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Chief of the Defence Staff

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FOREWORD

1.   As this doctrine will explain, the violent nature of warfare is constant, even though the associated clash of wills can cause its character to change. Warfare is thus a fundamentally human activity, but it is also an increasingly complex venture that demands a highly professional approach. Arguably, most true professions are defined in part by their bodies of professional knowledge and this doctrine is part of ours. It is authoritative, but it also requires judgement in its application. Far from replacing individual initiative, doctrine guides commanders and subordinates how to think and not what to think. It is:

> *'a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books; it will light his way, ease his progress, train his judgement and help him to avoid pitfalls…[doctrine] is meant to educate the mind of the future commander… not to accompany him to the battlefield.'* [1]

In setting out the fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions, doctrine draws on the lessons of history, on original thinking and on experiences gained from training and operations.

2.   This level of military doctrine is, for the most part, enduring. This fourth edition simply refreshes the contemporary context and language, but it also places additional emphasis on using force or the threat of it for coercion and its subordinate principle of deterrence; an important and fundamental tool of the military craft. All officers and other interested members of the armed forces, regular and reserve, should read it. Initial training should introduce it and all stages of subsequent training and education should re-visit it to establish, and then extend, our understanding and competence. British Defence Doctrine is of particular relevance to officers of mid-seniority and above in command and staff appointments.

Chief of the Defence Staff

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[1] Clausewitz C Von, *On War*, edited and translated, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, N J: Princeton University Press, page 141, 1976.

PREFACE

1.   British Defence Doctrine (BDD) provides the broad philosophy and principles underpinning the employment of the Armed Forces. It is the basis from which all other subordinate national doctrine describing in more detail how operations are directed, mounted, commanded, executed, sustained and recovered is derived.

2.   This fourth edition of BDD reflects recent policy changes and operational experience, including the need for cross-government and inter-agency co-operation, and the demands of contemporary military strategy and campaigning. The former, re-titled an *Integrated Approach*, encourages collaborative working and co-operative enterprises with other government departments, wider agencies and other actors. The latter encourages military planners to consider situations as a whole and to seek, through a range of activities, the achievement of outcomes which are both militarily and politically favourable.

3.   BDD is divided into 2 parts.

   a.   **Part 1 – Defence Context**. Chapter 1 explains the relationship between national interests, Defence policy and military strategy, and – while highlighting the utility of force – emphasises the importance of addressing security issues through an integrated, rather than an exclusively military, approach. Chapter 2 expounds the nature of war, the principles and levels of warfare, and its evolving character.

   b.   **Part 2 – Military Doctrine**. Chapter 3 describes the likely employment of the Armed Forces in pursuit of Defence policy aims and objectives while Chapter 4 explains the components of fighting power and the criticality of the operating context to its effective application. Finally, Chapter 5 describes the British approach to the conduct of military operations.

5.   BDD is linked to a variety of unclassified policy documents such as the National Security Strategy and the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, as well as classified Defence Strategic Direction. This edition is also underpinned by recent developmental and conceptual publications such as *The Future Character of Conflict* and *The High Level Operational Conceptual Framework*.

BRITISH DEFENCE DOCTRINE

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Part 1

Security and Defence

CHAPTER 1 – SECURITY AND DEFENCE

'The Armed Forces are at the core of our nation's security. They make a vital and unique contribution. Above all, they give us the means to threaten or use force when other levers of power are unable to protect our vital interests.'

Strategic Defence and Security Review

101.   Security encompasses the safety of a state or organisation and its protection from both external and internal threats. Externally, threats may result from invasion, attack or blockade; internally, threats may include terrorism, subversion, civil disorder, criminality, insurgency and espionage. These internal threats may, in some cases, be externally sponsored, but are only likely to jeopardise the stability of a state when they receive widespread internal popular support and mount a challenge to established authority. In the last resort, the authority and stability, particularly of democratic states, depend on meeting the legitimate political, economic, societal, religious and environmental needs of individuals and groups. These aspects are usually expressed collectively as human security.

Human Security

102.   Human security is characterised by: freedom from persecution, want and fear; adequate provision of essential commodities such as water and food; broader environmental security; and the protection of cultural values. It is threatened by: ethnic and religious divisions; poverty, inequality, criminality and injustice; competition for natural resources; and corrupt and inept governance, all exacerbated by greater awareness of global opportunities. The absence of, or threat to, human security undermines the stability of a state or region; individuals tend to transfer loyalty to any group that appears or promises to meet their needs, including organised, sometimes trans-national criminal gangs, warlords, and insurgent groups. Once such groups receive popular backing, they become a much greater threat to state, regional or even international security. Those benefiting from insecurity may seek to perpetuate crises and to undermine any international response.

103.   The significance of human security is recognised in the UN's 'Responsibility to Protect' agenda, which focuses on preventative and developmental lines of activity (including pre-emptive action) rather than purely reactive military intervention.[1] Provision of human security demands an awareness of the particular needs of individuals as well as states. It requires thorough consideration of the constituent parts of a society, such as: the rule of law; education; commercial and economic; humanitarian and health; information; military; and diplomacy, administration and governance, all shaped by history and culture.

UK Security

104.   The security of the UK is rooted in perceptions of national sovereignty and interests and how these may be best protected and promoted. The most important duty of the Government is to maintain the freedom and integrity of the nation's territory and people. In addition, it will seek to secure a range of broader interests: political, economic and social. Commitments by the UK, its allies and partners to the strengthening of international peace and security, underpinned by Defence, enhance national security.

105.   The UK's security goals are shaped by a complex combination of geo-strategic factors, which include geo-spatial, resource, social, political, science and technology and military aspects. Some factors are of enduring significance, but none can be regarded in isolation and all may vary in importance over time. As a result, the ways in which the UK's security goals are achieved are kept constantly under review and modified in the light of events, emerging priorities and an informed view of the future. In-depth analysis of the future security environment and the identification of strategic trends are undertaken continuously by the MOD. These assessments offer a range of potential outcomes, subject to chance and contingency and the possibility of significant strategic shocks. They alert policy makers to future possibilities, potentially adverse circumstances and likely security implications.

106.   Although the UK's geographic position is physically more remote than other European countries from some direct threats, the UK is a prominent international player,

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[1] UN Paper, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*. Report of the Secretary General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2004.

with numerous interests overseas and a role in the maintenance of international stability and law. The Nation's stability, prosperity and well-being depend on international trade and investment more than most other developed economies. It is one of the world's largest outward investors and an important source of capital to the developing world. The UK is reliant on the supply of raw materials from overseas, on the secure transport of goods by sea and by air, and on a stable world that is conducive to trade. The UK's global perspective is also shaped by its responsibility for more than 10 million British citizens who live and work overseas and by its large immigrant population.

107.   For these reasons, to maximise its influence in the world and to contribute to the resolution of global problems, the UK supports a system of international collaboration, based on international law. It also seeks to extend its influence internationally by focusing on a broad agenda of shared problems and challenges that affect mutual international security and prosperity. The ability to project and employ armed force is one factor within this multilateral system.

Collective Security

108.   Alliances and partnerships are fundamental to the UK approach to defence and security, recognising that, internationally, the UK rarely can, or even should, act alone. Collective security is an essential pillar of the UK's overall security strategy, promoted through its close relationship with the US and membership of major international organisations such as the UN, NATO, EU and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Other multilateral organisations that help underpin a robust rules-based international system include the G8,[2] the G20[3] and the Commonwealth.

109.   This balance of allies, partners and bilateral relationships can, in the right circumstances, generate significant diplomatic, economic and military leverage. Other standing military alliances include formal arrangements such as the Five Power Defence Arrangements and the UK/France Defence Co-operation Treaty. The UK also supports and co-operates with other international bodies working to increase global and regional security, for example, the African Union and the Gulf Co-operation Council.

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[2] G8 is a forum for the governments of 8 major economies: France, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, UK and USA.
[3] G20 is a group of finance ministers and central bank governors from 20 major economies; 19 countries and the EU.

NATIONAL INTEREST

110.   The National Security Strategy describes the UK national interest as security, prosperity and freedom; interests that are interconnected and mutually supportive.[4] Security and prosperity form a virtuous circle, because without security and the ability of UK citizens to live their lives freely, the foundations of prosperity would be undermined. While freedom for the UK to engage across the world brings opportunities, it also makes the country vulnerable to overseas events, including distant conflict. This means that the UK may need to act abroad, sometimes forcefully, to maintain the British way of life.

111.   National interest is served by a secure and resilient UK and by shaping a stable world.[5] This means acting to mitigate risks to the UK or to our interests overseas, using all the instruments of national power. We must shape the global environment and sometimes tackle potential threats at source. It is not, however, the role of the Armed Forces to define national interest; that is a political function.

POLICY AND STRATEGY

112.   Politics concerns the capacity to influence the behaviour of others. The conduct of international politics involves the application of national power, within the international system, in support of national or collective interests, usually in conjunction with allies and partners. Suitable political outcomes and objectives, and the use of the military instrument in support of these, are articulated in policy and strategy respectively.

National Strategy

113.   National strategy directs the co-ordinated application of the instruments of national power, described below, in the pursuit of national policy aspirations. Accordingly, it lies within the political domain, principally with the Prime Minister and Cabinet, with advice from the National Security Council. The Government's political intentions, in relation to a specific campaign, may be articulated as a national strategic

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[4] *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy* – 2010.

[5] Covered in detail in Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 02, Operations in the UK: *The Defence Contribution to Resilience.*

aim or end-state, based upon the outcome required and accompanied by associated strategic objectives. For its successful formulation and implementation, national strategy requires continuous re-assessment as circumstances and imperatives change.

114.   National strategy also involves determining the UK contribution to multinational operations, the extent of burden-sharing and the harmonisation of UK and other nations' policy objectives to achieve common strategic goals. The process by which objectives are established and resources allocated across an alliance or coalition is likely to be more complex than for a national enterprise, with less clearly defined conditions and, perhaps, greater limitations. Negotiation and consensus tend to precede formal direction, ultimately delivered through a defined national chain of command, even though military preparations and some operations may have started.

Military Strategy

115.   Military strategy is not another term for Defence policy. Defence policy establishes the ends of military strategy and, in the normal course of events, shapes the structures and capabilities of the Armed Forces within resource and other constraints. Strategy is particularly concerned with the political consequences and advantages of the threat and use of force; it gives meaning and context to all operational and tactical actions. Its purpose is to balance the ways and means required to achieve stipulated ends, conditioned by the environment and prospective opponents.

116.   Military strategy links political aspiration, expressed in Government policy and military feasibility. It is derived from national strategy and determines how the Armed Forces should be configured and employed, in conjunction with the other instruments of national power, to achieve favourable outcomes. Military strategy seeks success, underpinned by freedom of action, at the expense of an opponent or in relation to a particular situation. It evolves and adapts as circumstances change. The formulation of UK military strategy is shaped by a particular approach to crisis management in which conflict prevention is paramount, but the ability to intervene effectively with force to re-establish peace and security is also important.

117.   Military strategy is concerned with the allocation, prioritisation and balancing of military resources between concurrent and competing operational demands. A

particular challenge for senior commanders is to maintain an appropriate focus on long-term outcomes, especially when confronted by short-term contingencies.

118. Military strategy balances the ways and means required to achieve policy ends, conditioned by the environment and prospective opponents; it provides the rationale for military operations. Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke, co-chairman of the Anglo-US Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee for most of World War II, described the art of military strategy as:

> *'to derive from the [policy] aim a series of military objectives to be achieved: to assess these objectives as to the military requirements they create, and the pre-conditions which the achievement of each is likely to necessitate: to measure available and potential resources against the requirements and to chart from this process a coherent pattern of priorities and a rational course of action.'*

Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke

APPLICATION OF NATIONAL POWER

119. National policy objectives are achieved through the coherent and effective application of all 3 instruments of national power: diplomatic; economic; and military underpinned by information.

Diplomatic Instrument

120. The diplomatic instrument of national power enables the achievement of the UK's, mainly foreign, policy objectives through diplomatic means. Successful diplomacy depends upon the power of persuasion, reinforced by the possibility of coercive power and enhanced by a combination of reputation and integrity, the skilful interplay of the other military and economic instruments, and effective communication. It is based on the nation state system but has evolved to incorporate other opinion formers, power-brokers and third parties.

121.   The diplomatic instrument is in use constantly, including during conflict when the need to influence allies and neutrals, as well as opponents, is as vital as the application of military force. *Defence diplomacy* aims to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust, and assist in the development of responsible, competent and democratically accountable forces. It may also facilitate other UK military activity, by setting the conditions for overseas basing, access or overflight and co-operation with allies and partners. Diplomacy is enhanced by Defence sections in embassies, the provision of operational military advice and assistance, the conduct of overseas training and other activities to achieve influence.

Economic Instrument

122.   Overseas investment, international flows of capital and trade, and development assistance provide scope for the exercise of economic influence. Economic power can provide a range of incentives, boycotts, tariffs and sanctions to influence decisions and affect behaviour. The potential influence of such measures can, however, be diminished by the effects of economic integration and the political sophistication of recipient countries. Their impact is also complicated by the combination of public and private influences, the operation of market forces and the complex relationships between global and national rates of growth and economic activity.

123.   In some circumstances, military force may be required to support the economic instrument, through embargo operations and naval co-operation and guidance for shipping, for example. Alternatively, the placing of military equipment contracts or the reform of indigenous military structures in a foreign country may foster other positive economic outcomes abroad.

Military Instrument

124.   Military power is the ultimate instrument and expression of national power, in circumstances ranging from coercion through to the deliberate application of force to neutralise a specific threat, including pre-emptive intervention. It is the principal means of defence.

125.   However, the military instrument is most effective when employed in conjunction with the other instruments to achieve national objectives; its use is 'not an independent phenomenon, but the continuation of policy by different means.'[6] The military instrument can, nonetheless, be decisive. For example, in difficult negotiations with intractable opponents, diplomacy may only be successful if backed up by the prospect of force. Indeed, the unique contribution of the military instrument is to threaten or, where necessary, to apply force to ensure the security of the nation, freedom from foreign oppression and the promotion of national interests.

126.   The main strategic objectives and character of any campaign involving the Armed Forces are, however, likely to be largely political in nature, precluding an exclusively military solution to most conflict situations. Military utility relies upon the ability and willingness to deploy forces rapidly and effectively, and sustain them, beyond national boundaries and potentially world-wide. States with armed forces that lack the means of effectively projecting their power on a global scale can exert only limited regional influence. Generally, only a select few states are able to overcome the logistical difficulties inherent in the expeditionary deployment and operational direction of a modern, technologically advanced military force. This ability is a crucial element of the UK's power in international relations.

127.   The application of force or the threat of its use, against elements seeking to erode security, helps to maintain the integrity and security of the international system and re-assures populations and communities that may otherwise be at risk. The extent to which the UK can exert such influence depends on a combination of appropriately manned, trained, and equipped forces. The UK maintains a balanced, credible military capability comprising both nuclear and conventional forces, at readiness levels consistent with the assessed threat and perceived intentions of potential opponents.

Information

128.   Information enables the application of all 3 instruments. It is fundamental to the Government's approach to crisis management, although the British position

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[6] Clausewitz K Von, letter, 22 December 1827.

is that information does not form a separate instrument *per se*.[7] The dissemination of information, in accordance with a cross-Government information strategy, enables diplomatic, economic and military influence to be exerted in an effective and comprehensive way. At the same time, intelligence and information received across Government shapes planning and execution at all levels. In times of crisis, the information strategy will critically include a strategic master narrative articulating why the UK is engaged and what its objectives are. The master narrative is key to the efficient management of information to engender unity of effort and understanding, and to create the opportunity to influence a range of audiences and activities in a coherent manner.

