboration, duality, and impact on technological innovation also with reference to the market. To this end, the “Plan” will be also be defined by comparison with industry.

268. By defining the technological solutions to address the capability gap, the “Plan” will also contribute to the definition of priorities to be supported by the government and the authorities involved, with a process that will involve all the ministries and



bodies of the State, which will contribute to both the definition of requirements, and financial support programs. That prospect may find even greater force in the field of dual use technologies, where interests and the involvement of other public entities are stronger.

Science and technology

269. The world of science, knowledge and technological innovation is the future of our country and the cornerstone of our autonomy. It is, therefore, fundamental to the international security and defence strategy of the nation. The Defence, therefore, will adopt policies that promote growth paths with projects of the highest scientific and techno-



logical content and openness towards the civilian world of the capabilities possessed in research, applied knowledge and operational testing. Likewise, on an international scale, the skills and technical-scientific knowledge possessed by the armed forces are both a “business card” of the nation and of its quality and professionalism, both real tools to create opportunities for international cooperation, also in the fields of technological research and transport systems.

270. Science, technology, and research and development are therefore crucial elements of reference for the development of a national strategy for growth, to which the Defence will contribute actively. In order to improve and strengthen dual research and to allow the nation to benefit from initiatives of collaboration, the Defence will advocate a substantial adjustment of financial resources for research and development in relation to specific projects and initiatives to strengthen capability in the field of Defence and Security where priority projects are identified at European level.

271. The National Plan of Military Research (PNRM) is to enjoy increasing harmony and integration with National Research (PNR), in order to concentrate research activities on issues identified as priorities. Thanks to the cooperation between Defence, industry and the scientific world, aimed at future development programmes, great benefit can be obtained from the know-how, resulting in reduced risk, costs, and the timing of programmes.

272. Another aid for the harmony and coherence of technological research at national level is the development of the “matrix of enabling technologies”, of achieved or desirable excellence, prioritising to the most strategic. The matrix will be shared among all ministries and State bodies concerned, and with national industry. It will bring together all public needs at a national level, offering support, and at ministerial level, by developing a coordinated policy of investment and action.

Global dimension of the defence sector

273. The global dimension of the Defence Industry is closely related to positive development in a more integrated and shared security policy and defence of the European Union as well as NATO. In Europe, both NATO, through the initiative of “Smart Defence”, and the PSDC, with that of “Pooling & Sharing”, have long since begun a process aimed at enhancing the efficiency of military capabilities and enabling closer international cooperation.

274. To that end, the programs of European and international cooperation contribute to increasing the shared features of equipment and to reducing development and acquisition costs, and retention. In this framework, the lessons of experience shall be valued, to further reduce time and costs through new solutions that ensure nevertheless an “inclusive” approach able to involve those nations with the skills and willingness to participate. When fully implemented, these initiatives could gradually lead to greater interdependence among European countries of NATO and the EU Member States to force technological-industrial specialization, a symptom of real division of labour



through industrial policies of European Defence, covering all sectors of the AS&D industry. This evolution requires, however, a closer level of political and military cooperation without which the integration process could be weakened.

275. The military capabilities developed in international cooperation with NATO allies and EU Member States will therefore require a more extensive and effective consultation and coordination capability, to avoid redundancy and to ensure that gaps are not created nor damage caused to the security of supply schemes or control of technological and industrial structures. The security of supply in EU Member States, in fact, is necessary to strengthen the single market for Defence. These nations, in fact, will not be favourable to outlined changes if they do not have the security to meet their military needs in a fast, safe and unhindered fashion. This requires that the European Union focuses on greater liberalization of intra-EU transfers of military products for the armed forces in Europe.

276. This development reinforces the need to identify and support areas of national technological excellence. This poses difficult choices for the nation about the skills and technologies to be held, to be protected by encouraging recognition and use in the European context.

The relationship between Defence and industry

277. The cornerstone of the national strategy for Security and Defence, even within the perspective of a process of European integration in the Defence Sector, is the close collaboration between industry and the Ministry of Defence. The term “extended” operational needs and the resulting technical requirements are key elements in a policy of security and integrated defence. Operational needs and technical-military requirements for creating priority capability, in fact, are derived from the tasks and missions assigned to the Military. They must also keep in mind the possibility that the same technical requirements and associated technologies have a wide utility also for other national needs. This can only be guaranteed by a strong interrelationship

between Defence, industry and other ministries responsible for the various sectors. In particular:

- at the national level, it is necessary to adapt existing technical and administrative regulations, both to allow acquisitions over long periods, and in terms of contractual conditions and, more generally, arrangements governing the acquisition process and acceptance of the supplies for the Ministry of Defence. The goal is simplification and speeding up of procedures.
- at the European level, considering development, the acquisition process will be able to become more and more joint and multinational, allowing financial savings in terms of economies of scale, better interoperability, and operational integration. This objective can be achieved by stimulating the strengthening of the skills and capabilities of existing European agencies, such as EDA and OCCAR, with the contribution of nationally qualified staff.