Employment of National Power

129. The geo-strategic balance of power between nations changes over time, owing to uneven rates of growth and variations in technology, demography and resources, which confer advantage on one society or another. States also determine their posture in relation to the way in which their elites and populations perceive their position and status relative to other states within the international community. These factors, as well as a nation's propensity for security and stability, determine the relative importance afforded to the employment of its instruments of power.

130. Individually, each instrument of power is limited in terms of its discrete influence and impact. In practice, the diplomatic, economic and military instruments interact or conflict according to circumstance; ideally they act together, unified behind a common purpose or goal. What constitutes an appropriate combination, in any given situation, depends upon a full understanding of the complexities of the strategic context and the national policy objectives sought. At the same time, an appropriate balance should be drawn between the use of hard and soft power.

131. Strategic communication seeks to synchronise all messages by words, images and actions across the 3 levers of power and the whole information environment, thereby ensuring coherence in the pursuit of policy objectives.

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[7] Some other nations, such as the US, treat information as a discrete instrument of power.

Hard and Soft Power

132.   Hard power is the threat or use of military coercion to influence the behaviour of states, groups or individuals, or to directly change the course of events. It seeks to induce people to adopt a particular course of action, which they would not otherwise choose themselves. The UK's warfighting capability, for example, is an important source of hard power and it also serves as a deterrent to potential opponents. Similar effects may be realised by alternative or complementary soft power.

133.   Soft power is the ability of a political body, such as a state or combination of states, to attract and hence to persuade other political bodies through cultural and ideological means or by encouraging emulation. The ways in which soft power may be effective include: culture (when it is attractive to others); values (which are seen to be sincere in their application); and foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate by others), any of which may be reinforced with financial and material incentives. Popular culture and media are regularly identified as sources of soft power, as are the influence of a dominant internationally used language, discreet sharing of privileged technical and commercial information, and a particular set of normative behaviours. In an information age, increased inter-connectivity enhances both the possibilities and the inclination for co-operation. Here, attention is the vital ground and the ability to share information and to be believed becomes an important source of influence. The deliberate use of strategic communication makes a vital contribution to national security through seeking to shape behaviours and attitudes to the benefit of the UK, and counteract the influence of dangerous individuals, groups and states.[8]

134.   Therefore, a state may obtain the outcomes it wants without the explicit threat or prospect of more costly exchange because others admire its values, aspire to its prosperity or openness and so follow its example. The success of a state in deploying soft power is derived from consistently pursuing a long term narrative which depicts UK as competent as a country, robustly inclusive and conducting actions that are defensibly legal. This builds trust and makes crisis response easier.[9]

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[8] *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review – 2010.*

[9] Clarke, M Professor, CDS' Strategic Communications Seminar 22 March 2011.

135.   History has shown that soft power is generally slower and more diffuse, although it is often cheaper and its effects may be more enduring. The 2 may need to be used together. Ultimately, however, the carrots and sticks of hard power, especially the threat or actual use of force, have a value and potency of their own, especially in times of chronic instability or conflict.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

136.   Clausewitz wrote that there was 'no purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue or of a purely military scheme to solve it'. Indeed, attempts to solve major security issues by military means alone seldom succeed in the long run (even if initially enjoying apparent success). Only by understanding fully the dynamics of any particular situation or crisis can the appropriate range of activities be planned and orchestrated. These may be conducted by a variety of participants, such as: other government departments: international organisations; non-governmental organisations; other governments; private and commercial interests; and indigenous and local populations, including populations in the surrounding region.

Integrated Approach[10]

137.   Although the military instrument often plays a decisive role, especially in providing or building a secure environment, crisis management is unlikely to succeed without active cross-Government and multi-agency co-operation. The National Security Council provides the means for such unified direction and co-ordination. Effective inter-agency relationships need more than simple harmonisation of process. Relationships work better where people understand the different cultures involved and show patience where required. It is vital to the integrated approach and every officer has a duty to inculcate a working atmosphere that promotes shared or mutually-reinforcing goals.

138.   In a national context, an integrated approach also requires clear national

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[10] From a UK perspective, integrated approach replaces the term comprehensive approach to better reflect the terminology used by other government departments. NATO uses the term *comprehensive approach*, which is broadly comparable to the UK's *integrated approach*; although, integration implies a greater level of collaboration which may not always be possible during coalition operations due to national or organisational sensitivities.

objectives, strong political leadership and collaboration across departments to ensure the coherent application of national power. A national approach almost invariably needs to be framed within a broader multinational response, involving many actors including allies, international organisations and non-governmental organisations. It is more difficult to achieve coherence in a multinational context than it is nationally, owing to competing national or organisational aims and agendas.

139.   In complex multi-agency situations, involving multiple civilian organisations and possibly a civilian political head of mission, military planning can only address one element of the desired outcome. While it is unlikely that absolute consistency will be achieved between civilian and military activities, commanders should nonetheless encourage, as far as practicable, an integrated response.

140.   An integrated approach is based on 4 guiding principles:

   a.   **Proactive Engagement**. Proactive engagement between all entities, if possible ahead of a crisis, enables more sophisticated collaborative approaches to complex situations. Significantly, this requires a shared approach to the collection and interpretation of crisis indicators to increase the time available for reaction.

   b.   **Shared Understanding**. A shared understanding is essential to optimise the effectiveness of different capabilities. Each contributes distinct professional, technical and cultural disciplines, together with discrete values and perceptions, which offer additional perspectives and resilience. Where possible, shared understanding should be engendered between crises through co-operative working practices, liaison and education.

   c.   **Outcome-Based Thinking**. All participants involved in crisis resolution should base their thinking on the outcomes required to deliver a favourable situation. Cohesion and coherence through good leadership will help all entities to work towards agreed outcome-based objectives that are consistent with the various national strategic aims.

d. **Collaborative Working**. Institutional familiarity, generated through personal contact over time, enhances the trust that underpins the most productive relationships. Integrated information management, infrastructure and connectivity enable confidence building and common working practices across communities of interest, including shared review and reporting.

141. Above all, an integrated approach requires those dealing with a crisis to be predisposed to collaboration and co-operation, and structured to develop a shared understanding of a situation and its dynamics. This approach should foster collective intent and output-focused objectives, leading more easily to the implementation of mutually-supporting activity. Where it is not possible to co-ordinate or control actions and their effects, commanders should deconflict both planning and execution wherever possible.

Multinational and Multi-Agency Operations

142. Although the UK may choose to act alone, in most cases the Armed Forces are likely to operate – either as lead or a contributing nation – within either the political and military framework provided by NATO, in conjunction with other established allies and partners, or as part of an *ad hoc* coalition. The aim of any multinational response may be expressed as a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) or as part of a ceasefire or treaty settlement. This aspect generally requires diplomatic engagement in the formulation of the overall multinational aim and the character of the multinational response, before any national commitment to participate can be made.

143. Just as individual components bring different attributes and limitations to joint operations, allies and coalition partners do the same on multinational campaigns.[11] A clear understanding of the ways in which other nations' armed forces operate and the ability to merge contributions from several nations into one cohesive force, are important factors in the conduct of multinational military operations. The ability of the Armed Forces to operate with other nations requires agility and interoperability, and may incur significant resource costs. Cohesion and harmonisation at all levels of engagement

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[11] Activities, operations and organisations in which elements of at least 2 [armed] services participate. Effective integration of individual force elements, to form a coherent joint force under unified command, is fundamental to successful joint operations.

are critical requirements of any effective alliance or coalition, requiring consideration, protection and promotion by commanders, in both political and military spheres.

144.   In these circumstances, military commanders need to recognise and promote the benefits of co-operation to achieve unity of purpose, while not necessarily enjoying either unity of command or ownership. An integrated approach may not be possible owing to national and organisational sensitivities, in which case commanders should seek as inclusive an approach as possible. Effective collaboration requires flexibility, openness and sensitivity towards those who have a legitimate role in the area. An integrated approach may confer or generate additional legal and moral responsibilities for communication and deconfliction, and generate additional force protection and sustainment requirements.

Crises and their Implications

145.   While recognising that crises have a life, character and momentum of their own and may not necessarily be susceptible to deliberate management or resolution, a key UK policy priority is to prevent conflict or other crises from developing. Crisis management is the process of preventing, containing or resolving crises before they develop into armed conflict, while simultaneously planning for possible escalation.

146.   A crisis, whether identified in advance or in retrospect, ordinarily marks the point at which events take a turn for the worse. The term crisis may also be used to indicate a period of extreme instability and crisis management the steps necessary to defuse a crisis, to prevent its escalation into conflict, and contain hostilities should they result, while addressing its underlying causes. This description does not imply that all crises are amenable to management. By their nature, crises are autonomous in their development and likely to mutate, not least in response to any military or other intervention and not always in the ways envisaged.

147.   Relationships between states, between groups and factions within a state, and between state and non-state actors across the geopolitical landscape can usefully be classified as those of co-operation, confrontation and conflict. While mutual co-operation provides the ideal basis for enduring stability, confrontation arises where

innate differences can no longer be contained or effectively reconciled.

148.   Conflict results from an inability either to prevent or contain escalation, such that one or other party resorts to violence. A significant deterioration in relations may either be triggered by a crisis or may itself constitute one. In reality, the boundaries between co-operation, confrontation and conflict are complex and constantly shifting. The Armed Forces operate across this spectrum, conducting military activities to promote mutual co-operation, to prevent confrontation from escalating into conflict (or at least contain it) and, ultimately, to resolve armed conflict when it arises.

Co-operation

149.   Co-operation may manifest itself in a variety of different ways, from active collaboration (allies or partners working together to achieve common goals) through to mere co-existence (conceivably with only low levels of tangible co-operation). Co-operation may arise naturally between entities which share largely congruent or at least compatible aims and objectives. Alternatively, it can be established and maintained more actively through a coercive approach. Given that domestic and international relations always involve some degree of discord, including economic competition, what characterises co-operation is usually stability rather than consensus. Disputes are effectively managed, controlled or dissipated, during periods of co-operation, rather than being brought to a head.

Confrontation

150.   When co-operation breaks down, either precipitated by a specific trigger or caused by a gradual, or sudden, deterioration in relations, a crisis (and some form of confrontation between entities) is likely to ensue. Confrontation is characterised by a clash of wills, whereby opponents, having failed to reconcile their differences, seek to exert their respective influence over each other.

151.   Often the root causes underlying these crises may only be addressed effectively at the strategic level, through diplomatic and economic means, backed in most cases by the implicit threat or imminence of military activity. Hence, crisis management, and the

re-establishment of enduring stability, will demand an integrated rather than simply a military response.

Conflict

152.　An integral part of crisis management is the prevention of armed conflict by containing confrontation and preventing its escalation or expansion. If, however, opposing parties' differences cannot be resolved satisfactorily by other means, the situation could deteriorate, sometimes very rapidly, into conflict and combat. Conflict is characterised by a resort to violence to gain advantage and achieve desired outcomes; the reasons why parties may pursue this course of action, and indeed may be conditioned to do so more or less readily, are discussed in Chapter 2.

UTILITY OF FORCE

Coercion

153.　Although nations cannot use force legally to proactively manage their international affairs, they can defend their legitimate interests by seeking to deter those who would act against them. Coercion, therefore, is inevitably at the heart of UK Defence Policy, even if it is rarely expressed using that particular word. Its purpose at all levels of warfare is to influence potential opponents not to adopt courses of action that threaten UK national interests. Coercion has the subordinate ideas of compelling or deterring behaviour. Of these 2, deterrence is a more attractive security and defence overt policy proposition, because it is more easily presented as legitimate from both domestic and international perspectives. It seeks to discourage someone from doing something by instilling fear of the consequences; opponents are led to believe that the potential costs of their actions will outweigh any possible benefits. The threat of using military force can instill fear and so influence an adversary's calculation of risk during confrontation. But we should not neglect reassurance, which is an important part of deterrence; incentives can shape behaviour before and after any resort to threats of force. Incentives work well in tandem with threats, which is why deterrence should consider all levers of power in combination. It is only likely to succeed, however, if the opponent perceives the combination of threats and incentives, together with the will to carry them through, as credible.

154.   The Armed Forces thus serve, at the most fundamental and effective level, to deter adverse actions against UK interests. Nuclear weapons provide the ultimate means of deterrence against the most destructive weapons wielded by states. But most contemporary deterrence is achieved through conventional means and a wider, more flexible range of postures and responses with the associated levels of military and political risk. As the most obvious manifestation of hard power, effective deterrence depends upon demonstrable contingent capability and overt preparedness. Potential opponents must conclude, from their own evaluation and perspective, that there can be no guaranteed benefit from pursuing a particular course of action, because of the possible or probable consequences. History indicates that apparent weakness or lack of resolve encourages opportunistic adventurism by aggressive or ambitious regimes, groups and individuals.

155.   Since deterrence works only in the eye of the beholder, a firm grasp of culture and of the prevailing political and strategic situations – as an opponent perceives it – is crucial. We must establish the weight of effort an opponent applies to the deterrence equation: how they consider the interests of their state or group; their perception of the balance of power; the importance of bargaining space; the alternatives that they may consider to the use of force; and their calculations of expected gain and loss. Sometimes, an opponent cannot afford to be deterred; their domestic audience may not tolerate any display of weakness and the subsequent fear of any loss of face can be sufficient in some cultures to precipitate action that seems irrational in ours. Behaviour can appear short of rational for many other reasons, for example ethnic interest groups pursuing parochial instead of national interests, imperfect communication and fatalistic martyrs. However, truly irrational behaviour is rare and should not be confused with a rational pursuit of objectives that seem senseless to others. Almost nothing will persuade most states to sacrifice their sovereignty or national survival, yet even very limited pressure may be enough to coerce an opponent to give up something less trivial. This means striking the right balance between those assets that can threaten opponents and those that we can use to understand them.

The Principles of Coercion

156.   There is a major difference between the stakes involved in nuclear and

conventional contests. However, much of the theory translates well between the 2, because in coercion perceptions dominate, based on how each player communicates its capability and motivation to act. There are 4 principles:

    a.   Credibility of threats;

    b.   Effective communication;

    c.   Control of escalation; and

    d.   Capability that underpins any threats.

157. **Credibility**. Whatever the capability involved, a threat will only carry weight to the extent that an opponent believes there is sufficient motivation to carry it out; this relates closely to the balance of interests at stake. Whether the perception is correct is irrelevant; what matters is whether the threat is believed. Even small chances that a coercer will follow through may be sufficient in some cases to carry considerable weight. Because credibility can be difficult to establish, but central to coercion, it demands considerable thought. Severe conventional threats can be credible, but also expensive to carry out and therefore less credible than milder ones; the calculations are invariably complicated and highly context-dependent.

158. **Communication**. Making threats will not deter if they are not understood by the target, but communicating such threats is challenging, particularly if the coercer conducts messaging through actions rather than words. Too often, we judge actions and words from our own perspective and assume that what we *mean* to convey is easily understood. But even direct communication is difficult when cultural and language barriers are involved. Threats of harm must be communicated as conditional on behaviour if they are to encourage compliance. It is also important to reassure by explaining what will happen if the opponent *does* accede to the demands. Additionally when communicating to one audience, we should be careful how messages may be interpreted by others; in any confrontation, there will be multiple perspectives, including of adversaries, allies and neutrals. Strategic communications must be phrased in terms that make most sense to those who should be persuaded by their content. However,

if played carefully, the ambiguity inherent in signalling through military action can be a useful source of deterrence in the heat of crisis, if it introduces uncertainty in an opponent's risk calculations.