278. It is also necessary to review acquisitions models, taking inspiration from best practices at the European level, inserting long term logistic support into the purchase contract and, if needed, periods of initial training. This will ensure that the Ministry of Defence benefits from efficiency, certainty of costs and reasonable stability to medium-term planning in national industry.

279. In the past, most maintenance activities and technical management of the armed forces were run mainly by military authorities. Today, many of these activities are still managed by the Defence, with some others being managed by manufacturers, or those firms that are specialized in certain services. In future, the number of systems and the growing complexity of the technologies used, will require a balance between the new skills to be maintained in the armed forces and those to be managed by the relevant industries.

280. To this end, the solutions to be analysed regard: the management of some technical activities of by the Defence to be relayed to companies or private companies, the creation of public-private partnerships, and the use and development of new or existing administration bodies. In this process, research will be done on the possibility



of industry absorbing some of the technical-industrial structures of Defence and its personnel, according to specific regulations. Such a change would be subject to the need of maintaining an efficient and competitive industrial sector and not to compromise the priority needs of national security, all with the objective of strengthening the logistics of adherence and support to the armed forces front lines. This framework shall require better definition of the status of personnel of those companies used in theatre for better logistic support of the equipment used, and to promote the use by businesses operating in the area of Security and Defence of military personnel who have left active duty.

281. Specific priorities for the development of future capabilities and, consequently, indications to industry of areas of priority interest, can only be provided as part of the Strategic Defence Review, and an accurate survey of the areas of excellence held. Here, however, it is appropriate to provide some principles of reference and general guidelines to what has already emerged.

282. Firstly, for the development of future projects, it is appropriate that platforms and open and possibly modular architectural systems are used to allow long term autonomous and cost-effective management, ensuring maintenance over time and necessary updating, according to technological advancement, in simpler and more economical ways.

283. The promotion and acquisition of systems and platforms with dual-use technologies will also be important. The adoption of common requirements and “hybrid regulations” for products, equipment and components with both civilian and military applications, allowing advantages to be taken of “economies of scale” in development, production and in-service platform support will be necessary whenever possible. Given the difference in the life cycles of military platforms (usually very long) compared to civilian ones, planning during the design and programming stages for the constant updating of service platforms in order to achieve optimal cost-effectiveness and operability will be necessary. For these reasons, it is important to take the opportunity to include, as part of the drafting of purchase contracts (besides logistical support and

initial training), also provision for regular updates thereby transforming the nature and content of the relationship between industry and administration from mere supply to that of strategic partnership.

284. For long-term acquisitions of new equipment, a “spiral development acquisition process” shall be preferred, that is, a mode of development of systems that provides for subsequent cycles of: the study of solutions, testing, implementation, deployment, operational use and evaluation of results, and subsequent progressive adaptation. This setting will allow for better adjustment of technical solutions to operational problems, and better control of costs and updating needs in order to meet technological growth of the sector, as well as operational needs.

Management of development and acquisition programmes

285. The possibility that the “national system” can be characterized even in the field of Defence and Security as a competitive system able to facilitate the development of knowledge and skills with international success requires the development of different interaction modes between its many parts. In the definition of requirements, the “Anticipation capability” is to continue to be exercised in line with scenarios and commitments arising from NATO Integrated Defence policies, by CSDP initiatives, and within the framework of the United Nations. Whenever possible and consistent with the needs and timing of the Italian Defence, the reconciliation of NATO, CSDP and national requirements, and interoperability in areas of military cooperation between allies, collaboration and access to foreign markets will be favoured.

286. With regard to aspects of inter-ministerial coordination, the possibility of a wider use of the technologies to be developed, the need to reduce costs, the objectives of greater international collaboration and the acquisition of a share of the international market, creates the need to avoid requirements tailored for the specific needs of the national Military. In Europe, the adoption of common regulations will simplify the certification of products and facilitate their transfer within EU Member States. In or-



der for Italian industry to compete on an equal footing with major European nations, the current legal delays when dealing with other countries in the area of regulations and procedures for the development, acquisition, support, and updating of military equipment and, in particular, of the main systems will need adjustment.