159.   **Control**. Controlling how a confrontation escalates is vital if coercion is to remain effective during a crisis. However, coercion demands a new opponent course of action, which can be less clear in its intent and momentum, so difficult to control. Opponents may have modest or substantial capability to resist and could respond at different thresholds to the pressures applied. Psychological pressure is easy to induce, but difficult to relieve and it can have an almost irreversible effect. The threat of force – if perceived as offensive and imminent rather than defensive and contingent – may result in the opponent escalating the crisis. It could even result in pre-emptive action by an opponent fearful of not acting first if they perceive additional costs through delay (or gains through moving quickly). We can improve control by: careful framing of our demands; creating a sense of urgency and a choice of punishment; using incentives and a readiness to make changes as a crisis unfolds; changing our deployed posture; and introducing reassurance. However, it may be more difficult to control escalation using conventional forces if the stakes are too easily perceived as low in absolute terms, particularly if an opponent is prone to taking risks. The threat of force alone may also be ineffective against opponents whose calculations and motivations are not apparent or well-understood; such opponents may be irrational, irresponsible or otherwise implacable. An irrational opponent, for example, may be unable to appreciate the potential repercussions of his actions, while a fatalistic opponent or martyr may not care. Strategists must also account for potentially dysfunctional decision-making under conditions of extreme stress; humans can display character flaws that are concealed in normal times. Ultimately, some opponents may not be susceptible to deterrence and crisis resolution may depend upon compelling an opponent to bend to our will.

160.   **Capability**. Deterrence fails if an opponent believes that the coercer lacks the capability to carry out a threat, even if the political will to try is not in doubt. In escalation control, the most obvious signals using capability are unambiguous, but also the most expensive to make. This is the paradox of costly signalling; maintaining capable armed forces is expensive, but it provides a fundamental credibility. An established martial tradition and habit of operational success can also influence the efficacy of coercion.

Where used successfully in a limited intervention for example, force may enhance future deterrence, both locally and over a wider area. Conversely, where military action is unsuccessful, future coercion may be undermined. In crisis, the highest levels of political commitment can be signalled by deploying land forces at scale, because they can take and hold territory, work amongst the population, target what cannot be achieved from the air or sea alone and sustain forward presence. Land power signals a serious commitment, but it has big costs. The dynamics of land engagements can be difficult to control; deployments are not easily switched off without sending contradictory signals and engagement can be resource intensive. Escalation is easier to control using smaller scale deployments of sea and air power, which can more easily engage and disengage dynamically. Sea power can sustain a forward presence largely independent of overseas basing and offers a useful range of diplomatic and military signalling. It can also provide a base to project different forms of power, including Special Forces and land forces at smaller scales, directly from the sea or in combination with air mobility and air attack. Where land basing is available, air power offers flexible and strong signalling at reduced political risk, albeit at the costs of lower political commitment and limited effects.

Application of Force

161.   Should coercion fail, force may be required to counter an imminent threat. Force may be used in both an instrumental (or direct) way to diminish an opponent's capacity to act and in an expressive (or indirect) way to influence his behaviour, through shaping the understanding of his situation, his will to act and his ability to make timely and effective decisions.

162.   Threats may be countered by the disruption, defeat or destruction of an opponent. Disruption degrades specific parts of an opponent's capability, both moral and physical, thereby limiting his freedom of action. Defeat, a broader effect than simply disruption, diminishes his will, cohesion and overall capacity to the extent that he is no longer able to maintain a tangible threat or prevent friendly forces from achieving their objectives. Where it is considered necessary to completely eliminate a potential threat, destruction is the ultimate level of applied force. Complete destruction of adversary capabilities is a relatively rare contemporary strategy, but it has been used for counter-proliferation.

LEGITIMACY AND FORCE

163.   It is generally accepted that states should maintain an organised structure for authorising, applying and restraining the use of force. The objectives and conduct of the Armed Forces should, at all times, be subject to democratic parliamentary control, exercised on its behalf by the Executive. The application of force should be limited to that which is necessary to achieve the desired outcome, avoiding excessive damage which may subsequently increase the post-conflict reconstruction burden.

Campaign Authority

164.   Crisis management activities should be both purposeful and legal; they should also be, and be perceived to be, legitimate, acceptable and appropriate in a broader sense. A necessary condition for long-term success is campaign authority: *the authority established by international forces, agencies and organisations within a given situation in support of (or in place of) an accepted (or ineffective, even absent) indigenous government or organisation.*[12] It comprises 4 interdependent factors:

 a.   The perceived legitimacy of the mandate for action;

 b.   The perceived legitimacy of the manner in which those exercising that mandate conduct themselves both individually and collectively. Consent may vary from active resistance, through unwilling compliance, to freely given support.

 c.   The extent to which factions, local populations and others consent to, comply with or resist the authority of those executing the mandate.

 d.   The extent to which the expectations and aspirations of factions, local populations and others are managed or met by those executing the mandate.

165.   *Campaign authority* requires determination, control and demonstrable confidence on the part of those intervening in a crisis, to ensure that expectations are managed

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[12] JDP 01, *Campaigning*, 2nd Edition.

and that support is forthcoming from those groups and individuals that shape opinion, share power and grant consent. The creation and maintenance of campaign authority depends upon a continuous, rigorous assessment of all the effects and consequences of activities undertaken, whether intended or unintended. An effective information strategy, co-ordinated across government in support of the relevant national strategic aim and associated objectives, should be implemented to influence decisions, opinions and outcomes to complement and reinforce this authority.

Legitimacy

166. Legitimacy encompasses the legal, moral, political, diplomatic and ethical propriety of the conduct of military forces, once committed, and directly affects the utility of force. It confers a freedom (even an obligation) to act, as well as a constraint on military activity. As the justification for the use of force the manner in which it is applied, it has both collective and individual aspects, and is based as much upon subjective considerations, such as the values, beliefs and opinions of a variety of audiences (not least at home), as it is upon demonstrable, objective legality. Perceptions of legitimacy are, therefore, unlikely to be either universal or unequivocal and may be shaped, for example, by the media. Once military forces are committed, the perceived legitimacy of the manner in which they conduct themselves is an essential element of overall campaign authority. The maintenance of legitimacy depends on a variety of issues, such as consistently reputable behaviour, moral and ethical considerations, and the prospects of a successful outcome. Should one or all of these elements falter, or be perceived to falter, this may readily change opinions about the validity of military action. Moreover, it bolsters morale and promotes cohesion, both within a force and between coalition partners.

Legality

167. The Armed Forces always operate within a legal framework, defined by applicable national and international law.[13] Observance of the Rule of Law is fundamental to our warfighting ethos and to maintaining campaign authority. Legal aspects of UK Defence are detailed at Annex 1B.

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[13] JDP 3-46, *Legal Support to Joint Operations*, 2nd Edition.

Ethics and Morality

168.   Ethical and moral considerations underpin the law and the administration of justice, and are also reflected in operational decision-making and military conduct. Commanders are always accountable for their own actions and, where relevant, the actions of those under their command. They are, moreover, duty-bound to ensure that moral and ethical standards are imbued in their subordinates, through a robust corporate ethos, personal example, training and education, and ultimately experience gained on operations.

169.   Service personnel are often affected by, and respond to, the uniquely harsh realities and complexities of warfare. Frequently, they face opponents with different moral, ethical and legal boundaries and perspectives, while themselves operating under intense public scrutiny. The House of Commons Defence Select Committee, domestic law, humanitarian organisations, other NGOs and the media, continuously monitor UK Defence activities in relation to their moral and ethical impact.

170.   The tendency towards transparency and greater regulation of Defence activities reflects the expectations of contemporary society, which UK Defence serves and whose aspirations it reflects. Force used in another country needs to reflect the highest morals and ethics of the culture to which it is being applied, if campaign authority is to be maintained. This implies respect for local traditions, customs and practices and appropriate attention to the needs of minority or otherwise vulnerable groups, such as women, children and ethnic minorities. The challenge for Defence and those charged with regulating its activities is to ensure that society's expectations of greater legal and ethical regulation are balanced against the imperative of operational effectiveness.

Law and Political Direction

171.   Political decisions that affect the use of force include those that place limitations on objectives and targets, those that delineate the theatre of operations, those that restrict the types of weapons used and those aimed at avoiding escalation. In reality, there is unlikely to be an armed conflict that is entirely unlimited in its objectives, the

methods by which it is to be conducted, or the theatre in which it is to be fought; such political constraints and freedoms are a constant reality.

172.   The political direction, and operational and legal provisions, necessary to achieve a successful mission are laid down in Rules of Engagement (ROE).[14] ROE are designed to ensure that the activities of military personnel remain within the law and are consistent with Government policy; they are not a comprehensive statement of either the law or policy, although they take account of both. ROE define the constraints placed upon military activity, as well as the freedoms permitted and they reflect the operational context in which it is envisaged that force may be used. An enduring accompaniment to ROE is the inherent and inalienable legal right to act in self-defence, where such activity is both reasonable and necessary.

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[14] JSP 398, *United Kingdom National Rules of Engagement*.

ANNEX 1A – INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION

United Nations

1A1.　The UN is the mainstay of the international system and the influence gained by the UK's permanent membership of the UN Security Council (UNSC) is central to UK's Foreign Policy. The UNSC usually provides the mandate for multinational military operations although other regional organisations, such as the African Union could also sanction, for example, peace support operations on the African Continent. Such operations can play a vital role in conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation, and in alleviating humanitarian crises or the abuse of human rights. The UN works in close co-operation with other organisations, such as the NATO and the EU, which are better able to conduct integrated multinational operations.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1A2.　NATO is the cornerstone of transatlantic defence and security and has been central to the stability of Europe since 1949. Its core role remains the commitment to safeguard the freedom and security of its members by political and military means. To this end, the Alliance has a global role in crisis management and stabilisation, and can respond to threats wherever they occur. Such intervention may include military assistance to disaster relief operations.

1A3.　Since the end of the Cold War, NATO members have committed to transform the Alliance to meet contemporary and emerging security challenges. They have agreed that NATO should field forces that can deploy rapidly, wherever they are needed, to deal with these threats. This has led to the creation of a flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable NATO Response Force comprising maritime, land and air elements. Members have also agreed to improve individual contributions to NATO in key areas, such as strategic air and sea-lift. As a founder member of the Alliance, the UK plays a full part in NATO with a range of permanent commitments and the ability to assign further capability in times of crisis. The UK also supports NATO standardisation of doctrine, technology and logistics, to promote interoperability between member nations.

European Union

1A4.   The UK is a committed and active member of the EU. Within its borders, the EU is involved in a range of economic, social, environmental and other activities. It also has a broad external agenda, which encompasses co-operation on issues such as international crime, terrorism, economic development and trade. The EU is a leading political player on the world stage through its *Common Foreign and Security Policy* and plays an important complementary role to NATO in enhancing security and stability.

1A5.   The EU has agreed on a *European Security and Defence Policy* in support of its *Common Foreign and Security Policy*, to ensure that it has the tools to undertake a more comprehensive role in both military and civilian international crisis management. The *Common Security and Defence Policy* supplements other EU external instruments, such as aid and trade measures, and offers the international community a further option when considering how to respond to global crises. The *EU Battlegroup* initiative, for example, has evolved to provide capable forces held at high readiness that can be called on by the UN and EU. Members of the EU do not, however, currently share a NATO-style commitment to collective action or defence. The commitment of national forces to an EU operation remains a sovereign decision for each contributing nation. The EU's ambition in terms of military activity is summarised in the Petersburg Tasks, described in Article 17 of the *Treaty on European Union* (namely humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace enforcement).

Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

1A6.   The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe has 55 member states, of equal status, covering the whole of Europe and Central Asia, as well as the USA and Canada. The organisation addresses security across the region in 3 dimensions: political-military, economic/environmental, and human (including the promotion of human rights and democratic institutions). With the publication of the *Vienna Document*, Organisation for Security and Co-operation members committed themselves to an extensive set of *confidence and security building measures* including: an annual exchange of military information; mechanisms for consultation and co-operation regarding unusual military

activity or other hazardous incidents (with a view to crisis management); military contacts and co-operation; prior notification and observation of military activities above agreed thresholds; verification and inspection mechanisms; and the establishment of a network of direct electronic communications.

ANNEX 1B – UK DEFENCE AND THE LAW

Contingent Operations Overseas

1B1.   Non-intervention in another state's affairs is a principle of customary international law. A breach of this principle may amount to an act of aggression and the UN Charter requires that all member states refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other state. But this does not impair the inherent right of a state to take action in self defence in response to an armed attack. Further, it may also be lawful to use offensive force in another state's territory (without its consent) in certain circumstances – under a Chapter VII UN Security Council Resolution, or to prevent an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe:

   a.   **National (or State) Self Defence**. States have an inherent right of individual or collective self defence if an armed attack occurs, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to restore international peace and security. Self defence includes the protection of a state's own territorial integrity and may include the rescue of nationals from another state which is unable or unwilling to provide protection.

   b.   **UN Security Council Authorisation**. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council may determine that there is a threat to peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. It may then recommend measures to maintain or restore international peace and security, such as economic sanctions. If these would be inadequate, it may authorise the use of all necessary measures to restore stability and security which may thereby authorise the use of force. Security Council authorisations can be granted to regional organisations, such as NATO, as well as to individual member states.

   c.   **Overwhelming Humanitarian Catastrophe**. A limited use of force may be justifiable without the UN Security Council's express authorisation where that is the only means to avert an immediate and overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe. Such cases are likely to be exceptional and depend on objective

assessment of the factual circumstances at the time and on the terms of any relevant decisions of the Security Council bearing on the situation in question.

Military Operations in the UK

1B2.   National legislation permits the British Armed Forces to be deployed to support the civil authorities. Such support by MOD and UK Forces – *Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA)* – should always be at the request of those authorities and requires the authorisation of the Defence Council and Defence Ministers. Support to the civil authorities does not usually require additional powers under legislation dealing with emergencies. Therefore, the conduct of Service personnel is routinely governed by domestic law permitting the use of force in self defence, to prevent crime or enable the arrest of others in certain circumstances.

Conduct of Military Operations

1B3.   A combination of domestic and international law considerations provides the legal basis for the regulation of the manner in which military operations overseas are conducted.

1B4.   Because of the Armed Forces Act 2006, service personnel and their commanders are subject to the criminal law of England and Wales for any criminal conduct committed by them when deployed overseas as well as being liable for the commission of Service disciplinary offences. Service personnel are subject to international humanitarian law, encompassing war crimes and other grave breaches of international humanitarian law which have been brought down into UK domestic law by Act of Parliament. International humanitarian law regulates the planning and conduct of military operations in international armed conflicts, hostilities in which states act under UN Security Council authority and some internal armed conflicts. Different rules apply to each situation. Military activities and the conduct of Service personnel overseas may also be subject to the domestic law of the host nation concerning, for example, transport legislation and other administrative issues. Such matters may be addressed by a Memorandum of Understanding between the host nation and the UK. On multinational operations,

coalition partners may not all be subject to the same legal framework; their applicable domestic laws, for example, are likely to be different.

1B5.   Compliance with the underpinning principles of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) – distinction, proportionality, military necessity and humanity – in offensive military operations ensures that due account is taken of the wider ethical considerations from which the law is derived.[1]

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[1] JSP 383 *The Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict.*

CHAPTER 2 – WAR AND WARFARE

WHY WARS HAPPEN

> *'It is clear that war is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means.'*

Clausewitz

201.   War is an instrument of policy, normally stimulated by fear, self-interest or ideology and is characterised by organised violence, used as a means to assert the will of a state, individual or group. The potential and conditions for war, at all levels and intensities of armed conflict, exist at all times. They occur within and between all societies and polities and simply reflect the existence of incompatible goals, ambitions or perceptions among individuals, groups or states. The global security environment is shaped by a multitude of political, economic, religious, societal and environmental imbalances and discontinuities, whose interactions can precipitate the threat or actual use of violence. Peace and war cannot always be distinguished absolutely. The resolution of complex contemporary crises may involve a hybrid of conventional warfighting and irregular activity combined, as well as concurrent stabilisation activity, all in the same theatre. Boundaries between them may be blurred; they may change suddenly and very obviously, or more gradually, even imperceptibly, over time.