287. In the area of equipment acquisition, along with indispensable long-term strategic planning, the priority task of the Defence is to ensure the definition of precise requirements, to ensure that the knowledge and operational experience gained are exploited in the process of definition and development of the means and systems required, and that innovation and experimentation capability may be involved in the definition of solutions from initial stages of projects.

288. As a direct consequence, and in order to raise the level of expertise and competence in areas of priority interest, civilian and military personnel employed by Sectors devoted to acquisition processes must be characterized by high professionalism and unique specification, developed along precise training paths and through longer terms spent in key positions.

Defence, industry and university

289. The Security and Defence Sector favours growth and technological development for the nation. Preserving and strengthening the sector not only provides the capability to improve frames of Security and National Defence, but also allows the creation of new job opportunities and development in many fields of public utility. The basic technologies required, in fact, benefit a wider audience and represent an enabler in many fields far from the Security and Defence dimension. The possibility for this industry to find its proper development dimension lies in the national capability to favour continuation of close cooperation between Defence, industry, academia, and research. It is in this context that innovation finds its most fertile soil and it is here that future policies should be implemented for the structural strengthening of the sector, support for the development, and the creation of vital links between design, implementation and use.

290. The creation of a continuous cycle between the translation of the idea in specific technologies and products and the end user will produce a “national system” capability to be internationally competitive, to ensure employment and industrial development, and to renew processes and products for the benefit of the entire community. Therefore, the hoped-for better interaction between Defence and industry will be extended also to the way that the university system will have to be put in a position to interact directly and closely with the centres of experimentation and research, both military and industry. Innovative ideas and research proposals will have to find a quick and direct channel for their evaluation and promotion and those considered most useful will have to find funding and support for implementation. The focus of Defence on research will be towards the ideas and projects aimed at the implementation of innovative technological solutions rather than evolutionary.

291. The Centres of excellence (CoE), especially in NATO and European circles, are initiatives that the nation should consider as priorities, preserving and enhancing the present and the future to strengthen the operational and/or the technological excellence of the nation. Better links between Centres of Excellence, universities and industry will promote not only their growth in terms of relevance and ability, but the extension of opportunities for researchers and new areas of study, favouring the launch of innovative entrepreneurship and the strengthening of industrial structures.

292. Continuity and visibility in terms of the availability of resources and better interaction at the national level between all relevant spheres shall allow benefits to be obtained in terms of planning and programming. A new approach is required in order to attract resources and capital from the financial market, to be used for the competitive growth of the sector and in particular to strengthen Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) financially, which make up the national chain of subcontractors. The increase of public and private funds and their better governance will facilitate the strengthening of SMEs, through university spin-offs. In general an important contribution could come from the identification of a share of R & D to be reserved for SMEs in order to allow competition among companies of similar size.





DIFESA

Strategic planning and implementation of the White Paper



293. With this White Paper, the Government has started a major transformation of the Defence to enable it, in the present climate of limited economic resources, to guarantee the nation sufficient capabilities to defend national interests, contributing responsibly to international security.

294. The first and most urgent measures have already been adopted. This White Paper now provides an overall picture of the reforms to be implemented in the near future presenting them in a single form, as a measure of transparency for parliament and the general public. The White Paper is a “*ministerial directive*” for all bodies of the Administration of Defence, and therefore, the objectives stated therein, when decreed in keeping with current legislation, should be pursued immediately. As will be fully explained further on, in several areas in which the White Paper introduces and adopts concepts, measures and innovative procedures, it should be completed through rese-



arch conducted first by the Defence and then by a committee of high-level technical and legal emissaries, composed of high profile experts. This structure, comparing current military regulations gathered in the Code referred to in Legislative Decree no. 66 of 2010, including amendments, can decide and formulate the legal regulations for amendment and/or supplement or completely rewrite (according to indications formulated by parliament). It will formalize also for the more complex and more articulated issues, the criteria to place (by appropriate legislative powers) before the government.

295. Renewed commitment to the achievement of high levels of effectiveness in the protection of national interests and the efficient use of resources available in each area of the Ministry of Defence, military and civilian, will be required. The lines of action through which the process of transformation of the Defence and the Military is developed are four, namely: a review of governance; an adjustment of the “operative model”, understood as quantitative, qualitative and capability forces; personnel policy; science, industrial and technological innovation policies of the Defence. For each of these areas, specific areas of Defence will have the primary responsibility to implement reform measures.