202.   An understanding of the reasons why states or groups resort to the use of force and the contexts which in the past have caused conflict is essential to the intelligent planning and successful conduct of military operations. Historically, states, individuals and communities have been remarkably consistent:

    a.   **Self Interest**. Gaining or preserving a position of relative power, preferential control of resources/territory and the provision of human security (for example, in the face of a large scale humanitarian crisis on or across national borders) are the most common causes for resorting to war.

    b.   **Fear or Survival**. Even where success is not guaranteed, a state or group may initiate armed conflict because of its fear or perception of an opponent's

intentions or capabilities. It may also seek to avoid a more disadvantageous or disastrous outcome that could result from inaction. Where 2 or more parties perceive or fear a potential threat in this way, each is likely to have a reason to act pre-emptively.

    c.   **Values and Ideology**. Absolute belief in the rightness and justice of a cause, ideology or value system, whether religious or secular, may drive a state or party to war. When an ideology, sense of honour or reputational issue is perceived to be at stake, even the prospect of military defeat or societal collapse may not deter or dissuade this extreme course of action. In these cases, only total defeat is likely to be sufficient to prevent continued conflict and forestall the possibilities of large scale irregular opposition.

203.   Legally binding obligations and responsibilities between states, underpinned by international agreements and institutions, are designed to prevent or mitigate conflict. However, 2 particular factors can increase the likelihood or intensity of armed conflict:

    a.   **Culture**. A group or regime may be culturally inclined to threaten or employ violence. This inclination may be reinforced by political, societal or religious imperatives; moreover, it may be a long term and deep-rooted condition, not readily susceptible to change.

    b.   **Political Will**. A propensity for violence depends also upon the will of the political leadership, its inter-relationship with, and control over, its military, and its ability to sustain national support for conflict. However, conflicts based more upon political resolve than upon cultural pre-disposition may be more swiftly amenable to negotiated settlement, or the limited use of force.

WAR

204.   War is a violent relationship between 2 or more states or groups; warfare is the conduct of war. Clausewitz was of the opinion that war had 2 components: *objective* (its nature), which remains constant under all circumstances; and *subjective* (its character), the variable 'means by which war has to be fought' which alter according to context. The nature of war, however, has certain enduring features:

a.   The decision to wage war is an act or expression of policy. The measure of its success is the extent to which its political outcomes are deemed to have been favourable.

b.   War is always undertaken to maintain a position of advantage, establish a more advantageous (or less disadvantageous) situation, or otherwise change the attitudes or behaviour of another party; on occasion, however, it may be undertaken, or perpetuated, for its own sake.

c.   Belligerents may employ all the military and non-military ways and means available to them, to seek success.

d.   Warfare reflects, amongst other things, the culture, society and political aspirations of belligerents and other interested parties.

e.   Warfare is an inherently unpredictable, often chaotic, human activity; success will often depend upon asserting some form of order or dominance on a situation and overcoming the inherent frictions and consequences of military activity.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

205.   Principles of war guide commanders and their staffs in the planning and conduct of warfare. They are enduring, but not immutable, absolute or prescriptive, and provide an appropriate foundation for all military activity. The relative importance of each may vary according to context; their application requires judgement, common sense and intelligent interpretation. Commanders also need to take into account the legitimacy of their actions, based on the legal, moral, political, diplomatic and ethical propriety of the conduct of military forces, once committed.

Selection and Maintenance of the Aim

A single, unambiguous aim is the keystone of successful military operations. Selection and maintenance of the aim is regarded as the master principle of war.

206.   The aim provides a focus for co-ordinated effort and a reference point against which to gauge progress. Its maintenance prevents unnecessary or nugatory activity, and the unwarranted expansion of an operation. It is fundamentally important that this single aim pervades subordinate operations, all of which should contribute coherently to achieving this end-state, and that resources are allocated accordingly. Therefore, plans should be continually checked against the related objectives of the campaign to ensure that they remain valid. In practice, uncertainty, political reality and insufficient initial understanding of a situation frequently conspire against achieving an unambiguous aim from the outset. This ambiguity is exacerbated in multinational operations by differing national ambitions and perspectives. Military operations may, therefore, begin on the basis of an aim which, at the time, seems sensible but may need to be reconsidered as circumstances change. In this regard, senior commanders should provide clear military advice to political leaders regarding the feasibility of political aspirations in relation to the military means.

Maintenance of Morale

Morale is a positive state of mind derived from inspired political and military leadership, a shared sense of purpose and values, well-being, perceptions of worth and group cohesion.

207.   No doctrine, plan or formula for conducting warfare is likely to succeed without the maintenance of morale which, except in the most extreme circumstances, depends upon affording personnel the best chances of success or survival. High morale is characterised by steadfastness, courage, confidence and sustained hope. It is especially manifested as staying power and resolve, the will to win and prevail in spite of provocation and adversity. It is sustained and progressively increased by success on operations and is most powerful when it suffuses the whole chain of command.

Offensive Action

Offensive action is the practical way in which a commander seeks to gain advantage, sustain momentum and seize the initiative.

208.   Offensive action delivers the benefits inferred by action rather than reaction, and the freedom to force a decision. At its heart is the notion of an offensive spirit, which imbues forces with confidence, encourages enterprise and a determination not to cede the initiative, as well as promoting a culture of success and achievement. As a state of mind and in practical terms, offensive action is often decisive, and its broader application should not preclude defensive action when circumstances and prudence demand. Offensive action implies a vigorous, incisive approach to defeat opponents, to exploit opportunities and to apply constant pressure against other forms of resistance and sources of instability.

Security

Security is the provision and maintenance of an operating environment that affords the necessary freedom of action, when and where required, to achieve objectives.

209.   Security always entails balancing the likelihood of loss against the achievement of objectives. It demands prudent risk management and the protection of high value assets, including personnel, materiel, information and infrastructure, as well as those military activities vital to operational success. Security does not, however, imply undue caution or avoidance of all risks, for bold action is essential to success. Neither does it demand the over-commitment of resources to guard against every threat or possibility, thereby diminishing relative fighting power.

Surprise

Surprise is the consequence of shock and confusion induced by the deliberate or incidental introduction of the unexpected.

210.   It involves, to varying degrees, secrecy, concealment, deception, originality, audacity and tempo, and confuses, paralyses or disrupts effective decision-making and undermines an opponent's cohesion and morale. Surprise is a potent psychological feature of warfare and may be accomplished by manoeuvre, the introduction of novel technologies or by any activity that is unfamiliar or unforeseen. It may also be attributable to friction or chance. As such, surprising an opponent is a significant way of seizing the initiative and, while it cannot be effective on its own, it may be an important pre-condition for success. Surprise is by nature transient (shock and confusion recede over time), so its effects should be exploited rapidly and aggressively. Commanders should anticipate the effects of being surprised themselves, make appropriate contingency plans to safeguard their freedom of action, and exploit opportunities that may arise, for example, out of unexpected circumstances or success.

Concentration of Force

Concentration of force involves the decisive, synchronised application of superior fighting power (physical, intellectual and moral) to realise intended effects, when and where required.

211.   Concentration does not necessarily require the physical massing of forces, but their agile disposition such that they can engage and prevail through the aggregation and co-ordination of appropriate elements of fighting power at critical points and times. Similar outcomes may, for example, be achieved by superior command and control, deception, a stronger moral component, superior technology or firepower. Ultimately, success depends upon subtle and constant changes of emphasis in time and space to realise effects, accepting that concentration at the point of main effort may necessitate economy elsewhere.

Economy of Effort

Economy of effort is the judicious exploitation of manpower, materiel and time in relation to the achievement of objectives.

212.   Central to the conservation of fighting power, a commander should consider

carefully the requirements and relative priority between individual engagements, actions activities, the sustainability demands of the campaign as a whole and longer-term force balance issues. Economy of effort is best summarised as the right tool, in the right place, at the right time, leading to the right result.

Flexibility

Flexibility is the ability to change readily to meet new circumstances; it comprises agility, responsiveness, resilience, acuity and adaptability.

213.   Flexibility has both mental and physical dimensions. To lead to success, it needs to be associated with an organisation and culture that encourages people to think creatively, and to be resourceful and imaginative, especially in the face of adversity or the unexpected. Agility is the physical and structural ability that allows forces to adjust rapidly and decisively, especially when operating in complex situations or in the face of new or unforeseen circumstances. Responsiveness is a measure of not only speed of action and reaction, but also how quickly a commander seizes (or regains) the initiative. Resilience is the degree to which people and their equipment remain effective under arduous conditions or in the face of hostile action. Acuity is sharpness of thought, characterised by intellectual and analytical rigour, enabling intuitive understanding of complex and changing circumstances. Adaptability embraces the need to learn quickly, to adjust to changes in a dynamic situation, and to amend plans that in the light of experience seem unlikely to lead to a suitable outcome.

Co-operation

Co-operation entails the incorporation of teamwork and a sharing of dangers, burdens, risks and opportunities in every aspect of warfare.

214.   Co-operation is based on team spirit and training and relies on 3 inter-related elements: mutual trust and goodwill; a common aim (or at least unity of purpose); and a clear division of responsibilities, including understanding of, and compensation for, the capabilities and limitations of others. Within alliances or coalitions, potentially disparate goals and interests need to be harmonised, and political and military cohesion promoted

and protected, to ensure solidarity in the face of difficulties or dangers, and preserve overall unity of effort.

Sustainability

To sustain a force is to generate the means by which its fighting power and freedom of action are maintained.

215.   The ability to sustain a force, during every stage of a military campaign from force generation, through deployment and operations in theatre, to redeployment and recuperation afterwards, is a critical enabler of fighting power. Sustainability involves the sustenance of personnel, the maintenance and repair of vehicles, equipment and materiel (including associated networks), the provision of combat supplies and service support, and the evacuation, treatment and replacement of casualties. A rigorous assessment of logistic realities is essential to operational planning; indeed, it may be the deciding factor in assessing the feasibility of a particular campaign.

LEVELS OF WARFARE

There are 3 recognised levels of warfare that assist planning and provide a general framework for the command and control of operations.

Strategic

216.   The strategic level of warfare is the level at which national resources are allocated to achieve the Government's policy goals (set against a backdrop of both national and international imperatives). More often than not, the achievement of these goals requires a combination of military force, diplomacy and economic measures (the instruments of national power), as well as collaboration with other nations' armed forces, and other international organisations and agencies. Strategic success requires foresight, patience, endurance, constancy and tenacity.

217.   Military strategy (described in Chapter 1) determines the military contribution, as part of an *integrated approach*, to the achievement of national policy goals; it is an integral, not a separate, aspect of strategic level planning.

Operational

218.   The operational level of warfare is the level at which campaigns are planned, conducted and sustained, to accomplish strategic objectives and synchronise action, within theatres or areas of operation. It provides the 2-way bridge between the strategic and the tactical levels. In a national context, this level is the responsibility of the Joint Commander, acting in conjunction with the theatre-level Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC), if deployed. In a multinational setting, a UK National Contingent Commander (NCC) integrates the national contribution into the overall force, advises and influences the deployed Multinational Force Commander, applies national policies and caveats, and has the ultimate in-theatre responsibility for national activities.

Tactical

219.   The tactical level of warfare is the level at which formations, units and individuals ultimately confront an opponent or situation within the Joint Operations Area (JOA), either nationally or in conjunction with allies, other agencies and the indigenous population. Tactics is the art of employing maritime, land, and air assets, together with Special Forces and both integrated and wider area enablers, to conduct a range of activities that together contribute to success on operations. It is the level at which engagements are fought and direct contact is made with an enemy or opponent. In a joint operation, the tactical level normally involves component commanders operating directly to a JTFC, although some business and planning will overlap with the operational level. Under their direction, force elements execute activities to create the conditions for success and contribute to the realisation of the required effects in a joint, multinational and multi-agency context.

Significance of the Levels of Warfare

220.   The levels of warfare provide a framework within which to rationalise and categorise military activity. This is also useful in clarifying the inter-relationships between the various levels, although these should not be seen as strictly hierarchical. The framework of strategic, operational and tactical levels recognises the inevitable compression and blurring between them, and reflects their dynamic inter-relationship and non-linear interaction. For example, tactical events can have strategic repercussions,

just as strategic decisions will inevitably have tactical implications. The relationships are illustrated at Figure 2.1.


Figure 2.1 – Relationships between the Levels of Warfare

221.   Conflict is likely to be characterised by the pervasive, sometimes intrusive, presence of information resources, enabled by rapidly advancing technology and offering, amongst other features, increasingly accurate and timely situational awareness. However, modern communications and media technologies tend to compress levels of warfare, especially at the operational level, such that reported events and activities, true and false, can have immediate perceptual and political impact at the strategic level. At the same time, this inter-connected and information-rich environment invites intervention by strategic level political and military leaders to influence subordinate tactical level activity.

222.   While these levels exist formally within the military, the same distinctions are not necessarily made across the diplomatic and economic spheres. There are, however, broadly similar levels of decision-making and planning, if only for resource and manpower allocation. It is vital that interaction and co-operation between those planning and co-ordinating diplomatic, military and economic activities take place at every level, to ensure a unified, integrated approach to crisis resolution.

CHARACTER OF WARFARE

223.   The terms war and warfare are unsatisfactory to describe all the many different facets of armed conflict. War is bound by international law that regulates the circumstances in which states may resort to the use of armed force (*jus ad bellum* in accordance with the UN Charter) and regulates the way in which armed force is actually used (*jus in bello* in accordance with the Law of Armed Conflict). Neither peace nor war, however, are absolute, nor are they necessarily opposites of each other (being but different means of achieving the same end – that of policy). Instead, they represent a continuum or notional spectrum. No conflict is likely to be played out entirely at a single point; its prevalence, scale and intensity may vary from war (*in extremis* a war of national survival), through inter-and intra-state conflict characterised by instability and chaos, to activities to promote stability and, ultimately, lasting peace in one form or another. Moreover, it may be unhelpful to describe efforts to counter irregular activity,[1] for example, as war, although such circumstances may include armed conflict between state and non-state actors.

224.   Military operations are characterised by both the activities undertaken and the circumstances or context within which they take place. A combination of the operating environment, in the widest sense, and the various actors or participants involved (including the key constituents and make-up of the relevant nations or societies concerned) together provides the setting for any military activity. Accordingly, a full appreciation of the causes, as well as the symptoms, of any conflict relies upon a thorough understanding of its context.

Military Operations in Context

225.   Notwithstanding the changing pattern of geo-strategic engagement between states, multinational entities and socio-economic systems, the threat of conventional, regular warfare is always present. In addition, contemporary and more immediate physical threats to the peace and security of the UK include the potential use of chemical,

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[1] Irregular activity is the use or threat of force by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority.

biological, radiological and nuclear and unconventional weapons, as well as a range of irregular risks associated with organised crime, terrorism and the possibility of civil violence. These threats are complex, often inter-linked, rapidly evolving in both character and activity levels, and may require military resources to confront some of their more extreme manifestations. In general, experience indicates that states need to retain an affordable range of capabilities that can sustain credible deterrence, reinforce diplomatic and economic instruments and, ultimately, provide effective fighting power.

226.   Instability and the failure or inadequacy of effective governance provide catalysts for unlawful or disruptive activity, mostly within states, and increasingly on a trans-national scale, by groups or individuals that employ unconventional, illicit or irregular methods of operation. Perpetrators may draw on a variety of different, but often inter-related motivations, although all seek to exploit ambiguities and weaknesses in international or state structures in challenging existing authority through the threat or use of illicit activity and violence. A wide diversity of terrorists, criminals, insurgents, and other disruptive elements are likely to employ irregular means to pursue ideological, political and personal advantage. These opponents may be difficult to identify, target, deter or indeed induce to the negotiating table. Their ambitions and cultural assumptions may be unconstrained by either international law or accepted norms of morality, while their methods of operation are likely to be unconventional and have their greatest impact on civilian populations. In the modern world, they often have access to sophisticated networks and technologies and, in particular, exploit the vulnerabilities of open and pluralist societies.

227.   Similarly, conducting operations where 'the people in the streets and houses and fields – all the people anywhere – are the battlefield'[2] inhibits identification and engagement of opponents, especially in urban areas, and heightens the risk of collateral damage. Women, children, refugees, internally displaced people and other vulnerable groups may be especially affected by armed conflict. An opponent may even target such groups in order to undermine both the likelihood of reconciliation, with its impact upon a durable peace, and military success.

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[2] General Sir Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force – The Art of War in the Modern World*, Penguin, page 3, 2005.

228.   While physical destruction remains a necessary aspect of military activity, emphasis also needs to be placed on shaping perceptions through the co-ordinated, focused application of both physical and psychological means. In order that a commander can apply these precisely, he needs to have an intuitive feel for both the human dynamics at play and the other agencies that could aid operational planning and activity. This could involve, for example, the exploitation of local leaders and power brokers, and a critical appreciation of the cultural characteristics and motivations of both allies and opponents.

Operating Environment

229.   The operating environment, the surroundings or conditions within which military activity takes place, has a variety of dimensions: maritime, land, air, space, information (including cyberspace), electro-magnetic and time. Activity within the physical domain realises primarily physical effects (on an opponent's capability) and, alongside intangible activity in the virtual domain (such as the manipulation and transfer of information), psychological effects in the cognitive domain. Military action may, however, have a number of potentially undesirable as well as unintended consequences or risks, the threats (or opportunities) associated with which should be mitigated (or exploited) through contingency planning, or through the alternative use of non-military action.

230.   Activity in any domain is most successful when conducted jointly, with participation by each of the 3 Services determined by circumstances and by the outcomes required in individual situations. Although the operating environment may be imprecisely defined, and force density may be low, a military force should seek to establish and maintain superiority, and constrain the influence and freedom of action of an opponent, across the operating space. Irregular opponents, and regular opponents operating in unconventional ways, are likely to be particularly agile in operating throughout and between the various dimensions and environments. Commanders of more conventional forces should ensure that interoperability and integration, between components for example, prevents the exploitation of inherently vulnerable seams and boundaries between dimensions of the operating space.

231.   Operations often take place in situations of considerable complexity and in the presence of capable and intrusive media, supported by digital, real-time information

technology and personal communications. Any information strategy should be planned, both in support of operational objectives and to counter misinformation, to prevent adversaries from exploiting vulnerabilities in the indigenous population, or undermining the cohesion of nations, alliances and coalitions. A commander should employ appropriate influence and counter-information techniques to offset the impact of rumour, commentary and malicious manipulation made possible by informal and formal communities of interest at local and global levels, immediate access to universal net resources and near real-time personalised communication technologies.

Part 2

'Doctrine - the soul of warfare'

Julian S Corbett 1913

CHAPTER 3 – EMPLOYMENT OF UK ARMED FORCES

> *'In an age of uncertainty, we need to be able to act quickly and effectively to address new and evolving threats to our security.'*

301.   The National Security Strategy notes that the UK's response to global instability and conflict is to apply all of the instruments of national power to shape the global environment and tackle potential risks at source.[1] It recognises that this may require overseas military operations and that security is often a prerequisite for political and economic progress. Therefore, the UK maintains the ability to respond swiftly and decisively across a full range of intervention scenarios, not just to prevent or mediate violent conflicts, but also to stabilise situations in, or emerging from, violent conflicts and to support recovery and reconstruction. Annex 3A outlines when the Armed Forces may be used.

Understanding the Operational Context

302.   Effective military engagement depends critically on an accurate, detailed and informed analysis and interpretation of the situation. As illustrated in Figure 3.1, the precise operational context of a largely conventional campaign is defined by the relationships between internal and external actors, as well as by the prevailing cultural nuances and characteristics.


Figure 3.1 – Relationship between Actors in a Potential Crisis

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[1] *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review* – 2010.

303.   An understanding of these relationships and the way in which they change over time and in response to circumstances, indicates the opportunities and limitations of military intervention, together with the range of activities that are likely to be required. It is important that all activity is consistent with the achievement of a favourable outcome. Actions or activity for its own sake is more likely to prove counter-productive.

304.   The importance of the range and interplay of participants varies from one situation to another and from one day to the next, as the crisis proceeds. This can lead to a different correlation of forces, as indicated in Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2 – Relationship between Actors in an Evolving Crisis

Conflict Prevention

305.   Non-combat defence engagement is the military contribution to soft power. It may reduce or negate the need for military intervention to deal with emerging crises, develop an understanding of emerging threats or provide broader humanitarian assistance. Defence exports, key leader engagement, capacity building through the establishment of training teams, the delivery of exercise programmes and arms control engagement can all promote regional stability and reduce the risk of conflict. However, conflict prevention is not confined to sequential activities pre-conflict. While early defence engagement can reduce the likelihood of prolonged instability and prevent

the need for more expansive and expensive military intervention, conflict prevention activities should also form part of any enduring campaign to reduce the possibility of escalation and to lay the foundations for a sustainable peace post-conflict.

Conflict Intervention

306.   Military intervention, or the threat of it, is hard power. Initially it may be to achieve peace enforcement or prevent a crisis from escalating and spreading.[2] Subsequently, emerging threats can be neutralised through focused intervention, using high readiness forces, or by deliberate intervention with sufficient combat power to force a decision. Similarly, during peacekeeping the situation may deteriorate unexpectedly into a situation that requires combat operations to separate or disarm belligerents, or rival militias.[3] Intervention may involve other government departments, non-governmental organisations or other international organisations, whose capability to provide disaster relief, for example, may have been hindered by insecurity and violence. The Armed Forces' capacity to operate effectively, underwritten by combat power and readiness to act, can have a critical role in countering those elements that seek to profit from ongoing instability.

307.   In some circumstances, the Armed Forces may be called upon to discharge the responsibilities of an occupying power. Except in those circumstances when a community is dependent on an intervention force for survival, there is unlikely to be a consensus for intervention between the various sections of society. In these cases, opposition, including the use of armed force, intimidation and coercion, can be expected from disaffected, displaced or disempowered elements, mostly in the form of irregular activity by criminals, insurgents, opportunists and terrorists. It may be necessary,

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[2] The UN describes peace enforcement as follows: *peace enforcement involves the application, with the authorisation of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Such actions are authorised to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The Security Council may utilize, where appropriate, regional organisations and agencies for enforcement action under its authority.*

[3] The UN describes peacekeeping as: *a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragmented, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing ceasefires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements – military, police and civilians – working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.*

therefore, to maintain the security, confidence and expectations of the local population while re-building, reforming or building the capacity of state institutions, in particular those responsible for governance and the rule of law. These stabilisation activities are normally associated with security sector reform, reconstruction and regeneration.

308.   Security and stabilisation normally involves the regeneration and training of an indigenous military capacity to sustain recovery and preserve security in the longer term, coupled with the transfer of security responsibilities to local or other mandated forces. In all contexts, these roles should form part of an integrated approach in conjunction with other agencies and so compromises in approach may be necessary. For example, the responsibilities and tasks of military and police forces are likely to overlap in any post conflict environment. Similarly, in theory, other government departments and non-governmental organisations should take responsibility for many lines of operation, such as governance, reconstruction and development, but experience has shown that this may not always be the case, especially when security cannot be guaranteed and resources, human and material, are not available. In these circumstances, or when sufficient security cannot be created, the Armed Forces should be prepared, within their capabilities, training and authority, to deliver non-military lines of operation.

309.   Plans for the regeneration of indigenous forces, structures and institutions should be formulated in stride with more immediate plans. Intervention should ideally be limited to the achievement of realistic military objectives and its anticipated duration defined in advance. In practice, both will need to be adjusted in the light of changing operational or political circumstances.

Combat

310.   Combat, or the possibility of it, is often likely during intervention operations, when power and resources are contested. Combat may also arise unexpectedly during peacekeeping or disaster relief operations. Typically, a volatile, but otherwise largely stable confrontation, may be punctuated by intermittent episodes of fighting. Alternatively, hostility and belligerent behaviour during a protracted low-level conflict may develop into more intense combat. Where force is applied in response to an unexpected deterioration in an otherwise secure environment, or to counter or contain

sporadic violence, it is initially likely to be defensive in nature. Should those measures fail, forces could be employed offensively to achieve specified objectives, including the disruption, defeat or destruction of an opponent.

311.   Combat may also reinforce an existing, but fragile peace – potentially, the consequence of past conflict – to stabilise a critical situation that risks escalating into major conflict, or to intervene for security where it has broken down. In many situations it may be necessary to prevent instability from spreading to other, as yet unaffected areas, and to provide the security to enable other processes to resolve the more deep-seated causes of conflict. The role of the Armed Forces in these circumstances tends to be limited to creating and maintaining a stable environment in which underlying issues can be addressed by non-military means.

Major Combat Operations

312.   Short of UK direct defence against a major opponent, the most exacting commitment of the Armed Forces is likely to be a large-scale, deliberate intervention operation, which may in extremis, involve sustained combat. Major combat operations involve diplomatic, military and economic actions, unified by an overall strategy and, ultimately, the full resources of the state. They are generally characterised as a contest between the regular armed forces of a state, and/or an action against large-scale irregular opponents. During major combat operations, the operational context (see Figure 3.1) is dominated by the need to maintain military freedom of action and to deny that freedom to an enemy. The size of the footprint, the intensity and scale of the conflict and the scope of the theatre of operations determine the extent to which civilian populations are exposed to the consequences of combat operations. Other considerations include support from allies, the attitude of the wider world and the strength of the other instruments of national power in sustaining fighting power and national resilience.

313.   Major combat operations demand significant financial and organisational commitment, with rehabilitation and recuperation implications that extend well beyond the military dimension and the immediate conflict. They are likely to be highly resource intensive with often protracted and unrestrained violence, although an asymmetric advantage in weight of effort or technological superiority can mitigate human and

materiel losses. Major combat operations tend to be characterised by battles and major engagements and therefore have the potential to be accompanied by intense combat activity at high rates of logistic consumption. The tempo of activities can also be high, with a need to prioritise resources and re-generate fighting power.

314.   Although some routine and standing commitments will be maintained, such as the protection of overseas territories, which may have utility as forward operating or mounting bases, fighting power should be concentrated on those campaign aspects that may lead more directly to the effects required by the Government's overall strategy.

315.   Combat is always subject to a distinctive legal framework, including the international conventions and the Law of International Armed Conflict, but rules of engagement will generally be less restrictive for major combat operations than for other military activity. Even during major combat operations, both diplomatic and economic instruments continue to play an important role in sustaining fighting power, in exerting influence as part of the Government's overall strategy and in helping to achieve a favourable political outcome.

ANNEX 3A – WHEN ARMED FORCES MIGHT BE USED

Protecting the Security of the UK

3A1.   Protection of the UK includes the capacity to deter and defeat military threats or incursions. It encompasses the integrity of the UK, its territorial waters and airspace, and provides support to other government departments (termed Military Aid to Civil Authorities (MACA)) in matters of security and law enforcement.[1] MACA may also involve limited manpower to assist local authorities during unforeseen contingencies or more significant resources to assist the civil power in countering terrorism, for example. In the event of a direct military threat to the UK mainland, appropriate forces, either national or in conjunction with allies and partners, would be provided to confront the specific threat and to deter further aggression. In most cases, it is anticipated that any substantial threat to the UK would involve the use of the Armed Forces in a large-scale Alliance or coalition operation. In circumstances of extreme necessity, the UK has recourse to strategic nuclear systems.

Protecting the Security of Dependent Territories

3A2.   The Armed Forces require the capability to reinforce any British overseas territory or crown dependency facing a serious threat to its security. Local garrisons are needed in some of these territories to deter adventurism, conduct operations, or to support the civil authorities. Moreover, in response to serious terrorist incidents, specialist forces may need to deploy. Exceptionally, as was the case in the Falkland Islands conflict, circumstances may require the Armed Forces to mount a large-scale national operation, employing the full range of conventional military capabilities, to fight a limited but intense conflict at a considerable distance from the UK.

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[1] Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) covers the provision of military support to the civil power, other government departments and the community at large, see Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 02 *Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience*.

In Response to a United Nations Security Council Resolution

3A3.   Under Chapter VII, Articles 43 and 45 of the UN Charter, all members are to make available Armed Forces to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, responsible for the decision to use armed force in response to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, the UK has a particular responsibility to act.

Treaty Obligations

3A3.   Membership of NATO involves political obligations (under the terms of the Washington Treaty) which include the provision of assistance to an ally under attack, even if the security of the UK is not directly threatened. In addition or alternatively, the EU may request member states to take action (under the modified Brussels Treaty) in certain circumstances. The Armed Forces may also be deployed as part of a multinational force in a wide variety of operations as a result of decisions taken and direction given by the North Atlantic Council or the EU Council of Ministers.

Promoting and Defending National Interests Worldwide

3A4.   The Armed Forces may be used to promote national interests across the entire spectrum of military activities, including support to diplomacy, military assistance, humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping operations, through to major warfighting. This form of engagement is discretionary, rather than obligatory, based on assessments of the balance of risk and advantage in committing military forces. In view of the UK's widespread interests and investments, as well as its critical dependence on a stable, secure international environment for trade, it is likely that threats to international security would also represent a threat to national interests. In these circumstances, the Armed Forces may take part in operations as part of an alliance or coalition, but may have to act alone to protect or promote national interests. In certain situations, the interests at stake may be only indirectly pertinent to the national interest, in a narrow sense, but it may nonetheless be judged expedient to intervene on humanitarian, compassionate or moral grounds.

CHAPTER 4 – FIGHTING POWER

> *'Where fighting spirit is lacking everything else is just a waste of time.'*

<div align="right">Van Crefeld</div>

401.   Fighting power defines the Armed Forces' ability to fight. It consists of a conceptual component (the thought process), a moral component (the ability to get people to fight) and a physical component (the means to fight).

402.   The components of fighting power are shown at Figure 4.1. During conflict, belligerents seek to diminish or undermine the fighting power of their opponents while safeguarding, and ideally expanding, their own. Conflict is competitive and adversarial. The achievement of relative superiority is an important aspect of successful military operations.