296. Regarding Review of governance:

- within three months, a committee will prepare solutions to implement fully the provisions of the law regarding the powers of the Minister of Defence, also by sending back to the offices of directly involved, the tasks and functions that had been delegated to other areas of the administration, and reallocating towards support structures or administrative bodies all activities not directly involved;
- within six months, based on the guidelines contained in the White Paper and under the supervision of the Minister of Defence, the Chief of Defence Staff will prepare, for the evaluation of the Minister, a new organizational structure of the Military, inclusive of regulatory measures necessary for its implementation;
- in analogy with what has been done in the past for the introduction of the “Code of the Military” (COM) and the “Consolidation Act regulations concerning Military Order” (TUOM), a committee of experts will prepare within one year and for the approval of the Minister of Defence, and other Ministers concerned and for the subsequent exami-

nation of parliament, a comprehensive review of the existing laws and regulations, in order to renew, simplify, and adapt them to the new requirements;

- the government will prepare new regulations aimed at overcoming the existing tripartite division between personnel costs, operation and investment;

297. Regarding Adjustment of the Operational Model:

- within six months, based on the areas contained in the White Paper and under the supervision of the Minister of Defence, the Chief of Defence Staff will prepare, for the approval of the Minister, a Strategic Defence Review, which will set out the Force structure, including future Reserves, the levels of skill, preparation and readiness of the Armed Forces, with an indication of the necessary human, material and financial needs. Resulting from the Strategic Defence Review, there will be developed a new planning cycle, consistent with that worked out in Europe and the Atlantic Alliance, for the construction, by technical-operational bodies, of a fifteen-year document of general planning;

- the government will then prepare the armed forces' long-term investment laws for the consideration of parliament.

298. Regarding Personnel Policy, within six months, on the basis of the issues contained in the White Paper and under the supervision of the Ministry of Defence, the Chief of Defence Staff and the General Secretary of the Defence, regarding respective salary entitlements, will provide new guidelines for new regulations on:

- *selection, promotion and duties of military and civilian leadership;*

- *adjustment and modification of the principle of so-called "standardised promotion processes";*

- *recruitment and active duty service requirement of civilian and military personnel;*

- *setting up of Reserve Force;*

- *management of so-called "transitory regime".*

299. Regarding science, industrial and technological innovation policies of the Defence:

- within six months, based on the issues contained in the White Paper and under the supervision of the Minister of Defence, the Secretary General of Defence/the Natio-



nal Armaments Director will prepare, for the approval of the Defence Minister and other Ministers concerned, an Industry and Technology (SIT) Strategy with which to implement a new strategy of wide-ranging cooperation between the Defence, industry and academia and research units. Under SIT there will be defined long-term goals, specific skills, modes of interaction and development of initiatives, both in order to ensure greater compliance of the “national system” to the needs of future Security and Defence, and to facilitate international competitiveness, scientific and technological development and employment prospects.

300. In parallel with the four areas of Defence transformation described above, and in compliance with the objectives of this White Paper, specific ministerial directives will outline government policies for the redefinition of tasks, the priorities for action and the general operation of the Ministry of Defence.



Afterword

The drafting of the White Paper for International Security and Defence was decided by the Supreme Defence Council during its 19 March 2014 meeting. The definition of the White Paper's Guidelines, to be completed by June 2014, was identified as the first step of the process, and entrusted to a group of experts that would work under the guidance of the Ministry of Defence, with the cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.

In order to broaden the reflection on defence themes the Ministry of Defence promoted a Meeting on National Security and Defence that took place on 5-6 June, attended by top Italian international studies experts. The Guidelines were submitted to the Supreme Defence Council on 18 June, and later published on the Defence internet site, thus opening a public debate on their content.

Over the months of September and October 2014 the Ministry of Defence organized various meetings with experts from the different sectors involved in the Defence System (universities and the scientific and technological community, companies, pacifist movements and NGOs). In the meantime consultations were held also with experts from major European countries and the U.S..

Subsequently, after various meetings with top officials of the Ministry of Defence, the experts from the Cabinet of the Minister started the actual drafting of the document, under the direct responsibility of the Defence Minister. Finally, the Paper was discussed with the Chief of Defence Staff and submitted to the Prime Minister.

At the end of the process, the White Book for International Security and Defence was illustrated to the Supreme Defence Council on 21 April 2015, and later submitted to the Parliament and published on the Defence internet site. The House of Representatives and Senate Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees held a discussion on its content on 14 May and 4 June 2015.



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