Conceptual Component
- Principles of War
- Doctrine
- Conceptual Innovation

Physical Component
- Manpower
- Equipment
- Collective Performance
- Sustainability
- Readiness

Moral Component
- Moral Cohesion
- Motivation
- Leadership

Figure 4.1 – Components of Fighting Power

CONTEXT

403.   Fighting power should always be considered in *context*. This context will include: the character of the situation; the environment; opponents; allies, partners and other agencies; and culture and history.

a. **Character of the Situation**. Given the diversity of crises in which the Armed Forces may become involved, fighting power should be applied in a way that best suits the prevailing situation and conditions. In some cases, compromises may need to be made where political, resource or legal considerations apply, but commanders should be clear that the character, posture and activities of the forces under their command need to reflect the unique conditions prevailing.

b. **Environment**. The nature of the environment inevitably affects the range of options and choices available to a commander and determines the type of campaign and forces that may best suit his purposes. The distinctive topography, the climate and the distribution of the built-up, agricultural and industrial landscapes each present potential threats and opportunities. The features of the society among which forces may have to operate also need to be considered. As well as the manner in which the Armed Forces operate, the physical and cultural environment may also impact upon the efficacy of certain aspects of fighting power. A force optimised to fight in one scenario may be ill-equipped (mentally as well as physically) to operate elsewhere.

c. **Opponents**. Fighting power needs to be comparatively, rather than absolutely, superior to that of an opponent to ensure success, especially when applied at a critical time and place. Mass alone can only prevail against a numerically inferior opponent, when numbers are overwhelming in comparison to the means of resistance or attritional capacity of the other side. Frequently, however, it is the quality of fighting power and coherence of its application in a context that maximises a force's strengths and minimises its weaknesses, which provide a decisive edge. Success against irregular activists, for example, requires the selective application of appropriate elements of fighting power to counter and exceed their particular attributes. Furthermore, high morale and a strong resolve, or will to fight, may enable an apparently inferior opponent to absorb punishment yet sustain the determination and capacity to re-engage.

d. **Allies, Partners and Other Agencies**. The requirement to work with allies and partners may affect the use of individual nations' fighting power. Interoperability, for example, may enhance capability across a coalition force,

possibly at additional cost, while role specialisation and burden sharing may promote efficiency. In addition, co-operation and collaboration between the diplomatic, military and economic instruments, as part of an integrated approach, will demand external interaction and co-ordination with other agencies. This may further shape the utility of certain aspects of fighting power, not least the interpretation of doctrine to accommodate non-military actors, their respective cultures, practices and procedures.

e. **Culture and History**. In the consideration of context, the cultural and historical features of a situation or operating area are most important of all. Close analysis of cultural and historical features of a situation, and their incorporation into planning, affords key insights into how fighting power can best be applied to achieve objectives and favourable outcomes in the most efficient manner. As such, culture and history may affect all aspects of the application of fighting power, from training, through cultural acclimatisation, to the execution of operations.

404. The likelihood of success on operations is not simply a function of the application of coherent fighting power against an opponent, but also of a range of wider factors, such as the uncertainties induced by unpredictable events, the interplay of chance and the vagaries of human nature. It is, therefore, crucial in identifying risk, that a commander understands fully the context in which fighting power is to be applied and the type of operation on which he is engaged. Only then can he shape the situation to his advantage. In practice, commanders should always seek to exploit asymmetry between themselves and an opponent, by applying their forces' strengths against an opponent's vulnerabilities (while protecting areas of one's own comparative weakness). In all circumstances, however, commanders should have sufficient reserves or agility to refocus their effort in order to deal with the unexpected.

CONCEPTUAL COMPONENT

The conceptual component provides the coherent intellectual basis and theoretical justification for the provision and employment of Armed Forces.

405.   It has relevance at all levels of warfare, not least at the strategic level, where it provides the intellectual material needed for effective decision-making at the political-military interface. The conceptual component also serves an important role in preserving and taking forward corporate memory, experience and wisdom. In doing so, it reflects accumulated historic experience, improvements to existing operational practice (gained through lessons, analysis and experimentation) and continuous projections about the future security environment.

406.   The most important practical function of the conceptual component is to provide a framework of thinking within which military personnel can develop understanding about their profession and the activities that they may have to undertake, both now and into the future. Critically, it is the conceptual component that provides commanders with the ability to understand the context within which they operate and serves as the foundation upon which creativity, ingenuity and initiative may be exercised in complex situations, to ensure success. It comprises 3 elements: the principles of war; doctrine; and conceptual innovation.

Principles of War

407.   Principles of War, covered in detail in Chapter 2, inform and guide the way in which the Armed Forces apply military power. They represent enduring principles, whose expression and emphasis change only in relation to context, and are consistent with similar principles applied by the UK's major allies and potential coalition partners.

Doctrine

408.   Military Doctrine comprises:

   a.   **Allied Doctrine**. Except where there is a specific need for national doctrine,

the UK adopts NATO doctrine in the form of Allied Joint Publications, duly caveated where necessary to reflect the national position. Similarly, European Security and Defence Policy arrangements specify that NATO doctrine should be used in European Union-led military operations.

b. **Joint Doctrine**. The Joint Doctrine Hierarchy of publications, headed by *British Defence Doctrine*, also includes subordinate publications covering all aspects of military operations.

c. **Higher Level Environmental Doctrine**. Discrete doctrine publications for maritime, land, air (and space) environments guide respective single-Services.[1] They also provide the necessary familiarity and broad basis of understanding for joint and component commanders, formations and units to operate effectively across environmental boundaries.

d. **Tactical Doctrine**. Joint tactical doctrine, normally expressed as Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (JTTPs), is co-ordinated by the Permanent Joint Headquarters. Environmental tactical doctrine, relating to the employment of platforms, systems and units in a particular environment, is produced by the most appropriate Service.

e. ***Ad Hoc* Coalition Partners**. Where co-operation is required with partners with whom there are no existing agreements, NATO or national doctrine (appropriately de-classified) may be either adopted or adapted.

Conceptual Innovation

409.   An understanding of the Principles of War and extant doctrine all contribute directly to the conceptual component. It is also continuously refreshed by conceptual innovation, capturing how the Armed Forces' thinking changes over time in response to changing contexts, emerging technologies and new challenges. The results of conceptual innovation, including new capabilities, structures, tactics and procedures,

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[1] JDP 0-10 *British Maritime Doctrine*, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) *Land Operations and Air Publication* (AP) 3000 *British Air Power Doctrine*.

generate improvements in fighting power.

410.   To meet the requirements of Government policy and the development of future Defence capabilities, the UK maintains a progressive programme of intellectual and academic engagement, innovation and experimentation. Changes in the strategic environment are, thereby, reflected across all Defence Lines of Development.[2] The MOD's Defence Conceptual Framework provides coherence to this process and comprises 7 main elements:[3]

   a.   **Operate**. The ability to apply the military instrument of power in support of Government policy at a time and place of choice.

   b.   **Command**. The authority vested in an individual to influence events and to order subordinates to implement decisions exercised by, or on behalf of, commanders and comprising 3 closely inter-related elements: leadership; decision-making (including risk assessment); and control.

   c.   **Inform**. The ability to collect, analyse, manage and exploit information and intelligence to enable information and decision superiority.

   d.   **Prepare**. The timely provision of forces for military operations through effective intellectual, moral and physical development.

   e.   **Project**. The ability to intervene at a time and place of political choice to act against threats to UK security and in support of national interests.

   f.   **Protect**. The means by which operational effectiveness is maintained through countering the threats from technological, natural and human hazards.

   g.   **Sustain**. The capacity to generate the means by which fighting power and freedom of action are maintained.

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[2] Doctrine and Concepts, Equipment, Infrastructure, Organisation, Training, Information, Logistics and Personnel.

[3] *The High Level Operational Conceptual Framework.*

MORAL COMPONENT

The moral component of fighting power is about getting people to fight, a combination of 3 inter-related functions: moral cohesion (the preparedness to fight); motivation (the enthusiasm to fight); and leadership (the inspiration to fight).

411.   Above all other considerations, warfare is a human activity and the moral component exerts a decisive psychological influence, individually and collectively. While morals (principles of right and wrong) are one aspect (enhancing cohesion), the moral component is considerably broader. Similarly, morale (a sense of confidence and well-being) is also but one aspect of the moral component (promoting courage and commitment) and, again, it is not the whole.

> *'The one significant advantage that the British military had [in the Falklands War of 1982] was the human element. The quality of its individual soldiers, organisation and leadership, and the cohesion of its forces became the deciding factor.'*

> W D Henderson[4]

Moral Cohesion

Moral cohesion is a source of moral fortitude, to fight and to keep on fighting; moral integrity supports cohesion.

412.   Cohesion occurs when individuals want, or are encouraged, to work together, normally to share tasks, provide each other with support and to achieve a common enterprise. Moral cohesion depends on cultural solidarity, shared experiences, a common sense of worth, appropriate discipline and an expressed collective identity, which is sustained by shared common values and standards. It embodies genuine and deep comradeship that endures even as the experience of violence and fear of death and injury begin to pervade an individual's conscious and sub-conscious. Pride in belonging

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[4] Henderson W D, Cohesion, *The Human Element in Combat*, University Press of the Pacific, 2003.

and fear of exclusion, best described by the term *esprit de corps*, reinforces unit identity and cements moral cohesion. Three elements, in particular, need to be highlighted:

a. **Professional Ethos**. A willingness to face danger is strengthened by emotional links and commitment to comrades, units and country, and to the cause for which one is fighting. An exemplary professional ethos, combined with an appealing cultural identity and military reputation, is a powerful moral force in its own right. The ethos of each Service[5] is derived from a number of identifiable and intangible qualities that promote an offensive spirit and a determination to succeed, whatever the conditions. These qualities include physical and moral courage, selfless commitment, loyalty, mental agility, initiative, stamina, adaptability and a strong tendency towards teamwork.

b. **Self-Esteem**. The overwhelming majority of military personnel derive significant self-esteem and satisfaction with life through membership of the Armed Forces. Much of this is related to belonging to a highly professional body of men and women, who collectively reflect the aspirations of society and provide an example of devoted public service. Tradition and custom, manifested in ceremonies, uniforms, museums and Service distinctions, are also critical factors in promoting and sustaining an individual's sense of worth.

c. **Tradition**. Cohesion within a team is strengthened by a sense of heritage, infused by professional reputation and fostered through cultural identity. The commitment to prevail on operations, whatever the personal cost, is reinforced by an established and proven national and Service reputation for military success, and a consciousness of being part of that tradition. Indeed, to know and recall what predecessors have experienced and achieved helps an individual face the challenge of duty and the rigours of combat.

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[5] Each Service expresses its own perception of ethos, in published documents: *Royal Navy Ethos – The Spirit to Fight and Win, Naval Service Core Values and Standards and Royal Marines Ethos; Values and Standards of the British Army and Army Doctrine Publication - Land Operations, Chapter 2, The Moral Component; and Ethos, Core Values and Standards of the Royal Air Force.*

413. **Human Factors**. Moral cohesion may be further enhanced by the application of scientific expertise relating to the social, psychological and behavioural aspects of human behaviour. In particular, a more sophisticated understanding of group dynamics, and the motivations of people in relation to force preparation and generation, supports assessments of likely behaviour in complex situations.[6]

414. **Moral Integrity**. Moral integrity is another important source of moral strength, providing the foundations upon which cohesion and indeed motivation are built. Most Servicemen and women have an intuitive feel for what is right and good and can be relied upon to deplore what is either illegal or unethical. This predisposition is reinforced by aligning the basic decency of individuals with the values and standards of the Armed Forces, as organisations that are democratically accountable and responsible to the society they represent. The moral legitimacy of the Armed Forces depends upon the individual and collective adherence to ethical principles, both articulated and implicit. Commanders are required to promote and maintain legal and ethical standards amongst their subordinates, regardless of what may be considered acceptable behaviour elsewhere.

Motivation

415. Motivation is a product of training, confidence in equipment, effective leadership and management, firm and fair discipline, self-respect, mutual respect and a clear understanding of what is going on and what is required. Motivation and high morale (the will to fight and a confidence in succeeding) are, in practice, inter-dependent. Motivation is, however, also susceptible to a variety of external influences, such as public opinion. The will to fight is substantially reinforced and sustained by the personal belief that a nation or community supports a particular conflict and considers that its purpose is legitimate, its conduct ethically sound and military activity properly resourced. The contribution of the media is important in this regard. Positive reporting reassures Service personnel that they enjoy national support and recognises publicly their personal contribution to an arduous, and often dangerous, endeavour (without compromising operational security). Adverse media activity, on the other hand can significantly erode

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[6] Further detail can be found in Joint Doctrine Note 3/11, *Decision Making and Problem Solving: Human and Organisational Factors.*

morale and commanders should seek to counter it through positive briefing both externally and internally. A commander should keep the virtual aspects of his campaign under constant review, to ensure that any gap between perception (what is believed) and reality (what is true) does not erode the moral component and, thereby, inhibit the achievement of operational objectives.

Leadership

> *'A commander should have a profound understanding of human nature, the knack of smoothing out troubles, the power of winning affection while communicating energy, and the capacity for ruthless determination when required by circumstances. He needs to generate an electrifying current, and keep a cool head in applying it.'* [7]

B H Liddell Hart

416.   Effective leadership, a critical aspect of command, is characterised by the projection of personality and purpose to influence subordinates to prevail in the most demanding circumstances. There is no definitive style of leader and no prescription for leadership. The exercise of leadership is related to individual and group dynamics, and the context within which assigned missions and tasks have to be achieved. Natural leaders are rare, but training and experience can develop latent potential.

417.   Leadership is a variable combination of example, persuasion and compulsion. Strength of character, judgement, initiative and professionalism all help to overcome natural and human hazards, inadequate information and administrative shortcomings, as well as rivalries, ambitions, the operation of chance and institutional inertia. In order to gain the respect and commitment of their subordinates, leaders need to demonstrate professional competence, firm but fair discipline and moral courage. They should also engender the confidence that breeds initiative and the acceptance of risk and responsibility.

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[7] Liddell Hart B H, *Thoughts on War*, 1944.

418.   Especially in the face of adversity, leaders should share their courage and contain their fear. Calm, confident and collected leadership, enhanced by an ability to communicate clearly and to make things happen, is vital to the success of military operations and the maintenance of morale, even when other factors militate against it. When personal contact is maintained with subordinate formations, units and individuals, leadership is overwhelmingly based on presence and example. Different considerations apply to the exercise of leadership over distance, within large spans of command, decentralised networks, or allied and joint structures. Here subordinates' perceptions of their more remote leaders are based on reputation, mental images gleaned through communications and the media, and demonstrations of competence, personal example and authority.

419.   Management of personnel is no substitute for leadership, but is a vital supplement to it. Together, effective leadership and sound management establish and sustain motivation, and inspire confidence.

PHYSICAL COMPONENT

The physical component of fighting power provides the means to fight: manpower, equipment, collective performance, and sustainability, at readiness.

420.   **Manpower**. Manpower comprises Servicemen and women, both Regular and Reserve, as well as MOD-employed civilians and contracted personnel. It is manpower that must provide the military's decisive edge as western technological and equipment superiority can no longer be guaranteed. Investment in people – sufficient, capable and motivated – is therefore essential and places a premium on recruiting, retaining and developing personnel.[8] Military recruits undergo a rigorous selection and initial training process to condition them for the hardship and challenges of operations; collective training makes them into useful team members. Further professional development maintains the requisite skills balance within the overall force structure. Despite the attractions and economies of simulation, a reasonable amount of stimulation, in the form of live training, is necessary to inure personnel to the sights, sounds and smells of

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[8] DCDC, Global Strategic Trends Programme, *Future Character of Conflict* (FCOC), February 2010.

combat. Similarly, the training of all personnel should be matched to the technical, social, cultural, political and economic complexity of likely operating environments; to this end, specialist and technical skills need to be nurtured, developed and retained.

421. **Equipment**. A credible fighting force depends upon sufficient, effective equipment, optimised and scaled according to likely operational challenges. Suitable equipment should reflect and complement the envisaged scale and intensity of use, making allowance for the integration of human, system and platform requirements. A balanced, sustainable equipment capability programme, driven by conceptual innovation, should enable both the projection and employment of force. Equipment acquisition should be underpinned by sustainable and robust manufacture and supply, and by flexible through-life support (including requisite operating data). The exploitation of technology may provide a decisive edge over an opponent or in regard to an operational situation. However, experience has shown that reliance on technology (especially when it is unproven), at the expense of empirical evidence and human-based fighting culture, may increase operational risk.

422. **Collective Performance**. Collective performance is characterised by high levels of cohesion, confidence and proficiency among units and formations that have successfully trained or operated together. Where time and resources allow, this should be achieved by individual Services, to prepare their respective force elements for joint activity. Thereafter, collective performance should be focused on the leadership of, or contribution to, joint and multinational operations. Commanders should be trained and appointed according to the types of operation and scales of forces that are envisaged, concentrating primarily on the demands of warfighting, as the defining core of fighting power.

423. **Sustainability**. The credibility and effectiveness of a military force rests upon its sustainability. A fully agile end-to-end logistic support framework is required to link the strategic base (including infrastructure, stockpiles and industrial capacity) with front line forces. Overall, sustainment depends upon a combination of: logistic, personnel and administrative force structures, training and equipment; infrastructure; and communications and information management, tailored to the activities likely to be undertaken. Logistic support should enable, but may in practice constrain, operational

tempo. In addition, personnel support should be sufficiently resilient to meet the operational demands on military manpower.

424. **Readiness**. The UK holds forces at varying states of readiness, consistent with assessed risks and threats. The Armed Forces' readiness profile reflects a balance between the time needed for force generation, preparation and deployment, and the resources available to Defence. Readiness is, therefore, linked to a combination of manpower and equipment availability, sustainability and collective performance; it provides an assessment of the time within which a unit can be made ready to perform tasks. Overt readiness contributes to deterrence by indicating to potential aggressors and opportunists the UK's preparedness and resolve.

Progressive Adaptation

425. The UK retains sufficient capability to deal with crises and conflicts that affect its national interests, exploiting technology and maintaining an appropriate mix of fighting power to meet fresh challenges.

426. An emerging crisis, in an unforeseen environment or against an unexpected opponent, may require new capabilities or render obsolete those currently held. For this reason, the UK generates and maintains fighting power that, subject to adequate resourcing, is broadly balanced and sufficiently agile to deal with a variety of possible scenarios, but with the potential, through research and development, to adopt the latest technology and systems.

GENERATION OF FIGHTING POWER

427. Fighting power is generated to produce Armed Forces that are sufficiently capable, in all 3 components, to succeed on operations. There is an important, although not an absolute, distinction between having fighting power and generating it. Collective training, for example, provides no capability itself; it is the resulting collective performance that contributes to the physical component. Conceptual innovation, on the other hand, provides the basis for future capability development, as well as enhancing our understanding of the likely context within which forces may have to operate.

428.   The need to generate fighting power has 2 implications. First, it provides the focus for all non-operational activity across the Armed Forces. On operations, certain aspects of fighting power such as morale may also be enhanced, while others such as stocks of vehicles and equipment may become depleted. A balance should be struck, therefore, at all levels from the strategic through to the tactical, between the application of fighting power to achieve immediate objectives, especially at high tempo over prolonged periods, and efforts to sustain and generate fighting power for the future. Sometimes this may constrain current operations to ensure adequate capability for subsequent ones. Secondly, the generation of fighting power rests upon supporting foundations that, while not contributing directly to operational capability, are essential to ensure that it can be provided, as required, and sustained. A secure home base with adequate technical and domestic accommodation is one tangible aspect of this supporting foundation; the provision of appropriate health, welfare and administration for Servicemen and women is another equally important, yet intangible, example. In the same way that the fighting power applied today is the product of generation in the past, so current development and support will determine the extent of fighting power available in the future.

ORCHESTRATION OF FIGHTING POWER

429.   The primary responsibility of a military commander is to co-ordinate and balance *ends*, *ways* and *means* to achieve objectives and obtain favourable outcomes. His or her major preoccupation is the effective orchestration of the components of fighting power to optimise their potential for employment throughout the spectrum of likely operations and to preserve their strength and agility for future use.

430.   The co-ordination and synchronisation of activity are complex undertakings that will only deliver agility, tempo and unity of effort when planned and conducted by commanders and staffs who are experienced and practised in organising forces at all levels of likely engagement.

431.   The exercise of command and control, through appropriate organisations and structures provides a mechanism for synchronising activity and enables a commander to identify and manage risk, while converting his, or her, intent into effect. The complexity inherent in modern situations demands a command and control philosophy that does

not rely upon precise control, but is able to function despite uncertainty and disorder. Where control can be established, it has a role in reducing the complementary need for direct command; conversely, where control is weak, the more that command is required. In any environment characterised by complexity, unpredictability and rapid change, the system that adapts best and most quickly is likely to prevail. The most important qualities of any command and control system are constant agility in organisation, time and space to reflect the context within which activity is to take place. Commanders, in turn, need to be agile across all dimensions and levels of warfare if they are to deal with vast amounts of data and an array of complex, interrelated and possibly unexpected issues.

432.   Information and intelligence are critical to establish and maintain situational awareness, which after detailed analysis leads to more effective understanding. Effective decision-making relies on thorough understanding of the environment, circumstances and situations within which we may find ourselves operating or interacting. Developing understanding relies first on having the situational awareness to identify the problem. Analysis of the situational awareness provides greater comprehension (insight) of the problem, applying judgement to this comprehension provides understanding of the problem (foresight).[9] Understanding underpins identification of the conditions necessary to achieve the desired outcome and orchestration of military and other activity to realise the requisite effects for success. Network Enabled Capabilities can have utility, conferring potentially decisive advantage through the timely provision and exploitation of information and intelligence, allowing effective decision-making and agile synchronisation of activity. However, near-real time information flows, in ever increasing volumes and to wider audiences, offer both threats and opportunities. Effective information management is required to ensure that an abundance of data does not inhibit or overload the commander's decision-making capacity. Moreover, intuition, expertise and intellect continue to have an essential role in successful information exploitation and in shaping judgements to develop foresight.

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[9] Further information on understanding is detailed in JDP 04 *Understanding*.

CHAPTER 5 – THE BRITISH WAY OF WAR

> *'In peace nothing so becomes a man as modest stillness and humility, but when the blast of war blows in our ears, then imitate the action of the tiger, stiffen the sinews, disguise fair nature with hard favour'd rage…'*

William Shakespeare

501.   The British Way of War derives from a deep-seated martial tradition and a pragmatic fighting culture that stretches back centuries in both historic narrative and public sentiment. It has been shaped by the UK's imperial and colonial experience, its continuous role in the forefront of world affairs (notably as a Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council) and the country's active engagement with globalisation. History, together with an associated religious and secular mythology, exerts a powerful influence over the Armed Forces' perceptions of themselves and their way of war. At its heart is the notion that the profession of arms is an honourable calling – a vocation rather than merely an occupation.

502.   The British Way is characterised by pragmatism and moderation in response to provocation and confrontation, but complemented by steadfast resolve and a determination to win when confronted by aggression, danger or injustice. Its application is denoted by constant adaptation to circumstances and a preference for empirically-based rather than theoretical or necessarily technological solutions. An emphasis on professional competence engenders an uncompromising approach to training, to acquire and maintain the skills necessary to prevail in the most challenging situations. However, its most distinctive feature relates to the recognition that warfare is a human activity, both in its exercise and effects, and that the most decisive element is the contribution made by men and women suitably trained, equipped and led. The British Way implies a can-do approach and demands that, no matter how difficult the circumstances or remote the immediate chances of success, the urge to succeed should predominate over the need to avoid failure. The attributes of British military culture are expanded upon at Annex 5A.

503.   The Armed Forces respond continuously to the evolving character of warfare, advances in technology and the increasing complexity of the operating environment. The manner in which an individual commander, at any level, deals with these challenges is founded upon his intellect, ability and intuition – supplemented, perhaps decisively, by his or her creative genius, instinct and vision. He/she should, however, be guided by a number of principles and approaches that, together, provide a framework of understanding of how to plan and execute military operations. These precepts and the nature of military command necessary to apply them effectively are described below.

COMMAND

504.   Command embraces authority, responsibility and accountability. It has a legal and constitutional status, codified in Queen's Regulations, and is vested in a commander by his or her superior. Authority enables an individual to influence events and to order subordinates to implement decisions. While a commander can devolve specific authority, he/she retains overall responsibility for his/her command; responsibility is thus fundamental to command. Accountability involves a liability and obligation to answer for the proper use of delegated responsibility, authority and resources; it includes the duty to act. Thus, a commander who delegates responsibility should grant sufficient authority to a subordinate to enable him/her to carry out his/her task; the subordinate, meanwhile, remains accountable to his superior for its execution.

505.   The exercise of command includes the process by which a commander makes decisions, conveys his/her intent and impresses his/her will upon his subordinates. It comprises 3 inter-related aspects:

  a.   **Decision-Making**. Timely, accurate and effective decision-making enables adaptive command, the optimisation of tempo and, ultimately, success on operations. Much of the art of command depends on recognising when to decide and act, which, in turn, relies on good judgement and intuition, based on understanding and intelligent interpretation. However, fleeting opportunities need to be identified and sometimes exploited on the basis of incomplete information. Decisions should be communicated effectively and, where possible, personally to inspire confidence and promote cohesion between

commanders and their subordinates. The ability to make difficult decisions and to remain resolute, particularly when the outcome is uncertain, are the defining characteristics of a strong commander.

b. **Leadership**. A commander has ultimate, sole responsibility for ensuring that his/her plan delivers the best chances of success. The way in which he/she exercises leadership is determined by his/her character, style and experience, as well as the mix of personalities within his/her force or organisation. Furthermore, the intangible nature of the relationship between a commander and his/her subordinates may affect the way in which forces are employed and the enterprises they undertake. Consequently, different situations demand different styles of leadership, implying varying amounts of regulation and delegation, inspiration and coercion.

c. **Control**. Control is the co-ordination of activity, through processes and structures that enable a commander to manage risk and to deliver intent. The extent of military control over a particular situation is influenced by the balance between military and other actors' engagement, and contribution to relevant objectives. In purely military terms, control is frequently delegated to specialist staff or associated systems, except where a commander needs to intervene personally to ensure that his/her intent is achieved. Generally, a commander should seek to increase the freedom of action of his/her subordinates through appropriate decentralisation and delegation.

506. In all circumstances, command has to be inextricably linked to the strategic context and environmental conditions of a particular campaign. Since military activity does not take place in a vacuum, the challenge for any commander is to exercise command, possibly working with allies and partners, to achieve a national strategic aim while retaining both unity of purpose and, where possible, unity of command.

507. Moreover, a commander's immediate subordinates may themselves be senior, experienced commanders, including those from other nations. They should have confidence in his/her professional ability, sound judgement and firmness of purpose. Wherever possible, a commander should explain the rationale underlying his/her chosen

course of action so that his/her subordinates understand the reasoning behind his/her decision and have a clear sense of purpose. Subsequently, when the situation precludes these interactions, subordinates should, nonetheless, have confidence that his/her decisions are properly considered and valid. Furthermore, a commander should always be prepared to accept and make use of the ideas and objections of others, who may have an important contribution to make. Finally, a commander exercises command in conditions of inevitable uncertainty, risk, violence, fear and danger. His/her success depends largely on experience, flexibility and determination but, ultimately, on the ability to shape those aspects amenable to control and to retain sufficient capacity for the unexpected.

Mission Command

508.   The UK's philosophy of mission command has 4 enduring tenets:

    a.   Timely decision-making.

    b.   Subordinates are told what effect they are to achieve and why.

    c.   Subordinates are allocated sufficient resources to carry out their missions.

    d.   The commander's determination to take the plan through to a successful conclusion.

509.   The fundamental guiding principle is the absolute responsibility to act or, in certain circumstances, to decide not to act, within the framework of a superior commander's intent. This approach requires a style of command that promotes decentralised command, freedom and speed of action and initiative, but which is responsive to superior direction when a subordinate overreaches himself.

510.   In practical terms, mission command has 5 essential elements:

a.   A commander ensures that his/her subordinates understand his/her intent, their own contribution and the context within which they are to act.

b.   Subordinates are told what effect they are to achieve and why.

c.   Subordinates are allocated sufficient resources to carry out their missions.

d.   A commander exercises a minimum of control over his/her subordinates, consistent with their experience and ability, while retaining responsibility for their actions.

e.   Subordinates decide for themselves how best to achieve their superior's intent and objectives.

511.   Mission command therefore imparts understanding to subordinates about the intentions of a higher commander and their place within his/her plan, enabling them to carry out missions with the maximum freedom of action and appropriate resources. It is predicated upon delegation of authority and agility in execution. As such, it underpins the manoeuvrist approach and reinforces the resilience of command. Its essence relies on striking an appropriate balance between direction and delegation, dependent upon the training, personality and experience of the commander and subordinates concerned. It requires trust, shared awareness and common understanding.

CAMPAIGNING

512.   The UK's approach to crisis management (described in Chapter 1) is always cross-Government and very often multinational as well as multi-agency. This approach requires, amongst other things:

a.   A shared understanding across Government, as well as between governments, and with other institutions and agencies, of:

> (1)   The nature of the crisis situation and its causes.

> (2)   The nature of the desired outcome (a more favourable, probably more stable situation) and the conditions that need to be changed or created to reach and sustain it.

b.   An integrated response by all relevant instruments of national power, in conjunction with other nations and other actors as appropriate, to achieve mutually agreed objectives. More often than not, these objectives are inter-dependent, so any response needs to be collaborative as well as comprehensive.

c.   A strategy, and specifically a campaign plan, to achieve military objectives, in conjunction with other actors (who may support and/or be supported by the military).

513.   The practice of crisis management and within it campaigning as the military contribution involves:

a.   Analysis of the situation, to understand as much as possible about the context, complexity and possible causes of a crisis. It includes a thorough cultural and historical appreciation of the constituents of a nation or society, as well as recent developments.[1]

b.   Planning to reach the desired outcome. This is an iterative process, based upon analysis and assessment, with plans being continually updated as political priorities, as well as the situation on the ground, evolve.

c.   Execution of activities to change or create improved conditions (recognising that intervention will not necessarily achieve all, any, or only the results intended).

d.   Assessment of progress towards reaching the desired outcome.

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[1] Such as the Rule of Law, education, commerce, humanity, health, information, military, economy, diplomacy, administration and governance.

514.   These functions are common to all levels of warfare and are carried out, in some form but using a variety of terms, by the majority of organisations engaged in crisis management.

515.   Campaign planning is carried out by military commanders in consultation and through co-ordination with other actors; a campaign plan is only likely to be effective in conjunction with the plans of others. The purpose of campaign planning is to determine the military contribution to the overall desired outcome (the end-state), the conditions that military activity can realistically influence (some of which may be deemed decisive), and the appropriate combinations of activity and associated effect (task and purpose) by which to do so. Military operations are duly undertaken to achieve specific effects to improve conditions cumulatively and progressively, and thereby lead eventually to the desired outcome.

516.   The purpose of military operations may be unequivocal and well bounded, such as the defeat of an identifiable enemy. More often, however, crises involve a plethora of different actors and influences; military operations are therefore conducted in concert with others, such as other government departments and international organisations who lead on economic, governance and reconstruction activities. Seldom can the objectives of one be achieved and sustained in isolation, and military commanders at all levels engage continuously with their civilian counterparts to ensure that their respective activities are effectively co-ordinated in pursuit of agreed goals. If there is any delay in civilian agencies and organisations assuming, or re-assuming, responsibility for their respective lines of activity (perhaps because they cannot respond sufficiently quickly or the security situation prevents them from operating effectively), the military may be required to provide support in the interim, subject to their available resources, expertise and remit.

517.   Crises are habitually complex, adaptive and, to a greater or lesser extent, unpredictable. Continuous assessment of the performance of activities and their effects (both intended and unintended) is a critical aspect of campaigning. Commanders need to assess the impact of their actions on all participants, not merely the repercussions for individual elements or an opponent. Assessment informs iterative planning and improves situational understanding. It can, however, consume significant time and

resources and needs to be carefully focused on satisfying information requirements, rather than on measurement *per se.*

518.   Military operations are executed through *joint action*, a term used to describe the deliberate use and orchestration of military capabilities and activities to realise specific physical and/or psychological effects. Joint action is implemented through co-ordination and synchronisation of: fires (physical or virtual means to realise primarily physical effects); information activities to manipulate information or perceptions of information to affect understanding; manoeuvre (used to gain advantage in time and space; and outreach) including stabilisation, support to governance, capacity building and regional and key leader engagement.**²**

519.   The UK's approach to campaigning recognises that the features of crises and situations vary over time and that planning cannot address all eventualities. As such, operational success relies on the personality, intellectual engagement and experience of commanders, not only in leading debate on the issues, but also in personally monitoring and sustaining the momentum and integrity of an outcome-focused plan. Consequently, a commander should retain an active and personal role, interacting with his/her staff and subordinate commands, and engaging with other agencies. Indeed, in many operations, the commander plays an influential role in creating the desired effects himself by his/her personal interaction with key leaders, opinion-formers and other individuals. A commander has a special role to play when dynamic interventions are required to mitigate the consequences of unforeseen events, to vary the rate of activity in response to circumstances and to respond with agility to the effects induced by an enterprising opponent or other participant.

520.   Effective campaigning enables a commander to provide those under his/her command:

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² The definition of joint action recognises the centrality of influence as an effect, the integration of activities to realise it and that we may seek to influence a range of actors including ourselves, allies, civilian partners and regional audiences in addition to any adversary. Although an integral part of the UK's approach to campaigning, joint action is not a capability or an activity in its own right. It is, instead, a framework for considering the co-ordination and synchronisation of all military activity within the battlespace.

a.   A comprehensive understanding of the context in which they are operating.

b.   An awareness of the principal consequences of their actions.

c.   Essential guidance that allows them to exploit mission command and contribute precisely to the outcomes required.

d.   Discretion with regard to the employment of fires, information activities, manoeuvre and outreach.

e.   Accurate and timely measures of effectiveness.

MANOEUVRIST APPROACH

521.   The manoeuvrist approach to operations applies strength against identified vulnerabilities, involving predominantly indirect ways and means of targeting the intellectual and moral component of an opponent's fighting power. Significant features are momentum, tempo and agility which, in combination, aim to achieve shock and surprise.

522.   Emphasis is placed on the defeat, disruption or neutralisation of an opponent through ingenuity, even guile, rather than necessarily, or exclusively, through the destruction of his capability or gaining territory for its own sake. Degradation of an opponent's ability to make timely and well-informed decisions, for example, reduces his ability to act appropriately or conceivably to act at all. In practice, direct and indirect forms of attack are not mutually exclusive and any operation is likely to contain elements of both.

523.   The manoeuvrist approach does not preclude the use of attrition; it does, however, offer the prospect of achieving results that are disproportionately greater than the resources applied. It calls for an attitude of mind in which originality and producing the unexpected are combined with a ruthless determination to succeed.

WARFIGHTING ETHOS

524.   A warfighting ethos, as distinct from a purely professional one, is absolutely fundamental to all those in the Armed Forces.

525.   Notwithstanding the proportion of their career engaged in duties other than warfighting, it is essential that all Servicemen and women develop and retain the physical and moral fortitude to fight, when called upon to do so. Not only do they all accept the legal right and duty to apply lethal force, they also accept a potentially unlimited liability to lay down their lives in the service of the Nation.

526.   Armed conflict, of any type, is a bloody, chaotic and destructive business. The inherent chaos of warfighting introduces friction, exacerbated when (almost inevitably) initial plans are overtaken by events and then require continuous adjustment thereafter. Fear is commonplace, even within the minds of those conditioned to cope with its challenges. Courage and leadership, coupled with unit cohesion and discipline, regularly practised and tested during training, are the best counters to fear. By its very nature, military activity is about understanding and managing risk, rather than avoiding hazards; a warfighting ethos enables Service personnel to prevail in even the most demanding of circumstances. The warfighting ethos signifies and embodies the ideals and duties of military service, and unifies those who serve in the Armed Forces.

THE ARMED FORCES COVENANT

527.   Servicemen and women are bound by service. The nature of service is inherently unequal in that Servicemen and women may have to contribute more than they receive. They may be called upon to make the ultimate sacrifice in the service of the Nation. In putting the needs of the Nation, their Service, and others before their own, they forgo some of the rights and freedoms enjoyed by those outside. The Armed Forces Covenant, an enduring covenant between the people of the UK, Her Majesty's Government and all those who serve or have served in the Armed Forces, recognises the additional demands of service life and the sacrifices made in fulfilling the first duty of Government; defence of the realm. The Covenant sets a framework for how the Armed Forces Community can expect to be treated by the Nation and codifies the obligations that the different parties

to the Covenant owe to each other. However, the obligations are not conditional; the duty of a member of the Armed Forces to serve is never dependent on all the elements of the Covenant being met.[3]

BRITISH ARMED FORCES INTO THE FUTURE

528.   Apart from their primary roles in support of security and defence policy, the Armed Forces provide an important and distinctive strand in the fabric of the nation. They promote the ideals of integrity, discipline, professionalism, service and excellence, and also embody much tradition, which helps promote a sense of regional and national identity, stability and cohesion. The Armed Forces also represent a considerable repository of skills and talent, corporate memory, national character and heritage.

529.   The excellent reputation of the Armed Forces is promoted for the benefit of the Nation at large, now and into the future. Although military service makes additional demands on Service personnel, it is important that the Armed Forces should not become disassociated institutions, with markedly different values and goals from the rest of society. Within a democracy, the Armed Forces reflect both the aspirations and the expectations of the nation that they represent and defend.

530.   The starting point, therefore, is that the Armed Forces' values should represent the aspirations of society and that they only set their own particular values where it is necessary to do so by virtue of their distinctive function. Moreover, the Armed Forces need to remain broadly adaptable in relation to society and its evolving aspirations, both to strengthen civil-military relations and to sustain numbers (especially as the UK Armed Forces are voluntary, professional organisations, without conscription).

531.   The Armed Forces should continue to deter and, where necessary, defeat threats to the freedom and territorial integrity of the UK, as well as promoting its national interests. They are likely to do so within a strategic context that is complex, dynamic and uncertain. Commanders should, therefore, continue to be guided by enduring principles, such as those contained within *British Defence Doctrine*, supplemented by their own

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[3] The Armed Forces Covenant 2011.

experience, judgement and initiative. Lessons from operations and deductions drawn from conceptual analysis and practical experimentation, inform both current practice and future capability development.

532.   Fresh thinking and innovation, distilled in doctrine, should continue to underpin the successful and efficient use of the Armed Forces. However, to ensure that doctrine preserves a sensible balance between enduring principles and their application and articulation in modern and emerging contexts, its expression has to be continuously refined. This is best achieved by constant review of existing doctrine in the light of lessons from operations, advanced analysis and research and quick wins from emerging conceptual thinking. In short, doctrine must be refined to meet the demands of the first day of the next conflict, drawing upon, but not constrained by, experience of the last.

ANNEX 5A – ATTRIBUTES OF BRITISH MILITARY CULTURE

The military culture which pervades and therefore serves to epitomise the Armed Forces is characterised by a number of distinctive attributes.

Courage

Physical courage is a primary military virtue, as is, to a less obvious extent, moral courage in the face of seemingly insurmountable difficulty.

> *'Courage is rightly esteemed the first of human qualities …. because it is the quality which guarantees all others.'* [1]
>
> <div align="right">Sir Winston Churchill</div>

> *'War is the realm of danger; therefore, courage is the soldier's first requirement. Courage is of two kinds: courage in the face of personal danger, and courage to accept responsibility.'* [2]
>
> <div align="right">Clausewitz</div>

Offensive Spirit

An offensive spirit and a desire to get to grips with an opponent or problem are persistent features of military operations.

> *'No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy.'* [3]
>
> <div align="right">Vice-Admiral the Lord Nelson</div>

> *'No method of education, no system of promotion, no amount of common sense ability is of value unless the leader has in him the root of the matter – Fighting Spirit.'* [4]
>
> <div align="right">Field-Marshal Archibald Percival Wavell</div>

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[1] Churchill, Sir Winston, *Great Contemporaries*, 1932.

[2] Clausewitz, Carl von, *On War*, edited and translated, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Book 1 Chapter 3 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

[3] Nelson, Vice-Admiral Horatio, *Memorandum*, 9 October 1815.

[4] Wavell, Field Marshal Archibald Percival, *Soldiers and Soldiering, or Epithets of War*, 1953.

Loyalty

Loyalty is a characteristic without which military forces cannot operate, especially under pressure, and is implicit, regardless of personal or private considerations, in every aspect of British military life and engagement.

'Loyalty is a noble quality, as long as it is not blind and does not exclude the higher loyalty to truth and decency.' [5]

Captain Sir Basil Liddell-Hart

'I have ate of the King's salt, and, therefore, I conceive it to be my duty to serve with unhesitating zeal and cheerfulness, when and wherever the King and his Government may think proper to employ me.' [6]

Field Marshal Wellesley

Comradeship

Allied to loyalty is a sense of comradeship based on shared experiences, hardships and achievements. This is linked to a feeling that the military calling, with its implicit risks and dangers, is a worthy and valued profession.

'Such a gallant set of fellows! Such a band of brothers! My heart swells at the thought of them.' [7]

Vice-Admiral the Lord Nelson

'All things were bearable if one bore them 'with the lads'. Battles would have become terrible beyond endurance, if pride did not make a man endure what his comrades endured.' [8]

Charles Carrington

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[5] Liddell-Hart, Captain Sir Basil, *Through the Fog of War*, 1938.

[6] Wellesley, Field Marshal His Grace Arthur 1st Duke of Wellington, *Despatches: Letter to a friend*, 1808.

[7] Nelson, Vice-Admiral Lord, *Letter to Lord Moira*, 30 March 1805.

[8] Carrington, Charles, *A Subaltern's War* 1929.

Determination

A distinctive military attribute is the desire to prevail and give it a go whatever the circumstances and in the face of seemingly insuperable odds.

> *'Never yield to force: never yield to the apparently overwhelming might of the enemy.'* [9]
>
> Sir Winston Churchill

Patriotism

Patriotism manifests itself as a collective and individual attachment to the idea of Britishness and the values and way of life that it represents. Owing to history, training and cultural influences, it also engenders the belief that the British Serviceman or woman is a match for any opponent.

> *'If your country's worth living in, it's worth fighting for ... you can't fight a war without losing lives. Although no one wants killing, sometimes it has to be. To keep your country free sometimes you have to fight and die. It was to be a great honour to us.'* [10]
>
> Private William Mabin

> *'Patriotism does not calculate, does not profiteer, does not stop to reason; in an atmosphere of danger the sap begins to stir; it lives; it takes possession of our soul.'* [11]
>
> General Sir Ian Hamilton

Duty

Duty is the devotion to a cause or mission that transcends an individual's personal interests or desires.

> *'Duty is the great business of a sea officer; all private considerations must give way to it, however painful it may be.'* [12]
>
> Vice-Admiral the Lord Nelson

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[9] Churchill, Sir Winston, *Speech to Harrow School*, 29 October 1941.
[10] Mabin, Private William, 36th Ulster Division, Road to the Somme, 1916.
[11] General Sir Ian Hamilton, 1921.
[12] Nelson, Vice-Admiral Horatio, Letter to Frances Nisbet, 1787.

> *'Our first duty is towards the people of this country, to maintain their interests and their rights; our second duty is to all humanity.'* [13]

> Lord Salisbury

Sacrifice

Closely allied to duty, sacrifice is the acceptance by an individual that he or she may have to serve whenever or wherever needed, regardless of the dangers or difficulties.

> *'We were all making our way out – there seemed a very fair chance that some of us would make it: to stay here was to stay certainly for capture, possibly for death, when the Chinese launched their final assault on the position. And then I realised that he had weighed all this – weighed it all and made a deliberate choice: he would place his own life in the utmost jeopardy in order to remain with the wounded at the time when they would need him most.'* [14]

> General Farrar-Hockley

> *'You will put first the honour and interests of your country and your regiment; next you will put the safety, well-being and comfort of your men; and last - and last all the time - you will put your own interest, your own safety, your own comfort.'* [15]

> General Sir William Slim

Initiative

The use of initiative is a well-proven way of offsetting the friction, uncertainties and surprises that occur in dynamic situations, taking advantage of unexpected opportunities and gaining an advantage. As such, initiative and enterprise are encouraged at every level in the Armed Forces, based on an understanding of a commander's intentions and the demands of a situation.

> *'Not only strike while the iron is hot, but make it hot by striking.'* [16]

> Oliver Cromwell

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[13] Salisbury, Lord, Speech, 1896.

[14] Farrar-Hockley, General Sir Anthony, *The Edge of the Sword (Echoes of War)*, 1954.

[15] Slim, General Sir William.

[16] Cromwell, Oliver, referring to a cheering crowd, 1654.

'Initiative simply means that you do not sit down and wait for something to happen. In war, if you do, it will happen all right, but it will be mighty unpleasant. Initiative means that you keep a couple of jumps ahead, not only of the enemy, but of your own men.' [17]

General Sir William Slim

Humanity

A combination of honesty, compassion and chivalry, applied professionally, domestically and socially, provides Servicemen and women with a common moral compass. It is, arguably, exemplified to best effect in terms of their individual and collective humanity.

'May humanity after victory be the predominant feature in the British fleet.' [18]

Vice-Admiral the Lord Nelson

Ingenuity

Whether driven by necessity or natural curiosity, the British military are renowned for their ingenuity and resourcefulness. The innate ability to make do, and to respond to unfamiliar or unexpected circumstances with pragmatism and industry, gives the Armed Forces the capacity to adapt and to overcome both opponents and local difficulties.

'Remember that the one great thing to which you should at all times apply your thoughts and brains is the expansion of the power of material and personnel without increasing either. It is the man who can make bricks without straw who will make a success of any expedition.' [19]

Lord Trenchard

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[17] Slim, General Sir William, *Courage and other broadcasts,* 1951.

[18] Nelson, Vice-Admiral Horatio, 1805.

[19] Inaugural address by Lord Trenchard to the RAF Staff College, Andover, 4 April 1922.

Humour

The British sense of humour, capable of raising the spirits of subordinates and colleagues, as well as sustaining morale, even in the most trying circumstances, is a powerful force multiplier.

'There was a Grenadier at Fontenoy who, as the French presented their muskets for a devastating volley, intoned, "For what we are about to receive may the Lord make us truly thankful." He must have been brother to the freezing British fighting man, crouching under a Korean blizzard, who exclaimed, "I wish to Heaven the Iron Curtain was windproof!' [20]

General Sir William Slim

'While the battles the British fight may differ in the widest possible ways, they invariably have two common characteristics – they are always fought uphill and always at the junction of two or more map sheets.' [21]

General Sir William Slim

'What impressed me most at the time, and serves as an inspiring memory, was the steadiness and fortitude of the British private soldier combined with his queer ironic humour in days of deep privation and adversity.' [22]

Herbert Asquith

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[20] Slim, General Sir William, Courage and other broadcasts, 1951.
[21] Slim, General Sir William, Unofficial History, 1959.
[22] Herbert Asquith.